bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Europe’s Green Policy: Towards a Climate Neutral Economy by Way of Investors’ Choice
Authors: Rogge Ebbe , Ohnesorge Lara 
Published: March 2022

Corporations are primary actors in transitioning to a climate neutral society. This is also reflected in the green policy agenda of the European Union, including the latest ‘Green Deal’, which is seeking to improve and introduce legislation that will control and provide more insight into the impact of corporations on the environment. The focus of some of this legislation, and of this article, is on the reporting by larger corporations on their non-financial impact. In particular, the revision of the Non-Financial Reporting Directive, the new Taxonomy Regulation and the new Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation are examined. These will trigger newly available non-financial information which can be used by investors. As this article sets out, the European policy agenda is based on the notion that providing the markets with such information will unlock private investments, ensuring a shift towards a climate neutral economy. This does, however, require some form of ‘enlightened’ shareholdership.
European Green Deal, Non-Financial Reporting Directive, Taxonomy Regulation, Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation
Where Is Online Privacy Going?
Authors: Fernández Diego 
Published: March 2022

Digital devices allow for the collection of large amounts of user data. This poses crucial questions regarding online privacy and the rights of associated thereto. For example, the data generated by cell phones allows the accurate location of the device. This information, which is normally stored by wireless carriers, can have great impact on criminal investigations as it can help locate people under investigation with accuracy. In that connection, last year the Supreme Court of the United States ruled on Carpenter, a leading case on geolocation through cell phones and privacy. The Supreme Court finally established that the standard required to collect geolocation data is that of a warrant. Interestingly, the Carpenter ruling was mirrored and cited by an Argentine court shortly after it was issued, and it is also being replicated throughout multiple jurisdictions as privacy, as we know it, might be changing substantially.
privacy, geolocation, cellphone, cell-site, mobile devices
The Realization of Mutual Adequacy Recognition Between Japan and the EU and Issues Raised in the Process
Authors: Horibe Masao 
Published: March 2022

On 23 January 2019, the safe and smooth transborder transfer of personal data was realized between Japan and the European Union (EU). This mutual adequacy decision was the first in the world, and Japan was the first to be certified under Article 45 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The EU and European Economic Area (EEA) (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) were also the first in the world to be certified by Japan under Article 24 of the 2015 Amended Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI). It is the first mutual adequacy decision in the world and in the history of data protection.
The PPC’s dialogue and cooperation with the European Commission started in 2016 and further dialogue continued in 2017. In the first half of 2018, two important issues were raised. One was how to bridge differences between two systems, and the other was how to deal with access and use of personal data transferred from the EU by public authorities in Japan. The APPI only covers the private sector and the PPC does not deal with the handling of personal data by public authorities. These solutions are explained in the article.
adequacy decision, mutual recognition, cross-border data flows, independent institution, Personal Information Protection Act, Waseda University, Benesse Data Breach
How (Not) to Regulate Data Processing: Assessing Nigeria’s Data Protection Regulation 2019 (NDPR)
Authors: Omotubora Adekemi 
Published: March 2022

Data protection has become a key policy issue in Nigeria and for many years, law and policymakers have proposed to regulate data processing without success. The Nigeria Data Protection Regulation (NDPR) was issued by the National Information Technology Development Agency (the NITDA) in 2019 ostensibly to fill this regulatory void. While the NDPR has generated more awareness of data protection among stakeholders, this article argues that it is unlikely to change the regulatory landscape for data protection in Nigeria. This is firstly because the NDPR misapprehends key concepts and principles of data protection, thus creating interpretative and compliance problems, and secondly, because its enforcement mechanisms are deficient when measured against best practices in the regulation of data processing. The article demonstrates that in spite of the fact that the NDPR models the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and emulates most of its aspects, it has significant limitations in terms of effectiveness and enforcement. It proposes that in order for Nigeria to truly join the global data protection regime, a new data protection law must not only address the challenges identified in the NDPR but must also incorporate emerging best practices in data protection.
Nigeria, NDPR, GDPR, Data Protection, Data Processing
Managing Compliance with U.S. Treasury Department OFAC Obligations: Even If Your Business Is Exclusively Outside the U.S.
Authors: Barker John P. 
Published: March 2022

