bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Nahum’s Shaking Cypresses
Authors: Cook Gregory 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
The final two words of Nah 2:4 (2:3 NRSV) seem to suggest shaking trees, but scholars either emend MT or interpret the clause metaphorically. The literature deems the possibility of still-standing trees as ill-fitted to the context of Nah 2. This article proposes that the words והברשים הועלו do indeed refer to standing cypress trees. In Nah 2:4, the Ninevites see distant trees quaking as the besiegers chop them down to build siege engines. Sennacherib (reigned 705–681 B.C.) had created forests around Nineveh during his expansion of the city. These forests included transplanted cypresses. Nahum prophesied that these trees would be turned against the city by invading forces.
Markedness: Contrasting Porter’s Model with the Linguists Cited as Support
Authors: Runge Steven E. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
The linguistic concept of markedness underpins significant portions of Stanley Porter’s “planes of discourse” model. The work of several linguists is regularly cited in conjunction with the development of his ideas with little other argumentation or explanation offered, creating the impression that his claims are consistent with and supported by the cited works. This article compares Porter’s claims with those found in the primary literature cited and demonstrates that his markedness claims find little support there; however, Porter offers no rationale or linguistic justification for for such a dramatic departure from established linguistic methodology
The Wicked in Ambush (Job 27:18–19)
Authors: PINKER ARON 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Verses 18–19 have been generally understood as referring to the wicked and his demise, or the sudden loss of his wealth. The objective of this study is to clarify the image that the author tried to convey. I suggest that this image is the wicked in ambush of the innocent, a situation often referred to in the Tanach. Job claims that the wicked would not succeed in his entrapment efforts.
"The Sin of the Sanctuary” and the Referent of מקדש in Ezekiel 44
Authors: WARREN NATHANAEL JAMES 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
In Ezekiel 44, foreigners are prohibited from entering the sanctuary of Ezekiel’s visionary temple. Past scholars have often read this passage in view of postexilic xenophobic developments in the Israelite attitude toward the foreigner, especially noting the foreigners’ total exclusion from the later Herodian temple precincts, the violation of which was punishable by death. However, I argue that in keeping with common Priestly tradition, Ezekiel reserves the term “sanctuary” (מקדש) for the realm of the Levites and Zadokite priests, that is, specifically the inner court of the temple complex. In light of this interpretation, Ezekiel 44 cannot be read to represent any especial polemic against the foreigner, pagan, or proselyte. Rather, I assert that the traditional place of the foreigner within the cultus of the first temple is understood to be among the native Israelite laity within the outer court of the temple complex.
Nahum and the Question of Rape
Authors: COOK GREGORY D. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
In recent years, numerous biblical scholars have labelled Nah 2:8 [2:7, NRSV] and 3:4–7 as judgment by rape. This article tests this claim against an established feminist definition of rape. While these passages lead the reader to expect rape, it is argued that Nah 2:8 and 3:4–7 utilize allusions to Ishtar and Jezebel to portray the cultic desecration of Ishtar and Nineveh. Notably, the stripping of Nineveh’s queen elicits only horror in 3:7. The prophet’s motive was not to entice but to appall. By means of literary disjunction, these passages reverse the Neo-Assyrian Empire’s use of erotic Ishtar imagery and expose its ghastly spiritual and physical qualities.
The Author of 4 Maccabees and Greco-Roman Paideia: Facets of the Formation of a Hellenistic Jewish Rhetor
Authors: Desilva David A. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
It has long been recognized that the author of 4 Maccabees displays a high level of linguistic, literary, and rhetorical skill that plausibly suggests formal education. This study explores the author’s literary accomplishment in the light of Greek education, especially at the secondary and tertiary stages. The author is shown to exhibit facility in many of the particular skills nurtured by the progymnasmata, to reflect the kind of cultural knowledge inculcated by the core texts read in the Greek curriculum, and to demonstrate knowledge of philosophical discourse and rhetorical skills typically taught beyond the secondary level of education. While it remains unknown whether the author studied in the general institutions of his city (relying on private venues for his deep acquaintance with Jewish texts and traditions) or in special institutions established by the Jewish community where Greek education and Jewish cultural knowledge could be combined, he stands as an example of a Jewish author who has most certainly been formed by the standard Greek curriculum through some venue.
