bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Human Rights II
Authors: Mantouvalou Virginia 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
Welfare conditionality schemes with harsh sanctions increase the vulnerability to exploitation of the unemployed poor and turn them into working and exploited poor, as we saw in Chapter 5. Is this structure compatible with human rights law? This chapter considers this question in light of provisions such as the prohibition of forced labour, the right to private life, the right to social assistance, and the right to a subsistence minimum. It also assesses precarious working conditions separately from coercive conditionality, and explains that legal rules that constitute these structures may also at times violate human rights law, including trade union rights and the prohibition of discrimination. The chapter does not argue that all injustices that arise from welfare conditionality or precarious work can be addressed through human rights law. However, human rights law can challenge aspects of these legal rules and thus destabilise the unjust structures that affect disadvantaged workers.
Precedent, Exemplarity, and Imitation
Authors: Amaya Amalia 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
This chapter examines precedent in law from an exemplarist perspective. First, it develops an account of precedent as a specific kind of exemplar. More precisely, it claims that precedents as exemplars have a dual ontology as both typical and unique, embody a public, object-based, and critical kind of exemplarity, and have emotional, monumental, and aesthetic dimensions. Next, it gives an account of reasoning by precedent as a kind of imitative reasoning. From this analysis emerges a view of precedential reasoning as a collective and historical process that has both unreflective and deliberative components, combines adaptative and formal imitation, is both backward- and forward-looking, and aims at striking a balance between faithful transmission and transformative innovation. Lastly, the chapter discusses the role that precedent plays in law’s development in the context of larger questions about imitation-driven cultural evolution. This perspective allows us to see precedent following as a central mechanism which secures continuity while enabling change, and unveils some complexities involved in the process whereby precedent contributes to the growth of the law. In short, this chapter shows that exemplarism illuminates important aspects of the nature of precedent, reasoning by precedent, and its role in law’s development.
An Artefactual Theory of Precedent
Authors: Ehrenberg Kenneth M 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
This chapter provides an explanation of precedent as a kind of artefact, in keeping with broader accounts of law that do so, specifically the author’s account of law as a genre of institutionalized abstract artefact. The chapter develops its explanation by responding to an argument by Dan Priel against seeing the common law as an artefact when understood to be a form of custom. The chapter shows that customs can themselves be artefacts but also that the precedential elements of common law are not necessarily quite as customary as sometimes considered, showing that the common law built from precedents fits within a distributed design model of artefacts and that stare decisis has a wider systemic function of upholding certain rule of law principles. It ends with some considerations about the institutional nature of precedents, specifically that judicial decisions are most often both applications and developments of legal norms, but also determinations of legal validity.
Precedent as Generalized Second-Order Reasons
Authors: Perry Stephen 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
This chapter argues that the common law doctrine of precedent must be explained and justified in non-positivist terms. Raz, who has advanced the strongest extant argument for legal positivism, holds that the existence and content of all valid law is fully determined by social facts without resort to moral argument. He defends this ‘sources thesis’ by arguing that law can only guide conduct if it is publicly ascertainable by persons without their having to engage in moral argument. This chapter, while acknowledging that the sources thesis may apply to private citizens’ practical reasoning, argues that it does not apply to the practical reasoning of common law courts. Raz’s defence of the sources thesis rests on his notion of a ‘second-order’ reason for action, which is a reason to act on or refrain from acting on a ‘first-order’ reason. Legal rules are, for Raz, ‘exclusionary’ second-order reasons, meaning reasons to refrain from acting on the ordinary balance of first-order reasons. This chapter argues that a satisfactory account of precedent cannot be based on Raz’s notion of a second-order reason. It requires, rather, a generalization of that notion, which holds a second-order reason to be a reason to assign a first-order reason a greater or lesser weight than it would otherwise receive in an assessment of the ordinary balance of reasons. This yields a conception of precedent which does not comply with the sources thesis and is therefore non-positivist in character, because no relevant first-order reasons, including moral reasons, are excluded from judicial consideration as a matter of course.
