bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Must We Know What We Mean?
Authors: Cheng Kuang-Ming 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In his 1987 article “Indeterminacy, Empiricism and the First Person”, John Searle argues that we actually know what we mean; therefore, W. V. O. Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation must be wrong. In this paper, I will try to identify the mistakes in Searle’s criticism of Quine’s story. I will argue that Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be construed as containing two theses- that is, the immanent indeterminacy and the transcendent indeterminacy. With these two indeterminacies in mind, Quine’s indeterminacy thesis will still remain tenable even if we actually know what we mean.
Virtue Foundherentism
Authors: Lightbody Brian 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Foundherentism is a new and promising theory of epistemic justification that has not received its due in the secondary literature. Accordingly, in this paper, I will examine foundherentism with three principal concerns in mind. First, I explain the epistemic components of foundherentism. Second, I defend foundherentism against the charge of reliabilism. While third and finally, I argue that foundherentism needs to be supplemented with a virtuous component
Theorie der Konsequenzoperationen und logische Unabhängigkeit
Authors: Wallmann Christian 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
This article deals with algebraic logic. In particular, it discusses the theory of consequence operations and the general concept of logical independency. The advantage of this general view is its gr- eat applicability: The stated properties of consequence operations hold for almost every logical system. The notion of independency is well known and important in logic, philosophy of science and mathematics. Roughly speaking, a set is independent with respect to a consequence operation, if none of its elements is a consequence of the other elements. The property of being an independent set guarantees therefore that none of its elements is superfluous. In particular, I'm going to show fundamental results for every consequence operation, and hence for every logic: no infinite independent set is finite axiomatizable, and every finite axiomatizable set has relative to a finitary consequence operation an independent axiom system. The main result is that in sentential logic every set of formulas has an independend axiom system.
Rudolf Carnaps verschiedene Scheinproblemkonzeptionen
Authors: Cordes Moritz 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
This paper is a review of Rudolf Carnap's changing attitudes to- wards the conceptualisation of pseudo-problems. For that purpose his early works (until 1935) are divided into four phases each of which display subtle differences with respect to the role pseudo-problems play in Carnap's epistemology and philosophical methodology. Based on a number of short texts by Carnap, an attempt
is made to give provisional definitions of `pseudo-problem' and related expressions.
A New Approach to the Grounding of Abstract Concepts
Authors: Seuchter Tim 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
A central problem of theories of grounded cognition concerns the grounding of abstract concepts in sensorimotor representations. The paper aims at providing a new basis for a theory of cogni-tive abstraction mechanisms. The focus will be on the notions of causal indexicals and affordances, understood as action related concepts that show different degrees of abstraction. Abstraction
mechanisms will be characterized that allow the transformation of such obviously "grounded" concepts into more abstract ones. In this way, the relation between sensorimotor processes and abstract concepts will be described in detail, and general principles of abstraction will be determined.
How Are Semantic Metarepresentations Built and Processed?
Authors: Bremer Manuel 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
This paper looks at some aspects of semantic metarepresentation. It is mostly concerned with questions more formal, concerning the representation format in semantic metarepresentations, and the way they are processed. Section 1 distinguishes between metacognition and metarepresen- tation in a narrow and broad sense. Section 2 reminds the reader of some main areas where metarepresentations have to be used. The main part considers the ways that metarepresentations are built and processed. Section 3 introduces some general ideas how semantic metarepresentations are built and processed. Section 4 looks at some recent theories about ways that semantic metarep- resentations are built and processed.
Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation
Authors: Benovsky Jiri 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this article, I am interested in four versions of what is often referred to as "the Humphrey objection". This objection was initially raised by Kripke against Lewis's modal counterpart theory, so this is where I will start the discussion. As we will see, there is a perfectly good answer to the objection. I will then examine other places where a similar objection can be raised: it can arise in the case of temporal counterpart theory (in fact, it can arise in the case of all kinds of counterpart theories, independently on modal realism), and a very similar worry can also arise against modal realism itself or against an ersatzist theory of possible worlds itself. For similar reasons, in similar situations, a similar objection will arise. What is interesting is that it is not the case that a similar response can be given in all of these similar cases. So, in the end, we will see what dissimilarities there are and how and why they are relevant. In particular, we will see the di erences there are between alethic modalities and temporal modalities. In the case of alethic modalities (metaphysical necessity and possibility), the objection can be answered by appealing to the notion of representation, while this does not work very well in the case of temporal modalities.