The U.S. has long used trade and economic sanctions as elements of its national security and foreign policy. These sanctions target individuals and countries that represent national security threats to the U.S. and affect a wide range of transactions, both within the U.S. and beyond borders. Understanding these regulations and the transactions they cover is critical to anyone participating in international business transactions.
Indeed, if you engage in international business from outside the U.S., there is a good chance that your work will involve U.S. companies, subsidiaries of U.S. companies, U.S. banks, or U.S. citizens and permanent residents. Or you may yourself be a U.S. citizen, U.S. permanent resident or an employee of a U.S. subsidiary located outside the U.S. In these cases, some of your activities may be regulated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). These regulations have a surprisingly broad reach, even covering certain activities that take place entirely outside the U.S. For the international business and legal representative, it is essential to understand the scope and coverage of the OFAC regulations and recognize how they can apply to transactions outside the U.S. Failure to comply with the regulations can result in personal liability as well as U.S. sanctions on your company or organization, limiting your ability to transact business in the U.S. and with U.S. companies.
In general, the OFAC regulations serve to restrict certain types of trade with countries or entities of concern. OFAC has a variety of country-specific regulations. Two of the most well known are the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 515) and the Iranian Transaction Regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 560). These regulations restrict trade with Cuba and Iran in many significant ways. Another well-known set of restrictions are those imposed on individuals or organizations of concern to the U.S., the so-called “Specially Designated Nationals” (SDNs). The names of these individuals and entities appear on OFAC’s SDNs list. The list includes organizations such as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas, as well as particular individuals, including known terrorists, supporters of weapons of mass destruction programs, and drug kingpins.
This article highlights ten key aspects of the OFAC regulations for the international business representative operating predominantly outside the U.S. Our list focuses on the particular risks to non-U.S. persons, and U.S. persons operating outside the U.S.
At the Cross-Roads of US and Canadian Trade Controls: The Cuba Conflict
Authors: Boscariol John 
Published: March 2022

Canada and the United States are each other’s best trading partners. Our supply chains are deeply integrated. Corporate ownership criss-crosses the border many times over. In the context of foreign policy, although we have differed from time to time in the past, we generally target the same list of ‘bad actors’ – Iran, North Korea, Myanmar among them.
Indeed, many of our sanctions programmes have been adopted pursuant to the same United Nations Security Council resolutions that are applied in similar fashion by UN member countries. Our controls on the export of goods and transfer of technology arise from our common commitments under the 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms, Dual-use Goods, Technology and other international agreements.
It should come as no surprise therefore that in this environment many companies impose a single set of rules or principles regarding export controls and doing business with sanctioned countries. Under the assumption that Canadian and US laws are similar and, that any differences arise from more restrictive elements of US policy, a common default approach is for US companies to graft their US-based export control, economic sanctions policies, and procedures on to their Canadian operations; even some Canadian-based companies doing business in the United States will follow this approach.
This is problematic for a number of reasons. Contrary to popular belief, Canadian export controls and economic sanctions can be more restrictive than those of the United States – aspects of the control regime for cryptographic goods and technology and the rules governing trade with and investment in Myanmar are two such examples. More importantly, there are instances in which there is direct conflict between Canadian and US law – that is, compliance with the requirements of one nation’s laws results in contravention of the laws of the other. Two examples of such conflict arise with US military controls under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Canadian human rights legislation and with Cuban trade and investment. The latter conflict is the focus of this article.
Potential Impact under US Customs Laws of the World Customs Organization Recent Publication of Commentary 25.1 to the WTO Valuation Agreement Relating to the Dutiable Status of Third-Party Royalties a
Authors: Goldstein Brian 
Published: March 2022

The World Customs Organization Technical Committee has published Commentary 25.1 to Article 8, paragraph l(c) of the WTO Valuation Agreement. The Commentary offers significant insight into the analysis that is necessary in the determination of whether so-called third party royalty license payments are 'related' to the sale of the imported merchandise and whether the payment is a 'condition' of the sale under consideration. If both elements are satisfied, the result will generally lead to the conclusion that the payment under consideration is to be included in the dutiable value of merchandise imported into the particular territory. Although Commentary 25.1 is not controlling upon US Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Commentary does serve as an additional tool in evaluating the status of such royalty license fee payments under US Customs laws. The Commentary also represents an important backdrop to the criteria employed by CBP in its evaluation of the status of third party royalty license fee payments.
Gone with the Wind II: The Ralls Decision and Lessons for Foreign Investors
Authors: Hari Hrishikesh , Zucker Jeremy 
Published: March 2022

