bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Why Sufficientarianism is not Indifferent to Taxation
Authors: Kanschik Philipp 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The indifference objection is one of the most powerful objections to sufficientarianism. Critics argue that sufficientarianism is objectionably indifferent to the distribution of benefits and
burdens. This article focuses on the criticism of the latter, particularly the claim that sufficientarianism is indifferent to taxation. Contrary to this allegation, it is argued that sufficientarianism warrants progressive taxation, the reason being that even those who are sufficiently well off face the risk of being pushed below sufficiency. This risk decreases the better off someone is as it is easier for those who are better off to deal
with sufficiency-threatening circumstances. It is argued that the risk of insufficiency understood as a function of distance to the threshold justifies progressive taxation. The proposed line of reasoning corresponds to the sufficientarian belief that there should be no redistribution between the rich, as the differences in risk of insufficiency eventually become marginal among those who are very well off. Moreover, the proposed rationale for progressive taxation does not depend on prioritarian or egalitarian reasoning.
Rather, it transpires that sufficientarianism is well-suited to justify the progressive redistributive system of the modern welfare state.
Self-Exempting Conciliationism is Arbitrary
Authors: Blessenohl Simon 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Self-exempting conciliationism is the view that it is rational to give weight to the opinions of peers in disagreement, except in disagreements about how to respond to disagreement. The special treatment of disagreements about disagreement, which is important to avoid self-undermining, seems arbitrary. Two arguments against this objection were put forward. Elga [3] aims to show that there is an independent motivation for conciliationism to be self-exempting. Pittard [5] argues that the special treatment is not arbitrary because the concern for epistemic deference motivates conciliatory responses only in ordinary disagreements, but not in disagreements about disagreement. I will argue that both replies fail|none of them can provide a consistent justication for why one ought to be conciliatory in disagreements except in cases of disagreement about disagreement.
Sellars and McDowell on Objectivity
Authors: Philie Patrice 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
On the surface, one of the main di erences between John Mc- Dowell and Wilfrid Sellars when it comes to their conceptions of intentionality has to do with their respective accounts of meaning. McDowell advocates a relational account of meaning, whereas Sellars holds, on the contrary, that a correct view of intentionality is only possible through a non-relational account of meaning. According to McDowell, Sellars does not consider the possibility of his own relational view because he su ers from a `blind spot'. It is implied that if Sellars saw this possibility, he would see the light and embrace something like McDowell's own account. I would like to argue in this paper that the whole issue goes much deeper than that. Sellars does not su er from a `blind spot' and showing why this is the case should give us an idea of how far apart these two thinkers really are, appearances notwithstanding. It will also reveal that the heart of their disagreement does not consist in a dispute over whether the correct shape of an account of meaning should be relational or not. Sellars's and McDowell's respective outlooks on intentionality di er fundamentally with regards to the concept of objectivity.
Lassen sich fremdpsychische Zustände wahrnehmen?
Authors: Kraschl Dominikus 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
This paper discusses whether other people's mental states are, at times, perceivable. Against such a possibility it was objected that other people's mental states are not empirically accessible and therefore, at best, recognizable by inference to the best explanation of their behaviour. However, this fairly common view is committed to a narrow empiricist concept of perception. Hence, this article explores a broader concept of perception and analyses its application-conditions with respect to the perception of other people's mental states.
Do You Really Want to Know? Challenging Pragmatism and Clearing Space for the Intrinsic Value View
Authors: Bruckner Michael 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Pragmatic theories of epistemic normativity ground norms of belief formation in true belief's instrumental value as a means to promoting our desires. I argue that advocates of this view face a dilemma: either they agree that epistemic norms prescribe truth-conducive procedures of belief formation, which is untenable against the backdrop of their theory, or they dismiss the truth-conduciveness criterion and thereby render themselves incapable of explaining an intuition that most of us share: in cases where false beliefs generate the same pragmatic output as true ones, truth-conducive procedures of belief formation are still preferable to fallacious ones. After establishing this objection, I make a case for the position that regards the intrinsic value of true belief as the source of epistemic normativity by showing how it meets the challenge that pragmatism falls victim to.
The Ability Hypothesis: An Empirically Based Defense
Authors: Zakeri Mahdi , Ghasemi Majid 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
