bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Worthlessness of Natural Human Life
Authors: Church Jeffrey 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
This chapter argues that for Kant, the development of the civilized state increasingly destroys the possibility of the simultaneous satisfaction of our two basic human ends, perfection and wholeness. For this reason, Kant challenges two major views of the meaning of life based on these two ends, contemplation and happiness. Kant conceives of the contemplative philosophical life as a heritage of the ancient aspiration for human perfection. He conceives of happiness as a modern democratic end, one that aims to satisfy our natural drive for wholeness. Both views of the meaning of life turn out to be self-defeating on their own terms, since they aim to satisfy one of the aims of our natures at the expense of the other. Ultimately, then, the conflict in our natures calls into question the very value of human existence.
Kant’s Genealogy of Morality
Authors: Church Jeffrey 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
The questioning of the value of our existence, possible because of the freedom given to us by nature, also makes possible the transcendence of our divided nature and the unification of our two ends through the realization of our freedom in our moral conscience, establishing a moral constitutional order to end the state of nature that is our natural vocation. Nature’s irrationality licenses humanity to use its freedom to transcend nature and give itself its own purpose and hence value. This chapter argues that we give ourselves a moral vocation, such that individuals and the species as a whole gain worth in contributing to this purpose, because this vocation satisfies our distinctively human need for freedom, while also bringing harmony to our divided nature.
Kant’s View of the Meaning of Life
Authors: Church Jeffrey 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
This chapter argues that Kant provides us with a persuasive account of the relationship among the questions of the purpose, value, and meaning of existence. The purpose and value of existence are perennial questions facing humanity, but the meaning of life is new, emerging only in the 19th century. Though Kant never uses the phrase “the meaning of life,” his philosophy creates the logical space for that question, as humanity’s self-given purpose requires extended historical progress in order to achieve. The meaning of life, on Kant’s view, involves contributing to the progress of human emancipation, which can be realized in many different ways, especially through advancing the ends of culture, civilization, and moral community. Chapter 5 concludes by responding to an important criticism of Kant’s anthropology, namely, that it is racist and Eurocentric.
The Purposes of Politics (2)
Authors: Church Jeffrey 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
For Kant, civilization is that form of community—comprising the norms of politeness and honor—that reduces conflict and ensures order and stability in society. This chapter argues that for Kant politics may take as its end the advancement of the norms of civilization insofar as those norms are necessary to the protection of our rights. The chapter focuses in particular on Kant’s mostly ignored passages on the police power of the state, which, he argues, licenses liberal governments to control smells, loud noises, prostitution, and other threats to our sense of public “decorum.” In these and other passages, Kant recognizes that politics may maintain and transmit civilization from one generation to another so long as these norms provide the condition for the possibility of a system of right.
The Purposes of Politics (3)
Authors: Church Jeffrey 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
Most commentators on Kant emphasize the parallels between morality and right. After all, both involve formal principles legislated by pure practical reason. However, this chapter argues, for Kant, right differs from the moral law in that its content is radically indeterminate without positive, empirical legislation. The rule of right itself needs to be “laid down” by a sovereign. As such, the sovereign is accorded a distinctive form of freedom: an empirical agent has the capacity to make determinate a pure practical law. Political autonomy is thereby a significant and meaningful human activity, even if carried out by self-interested agents. With this understanding of the noble, even sacred purpose of sovereignty, we can make sense of some of Kant’s more puzzling doctrines, such as his condemnation of the right to revolution and strong retributivism in his view of punishment.
Kant’s Perfectionist Liberalism
Authors: Church Jeffrey 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
This chapter argues that perfectionist liberalism is vulnerable to the criticism of paternalism, that liberal perfectionist theories infantilize members by choosing their ends for them. The author’s Kantian form of perfectionism improves on these theories by adopting a single goal as its end, namely, independence, thereby not infantilizing members, but encouraging their self-mastery. At the same time, Kantian liberal government can still advance the ends cherished by contemporary perfectionists—friendship, art, excellence—by reconceiving them as essential instruments for the cultivation of independence. In addition, Kantian liberal perfectionism improves on contemporary perfectionism by focusing on the meaning of life as central to governments’ efforts, rather than the good life. As this chapter argues, the good life tends to focus perfectionist governments’ attention on the present, fostering temporary goods enjoyed by individuals here and now. They fail to address, then, enduring, communal goods which will outlast all human beings living now on earth.