Eve’s Curse Revisited: An Increase of “Sorrowful Conceptions”
Authors: Curley Christine , Peterson Brian 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Translators have rendered Eve’s curse in Gen 3:16a in various ways. Taking into account lexical, syntactical, and rhetorical considerations, we propose that the phrase עצבונך והרנך should be translated “your sorrowful conceptions.” Yhwh’s curse on Eve, therefore, was an increase in the rate of barrenness and infertility, and the emotional turmoil that engendered. As a result of the curse, Yhwh makes a descriptive (not prescriptive) observation that Eve would “desire” (תשׁוקה) her husband to help remove the stigma of the curse—something the man would seek to exploit. Syntactically, interpreting Eve’s curse as the emotional anguish that accompanies infertility and barrenness parallels Adam’s emotional toil over the now-cursed and unproductive earth. Rhetorically, the curse of infertility may explain why the author(s) of Genesis chose to include the motif of matriarchal barrenness as well as the “barrenness” of the land (famine) with which the Patriarchs had to contend.
GROUNDING RESPONSIBILITY IN APPROPRIATE BLAME
Authors: Menges Leonhard 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
When confronted with the question of why it is appropriate to morally blame a person for some bad action, it may seem plausible to reply that she is morally responsible for it. Some authors, inspired by Peter Strawson’s "Freedom and Resentment," argue, however, that thinking this way is backwards. They believe that a person is morally responsible for some bad action because it would be appropriate to blame her for it. The aims of this paper are to present this account, to highlight some of its important but often overlooked features, and to defend it against pressing objections.
IS SOME BACKWARDS TIME TRAVEL INEXPLICABLE?
Authors: Miller Kristie 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
It has been suggested that there is something worrisome, puzzling, or incomprehensible about the sorts of causal loops sometimes involved in backwards time travel. This paper disentangles two distinct puzzles and evaluates whether they provide us reason to find backwards time travel incomprehensible, inexplicable, or otherwise worrisome. The paper argues that they provide no such reason.
THE PROBLEM OF OTHER ATTITUDES
Authors: Shiller Derek 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Non-cognitivists are known to face a problem in extending their account of straightforward predicative moral judgments to logically complex moral judgments. This paper presents a related problem concerning how non-cognitivists might extend their accounts of moral judgments to other kinds of moral attitudes, such as moral hopes and moral intuitions. Non-cognitivists must solve three separate challenges: they must explain the natures of these other attitudes, they must explain why they count as moral attitudes, and they must explain why the moral attitudes are systematically correlated with ordinary propositional attitudes. After presenting the problem, this paper examines several contemporary theories with some initial promise for solving it, and argues that they are insufficient.
DOGMATISM WITHOUT MOOREANISM
Authors: Fuqua Jonathan 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
One common way of attacking dogmatism is to attack its alleged Mooreanism. The thought is that dogmatism includes (or perhaps entails) Mooreanism, but that Mooreanism is false and thus so is dogmatism. One way of responding to this charge is to defend Mooreanism. Another strategy is to articulate a version of dogmatism without Mooreanism. This paper is an attempt to articulate the latter view.
IS RELIABILISM A FORM OF CONSEQUENTIALISM?
Authors: Dunn Jeffrey , Ahlstrom-Vij Kristoffer 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Reliabilism—the view that a belief is justified iff it is produced by a reliable process—is often characterized as a form of consequentialism. Recently, critics of reliabilism have suggested that since it is a form of consequentialism, reliabilism condones a variety of problematic trade-offs involving cases where someone forms an epistemically deficient belief now that will lead her to more epistemic value later. In the present paper, we argue that the relevant argument against reliabilism fails because it equivocates. While there is a sense in which reliabilism is a kind of consequentialism, it is not of a kind on which we should expect problematic trade-offs.
