bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Expert and novice sensitivity to environmental regularities in predicting NFL games
Authors: Montgomery Lauren E. , Lee Michael D. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWe study whether experts and novices differ in the way they make predictions about National Football League games. In particular, we measure to what extent their predictions are consistent with five environmental regularities that could support decision making based on heuristics. These regularities involve the home team winning more often, the team with the better win-loss record winning more often, the team favored by the majority of media experts winning more often, and two others related to surprise wins and losses in the teams’ previous game. Using signal detection theory and hierarchical Bayesian analysis, we show that expert predictions for the 2017 National Football League (NFL) season generally follow these regularities in a near optimal way, but novice predictions do not. These results support the idea that using heuristics adapted to the decision environment can support accurate predictions and be an indicator of expertise.
Development of decision making based on internal and external information: A hierarchical Bayesian approach
Authors: Zadelaar Jacqueline N. , Rentergem Joost A. Agelink van , Schaaf Jessica V. , Dekkers Tycho J. , Vent Nathalie de , Dekkers Laura M. S. , Olthof Maria C. , Jansen Brenda R. J. , Huizenga Hilde M. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn decision making, people may rely on their own information as well as on information from external sources, such as family members, peers, or experts. The current study investigated how these types of information are used by comparing four decision strategies: 1) an internal strategy that relies solely on own information; 2) an external strategy that relies solely on the information from an external source; 3) a sequential strategy that relies on information from an external source only after own information is deemed inadequate; 4) an integrative strategy that relies on an integration of both types of information. Of specific interest were individual and developmental differences in strategy use. Strategy use was examined via Bayesian hierarchical mixture model analysis. A visual decision task was administered to children and young adolescents (N=305, ages 9–14). Individual differences but no age-related changes were observed in either decision accuracy or strategy use. The internal strategy was dominant across ages, followed by the integrative and sequential strategy, respectively, while the external strategy was extremely rare. This suggests a reluctance to rely entirely on information provided by external sources. We conclude that there are individual differences but not developmental changes in strategy use pertaining to perceptual decision-making in 9- through 14-year-olds. Generalizability of these findings is discussed with regard to different forms of social influence and varying perceptions of the external source. This study provides stepping stones in better understanding and modeling decision making processes in the presence of both internal and external information.
Success stories cause false beliefs about success
Authors: Lifchits George , Anderson Ashton , Goldstein Daniel G. , Hofman Jake M. , Watts Duncan J. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractMany popular books and articles that purport to explain how people, companies, or ideas succeed highlight a few successes chosen to fit a particular narrative. We investigate what effect these highly selected “success narratives” have on readers’ beliefs and decisions. We conducted a large, randomized, pre-registered experiment, showing participants successful firms with founders that all either dropped out of or graduated college, and asked them to make incentive-compatible bets on a new firm. Despite acknowledging biases in the examples, participants’ decisions were very strongly influenced by them. People shown dropout founders were 55 percentage points more likely to bet on a dropout-founded company than people who were shown graduate founders. Most reported medium to high confidence in their bets, and many wrote causal explanations justifying their decision. In light of recent concerns about false information, our findings demonstrate how true but biased information can strongly alter beliefs and decisions.
Incentivized and non-incentivized liking ratings outperform willingness-to-pay in predicting choice
Authors: Hascher Joshua , Desai Nitisha , Krajbich Ian 
Published: January 2023

