bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Not by desire alone: The role of cognitive consistency in the desirability bias
Authors: Russo J. Edward , Corbin Jonathan C. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWe demonstrate that the desirability bias, the elevation of the estimated likelihood of a preferred event, can be due in part to the desire for consistency between the preference for the favored event and its predicted likelihood. An experiment uses a participant’s favorite team in Major League Baseball games and a recently devised method for priming the consistency goal. When preference is the first response, priming cognitive consistency moves prediction toward greater agreement with that preference, thereby increasing the desirability bias. In contrast, when prediction is the first response, priming cognitive consistency facilitates greater agreement with the factual information for each game. This increases the accuracy of the prediction and reduces the desirability bias.
Process dynamics in delay discounting decisions: An attractor dynamics approach
Authors: Scherbaum Stefan , Frisch Simon , Leiberg Susanne , Lade Steven J. , Goschke Thomas , Dshemuchadse Maja 
Published: January 2023

AbstractHow do people make decisions between an immediate but small reward and a delayed but large one? The outcome of such decisions indicates that people discount rewards by their delay and hence these outcomes are well described by discounting functions. However, to understand irregular decisions and dysfunctional behavior one needs models which describe how the process of making the decision unfolds dynamically over time: how do we reach a decision and how do sequential decisions influence one another? Here, we present an attractor model that integrates into and extends discounting functions through a description of the dynamics leading to a final choice outcomewithina trial andacrosstrials. To validate this model, we derive qualitative predictions for the intra-trial dynamics of single decisions and for the inter-trial dynamics of sequences of decisions that are unique to this type of model. We test these predictions in four experiments based on a dynamic delay discounting computer game where we study the intra-trial dynamics of single decisions via mouse tracking and the inter-trial dynamics of sequences of decisions via sequentially manipulated options. We discuss how integrating decision process dynamics within and across trials can increase our understanding of the processes underlying delay discounting decisions and, hence, complement our knowledge about decision outcomes.
Developing expert political judgment: The impact of training and practice on judgmental accuracy in geopolitical forecasting tournaments
Authors: Chang Welton , Chen Eva , Mellers Barbara , Tetlock Philip 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe heuristics-and-biases research program highlights reasons for expecting people to be poor intuitive forecasters. This article tests the power of a cognitive-debiasing training module (“CHAMPS KNOW”) to improve probability judgments in a four-year series of geopolitical forecasting tournaments sponsored by the U.S. intelligence community. Although the training lasted less than one hour, it consistently improved accuracy (Brier scores) by 6 to 11% over the control condition. Cognitive ability and practice also made largely independent contributions to predictive accuracy. Given the brevity of the training tutorials and the heterogeneity of the problems posed, the observed effects are likely to be lower-bound estimates of what could be achieved by more intensive interventions. Future work should isolate which prongs of the multipronged CHAMPS KNOW training were most effective in improving judgment on which categories of problems.
Less cognitive conflict does not imply choice of the default option: Commentary on Kieslich and Hilbig (2014)
Authors: Myrseth Kristian Ove R. , Wollbrant Conny 
Published: January 2023

AbstractKieslich and Hilbig (2014) employ a mouse-tracking technique to measure decision conflict in social dilemmas. They report that defectors exhibit more conflict than do cooperators. They infer that cooperation thus is the reflexive, default behavior. We argue, however, that their analysis fails to discriminate between reflexive versus cognitively controlled behavioral responses. This is because cognitive conflict can emanate from resisting impulse successfully—or unsuccessfully.
Others’ opinions count, but not all of them: anchoring to ingroup versus outgroup members’ behavior in charitable giving
Authors: Hysenbelli Dorina , Rubaltelli Enrico , Rumiati Rino 
Published: January 2023

AbstractBecause of the large amount of information and the difficulty in selecting an appropriate recipient in the context of charitable giving, people tend to make extensive use of heuristics, which sometimes leads them to wrong decisions. In the present work, we focused on exploring how individuals are influenced by anchoring heuristics and how group membership interacts with this heuristic. In Experiment 1, two different groups of participants were informed about low versus high average donations of other people, and a third control group did not receive any information about the others’ donations. The results showed that participants were willing to donate significantly more in the high-anchor condition compared to the low-anchor condition, as well as about the same amount of money in the low-anchor condition and no-anchor condition. Experiment 2 and 3 showed that high anchors are more effective when the information about others’ donations reflects members of the ingroup rather than the outgroup. Other variables related to these results are further discussed.
Risk perception and risk attitudes in Tokyo: A report of the first administration of DOSPERT+M in Japan
Authors: Schwartz Alan , Yamagishi Kimihiko , Hirahara Norimichi , Onishi Hirotaka , Barnes James , Rosman Adam , Garcia Maggie , Lee Sam , Butler Shoshana 
Published: January 2023