We defend Laurence Nemirow's and David Lewis's Ability Hypothesis against Paul Raymont's criticisms in defense of Jackson's Knowledge Argument. According to the Ability Hypothesis, what Mary lacked when she was in her black-and-white room was a set of abilities; she did not know how to recognize or imagine certain types of experience. Her subsequent discovery of what it is like to experience color amounts to no more than her acquiring these abilities. Appealing to the Molyneux test, Raymont has argued that knowledge of what an experience is like cannot be equated with the possession of any set of abilities, since one can be in possession of a recognitional ability concerning a certain type of experience without knowing what that experience is like. We argue that the intermodal recognitional ability in the Molyneux test and similar ones depends on previous experience and thus makes an implicit appeal to knowledge of what it is like.
The Mind-Dependence of the Relational Structure of Time (or: What Henri Bergson Would Say to B-theorists)
Authors: Deppe Sonja 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Tenseless theorists assert that the relational structure of earlier/ later is the essential structure of time. Using B-notions, so they think, we speak about time `as it is' in a metaphysical sense and hence from the outside of our subjective perspective on it. I suggest on the contrary that the relational structure of earlier/later is part of our own intellectual structuring within the access to temporal phenomena. Furthermore it is essentially characterized by the structure of juxtaposition which originates in spatial experience rather than in temporal. In order to show this I consult Henri Bergson's analysis of our temporal experience on the one hand and of our intellectual practice on the other hand. I will conclude that it is not unplausible to take the relational account of time to be more closely connected to the nature of our intellect than to the nature of time itself.
Lucretius On Time and Its Perception
Authors: Zinn Pamela 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
This paper analyzes the ontology and epistemology of time in Lucretius’ De rerum natura. It uses the physiology of perception as well as epistemology to shed new light on the metaphysics. It presents an exegesis-based interpretation of the nature of time and of its perception, both arguing for and refining this interpretation by showing its explanatory power. The paper shows that Lucretius represents the perception of time or sensus temporis as a distinct sensory faculty, reconstructs how it emerges and operates, and relates it to his account of perception more generally. The sense of time in turn is seen to explain aspects of related faculties, including thought and sight, and cases of apparent simultaneity. The paper thus contributes to, among other things, our understanding of the speed of perception and Lucretius’ account of the nature of time itself - arguing that Lucretius represents time as both continuous (not atomic) and real, as well as something perceived.
New Experiments On Psychological Egoism
Authors: Popovic Nenad Natan 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Psychological egoism is the doctrine that all of our actions are ultimately motivated by self-interest, even including seemingly altruistic actions. Although this view is commonly referred to as \vacuous" or \trivially true" because of its immunity to counterexamples, I argue that there are possible observations that can refute this thesis. I describe the experiments, identify the results that could in principle falsify the strongest possible version of psychological egoism and formulate a probabilistic argument against this view. Ultimately, I conclude that a \trivially true" formulation of psychological egoism is an empirical theory that is in all likelihood false.
On Treating Past and Present Scientific Theories Differently
Authors: Park Seungbae 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Scientific realists argue that present theories are more successful than past theories, so present theories will not be superseded by alternatives, even though past theories were superseded by alternatives. Alai [1] objects that although present theories are more successful than past theories, they will be replaced by future theories, just as past theories were replaced by present theories. He contends, however, that past theories were partly true, and that present theories are largely true. I argue that Alai's discrimination between past and present theories is subject to his own criticism against realists' discriminations between past and present theories, and also subject to other criticisms that philosophers have raised against scientific realism and pessimism
The Theoretical and Scientific Problems of Damasio's Conceptual Model of Consciousness
Authors: Augusto Rosa Luiz 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Here I assess Damasio's conceptual model of consciousness based mainly on the concepts of emotion, feeling, and consciousness by analyzing its conceptual implications and its theoretical and scientific problems. One of the conceptual implications of the direct interaction between the concept of \feeling" and the concept of ‘consciousness" is the concept of consciousness as \feeling a feeling", which is also recognized by Damasio. The concept \feeling a feeling" directly implies the concept of consciousness as "an emotional perception of an emotional perception". Each implication has further theoretical implications that form a web of theoretical and scientific problems. I also argue that, since Damasio's model of consciousness is a neuroscientific model, it should provide a rigorous integration between the high-order concepts and the empirical concepts that underlie them, which, for example, is the case of Dehaene's model of consciousness. Moreover, at the end of the paper, I suggest some conceptual changes that would minimize the theoretical problems of Damasio's conceptual model of consciousness.
