bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Do minorities like nudges? The role of group norms in attitudes towards behavioral policy
Authors: Pe’er Eyal , Feldman Yuval , Gamliel Eyal , Sahar Limor , Tikotsky Ariel , Hod Nurit , Schupak Hilla 
Published: January 2023

AbstractAttitudes of public groups towards behavioral policy interventions (or nudges) can be important for both the policy makers who design and deploy nudges, and to researchers who try to understand when and why some nudges are supported while others are not. Until now, research on public attitudes towards nudges has focused on either state- or country-level comparisons, or on correlations with individual-level traits, and has neglected to study how different social groups (such as minorities) might view nudges. Using a large and representative sample, we tested the attitudes of two distinct minority groups in Israel (Israeli Arabs and Ultra-Orthodox Jews), and discovered that nudges that operated against a minority group’s held social norms, promoting a more general societal goal not aligned with the group’s norms, were often less supported by minorities. Contrary to expectations, these differences could not be explained by differences in trust in the government applying these nudges. We discuss implications for public policy and for the research and applications of behavioral interventions.
The effect of limited availability on children’s consumption, engagement, and choice behavior
Authors: Maimaran Michal , Salant Yuval 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThree studies examine the effect of limited availability on the engagement, consumption, and choice behavior of four- to five-year old children. It is shown that children engage longer in an activity when the activity is presented as limited in time and consume more of a particular food when the food is presented as limited in quantity. It is also shown that the consumption ratio of a less preferred food to a more preferred one increases when the less preferred food is presented as limited in quantity. Finally, children are more likely to choose a less preferred option over a more preferred one when the less preferred option becomes less available.
Professionally biased: Misestimations of driving speed, journey time and time-savings among taxi and car drivers
Authors: Peer Eyal , Solomon Lidor 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPeople make systematic and predictable mistakes regarding estimations of average speed and journey time. In addition, people have been shown to commit a time-saving bias by underestimating the time that can be saved when increasing from a low speed and overestimating the time that can be saved when increasing from a relatively high speed. These misestimations have been shown to relate to biases in judgments of the speed required to arrive at a specific time and to choosing unduly high speed. Professional drivers, such as taxi drivers, might be less susceptible to these biases due to their increased driving experience. In the current study, we interviewed taxi drivers about a journey they were currently making and examined their estimations of journey time, average speed and time savings. Compared to a group of non-professional car drivers, taxi drivers showed the same considerable misestimations of driving speed, journey time and time savings as non-professionals. However, overestimations of time savings among taxi drivers were smaller than those made by car drivers. We discuss the practical significance of these findings.
Graphs versus numbers: How information format affects risk aversion in gambling
Authors: Dambacher Michael , Haffke Peter , Groß Daniel , Hübner Ronald 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn lottery gambling, the common phenomenon of risk aversion shows up as preference of the option with the higher win probability, even if a riskier alternative offers a greater expected value. Because riskier choices would optimize profitability in such cases, the present study investigates the visual format, with which lotteries are conveyed, as potential instrument to modulate risk attitudes. Previous research has shown that enhanced attention to graphical compared to numericalprobabilitiescan increase risk aversion, but evidence for the reverse effect — reduced risk aversion through a graphical display ofoutcomes— is sparse. We conducted three experiments, in which participants repeatedly selected one of two lotteries. Probabilities and outcomes were either presented numerically or in a graphical format that consisted of pie charts (Experiment 1) or icon arrays (Experiment 2 and 3). Further, expected values were either higher in the safer or in the riskier lottery, or they did not differ between the options. Despite a marked risk aversion in all experiments, our results show that presenting outcomes as graphs can reduce — albeit not eliminate — risk aversion (Experiment 3). Yet, not all formats prove suitable, and non-intuitive outcome graphs can even enhance risk aversion (Experiment 1). Joint analyses of choice proportions and response times (RTs) further uncovered that risk aversion leads to safe choices particularly in fast decisions. This pattern is expressed under graphical probabilities, whereas graphical outcomes can weaken the rapid dominance of risk aversion and the variability over RTs (Experiment 1 and 2). Together, our findings demonstrate the relevance of information format for risky decisions.
Number preferences in lotteries
Authors: Wang Tong V. , van Loon Rogier J.D. Potter , van den Assem Martijn J. , van Dolder Dennie 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWe explore people’s preferences for numbers in large proprietary data sets from two different lottery games. We find that choice is far from uniform, and exhibits some familiar and some new tendencies and biases. Players favor personally meaningful and situationally available numbers, and are attracted towards numbers in the center of the choice form. Frequent players avoid winning numbers from recent draws, whereas infrequent players chase these. Combinations of numbers are formed with an eye for aesthetics, and players tend to spread their numbers relatively evenly across the possible range.
“Leaving it to chance”—Passive risk taking in everyday life
Authors: Keinan Ruty , Bereby-Meyer Yoella 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWhile risk research focuses on actions that put people at risk, this paper introduces the concept of “passive risk”—risk brought on or magnified by inaction. We developed a scale measuring personal tendency for passive risk taking (PRT), validated it using a 150 undergraduate student sample, and obtained three factors indicating separate domains of passive risk taking: risk involving resources, medical risks and ethical risks. The scale has criterion validity, as it is correlated with reported passive risk taking in everyday life, and also has high test-retest reliability. While correlated with the DOSPERT scale, the PRT shows divergent validity from classic risk taking constructs like sensation seeking, and convergent validity with tendencies previously not linked to risk taking, such as procrastination and avoidance. The results indicate that passive risk is a separate and unique domain of risk taking, which merits further research to understand the cognitive and motivational mechanism perpetuating it.
Predicting (un)healthy behavior: A comparison of risk-taking propensity measures
Authors: Szrek Helena , Chao Li-Wei , Ramlagan Shandir , Peltzer Karl 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWe compare four different risk-taking propensity measures on their ability to describe and to predict actual risky behavior in the domain of health. The risk-taking propensity measures we compare are: (1) a general measure of risk-taking propensity derived from a one-item survey question (Dohmen et al., 2011), (2) a risk aversion index calculated from a set of incentivized monetary gambles (Holt & Laury, 2002), (3) a measure of risk taking derived from an incentive compatible behavioral task—the Balloon Analog Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002), and (4) a composite score of risk-taking likelihood in the health domain from the Domain-Specific Risk Taking (DOSPERT) scale (Weber et al., 2002). Study participants are 351 clients of health centers around Witbank, South Africa. Our findings suggest that the one-item general measure is the best predictor of risky health behavior in our population, predicting two out of four behaviors at the 5% level and the remaining two behaviors at the 10% level. The DOSPERT score in the health domain performs well, predicting one out of four behaviors at the 1% significance level and two out of four behaviors at the 10% level, but only if the DOSPERT instrument contains a hypothetical risk-taking item that is similar to the actual risky behavior being predicted. Incentivized monetary gambles and the behavioral task were unrelated to actual health behaviors; they were unable to predict any of the risky health behaviors at the 10% level. We provide evidence that this is not because the participants had trouble understanding the monetary trade-off questions or performed poorly in the behavioral task. We conclude by urging researchers to further test the usefulness of the one-item general measure, both in explaining health related risk-taking behavior and in other contexts.
The unconscious thought advantage: Further replication failures from a search for confirmatory evidence
Authors: Nieuwenstein Mark , van Rijn Hedderik 
Published: January 2023

