bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
What have I just done? Anchoring, self-knowledge, and judgments of recent behavior
Authors: Cheek Nathan N. , Coe-Odess Sarah , Schwartz Barry 
Published: January 2023

AbstractCan numerical anchors influence people’s judgments of their own recent behavior? We investigate this question in a series of six studies. In Study 1, subjects’ judgments of how many anagrams they were given assimilated to numerical anchors. Subjects’ judgments of how many math problems they correctly solved and how many stairs they had just walked up were also influenced by numerical anchors (Studies 2A and 3A), and this occurred even when the anchors were extreme and nonsensical (Studies 2B and 3B). Thus, our first five studies showed that anchors can affect people’s judgments of their own recent behavior. Finally, in Study 4, we tested the hypothesis that self-knowledge, despite not eliminating anchoring effects, does still attenuate anchoring. However, we found no evidence that self-knowledge reduced anchoring: subjects’ judgments of their own recent behavior and subjects’ judgments of other people’s recent behavior were equally influenced by anchors. We discuss implications of these findings for research on domain knowledge and anchoring, as well as for research on the malleability of memory.
When less is more in the recognition heuristic
Authors: Smithson Michael 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe “less is more effect” (LIME) occurs when a recognition-dependent agent has a greater probability of choosing the better item than a more knowledgeable agent who recognizes more items. Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) define α as the probability that a correct choice is made on the basis of recognition alone and β the probability that a correct choice is made when both items are recognized (via additional cues). They claim that a LIME occurs if α > β (α > 1/2) and α and β remain constant as the number of recognized items, n, varies. In fact, it can be shown that neither of these parameters generally remains constant as n varies, and neither of them are simple functions of n. Therefore, a new theoretical basis for the LIME is needed. This paper provides mathematical results for understanding when the LIME can occur and elucidates implications of these results. The major findings presented here are as follows:Demonstrations that the LIME can occur when α ≤ β and fail to occur when α > β, and derivation of the conditions for these co-occurrences;A new characterization of the conditions under which the LIME occurs;Generalizations of this characterization to handle imperfect recognition; andCharacterization of when the LIME occurs as more items become recognized.The primary implication of these results is that the advantage of the recognition cue depends not only on cue validities, but also on the order in which items are learned. This realization, in turn, suggests that research in this area should incorporate a more dynamic focus on learning and memory processes, and the effects of reputational information.
Physiological arousal in processing recognition information: Ignoring or integrating cognitive cues?
Authors: Hochman Guy , Ayal Shahar , Glöckner Andreas 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe recognition heuristic (RH; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) suggests that, when applicable, probabilistic inferences are based on a noncompensatory examination of whether an object is recognized or not. The overall findings on the processes that underlie this fast and frugal heuristic are somewhat mixed, and many studies have expressed the need for considering a more compensatory integration of recognition information. Regardless of the mechanism involved, it is clear that recognition has a strong influence on choices, and this finding might be explained by the fact that recognition cues arouse affect and thus receive more attention than cognitive cues. To test this assumption, we investigated whether recognition results in a direct affective signal by measuring physiological arousal (i.e., peripheral arterial tone) in the established city-size task. We found that recognition of cities does not directly result in increased physiological arousal. Moreover, the results show that physiological arousal increased with increasing inconsistency between recognition information and additional cue information. These findings support predictions derived by a compensatory Parallel Constraint Satisfaction model rather than predictions of noncompensatory models. Additional results concerning confidence ratings, response times, and choice proportions further demonstrated that recognition information and other cognitive cues are integrated in a compensatory manner.
The day after the disaster: Risk-taking following large- and small-scale disasters in a microworld
Authors: Liang Garston , Rakow Tim , Yechiam Eldad , Newell Ben R. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractUsing data from seven microworld experiments (N = 841), we investigated how participants reacted to simulated disasters with different risk profiles in a microworld. Our central focus was to investigate how the scale of a disaster affected the choices and response times of these reactions. We find that one-off large-scale disasters prompted stronger reactions to move away from the affected region than recurrent small-scale adverse events, despite the overall risk of a disaster remaining constant across both types of events. A subset of participants are persistent risk-takers who repeatedly put themselves in harm’s way, despite having all the experience and information required to avoid a disaster. Furthermore, while near-misses prompted a small degree of precautionary movement to reduce one’s subsequent risk exposure, directly experiencing the costs of the disaster substantially increased the desire to move away from the affected region. Together, the results point to ways in which laboratory risk-taking tasks can be used to inform the kinds of communication and interventions that seek to mitigate people’s exposure to risk.
