bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Bayesian and frequentist analysis of True and Error models
Authors: Birnbaum Michael H. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractBirnbaum and Quispe-Torreblanca (2018) presented a frequentist analysis of a family of six True and Error (TE) models for the analysis of two choice problems presented twice to each participant. Lee (2018) performed a Bayesian analysis of the same models, and found very similar parameter estimates and conclusions for the same data. He also discussed some potential differences between Bayesian and frequentist analyses and interpretations for model comparisons. This paper responds to certain points of possible controversy regarding model selection that attempt to take into account the concept of flexibility or complexity of a model. Reasons to question the use of Bayes factors to decide among models differing in fit and complexity are presented. The partially nested inter-relations among the six TE models are represented in a Venn diagram. Another view of model complexity is presented in terms of possible sets of data that could fit a model rather than in terms of possible sets of parameters that do or do not fit a given set of data. It is argued that less complex theories are not necessarily more likely to be true, and when the space of all possible theories is not well-defined, one should be cautious in interpreting calculated posterior probabilities that appear to prove a theory to be true.
Lay understanding of probability distributions
Authors: Goldstein Daniel G. , Rothschild David 
Published: January 2023

AbstractHow accurate are laypeople’s intuitions about probability distributions of events? The economic and psychological literatures provide opposing answers. A classical economic view assumes that ordinary decision makers consult perfect expectations, while recent psychological research has emphasized biases in perceptions. In this work, we test laypeople’s intuitions about probability distributions. To establish a ground truth against which accuracy can be assessed, we control the information seen by each subject to establish unambiguous normative answers. We find that laypeople’s statistical intuitions can be highly accurate, and depend strongly upon the elicitation method used. In particular, we find that eliciting an entire distribution from a respondent using a graphical interface, and then computing simple statistics (such as means, fractiles, and confidence intervals) on this distribution, leads to greater accuracy, on both the individual and aggregate level, than the standard method of asking about the same statistics directly.
The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations
Authors: van de Calseyde Philippe P. F. M. , Keren Gideon , Zeelenberg Marcel 
Published: January 2023

AbstractAn insurance policy may not only affect the consequences for victims but also for perpetrators. In six experiments we find that people recommend milder punishments for perpetrators when the victim was insured, although people believe that a sentence should not depend on the victim’s insurance status. The robustness of this effect is demonstrated by showing that recommendations can even be more lenient for crimes that are in fact more serious but in which the victim was insured. Moreover, even when harm was possible but did not materialize, people still prefer to punish crimes less severely when the (potential) victim was insured. The final two experiments suggest that the effect is associated with a change in (1) compassion for the victim and (2) perceived severity of the transgression. Implications of this phenomenon are briefly discussed.
Improving dynamic decision making through training and self-reflection
Authors: Donovan Sarah J. , Güss C. Dominik , Naslund Dag 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe modern business environment requires managers to make effective decisions in a dynamic and uncertain world. How can such dynamic decision making (DDM) improve? The current study investigated the effects of brief training aimed at improving DDM skills in a virtual DDM task. The training addressed the DDM process, stressed the importance of self-reflection in DDM, and provided 3 self-reflective questions to guide participants during the task. Additionally, we explored whether participants low or high in self-reflection would perform better in the task and whether participants low or high in self-reflection would benefit more from the training. The study also explored possible strategic differences between participants related to training and self-reflection. Participants were 68 graduate business students. They individually managed a computer-simulated chocolate production company called CHOCO FINE and answered surveys to assess self-reflection and demographics. Training in DDM led to better performance, including the ability to solve initial problems more successfully and to make appropriate adjustments to market changes. Participants’ self-reflection scores also predicted performance in this virtual business company. High self-reflection was also related to more consistency in planning and decision making. Participants low in self-reflection benefitted the most from training. Organizations could use DDM training to establish and promote a culture that values self-reflective decision making.