AbstractAccording to the deliberation without attention (DWA) hypothesis, people facing a difficult choice will make a better decision after a period of distraction than after an equally long period of conscious deliberation, an effect referred to as the unconscious thought advantage (UTA). The status of the DWA hypothesis is controversial, as many studies have tried but failed to replicate the UTA. Here, we report a series of experiments that sought to identify the conditions under which the UTA can be replicated. Our starting point was a recent meta-analysis that identified the conditions under which the UTA was strongest in previous studies. Using a within-subjects design and a task that met each of these conditions, we failed to replicate the UTA. Based on closer inspection of previous methods and findings, we then examined some additional factors that could be important for replicating the UTA, including mental fatigue and choice complexity. This was to no avail, as the results revealed only a significant conscious thought advantage, when choice complexity was increased relative to the first experiment. We subsequently conducted exploratory analyses on the data across experiments and found that male subjects showed a significant conscious thought advantage while female subjects showed a trend towards an UTA. Taken together, our results suggest that replication of the UTA may depend more on characteristics of the sample than on the characteristics of the task, and they suggest that gender could be a source of variance in the outcomes of previous studies using a between-subjects design.
Short-sighted greed? Focusing on the future promotes reputation-based generosity
Authors: Sjåstad Hallgeir 
Published: January 2023