Response time and decision making: An experimental study
Authors: Rubinstein Ariel 
Published: January 2023

AbstracResponse time is used here to interpret choice in decision problems. I first establish that there is a close connection between short response time and choices that are clearly a mistake. I then investigate whether a correlation also exists between response time and behavior that is inconsistent with some standard theories of decision making. The lack of such a correlation could be interpreted to imply that such behavior does not reflect a mistake. It is also shown that a typology of slow and fast responders may, in some cases, be more useful than the standard typologies.
Preference-driven biases in decision makers’ information search and evaluation
Authors: Chaxel Anne-Sophie , Russo J. Edward , Kerimi Neda 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWhile it is well established that the search for information after a decision is biased toward supporting that decision, the case of preference-supporting search before the decision remains open. Three studies of consumer choices consistently found a complete absence of a pre-choice bias toward searching for preference-supporting information. The absence of this confirming search bias occurred for products that were both hedonic and utilitarian, both expensive and inexpensive, and both high and low in expected brand loyalty. Experiment 3 also verified the presence of the expected post-choice search bias to support the chosen alternative. Therefore the absence of a pre-choice search bias in all three studies was not likely to be due to our using a method that was so insensitive that a search bias would not be observed under any circumstances. In addition to the absence of an effect of prior preferences on information selection, subjects’ self-reported search strategies exhibited a clear tendency toward a balance of positive and negative information. Across the three studies, we also tested for the presence of a preference-supporting bias in the evaluation of the information acquired in the search process. This evaluation bias was found both pre- and post-choice.
Myopic loss aversion: Potential causes of replication failures
Authors: Klos Alexander 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThis paper presents two studies on narrow bracketing and myopic loss aversion. The first study shows that the tendency to segregate multiple gambles is eliminated if subjects face a certainty equivalent or a probability equivalent task instead of a binary choice. The second study argues that the behavioral differences previously attributed entirely to myopic loss aversion are partly because long-term return properties are simply easier to grasp if the return information is already provided in the form of long-term returns rather than one-year returns. Both results may be related to recent failures to replicate myopic loss aversion. When the choice situation is structured in such a way that it draws respondents’ attention to the final outcome distribution and/or if severe misestimations of long-term returns based on short-term return information are unlikely, behavioral differences consistent with myopic loss aversion are less likely to be observed.
Are neoliberals more susceptible to bullshit?
Authors: Sterling Joanna , Jost John T. , Pennycook Gordon 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWe conducted additional analyses of Pennycook et al.’s (2015, Study 2) data to investigate the possibility that there would be ideological differences in “bullshit receptivity” that would be explained by individual differences in cognitive style and ability. As hypothesized, we observed that endorsement of neoliberal, free market ideology was significantly but modestly associated with bullshit receptivity. In addition, we observed a quadratic association, which indicated that ideological moderates were more susceptible to bullshit than ideological extremists. These relationships were explained, in part, by heuristic processing tendencies, faith in intuition, and lower verbal ability. Results are inconsistent with approaches suggesting that (a) there are no meaningful ideological differences in cognitive style or reasoning ability, (b) simplistic, certainty-oriented cognitive styles are generally associated with leftist (vs. rightist) economic preferences, or (c) simplistic, certainty-oriented cognitive styles are generally associated with extremist (vs. moderate) preferences. Theoretical and practical implications are briefly addressed.
Information asymmetry in decision from description versus decision from experience
Authors: Hadar Liat , Fox Craig R. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn this paper we investigate the claim that decisions fromexperience(in which the features of lotteries are learned through a sampling process) differ from decisions fromdescription(in which features of lotteries are explicitly described). We find that the experience-description gap is not as robust as has been previously assumed. We argue that when this gap appears it is driven to a large extent by asymmetries in information concerning which events are possible and which are certain. First, we find that, when experience-based decision makers sample events without error and then are told what outcomes are associated with each possible event, they are risk seeking for low-probability gains and risk averse for high-probability gains, as in description-based decision making. Second, we find that the experience-description gap for low-probability outcomes appears when rare outcomes are never experienced but disappears when: 1) all distinct outcomes are experienced at least once or 2) never-experienced outcomes are described as possibilities. Third, we find that the experience-description gap for high-probability outcomes is pronounced when decision makers previously experience lotteries that both offered the possibility of a zero outcome (which presumably makes them doubt that an always-experienced outcome is certain), but disappears when they have not previously experienced such lotteries.
