bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Contamination, association, or social communication: An examination of alternative accounts for contagion effects
Authors: Fedotova Natalie O. , Rozin Paul 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIndividuals avoid objects that have been in physical contact with morally offensive or disgusting entities. This has been called negative magical contagion, an implicit belief in the transmission of essence by physical contact. Alternatively, individuals may avoid a negatively contaminated object because: 1) the object is a strong reminder of the original contagion source (association account); or 2) the act of interacting with the object signals specific information about the self (social communication account). We report that: 1) people often prefer to interact with an entity that they believe is more associated with a negative source rather than an entity that is less associated but has made physical contact with the same negative source; 2) while an associative account requires that contact enhances association, a study of memory for visual pairings of objects indicates that when objects are touching, their associative link (recall) is no greater than when they are in proximity; and 3) subjects continue to show aversion to (prefer to wear gloves to handle) an object that contacted a negative entity even if they are handling the object in order to physically destroy it, hence strongly signaling their rejection of that object. Association and social communication are at best partial accounts for contagion effects.
Using Tversky’s contrast model to investigate how features of similarity affect judgments of likelihood
Authors: Galesic Mirta , Goode A. Walkyria , Wallsten Thomas S. , Norman Kent L. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe representativeness heuristic suggests that similarity judgments provide a basis for judgments of likelihood. We use Tversky’s (1977) contrast model of similarity to design tests of this underlying mechanism. If similarity is used to judge likelihood, factors that are known to affect similarity should also affect judgments of likelihood. In two experiments, we manipulated two such factors described in the contrast model of similarity: the nature of the task and context effects. In a between-subject design, respondents assessed either similarity of fictive citizens of 15th century Florence, or the likelihood that they belonged to the same family. The factors that affected similarity also affected the likelihood judgments. These results support the assumption that similarity is an important contributor to judgments of likelihood.
Do multiple-trial games better reflect prosocial behavior than single-trial games?
Authors: Haesevoets Tessa , Van Hiel Alain , Dierckx Kim , Reinders Folmer Chris 
Published: January 2023

AbstractMost prior research on the external validity of mixed-motive games has studied only one single game version and/or one specific type of real-life prosocial behavior. The present study employs a different approach. We used multiple game trials — with different payoff structures — to measure participants’ behavior in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Commons Dilemma, and the Public Goods Dilemma. We then examined the associations between these aggregated game behaviors and a wide set of self-reported prosocial behaviors such as donations, commuting, and environmental behaviors. We also related these prosocial behavior measures to a dispositional measure of prosociality, social value orientation. We report evidence that the weak statistical relationships routinely observed in prior studies are at least partially a consequence of failures to aggregate. More specifically, our results show that aggregation over multiple game trials was especially effective for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, whereas it was somewhat effective for the Public Goods Dilemma. Yet, aggregation on the side of the prosocial behaviors was effective for both these games, as well as for social value orientation. The Commons Dilemma, however, turned out to yield invariably poor relationships with prosocial behavior, regardless of the level of aggregation. Based on these findings, we conclude that the use of multiple instances of game behaviorandprosocial behavior is preferable to the use of only a single measurement.
Individual differences in receptivity to scientific bullshit
Authors: Evans Anthony , Sleegers Willem , Mlakar Žan 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPseudo-profound bullshit receptivity is the tendency to perceive meaning in important-sounding, nonsense statements. To understand how bullshit receptivity differs across domains, we develop a scale to measure scientific bullshit receptivity — the tendency to perceive truthfulness in nonsensical scientific statements. Across three studies (total N = 1,948), scientific bullshit receptivity was positively correlated with pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity. Both types of bullshit receptivity were positively correlated with belief in science, conservative political beliefs, and faith in intuition. However, compared to pseudo-profound bullshit receptivity, scientific bullshit receptivity was more strongly correlated with belief in science, and less strongly correlated with conservative political beliefs and faith in intuition. Finally, scientific literacy moderated the relationship the two types of bullshit receptivity; the correlation between the two types of receptivity was weaker for individuals scoring high in scientific literacy.
