bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
HOW TO BE OMNIPRESENT
Authors: Cowling Sam , Cray Wesley D. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Attributions of omnipresence, most familiar within the philosophy of religion, typically take the omnipresence of an entity to either consist in that entity’s occupation of certain regions or be dependent upon other of that entity’s attributes, such as omnipotence or omniscience. This paper defends an alternative conception of omnipresence that is independent of other purported divine attributes and dispenses with occupation. The resulting view repurposes the metaphysics of necessitism and permanentism, taking omnipresent entities to be those entities that exist at all regions. This view is then shown to best accommodate attributions of omnipresence to a diverse range of metaphysical posits, like abstract entities, and a more diverse class of religious posits.
NORMS OF CREDIBILITY
Authors: Lackey Jennifer 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
In this paper, I explore whether there is a need for a multiplicity of norms governing belief due to differences in the objects of those beliefs, particularly the difference between persons and nonpersons. I call the view according to which there is a single epistemic norm governing belief monism, and the view that there is more than one such noun pluralism. I consider three different kinds of objections to monism that stem specifically from considerations unique to assessing the credibility of persons, along with corresponding pluralist proposals. I argue not only that all of the criticisms of monism fail, but also that the proposed pluralist norms face significant problems of their own. In so doing, the aim of the paper is to clear the path for there being a single epistemic norm governing belief, despite there being important epistemic differences between how we ought to treat persons and nonpersons.
A REFINED ACCOUNT OF THE "EPISTEMIC GAME": EPISTEMIC NORMS, TEMPTATIONS, AND EPISTEMIC COOPERATION
Authors: Henderson David , Graham Peter 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
In "Epistemic Norms and the ’Epistemic Game’ They Regulate" (2017, 367—382), we advance a general case for the idea that epistemic norms regulating the production of beliefs might usefully be understood as social norms. There, we drew on the influential account of social norms developed by Cristina Bicchieri, and we managed to give a crude recognizable picture of important elements of what are recognizable as central epistemic norms. Here, we consider much needed elaboration, suggesting (again, highly idealized) models that help one think about epistemic communities and, ultimately, the temptations confronted in one’s epistemic life. We suggest that once "the epistemic game" is embedded into a wider set of gains and losses, one can understand the epistemic choice situation as a form of mixed-motive game. This allows one to understand epistemic games more straightforwardly using Bicchieri’s framework for thinking about social norms. That is, once the choice situation denominated only in terms of classical epistemic gains and losses is embedded in a wider accounting of goods that may compete with the production of true beliefs, one can see how an agent’s individual and community epistemic project can be furthered by social norms regulating epistemic practices. We recommend thinking of epistemic norms as analogous to social norms for hygiene.
ACCIDENTS UNMOORED
Authors: Heil John 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
The essence of an accident consists in its relationship (dispositione) to a substance. For we should not imagine that an accident is a thing in its own right to which gets attached a relationship or a link (respectus) to a substance in which that accident exists. For if so, an accident would be something in its own right, dependent on substance only as extrinsic, and on this view, an accident could be cognized apart from the substance. These outcomes are impossible, however. Hence, what an accident is to something of the substance: either a measure (as a quantity is), or a state (as a quality is), and so on. Thus, the Philosopher says that an accident has being only because it belongs to something that has being (Oriel ms. 33 in Donati, Utram Accidens, 600 quoted in Pasnau 2011, p. 185).
BERGMANN’S UNIVERSAL REALISM: WITH AND WITHOUT FUNDAMENTAL TIE
Authors: Tegtmeier Erwin 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Bergmann advocated a universal realism different from that of Plato. His universals are different, and the fundamental tie connecting universals to particulars is also in many respects different from Plato’s participation. Since Bergmann takes universals to be perceptible, it makes sense to argue empirically for the existence of the fundamental tie of exemplification. He holds that exemplification ties universals and particulars together into facts. However, finally he drops fundamental ties and attributes to diads of diversity the togetherness of universals and particulars, though he is very reluctant to give up the principle that complexes need ties to give them unity. Analyzing the ontological tradition, Bergmann claims that it mostly mistook a function for a fundamental tie.
A SPECULATIVE SOLUTION TO THE INSTANTIATION AND STRUCTURE PROBLEMS FOR UNIVERSALS
Authors: Forrest Peter 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Typical structural universals are not just the mereological sum of their constituents. Hence, there is the Structure Problem of explaining this non-mereological structure. The Instantiation Problem is that the predicate "U is instantiated by x, y, etc., in that order" is ill-suited to be a primitive, unanalyzed predicate. The proposed solution to these problems is based on the observation that if universal U is said to supervene upon universals V, W, etc., then it is the instantiation of U that supervenes on the instantiation of V, W, etc. Assuming there are few subvenient universals, which is admittedly a speculation, their instantiation may be explained in ways that would be uneconomic if there were too many.
THE BASING RELATION AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE DEBASING DEMON
Authors: Bondy Patrick , Carter J. Adam 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Descartes’ demon is a deceiver: the demon makes things appear to you other than as they really are. However, as Descartes famously pointed out in the Second Meditation, not all knowledge is imperiled by this kind of deception. You still know you are a thinking thing. Perhaps, though, there is a more virulent demon in epistemic hell, one from which none of our knowledge is safe. Jonathan Schaffer (2010) thinks so. The "debasing demon" he imagines threatens knowledge not via the truth condition on knowledge, but via the basing condition. This demon can cause any belief to seem like it’s held on a good basis, when it’s really held on a bad basis. Several recent critics grant Schaffer the possibility of such a debasing demon, and argue that the skeptical conclusion doesn’t follow. By contrast, we argue that on any plausible account of the epistemic basing relation, the "debasing demon" is impossible. Our argument for why this is so gestures, more generally, to the importance of avoiding common traps by embracing mistaken assumptions about what it takes for a belief to be based on a reason.
RECENT WORK ON TRUST AND TESTIMONY
Authors: McMyler Benjamin , Ogungbure Adebayo 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Epistemologists have recently started appealing to the moral philosophy literature on interpersonal trust in order to help explain the epistemology of testimony. We argue that epistemologists who have given trust a significant role in their accounts of the epistemology of testimony have appealed to very different conceptions of the nature of trust, which have inevitably influenced the shape of their epistemological theorizing. Some have employed accounts of the nature of interpersonal trust according to which trust is a practical phenomenon subject to the will and to practical reasoning. Such accounts face the task of showing how the practical phenomenon that is interpersonal trust has epistemic implications for testimonial belief. Other theorists have employed accounts of the nature of interpersonal trust according to which trust is at least partly a cognitive phenomenon, itself subject to epistemic norms. Such accounts do not face the task of showing how practical rationality has implications for theoretical reason. Instead, they face the rather different tasks of showing how it is that cognitive trusting bears genuinely interpersonal features, and of how theoretical rationality can share features with practical rationality.
PAINFULNESS, DESIRE, AND THE EUTHYPHRO DILEMMA
Authors: Brady Michael S. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
The traditional desire view of painfulness maintains that pain sensations are painful because the subject desires that they not be occurring. A significant criticism of this view is that it apparently succumbs to a version of the Euthyphro Dilemma: the desire view, it is argued, is committed to an implausible answer to the question of why pain sensations are painful. In this paper, I explain and defend a new desire view, and one which can avoid the Euthyphro Dilemma. This new view maintains that painfulness is a property, not of pain sensations, but of a pain experience, understood as a relational state constituted by a pain sensation and a desire that the sensation not be occurring.
INTENTION AND PREDICTION IN MEANS-END REASONING
Authors: White Stephen J. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
How, if at all, does one’s intention to realize an end bear on the justification for taking the means to that end? Theories that allow that intending an end directly provides a reason to take the means are subject to a well-known "bootstrapping" objection. On the other hand, "anti-psychologistic" accounts—which seek to derive instrumental reasons directly from the reasons that support adopting the end itself—have unacceptable implications where an agent faces multiple rationally permissible options. An alternative, predictive, role for intention in means-end reasoning is considered and rejected. A new proposal is then developed, according to which instrumental reasons are not merely reasons to perform an act necessary for a given end, but to perform the act for the sake of that end.
HOW TO FORMULATE ARGUMENTS FROM EASY KNOWLEDGE, AND MAYBE HOW TO RESIST THEM
Authors: Jackson Alexander 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Arguments from "easy knowledge" are meant to refute a class of epistemological views, including foundationalism about perceptual knowledge. I present arguments from easy knowledge in their strongest form, and explain why other formulations in the literature are inferior. I criticize two features of Stewart Cohen’s presentation (2002, 2005), namely his focus on knowing that one’s faculties are reliable, and his use of a Williamson-style closure principle. Rather, the issue around easy knowledge must be understood using a notion of epistemic priority. Roger White’s presentation (2006) is contaminated by the so-called lottery puzzle, which is best kept separate. Distinguishing basic from non-basic visual contents limits the force of the examples discussed by Cohen, White, and Crispin Wright (2007). Finally, I present a new strategy for resisting even the best-formulated arguments from easy knowledge.
METAPHYSICS AND THE PARONYMY OF NAMES
Authors: Lycan William G. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Paronymy—ambiguity that is not sheer ambiguity—is underdiscussed by philosophers of language. And hardly anyone has noticed that proper names are paronymous; different occurrences of a single name have slightly and subtly different referents. This paper invokes that fact to illuminate some issues in metaphysics: a puzzle about fictional characters; Jennifer Saul’s phenomenon of referential opacity in the absence of opacity-inducing operators; the relation between persons and bodies; death; personal identity through time; and Peter Ludlow’s argument for the zany claim that the distinction between fiction and actuality is merely contextual.
CONCEPTUAL DISAGREEMENT
Authors: Stroud Sarah 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Can you disagree with someone without thinking that what they say (or think) is false? As we shall see, this is not only possible but quite frequent. Starting with the type of disagreement most familiar from the philosophical literature, we will progressively expand the circle of genuine disagreement until it encompasses even conceptual disagreement, which might sound like a contradiction in terms. For conceptual disagreement necessarily involves the parties’ using different concepts, which one might think would preclude genuine disagreement. We shall argue otherwise, adducing three different types of case in order to demonstrate the scope of this phenomenon.
MASTERING MARY
Authors: Rabin Gabriel Oak 
Published: February 2022