The effect of consumer ratings and attentional allocation on product valuations
Authors: Ashby Nathaniel J.S. , Walasek Lukasz , Glöckner Andreas 
Published: January 2023

AbstractOnline marketplaces allow consumers to leave reviews about the products they purchase, which are visible to potential customers and competitors. While the impact of reviews on valuations of worth and purchasing decisions has been intensively studied, little is known about how the reviews themselves are attended to, and the relation between attention and valuations. In three studies we use eye-tracking methodologies to investigate attention in subjective monetary valuations of consumer goods. We find that, when evaluating consumer goods, individuals’ attention to ratings are related to their frequencies, attention to positive or negative information is related to subjective valuations, and that perspective (owner vs. non-owner) influences the type of information attended to. These findings extend previous research regarding the valuations of risky prospects as implemented in abstract monetary gambles and suggest that similar cognitive processes might underlie both types of tasks.
The coexistence of overestimation and underweighting of rare events and the contingent recency effect
Authors: Barron Greg , Yechiam Eldad 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPrevious research demonstrates overestimation of rare events in judgment tasks, and underweighting of rare events in decisions from experience. The current paper presents three laboratory experiments and a field study that explore this pattern. The results suggest that the overestimation and underweighting pattern can emerge in parallel. Part of the difference between the two tendencies can be explained as a product of a contingent recency effect: Although the estimations reflect negative recency, choice behavior reflects positive recency. A similar pattern is observed in the field study: Immediately following an aversive rare-event (i.e., a suicide bombing) people believe the risk decreases (negative recency) but at the same time exhibit more cautious behavior (positive recency). The rest of the difference is consistent with two well established mechanisms: judgment error and the use of small samples in choice. Implications for the two-stage choice model are discussed.
Exploiting moral wiggle room: Illusory preference for fairness? A comment
Authors: Larson Tara , Capra C. Monica 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWe designed an experiment to test the robustness of Dana, Weber, and Kuang’s (DWK), 2007 results. DWK observed that, when participants were given a “costless” way — the click of a button — to ignore the consequences of their actions on others’ payoffs, they chose to remain ignorant and fair behavior diminished. By implementing a double-blind experiment together with a design that controls for alternative explanations for the observed behavior, we confirmed DWK’s findings.
New paradoxes in intertemporal choice
Authors: Rao Li-Lin , Li Shu 
Published: January 2023

AbstractSimilar to research on risky choice, the traditional analysis of intertemporal choice takes the view that an individual behaves so as to maximize the discounted sum of all future utilities. The well-known Allais paradox contradicts the fundamental postulates of maximizing the expected value or utility of a risky option. We describe a violation of the law of diminishing marginal utility as well as an intertemporal version of the Allais paradox.
The effect of military service on soldiers’ time preferences — Evidence from Israel
Authors: Lahav Eyal , Benzion Uri , Shavit Tal 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe current field study compares the time preferences of young adults of similar ages but in two very different environments, one more dangerous and uncertain than the other. Soldiers, college students and a control group of teenagers answered questionnaires about their time preferences. During mandatory service, soldiers live in a violent atmosphere where they face great uncertainty about the near future and high risk of mortality (measured by probability of survival). University students and teenagers live in much calmer environment and are tested for performance only periodically. The soldier-subjects show relatively high subjective discount rates when compared to the other two groups. We suggest that the higher subjective discount rate among soldiers can be the result of high perceived risk in the army as an institution, or higher mortality risk.
Biased calculations: Numeric anchors influence answers to math equations
Authors: Smith Andrew R. , Windschitl Paul D. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPeople must often perform calculations in order to produce a numeric estimate (e.g., a grocery-store shopper estimating the total price of his or her shopping cart contents). The current studies were designed to test whether estimates based on calculations are influenced by comparisons with irrelevant anchors. Previous research has demonstrated that estimates across a wide range of contexts assimilate toward anchors, but none has examined estimates based on calculations. In two studies, we had participants compare the answers to math problems with anchors. In both studies, participants’ estimates assimilated toward the anchor values. This effect was moderated by time limit such that the anchoring effects were larger when the participants’ ability to engage in calculations was limited by a restrictive time limit.
