bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Inequity in Telemedicine Use Among Patients with Cancer in the Deep South During the COVID-19 Pandemic
Authors: Shao Connie C , McLeod M Chandler , Gleason Lauren T , Dos Santos Marques Isabel C , Chu Daniel I , Wallace Eric L , Fouad Mona N , Reddy Sushanth 
Published: February 2022

Abstract

Background
Telemedicine use has increased significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic. It remains unclear if its rapid growth exacerbates disparities in healthcare access. We aimed to characterize telemedicine use among a large oncology population in the Deep South during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Materials and Methods
A retrospective cohort study was performed at the only National Cancer Institute designated-cancer center in Alabama March 2020 to December 2020. With a diverse (26.5% Black, 61% rural) population, this southeastern demographic uniquely reflects historically vulnerable populations. All non-procedural visits at the cancer center from March to December 2020 were included in this study excluding those with a department that had fewer than 100 visits during this time period. Patient and clinic level characteristics were analyzed using t-test and Chi-square to compare characteristics between visit types (in-person versus telemedicine, and video versus audio within telemedicine). Generalized estimating equations were used to identify independent factors associated with telemedicine use and type of telemedicine use.

Results
There were 50 519 visits and most were in-person (81.3%). Among telemedicine visits, most were phone based (58.3%). Black race and male sex predicted in-person visits. Telemedicine visits were less likely to have video among patients who were Black, older, male, publicly insured, and from lower income areas.

Conclusions
Telemedicine use, specifically with video, is significantly lower among historically vulnerable populations. Understanding barriers to telemedicine use and preferred modalities of communication among different populations will help inform insurance reimbursement and interventions at different socioecological levels to ensure the continued evolution of telemedicine is equitable.
Neuroscience and Competitive Behavior
Authors: Balconi Michela , Angioletti Laura 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Cognitive and social neuroscience may provide a wide range of neuroscientific tools and paradigms for the research on competitive behavior. Specifically, hyperscanning is a relatively new paradigm in neuroscience that involves capturing the brain activity of two or more participants engaged in a joint task, such as a competitive game, simultaneously. A brief overview of hyperscanning studies on competition and the intra-brain and inter-brain functional connectivity analysis have been here described. Taking inspiration from previous hyperscanning protocols, this chapter suggests that the neuroscientific study of competitive behavior could also be fruitfully explored in other real-life contexts, such as the educational field, the peer group, the sports field, and the organizational context.
Disability and Family Care Work over the Life
Course
Authors: Stevens J. Dalton 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
As rates of disability have risen over the last decade for all age groups, families have taken on more care responsibilities. Current theoretical frameworks of disability and care work are largely unconnected, limiting the ability of researchers to account for experiences of care work and receipt. How can sociologists blend these disparate theoretical and empirical literatures to develop a more comprehensive understanding of care work in the context of disability? This chapter proposes the Life Course Disability Care Work Integrated Model (LCDCW) as a potential theoretical framework informed by life course theory, a sociopolitical model of disability, and theories of care work that could unite the literatures. The model enables researchers to identify overlapping and unique structural and interpersonal barriers to care for care workers and care recipients in the context of disability. The chapter then reviews the empirical literature on people’s experiences with disability receiving and providing family care to highlight the framework’s usefulness, emphasizing the unique and shared contexts that shape care relationships and the problems that arise therein. The empirical literature review identifies that people with disability are providers and recipients of care, an essential link between disability and care work literatures. The conclusion summarizes the main contributions of the review, highlights existing gaps in the literature and opportunities for future research, and illustrates how disability and family care work scholarship can influence disability-related policy and programs.
Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt Examples
Authors: Pereboom Derk 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
This chapter addresses the debate about whether moral responsibility for an action requires that the agent could have avoided that action, and thus had an alternative possibility available to her. The assumption that blameworthiness, in particular, requires that the agent could have done something that would have precluded her blameworthiness is widespread, and for a long time went unchallenged. But then in a 1969 article, Harry Frankfurt, using an intriguing type of example, argued that this assumption is false. This chapter surveys this challenge and debate to which it has given rise, which has the following structure. In response to the challenge from Frankfurt examples, defenders of the alternative-possibilities requirement have advanced a number of counterstrategies. One involves contending that despite initial impressions, the example does feature a relevant alternative possibility after all; John Fischer calls this the “flicker of freedom strategy.” Another is to argue that despite initial impressions, the example requires causal determinism in the actual causal history of the action in order to secure the absence of alternatives, and this counts against the intuition that the agent in the example is morally responsible. These objections have given rise to Frankfurt examples designed to address the objections. The chapter provides a critical appraisal of these moves in the debate.
