bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Sufficient Conditions, Conditional Logic, and Transitivity
Authors: Levin Yakir 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In a series of publications E.J. Lowe has advocated an attractive alternative to the orthodox view about conditionals embodied in the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One alleged advantage of Lowe’s approach over its rival is that it offers the prospect of a simpler conditional logic. Another related advantage is that it appears to treat inference by transitivity more plausibly than does the Stalnaker-Lewis approach. One central goal of this paper is to call into question Lowe’s success in providing an account that is better than the Stalnaker-Lewis account in these respects. As part of this, I develop a Loweian-inspired account of sufficient condition sentences such as ‘Harry’s eating this apple is a sufficient condition for his getting sick’, which is another central goal of the paper.
Branching versus Divergent Possible Worlds
Authors: Jiří Beńovský 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
David Lewis’ modal counterpart theory falls prey to the famous Saul Kripke’s objection, and this is mostly due to his ‘static’ ontology (divergence) of possible worlds. This paper examines a genuinely realist but different, branching ontology of possible worlds and a new definition of the counterpart relation, which attempts to provide us with a better account of de remodality, and to meet satisfactorily Kripke’s claim, while being also ontologically more ‘parsimonious’.
The Case for Hyper-Libertarianism
Authors: Harrison Gerald 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The hyper libertarian is compatibilist about control, but incompatibilist about free will. This paper argues that such a position has more to recommend it than either compati- bilism or traditional libertarianism. It com- bines what is strongest about both positions, without encountering their principle weak- nesses. Furthermore it has the resources to help render intelligible the reality of moral luck
Are “Attributive” Uses of Definite Descriptions Really Attributive?
Authors: Boğaziçi İlhan İnan 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this essay I argue that given Donnellan’s formulation of the attributive uses of definite descriptions, as well as Kripke’s [6] and Salmon’s [10] generalized accounts, most uses of definite descriptions that are taken to be attributive turn out not to be so. In building up to my main thesis, I first consider certain problematic cases of uses of definite descriptions that do not neatly fit into any category. I then argue that, in general, a complete definite description we use is complex, in which there is an embedded singular term that is used referentially. From this I conclude that an attributive use of a definite description is an extremely rare linguistic phenomenon, much less frequent than what Donnellan, Kripke, and Salmon have presupposed; so much so that the standard examples given by Donnellan of the attributive use of definite descriptions do not qualify as attributive
Weltanschauungsanalyse und Robert Musils Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften
Authors: Schurz Gerhard 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper I develop a theory of Weltanschauungen (world- views). A judgment belongs to a Weltanschauung if it represents reality simultaneously in three dimensions: the descriptive- cognitive dimension (true/false), the ethical-practical dimension (right/wrong), and the esthetic-emotive dimension (beautiful/ugly). It is a crucial anthropological function of Weltanschauungen that they coordinate human perception and action in all these three dimensions (this idea goes to Ernst Topitsch). Different Weltanschauungen differ from each other in the weight of importance which they attach to each of these three dimensions. Therefore I suggest to classify Weltanschauungen according to their position within a triangle, the so-called Weltanschauungsdreieck, whose vertices represent these three dimensions. In sections 1-3 my analysis of Weltanschauungen is based on general epistemological and anthropological reections, drawing on the philosophical and scientific literature. My sections 4-6 make use of Robert Musil's impressing novel \The man without qualities", in which Musil explores Weltanschauungen by literary methods: at hand of the major figures of his novel he brings Weltanschauungen into being, lets them develop, reconstructs them, parodises them and finally deconstructs them. In the final section I show how a variety of typical bipolarities of Weltanschauungen (such rational vs. intuitive, passive versus active, etc.) can be analyzed within the Weltanschauungsdreieck.
Attributive" Uses of Definite Descriptions Are Always Attributive
Authors: Agbaba Krešimir 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The scope of this short paper is to show that the examples Ilhan Inan uses to undermine Donnellan's distinction (primarily, the attributive uses of definite descriptions in general) fall short on
account of wrong interpretation those examples were provided with in his paper. Whilst Ilhan Inan showed how complex definite descriptions (having an embedded referential term) may cause doubts as to which category they should be put in, these referring terms only play a secondary role. I argue that all of his three key examples are, in fact, sheer attributive uses of definite descriptions and have to be taken as such, which seriously diminishes the pedestal Inan places his argument on
How Often Do We Use a Definite Description to Talk About its Semantic Referent?