Semantische Aspekte pluraler prädikatenlogischer Sprachen
Authors: Lukic Jonathan 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Plural constructions in mathematical speech are no rarity. E.g., when we want to say that the real numbers are the basis on which we construct Calculus (cf. [16], p. 6), and that the integers are an integral domain (cf. [14], p. 237), we are not talking about one thing, namely the set of the real numbers and the set of the integers, respectively, but we are talking about several things, namely the real numbers and the integers, respectively. In the present paper, we introduce a semantics which takes the use of plural constructions in mathematical speech as a basis and thus avoids sets and attributes.
Truthmaking as an Account of How Grounding Facts Hold
Authors: Yip Jack 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Grounding, as a way to articulate ontological dependence, faces the problem of what grounds grounding facts themselves (such as the fact that the singleton of Socrates is grounded in Socrates). This problem stems from the need to account for the holding of grounding facts, which generates the hierarchical structure of ontological dependence. Within the grounding framework, grounding facts are either ungrounded or grounded. I will first argue that neither option can provide us with a satisfactory account. The main reason is that non-fundamental entities have to be counted as
fundamental or involved in the essences of fundamental entities in order for either of the two options to work-the non-fundamental is being smuggled into the fundamental. My suggestion is to appeal to the notion of truthmaking and tackle the problem about the holding of grounding facts outside the grounding framework|-instead of asking what grounds grounding facts, I ask what makes grounding claims true.
Truthmaking is a prima facie relation holding between the representational and the non-representational such that the latter makes the former true. With the principle 'if hpi is true, then it is
a fact that p,' we can account for the holding of grounding facts in a derivative sense. As a proposition contains the information about its truthmaker, the nature of grounding claims will tell us how grounding facts hold. I accept a realm of concepts which make up propositions (which might be needed already if there are propositions and propositions are compositional). These concepts will act as part of the truthmaker for grounding claims (in addition to the non-conceptual fundamental entities)-the
concept of the ground must figure in the concept of the grounded. For a concept to figure in another, it is to be involved in the constitutive essence of the latter (analogous to Kit Fine's idea that the ground of a grounded entity figures in the essence of the grounded entity). This account will not smuggle anything
non-fundamental into the fundamental realm. The implication is that ontological dependence stems from our different kinds of conceptualisations (perhaps of the same stuff, as in the concepts of water and H2O), which justifies metaphysicians' armchair method.
Disagreement, Self-Refutation and the Minority Report of the Meta-Skeptics
Authors: Paár Tamás 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Those who I call meta-skeptics in my paper argue that one should suspend judgment about every philosophical question. Most often they use the argument from disagreement to show that the suspension of our philosophical beliefs is our epistemic obligation. In the present paper I argue against the main motivation for this view and show that since even the meta-skeptics' stance is a contested philosophical one, their argument cannot succeed without refuting itself. Various meta-skeptics proposed counter- objections to this self-refutation objection. I consider here Jason Brennan's quite simple and Bryan Frances's more sophisticated counter-objections. Their proposals are even more interesting because they di er from the typical points of meta-skeptics: Brennan argues for outsider skepticism, that is non-philosophers should suspend judgment about philosophical issues, and Frances relies on the notion of epistemic superior instead of epistemic peer. I consider their points in two ways: whether their counter-objections can help regular meta-skepticism and whether their skepticism can stand on its own. In my replies to these proposals I show why both are problematic in each of these two ways. Brennan says that widespread disagreement is a sign of philosophy's unreliability. Yet, he can only address the charge that his point is a philosophical one and not the objection that there can be disagreement about it. And since there is good reason to think that even his position is subject to disagreement, it is self-undermining. Furthermore, Brennan does not give any reason why any first-order philosophical theory must lack the virtues that his argument displays. Frances argues that even if the argument from disagreement is self-refuting and meta-skeptics have to suspend judgment about it, they might still remain skeptics after all. In my reply I show how Frances's defense of his position still relies on principles that could be the objects of further arguments from disagreement.
The Ethics of Genetic Intervention in Human Embryos: Assessing Jürgen Habermas's Approach
Authors: Fischer Enno 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In the near future we may be able to manipulate human embryos through genetic intervention. Jürgen Habermas has argued against the development of technologies which could make such intervention possible. His argument has received widespread criticism among bioethicists. These critics argue that Habermas's argument relies on implausible assumptions about human nature. Moreover, they challenge Habermas's claim that genetic intervention adds something new to intergenerational relationships pointing out that parents have already strong control over their children through education. In this paper a new approach to Habermas's theory is suggested which makes clear that he has a strong point against genetic intervention. A more charitable reading of Habermas with respect to his assumptions concerning human nature is presented. Moreover, Habermas's assumption concerning the power of genetic controlling is evaluated. By means of a close comparison of genetic and educational control it is shown that Habermas's argument relies on much weaker assumptions than generally understood.