Responsibility and Distributive Justice
Authors: Arneson Richard 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Distributive justice principles specify what is a fair distribution of benefits and burdens across individual persons (and other beings as well, but this complication is set aside). Some distributive justice principles require provision of assistance to those who suffer misfortune and are worse off than others or badly off in absolute terms. Does one’s eligibility for receipt of such assistance vary, to some degree, independently of instrumental considerations, depending on the extent to which one is reasonably held responsible for coming to be in need of it? This chapter explores some answers to this question. One Yes answer holds that having had reasonable alternative courses of action that would have reduced the risk of suffering misfortune reduces the obligations of others to alleviate one’s plight. Another Yes answer holds that being morally deserving or undeserving affects the strength of one’s claim to assistance. These answers appear in luck egalitarian accounts of distributive justice. Two types of the No answer are distinguished. One type holds that distributive justice principles that call for aid to the unfortunate should be insensitive to the extent to which one is prudentially or morally responsible for becoming unfortunate and that it is bad moralism to think otherwise. Another type expresses free will skepticism, challenging the assumption that individuals are in fact variously responsible (or alternatively that we can ever know them to be variously responsible) for choosing and acting in ways that might land them in predicaments from which they need to be rescued.
Legal Responsibility
Authors: Shaw Elizabeth 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
This chapter draws attention to a question that has been paid insufficient attention to in the legal philosophical literature on the criminal responsibility of psychopaths: Who should bear the burden of proving that they are or are not responsible and to what standard? It provides some reasons for thinking that raising a reasonable doubt as to psychopaths’ capacity for moral understanding should be enough to justify exempting them from criminal responsibility and punishment. (Although it may still of course be necessary to hospitalize or treat them—if effective treatments can be developed—to prevent them from harming others.) This chapter summarizes relevant research on psychopathy and discusses an interpretation of this research that is consistent with at least some psychopaths being entitled to an excuse based on their impaired emotional capacities. Since, in some cases, there may be enough evidence to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the criminal responsibility of individuals with psychopathy, this chapter proposes that it should be decided on a case-by-case basis whether someone diagnosed with psychopathy should be excused from criminal responsibility.
Responsibility and Situationism
Authors: Warmke Brandon 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
This chapter explores the relationship between an agent’s moral responsibility for their actions and the situations in which an agent acts. Decades of research in psychology are sometimes thought to support situationism, the view that features of an agent’s situation greatly influence their behavior in powerful and surprising ways. Such situational features might therefore be thought to threaten agents’ abilities to act freely and responsibly. This chapter begins by discussing some relevant empirical literature on situationism. It then surveys several ways of construing the situationist threat to moral responsibility as reducible to worries about determinism, manipulation, or luck. It is then argued that the best way to understand the situationist challenge is as a threat to reasons-responsiveness. A common strategy for responding to the situationist threat to reasons-responsiveness—the so-called modal response—is discussed. The chapter then defends a view called pessimistic realism: While the situationist literature puts human agency in an unflattering light, it does not show that agents’ reasons-responsiveness capacities are generally undermined by situational features. Several objections both to the modal strategy and to pessimistic realism are discussed. The chapter concludes with three thoughts concerning future directions.
Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias and the Impact of Social Categorization
Authors: Sie Maureen 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
This article discusses the empirical research on implicit bias in the domain of social categorization and the philosophical reflection on what the research tells us about our responsibility for actions influenced or caused by it. It distinguishes reflections (1) on the implicit nature of these biases in relation to the agential control required for moral responsibility; and (2) on the harm implicit biases allegedly do, such as microaggressions, epistemic injustice, shooter bias, and evaluation bias. With respect to (1), it argues that the empirical literature is inconclusive on whether implicit biases undermine backward-looking responsibility. With respect to (2), it argues that our increased knowledge about the harm implicit biases do, understandably inspires forward-looking accounts of moral responsibility. However, it also argues that with respect to the harm implicit biases do, not all harm done is easy address or remedy, for example because not all harm done can be classified as a wrong done by one individual to another. What to do about these harms, is a complex, difficult issue, and an issue on which we might disagree with one another. Ironically, so the chapter points out, if the research on implicit bias is correct, not everyone will be treated as an equal participant in a public discussion of opposing ideas. The chapter concludes that the empirical research on implicit bias is of interest to discussions about moral responsibility and provides us with ample reason to be vigilant with respect to our widespread inclination to categorize one another socially.
