bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Apparent age and gender differences in survival optimism: To what extent are they a bias in the translation of beliefs onto a percentage scale?
Authors: Comerford David A. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractA standard way to elicit expectations asks for the percentage chance an event will occur. Previous research demonstrates noise in reported percentages. The current research models a bias; a five percentage point change in reported probabilities implies a larger change in beliefs at certain points in the probability distribution. One contribution of my model is that it can parse bias in beliefs from biases in reports. I reconsider age and gender differences in Subjective Survival Probabilities (SSPs). These are generally interpreted as differences in survival beliefs, e.g., that males are more optimistic than females and older respondents are more optimistic than younger respondents. These demographic differences (in the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing) can be entirely explained by reporting bias. Older respondents are no more optimistic than younger respondents and males are no more optimistic than females. Similarly, in forecasting, information is obscured by taking reported percentages at face value. Accounting for reporting bias thus better exploits the private information contained in reports. Relative to a face-value specification, a specification that does this delivers improved forecasts of mortality events, raising the pseudo R-squared from less than 3 percent to over 6 percent.
More time, more work: How time limits bias estimates of task scope and project duration
Authors: Goswami Indranil , Urminsky Oleg 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWe propose that externally induced time limits on a task overly affect predictions of other people’s completion times for that task, due to an over-generalized association between the time available and inferred task scope. We find higher estimates of the time needed to complete a given task by another person when the time limit is longer. While such predictions could be normative when time limits are informative, the effect persists even when the decision-maker knows that the limit is arbitrary and is unknown to the other person, and therefore, cannot affect behavior. Perception of task scope mediates the relationship between time limits and completion time estimates, and weakening the association between time limits and task scope attenuates the effect. The over-learned cognitive bias persists even among experienced decision-makers making estimates in a familiar setting. Our findings have implications for people who make decisions that use judgments of others’ task completion time as an input.
Veil-of-ignorance reasoning mitigates self-serving bias in resource allocation during the COVID-19 crisis
Authors: Huang Karen , Bernhard Regan M. , Barak-Corren Netta , Bazerman Max H. , Greene Joshua D. 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe COVID-19 crisis has forced healthcare professionals to make tragic decisions concerning which patients to save. Furthermore, The COVID-19 crisis has foregrounded the influence of self-serving bias in debates on how to allocate scarce resources. A utilitarian principle favors allocating scarce resources such as ventilators toward younger patients, as this is expected to save more years of life. Some view this as ageist, instead favoring age-neutral principles, such as “first come, first served”. Which approach is fairer? The “veil of ignorance” is a moral reasoning device designed to promote impartial decision-making by reducing decision-makers’ use of potentially biasing information about who will benefit most or least from the available options. Veil-of-ignorance reasoning was originally applied by philosophers and economists to foundational questions concerning the overall organization of society. Here we apply veil-of-ignorance reasoning to the COVID-19 ventilator dilemma, asking participants which policy they would prefer if they did not know whether they were younger or older. Two studies (pre-registered; online samples; Study 1, N=414; Study 2 replication, N=1,276) show that veil-of-ignorance reasoning shifts preferences toward saving younger patients. The effect on older participants is dramatic, reversing their opposition toward favoring the young, thereby eliminating self-serving bias. These findings provide guidance on how to remove self-serving biases to healthcare policymakers and frontline personnel charged with allocating scarce medical resources during times of crisis.
Differences in cooperation between social dilemmas of gain and loss
Authors: Sun Qingzhou , Guo Haozhi , Wang Jiarui , Zhang Jing , Jiang Chengming , Liu Yongfang 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn social interactions, people frequently encounter gain (i.e., all outcomes are gains from the status-quo) or loss (all outcomes are losses from the status-quo) social dilemmas, where their personal interests conflict with social interests. We ask whether there are any behavioral differences in social interactions when it comes to gains and losses. Using the Prisoner’s Dilemma games, in three studies we observed that participants were less cooperative in the loss domain than in the gain domain. This effect was robust, not moderated by payoff amount (Study 1), cooperation index (Study 1), domain comparison (Studies 1 and 2), and personal loss aversion (Study 3). Social motive and belief explained this effect: compared to the gain domain, participants in the loss domain aroused more pro-self motive and less prosocial motive, and showed stronger beliefs that their partner would defect, which led them to cooperate less. These findings suggest that gain and loss domains affect individual motivation and belief, subsequently affecting strategic choices in social dilemmas.
Risky choice framing with various problem descriptions: A replication and extension study
Authors: Zhou Lei , Liu Nan , Liao Ya-Qiong , Li Ai-Mei 
Published: January 2023