Labour Commodification and Global Justice
Authors: Corvino Fausto 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this article, I maintain that the social process of labour commodification, through which the individual capability to uphold a decent welfare is bound to participation in the labour market, poses a problem of justice from the republican prospective on freedom as non-domination. I first discuss the reasons we might hold that capitalism brings a form of systemic domination by virtue of one of its intrinsic features: unequal access to the means of production. Then, I argue for a minimum de-commodification of labour power as a criterion of justice, adding that it should be conceived as a cosmopolitan proviso because states unfairly suffer from their limited economic capacity to neutralize capitalist systemic domination. Lastly, I compare the normative account of global justice that I am proposing in this article with sufficientarianism, with the capability approach, and with Thomas Pogge's 'Global Resources Dividend'
A Hybrid Account of Scientific Progress: Finding Middle Ground Between the Epistemic and the Noetic Accounts
Authors: Goebel Clara 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Whereas the progressive nature of science is widely recognised, specifying the standards of scientific progress has been subject to philosophical debate since the enlightenment. Recently, Ilkka Niiniluoto, Alexander Bird, and Finnur Dellsfien have revived this debate by setting forward a semantic, epistemic and noetic ac- count of scientific progress respectively. I argue that none of these accounts is satisfactory. The semantic and epistemic accounts might advance necessary conditions for scientific progress, namely an accumulation of true, justified, and non-Gettiered beliefs, but fail to specify sufficient conditions. The noetic account, in contrast, advances sufficient conditions for scientific progress, namely an increase of genuine understanding, but fails to specify the necessary conditions. To remedy these deficits, I advance a hybrid account of scientific progress between the epistemic and noetic accounts, according to which the accumulation of explanatorily or predictively powerful knowledge constitutes scientific progress. In contrast to the epistemic account, my account ensures that only scientifically relevant knowledge constitutes scientific progress, thereby evading the threat of underdemandingness. In contrast to the noetic account, my account does not impose a psychological requirement of grasping the explanatory or predictive power of a scientific development, thereby evading the threat of overdemandingness. A further advantage of my account is that it can preserve plausible features of the noetic account.
Letting the Truth Out: Children, Naive Truth, and Deflationism
Authors: Lightbody Brian 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In their recent paper, \Epistemology for Beginners: Two to Five-Year-Old Children's Representation of Falsity," Olivier Mascaro and Olivier Morin study the ontogeny of a naive understanding of truth in humans. Their paper is fascinating for several reasons, but most striking is their claim (given a rather optimistic reading of epistemology) that toddlers as young as two can, at times, recognize false from true assertions. Their Optimistic Epistemology Hypothesis holds that children seem to have an innate capacity to represent a state of affairs truthfully. In the following paper, I investigate the problems this research poses for deationist theories of truth. Richard Rorty and Huw Price hold that the best way to understand truth or \the truth" is to understand the necessary conditions required for assertoric practice. Both philosophers present unique and very different deationary theories when it comes to construing truth. I argue that neither philosopher's approach is successful because they focus on truth and fail to recognize truthfulness as a norm of assertoric practice. I show that truthfulness is the elusive third norm of claim-based discourse and is consistent with Mascaro and Morin's findings.
Relative to What? - Interpretation with higher-place predicates
Authors: Samhammer Michael 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Ordinary language contains groups of related predicates with different arities. Interpreting utterances that appear to contain an n-place predicate by using an n+m-place predicate to dissolve merely apparent disagreements and other misunderstandings is an established practice in everyday discourse. This paper aims to present hermeneutical maxims to guide and evaluate these interpretations through arity raising. In interpreting utterances by using a higher-place predicate, we should use only expressions that their authors themselves reasonably could have used and which would have been suitable to achieve their supposed purposes. The goal is to achieve a charitable, accurate reading that also maximizes the text's transparency to improve our understanding of it.
Categorizing Imaginary Objects
Authors: Arroyo Gustavo 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Philosophers often invite their readers to categorize imaginary objects. These objects are not only hypothetical: many of them cannot exist because of physical or technological reasons. They are unprecedented or unheard-of objects. By categorizing imaginary objects, philosophers expect to gain knowledge about our concepts. In this paper, I challenge this general assumption: not every conceivable object can be described in terms of our existing categories. Although prominent philosophers held similar views in the past, they made no effort to provide a satisfactory explanation for such impossibility. The argument that I will develop in the following pages rests mainly on three philosophical assumptions: a) that concepts whose content philosophers attempt to describe denote "monothetic classes"; b) that concept formation depends largely on "ecological salience" (a notion developed in the field of ethnobiology); c) that in any monothetic class, we can draw a proper distinction between definitional and correlated properties.