Authors: İnan İlhan 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper I respond to the objections put forth by Krešimir Agbaba (this volume: Kriterion (2009) 22: 1-6) against my earlier paper (Kriterion (2006) 20: 7-13) in which I argue that given Donnellan's formulation|as well as Kripke's and Salmon's generalized accounts|an attributive use of a definite description is a very rare linguistic phenomenon
A Goldman / Chisholm View of Property-Exemplifications
Authors: Botting David 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
I believe that a radically fine-grained property-exemplification theory is the right approach to the metaphysics of events. In this paper I will not be arguing for this detail but will be more concerned with issues over the internal consistency of the property-exemplification theory; in particular, I want to resolve issues about the individuation of property-tokens.
Theorie der Konsequenzoperationen und Grundbegriffe der Logik
Authors: Wallmann Christian 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
We give an elementary introduction into the theory of consequence operations. We proof some elementary results concerning basic notions of logic like tautology, consistency, independence and completeness. We show in particular that every finite axiomatizable set is independent axiomatizable and that every consistent set has relative to a finitary consequence operation a maximal consistent extension. Finally we provide an abstract semantics for consequence operations
The Folk Psychology of Free Will: An Argument Against Compatibilism
Authors: Caruso Gregg D. 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
This paper presents existing results and experimental evidence in social psychology to argue against the compatibilist thesis that our folk-psychological notions of freedom and moral responsibility are completely consistent with the acceptance of determinism. In section 1, I spell out the compatibilist position and briefly discuss the standard incompatibilist argument-the so-called consequence argument. In section 2, I take a closer look at the folk psychology of free will and argue that, contra the compatibilist, recent empirical research by Shaun Nichols, Joshua Knobe and others,
reveals that our folk-psychological intuitions are essentially incompatibilist and libertarian in nature. I conclude in section 3 by examining the phenomenology of agentive experience and argue
that it further undermines the compatibilist thesis.
Gaunilo referiert Anselm. Aus dem Tagesgeschäft des Rekonstrukteurs
Authors: Siegwart Geo 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The monk Gaunilo opens the vigorous disputation with Anselm by describing the infamous proof in the second chapter of the Proslogion. The following paper offers a detailed logical reconstruction of Gaunilo’s account of Anselm’s argument, thus making explicit the reasoning of Anselm in the view of Gaunilo. It will serve two purposes. Firstly it provides an easily understood example for the use of logic to interpret a nontrivial philosophical text. Secondly it reveals the reasons and the concepts involved in the argument, thereby indicating further argumentative and semantic tasks
Practical Knowledge and Fallibility – Some Pitfalls
Authors: Mürbe Ulrike 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The following considerations deal with a suggestion on how to conceive of knowledge of one’s own intentional doings as a kind of knowledge that is somehow infallible. The proposal discussed in this paper holds that there is no way to get the content of one’s own practical knowledge claim wrong but that we might err in ascribing practical knowledge to ourselves. The upshot of my argumentation will be the following: if we assert that conjunction, that is, if we adhere to the subject-content-disanalogy, as I will name it, we are faced with a dilemma. Therefore, it seems, the subject-content-disanalogy needs to be rejected. But, as will show up, rejecting it comes at high costs, too: to reject the subjectcontent- disanalogy forces us to equally reject at least one basal action theoretical insight we aim at accounting for
The Wishful Thinking Problem for Non-cognitivism: Does It Really Make Sense?