AbstractBackground:The Domain-Specific Risk Taking scale (DOSPERT) has been used to measure risk perceptions and attitudes in several nations and cultures. Takahashi translated DOSPERT to Japanese but DOSPERT responses from Japan have never been reported. Butler et al. (2012) developed an additional medical risk domain subscale to be added to DOSPERT to form DOSPERT+M.Objective:To describe the translation of the medical risk domain subscale to Japanese and to characterize domain-specific risk attitudes in Tokyo.Methods:Members of a probability-weighted online panel representative of the Tokyo metro area were randomized to complete pairs of DOSPERT+M tasks (risk attitude, risk perception, benefit perception). We explored relationships among domains through correlational and factor analysis; we tested the hypothesis that the medical risk domain and DOSPERT’s health/safety domains were uncorrelated.Participants:One hundred eighty panelists.Results:Six of the original DOSPERT items (two each in the ethics, health/safety, and financial domains) are not useable in Japan according to the Japanese Marketing Research Association code because they ask about participation in illegal activities; we thus used abbreviated versions of those domains leaving out these items. The DOSPERT+M items generally did not cluster cleanly into the expected domains, although items within the same domain usually were intercorrelated. Participants demonstrated domain-specific conventional risk attitudes, although nearly half of those assessed were perceived-risk neutral in all domains. Unlike our recently reported findings in the U.S. population, DOSPERT+M medical domain scores were associated with health/safety domain scores, although they were often more strongly associated with scores in other domains, such as recreational activities.Conclusion:The DOSPERT (and DOSPERT+M) instruments are problematic in Japan but Japanese citizens may also differ from those of other nations in their risk attitudes and perceptions.
The potential relationship between spicy taste and risk seeking
Authors: Wang Xue , Geng Liuna , Qin Jiawen , Yao Sixie 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWe conducted three studies to examine the relationship between spicy tastes and risk seeking. In Study 1, results from a personality judgment task indicated that people were more inclined to attribute a higher level of risk seeking to individuals who enjoy spicy foods. The second study examined whether people who like spicy foods are actually more risk seeking. In fact, people who reported a preference for spicy tastes scored higher on risk taking, as assessed via the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking Scale (Chinese version). Finally, Study 3 employed an experimental design to manipulate risk-seeking tendencies by having participants experience spicy food tastes in the lab. Momentarily savoring spicy foods increased participants’ risk taking in the Iowa Gambling Task. The present findings suggest that preferences for spicy tastes could relate to risk-seeking tendencies and subsequent risk-seeking behaviors.
Trade-upgrade framing effects: Trades are losses, but upgrades are improvements
Authors: Sun Yan , Mellers Barbara 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn two studies, people were reluctant to trade items they own, but glad to accept upgrades with identical end states. The framing of the transaction makes a difference. A mediational analysis suggests that the relationship between the frame of the transaction and measures of value (willingness to accept, WTA) depends on perceived losses. Losses are perceived as greater when the transaction is a trade than as an upgrade. We manipulated perceptions of loss across descriptions of transactions and found that, when the difference in perceptions of losses with trades versus upgrades was large, framing effects were strong. But when the difference was small, framing effects disappeared. These framing effects with identical end states influence WTA because trades are associated with perceived losses, while upgrades are associated with perceived costs.
Partner selection supported by opaque reputation promotes cooperative behavior
Authors: Capraro Valerio , Giardini Francesca , Vilone Daniele , Paolucci Mario 
Published: January 2023

AbstractReputation plays a major role in human societies, and it has been proposed as an explanation for the evolution of cooperation. While the majority of previous studies equates reputation with a transparent and complete history of players’ past decisions, reputations in real life are often ambiguous and opaque. Using web-based experiments, we explore the extent to which opaque reputation works in isolating defectors, with and without partner selection opportunities. We found that low reputation works as a signal of untrustworthiness, whereas medium or high reputations are not taken into account by subjects for orienting their choices. Reputation without partner selection does not promote cooperative behavior; that is, defectors do not turn into cooperators only for the sake of getting a positive reputation. Finally, in a third study, when reputation is pivotal to selection, then a substantial proportion of would-be-defectors turn into cooperators. Taken together, these results provide insights about the characteristics of reputation and about the way in which humans make use of it when selecting partners, and also when knowing that they will be selected.
The effect of interruption on the decision-making process
Authors: Nicholas Cheryl A. , Cohen Andrew L. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPrevious research has shown that interruptions can lead to delays and errors on the interrupted task. Such research, however, seldom considers whether interruptions cause a change in how information is processed. The central question of this research is to determine whether an interruption causes a processing change. We investigate this question in a decision-making paradigm well-suited for examining the decision-making process. Participants are asked to select from a set of risky gambles, each with multiple possible stochastic outcomes. The information gathering process is measured using a mouse-click paradigm. Consistent with past work, interruptions did incur a cost: An interruption increased the time and the amount of information needed to make a decision. Furthermore, after an interruption, participants did seem to partially “restart” the task. Importantly, however, there was no evidence that the information gathering pattern was changed by an interruption. There was also no overall cost to the interruption in terms of choice outcome. These results are consistent with the idea that participants recall a subset of pre-interruption information, which was then incorporated into post-interruption processing.
An exploration of the motivational basis of take-some and give-some games
Authors: Haesevoets Tessa , Hiel Alain Van , Assche Jasper Van , Bostyn Dries H. , Folmer Chris Reinders 
Published: January 2023