Agent-Democratic Markets
Authors: Mildenberger Carl David 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
This essay examines a new way to exercise democratic control over the market. Instead of a democratic government interfering with a market's outcomes (e.g. via taxes or minimum wages), we may also "democratize" the market by requiring that all relevant group agents who participate in that market (notably: firms) be democratically governed. This is what I call an agent-democratic market. The purpose of this essay is to argue for the claim that agent-democratic markets are a normatively viable way to democratize the market - and potentially constitute a genuine alternative to the standard approach of subjecting market outcomes to democratic control
Intuitions and Values: Re-assessing the classical arguments against quantitative hedonism
Authors: Lanius David 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Few philosophers today embrace quantitative hedonism, which states that a person's well-being depends only on the amount of her experienced happiness and suffering. Despite recent attempts to rehabilitate it, most philosophers still consider it untenable. The most influential arguments levelled against it by Mill, Moore, Nozick and Kagan purport to demonstrate that well-being must depend on more than only the amount of experienced happiness and suffering. I argue in this paper that quantitative hedonism can rebut these arguments by pointing out a shared systematic aw in their argumentative structure. In particular, I argue that they are based on thought experiments that invoke either structurally unreliable intuitions or intuitions that are not in tension to the tenets of quantitative hedonism. While this does not rehabilitate the theory by itself, it shows that the classical arguments against quantitative hedonism provide less evidence against it than commonly thought and certainly do not conclusively prove it wrong
Musicians (Don't) Play Algorithms. Or: What makes a musical performance
Authors: Sickinger Mira Magdalena 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Our private perception of listening to an individualized playlist during a jog is very different from the interaction we might experience at a live concert. We do realize that music is not necessarily a performing art, such as dancing or theater, while our demands regarding musical performances are conflicting: We expect perfect sound quality and the thrill of the immediate. We want the artist to overwhelm us with her virtuosity and we want her to struggle, just like a human. We want to engage with the musical expression and rely on visual and physical cues. Considering that the ears of today's listeners are used to technologically mediated music, in this paper I explore the unique qualities of musical live performances and examine if our conception allows for new mechatronic inventions, in particular robotic musicians, to participate in this art form. Some of Godlovitch's main thoughts expounded in his work on "musical performance" [11] serve as a reference and starting point for this investigation. His concept of `personalism', which deprives computer-/program-based musical performances from expressive potential and creative accomplishment is an issue that I want to challenge by pointing out new approaches arising from a reective discourse on technology, embodiment and expression. The enquiry conducted illustrates, how in reasoning about machine performers and algorithmic realization of music, we also examine the perceptual, physical and social aspects of human musicianship, reconceptualizing our understanding of a musical live performance.
What Tim Can and Cannot Do: A Paradox of Time Travel Revisited
Authors: Jaster Romy 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Time travel, it has been argued, leads to paradoxes, and in particular to a problem known as the grandfather paradox. Lewis has famously argued for the now standard view that the grandfather paradox is merely apparent. But underlying Lewis's solution is a faulty account of ability statements - one, according to which ability statements express possibility statements. I argue, contrary to Vihvelin and others, that an ameliorated view of ability statements allows for the same treatment of the seeming paradox. Hence, Lewis's take on the grandfather paradox stands despite the failure of the particular view of ability statements it is built upon.
Crystal structure of 3,5,6,7-tetramethoxy-3′,4′-methylenedioxy-flavone, C20H18O8
Authors: Gu Ming , Li Ji-Xin , Ye Jiang-Hai , Zou Juan , Liu Ya-Hua 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
C20H18O8, monoclinic, P21/c (no. 14), a = 7.3855(2) Å, b = 28.1424(9) Å, c = 8.5863(3) Å, β = 98.4040(10)°, V = 1765.46(10) Å3, Z = 4, R

gt
(F) = 0.0545, wR

ref
(F
2) = 0.1641, T = 273(2) K.
The crystal structure of dimethanol-κ1O-(5,10,15,20-tetrakis(4-nitrophenyl)porphyrin-21,23-diido-κ4
O,O′,O″,O′″)manganese(III) trans-dicyanido-κ1C-bis(acetylacetonato-κ2
O,O′)ruthenium(III), C58H46N10O14RuMn
Authors: Zhou Tingting 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
C58H46N10O14RuMn, triclinic, P

1
‾

$\overline{1}$

(no. 2), a = 8.0148(18) Å, b = 12.141(3) Å, c = 14.843(3) Å, α = 107.379(4)°, β = 98.415(4)°, χ = 93.430(4)°, V = 1355.4(5) Å3, Z = 1, R

gt
(F) = 0.0509, wR

ref
(F
2) = 0.1400, T = 293 K.