Authors: Guan Chengying 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
This paper concerns the Wishful Thinking Problem for non-cognitivism, which has recently been raised by Cian Dorr. Contrary to Dorr’s claim that the Wishful Thinking Problem is a new crucial objection to non-cognitivism in addition to the well-known Frege- Geach Problem, I argue that recent research has shown that the Wishful Thinking Problem is not independent of the Frege-Geach Problem and therefore it is not lethal to non-cognitivism. However, the Wishful Thinking Problem is still a problem for noncognitivism, for it reveals that the Frege-Geach Problem may be even more troublesome than non-cognitivists originally thought
Handlungstheoretischer Interventionismus und Modelle
Authors: Kremling Alexander 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The “model argument” against action-theories of causation is a reply to a strategy for avoiding the “argument of unmanipulable causes”. The critics follow the action-theorists in a certain shift of topic - leaving the explication debate towards one of justified assertion of causal claims - and end up at a wrong position concerning the role of practical knowledge for justifying causal claims about events that are not under technical control. Following them the justification would take the form of “analogy arguments“, which can not guarantee the truth of the conclusion in a non-circular way. Contrary to their position I present a reconstruction of causal inference in which practical knowledge about manipulation does play the role of a necessary condition for justifiying causal claims about unmanipulable relations
Self-Consciousness in Animals: Advantages and Problems of a Multipronged Approach
Authors: Wüstholz Florian Leonhard 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Self-consciousness in non-human animals is a complex phenomenon which raises both conceptual and methodological problems. First, what do we mean by the concept of ‘self-consciousness’? Secondly, what is the best experimental approach to self-consciousness? This paper gives a short overview of the concept of self-consciousness in section 1. We can understand the concept of self-consciousness as capturing the ability of subjects to consciously think about themselves as themselves. If this is accurate, then it is prudent to look at a broad bundle of abilities which are related to this ability. The paper then focuses on advantages and problems of the multipronged approach, a kind of empirical approach which uses several different test criteria to determine whether a subject is self-conscious or not. Section 2 briefly contrasts this kind of approach with other possibilities. The main disparity is to singlepronged approaches, which have been discussed and dismissed in greater detail elsewhere [34]. Section 3 discusses the advantages of a multipronged approach, whereas section 4 is dedicated to the discussion of some of its problems
The Ideal Observer Theory and Motivational Internalism
Authors: Rönnedal Daniel 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper I show that one version of motivational internalism follows from the so-called ideal observer theory. Let us call the version of the ideal observer theory used in this essay (IOT). According to (IOT), it is necessarily the case that it ought to be that A if and only if every ideal observer wants it to be the case that A. We shall call the version of motivational internalism that follows from (IOT) (moral) conditional belief motivational internalism (CBMI). According to (CBMI), it is necessarily the case that, for every x: if x were an ideal observer, it would be the case that x believes that it ought to be that A only if x wants it to be the case that A. Given that it is necessarily true that no ideal observer has any false beliefs, (IOT) entails (CBMI). Or, so I shall argue
Metaontological De ationism in the Aftermath of the Quine-Carnap Debate
Authors: Egeland Harouny Jonathan 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
With metaphysical philosophy gaining prominence in the af- termath of the Quine-Carnap debate, not only has it become assumed that the Quinean critique leaves ontological pluralism behind as an untenable approach, but also that the same is true of deationism more generally. Building on Quine's criticisms against the analytic-synthetic distinction and the notion of quantifier variance, contemporary metaphysicians like van Inwagen and Sider continue to argue for the untenability of deflationary approaches to metaontology. In this paper I will argue that Quine's criticisms do not provide sufficient grounds for revitalizing metaphysics, as the aforementioned metaphysicians conceive
them as doing, and that they also don't eliminate all hope for Carnapian pluralism. Furthermore, Carnap's initial position may even yield the most promising route for the pluralistically inclined. Moreover, pluralism is often conceived as being equivalent with the narrower notion of quantifier variance, often associated with
Hirsch and Putnam. As this notion often is attributed not only to Carnap and other pluralists, but also is taken to be an essential feature of deationism, explicating how their merits in fact don't necessarily coincide with those of quantifier variance will clarify matters. I will conclude by noting how neither pluralism nor
deationism is committed to quantifier variance, and thus how arguments against the latter don't entail a refutation of the former.
The Collectivity of Blaming
Authors: Botting David 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper I want to argue that acts of blame are performed by collectives, and not by any collective but only by collectives that satisfy certain conditions { broadly those that, by collectivizing reason, can be held to be autonomous subjects to which it makes sense to attribute attitudes, including participant reactive attitudes such as resentment. The actors involved must also be related to the collective in particular ways in order to hold and be held responsible, but they need not have the same attitudes as the collective. This implies both that our attributions of moral responsibility to an agent does not depend only on facts about the agent but also on facts about us, and that the reasons for which we hold responsible and by which we justify our moral practices, and which the agent can likewise appeal to in an attempt to avoid being held responsible, depend on the collective involved and its substantive ethical precepts. The answer to whether an agent is responsible, or is an appropriate object of a reactive attitude, is not to be settled purely by philosophical analysis, and even the kind of naturalistic description of the pattern of our reactive attitudes that [22] suggests in \Freedom and Resentment" will only go part of the way { the excuses and exemptions are things we might say in a dialogue where reasons are exchanged, but each collective has some leeway over what substantive reasons count as grounds of an excuse or exemption.