Defining Original Presentism
Authors: Mulder Jesse M. 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
It is surprisingly hard to define presentism. Traditional definitions of the view, in terms of tensed existence statements, have turned out not to to be capable of convincingly distinguishing presentism from eternalism. Picking up on a recent proposal by Tallant, I suggest that we need to locate the break between eternalism and presentism on a much more fundamental level. The problem is that presentists have tried to express their view within a framework that is inherently eternalist. I call that framework the Fregean nexus, as it is defined by Frege's atemporal understanding of predication. In particular, I show that the tense-logical understanding of tense which is treated as common ground in the debate rests on this very same Fregean nexus, and is thus inadequate for a proper definition of presentism. I contrast the Fregean nexus with what I call the original temporal nexus, which is based on an alternative, inherently temporal form of predication. Finally, I propose to define presentism in terms of the original temporal nexus, yielding original presentism. According to original presentism, temporal propositions are distinguished from atemporal ones not by aspects of their content, as they are on views based on the Fregean nexus, but by their form|in particular, by their form of predication.
Austin on Literal Meaning
Authors: Al Zoubi Odai 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper, I examine the debate between Alice Crary and Nat Hansen concerning Austin's view of `literal meaning'. Crary suggests that Austin thinks that there is no literal meaning, while Hansen thinks that for Austin there is literal meaning. I will argue that for Austin there is indeed a literal meaning, a fixed meaning, which sentences carry across all occasions of use, however, such meaning does not suffice to determine whether, independent of these occasions, the sentences can be used to say something true or false. Thus I suggest a middle ground between the two readings. My reading highlights the importance of Austin's claim that `true' is a dimension-word, which both Crary and Hansen overlook.
Present Rights for Future Generations
Authors: Unruh Charlotte 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper, I defend the view that within a rights-based ethical framework, the moral status of future generations is best under- stood as that of present rightsholders. I argue that in this way it can be justified that we have obligations towards future generations. This justification in turn is of great relevance for many issues in moral theory and applied ethics. In the first part of the paper, I argue that the fact that future persons will have rights in the future cannot fully account for present obligations. The missing link in this argument cannot be provided by approaches that infer those obligations mediately. In the second part of the paper, I argue that existing is not a necessary condition for being a rightsholder. First, our own future selves should be said to have rights even though they do not exist at present. Second, even at present, uncertainty challenges the relationship between rightsholders and obligation bearers: of- ten enough, obligations depend on presuppositions or suspicions about other persons' existence. In light of these cases, we should conceive of rightsholders as place holders, that is, sets of (actual) individuals whose existence or identity can be unknown or indetermined, with specific properties. Therefore, future generations can coherently be said to have rights now that correspond to our present obligations towards them.
The Future of Epistemic Possibility
Authors: Phillips Meagan Lowell 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
I am concerned with epistemic possibility expressions (EPEs) such as \It might be raining." Much of the discussion of EPEs has concerned the fact that a given EPE can seem true in one context and false in another. Motivated by this data, contextualists have argued that modal expressions are sensitive to information at a context of use. Contextualist analyses encounter problems when it comes to disagreements centered on EPEs. Relativists such as John Mac- Farlane argue that epistemic modals are sensitive to information available to an assessor at a circumstance of evaluation. I side with a relativistic account of epistemic possibility, on which the truth conditions of EPEs depend not only on a context of use but also as on a context of assessment. The stipulation of contexts of assessments explains why third parties can judge an interlocutor's utterance false, and why the interlocutor will retract her previous utterance. However, judgements of falsity and retraction seem to be absent in future-oriented EPEs such as \It might rain tomorrow." I propose an amendment to John MacFarlane's semantics that better models this quirk of epistemic possibility expressions
Expressives, Majoratives, and Ineffability
Authors: Mildenberger Carl David 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The purpose of this essay is to argue that not all instances of expressive language suffer alike from the problem of descriptive ineffability. Descriptive ineffability refers to the problem that speakers are never fully satisfied when they are asked to paraphrase sentences containing expressive terms such as `damn' using only descriptive terms. It is commonly assumed that descriptive ineffability is an important feature of all kinds of expressive language - derogatory language just as commendatory or valorizing language. However, I find that majoratives, i.e. the positive counterpart to negative expressives (pejoratives), do not exhibit the characteristic of descriptive ineffability. This finding is important both to clarify what kind of data competing theories of expressives have to explain and to shed further light on the wider phenomenon of ineffability.