Kant’s Political Liberalism
Authors: Church Jeffrey 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
This chapter argues that the author’s form of Kantian liberalism can be reasonably expected to command a wider overlapping consensus than Rawls’ liberalism. It can include more disagreement, the chapter argues, because of its thin account of liberalism’s end, namely, the single principle of independence. As Thomas Pogge has argued, the simplicity of Kant’s political theory—in its appeal to the single principle of external freedom—allows it to be affirmed from a Hobbesian or Millean view, or indeed from many religious views. At the same time, Kant’s distinction between legality and morality means that citizens need not abide by the law for moral reasons. They can obey for any reason, so long as they obey.
Uncovering Meaning and Practice in Regional Diplomacy
Authors: Glas Aarie 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
This chapter takes a second step in accounting for the conflictual regional peace of both Southeast Asia and South America by outlining the interpretive and practice-oriented methodologies and methods of the book. The first section offers one approach to uncover the existence of habitual dispositions. It outlines a particular approach to interviewing to uncover what officials—like those at ASEAN and the OAS—think from rather than about, and to contrast the given thinking and rather automatic behaviors of one community of practice with those of another that overlaps it. The second section offers a two-part approach to examine the effects of habitual dispositions. This includes exploring the robustness of these qualities of regional relations—that officials assume they work, and work effectively—and tracing their role within particular cases of regional conflict management.
Comparisons, Contributions, and Conclusions
Authors: Glas Aarie 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
This chapter concludes the book over three sections. First, the chapter brings the habitual dispositions of conflict management and regionalism in Southeast Asia and South America into direct comparison. As the preceding chapters suggest, there are similarities and differences in the processes and content of the habitual dispositions of each regional diplomatic community. While the processes and content differ, officials in each understand the necessity of their particular brand of diplomacy, assume it is uniquely effective, and practice it as a matter of course. The second section highlights the book’s three major contributions. These include the substantive finding that practices of peace vary across regions of the Global South, the methodological value of interpretive interviews with overlapping communities of practice to unearth habitual and dispositional qualities of relations, and the theoretical contribution of highlighting and documenting the often overlooked interrelationship between norms and practices. The third section concludes.
Introducing an idea
Authors: Baras Dan 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
This chapter introduces the topic of the book: the idea that some facts call for explanation. It presents arguments premised on this view and clarifies its content. The chapter ends by presenting the naïve picture, which will remain the focus of the book until Chapter 6. According to the naïve picture, there is (1) a property that some facts have to different degrees—strikingness—that serves as a reason to expect (2) a special kind of explanation for those facts. When inferring from such striking facts that there are special explanations, one is applying (3) an epistemic principle: the striking principle.
Inference to the best explanation, Bayesianism, and their relationship with the striking principle
Authors: Baras Dan 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
This chapter examines the relationship between the striking principle and two other philosophical approaches: inference to the best explanation and Bayesianism. It begins by introducing some concepts that will be needed for the analysis, including good epistemic principles and privileged epistemic principles. This will help the reader locate the subject of this book in larger contexts. In addition, it makes more precise theoretical possibilities that lie in the background of the work of previous authors. Finally, this chapter paves the way for the view developed in Chapter 5, that the striking principle, while in some ways good, is not a privileged epistemic principle.
What is strikingness?
Authors: Baras Dan 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
When facts call for explanation, why do they do so? According to the naïve picture presented in Chapter 1, there is a property that some facts have, strikingness, in virtue of which they call for explanation. Accordingly, there have been attempts by philosophers to provide an account for this property. This chapter lays out desiderata for a successful account of strikingness. It then examines ten different proposals and argues that none of them succeed. The repeated failure of attempts to find a unified account of strikingness suggests that there may be no such account to be found. The conclusion of the chapter is that there is no unified property shared by all facts that call for explanation.
Reparations for Slavery in International Law
Authors: Schwarz Katarina 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
Reparations for Slavery in International Law examines the case for contemporary redress for the harms and legacies of transatlantic enslavement from a legal perspective. It critically evaluates the history of transatlantic enslavement and the evolutions in international law that justified and perpetuated the exploitation of African people and people of African descent. It unpacks the requirements of state responsibility, assessing the impact of time on claims for redress for historic injustices. It presents a new theory of reparatory justice, responsive to both the underpinning principles and the modalities of redress in international law. This book considers the emerging practice of reparations in transitional justice and the relevance of these frameworks in cases of widespread historic injustice, while upending orthodox understandings of the international legal frameworks relevant to case for reparations. In so doing, it opens new space for the reconsideration not only of the international legal claim for reparations for slavery but also the moral and political case.