AbstractIn “Risky choice framing: Task versions and a comparison of prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory”, Kühberger and Tanner (2010) examined the impacts of removing stated zero/non-zero complements of risky options on the gain/loss framing effect. They also tested two rival theoretical explanations for this effect: prospect theory and fuzzy-trace theory. The present study aimed to examine the reliability and robustness of the evidence provided by Kühberger and Tanner by precise replication in Study 1. The original findings were reported for conditions in which the probability of the risky option was fixed, and the expected value of the two alternatives was approximately equivalent. The present study also aimed to examine the generality of their findings under additional conditions in which large, medium and small probabilities of the risky option were assigned, and the expected value of the certain or risky options differed. The main findings of Kühberger and Tanner (2010) were successfully replicated and confirmed under the original and additional conditions. The implications of these findings are discussed.
Inference and preference in intertemporal choice
Authors: Skylark William J. , Farmer George D. , Bahemia Nadia 
Published: January 2023

AbstractWhen choosing between immediate and future rewards, how do people deal with uncertainty about the value of the future outcome or the delay until its occurrence? Skylark et al. (2020) suggested that people employ a delay-reward heuristic: the inferred value of an ambiguous future reward is a function of the stated delay, and vice-versa. The present paper investigates the role of this heuristic in choice behaviour. In Studies 1a–2b, participants inferred the value of an ambiguous future reward or delay before the true value was revealed and a choice made. Preference for the future option was predicted by the discrepancy between the estimated and true values: the more pleasantly surprising the delayed option, the greater the willingness to choose it. Studies 3a–3c examined the association between inference and preference when the ambiguous values remained unknown. As predicted by the use of a delay-reward heuristic, inferred delays and rewards were positively related to stated rewards and delays, respectively. More importantly, choices were associated with inferred rewards and, in some circumstances, delays. Critically, estimates and choices were both order-dependent: when estimates preceded choices, estimates were more optimistic (people inferred smaller delays and larger rewards) and were subsequently more likely to choose the delayed option than when choices were made before estimates. These order effects argue against a simple model in which people deal with ambiguity by first estimating the unknown value and then using their estimate as the basis for decision. Rather, it seems that inferences are partly constructed from choices, and the role of inference in choice depends on whether an explicit estimate is made prior to choosing. Finally, we also find that inferences about ambiguous delays depend on whether the estimate has to be made in “days” or in a self-selected temporal unit, and replicate previous findings that older participants make more pessimistic inferences than younger ones. We discuss the implications and possible mechanisms for these findings.
Denotative and connotative management of uncertainty: A computational dual-process model
Authors: Hoey Jesse , MacKinnon Neil J. , Schröder Tobias 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe interplay between intuitive and deliberative processing is known to be important for human decision making. As independent modes, intuitive processes can take on many forms from associative to constructive, while deliberative processes often rely on some notion of decision theoretic rationality or pattern matching. Dual process models attempt to unify these two modes based on parallel constraint networks or on socially or emotionally oriented adjustments to utility functions. This paper presents a new kind of dual process model that unifies decision theoretic deliberative reasoning with intuitive reasoning based on shared cultural affective meanings in a single Bayesian sequential model. Agents constructed according to this unified model are motivated by a combination of affective alignment (intuitive) and decision theoretic reasoning (deliberative), trading the two off as a function of the uncertainty or unpredictability of the situation. The model also provides a theoretical bridge between decision-making research and sociological symbolic interactionism. Starting with a high-level view of existing models, we advance Bayesian Affect Control Theory (BayesACT) as a promising new type of dual process model that explicitly and optimally (in the Bayesian sense) trades off motivation, action, beliefs and utility. We demonstrate a key component of the model as being sufficient to account for some aspects of classic cognitive biases about fairness and dissonance, and outline how this new theory relates to parallel constraint satisfaction models.
Nudging freelance professionals to increase their retirement pension fund contributions
Authors: Rubaltelli Enrico , Lotto Lorella 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPeople do not save enough for retirement and this can have serious repercussions on their well-being. We tested an intervention in a large field study (N = 20,507) with the goal of nudging a population of freelance workers to save more for the future. First, we changed the default from the earlier contribution rate of 10% to a contribution rate of 20%, but left people free to choose how much they wanted to contribute. Second, those who reduced their contribution were reminded that they would receive a lower pension as a result. Third, we informed people about how much tax they would save as a result of their contribution. This nudging intervention proved to be a cost-effective, yet powerful way to remind people about the long-term implications of their savings decisions. It was also successful at counteracting the temptation to keep as much money as possible for present consumption while losing out on the long run. Overall, we were able to increase cash flow to the fund by more than eight million Euros (in addition to the roughly 50 million collected in the previous year), with an almost seven-fold increase in the number of people who chose to contribute more than the minimum.
Time-varying risk behavior and prior investment outcomes: Evidence from Italy
Authors: Lippi Andrea , Barbieri Laura , Piva Mariacristina , De Bondt Werner 
Published: January 2023