AbstractI make three claims about the interactions between concept mastery and the knowledge argument. First, I argue that, contra Ball (2013), the concept mastery response to the knowledge argument does not suffer from the heterogeneity of concept mastery. Second, I argue that, when doing metaphysics by relating propositions on the basis of whether a hypothetical agent who knew a base collection could infer a target proposition, it is legitimate to rely on propositions that are not contained in the base, as long as those propositions are required for mastery of relevant concepts. One upshot is that, when checking whether the physical truths a priori entail the consciousness truths, it is fair game to rely on substantive truths about consciousness. Third, I argue that the only version of the knowledge argument that has any hope of succeeding against physicalism completely lacks the argument’s driving intuition: that Mary learns something new when she emerges from the black and white room.
A CAPACITY ACCOUNT OF MEMORY
Authors: Salvaggio Mary 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
In this paper I argue for a capacity account of memory, according to which memory is a neurocognitive capacity to encode, store, and retrieve information. Phenomenal accounts classify memory as having a certain phenomenal character. However, the mental processes generating that phenomenal character are separate from the processes that generate content. Causal accounts require a causal connection between the subject’s current representation and their original representation. However, when memory is constructed, this connection does not exist. Unlike its major competitors, the capacity account picks out an epistemically interesting class of memory beliefs while accommodating the constructive nature of memory.
PRACTICAL IDENTITY AND DUTIES TO THE SELF
Authors: Schofield Paul 
Published: February 2022