Consequences, norms, and inaction: A critical analysis
Authors: Baron Jonathan , Goodwin Geoffrey P. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractGawronski, Armstrong, Conway, Friesdorf and Hütter (2017, GACFH) presented a model of choices in utilitarian moral dilemmas, those in which following a moral principle or norm (the deontological response) leads to worse consequences than violating the principle (the utilitarian response). In standard utilitarian dilemmas, the utilitarian option involves action (which causes some harm in order to prevent greater harm), and the deontological response, omission. GACFH propose that responses in such dilemmas arise in three different ways: a psychological process leading to a deontological choice, a different process leading to a utilitarian choice, or a bias toward inaction or action. GACFH attempt to separate these three processes with new dilemmas in which action and omission are switched, and dilemmas in which the utilitarian and deontological processes lead to the same choice. They conclude that utilitarian and deontological responses are indeed separable, and that past research has missed this fact by treating them as naturally opposed. We argue that a bias toward harmful inaction is best understood as an explanation of deontological responding rather than as an alternative process. It thus should be included as an explanation of deontological responding, not an alternative response type. We also argue that GACFH’s results can be largely explained in terms of subjects’ unwillingness to accept the researchers’ assumptions about which consequence is worse and which course of action is consistent with a moral norm. This problem is almost inherent in the attempt to switch act and omission while maintaining equivalent norms. We support this argument with data from experiments with new and old scenarios, in which we asked subjects to judge both norms and consequences. We also find that GACFH’s results are not as consistent as they appear to be in the paper.
Patients prefer artificial intelligence to a human provider, provided the AI is better than the human: A commentary on Longoni, Bonezzi and Morewedge (2019)
Authors: Pezzo Mark V. , Beckstead Jason W. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWe call attention to an important, but overlooked finding in research reported by Longoni, Bonezzi and Morewedge (2019). Longoni et al. claim that people always prefer a human to an artificially intelligent (AI) medical provider. We show that this was only the case when the historical performance of the human and AI providers was equal. When the AI is known to outperform the human, their data showed a clear preference for the automated provider. We provide additional statistical analyses of their data to support this claim.
Algorithm aversion is too often presented as though it were non-compensatory: A reply to Longoni et al. (2020)
Authors: Pezzo Mark V. , Beckstead Jason W. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWe clarify two points made in our commentary (Pezzo & Beckstead, 2020, this issue) on a recent paper by Longoni, Bonezzi, and Morewedge (2019). In both Experiments 1 and 4 from their paper, it is not possible to determine whether accuracy can compensate for algorithm aversion. Experiments 3A-C, however, do show a strong effect of accuracy such that AI that is superior to a human provider is embraced by patients. Many papers, including Longoni et al. tend to minimize the role of this compensatory process, apparently because it seems obvious to the authors (Longoni, Bonezzi, Morewedge, 2020, this issue). Such minimization, however, can lead to (mis)citations in which research that clearly demonstrates a compensatory role of AI accuracy is cited as non-compensatory.
Backward planning: Effects of planning direction on predictions of task completion time
Authors: Wiese Jessica , Buehler Roger , Griffin Dale 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPeople frequently underestimate the time needed to complete tasks and we examined a strategy – known as backward planning – that may counteract this optimistic bias. Backward planning involves starting a plan at the end goal and then working through required steps in reverse-chronological order, and is commonly advocated by practitioners as a tool for developing realistic plans and projections. We conducted four experiments to test effects on completion time predictions and related cognitive processes. Participants planned for a task in one of three directions (backward, forward, or unspecified) and predicted when it would be finished. As hypothesized, predicted completion times were longer (Studies 1–4) and thus less biased (Study 4) in the backward condition than in the forward and unspecified conditions. Process measures suggested that backward planning may increase attention to situational factors that delay progress (e.g., obstacles, interruptions, competing demands), elicit novel planning insights, and alter the conceptualization of time.
The many obstacles to effective giving
Authors: Caviola Lucius , Schubert Stefan , Nemirow Jason 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWhen people donate, they rarely give to the charities that do the most good per dollar. Why is this? One possibility is that they do not know how to give effectively. Another possibility is that they are not motivated to do so. Across six tasks (Studies 1a, 1b), we found support for both explanations. Among lay donors, we observed multiple misconceptions—regarding disaster relief, overhead costs, donation splitting, and the relative effectiveness of local and foreign charities—that reduced the effectiveness of their giving. Similarly, we found that they were unfamiliar with the most effective charities (Studies 2a, 2b). Debunking these misconceptions and informing people about effectiveness boosted effective donations; however, a portion of lay donors continued to give ineffectively to satisfy their personal preferences. By contrast, a sample of self-identified effective altruists gave effectively across all tasks. They exhibited none of the misconceptions that we observed among lay donors and overwhelmingly favored the most effective option in their choice set (Study 3). Taken together, our studies imply that donors need to be both informed and motivated to give effectively on a consistent basis.