The curious tale of Julie and Mark: Unraveling the moral dumbfounding effect
Authors: Royzman Edward B. , Kim Kwanwoo , Leeman Robert F. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe paper critically reexamines the well-known “Julie and Mark” vignette, a stylized account of two college-age siblings opting to engage in protected sex while vacationing abroad (e.g., Haidt, 2001). Since its inception, the story has been viewed as a rhetorically powerful validation of Hume’s “sentimentalist” dictum that moral judgments are not rationally deduced but arise directly from feelings of pleasure or displeasure (e.g., disgust). People’s typical reactions to the vignette are alleged to support this view by demonstrating that individuals are prone to becomemorally dumbfounded(Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Bjorklund, & Murphy, 2000), i.e., they tend to “stubbornly” maintain their disapproval of the act without supporting reasons. In what follows, we critically reassess the traditional account, predicated on the notion that, among other things, most subjects simply fail to be convinced that the siblings’ actions are truly harm-free, thus having excellent reasons to disapprove of these acts. In line with this critique, 3 studies found that subjects 1) tendednotto believe that the siblings’ actions were in fact harmless; 2) notwithstanding that, and in spite of holding a number of “counterargument-immune” reasons, subjects could be effectively maneuvered into exhibiting all the trademark signs of a morally dumbfounded state (which they subsequently recanted), and 3) with subjects’ beliefs about harm and standards of normative evaluation properly factored in, a more rigorous assessment procedure yielded a dumbfounding estimate of about 0. Based on these and related results, we contend that subjects’ reactions are wholly in line with the rationalist model of moral judgment and that their use in support of claims of moral arationalism should be reevaluated.
It pays to be nice, but not really nice: Asymmetric reputations from prosociality across 7 countries
Authors: Klein Nadav , Grossmann Igor , Uskul Ayse K. , Kraus Alexandra A. , Epley Nicholas 
Published: January 2023

AbstractCultures differ in many important ways, but one trait appears to be universally valued: prosociality. For one’s reputation, around the world, it pays to be nice to others. However, recent research with American participants finds that evaluations of prosocial actions are asymmetric—relatively selfish actions are evaluated according to the magnitude of selfishness but evaluations of relatively generous actions are less sensitive to magnitude. Extremely generous actions are judged roughly as positively as modestly generous actions, but extremely selfish actions are judged much more negatively than modestly selfish actions (Klein & Epley, 2014). Here we test whether this asymmetry in evaluations of prosociality is culture-specific. Across 7 countries, 1,240 participants evaluated actors giving various amounts of money to a stranger. Along with relatively minor cross-cultural differences in evaluations of generous actions, we find cross-cultural similarities in the asymmetry in evaluations of prosociality. We discuss implications for how reputational inferences can enable the cooperation necessary for successful societies.
Willingness to test for BRCA1/2 in high risk women: Influenced by risk perception and family experience, rather than by objective or subjective numeracy?
Authors: Miron-Shatz Talya , Hanoch Yaniv , Katz Benjamin A. , Doniger Glen M. , Ozanne Elissa M. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractGenetic testing for breast and ovarian cancer can help target prevention programs, and possibly reduce morbidity and mortality. A positive result ofBRCA1/2is a substantial risk factor for breast and ovarian cancer, and its detection often leads to risk reduction interventions such as increased screening, prophylactic mastectomy and oophorectomy. We examined predictors of the decision to undergo cancer related genetic testing: perceived risk, family risk of breast or ovarian cancer, and numeracy as predictors of the decision to test among women at high risk of breast cancer. Stepwise regression analysis of survey responses from 459 women registered in the Cancer Genetics Network revealed greater likelihood to test for women with more family history, higher perceived risk of mutation, or Ashkenazi descent. Neither subjective nor objective numeracy was associated with the decision to test, although we replicated an earlier finding that subjective numeracy predicted willingness to pay for testing. Findings underscore the need for genetic counselling that disentangles risk perception from objective information to promote better decision-making in the context of genetic testing. Highlighting these factors is crucial for public health campaigns, as well as to clinic-based testing and direct-to-consumer testing.
Is loss-aversion magnitude-dependent? Measuring prospective affective judgments regarding gains and losses
Authors: Mukherjee Sumitava , Sahay Arvind , Pammi V. S. Chandrasekhar , Srinivasan Narayanan 
Published: January 2023

AbstractProspect Theory proposed that the (dis)utility of losses is always more than gains due to a phenomena called ‘loss-aversion’, a result obtained in multiple later studies over the years. However, some researchers found reversed or no loss-aversion for affective judgments of small monetary amounts but, those findings have been argued to stem from the way gains versus losses were measured. Thus, it was not clear whether loss-aversion does not show with affective judgments for smaller magnitudes, or it is a measurement error. This paper addresses the debate concerning loss-aversion (in the prospect theoretic sense) and judgments about the intensity of gains and losses. We measured affective prospective judgments for monetary amounts using measurement scales that have been argued to be suitable for measuring loss-aversion and hence rule out any explanations regarding measurement. Both in a gambling scenario (Experiments 1 and 2) and in the context of fluctuating prices (Experiments 3a and 3b), potential losses never loomed larger than gains for low magnitudes, indicating that it is not simply a measurement error. Moreover, for the same participant, loss aversion was observable at high magnitudes. Further, we show that loss-aversion disappears even for higher monetary values, if contextually an even larger anchor is provided. The results imply that Prospect Theory’s value function is contextually dependent on magnitudes.