A DEFENSE OF SCALAR UTILITARIANISM
Authors: Tobia Kevin Patrick 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Scalar Utilitarianism eschews foundational notions of rightness and wrongness in favor of evaluative comparisons of outcomes. I defend Scalar Utilitarianism from two critiques, the first against an argument for the thesis that Utilitarianism’s commitments are fundamentally evaluative (or Scalar), and the second that Scalar Utilitarianism does not issue demands or sufficiently guide action. These defenses suggest a variety of more plausible Scalar Utilitarian interpretations, and I argue for a version that best represents a moral theory founded on evaluative notions, and offers better answers to demandingness concerns than does the ordinary Scalar Utilitarian response. If Utilitarians seek reasonable development and explanation of their basic commitments, they may wish to reconsider Scalar Utilitarianism.
EPISTEMIC VALUE: THE INSUFFICIENCY OF TRUTH
Authors: Gaultier Benoit 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
We are naturally inclined to judge that it is better to know that p than to merely truly believe that p. How to account for this intuition? In this paper, I examine Williamson, Goldman and Olsson, and Pritchard’s answers, and agree with Pritchard that it cannot be consistently claimed that (a) knowledge is epistemically superior to mere true belief, and that (b) truth is the only finally valuable epistemic good. Contrary to Pritchard, I argue that the latter claim is deeply mistaken. I do so by showing that mere true beliefs have no epistemic value at all. I sketch the consequences of this point concerning the epistemic value of knowledge, and answer some objections to the thesis that mere true beliefs do not possess epistemic value.
NORMS, CONSTITUTIVE AND SOCIAL, AND ASSERTION
Authors: Fricker Elizabeth 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
I define a social norm as a regularity in behavior whose persistence is causally explained by the existence of sanctioning attitudes of participants toward violations—without these sanctions, individuals have motive to violate the norm. I show how a universal precept "When in circumstances S, do action F" can be sustained by the conditional preference of each to conform, given that others do, of a convention, and also reinforced by the sanctions of a norm. I observe that a precept with moral force can be reinforced by a social norm. I then consider constitutive norms and show by means of an example, competitive figure skating, how a type of activity or practice G can have a constitutive norm NG. An ongoing activity in a community is engagement in that practice only if NG is reinforced as a social norm by participants. I apply this to the case of assertion: the speech act type Assertion has a constitutive norm NA, and a practice of making speech acts in a community is one of making assertions only if it is controlled by NA enforced by the sanctions of a social norm.
PROMISES AND THE BACKWARD REACH OF UPTAKE
Authors: Liberto Hallie 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
I present a set of cases that pose problems for existing theories of promissory uptake. These cases involve (i) a delayed receipt and/or acceptance of a promise, though the obligation arises before the receipt or acceptance has taken place; (ii) a delay or absence of agency on the part of the promisee—making it impossible to satisfy the various suggested uptake criteria, though promissory obligation is nonetheless generated; and (iii) the promise is made to someone, de dicto—that is, the person who will be the promisee has not yet been filled in at the time when the obligation begins. I identify clues within each theory of promising to determine the temporal and agency-related boundaries on promissory obligation. I then introduce the backward reach of uptake.
THE TRANSMISSION VIEW OF TESTIMONY AND THE PROBLEM OF CONFLICTING JUSTIFICATION
Authors: Leonard Nick 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
According to the Transmission View of Testimony (TVT): TVT: If a speaker testifies to a hearer that p, and if the hearer is justified in believing that p on the basis of that speaker’s testimony, then the hearer’s belief is justified by whatever justification the speaker has for believing that p. The aim of this paper is to develop and defend a novel objection to the TVT.