‘A Previous Instance’
Authors: Waldron Jeremy 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
When questions have been raised about targeted killing—that is, about the practice of hunting down and killing terrorist suspects identified by name—defenders of the practice often bring up the case of the 1943 killing of Japanese Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor, and they cite it as a ‘precedent’. Now, the first meaning given to the word ‘precedent’ in the Oxford English Dictionary is ‘a previous instance taken as an example or rule by which to be guided in similar cases or circumstances; an example by which a comparable subsequent act may be justified’. Can this apply to the Yamamoto killing? In what way can a single instance like this from almost eighty years ago contribute anything to the permissibility of a highly controversial practice today? If the Yamamoto attack is a precedent, it is a non-judicial precedent and its invocation invites us to consider how precedent operates outside the framework of judicial decision. Beyond that, we must also ask what kind of justificatory work a single instance can do in normative argument. Does it justify by being a shining example of the rightfulness of actions of this sort? Or does it justify by beginning a line of analogical conduct that increases in its justifiability the longer it goes on?
Emotions and Precedent
Authors: Kidd White Emily 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
The philosophy of emotion raises complications for theories of precedent by outlining several distinctive ways that emotions might interact with thick concepts. It is productive to think of the effect of some precedents as facets of legal reasoning that are related to the use and understanding of legal concepts as thick concepts. In legal reasoning, precedents are routinely invoked to explicate, and/or to clarify the content of legal concepts that are at issue in a case. This chapter develops an argument by Bernard Williams, to conclude, that is, that one must avoid the risk of overgeneralizing the relationship of emotions to thick concepts, by placing it in the context of legal reasoning. It argues that the several distinctive ways that emotions interact with thick legal concepts pose challenges for any general theoretical account of precedent in legal reasoning. A focus on these different roles that emotions can play in judicial uses of precedent illuminates some of the more subtle ways in which these uses reveal held values, ways of seeing, and political commitments. The chapter finds that in at least some cases where a precedent is invoked to thicken the understanding of a legal concept at issue in a case, variations in the emotional architecture associated with that invocation will come in direct tension with the legal concept under examination, or with other legal values and principles that pertain to equality, and equal treatment under law.
Reasons to Try
Authors: Herstein Ori J 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
The distinction between “reasons to try” and “reasons to succeed” is intriguing and fertile one. Building on John Gardner’s work, Chapter 4 explains the notions of “reasons to try” and “reasons to succeed” and deploys them to illuminate and reflect on different normative contexts as well as explores Gardner’s own use of the distinction. The normative contexts explored using this distinction include the obligations of the law of accidents, obligations in law more generally, as well as how reasons to try and reasons to succeed feature in values and legal obligations such as fidelity, loyalty, friendship, parenthood, integrity, and others.
Legality and Capacity
Authors: Wilmot-Smith Frederick 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
Gardner was a passionate and persistent critic of the thesis that “ought implies can.” Indeed, the rejection of that thesis—or, more accurately, his adoption of a highly idiosyncratic interpretation—lies beneath a number of claims he made about private law. Most obviously, Gardner’s distinction between duties to try and duties to succeed depends upon the intelligibility of duties to succeed (even where trying is rationally pointless). Gardner was also a passionate defender of the value of legality. He understood this to be the value that people are able to guide their lives according to the law’s norms. For example, one of his last published papers, “The Twilight of Legality,” was a cri de cœur against the slow decline of that value in our civil justice system. There is something a little jarring about these twin commitments. “Ought implies can” is often justified by the claim that it is in the nature of reasons that they are able to guide: if some fact cannot guide our action, the argument goes, it cannot be a reason for us. Given that the rule of law’s specific prescriptions—that laws not be retrospective, that they be published, and so on—are grounded in the idea that law should act as a guide, there is an apparent commonality between “ought implies can” and legality. Why endorse one thesis but not the other? And what, if anything, should we take from the fact there is a counterpart in morality to the law’s first ideal?
Deterrence in Private Law
Authors: Steel Sandy 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
Non-consequentialist justifications of private law liability foreground the role of the law in setting out, part-constituting, and providing enforcement of interpersonal moral rights and duties at the suit of right-holders. The justificatory role of deterrence is either explicitly rejected or not given much attention. The impression given is that deterrence is somehow necessarily inconsistent with the justificatory role of interpersonal moral rights and duties. Chapter 8 shows that this is not the case. The chapter outlines a general account of the normative role of deterrence in the justification of private law norms and enforcement. In making this argument, the chapter affirms Gardner’s view that deterrence matters, non-trivially, to private law, while not being the whole story, or even the most important story. In a nutshell, the thesis is that deterrence is neither necessary nor sufficient for a private law norm to be justified, but can play an important, difference-making, justificatory role when individuals do not have a reasonable individual objection to the deterrence-justified norm.