AbstractSurprisingly little research has investigated the particular motives that underlie choice behavior in social dilemma situations. The main aim of the present research was to ask whether behavior in take-some games (such as the multiple-person Commons Dilemma Game and the two-person Bandit Game) and give-some games (such as the multiple-person Public Goods Dilemma Game and the two-person Dictator Game) is differently affected by proself and prosocial motives. Two experimental studies were conducted. Our first experiment used a trait-based assessment of the motives, whereas in our second experiment the motives were measured as state variables. The results of both experiments revealed that proself and prosocial motives did not explain much difference between taking and giving when comparing the Commons Dilemma Game and the Public Goods Dilemma Game. Yet, our second experiment revealed that these motives did differentiate choices in the Bandit Game and the Dictator Game. More specifically, prosocial motives are more strongly related to giving behavior in the Dictator Game than to taking behavior in the Bandit Game. As such, it can be concluded that in dyadic games (but not in multiple-person games) prosocial motives (but not proself motives) predict choice behavior in a game-specific way.
A hard to read font reduces the causality bias
Authors: Díaz-Lago Marcos , Matute Helena 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPrevious studies have demonstrated that fluency affects judgment and decision-making. The purpose of the present research was to investigate the effect of perceptual fluency in a causal learning task that usually induces an illusion of causality in non-contingent conditions. We predicted that a reduction of fluency could improve accuracy in the detection of non-contingency and, therefore, could be used to debias illusory perceptions of causality. Participants were randomly assigned to either an easy-to-read or a hard-to-read condition. Our results showed a strong bias (i.e., overestimation) of causality in those participants who performed the non-contingent task in the easy-to-read font, which replicated the standard causality bias effect. This effect was reduced when the same task was presented in a hard-to-read font. Overall, our results provide evidence for a reduction of the causality bias when presenting the problem in a hard-to-read font. This suggests that perceptual fluency affects causal judgments.
Limited resources or limited luck? Why people perceive an illusory negative correlation between the outcomes of choice options despite unequivocal evidence for independence
Authors: Marciano Déborah , Krispin Eden , Bourgeois-Gironde Sacha , Deouell Leon Y. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWhen people learn of the outcome of an option they did not choose (the alternative outcome) before they know their own outcome, they see an illusory negative correlation between the two outcomes, the Alternative Omen Effect (ALOE). Why does this happen? Here, we tested several alternative explanations and conclude that the ALOE may derive from a pervasive belief that good luck is a limited resource. In Experiment 1, we show that the ALOE is due to people seeing a good alternative outcome as a bad sign regarding their outcome, relative to seeing a neutral alternative, but find no evidence for seeing a bad alternative outcome as a good sign. Experiment 2 confirms that the ALOE replicates across tasks, and that the ALOE cannot be explained by preconceptions regarding outcome distribution, including: 1) the Limited Good Hypothesis (zero-sum bias), according to which people see the world as a zero-sum game, and assume that resources there means fewer resources here, and/or 2) a more specific assumption that laboratory tasks are programmed as zero-sum games. To neutralize these potential beliefs, participants had to draw actual colored beads from two real, distinct bags. The results of Experiment 3 were consistent with a prediction of the Limited Luck Hypothesis: by eliminating the value of the outcomes we eliminated the ALOE. Taken together, our results show that either the limited good belief is so robust that it defies strong situational evidence, or that individuals perceive good luck itself as a limited resource. Such a limited-luck belief might have important consequences in decision making and negotiations.
High-stakes hedges are misunderstood too. A commentary on: “Valuing bets and hedges: Implications for the construct of risk preference”
Authors: Newall Philip W. S. , Cortis Dominic 
Published: January 2023