Outcomes and expectations in dilemmas of trust
Authors: Evans Anthony M. , Krueger Joachim I. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractRational trust decisions depend on potential outcomes and expectations of reciprocity. In the trust game, outcomes and expectations correspond to the structural factors of risk and temptation. Two experiments investigated how risk and temptation influenced information search and final decisions in the trust game. The central finding was that trustors underemphasized temptation relative to its effects on the expected value of trust. Instead, trustors made decisions egocentrically, focusing on potential outcomes. In Experiment 1, information search data revealed that trustors often made decisions without learning about the payoffs related to temptation. Experiment 2 investigated whether trustors were able to use temptation to form accurate expectations of reciprocity. Trustors understood, but underestimated, the relationship between temptation and the probability of reciprocity. Moreover, they did not fully consider expectations in their final trust decisions. Changes in potential outcomes had larger effects on trust than comparable changes in expectations. These results suggest that levels of trust are too high when the probability of reciprocity is low and too low when that probability is high.
A signal detection theory analysis of racial and ethnic disproportionality in the referral and substantiation processes of the U.S. child welfare services system
Authors: Mumpower Jeryl L. , McClelland Gary H. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractSignal detection theory (SDT) was developed to analyze the behavior of a single judge but also can be used to analyze decisions made by organizations or other social systems. SDT quantifies the ability to distinguish between signal and noise by separating accuracy of the detection system from response bias—the propensity to over-warn (too many false positives) or under-warn (too many misses). We apply SDT techniques to national and state-level data sets to analyze the ability of the child welfare services systems to detect instances of child maltreatment. Blacks have higher rates of referral and the system is less accurate for them than for Whites or Hispanics. The incidence of false positives—referrals leading to unsubstantiated findings—is higher for Blacks than for other groups, as is the incidence of false negatives—children for whom no referral was made but who are in fact neglected or abused. The rate of true positives–children for whom a referral was made and for whom the allegation was substantiated–is higher for Blacks. Values of d′ (signal strength) are roughly the same for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics but there are pronounced group differences in C (a measure of the location of the decision threshold). Analyses show that the child welfare services system treats Blacks differently from Hispanics and Whites in ways that cannot be justified readily in terms of objective measures of group differences. This study illustrates the potential for JDM techniques such as SDT to contribute to understanding of system-level decision making processes.
Forecasting forecasts: The trend effect
Authors: Hohle Sigrid Møyner , Teigen Karl Halvor 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPeople often make predictions about the future based on trends they have observed in the past. Revised probabilistic forecasts can be perceived by the public as indicative of such a trend. In five studies, we describe experts who make probabilistic forecasts of various natural events (effects of climate changes, landslide and earthquake risks) at two points in time. Prognoses that have been upgraded or downgraded from T1 to T2 were in all studies expected to be updated further, in the same direction, later on (at T3). Thus, two prognoses were in these studies enough to define a trend, forming the basis for future projections. This “trend effect” implies that non-experts interpret recent forecast in light of what the expert said in the past, and think, for instance, that a “moderate” landslide risk will cause more worry if it has previously been low than if it has been high. By transcending the experts’ most recent forecasts the receivers are far from conservative, and appear to know more about the experts’ next prognoses than the experts themselves.
The influence of identifiability and singularity in moral decision making
Authors: Wiss Johanna , Andersson David , Slovic Paul , Västfjäl Daniel , Tinghög Gustav 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThere is an increased willingness to help identified individuals rather than non-identified, and the effect of identifiability is mainly present when a single individual rather than a group is presented. However, identifiability and singularity effects have thus far not been manipulated orthogonally. The present research uses a joint evaluation approach to examine the relative contribution of identifiability and singularity in moral decision-making reflecting conflicting values between deontology and consequentialism. As in trolley dilemmas subjects could either choose to stay with the default option, i.e., giving a potentially life-saving vaccine to a single child, or to actively choose to deny the single child the vaccine in favor of five other children. Identifiability of the single child and the group of children was varied between-subjects in a 2x2 factorial design. In total 1,232 subjects from Sweden and the United States participated in three separate experiments. Across all treatments, in all three experiments, 32.6% of the subjects chose to stay with the deontological default option instead of actively choosing to maximize benefits. Results show that identifiability does not always have a positive effect on decisions in allocation dilemmas. For single targets, identifiability had a negative or no effect in two out of three experiments, while for the group of targets identifiability had a more stable positive effect on subjects’ willingness to allocate vaccines. When the effect of identifiability was negative, process data showed that this effect was mediated by emotional reactance. Hence, the results show that the influence of identifiability is more complex than it has been previously portrayed in the literature on charitable giving.