AbstractLong-term thinking and voluntary resource sharing are two distinctive traits of human nature. Across three experiments (N=1,082), I propose a causal connection: Sometimes people are generousbecausethey think about the future. Participants were randomly assigned to either focus on the present or the future and then made specific decisions in hypothetical scenarios. In Study 1 (N=200), future-focused participants shared more money in a public dictator game than present-focused participants (+39%), and they were willing to donate more money to charity (+61%). Study 2 (N=410) replicated the positive effect of future-focus on dictator giving when the choice was framed as public (+36%), but found no such effect when the choice was framed as private. That is, focusing on the future made participants more generous only when others would know their identity. Study 3 was a high-powered and pre-registered replication of Study 1 (N=472), including a few extensions. Once again, future-focused participants gave more money to charity in a public donation scenario (+40%), and they were more likely to volunteer for the same charity (+17%). As predicted, the effect was mediated by reputational concern, indicating that future-orientation can make people more generous because it also makes them more attuned to the social consequences of their choices. Taken together, the results suggest that focusing on the future promotesreputation-based generosity. By stimulating voluntary resource sharing, a central function of human foresight might be to support cooperation in groups and society.
Why recognition is rational: Optimality results on single-variable decision rules
Authors: Davis-Stober Clintin P. , Dana Jason , Budescu David V. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe Recognition Heuristic (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) makes the counter-intuitive prediction that a decision maker utilizing less information may do as well as, or outperform, an idealized decision maker utilizing more information. We lay a theoretical foundation for the use of single-variable heuristics such as the Recognition Heuristic as an optimal decision strategy within a linear modeling framework. We identify conditions under which over-weighting a single predictor is a mini-max strategy among a class of a priori chosen weights based on decision heuristics with respect to a measure of statistical lack of fit we call “risk”. These strategies, in turn, outperform standard multiple regression as long as the amount of data available is limited. We also show that, under related conditions, weighting only one variable and ignoring all others produces the same risk as ignoring the single variable and weighting all others. This approach has the advantage of generalizing beyond the original environment of the Recognition Heuristic to situations with more than two choice options, binary or continuous representations of recognition, and to other single variable heuristics. We analyze the structure of data used in some prior recognition tasks and find that it matches the sufficient conditions for optimality in our results. Rather than being a poor or adequate substitute for a compensatory model, the Recognition Heuristic closely approximates an optimal strategy when a decision maker has finite data about the world.
Think or blink — is the recognition heuristic an “intuitive” strategy?
Authors: Hilbig Benjamin E. , Scholl Sabine G. , Pohl Rüdiger F. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractSeveral approaches to judgment and decision making emphasize the effort-reducing properties of heuristics. One prominent example for effort-reduction is the recognition heuristic (RH) which proposes that judgments are made by relying on one single cue (recognition), ignoring other information. Our research aims to shed light on the conditions under which the RH is more useful and thus relied on more often. We propose that intuitive thinking is fast, automatic, and effortless whereas deliberative thinking is slower, stepwise, and more effortful. Because effort-reduction is thus much more important when processing information deliberately, we hypothesize that the RH should be more often relied on in such situations. In two city-size-experiments, we instructed participants to think either intuitively or deliberatively and assessed use of the RH through a formal measurement model. Results revealed that, in both experiments, use of the RH was more likely when judgments were to be made deliberatively, rather than intuitively. As such, we conclude that the potential application of heuristics is not necessarily a consequence of “intuitive” processing. Rather, their effort-reducing features are probably most beneficial when thinking more deliberatively.
Energy conservation goals: What people adopt, what they recommend, and why
Authors: Attari Shahzeen Z. , Krantz David H. , Weber Elke U. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractFailures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by adopting policies, technologies, and lifestyle changes have led the world to the brink of crisis, or likely beyond. Here we use Internet surveys to attempt to understand these failures by studying factors that affect the adoption of personal energy conservation behaviors and also endorsement of energy conservation goals proposed for others. We demonstrate an asymmetry between goals for self and others (“I’ll do the easy thing, you do the hard thing”), but we show that this asymmetry is partly produced by actor/observer differences: people know what they do already (and generally do not propose those actions as personal goals) and also know their own situational constraints that are barriers to action. We also show, however, that endorsement of conservation goals decreases steeply as a function of perceived difficulty; this suggests a role for motivated cognition as a barrier to conservation: difficult things are perceived as less applicable to one’s situation.
The mean, the median, and the St. Petersburg paradox
Authors: Hayden Benjamin Y. , Platt Michael L. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe St. Petersburg Paradox is a famous economic and philosophical puzzle that has generated numerous conflicting explanations. To shed empirical light on this phenomenon, we examined subjects’ bids for one St. Petersburg gamble with a real monetary payment. We found that bids were typically lower than twice the smallest payoff, and thus much lower than is generally supposed. We also examined bids offered for several hypothetical variants of the St. Petersburg Paradox. We found that bids were weakly affected by truncating the gamble, were strongly affected by repeats of the gamble, and depended linearly on the initial “seed” value of the gamble. One explanation, which we call the median heuristic, strongly predicts these data. Subjects following this strategy evaluate a gamble as if they were taking the median rather than the mean of the payoff distribution. Finally, we argue that the distribution of outcomes embodied in the St. Petersburg paradox is so divergent from the Gaussian form that the statistical mean is a poor estimator of expected value, so that the expected value of the St. Petersburg gamble is undefined. These results suggest that this classic paradox has a straightforward explanation rooted in the use of a statistical heuristic.
Don’t stop thinking about tomorrow: Individual differences in future self-continuity account for saving
Authors: Ersner-Hershfield Hal , Garton M. Tess , Ballard Kacey , Samanez-Larkin Gregory R. , Knutson Brian 
Published: January 2023