RESEMBLANCE, EXEMPLIFICATION, AND ONTOLOGY
Authors: Valore Paolo 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
According to the quantificational (neo-)Quinean model in meta-ontology, the question of ontology boils down to the question of whether a sortal property is exemplified. I address some complications that arise when we try to build a philosophical reconstruction of the link between individuals and kinds displayed in the exemplification relation from the point of view of conceptualism about kinds and having in mind this stand in ontology. I distinguish two notions of resemblance, objectto-object and object-to-kind, and show the problems with both of them. Finally, I argue for a better awareness of the implicit "bias" involved in the very notion of "resemblance," without indulging in Quine’s veto toward this notion.
THREE CONCEPTIONS OF THE LOGICAL FORM OF EXEMPLIFICATION
Authors: Buonomo Valerio 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
My aim in this paper is to discuss the logical form of exemplification. In order to achieve this goal, I analyze three views on the logical form of exemplification, namely, Gustav Bergmann’s logical realism, Wilfrid Sellars’s meta-linguistic expressivism, and Javier Cumpa’s logical eliminativism. I start by examining the account advanced by Bergmann in his 1960 essay "Ineffability, Ontology, and Method," according to which the logical form of exemplification is represented by the juxtaposition of logical signs in a sentence. Then I consider two alternatives to Bergmann’s realism, namely, Sellars’s meta-linguistic expressivism, according to which exemplification is a quasi-semantical relation that is accounted for at a meta-linguistic level; and Cumpa’s molecular theory of exemplification—which I will call logical eliminativism—according to which exemplification is an eliminable constituent of facts. I conclude that neither the account advanced by Sellars nor the one provided by Cumpa is preferable to Bergmann’s account of the logical form of exemplification, while offering a defense of the latter.
NO EPISTEMIC NORM FOR ACTION
Authors: Simion Mona 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
One central debate in recent literature on epistemic normativity concerns the epistemic norm for action. This paper argues that this debate is afflicted by a category mistake: strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an epistemic norm for action. To this effect, I introduce a distinction between epistemic norms and norms with epistemic content; I argue that while it is plausible that norms of the latter type will govern action in general, epistemic norms will only govern actions characteristically associated with delivering epistemic goods.
MAKING A CONTRIBUTION AND MAKING A DIFFERENCE
Authors: McDonnell Neil 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
There are at least two different concepts that philosophers might target when analyzing causation: a pre-selective notion and a selective notion. This paper argues that these two distinct conceptions have been conflated to date, citing the puzzles of overdetermination, extensionality, and transitivity as evidence. The primary aim of the paper is to help reset the methodological scene concerning analyses of causation.
ARISTOTELIAN NATURALISM VS. MUTANTS, ALIENS, AND THE GREAT RED DRAGON
Authors: Woodcock Scott 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
In this paper I present a new objection to the Aristotelian Naturalism (AN) defended by Philippa Foot. I describe this objection as a membership objection because it reveals the fact that AN invites counterexamples when pressed to identify the individuals bound by its normative claims. I present three examples of agents for whom the norms generated by AN are not obviously authoritative: mutants, aliens, and the Great Red Dragon. Those who continue to advocate for Foot’s view can give compelling replies to the first two of these examples, but their replies drive the view into an unwelcome result when it faces the last example. I conclude that the concept of being human, on which AN crucially depends, is not as straightforward as Foot’s advocates presume.
ETIOLOGICAL CHALLENGES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
Authors: De Cruz Helen 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
There is a common assumption that evolutionary explanations of religion undermine religious beliefs. Do etiological accounts similarly affect the rationality of religious practices? To answer this question, this paper looks at two influential evolutionary accounts of ritual, the hazard-precaution model and costly signaling theory. It examines whether Cuneo’s account of ritual knowledge as knowing to engage God can be maintained in the light of these evolutionary accounts. While the evolutionary accounts under consideration are not metaphysically incompatible with the idea that religious rituals engage God, they cast doubt on whether many, if not all, rituals can do this successfully.