How many calories were in those hamburgers again? Distribution density biases recall of attribute values
Authors: Choplin Jessica M. , Wedell Douglas H. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractDecisions that consumers make often rest on evaluations of attributes, such as how large, expensive, good, or fattening an option seems. Extant research has demonstrated that these evaluations in turn depend upon the recently experienced distribution of attribute values (e.g., positively or negatively skewed). In many situations decisions rely on recalling the attribute values of each option, a process that has been neglected in much of the previous literature. In two experiments, participants learned attribute information for labeled stimuli presented within either a positively or negatively skewed distribution and then they recalled values from labels after approximately one minute. The results demonstrated effects that are inconsistent with predictions of the category-adjustment model (Duffy, Huttenlocher, Hedges & Crawford, 2010) that recalled values would shift toward the mean of the distribution of values presented. Instead, results were consistent with predictions of the comparison-induced distortion model (Choplin & Hummel, 2002) that remembered values would depend on the density of stimuli within the attribute range. Reasons for these results, alternative models, and implications for decision-making are discussed.
It’s not fair: Folk intuitions about disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversion
Authors: Shaw Alex , Choshen-Hillel Shoham 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPeople often object to inequity; they react negatively to receiving less than others (disadvantageous inequity aversion), and more than others (advantageous inequity aversion). Here we study people’s folk intuitions about inequity aversion: what do people infer about others’ fairness concerns, when they observe their reactions to disadvantageous or advantageous inequity? We hypothesized that, people would not intuitively regard disadvantageous inequity aversion by itself as being rooted in fairness, but they would regard advantageous inequity aversion by itself as being rooted in fairness. In four studies, we used vignettes describing inequity aversion of a made up alien species to assess people’s folk intuitions about inequity aversion. The studies supported our main hypothesis that disadvantageous inequity aversion, without advantageous inequity aversion, does not fit people’s folk conception of fairness. Instead, participants reported it to be rooted in envy. According to these results, the claim that disadvantageous inequity aversion reveals a concern with fairness, does not readily accord with people’s intuitions. We connect these findings to other pieces of evidence in the literatures of behavioral economics, developmental psychology, and social psychology, indicating that lay people’s intuitions may be on the mark in this case. Specifically, unlike advantageous inequity aversion, disadvantageous inequity aversion need not be rooted in a sense of fairness.
When imagining future wealth influences risky decision making
Authors: Greenberg Adam Eric 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe body of literature on the relationship between risk aversion and wealth is extensive. However, little attention has been given to examining how future realizations of wealth might affect (current) risk decisions. Using paired lottery choice experiments and exposing subjects experimentally to imagined future wealth frames, I find that individuals are more risk-seeking if they are asked to imagine that they will be wealthy in the future. Yet I find that individuals are not significantly more risk-averse if they are asked to imagine that they will be poor in the future. I discuss theoretical and policy implications of these findings, including why savings rates are so low in the United States.
American’s desire for less wealth inequality does not depend on how you ask them
Authors: Norton Michael I. , Ariely Dan 
Published: January 2023

AbstractA large body of survey research offers evidence that citizens are not always fully aware of the economic and political realities in their respective countries. Norton and Ariely (2011) extended this research to the domain of wealth inequality, showing that Americans were surprisingly unaware of the shape of the wealth distribution in America. Using an alternative methodology, Eriksson and Simpson (2012) found that asking Americans to estimate the average wealth of quintiles, rather than the percent of wealth owned by each quintile, led to relatively more accurate estimates. We note, however, that the Eriksson and Simpson (2012) results do not challenge Norton and Ariely’s (2011) conclusion that Americans desire a much more equal distribution of wealth.
The available evidence suggests the percent measure should not be used to study inequality: Reply to Norton and Ariely
Authors: Eriksson Kimmo , Simpson Brent 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn this reply, we reiterate the main point of our 2012 paper, which was that the measure of inequality used by Norton and Ariely (2011) was too difficult for it to yield meaningful results. We describe additional evidence for this conclusion, and we also challenge the conclusion that political differences in perceived and desired inequality are small.