AbstractA core principle in decision science is that people choose according to their subjective values. These values are often measured using unincentivized scales with arbitrary units (e.g., from 0 to 10) or using incentivized willingness-to-pay (WTP) with dollars and cents. What is unclear is whether using WTP actually improves choice predictions. In two experiments, we compare the effects of three different subjective valuation procedures: an unincentivized rating scale, the same scale with incentives, and incentivized WTP. We use these subjective values to predict behavior in a subsequent binary food-choice task. The unincentivized rating task performed better than the incentivized WTP task and no worse than the incentivized rating task. These findings challenge the view that subjective valuation tasks need to be incentivized. At least for low-stakes decisions, commonly used measures such as WTP may reduce predictive power.
Selection effects on dishonest behavior
Authors: Houdek Petr , Bahník Štěpán , Hudík Marek , Vranka Marek 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn many situations people behave ethically, while elsewhere dishonesty reigns. Studies of the determinants of unethical behavior often use random assignment of participants in various conditions to identify contextual or psychological factors influencing dishonesty. However, in many real-world contexts, people deliberately choose or avoid specific environments. In three experiments (total N = 2,124) enabling self-selection of participants in two similar tasks, one of which allowed for cheating, we found that participants who chose the task where they could lie for financial gain reported a higher number of correct predictions than those who were assigned it at random. Introduction of financial costs for entering the cheating-allowing task led to a decrease in interest in the task; however, it also led to more intense cheating. An intervention aimed to discourage participants from choosing the cheating-enabling environment based on social norm information did not have the expected effect; on the contrary, it backfired. In summary, the results suggest that people low in moral character are likely to eventually dominate cheating-enabling environments, where they then cheat extensively. Interventions trying to limit the preference of this environment may not have the expected effect as they could lead to the selection of the worst fraudsters.
Beyond “fake news”: Analytic thinking and the detection of false and hyperpartisan news headlines
Authors: Ross Robert M. , Rand David G. , Pennycook Gordon 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWhy is misleading partisan content believed and shared? An influential account posits that political partisanship pervasively biases reasoning, such that engaging in analytic thinking exacerbates motivated reasoning and, in turn, the acceptance of hyperpartisan content. Alternatively, it may be that susceptibility to hyperpartisan content is explained by alackof reasoning. Across two studies using different participant pools (total N = 1,973 Americans), we had participants assess true, false, and hyperpartisan news headlines taken from social media. We found no evidence that analytic thinking was associated with judging politically consistent hyperpartisan or false headlines to be accurate and unbiased. Instead, analytic thinking was, in most cases, associated with an increased tendency to distinguish true headlines from both false and hyperpartisan headlines (and was never associated with decreased discernment). These results suggest that reasoning typically helps people differentiate between low and high quality political news, rather than facilitate belief in misleading content. Because social media play an important role in the dissemination of misinformation, we also investigated willingness to share headlines on social media. We found a similar pattern whereby analytic thinking was not generally associated with increased willingness to share hyperpartisan or false headlines. Together, these results suggest a positive role for reasoning in resisting misinformation.
Do discounts mitigate numerological superstitions? Evidence from the Russian real estate market
Authors: Burakov Dmitry 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn this paper I investigate the impact of numerological superstitions and discounts’ effect on the buyers’ behavior in the apartment market using actual sales data. Based on the dataset from Moscow primary real estate market, which includes 40 buildings, we test the apartments buyers’ demand on lucky 7thfloor and unlucky 13thfloor in comparison to neighboring floors and its response to developers’ discount policy for the apartments on the 13thfloor. Results of the random-effects model for the preference towards 7thfloor show that that “good luck” effect is present at the 90% confidence interval. Results of the mixed-effects model for the preference towards the 13thfloor’s apartments show that in case of discount moderation, the “bad luck” effect of the 13thfloor is mitigated, while in case of “no discount” buildings we find the clear negative effect of the 13thfloor.
Kenneth R. Hammond’s contributions to the study of judgment and decision making
Authors: Dhami Mandeep K. , Mumpower Jeryl L. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractKenneth R. Hammond (1917–2015) made several major contributions to the science of human judgment and decision making. As a student of Egon Brunswik, he kept Brunswik’s legacy alive – advancing his theory of probabilistic functionalism and championing his method of representative design. Hammond pioneered the use of Brunswik’s lens model as a framework for studying how individuals use information from the task environment to make clinical judgments, which was the precursor to much ‘policy capturing’ and ‘judgment analysis’ research. Hammond introduced the lens model equation to the study of judgment processes, and used this to measure the utility of different forms of feedback in multiple-cue probability learning. He extended the scope of analysis to contexts in which individuals interact with one another – introducing the interpersonal learning and interpersonal conflict paradigms. Hammond developed social judgment theory which provided a comprehensive quantitative approach for describing and improving judgment processes. He proposed cognitive continuum theory which states that quasi-rationality is an important middle-ground between intuition and analysis and that cognitive performance is dictated by the match between task properties and mode of cognition. Throughout his career, Hammond moved easily from basic laboratory work to applied settings, where he resolved policy disputes, and in doing so, he pointed to the dichotomy between theories of correspondence and coherence. In this paper, we present Hammond’s legacy to a new generation of judgment and decision making scholars.
Learning psychology from riddles: The case of stumpers
Authors: Bar-Hillel Maya , Noah Tom , Frederick Shane 
Published: January 2023