AbstractFrederick, Levis, Malliaris & Meyer (2018) report a package of laboratory studies where participants underestimate the value of “hedges”: Risky bets which cancel out the risk of another presently-held bet. However, it might be questioned to what extent laboratory findings predict field behavior. People might better understand hedges when more money is at stake, or when they have more time to reflect. We discuss three gamblers who, instead of hedging, used a costly “cash-out” option to eliminate the risk of their bets on Leicester FC’s improbable victory in the 2015/2016 English Premier League soccer season. The decision to cash-out rather than to hedge led to individual losses of up to £8,000, and did not seem plausibly explained by rational economic factors. High-stakes hedges are misunderstood too.
A response to Mandel’s (2019) commentary on
Authors: Lehner Paul , Stastny Bradley 
Published: January 2023

AbstractStastny and Lehner (2018) compared the accuracy of forecasts in an intelligence community prediction market to comparable forecasts in analysis reports prepared by groups of professional intelligence analysts. To obtain quantitative probabilities from the analysis reports experienced analysts were asked to read the reports and state what probability they thought the reports implied for each forecast question. These were calledimputed probabilities. Stastny and Lehner found that the prediction market was more accurate than the imputed probabilities and concluded that this was evidence that the prediction market was more accurate than the analysis reports. In a commentary, Mandel (2019) took exception to this interpretation. In a re-analysis of the data, Mandel found a very strong correlation between readers’ personal and imputed probabilities. From this Mandel builds a case that the imputed probabilities are little more than a reflection of the readers’ personal views; that they do not fairly reflect the contents of the analysis reports; and therefore, any accuracy results are spurious. This paper argues two points. First, the high correlation between imputed and personal probabilities was not evidence of substantial imputation bias. Rather it was the natural by-product of the fact that the imputed and personal probabilities were both forecasts of the same events. An additional analysis shows a much lower level of imputation bias that is consistent with the original results and interpretation. Second, the focus of Stastny and Lehner (2018) was on the reports as understood by readers. In this context, even if there was substantial imputation bias it would not invalidate accuracy results; it would instead provide a possible causal explanation of those results.
Cultural differences in responses to real-life and hypothetical trolley problems
Authors: Gold Natalie , Colman Andrew M. , Pulford Briony D. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractTrolley problems have been used in the development of moral theory and the psychological study of moral judgments and behavior. Most of this research has focused on people from the West, with implicit assumptions that moral intuitions should generalize and that moral psychology is universal. However, cultural differences may be associated with differences in moral judgments and behavior. We operationalized a trolley problem in the laboratory, with economic incentives and real-life consequences, and compared British and Chinese samples on moral behavior and judgment. We found that Chinese participants were less willing to sacrifice one person to save five others, and less likely to consider such an action to be right. In a second study using three scenarios, including the standard scenario where lives are threatened by an on-coming train, fewer Chinese than British participants were willing to take action and sacrifice one to save five, and this cultural difference was more pronounced when the consequences were less severe than death.
Foreground-background salience effect in traffic risk communication
Authors: Hu Tian-Yi , Jiang Xin-Wen , Xie Xiaofei , Ma Xiao-Qin , Xu Chao 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPie charts are often used to communicate risk, such as the risk of driving. In the foreground-background salience effect (FBSE), foreground (probability of bad event) has greater salience than background (no bad event) in such a chart. Experiment 1 confirmed that the displays format of pie charts showed a typical FBSE. Experiment 2 showed that the FBSE resulted from a difference in cognitive efforts in processing the messages and that a foreground-emphasizing display was easier to process. Experiment 3 manipulated subjects’ information processing mindset and explored the interaction between displays format and information processing mindset. In the default mindset, careless subjects displayed a typical FBSE, while those who were instructed to be careful reported similar risk-avoidant behavior preference reading both charts. Suggestions for improving risk communication are discussed.
Cognitive reflection predicts the acceptance of unfair ultimatum game offers
Authors: Calvillo Dustin P. , Burgeno Jessica N. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn the ultimatum game, one player proposes a split of money between him- or herself and another player, who can accept the offer (and both players keep the allocated money) or reject the offer (and both players get nothing). The present study examined predictors of accepting unfair ultimatum offers. In Study 1, 184 participants responded to an unfair ultimatum offer, completed a measure of cognitive reflection, and completed a self-report measure of rational and experiential thinking. Slightly more than half of the participants (54.3%) accepted the unfair offer, and cognitive reflection was positively correlated with accepting unfair offers. The rational and experiential thinking scales were not significantly correlated with ultimatum decisions. In Study 2, 306 participants responded to 20 ultimatum offers that varied in fairness and completed an expanded measure of cognitive reflection. Performance on the cognitive reflection measure predicted the number of ultimatum offers accepted. These results suggest that rejecting ultimatum offers is related to intuitive, heuristic-based thinking, whereas accepting offers is related to deliberate, analytic-based thinking.