Fewer but poorer: Benevolent partiality in prosocial preferences
Authors: Paolacci Gabriele , Yalcin Gizem 
Published: January 2023

AbstractA prosocial action typically provides a more sizable benefit when directed at those who have less as opposed to those who have more. However, not all prosocial acts have a direct bearing on socioeconomic disadvantage, nor does disadvantage necessarily imply a greater need for the prosocial outcome. Of interest here, welfare impact may depend on the number of beneficiaries but not on their socioeconomic status. Across four preregistered studies of life-saving decisions, we demonstrate that when allocating resources, many people are benevolently partial. That is, they choose to help the disadvantaged even when this transparently implies sacrificing lives. We suggest that people construct prosocial aid as an opportunity to correct morally aversive inequalities, thus making relatively more disadvantaged recipients a more justifiable target of help. Benevolent partiality is reduced when people reflect beforehand on what aspects they will prioritize in their donation decision.
“Do the right thing” for whom? An experiment on ingroup favouritism, group assorting and moral suasion
Authors: Bilancini Ennio , Boncinelli Leonardo , Capraro Valerio , Celadin Tatiana , Paolo Roberto Di 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn this paper we investigate the effect of moral suasion on ingroup favouritism. We report a well-powered, pre-registered, two-stage 2x2 mixed-design experiment. In the first stage, groups are formed on the basis of how participants answer a set of questions, concerning non-morally relevant issues in one treatment (assorting on non-moral preferences), and morally relevant issues in another treatment (assorting on moral preferences). In the second stage, participants choose how to split a given amount of money between participants of their own group and participants of the other group, first in the baseline setting and then in a setting where they are told to do what they believe to be morally right (moral suasion). Our main results are: (i) in the baseline, participants tend to favour their own group to a greater extent when groups are assorted according to moral preferences, compared to when they are assorted according to non-moral preferences; (ii) the net effect of moral suasion is to decrease ingroup favouritism, but there is also a non-negligible proportion of participants for whom moral suasion increases ingroup favouritism; (iii) the effect of moral suasion is substantially stable across group assorting and four pre-registered individual characteristics (gender, political orientation, religiosity, pro-life vs pro-choice ethical convictions).
Gaze patterns disclose the link between cognitive reflection and sophistication in strategic interaction
Authors: Zonca Joshua , Coricelli Giorgio , Polonio Luca 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn social contexts, we refer to strategic sophistication as the ability to adapt our own behavior based on the possible actions of others. In the current study, we explore the role of other-oriented attention and cognitive reflection in explaining heterogeneity in strategic sophistication. In two eye-tracking experiments, we registered eye movements of participants while playing matrix games of increasing relational complexity (2x2 and 3x3 matrices), and we analyzed individual gaze patterns to reveal the ongoing mechanisms of integration of own and others’ incentives in the current game representation. Moreover, participants completed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), in addition to alternative measures of cognitive ability. In both classes of games, higher cognitive reflection levels specifically predict the ability to incorporate the counterpart’s incentives in the current model of the game, as well as higher levels of strategic sophistication. Conversely, players exhibiting low cognitive reflection tend to pay less attention to relevant transitions between the counterpart’s payoffs, and such incomplete visual analysis leads to out-of-equilibrium choices. Gaze patterns appear to completely mediate the relationship between cognitive reflection and strategic choices. Our results shed new light on the cognitive factors driving heterogeneity in strategic thinking and on theories of bounded rationality.
Preferences for rank in competition: Is first-place seeking stronger than last-place aversion?
Authors: Shechter Steven M. , Hardisty David J. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe use of gamification to motivate engagement has greatly increased the number of ways in which people compete. Many of these competitions allow individuals to see how they rank as a competition progresses. Our work aims to provide a better understanding of how individuals feel about different rank outcomes in competitions. We do this by applying the principles of expected utility theory to elicit utility curves for over 3,000 people across three studies using hypothetical competition scenarios. We find consistent support for the following generalizations: 1) individuals are risk-seeking when in second place, 2) they are risk-averse when in second-to-last place, and 3) the utility decrease going from first to second place is greater than their decrease going from second-to-last to last place. Our results suggest individuals are both last-place averse and first-place seeking, with an even stronger inclination towards the latter.