Primary Duty = Secondary Duty?
Authors: Michelon Claudio 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
Chapter 13 addresses one of the central questions in the law of torts: what is the relationship between the primary duty and the secondary (or remedial) duty? The two dominant answers to that question (the continuity thesis and the identity thesis) stand in a complex relationship that is not yet fully understood and, as a result, the arguments for and against each thesis are muddled. The chapter clarifies each thesis, defends each rival against objections that have been leveled against them, and, at the end, presents reasons why an original version of the continuity thesis offers a better framework within which to understand the relationship between primary and remedial duty.
The Role of Plaintiffs in Private Law Institutions
Authors: Katz Larissa , Shapiro Matthew A 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
Chapter 14 considers a question Gardner posed most explicitly in his later writings: why do victims of private wrongs, rather than third parties such as government officials, have the power to sue those who wronged them? Perhaps surprising for an avowed corrective justice theorist, Gardner denied that victims have any moral entitlement to the power to sue, arguing instead that granting them that power serves various institutional objectives, such as the dispersion of political power. The chapter critically examines Gardner’s arguments for this claim, distinguishing several possible readings of his account of the power to sue. While the chapter authors agree with Gardner that the power to sue is rightly conceptualized in institutional terms, they also contend that his account has some serious shortcomings, particularly in how it alienates victims from the moral underpinnings of the powers they exercise and the institutions in which they participate as plaintiffs. A more compelling account of the power to sue, the authors suggest, recognizes that victims of private wrongs have a moral stake in how those wrongs are rectified, even as it allows that such personal considerations must sometimes yield to more pressing institutional imperatives.
How is Tort Law Political?
Authors: Steele Jenny 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
Chapter 16 addresses Gardner’s take on the particular relationship between tort and the political. Flagging of a link between tort and the political is most evident in his discussion of the negligence standard. Equally, Gardner set out the reasons why distributive questions (which are typically associated with the political) are inescapably a part of the law of tort, and not merely external to it. In both of these two senses in which tort could be called political, Gardner’s position is, essentially, one of reassurance. Tort is unavoidably political, but is none the weaker for that. Finally, Gardner argued that tort could, through its distribution of security rights, be seen as promoting a “mode of social power” which is in some sense distinctive and potentially (if the appropriate rights are distributed) deserving of political support. Tort begins with the protection of value, through security rights, and not of “autonomy”: at core it is a preserver of value in the form of the continuity of a life. The chapter explores whether tort can be seen as advancing protection of security rights in a progressive fashion, and whether it can be urged that this is of distinctive political significance, despite the blurring of boundaries between law and politics.
The Value of the Neighbour Relation
Authors: Essert Christopher 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
Chapter 17 explores two distinct but related arguments made by Gardner about the value of certain kinds of private law relations. In From Personal Life to Private Law, Gardner offers a brief but tantalizing interpretation of Lord Atkin’s famous speech in Donoghue v Stevenson, arguing that the primary duty that constitutes the core of negligence law—the duty of care—cannot be relational in the familiar sense of being specially owed to another person, contrary to the equally famous judgment of Judge Cardozo in Palsgraf v Long Island Railway. The chapter argues, against Gardner, that there is a way to make sense of the idea of a relational duty of care that meets Gardner’s own account of what a relational duty is. This shows the way to a clarification of some disagreements between Gardner and Kantian private law theorists.
The Reasonably Loyal Person
Authors: Gold Andrew S 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
Chapter 19 takes up a puzzle that Gardner raised: why is there no “reasonably loyal trustee” in fiduciary law? Notably, he proposes that the role of a trustee might lack a law-independent counterpart. That, in turn, could make it impossible for trust law (and by implication, fiduciary law) to “pass the buck” to whatever it is that the “reasonably loyal person” would do. This chapter suggests that fiduciary relationships frequently do have law-independent counterparts, and moreover that such counterparts can evolve over time. Relatedly, it argues that a wide range of extra-legal conceptions of loyalty are available for buck passing purposes; not all loyalty is built on a prior meaningful relationship between a loyal party and the object of her loyalty. Lastly, the chapter concludes with some thoughts on why buck passing could be valuable.