The Self as Agent, the Self as Observer
Authors: Maibom Heidi L. 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
This chapter introduces two different ways of thinking about the world, as someone who acts in it and as someone who merely observes it. I use psychological research—on interpersonal understanding, autobiographical memory, and biased thinking—to pinpoint the exact differences between thinking of a situation from inside someone who acts and thinking about the same situation from the outside as an observer. It turns out that there are a great number of structural differences between these two ways of thinking about a situation. These lead to differences in what features of the situation are considered and how they are related to the thinker. For instance, our experience is of sensing the world directly, whereas we regard others as relating to it in a more subjective way.
Victims and Perpetrators
Authors: Maibom Heidi L. 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
There are different ways of conceiving of the situation one is in as a function of one’s relationship to other actors in that situation. The most obvious discrepancy arises when one thinks of oneself as a perpetrator of wrong or as a victim of it. Perpetrators tend to think of the event as an accident or as something that couldn’t be helped and that wasn’t that serious, whereas victims tend to think of it as being very serious and the result of an intentional act on the part of the perpetrator. Because these differences are structural or formal—that is, have to do with one’s position in a web of relationships—they can be captured when we imagine being in a certain position, and thus form the basis of perspective taking.
Perspective Taking
Authors: Maibom Heidi L. 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
This chapter returns to perspective taking. It starts with a couple of common examples of perspective taking and shows how what we have learned about perspectives makes it clear what we can do by taking another perspective and why it works. It then moves on to argue that emotional empathy—feeling sad because someone else is sad—is a form of perspective taking. It is, in fact, one of the simpler and more effective ways of putting oneself in another’s shoes. This is due to the fact that emotions are not just feelings; they are ways of regarding the world and being motivated to act in it. Emotions affect what we pay attention to and the way we think. By feeling what others are feeling, therefore, we enter into an affective and cognitive space very similar to that of the other person, and this yields a great deal of interpersonal understanding.
Knowing Me
Authors: Maibom Heidi L. 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
Perspective taking doesn’t just give us deeper understanding of other people; it is also key to understanding ourselves. The fact is that we are often blind to facts about ourselves that are glaringly obvious to other people. We fail to understand how others understand what we do and the kinds of characters we have. We do so because we tend to view our actions in a self-interested and highly charitable way. We see this both in philosophical and psychological research, but also in many factual cases of problematic behaviors. It is therefore important that we balance this tendency with a view of ourselves “from the outside.” In other words, we must take an observer perspective on ourselves. The ability to take such a view on oneself is, this chapter argues, essentially tied to responsibility. The fact that we fail to take such a perspective and therefore ignore important aspects of what we do does not absolve us of responsibility.
The Empathy Trap
Authors: Maibom Heidi L. 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
Perspective taking, the author has argued, is a powerful tool. This chapter shows that its power can sometimes be used against us. If we easily and uncritically take on the perspective of others on ourselves, we become vulnerable to abuse and self-denial. This is sometimes known as gaslighting, but is in reality a basic human existential condition. When faced with others, we are invariably faced with different points of view that may not simply add to our knowledge, but might contradict it. The danger of gaslighting highlights the fact that taking another person’s perspective is rarely the endpoint of the process of understanding that person, because once we have taken another’s perspective, we must return to our own. We must reach a synthesis of their view and our own. To do so, we must compare and contrast our own perspective, that of another person, and sometimes also that of an uninvolved observer. The chapter illustrates the idea in terms familiar from existentialist thought and Hegelian synthesis.
Introduction
Authors: McGinnis Reginald , Smyth John Vignaux 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
The book begins with a scandal reported in February 2019 involving French journalists, the League of LOL, who had for several years been engaged in online harassment and were regarded by several commentators as illustrating the return of archaic mocking practices in the digital age. The introduction highlights examples of mock ritual discussed by anthropologist James George Frazer, where the ritual killing of the king was replaced by mocking him, for instance, or by a mock execution instead of a real one. Anticipating the book’s contents, the introduction also outlines some key elements of Enlightenment mockery, especially the mockery of ritual, in Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopedia and other examples, and raises the question of the extent to which such supposedly rational ridicule can itself still be considered ritualistic. The introduction finally considers, via Konrad Lorenz and René Girard, the origins of the ambivalent relation between laughter, aggression, and ritualized behavior more generally.