AbstractIn this paper, I appeal to the notion of practical identity in order to defend the possibility of synchronic duties to the self—that is, self-directed duties focused on one’s present self as opposed to one’s future self. While many dismiss the idea of self-directed duties, I show that a person may be morally required to act in ways that advance her present interests and autonomy by virtue of her occupying multiple practical identities at a single moment.
THE END OF MYSTERY
Authors: Baron Sam , Colyvan Mark 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
Tim travels back in time and tries to kill his grandfather before his father was born. Tim fails. But why? Lewis’s response was to cite “coincidences”: Tim is the unlucky subject of gun jammings, banana peels, sudden changes of heart, and so on. A number of challenges have been raised against Lewis’s response. The latest of these focuses on explanation. This paper diagnoses the source of this new disgruntlement and offers an alternative explanation for Tim’s failure, one that Lewis would not have liked. The explanation is an obvious one but controversial, so it is defended against all the objections that can be mustered.
EACH THING IS FUNDAMENTAL
Authors: Fiocco M. Oreste 
Published: February 2022

AbstractEach thing is fundamental. Not only is no thing any more or less real than any other, but no thing is prior to another in any robust ontological sense. Thus, no thing can explain the very existence of another, nor account for how another is what it is. This surprising conclusion is reached by undermining two important positions in contemporary metaphysics: hylomorphism and hierarchical views employing so-called building relations, such as grounding. The paper has three main parts. First, it is observed that hylomorphism is alleged by its proponents to solve various philosophical problems. However, it is demonstrated, in light of a compelling account of explanation, that these problems are actually demands to explain what cannot be but inexplicable. Second, it is shown how the argument against hylomorphism illuminates an account of the essence of a thing, thereby providing insight into what it is to exist. This indicates what a thing, in the most general sense, must be and a correlative account of the structure in reality. Third, it is argued that this account of structure is incompatible not only with hylomorphism, but also with any hierarchical view of reality. Although hylomorphism and the latter views are quite different, representing distinct philosophical traditions, it is maintained that they share untenable accounts of structure and fundamentality and so should be rejected on the same grounds.
THE “NEGATION PROBLEM” FOR METAETHICAL ERROR THEORY
Authors: Pravato Giulia 
Published: February 2022

