bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
A primal-dual approach for the Robin inverse problem in a nonlinear elliptic equation: The case of the 𝐿1 − 𝐿2 cost functional
Authors: Hadri Aissam , Nachaoui Mourad , Laghrib Amine , Chakib Abdelkrim , Afraites Lekbir 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this work, we consider the inverse problem of identifying a Robin coefficient in a nonlinear elliptic equation with mixed boundary conditions.
We firstly reformulate the inverse problem as a regularized optimal control one, where the functional cost is of type

L
1

-

L
2

L^{1}-L^{2}

; then we prove the existence and uniqueness of a minimizer to the resulting optimization problem in a suitable functional space.
Finally, we provide a primal-dual algorithm to solve the variational problem and give some numerical results that prove the accuracy of the proposed method in the identification of the Robin coefficient.
VERSCHIEDENE VERSIONEN DES NEGATIVEN UTILITARISMUS
Authors: Fricke Fabian 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Karl Popper suggested that the utilitarian formula "Maximise happiness" should be replaced by the formula "Minimize suffering" - a view which has been called "negative utilitarianism". Can such a view be spelled out in a plausible way? Examining several ways of understanding the alleged ethical priority of pain over pleasure, I come to the conclusion that none of them is satisfactory as a basis for a theory of benevolence. However, once we move from hedonistic to preference utilitarianism two possible views emerge which, although not fundamentally different from classical utilitarianism, diverge from it in interesting ways and seem to warrant further study
Der Begriff der Notwendigkeit in der Antike und in der Gegenwart
Authors: Meixner Uwe 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
This paper has two parts. The first part (sections 1 to 5) is historical, presenting a brief history of the concept of necessity from the time of antiquity to the present. It is shown that the conceptions of necessity in antiquity had four main sources: matter-necessity, form-necessity, efficiencynecessity, and purpose-necessity. Special attention is accorded to the syncretistic concept of the necessity of fate, and its transformations from the beginning of antiquity to its end. Moreover, it is pointed out that already in antiquity we find the conception of proofnecessity, and the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic necessity. At present, of the original four main sources of conceptions of necessity, three have dried up, leaving only form-necessity still active. The second part of the paper (sections 6 to 9) is dedicated to the development of a rigorous theory of form-necessity (or nomological necessity, broadly conceived), at the end of which a skeptical note is struck regarding laws of nature
Contentless Syntax, Ineffable Semantics, and Transcendental Ontology. Reflections on Wittgenstein's Tractatus
Authors: Chrudzimski Arkadiusz 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Wittgenstein's Tractatus [6] contains some very striking theses. We read, e.g., that \in a sense" we could not be wrong in logic, and that the whole subject matter of the theory of modalities could be reconstructed on the ground of the insights in the mechanism of the linguistic reference. Yet in the light of the last sentences of Tractatus the whole semantics turns out to be principally ineffable. In our paper we will try to clarify these matters. We show how these theses could be made plausible in the context of the transcendental method of Wittgenstein's Tractatus.
A Neo-Hintikkan Theory of Attitude Ascriptions
Authors: Alward Peter 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In the paper, I develop what I call the “Neo-Hintikkan theory” of belief sentences. What is characteristic of this approach is that the meaning of an ascription is analyzed in terms of the believer’s “epistemic alternatives”: the set of worlds compatible with how the believer takes the world to be. The Neo-Hintikkan approach proceeds by assuming that (1) individuals in believers’ alternatives can share spatio-temporal parts with actual individuals, and (2) ascribers can refer to individuals in believer’s alternatives in virtue of their perceptual or causal interaction with the spatio-temporal parts these “believed individuals” share with actual individuals. The guiding idea underlying this view is that the source of substitutivity failure in certain central cases is that believers have put the spatio-temporal parts of the objects they have encountered together in the wrong way.
Realism, Naturalism, and Pragmatism: A Closer Look at the Views of Quine and Devitt
Authors: Caruso Gregg 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Michael Devitt's views on realism and naturalism have a lot in common with those of W.V. Quine. Both appear to be realists; both accept naturalized epistemology and abandon the old goal of first philosophy; both view philosophy as continuous with the empirical procedures of science and hence view metaphysics as similarly empirical; and both seem to view realism as following from naturalism. Although Quine and Devitt share quite a bit ideologically, I think there is a deeper, more fundamental dissimilarity between the two. I will explore the difference between them in an attempt to bring out the subtle complexities surrounding the issue of realism{complexities, I will argue, Devitt sometimes overlooks. I will also explore a real tension in Quine between his earlier, more pragmatic (or anti-realist) tendencies and his later, more austere realism. I will conclude by defending a more Quinean brand of realism I call internal realism.