The Logic of Intending and Predicting
Authors: Botting David 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Can human acts be causally explained in the same way as the rest of nature? If so, causal explanation in the manner of the Hempelian model shouldn’t the human sciences and the natural sciences equally. This is not so much a question of whether the Hempelian model is a completely adequate account of causal explanation, but about whether it is adequate or inadequate in the same way for each: if there is some unique feature of human acts that dictates that they are to be explained differently from natural events, then it is reasonable to suppose that this feature will be revealed by consideration of Hempelian explanations whether this is our final account of explanation or not, and if no such feature is revealed then it is reasonable to suppose that there are no fundamental differences between the human and natural sciences in how causal explanations proceed, whether this explanation is Hempelian or of some other kind. Two arguments have been given for there being such a feature. One - the well-known "Logical Connection Argument" - states that there cannot be a causal relation between a human action and the intention to perform that action. If this argument succeeds, then our ordinary explanations of human acts in terms of psychological states like intentions are not causal explanations at all. Although this does not mean that no causal explanation is true, we have the problem of finding appropriate causal antecedents of the acts. The other - the anti-predictionist argument - concludes from the fact that at least some human acts cannot be predicted that they cannot be causally explained. I wish to disarm the force of both of these arguments, and thus argue for explanatory monism: we do not need to adopt a mode of explanation for human sciences distinct from that of natural sciences.
Two Conceptions of Legitimacy: A Response to Fabian Wendt's Moralist Critique of Political Realism
Authors: Aytaç Uğur 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Fabian Wendt [20] argues that political realism is not capable of explaining how the state's moral right to rule over its subjects is generated. I believe that Wendt's criticism is not sound because his position relies on the false implicit assumption that realism and moralism ask the same philosophical questions on state authority. I contend that it is fallacious to evaluate the realist account of legitimacy by the standards of moralism, and vice versa, as these two accounts arrive at different conceptions of legitimacy by raising different sets of philosophical questions. The two sets of philosophical questions are not reducible to each other. The realist account of legitimacy does not aim to explain what the moralist account of legitimacy aims to explain.
Against Foundationalism about Persistence-Conditions
Authors: Franken Dirk 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper I will argue against a view that I call foundationalism about persistence-conditions.The core of this view is that composite physical objects have their specific persistence-conditions in virtue of these conditions being fulfilled by the object's physical constituents at various times. I will provide two arguments - the argument from the possibility of instantaneous objects and the argument from the presence of persistence-conditions - which show that this view is untenable. These arguments will also point towards a more adequate understanding of what it means for an object to have certain persistence-conditions. I will expound this understanding and suggest, on its basis, an unorthodox, hylomorphist account of the persistence-conditions of objects
Revisiting Kumm's Cosmopolitan Constitutionalism
Authors: Fenner Maximilian 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper, I revisit Mattias Kumm's work on a `cosmopolitan conception of law'. I make two claims: First, I claim that although some criticism can be resisted by Kumm, under closer methodological scrutiny there are flaws in his theory. Second, I claim that these flaws challenge Kumm's approach when reading the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) as a `global constitution'. This also has pertinent practical implications for the functioning of the United Nations. This contribution does not take a stance on the nature of law but focuses on this conception in the context of politics and law. In a first section, I recount Kumm's cosmopolitan conception of law. In a second section, I claim that implicit monism in the relationship between national and international law and theoretical idealization pose serious dificulties to the cosmopolitan approach. In a third section, I claim that these flaws pose a challenge to the United Nations when considering the UN Charter as a `global constitution'. I sum up my findings in a final section and reflect on a future outlook for research on global constitutionalism in political philosophy.
Conditions of Rationality for Scientific Research
Authors: Weingartner Paul 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to discuss conditions of rationality for scientific research (SR) where "conditions" are understood as "necessary conditions". This will be done in the following way: First, I shall deal with the aim of SR since conditions of rationality (for SR) are to be understood as necessary means for reaching the aim (goal) of SR. Subsequently, the following necessary conditions will be discussed: Rational Communication, Methodological Rules, Ideals of Rationality and its Realistic Aspects, Methodological and Ontological Conditions (Universality, Rules for Experiments, Causality), and Metaphysical Presuppositions and Extrapolations.