AbstractRiddles can teach us psychology when we stop to consider the psychological principles that make them “work”. This paper studies a particular class of riddles that we callstumpers, and provides analysis of the various principles (some familiar, some novel) that inhibit most people from finding the correct solution – oranysolution – even though they find the answers obvious ex post. We restrict our analysis to four stumpers, propose the psychological antecedents of each, and provide experimental support for our conjectures.
Affect and prosocial behavior: The role of decision mode and individual
processing style
Authors: Gärtner Manja , Andersson David , Västfjäll Daniel , Tinghög Gustav 
Published: January 2023

Abstract
We study the effects of experimental manipulation of decision mode
(rational “brain” vs. affective “heart”) and individual difference in
processing styles (intuition vs. deliberation) on prosocial behavior. In a
survey experiment with a diverse sample of the Swedish population
(n = 1,828), we elicited the individuals’
processing style and we experimentally manipulated reliance on affect or
reason, regardless of subjects’ preferred mode. Prosocial behavior was
measured across a series of commonly used and incentivized games (prisoner’s
dilemma game, public goods game, trust game, dictator game). Our results
show that prosocial behavior increased for the affective (“heart”) decision
mode. Further, individual differences in processing style did not predict
prosocial behavior and did not interact with the experimental
manipulation.
“When in Rome”: Identifying social norms using coordination games
Authors: Krupka Erin L. , Weber Roberto , Crosno Rachel T. A. , Hoover Hanna 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPrevious research in economics, social psychology, and sociology has produced compelling evidence that social norms influence behavior. In this paper we apply the Krupka and Weber (2013) norm elicitation procedure and present U.S. and non-U.S. born subjects with two scenarios for which tipping and punctuality norms are known to vary across countries. We elicit shared beliefs by having subjects match appropriateness ratings of different actions (such as arriving late or on time) to another randomly selected participant from the same university or to a participant who is born in the same country. We also elicit personal beliefs without the matching task. We test whether the responses from the coordination task can be interpreted as social norms by comparing responses from the coordination game with actual social norms (as identified using independent materials such as tipping guides for travelers). We compare responses elicited with the matching tasks to those elicited without the matching task to test whether the coordination device itself is essential for identifying social norms. We find that appropriateness ratings for different actions vary with the reference group in the matching task. Further, the ratings obtained from the matching task vary in a manner consistent with the actual social norms of that reference group. Thus, we find that shared beliefs correspond more closely to externally validated social norms compared to personal beliefs. Second, we highlight the importance that reference groups (for the coordination task) can play.
Does the evaluability bias hold when giving to animal charities?
Authors: Spiteri Glen William 
Published: January 2023

Abstract
When evaluating a charity by itself, people tend to overweight overhead
costs in relation to cost-effectiveness. However, when evaluating charities
side by side, they base their donations on cost-effectiveness. I conducted a
replication and extension of Caviola et al. (2014; Study 1) using a 3 (High
Overhead/Effectiveness, Low Overhead/Effectiveness, Both) x 2 (Humans,
Animals) between-subjects design. I found that the overhead ratio is an
easier attribute to evaluate than cost-effectiveness in separate evaluation,
and, in joint evaluation, people allocate donations based on
cost-effectiveness. This effect was observed for human charities, and to a
lesser extent, for animal charities.
Effects of icon arrays to communicate risk in a repeated risky
decision-making task
Authors: Price Paul C. , Carlock Grace A. , Crouse Sarah , Arciga Mariana Vargas 
Published: January 2023

Abstract
In two experiments, participants decided on each of several trials
whether or not to take a risk. If they chose to take the risk, they had a
relatively high probability (from 75% to 95%) of winning a small number of
points and a relatively low probability (5% to 25%) of losing a large number
of points. The loss amounts varied so that the expected value of taking the
risk was positive on some trials, zero on others, and negative on the rest.
The main independent variable was whether the probability of losing was
communicated using numerical percentages or icon arrays. Both experiments
included random icon arrays, in which the icons representing losses were
randomly distributed throughout the array. Experiment 2 also included
grouped icon arrays, in which the icons representing losses were grouped at
the bottom of the array. Neither type of icon array led to better
performance in the task. However, the random icon arrays led to less risk
taking than the numerical percentages or the grouped icon arrays, especially
at the higher loss probabilities. In a third experiment, participants made
direct judgments of the percentages and probabilities represented by the
icon arrays from Experiment 2. The results supported the idea that random
arrays lead to less risk taking because they are perceived to represent
greater loss probabilities. These results have several implications for the
study of icon arrays and their use in risk communication.
Who lies? A large-scale reanalysis linking basic personality traits to unethical decision making
Authors: Heck Daniel W. , Thielmann Isabel , Moshagen Morten , Hilbig Benjamin E. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPrevious research has established that higher levels of trait Honesty-Humility (HH) are associated with less dishonest behavior in cheating paradigms. However, only imprecise effect size estimates of this HH-cheating link are available. Moreover, evidence is inconclusive on whether other basic personality traits from the HEXACO or Big Five models are associated with unethical decision making and whether such effects have incremental validity beyond HH. We address these issues in a highly powered reanalysis of 16 studies assessing dishonest behavior in an incentivized, one-shot cheating paradigm (N= 5,002). For this purpose, we rely on a newly developed logistic regression approach for the analysis of nested data in cheating paradigms. We also test theoretically derived interactions of HH with other basic personality traits (i.e., Emotionality and Conscientiousness) and situational factors (i.e., the baseline probability of observing a favorable outcome) as well as the incremental validity of HH over demographic characteristics. The results show a medium to large effect of HH (odds ratio = 0.53), which was independent of other personality, situational, or demographic variables. Only one other trait (Big Five Agreeableness) was associated with unethical decision making, although it failed to show any incremental validity beyond HH.
Failing to ignore the ignorant: Mistaking ignorance for error
Authors: Vaz André , Mata André 
Published: January 2023