Zu Bolzanos Kritik der Kantischen Antinomien
Authors: Siitonen Arto 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Bernard Bolzano criticised Kant's philosophy so vehemently that his pupil Franz Prihonsky called him "Anti-Kant". One of his criticisms concerns Kant's cosmological antinomies. The context of this critique is the problem of limits of knowledge. Kant wanted to prove that there are such boundaries, and to show where these are located. In this paper we will (i) schematize Kant's antinomies (to see what Bolzano really criticised on them) and (ii) summarize Bolzano's criticism, which is distributed over his and his student's work. At the beginning we will work out the (more fundamental) theoretical differences between Kant's and Bolzano's philosophy to see what roles these play in the construction of the antinomies.
Der Hauptsatz der Smullyanmengen
Authors: Zimmermann Alexander 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this article we prove step by step the main theorem of Smullyan sets. This main theorem says that each element of a Smullyan set is simultaneously satisfiable in a semantic system of model sets
and therefore also, for example, in a semantic system of truth sets as well as in a semantic system according to Henkin. After that, we prove the semantical compactness of a propositional logic
system as an example of a utilisation of Smullyan sets and its main theorem.
Finkishness, Frankfurt-Szenarien und die konditionale Analyse von Fähigkeit
Authors: Schälike Julius 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The conditional analysis interprets power/capability as disposition and gives it a counterfactual analysis. The phenomenon of finkishness poses a problem for this account. I argue that the conditional analysis has to be modified in order to solve these problems. The new analysis, I claim, is well suited to deal with Frankfurt-style scenarios as well, which conditional analyses are frequently thought to be incapable of.
How (Not) to Justify Induction
Authors: Jacquette Dale 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
A conceptual analysis of the problem of induction suggests that the difficulty of justifying probabilistic reasoning depends on a mistaken comparison between deductive and inductive inference.
Inductive reasoning is accordingly thought to stand in need of special justification because it does not measure up to the standard of conditional absolute certainty guaranteed by deductive validity. When comparison is made, however, it appears that deductive reasoning is subject to a counterpart argument that is just as threatening to the justification of deductive as to inductive inference. Trying to explain induction in such a way that it satisfies a special justificatory requirement in contrast with deduction is
therefore not the way to justify induction. An alternative approach is sought in a style of justification developed by Aristotle for the law of noncontradiction and by Kant for the conclusions of transcendental reasoning that with variations can be used to justify both deduction and induction. This strategy upholds a
principle when the principle must be presupposed even to raise doubts about the principle's justification.
A Critique of the Incentives Argument for Inequalities
Authors: Seeger Max 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
According to the incentives argument, inequalities in material goods are justifiable if they are to the benefit of the worst off members of society. In this paper, I point out what is easily overlooked, namely that inequalities are justifiable only if they are to the overall benefit of the worst off, that is, in terms of both material and social goods. I then address the question how gains in material goods can be weighed against probable losses in social goods. The ultimate criterion, so my idea, is how these gains and
losses affect a person's ability to reach her goals in life. Based on the idea that goals in life cannot be taken as given, I conclude that the absolute material gains are negligible compared to the losses of
social goods and the disadvantage in the relative position caused by material inequalities.
Karl Poppers problematische Sichtweise der Induktion
Authors: Hoerster Norbert 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Karl Popper's well-known refusal of induction consists of three theses which have to be distinguished clearly: the thesis of deduction, the thesis of rationality, and the thesis of use. Whereas
the first thesis is correct, the second thesis is pretty questionable and the third thesis is definitely false. It will be argued that Popper himself does not adhere to the second and third thesis consequently, insofar he thinks that practical induction is legitimate whereas theoretical induction is not. Further it will be shown that
Popper's presentation of David Hume's thoughts on induction is inadequate.
Treating the Enhancement Debate: Irrelevant Distinctions in the Enhancement Medicine Debate
Authors: Roberts Joseph Tarquin Foulkes 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
This article argues against the relevance of the enhancement/treatment and biomedical/non-biomedical enhancement distinctions by analysing their validity in two ways: their clarity and whether they track our intuitions regarding what is permissible and impermissible. The treatment/enhancement distinction is found to be deficient in both respects. The biomedical/non-biomedical distinction, whilst clear, does not track our intuitions regarding what is permissible and impermissible. The article concludes that, in order to help the enhancement medicine debate, the distinctions should be abandoned due to the fact they hinder clear ethical analysis.