Mock Ritual in Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopedia
Authors: McGinnis Reginald , Smyth John Vignaux 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
Following the comparison of pre-Revolutionary France with the late twentieth century in chapter 1, this chapter is devoted to one of the great works of the French Enlightenment, Diderot and d’Alembert’s Encyclopedia. Several articles in this work are identified as related to mock ritual, for instance, on French customs of the Middle Ages, seen by the authors as “farcical” and “grotesque,” or on seafaring. Judging from these examples, such rituals appear remote from the world of the encyclopedists and alien to eighteenth-century thought. The feast of fools, for instance, is relegated to a distant past, and there is the suggestion in the article on the “baptism of the tropic or of the line” that this ceremony should also be abolished. Expanding this inquiry to articles on coteries, immolation, meanness, and ridicule, however, reveals within the Encyclopedia a more intimate, and more disturbing, connection between mock ritual and Enlightenment reason itself.
Mocking Priests in Tristram Shandy and Jacques le fataliste
Authors: McGinnis Reginald , Smyth John Vignaux 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
Because he presented himself as a champion of amiable English humor of the kind praised at the end of Leconte’s Ridicule, this chapter considers Laurence Sterne and foregrounds the mock ritual death of Parson Yorick in Tristram Shandy as a consequence of his jokes. Yorick’s death appears as a reversal of the pattern encountered earlier, since the joker is the laughing sacrificial victim instead of the sort of persecutor dramatized in Ridicule. This discussion prepares a return to Diderot and particularly to a scene from Jacques le fataliste, influenced by Sterne, in which an ugly vicar is the object of mock ritualistic violence or charivari. These passages are exemplary since the fiction in each case not only treats mock ritual, but effectively is one. Diderot’s vicar’s objection to public copulation is hardly prudish by modern secular standards, while Yorick’s mock death recalls the biblical Isaac, whose name means “laughs.”
Mock Ritual and Medicine in Flaubert’s Dictionary of Received Ideas
Authors: McGinnis Reginald , Smyth John Vignaux 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
Having considered in the previous chapter how Madame Bovary deploys mock ritualistic connections between its major themes of ridicule, religion, medicine, education, erotic love, and art itself, this chapter uses Flaubert’s Dictionary of Received Ideas, as well as Bouvard and Pécuchet, to further develop their implications, particularly for modern medicine. Medicine is often portrayed as ridiculous in its purgative pretensions, but ridicule, including Flaubert’s own, is often described as purgative or medicinal. The chapter also highlights how sacrificial religion can sometimes give way to a secular medicine (e.g., bleeding and circumcision) even less “rational” than its religious analogues. The reciprocal sexualization of medicine and medicalization of sex is especially emphasized, alongside Flaubert’s “medical” treatment of sexual swearing, as are medical interpretations of religious taboo (e.g., concerning pork). Flaubert also anticipates what are now called placebo and nocebo effects, whereby the Christian dictum that “the Word is made flesh” appears reincarnated in medical science.
The Duel as Privatized Mock Ritual
Authors: McGinnis Reginald , Smyth John Vignaux 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
Dueling bloodletting has been described as no less “magical” than medical bleeding, and “ritual” and “ritualized combat” are terms applied to dueling by historians and novelists alike. Because the secular duel was an unofficial and generally illegal derivative of “trial by combat,” it provides an exemplary illustration of a mutation from official ritual to what the authors call “privatized mock ritual,” all the more interesting because it concerns the relation between public and private “egalitarian” justice. Octave Mirbeau called dueling “of all human absurdities, the most absurdly absurd absurdity,” but it was nevertheless more or less ubiquitous between the Enlightenment and World War I. This chapter focuses particularly on how the codification of dueling rules made the practice increasingly akin to an arbitrary sacrificial lottery. Though emphasizing history rather than fiction, the chapter concludes by returning to patterns of dueling reciprocity in Jacques le fataliste, and briefly considers contemporary suicide-murders.
Summation
Authors: McGinnis Reginald , Smyth John Vignaux 
Published: August 2022

Abstract
This chapter summarizes the trajectory of the book, situating it in relation to contemporary anthropology and sociology. Having suggested that the evolution of ritual appears as a process of displacement and mutation in which mockery is alternately a means of eliminating and the substance of ritual, and that derision has a striking tendency to repeat the very patterns it derides, the authors place their post-Enlightenment materials in historical and cultural perspective by calling attention to the ambivalent role of laughter in sacred premodernity. Referring to the prescription of laughter in a number of rites—such as the “sardonic” laughter associated with Sardinians’ killing of their old people, and the “dance of derision” that purified Maori cannibals—as well as to the apparent efficacy of rituals known by their participants to be “fake,” the chapter also discusses Georges Bataille’s “philosophy of laughter,” and even self-described “professional laugher,” the Dalai Lama.