AbstractSome people find it more difficult to delay rewards than others. In three experiments, we tested a “future self-continuity” hypothesis that individual differences in the perception of one’s present self as continuous with a future self would be associated with measures of saving in the laboratory and everyday life. Higher future self-continuity (assessed by a novel index) predicted reduced discounting of future rewards in a laboratory task, more matches in adjectival descriptions of present and future selves, and greater lifetime accumulation of financial assets (even after controlling for age and education). In addition to demonstrating the reliability and validity of the future self-continuity index, these findings are consistent with the notion that increased future self-continuity might promote saving for the future.
Reducing the impact bias in judgments of post-decisional affect: Distraction or task interference?
Authors: Sevdalis Nick , Harvey Nigel 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPeople overestimate their affective reactions to future events and decisions — a phenomenon that has been termed “impact bias.” Evidence suggests that completing a diary detailing events contemporaneous with the focal one de-biases judgments of affect. It is generally assumed that this is because diary completion helps people to realize that they will be distracted from the focal event. However, there is another possibility: de-biasing may occur because diary completion interferes with the processing responsible for the bias. In a first experiment, we showed that diary completion also lowers affect associated with past decisions. In a second experiment, we showed that solving anagrams has the same effect. A third experiment demonstrates that this is not because affect judgments are influenced by mood changes brought about by solving anagrams. Indeed, monitoring moods lowered affect in the same way as diary completion. It appears that cognitive tasks of any sort interfere with the processing required by judgments of affect.
Attentional mechanisms in the generation of sympathy
Authors: Dickert Stephan , Slovic Paul 
Published: January 2023

AbstractEmpathic responses, such as sympathy towards others, are a key ingredient in the decision to provide help to those in need. The determinants of empathic responses are usually thought to be the vividness, similarity, and proximity of the victim. However, recent research highlights the role that attention plays in the generation of feelings. We expanded on this idea by investigating whether sympathy depends on cognitive mechanisms such as attention. In two studies we found that sympathy responses were lower and reaction times were longer when targets were presented with distractors. In addition, online sympathy judgments that allow attentional focusing on a target lead to greater affective responses than judgments made from memory. We conclude that attention is an ingredient in the generation of sympathy, and discuss implications for research on prosocial behaviour and the interaction between attention and emotions.
Elicitation of normative and fairness judgments: Do incentives matter?
Authors: Veselý Štěpán 
Published: January 2023

AbstractKrupka and Weber (2013) introduce an incentive-compatible coordination game as an alternative method for elicitation of normative judgments. I show, however, that people provide virtually the same responses in incentivized and non-incentivized versions of the Krupka-Weber game. Besides ratings of social appropriateness, I also elicit ratings of fairness of all possible offers in an ultimatum game. Ratings of social appropriateness and fairness are similar for low offers (below or equal to the equal split), but not for high offers which are judged to be more appropriate than fair.
Pair-wise comparisons of multiple models
Authors: Broomell Stephen B. , Budescu David V. , Por Han-Hui 
Published: January 2023

AbstractOften research in judgment and decision making requires comparison of multiple competing models. Researchers invoke global measures such as the rate of correct predictions or the sum of squared (or absolute) deviations of the various models as part of this evaluation process. Reliance on such measures hides the (often very high) level of agreement between the predictions of the various models and does not highlight properly the relative performance of the competing models in those critical cases where they make distinct predictions. To address this important problem we propose the use of pair-wise comparisons of models to produce more informative and targeted comparisons of their performance, and we illustrate this procedure with data from two recently published papers. We use Multidimensional Scaling of these comparisons to map the competing models. We also demonstrate how intransitive cycles of pair-wise model performance can signal that certain models perform better for a given subset of decision problems.