Can the ‘Theory of Mind’ Hypothesis Survive, Given Theoretical Insights Derived from the Study of Autism? A Response to Hacking and McGeer
Authors: Cull Matthew 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper I agree with both Ian Hacking and Victoria McGeer that the ‘Theory of Mind’ theory (ToM) is fundamentally flawed. However, I find reasons to reject both of their critiques of ToM as incoherent and instead build upon certain parts of McGeer’s work to develop my own rejection of ToM. I end by suggesting routes this rejection might take the philosophy of psychology down
Dawid et al.’s [2015] No Alternatives Argument: an empiricist note
Authors: Basshuysen Philippe van 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In a recent paper [2], Dawid, Hartmann and Sprenger claim to prove the possibility of non-empirical theory confirmation via the No Alternatives Argument. In this note, I argue that from an empiricist point of view, their "proof" begs the question in the sense that it cannot convince someone who has not already been convinced of non-empirical theory confirmation before
The Layer Cake Model of the World and Non-Reductive Physicalism
Authors: Baxendale Matthew 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper I argue that non-reductive physicalism (NRP) continues to rely on the ontological aspect of the layer cake model of the world (LCM). NRP is a post-unity account of the relationship between phenomena in the world in the sense that it has been developed in response to the perceived failure of the unity of science thesis. The LCM constitutes a framework for the organisation of phenomena in the world. It articulates the idea that phenomena in the world are organised into levels. Specifically, that phenomena are layered into distinct, hierarchical levels of organisation. Historically, the unity of science thesis and the LCM have been intertwined; the LCM being the framework within which a unity of science might be possible. My argument will demonstrate that, despite a move away from unity of science positions, the LCM persists in post-unity accounts. In order to argue for this thesis, I present a close analysis of Oppenheim & Putnam's classic presentation of the LCM; picking out the principle of hierarchic compositionality which, I argue, captures the ontological aspect of the LCM. I then demonstrate how NRP continues to rely upon the principle and, as a result, continues to support the ontological aspect of the LCM. This result is significant. It shows that whilst the rejection of the reductionist aspect of the thesis has served as the basis for post-unity positions these positions do not engage directly with the framework within which reduction might be facilitated - the LCM. Furthermore, it demonstrates that pluralist or disunity accounts of the relationship between phenomena in the world will also have to engage directly with the framework of the LCM in order to avoid being merely anti-reductionist.
Carnap's Logic of Science and Reference to the Present Moment
Authors: Fischer Florian 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The important switch from the so-called old B-theory to the new tenseless theory of time (NTT), which had significant implications for the field of tense and indexicals, occurred after Carnap's era. Against this new background, Carnap's original inter-translatability thesis can no longer be upheld. The most natural way out would be to modify Carnap's position according to the NTT; but this is not compatible with Carnap's metaphysi- cal neutrality thesis. Even worse, Carnap's work on measurement theory can be used to develop an argument in favour of the A-theory. I argue that there are tensed basic sentences which are needed in order to construct a tenseless system and thus cannot be translated without loss of meaning into tenseless ones (old B-theory) or made true by tenseless facts (NTT).
Erkenntnisbasis und Intersubjektivitat. Moritz Schlick und Béla Juhos uber Konstatierungen
Authors: Friedl Johannes 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
When Schlick introduced his theory of "Konstatierungen" in the Vienna Circle's Protocol-Sentence Debate, the sole other member of the Circle who took part on his side was his former disciple Béla Juhos. However, Juhos' own conception, developed in full extend only later, differs in important respects from the one of his teacher. Both conceptions are critically examined in the first part of this paper. The second part is devoted to an examination of the charge that such basic propositions are by all means useless because of incommunicability.
The Modal Argument against Nominal Description Theory
Authors: Raclavský Jiří 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The paper examines Loar's and Bach's defence of Nominal Description Theory against Kripkean Modal Argument (MA). Using formal tools of hyperintensional logic, I discriminate three kinds of nominal description which are possible substitutes for a proper name, thus considering various readings of the MA. On its natural understanding, the MA is valid { contrary to what Loar and Bach say. On the other hand, the soundness of the MA remains doubtful, as pointed out already by Loar and Bach
Worrall zu Theorienunterbestimmtheit und Strukturenrealismus: Wirklich kein Problem?