International Economics
Authors: Acharyya Rajat 
Published: April 2023

Abstract
Complementing trade theories with relevant trade empirics, this book covers three aspects of the study of International Economics: Pure theory of trade, trade policy, and theory of BoP and exchange rate. In the first part, it discusses the basic principles of international trade between dissimilar countries as well as between similar countries, and implications thereof in terms of welfare, income distribution and growth. In the second part a wide range of policy issues are analysed including costs and benefits of unilateral trade restrictions and promotions through different instruments like tariff, import quotas, export subsidy, and VER; reciprocatory trade policy choices through bilateralism and regionalism; product standards that regulate trade between developed and developing countries; and implications of capital inflow, FDI, fragmentation and global value chains. In the third part, the book discusses different currency and exchange rate regimes and their implications for a country’s balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves. Drawing upon the basic theories, it studies expenditure-reducing and expenditure-switching policies to correct for BoP imbalances under a pegged exchange rate regime. Lessons learnt from some of the financial crises originating in the developing world under overvalued pegged exchange rate regimes with or without capital and exchange controls have been analysed in the context of the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s, BoP crisis in India in 1991, and the Asian financial crisis during 1997–98. Finally, some reflections on the choice of exchange rate regime and optimum currency area wind up discussions of monetary issues in international economics.
Pseudo-incorporation vs differential object marking
Authors: Driemel Imke 
Published: April 2023

AbstractThis chapter is concerned with the most prominently discussed property for pseudo-incorporated arguments -absence of case morphology. Lack of case marking is also a primary diagnostic of differential object marking. Whereas the PNI literature focuses on a correlation of case drop with scope inertness, DOM-languages often display a correlation of case drop with animacy and/or specificity restrictions. The primary aim of this chapter is to develop a clear distinction between PNI and DOM effects. As will be shown, languages select different classes of noun types which can either be pseudo-incorporated or DOM-marked. The theory of this book ties case loss due to PNI to the verbal nature of the hybrid PNI determiner, proposed in the previous chapter. This PNI-account can be neatly integrated into existing accounts of post-syntactic DOM-marking. The need to locate case loss in post-syntax stems from the lack of interaction with agreement and grammatical function change.
PNI-property I: Restriction to low scope
Authors: Driemel Imke 
Published: April 2023

AbstractSince the current proposal argues that the restriction to low scope readings of pseudo-incorporated arguments is connected to their partially verbal character, one of the goals of this chapter is to provide evidence for the scopal inertness of verbal categories. The main idea is then spelled out in more detail and LFs will be given for concrete examples coming from Spanish and Hindi. Since pseudo-incorporated arguments can be dislocated from their base positions in some languages, this chapter also discusses ways to integrate the current idea into theories of syntactic and semantic reconstruction. For the case studies, each noun type with optional case marking will be tested for its scopal properties with respect to negation and universal quantification. Where an interaction between case marking and scope is missing, further specificity tests are run.
Introduction
Authors: Hossein Caroline Shenaz , Edmonds Kevin , Austin Sharon D. Wright 
Published: April 2023

AbstractThe people of the African diaspora have been organizing and protesting for as long as they have been forcibly displaced. Oppressed and racialized community members design their own financial systems and economic institutions and therefore are in complete control of the systems and institutions they have created. For people new to the concept of ROSCAs and other types of cooperatives, a key point is that members are committed to democracy and share decision-making and they build a sense of community through various forms of informal cooperativism. The people of the Black diaspora take charge of local economies, and they continue doing what they have always done—making life vibrant and meaningful with the overriding goals to provide self-help to one another, embrace cultural traditions, and counter economic and societal exclusion.
Caribbean Banker Ladies Making Equitable Economies
Authors: Hossein Caroline Shenaz 
Published: April 2023

AbstractCaribbean women create ROSCAs to take care of the needs of their community people and to show that cooperatives have a place in society. These women also push against commercial banks which fail to diversify lending and include certain groups, namely Black poor women. The argument here is that ROSCAs are an antidote to racial capitalism, and that these money groups do not depend on external subsidies to achieve financing for the community, because Black women, usually from lower income areas, create ROSCAs to mobilize local resources. This chapter examines five country cases—in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Guyana, and Haiti—to show how Black women cooperators revamp colonial financial systems through African ideas of Kombit (collectivity). Elites who deprive many poor women of access to finance are the first ones to respect the ROSCAs called Susus, Partners, and Sols that these women organize. It may be that some of these elites—though not all—had mothers who relied on ROSCAs to pay for their schooling and family expenses. Some may even join a ROSCA because these systems are so culturally ingrained in the social life.