AbstractExpertise is a reliable cue for accuracy – experts are often correct in their judgments and opinions. However, the opposite is not necessarily the case – ignorant judges are not guaranteed to err. Specifically, in a question with a dichotomous response option, an ignorant responder has a 50% chance of being correct. In five studies, we show that people fail to understand this, and that they overgeneralize a sound heuristic (expertise signals accuracy) to cases where it does not apply (lack of expertise does not imply error). These studies show that people 1) tend to think that the responses of an ignorant person to dichotomous-response questions are more likely to be incorrect than correct, and 2) they tend to respond the opposite of what the ignorant person responded. This research also shows that this bias is at least partially intuitive in nature, as it manifests more clearly in quick gut responses than in slow careful responses. Still, it is not completely corrected upon careful deliberation. Implications are discussed for rationality and epistemic vigilance.
Base rate neglect and conservatism in probabilistic reasoning: Insights from eliciting full distributions
Authors: Howe Piers Douglas Lionel , Perfors Andrew , Walker Bradley , Kashima Yoshihisa , Fay Nicolas 
Published: January 2023

AbstractBayesian statistics offers a normative description for how a person should combine their original beliefs (i.e., their priors) in light of new evidence (i.e., the likelihood). Previous research suggests that people tend to under-weight both their prior (base rate neglect) and the likelihood (conservatism), although this varies by individual and situation. Yet this work generally elicits people’s knowledge as single point estimates (e.g.,xhas a 5% probability of occurring) rather than as a full distribution. Here we demonstrate the utility of eliciting and fitting full distributions when studying these questions. Across three experiments, we found substantial variation in the extent to which people showed base rate neglect and conservatism, which our method allowed us to measure for the first time simultaneously at the level of the individual. While most people tended to disregard the base rate, they did so less when the prior was made explicit. Although many individuals were conservative, there was no apparent systematic relationship between base rate neglect and conservatism within each individual. We suggest that this method shows great potential for studying human probabilistic reasoning.
On the descriptive value of the reliance on small-samples assumption
Authors: Erev Ido , Cohen Doron , Yakobi Ofir 
Published: January 2023

AbstractExperience is the best teacher. Yet, in the context of repeated decisions, experience was found to trigger deviations from maximization in the direction of underweighting of rare events. Evaluations of alternative explanations for this bias led to contradicting conclusions. Studies that focused on the aggregate choice rates, including a series of choice prediction competitions, favored the assumption that this bias reflects reliance on small samples. In contrast, studies that focused on individual decisions suggest that the bias reflects a strong myopic tendency by a significant minority of participants. The current analysis clarifies the apparent inconsistency by reanalyzing a data set that previously led to contradicting conclusions. Our analysis suggests that the apparent inconsistency reflects the differing focus of the cognitive models. Specifically, sequential adjustment models (that assume sensitivity to the payoffs’ weighted averages) tend to find support for the hypothesis that the deviations from maximization are a product of strong positive recency (a form of myopia). Conversely, models assuming random sampling of past experiences tend to find support to the hypothesis that the deviations reflect reliance on small samples. We propose that the debate should be resolved by using the assumptions that provide better predictions. Applying this solution to the data set we analyzed shows that the random sampling assumption outperforms the weighted average assumption both when predicting the aggregate choice rates and when predicting the individual decisions.