Authors: Leerhoff Holger 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In the debate of scientific realism, the argument from underdeter- mination of theories by evidence is put forward by the antirealist side. According to this argument, for any scientific theory rival theories can be found which are equally well supported by the evidence but incompatible with the original theory. Structural realism is a form of realism that limits the realistic belief in the existence of the entities and structures talked about in scientific theories: Only the structures of reality are relevant in an epistemic sense and responsible for the truth and falsehood of theories. In the light of the antirealistic arguments, structural realism is supposed to have clear advantages over other varieties of scientific realism. In particular, Worrall ([21]) argues that structural realism is immune against the argument from underdetermination. I will sketch Worrall's line of argument in a more systematic manner and conclude that it is based on some problematic preconditions
The Inexpressibility Objection
Authors: Costantini Filippo 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
In this paper, we offer a contribution to the discussion of one of the most important objections against a relativist position in the absolute generality debate. The inexpressibility objection accuses the generality-relativist of not being able to coherently express her own position. First, we examine Glanzberg's attempt to reply to this objection and we show that it fails. Second, we study the prospects of generalizing the relativist position. In particular, we analyze Fine's and Linnebo's modal approaches and we argue that, even though they are able to coherently express one of the core ideas of relativism while avoiding the inexpressibility objection, there is an important sense in which they are no longer relativist positions. Third, while strengthening the idea that the inexpressibility objection does succeed, we argue that this is no guarantee of the falsity of relativism. Relativism may be inexpressible but true. However, we stress that even if the inexpressibility objection does not supply a definitive, knock-down objection against relativism, if we want to discuss relativism in a rational way, the objection offers a compelling reason not to embrace generality-relativism.
Do Categorical Properties Confer Dispositions on Their Bearers?
Authors: Livanios Vassilis 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Categorical Monism (that is, the view that all fundamental natural properties are purely categorical) has recently been challenged by a number of philosophers. In this paper, I examine a challenge which can be based on Gabriele Contessa's [10] defence of the view that only powers can confer dispositions. In his paper Contessa argues against what he calls the Nomic Theory of Disposition Conferral (NTDC). According to NTDC, in each world in which they exist, (categorical) properties confer specific dispositions on their bearers; yet, which disposition a (categorical) property confers on its bearers depends on what the (contingent) laws of nature happen to be. Contessa, inter alia, rests his case on an intuitive analogy between cases of mimicking (in which objects do not actually possess the dispositions associated with their displayed behaviour) and cases of disposition conferral through the action of laws. In this paper, I criticize various aspects of Contessa's argumentation and show that the conclusion he arrives at (that is, only powers can confer dispositions) is controversial.
Against an Identity Criterion for Fictional Ersatz Realism
Authors: Meier Timo 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Fictional ersatz realism is the metaphysical stance that abstract fictional entities exist and are dependent on fiction and literary practices. Everett [4] tackled the position of ersatz realism by claiming that the ersatz realist cannot provide an identity criterion for fictional entities that does not imply a contradiction. Al- though Woodward [20] proposed a defense to Everett's argument, I will argue that ersatz realism is no tenable position, as it still cannot provide an adequate identity criterion. To establish this result, I will provide a base frame for identity criteria available to the ersatz realist. Afterwords, I will show that to any identity criterion the ersatz realist may propose there is a story such that a fictional entity corresponding to this story is not self-identical, imposing a contradiction to the metaphysical account of ersatz realism.
Emergence of Public Meaning from a Teleosemantic and Game Theoretical Perspective
Authors: Baraghith Karim 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
The generalized theory of evolution suggests that evolutionary algorithms apply to biological and cultural processes like language alike. Variation, selection and reproduction constitute abstract and formal traits of complex, open and often self-regulating systems. Accepting this basic assumption provides us with a powerful background methodology for this investigation: explaining the emergence and proliferation of semantic patterns, that become conventional. A teleosemantic theory of public (conventional) meaning (Millikan 1984; 2005) grounded in a generalized theory of evolution explains the proliferation of public language forms in terms of their adaptive proper function. It has also been suggested, that the emergence of meaning, can be formalized with game-theoretical tools (Skyrms 2010) within signaling systems of coordination. I want to show how closely related these approaches are, both in terms of explanandum and of outcomes. To put it in a nutshell: If the emergence of public meaning can be satisfyingly explained in terms of signaling games, then the cultural evolutionary dynamics will serve as an adequate model to describe their proliferation. Public or conventional meaning (in contrast to personal meaning) can be fully understood in terms of its evolutionary function in a population of communicators. Furthermore, I want to argue how this understanding of conventional meaning could lead us to a strong semantic holism
Optimistic Realism over Selectivism
Authors: Park Seungbae 
Published: September 2022

Abstract
Selectivism holds that some theoretical contents of most present theories will be preserved in future theories. By contrast, optimistic realism holds that most theoretical contents of most present theories will be preserved in future theories. I construct a pessimistic induction over selectivists to undermine selectivism, and an optimistic induction over optimistic realists to support optimistic realism. The former holds that since the selectivists of the early twentieth century were overly cautious about their present theories, those of the early twenty-first century are also overly cautious about their present theories. The latter holds that since the optimistic realists of the early twentieth century were right about their present theories, those of the early twentyfirst century are also right about their present theories