A recent decision of the US District Court for the District of Columbia (District Court) merits consideration by both foreign investors and the US national security community. The case involved a dispute between a foreign investor, Ralls Corporation (Ralls), and the US Government. In July 2012, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) found that Ralls' acquisition of several windfarm projects located near a US Naval facility in Oregon posed a national security risk to the United States. As we discussed at length in a prior article in this Journal, the President then issued an historic order-just the second of its kind-mandating the unwinding of a completed transaction pursuant to a national security review. Ralls then took CFIUS and the President to court, marking the first time an aggrieved foreign investor had done so. After an initial hearing, in February 2013 the District Court dismissed all but one of Ralls' claims, granting an additional hearing only to determine whether Ralls' due process claim merited further consideration. On October 9, 2013, the District Court rejected Ralls' due process argument as well, finding national security interests outweighed Ralls' interest in learning the specific grounds for President Obama's divestment order. For prospective foreign investors, this ruling offers an important lesson, underscoring the importance of seeking prior approval from CFIUS before entering into a "covered transaction."
Sanctions and the Supply Chain
Authors: Vuola Lasse 
Published: March 2022

The Ukraine crisis and the Western and Russian sanctions it has prompted are not only a geopolitical problem for governments but also a noteworthy contractual issue for private parties. Sudden and unexpected drops in supply and substantial increases in the cost of inputs due to the sanctions may lead to problems in contract performance or even to a risk of default. These problems are exacerbated in long-term contracts that were originally drafted in a very different geopolitical climate. It is therefore important to understand the impact of sanctions on existing contracts, on one hand, and to take the risks of sanctions into account in drafting new contracts, on the other hand. Sanctions are not a new phenomenon in business or in law. However, a trade war between the Western nations and Russia would have such major negative effects on the complex contractual networks in supply chains that it is more than reasonable to analyse this risk from the legal perspective. The Ukraine crisis might not be making the lead headlines anymore, but there is no sign as of now that the economic sanctions put in place during spring and summer would be lifted anytime soon. In addition, depending on the way the situation develops, there is always a risk of further Western sanctions on Russia or counter-sanctions by Russia. If anything, the present crisis has taught us that the geopolitical situation can change dramatically in just a few months, with direct and indirect effects on businesses. Sanctions pose serious risks to the supply of materials, goods and energy, which may lead to shortages in supply or significant hikes in the prices of inputs, making it harder for companies to deliver orders or perform long-term agreements according to contract. For example, sudden restrictions on natural gas and fuel imports can lead to difficult problems in the performance of contracts for industrial manufacturers or power companies, including risk of default. To manage sanction-related risks, companies should first consider whether they have the right to suspend performance or terminate existing contracts on grounds of force majeure if they face sanction-related difficulties in performance. Going forward, companies need to take sanctions and the threat of sanctions into account when drafting contracts and entering into new agreements, for example, by including suitably worded force majeure and hardship clauses.
Bounty Hunter Reward System: A Necessary Management Evil?  A Case Study of Sri Lanka Customs
Authors: Rajmohan M.R. 
Published: March 2022

Making successful management reforms and employing modern change management techniques requires striking a balance between employee satisfaction and operational performance. In this endeavour, Sri Lanka Customs has found that the incentive of rewards takes the centre stage between operational performance and employee satisfaction. This case study dissects various elements involved in a 150-year old, ‘pay half the catch’ customs rewards scheme that was approved by the Parliament, but has yet to be exposed to the outside modern world. Is Customs an enforcer, collector, protector or a facilitator? Is reward an indispensable feature or a management evil? Is the enforcer role compromised due to the exorbitance of the reward money? Does the facilitator role make a hole in the enforcer role? What are the criticisms? Does the interest in rewards result in increasing harassment of importers and exporters? Could there be reforms? Both the internal point of view of the employees and the external point of view of the stakeholders are surveyed in this exploratory case study to begin the discussion on reforms. Could this live example help other Customs administrations to rethink or to reformulate their theories on enforcement and incentives? These are matters discussed by a Customs officer who has worked for more than thirty years in this organization as an investigator and an inquiry officer.
The Non-discrimination Principle and VAT: Rules of Thumb for Trade and Tax Policy-Makers
Authors: Cuadros Miguel A. Rodriguez 
Published: March 2022

