Cooperation strategy of government-enterprise supply chain finance based on differential game
Authors: Chen Chen , Yongsheng Zhou 
Published: January 2025

PurposeThe government plays an important role in the financing process of small and medium enterprises (SMEs), but the current government-enterprise cooperation (GEC) mechanism cannot well solve the financing problem of SMEs. In addition, since government-enterprise cooperation is a long-term dynamic process, this study aims to explore the cooperation strategy between the government and core enterprises in supply chain finance (SCF) under the dynamic structure.Design/methodology/approachConsidering both parties have the characteristics of disappointment aversion, our research constructs a game theory model of government subsidy and the effort of the enterprise to implement SCF based on differential game and studies different game strategies in the non-cooperative game, the Stackelberg game and the cooperative game.FindingsOur findings show that the government subsidy can significantly spur the enterprise in the supply chain to implement SCF. We also find that the limitation of the government subsidy exists. In addition, the optimal strategy, the optimal benefit and the total benefit of the financing system formed by the government and the enterprise in the cooperative game are better than those in the non-cooperative game. Pareto optimality is achieved.Research limitations/implicationsThe limitations of this paper are: (1) In theory, this paper only takes the government and enterprise as game subjects without considering other participants in the supply chain. In addition, only disappointment aversion is taken into consideration while in reality the participants often exhibit multiple behavior preferences. (2) In methodology, only the numerical solution is given through the solution algorithm and all parameters are assumed to be determined as time changes for the convenience of calculation.Practical implicationsThe government can motivate enterprises in the supply chain to implement SCF by providing subsidies. However, it should be noted that excessive subsidy will make the enterprise dependent on the government and as a result, decrease the effort level to implement SCF. Thus, it is necessary for the government to keep track of the business conditions of the enterprise to make a subsidy strategy. In addition, the government can reduce the impact of disappointing aversion by making more targeted policies and taking risk management measures.Social implicationsOn one hand, it is necessary for the government to keep track of the business conditions of the enterprise to make a subsidy strategy. In addition, the government can reduce the impact of their own disappointing aversion by making more targeted policies and adopting risk management measures. On the other, it is important for the enterprise to improve the regulatory mechanism and optimize the compensation structure of decision-makers to inhibit the impact of decision-makers' disappointing aversion.Originality/valueThis study is the first to investigate the mechanism of GEC in the setting of SCF based on a differential game. Furthermore, our study provides a theoretical basis for the government and enterprises to cooperate in SCF.