Experimental Philosophy and Moral Responsibility
Authors: Björnsson Gunnar 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Can experimental philosophy help us answer central questions about the nature of moral responsibility, such as the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism? According to reasoning behind the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), it might: If individual judges independently track the truth with even modest reliability, this reliability can quickly aggregate as the number of judges goes up. This chapter asks whether preconditions for such aggregation hold with respect to folk attributions of responsibility to deterministic scenarios, and whether it has consequences for philosophical method. Section 1 introduces the basic assumptions behind the CJT. Section 2 looks at the distribution of responsibility attributions in recent empirical studies. Section 3 looks at evidence concerning folk reliability, including evidence supporting two error theories for folk compatibilism—the No Matter What and Indeterminist Intrusion hypotheses—and one error theory for folk incompatiblism—the Bypassing hypotheses. It is argued that data undermines the first two error theories and suggests that only a limited class of judgments are subject to the third. Section 4 explains how conditional error theories can change the support of a position without begging the question. Section 5 asks whether the intricacies of the compatibilism question should lead us to deny that the folk are even modestly reliable in their judgments. Section 6 suggests that even if they are, their judgments will often not be independent enough to add much to the judgments of professional philosophers. Section 7 concludes.
Performative Labor among Balkan Romani Wedding Musicians
Authors: Silverman Carol 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
This chapter explores the relationship among value, money, and the challenges of embodied, artistic, and interpersonal professional musical labor for Balkan Romani wedding musicians. Via discourse and events in North Macedonia and Bulgaria, it examines the multiple strands of exchange between performers and patrons. Four case studies show how musicians debate their art and labor and how tipping is negotiated at weddings and a youth dance. The chapter focuses on how musicians strategize their artistry to produce affective states and how this in turn procures income, impacts their personhood and status, and accomplishes social transformations in Romani communities.
Berkeley’s Theory of Language
Authors: Pearce Kenneth L. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
According to the ideational theory of meaning held by most seventeenth- and eighteenth- century European philosophers, meaningful words signify ideas in the mind of the speaker. This view was famously rejected by Berkeley. Some interpreters hold that in rejecting this view Berkeley meant merely to carve out some exceptions to the general principle that meaningful words stand for ideas. Others attribute to Berkeley the view that, rather than signifying ideas, words signify speaker intentions. Finally, some interpreters attribute to Berkeley a use theory of language similar to the later Wittgenstein. This chapter provides an overview of this interpretive debate and a defense of the use theory interpretation.
Berkeley on Common Sense
Authors: Bordner S. Seth 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Debate surrounds whether Berkeley’s philosophy is a defense of, or merely consistent with, common sense, as well as what Berkeley means by “common sense.” This chapter defends a view that synthesizes elements of recent approaches: by “common sense” Berkeley means primarily the (de re) belief that the things immediately perceived are the real things, characteristically held by the vulgar and exemplified by vulgar ways of speech. In holding that it is a natural belief, this view is consistent with recent accounts that identify common sense with the proper use of our cognitive faculties as well as those accounts that identify it with (some) commonly held propositions.
Berkeley on Perception
Authors: Fields Keota 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
This chapter interprets Berkeley’s theory of visual perception as more similar to contemporary constructivist models of vision than to the representationalist theories dominant among his predecessors. It also interprets Berkeley’s theory as addressing a problem of epistemic luck rather than perceptual error. Berkeley shows that the received representationalist solution to perceptual error—having ideas that are caused by and resemble external primary qualities—is neither necessary nor sufficient for veridically seeing those qualities. Berkeley’s constructivist approach to this problem of visual epistemic luck includes three unique features. First, visual processing has a linguistic structure. Second, visual experiences of the external world include normative contents. Third, natural laws ground both the linguistic structure of visual processing and the normative contents of visual experiences. It is argued that these features allow Berkeley to overcome both perceptual error and visual epistemic luck.
Berkeley and Collier
Authors: Stoneham Tom 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Collier was a contemporary of Berkeley’s who also defended a form of immaterialism. This chapter begins with some historical background about Collier’s writings and their reception before considering two challenges to immaterialism—(1) distinguishing perception from imagination and (2) the nature of the perceiving self—where the two immaterialists had strikingly different approaches. While neither of them developed a fully adequate account of either imagination or the self, the exercise of comparing them shows that there was in the early eighteenth century the potential for a rich and varied tradition of immaterialist philosophy.