The form of Value-Added Tax (VAT) most commonly imposed by World Trade Organisation (WTO) Members is the consumption-based form. As regards the main features of VAT, this indirect tax is broadly based (unlike excise taxes), imposed at multiple stages (unlike a retail sales tax), usually involves the credit-invoice method of assessment (rather than the subtraction method), and distinguishes between zero-rating (of exports, for example, which is consistent with the destination principle) and so-called exemptions. Likewise, this kind of VAT is neutral with respect to international trade. This article analyzes how the VAT system might violate the National Treatment Principle under Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A violation of the National Treatment Principle could be most obviously caused by the application of different VAT rates (or exemptions) to imported and domestic like products, so that an imported product is subject to a 19% VAT, for example, while a lower rate is levied on the sale of the like domestically produced product. Violation of the National Treatment Principle might be less obvious where it involves, for example, partial VAT refunds, VAT payment modalities, or highly burdensome procedures to recover paid VAT or to apply for VAT refunds. For example, importers must pay import VAT immediately during the customs clearance process, while the payment of VAT by domestic producers can be deferred according to the VAT legislation.
The EU-Mexico Global Agreement: A Groundbreaking Precedent for Animal Welfare in Trade Policy
Authors: Ghislain Stephanie 
Published: March 2022

On 21 April 2018, after only two years of negotiations, the European Union and Mexico announced the conclusion of the modernization of their 1997 ‘Global Agreement’, covering both political and trade cooperation between the two partners. The new text includes a unique chapter on animal welfare and antimicrobial resistance – sending a strong statement to the world that animal welfare matters and is critical to protect Europe’s values and the health of European citizens. As such it sets a groundbreaking precedent for international and EU trade policy, as well as for animal welfare. As the world’s fourth producer of eggs (most of them from caged hens), the seventh of poultry meat, the sixth of beef, and the fifteenth of pork, Mexico is a key country for animal products. It has the second largest amount of livestock among Latin American countries behind Brazil, accounting for around 550 million chickens, 34 million heads of cattle and 17 million pigs. (FAO statistics collected for 2016.) Promoting better animal welfare standards through the newly concluded agreement could thus improve the life of millions of farm animals, wild animals kept in captivity and those used for scientific purposes.
Non-Preferential Origin and Made in Italy
Authors: Satta Tiziana 
Published: March 2022

This article examines the rules on non-preferential origin under international law, the European Union (EU) law and Italian law. In particular, the article explains that while the Union Customs Code (UCC) provides rules on non-preferential origin in EU level, the EU Member States may adopt national laws that are in full compliance with the EU Treaties and regulations. The article then examines the Italian legal framework providing rules on non-preferential origin. In addition, the article highlights the difference between ‘intellectual property rights’ (where the trademarks are found), the ‘made in’ regulation and the provisions on ‘product labelling’. The article further analyses the problems that have emerged over time in relation to the ‘false indication of origin’ and the ‘fallacious indication of origin’ under the Italian legislation, and how the regulatory provisions have developed over time. The article emphasizes the importance of the discipline of ‘made in’ for Italy due to the ‘manufacturing’ vocation of the country. Finally, the evolution of the jurisprudential orientation is represented by an address of ‘legal origin’ (understood as traceability of an asset to a particular producer, without detecting the connection of the asset to the territory), to the recognition of a ‘customs origin’ which, on the other hand, takes the territory into consideration.
The WTO’s Exclusive and Compulsory Jurisdiction v.Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Regional Trade Agreements: A Clash of Jurisdiction?
Authors: Furner Courtney , Lederer Nadine , Sergaki Claire 
Published: March 2022

Recently, the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has flourished and at the same time, trade disputes are increasing. The dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) in those RTAs may be potentially at odds with the DSM of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). The interaction between the DSMs of the WTO and in RTAs raise various concerns, including forum shopping and conflicts of jurisdiction. The key question is: which DSM should prevail? The relationship between the DSU and the default DSM in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) provides an example of such an interaction and illustrates the potential fragmentation in case of overlapping jurisdiction. In the Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages case, the WTO’s Appellate Body was reluctant to adopt a straightforward position on such overlaps. Thus, at least for now, there are many open questions, but no clear-cut answers. After providing an overview of the legal framework and discussing this important case, the authors propose solutions as to how to deal with jurisdictional overlaps in trade disputes.
World Trade Organization (WTO), Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Mexico – Soft Drinks, regional trade agreements (RTA), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), dispute settlement mechanisms, jurisdiction, proliferation, multiplication, international courts and tribunals