Reliance on small samples and the value of taxing reckless behaviors
Authors: Yakobi Ofir , Cohen Doron , Naveh Eitan , Erev Ido 
Published: January 2023

AbstractNew technology can be used to enhance safety by imposing costs, or taxes, on certain reckless behaviors. The current paper presents two pre-registered experiments that clarify the impact of taxation of this type on decisions from experience between three alternatives. Experiment 1 focuses on an environment in which safe choices maximize expected returns and examines the impact of taxing the more attractive of two risky options. The results reveal a U-shaped effect of taxation: some taxation improves safety, but too much taxation impairs safety. Experiment 2 shows a clear negative effect of high taxation even when the taxation eliminates the expected benefit from risk-taking. Comparison of alternative models suggests that taxing reckless behaviors backfires when it significantly increases the proportion of experiences in which a more dangerous behavior leads to better outcomes than the taxed behavior. Qualitative hypotheses derived from naïve sampling models assuming small samples were only partially supported by the data.
Decisions from experience: Competitive search and choice in kind and wicked environments
Authors: Frey Renato 
Published: January 2023

AbstractInformation search is key to making decision from experience: exploration permits people to learn about the statistical properties of choice options and thus to become aware of rare but potentially momentous decision consequences. This registered report investigates whether and how people differ when making decisions from experiencein isolationversusunder competitive pressure, which may have important implications for choice performance in different types of choice environments: in “kind” environments without any rare and extreme events, frugal search is sufficient to identify advantageous options. Conversely, in “wicked” environments with skewed outcome distributions, rare but important events will tend to be missed in frugal search. One theoretical view is that competitive pressure encourages efficiency and may thereby boost adaptive search in different environments. An alternative and more pessimistic view is that competitive pressure triggers agency-related concerns, leading to minimal search irrespective of the choice environment, and hence to inferior choice performance. Using a sampling game, the present study (N= 277) found that solitary search was not adaptive to different choice environments (M= 14 samples), leading to a high choice performance in a kind and in a moderately wicked environment, but somewhat lower performance in an extremely wicked environment. Competitive pressure substantially reduced search irrespective of the choice environment (M= 4 samples), thus negatively affecting overall choice performance. Yet, from the perspective of a cost-benefit framework, frugal search may beefficientunder competitive pressure. In sum, this report extends research on decisions from experience by adopting an ecological perspective (i.e., systematically varying different choice environments) and by introducing a cost-benefit framework to evaluatesolitaryandcompetitivesearch — with the latter constituting a challenging problem for people in an increasingly connected world.
On the belief that beliefs should change according to evidence: Implications for conspiratorial, moral, paranormal, political, religious, and science beliefs
Authors: Pennycook Gordon , Cheyne James Allan , Koehler Derek J. , Fugelsang Jonathan A. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractDoes one’s stance toward evidence evaluation and belief revision have relevance for actual beliefs? We investigate the role of endorsing an actively open-minded thinking style about evidence (AOT-E) on a wide range of beliefs, values, and opinions. Participants indicated the extent to which they think beliefs (Study 1) or opinions (Studies 2 and 3)oughtto change according to evidence on an 8-item scale. Across three studies with 1,692 participants from two different sources (Mechanical Turk and Lucid for Academics), we find that our short AOT-E scale correlates negatively with beliefs about topics ranging from extrasensory perception, to respect for tradition, to abortion, to God; and positively with topics ranging from anthropogenic global warming to support for free speech on college campuses. More broadly, the belief that beliefs should change according to evidence was robustly associated with political liberalism, the rejection of traditional moral values, the acceptance of science, and skepticism about religious, paranormal, and conspiratorial claims. However, we also find that AOT-E is more strongly predictive for political liberals (Democrats) than conservatives (Republicans). We conclude that socio-cognitive theories of belief (both specific and general) should take into account people’s beliefs about when and how beliefs should change – that is, meta-beliefs – but that further work is required to understand how meta-beliefs about evidence interact with political ideology.
The tide that lifts all focal boats: Asymmetric predictions of ascent and descent in rankings
Authors: Davidai Shai , Gilovich Thomas 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn six studies, we find evidence for an upward mobility bias, or a tendency to predict that a rise in ranking is more likely than a decline, even in domains where motivation or intention to rise play no role. Although people cannot willfully change their height (Study 1), and geographical entities cannot willfully alter their temperature (Study 2), number of natural disasters (Study 3), levels of precipitation (Studies 4A and 4B), or chemical concentration (Study 5), subjects believed that each is more likely to rise than drop in ranking. This bias is due to an association between a ranking’s order and the direction of absolute change, and to the tendency to give considerable weight to a focal agent over non-focal agents. Because people generally expect change to be represented in terms of higher ranks, and because they tend to focus on specific, focal targets, they believe that any given target will experience a larger relative increase than other targets. We discuss implications for social policy.