Berkeley’s Philosophy of Science
Authors: Atherton Margaret 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Many treatments of Berkeley’s major works, Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues, omit all mention of philosophy of science, preferring to focus on Berkeley’s signature doctrine of idealism. Discussions of Berkeley’s scientific theorizing are often limited to his later works, De Motu and Siris, that do not take up his idealism. The Principles itself, however, contains a philosophy of science in which cause-based explanations of corpuscular materialism are replaced by explanations resting on the laws of nature, in which causes are replaced with signs. The new account of explanation provides the consistent link between the idealistic Principles and the later scientific works.
Berkeley’s Theory of Vision
Authors: Schwartz Robert 
Published: February 2022

AbstractBerkeley’s New Theory of Vision has had and continues to have a major influence in vision science. Although his understanding of the nature of visual perception and the processes underlying it permeate his later more philosophical writings, his theory can be evaluated empirically independently of these works. This chapter attempts to summarize Berkeley’s theory of vision and explain his contribution to the field. When properly understood, Berkeley’s work on vision fits in well with his epistemic and metaphysical positions. Critics and defenders of Berkeley often offer interpretations of his theory of vision that are not consonant with issues in the empirical study of vision to which he wished to contribute. This chapter will attempt to show why.
The Life and Times of George Berkeley
Authors: Flage Daniel E. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
After a brief survey of Berkeley’s life, this chapter focuses on the historical background to some of Berkeley’s discussions. The discussion of vision examines the geometrical theory of depth perception, Descartes’s empirical theory of depth perception, and the Molyneux problem. The method of analysis was prominent in the modern period in both philosophy and the sciences. The discussion shows that analysis is comparable to argument to the best explanation and illustrates its use in Berkeley’s discussion of vision. Abstraction is an epistemological process by which one (allegedly) knows general concepts. The discussion traces its roots to Aristotle and examines the distinction between the separation thesis and selective attention. Free-thinking was a movement that criticized revealed religion based primarily on Lockean principles of rationality. The discussion focuses on John Toland’s arguments. The discussion of mathematics focuses on infinitesimals in calculus.
Berkeley on the Economics of Poverty
Authors: Hight Marc A. , Lea Geoffrey S. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Berkeley shares with his contemporaries the view that the poor are typically lazy and idle, but, unlike them, he marries institutional concerns to his moral defect theory of poverty. This chapter characterizes the economic situation of the Irish in the eighteenth century and presents the problem of the idle poor. It then provides an economic model that explains why people might choose leisure and poverty over a bit less want but more work. It is argued that this model explains Berkeley’s Ireland. Perhaps Berkeley errs in his thinking about how a society might bring about the alleviation of poverty, but his diagnosis of the problem is innovative and sensitive to economic realities often ignored even today. His insights are then connected to contemporary capability theory.
Berkeley’s Theology
Authors: Airaksinen Timo 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Berkeley’s theology is not a systematic set of doctrines but a collection of rather informally expressed views and viewpoints mainly concerning such practical questions as the reasonability of faith and human happiness in heaven. His most interesting ideas concern natural religion. He deals with these matters in his sermons and other minor writings, but also in Alciphron. An important question concerns ethics and moral virtue. To be virtuous we must obey God’s commands, but that is possible only if we have faith in him. The importance of the second condition is often underestimated because Berkeley is seen as a philosopher. The virtuous go to heaven, where their happiness is “large as our desires,” in other words, infinite eternal bliss. However, Berkeley says we know nothing of its characteristics, or what heaven is like. He even says that we need new, possibly angelic, faculties to experience it, yet we may speculate about the nature of afterlife.
Berkeley and Shaftesbury
Authors: Jaffro Laurent 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
The Third Earl of Shaftesbury was one of Berkeley’s main targets throughout his career, and especially in Alciphron. The English moralist, who claims to adapt ancient philosophy, particularly Stoic philosophy, to the taste of a modern audience, is in Berkeley’s eyes a promoter of anti-Christian free-thinking. It is on the occasion of his criticism of Shaftesbury that Berkeley expounds his own views on the epistemology of ethical and aesthetic values, and on education. Berkeley sees in Shaftesbury, as in Hutcheson, a philosopher who makes the mistake of devaluing reasoning in favor of feeling, whereas it has a rightful place in the ethical and aesthetic fields. He rejects Shaftesbury’s appeal to “enthusiasm” and “natural taste.” Berkeley also blames him for trying to confiscate the Socratic legacy in the service of a libertine project, as if the philosophy of the ancients did not prefigure Christianity.