THE INVALIDITY OF THE ARGUMENT FROM ILLUSION
Authors: French Craig , Walters Lee 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal of critical scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowledge, has not hitherto been explored. We consider the canonical form of the argument as it is captured in contemporary expositions. There are two stages to our criticism. First, we show that the argument is invalid. Second, we identify premises that can be used to make the argument valid. But we argue that the obvious fixes are problematic. If our arguments are successful, we show that the argument from illusion is even more difficult to defend than is commonly acknowledged.
THE NORMATIVITY OF DOXASTIC CORRECTNESS
Authors: Ho Tsung-Hsing 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
It is widely maintained that doxastic norms that govern how people should believe can be explained by the truism that belief is governed by the correctness norm: believing p is correct if and only if p.This approach fails because it confuses two kinds of correctness norm: (1) It is correct for S to believe p if and only p; and (2) believing p is correct qua belief if and only if p. Only can (2) be said to be a truism about belief, but it cannot ground doxastic norms.
MORAL STEADFASTNESS AND META-ETHICS
Authors: Fritz James , McPherson Tristram 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Call the following claim Asymmetry: rationality often requires (or permits) a more steadfast response to pure moral disagreement than it does to otherwise analogous non-moral disagreement. This paper briefly motivates Asymmetry and explores its implications for meta-ethics. Some philosophers have thought that anti-realists are better-placed than realists to explain Asymmetry because, if anti-realism is true, disagreement cannot provide evidence against the reliability of one’s thinking about objective moral facts. This paper argues that this simple diagnosis fails to support otherwise plausible anti-realisms. It closes by discussing an alternative explanation for Asymmetry, which appeals to the moral importance of steadfastness.
PATERNALISM, DISAGREEMENTS, AND THE MORAL DIFFERENCE
Authors: Groll Daniel 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Cases of paternalism usually involve disagreement between the paternalist and the paternalized subject. But not all the disagreements that give rise to paternalism are of the same kind and, as a result, not all instances of paternalism are morally on a par. There is, in other words, a moral difference between different kinds of paternalism, which can be explained in terms of the nature of the disagreements that give rise to the paternalism in the first place. This paper offers a novel account of how to characterize the nature of these disagreements such that we can explain this moral difference.
DISAGREEMENT AND THE DUTIES OF CITIZENSHIP
Authors: Pallikkathayil Japa 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Political liberalism holds that some kinds of disagreement give rise to a duty of restraint. On this view, citizens ought to limit the considerations they invoke in political advocacy to those that meet a certain kind of publicity requirement. Many of the arguments for political liberalism’s duty of restraint contain a grain of truth. But properly understood, these arguments instead support the duty of responsiveness, which directs citizens to respond to disagreement in a very different way than the duty of restraint recommends.
HOW TO SOLVE THE PUZZLE OF PEER DISAGREEMENT
Authors: Palmira Michele 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
While it seems hard to deny the epistemic significance of a disagreement with our acknowledged epistemic peers, there are certain disagreements, such as philosophical disagreements, which appear to be permissibly sustainable. These two claims, each independently plausible, are jointly puzzling. This paper argues for a solution to this puzzle. The main tenets of the solution are two. First, the peers ought to engage in a deliberative activity of discovering more about their epistemic position vis-à-vis the issue at stake. Secondly, the peers are permitted to do so while entertaining a sui generis doxastic attitude of hypothesis.
MORAL DISAGREEMENT AND INEXCUSABLE IRRATIONALITY
Authors: Wedgwood Ralph 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
This essay explores the following position: Ultimate moral principles are a priori truths; hence, it is irrational to assign a non-zero credence to any proposition that is incompatible with these ultimate moral principles (since such propositions are a priori false); and this sort of irrationality, if it could have been avoided, is in a sense inexcusable. So—at least if moral relativism is false—in any disagreement about ultimate moral principles, at least one party to the disagreement is inexcusably irrational. This position may seem extreme, but it is argued that it is more plausible than it first appears.