Relative thinking in consumer choice between differentiated goods and services and its implications for business strategy
Authors: Azar Ofer H. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe article shows that when people consider differentiated goods or services that differ in price and quality, they exhibit a decision-making bias of “relative thinking”: relative price differences affect them even when economic theory suggests that only absolute price differences matter. This result is obtained in four different consumption categories. Sometimes subjects are affected only by relative price differences (“full relative thinking”) and sometimes also by absolute price differences (“partial relative thinking”). This behavior has implications for various disciplines, and it is particularly relevant in models dealing with horizontal or vertical differentiation, optimal pricing, competitive strategy, or advertising.
The role of process data in the development and testing of process models of judgment and decision making
Authors: Schulte-Mecklenbeck Michael , Kühberger Anton , Ranyard Rob 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe aim of this article is to evaluate the contribution of process tracing data to the development and testing of models of judgment and decision making (JDM). We draw on our experience of editing the “Handbook of process tracing methods for decision research” recently published in the SJDM series. After a brief introduction we first describe classic process tracing methods (thinking aloud, Mouselab, eye-tracking). Then we present a series of examples of how each of these techniques has made important contributions to the development and testing of process models of JDM. We discuss the issue of large data volumes resulting from process tracing and remedies for handling those. Finally, we argue for the importance of formulating process hypotheses and opt for a multi-method approach that focuses on the cross-validation of findings.
A shift in strategy or “error”? Strategy classification over multiple stochastic specifications
Authors: Davis-Stober Clintin P. , Brown Nicholas 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWe present a classification methodology that jointly assigns to a decision maker a best-fitting decision strategy for a set of choice data as well as a best-fitting stochastic specification of that decision strategy. Our methodology utilizes normalized maximum likelihood as a model selection criterion to compare multiple, possibly non-nested, stochastic specifications of candidate strategies. In addition to single strategy with “error” stochastic specifications, we considermixturespecifications, i.e., strategies comprised of a probability distribution over multiple strategies. In this way, our approach generalizes the classification framework of Bröder and Schiffer (2003a). We apply our methodology to an existing dataset and find that some decision makers are best fit by a single strategy with varying levels of error, while others are best described as using a mixture specification over multiple strategies.
Cognitive ability and risk aversion: A systematic review and meta analysis
Authors: Lilleholt Lau 
Published: January 2023

AbstractAre highly intelligent people less risk averse? Over the last two decades scholars have argued the existence of a negative relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion. Although numerous studies support this, the link between cognitive ability and risk aversion has not been found consistently. To shed new light on this topic, a systematic review and meta-analysis was conducted. A total of 97 studies were identified and included for meta-analysis in the domain of gains (N=90, 723), 41 in the mixed domain (N=50, 936), and 12 in the domain of losses (N=4, 544). Results indicate that there exists a weak, but significant negative relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion in the domain of gains. However, no relationship was observed in the mixed domain or in the domain of losses. Several meta-regressions were performed to investigate the influence of moderator variables. None of the moderator variables were found to consistently influence the relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion across the domain of gains, mixed and losses. Moreover, no significant difference was observed between males and females across all three domains. In conclusion, this systematic review and meta-analysis provides new evidence that the relationship between cognitive ability and risk aversion is domain specific and not as strong as suggested by some previous studies.
The devil you know: The effect of brand recognition and product ratings on consumer choice
Authors: Thoma Volker , Williams Alwyn 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPrevious research on the role of recognition in decision-making in inferential choice has focussed on the Recognition Heuristic (RH), which proposes that in situations where recognition is predictive of a decision criterion, recognized objects will be chosen over unrecognized ones, regardless of any other available relevant information. In the current study we examine the role of recognition in preferential choice, in which subjects had to choose one of a pair of consumer objects that were presented with quality ratings (positive, neutral, and negative). The results showed that subjects’ choices were largely based on recognition, as the famous brand was preferred even when additional star ratings rendered it as less attractive. However, the additional information did affect the proportion of chosen famous items, in particular in the cases when star ratings for the recognised brand were negative. This condition also resulted in longer response times compared to neutral and positive conditions. Thus, the current data do not point to a simple compensatory mechanism in preferential choice: although choice is affected by additional information, it seems that recognition is employed as an initial important first step in the decision-making process.