The Value Problem in Allen's Non-Adaptive Understanding of Knowledge
Authors: Hepçağlayan Cansu 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper I argue that Barry Allen's non-adaptive theory of knowledge as introduced in Knowledge and Civilization fails to assign a proper value to knowledge. In defending this view, I first briefly spell out Allen's evolutionary standpoint by contrasting it with classical pragmatism's adaptive perspective and then contend that his view is ultimately unable to offer a practical reason for the preferability of knowledge from the standpoint of actual cognitive agents.
Deploying Racist Soldiers: A critical take on the `right intention' requirement of Just War Theory
Authors: Wood Nathan G. 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B.J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is awed, in that it mistakes what makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.'s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one's action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one's reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one's reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether
Procreative Beneficence and Genetic Enhancement
Authors: Veit Walter 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Imagine a world where everyone is healthy, intelligent, long living and happy. Intuitively this seems wonderful albeit unrealistic. However, recent scientific breakthroughs in genetic engineering, namely CRISPR/Cas bring the question into public discourse, how the genetic enhancement of humans should be evaluated morally. In 2001, when preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) and in vitro fertilisation (IVF), enabled parents to select between multiple embryos, Julian Savulescu introduced the principle of procreative beneficence (PPB), stating that parents have the obligations to choose the child that is expected to have the best life. In this paper I argue that accepting the PPB and the consequentialist principle (CP) that two acts with the same consequences are morally on par, commits one to accepting the parental obligation of genetically enhancing one's children
Induction by Direct Inference Meets the Goodman Problem
Authors: Thorn Paul D. 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
I here aim to show that a particular approach to the problem of induction, which I will call "induction by direct inference", comfortably handles Goodman's problem of induction. I begin the article by describing induction by direct inference. After introducing induction by direct inference, I briefly introduce the Goodman problem, and explain why it is, prima facie, an obstacle to the proposed approach. I then show how one may address the Goodman problem, assuming one adopts induction by direct inference as an approach to the problem of induction. In particular, I show that a relatively standard treatment of what some have called the \Reference Class Problem" addresses the Goodman Problem. Indeed, plausible and relatively standard principles of direct inference yield the conclusion that the Goodman inference (involving the grue predicate) is defeated, so it is unnecessary to invoke considerations of `projectibility' in order to address the Goodman problem. I conclude the article by discussing the generality of the proposed approach, in dealing with variants of Goodman's example.
The Limits of Stanley and Williamson's Attack on Ryle's View About Know-How
Authors: Espejo-Serna Juan Camilo 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to discuss Stanley and Williamson's take on Ryle's argument against know-how being know-that. For this, I provide an initial consideration of the possibility of isolating Ryle's argument from his overall philosophical outlook and Stanley and Williamson's purpose in their discussion of Ryle. I then examine in detail Stanley and Williamson's reconstruction of Ryle's argument with the specific aim of showing where they have introduced extraneous elements: I examine what they take to best additional assumptions needed for the argument to be valid and how they construct the premises in order to attempt to show that Ryle's argument is not sound. I end the paper showing the limits of Stanley and Williamson's attack, suggesting how the extraneous elements Stanley and Williamson introduce already bias the discussion against Ryle. The main aim is not to defend a form of Ryle's regress but rather advocate the need for a deeper discussion of Ryle's views of mind and action when discussing his views on know-how.
Creative Abduction, Factor Analysis, and the Causes of Liberal Democracy
Authors: Glymour Clark 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The ultimate focus of the current essay is on methods of "creative abduction" that have some guarantees as reliable guides to the truth, and those that do not. Emphasizing work by Richard Englehart using data from the World Values Survey, Gerhard Schurz has analyzed literature surrounding Samuel Huntington's well-known claims that civilization is divided into eight contending traditions, some of which resist "modernization" - democracy, civil rights, equality of rights of women and minorities, secularism. Schurz suggests an evolutionary model of modernization and identifies opposing social forces. In a later essay, citing Englehart's work as an example, Schurz identifies factor analysis as an example of "creative abduction". The theories of Englehart and his collaborators are reviewed again in the current essay. Published simulations and standard statistical desiderata for causal inference show the methods Englehart used, factor analysis in particular, are not guides to truth for the kind of data Schurz recognizes as common in political science. Recent work in statistics, philosophy and computer science that makes advances towards such methods is briefly reviewed