AbstractThis paper investigates an objection often raised against metaethical error theory. The challenge runs as follows. Metaethical error theory says that all substantive ethical sentences are false. But if a sentence p is false, then given a standard semantics for “not,” ¬p must be true, and vice versa. On the face of it, one can’t hold that p and ¬p are both false. After presenting a more refined version of the challenge (in the form of a set of initially plausible and yet jointly inconsistent principles), the paper examines a common way out of the puzzle, finds it unsatisfactory, and offers some alternative escape routes that, it is submitted, fare better than the standard one.
SUPEREROGATION AND THE CASE AGAINST AN “OVERALL OUGHT”
Authors: Ventham Elizabeth 
Published: February 2022

AbstractThis paper argues against a kind of “overall ought.” The main argument is a version of the paradox of supererogation. The problem is this: obligating an agent to do what’s overall best will, when that differs from what’s they morally ought to do, obligate the agent to not do what’s they morally ought to. This, the paper will argue, is implausible. For each of four possible interpretations of this overall ought concept, it will either come across a form of this paradox or no longer look like the targeted “overall ought” concept at all.
RECENT WORK ON EPISTEMIC ENTITLEMENT
Authors: Graham Peter J. , Pedersen Nikolaj J. L. L. 
Published: February 2022

AbstractTyler Burge and Crispin Wright distinguish between justification and entitlement. For both entitlement is the new notion. For Burge, entitlement is warrant without reasons. Burge’s account of reasons is explained. For Wright, entitlement is a non-evidential right to claim knowledge of authenticity-conditions. Wright’s account is motivated by warrant transmission failure. Burge and Wright mean different things by entitlement; they do not share a common project. Burge’s use connects to mainstream epistemological inquiry into knowledge and warrant. Wright’s use connects to mainstream epistemology inquiry into skepticism and warrant transmission. Recent work from and about both is discussed. Among other results, it is shown that Burge’s distinction is not a version of the internalism vs. externalism distinction. For Burge, both justifications and entitlements are externalist.
HUME ON THE DEFEASIBLE JUSTIFICATION OF THE VULGAR BELIEF IN BODY
Authors: Sasser Nathan 
Published: February 2022

AbstractI argue that the vulgar belief in continued and distinct existences, as Hume describes it in Treatise 1.4.2, “Of Scepticism with Regard to the Senses,” is defeasibly justified. Prior to and apart from the rebutting defeater that Hume brings forward as an argument from perceptual relativity in paragraphs 44 and 45, the vulgar belief is perfectly in order, philosophically speaking. For Hume, a belief is defeasibly justified if and only if it is produced by permanent, irresistible, and universal principles of the imagination. The vulgar belief meets these conditions and thus is defeasibly justified—even though it suffers eventual defeat.
CONNOTATION AND FREGE’S SEMANTIC DUALISM
Authors: Hicks Michael R. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
The traditional distinction between Millian and Fregean theories of names presupposes that what Mill calls ‘connotation’ lines up with what Frege calls ‘sense.’ This presupposition is false. Mill’s talk of connotation is an attempt to bring into view the line of thought that crystallizes in Frege’s distinction between concept and object. This latter is the semantic dualism of my title.
C. I. LEWIS WAS A FOUNDATIONALIST AFTER ALL
Authors: Klemick Griffin 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
While C. I. Lewis was traditionally interpreted as an epistemological foundationalist throughout his major works, virtually every recent treatment of Lewis’s epistemology dissents. But the traditional interpretation is correct: Lewis believed that apprehensions of “the given” are certain independently of support from, and constitute the ultimate warrant for, objective empirical beliefs. This interpretation proves surprisingly capable of accommodating apparently contrary textual evidence. The non-foundationalist reading, by contrast, simply cannot explain Lewis’s explicit opposition to coherentism and his insistence that only apprehensions of the given enable us to answer the regress problem—and so vindicate the possibility of empirical justification.
MEANING MAKING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE ACADEMIC ARENA: INVESTIGATING THE CONTEXTUALITY OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN COLLEGE STUDENTS
Authors: Pizzolato Jane Elizabeth 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
By investigating undergraduates’ epistemological orientations and processes in academic and personal contexts, this study examined whether and how epistemological development in one context is related to development in another context. It is difficult to know how holistic epistemological development is. Our findings suggest there are contextual differences in students’ epistemologies.
GENERAL EDUCATION COURSES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA: APPLICATION OF THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION IN MEASURING COURSE OUTCOMES
Authors: Garg Deepti , Garg Ajay K. 
Published: February 2022

Abstract
This study applied the Theory of Reasoned Action and the Technology Acceptance Model to measure outcomes of general education courses under the University of Botswana Computer and Information Skills program. An exploratory model was validated for responses from 298 students. The results have implications for course design and resource utilization.