AbstractRisk behavior can be capricious and may vary from month to month. We study 62 clients of a private bank in Northern Italy. The individuals are of special interest for several reasons. As active traders, they manage the value-at-risk (VaR) of a portion of their wealth portfolios. In addition, they act alone, i.e., without input from a financial adviser. Based onVaR-statistics, we find that, in general, the subjects become more risk-averse after suffering losses and more risk-seeking after experiencing gains. The monthly gains and losses that alter investor risk behavior represent true changes in wealth but are “on paper” only, i.e., not immediately realized. Our results allow several interpretations, but they are not at odds with a house money effect, or the possibility that overconfident investors trade on illusions. Rapidly shifting risk behavior in fast response to unstable circumstances weakens individual risk tolerance as a deep parameter and key construct of finance theory.
Stepwise training supports strategic second-order theory of mind in turn-taking games
Authors: Verbrugge Rineke , Meijering Ben , Wierda Stefan , van Rijn Hedderik , Taatgen Niels 
Published: January 2023

AbstractPeople model other people’s mental states in order to understand and predict their behavior. Sometimes they model what others think about them as well: “He thinks that I intend to stop.” Such second-order theory of mind is needed to navigate some social situations, for example, to make optimal decisions in turn-taking games. Adults sometimes find this very difficult. Sometimes they make decisions that do not fit their predictions about the other player. However, the main bottleneck for decision makers is to take a second-order perspective required to make a correct opponent model. We report a methodical investigation into supporting factors that help adults do better. We presented subjects with two-player, three-turn games in which optimal decisions required second-order theory of mind (Hedden and Zhang, 2002). We applied three “scaffolds” that, theoretically, should facilitate second-order perspective-taking: 1) stepwise training, from simple one-person games to games requiring second-order theory of mind; 2) prompting subjects to predict the opponent’s next decision before making their own decision; and 3) a realistic visual task representation. The performance of subjects in the eight resulting combinations shows that stepwise training, but not the other two scaffolds, improves subjects’ second-order opponent models and thereby their own decisions.
Making good cider out of bad apples — Signaling expectations boosts cooperation among would-be free riders
Authors: Nagatsu Michiru , Larsen Karen , Karabegovic Mia , Székely Marcell , Mønster Dan , Michael John 
Published: January 2023

AbstractThe present study investigates how group-cooperation heuristics boost voluntary contributions in a repeated public goods game. We manipulate two separate factors in a two-person public goods game: i) group composition (Selfish Subjects vs. Conditional Cooperators) and ii) common knowledge about group composition (Information vs. No Information). In addition, we let the subjects signal expectations of the other’s contributions in the experiment’s second phase. Common knowledge of Selfish type alone slightly dampens contributions but dramatically increases contributions when signaling of expectations is allowed. The results suggest that group-cooperation heuristics are triggered when two factors are jointly salient to the agent: (i) that there is no one to free-ride on; and (ii) that the other wants to cooperate because of (i). We highlight the potential effectiveness of group-cooperation heuristics and proposesolution thinkingas the schema of reasoning underlying the heuristics. The high correlation between expectations and actual contributions is compatible with the existence of default preference to satisfy others’ expectations (or to avoid disappointing them), but the stark end-game effect suggests that group-cooperation heuristics, at least among selfish players, function ultimately to benefit material self-interest rather than to just please others.
The effects of communicating scientific uncertainty on trust and decision making in a public health context
Authors: Schneider Claudia R. , Freeman Alexandra L. J. , Spiegelhalter David , van der Linden Sander 
Published: January 2023

AbstractLarge-scale societal issues such as public health crises highlight the need to communicate scientific information, which is often uncertain, accurately to the public and policy makers. The challenge is to communicate the inherent scientific uncertainty — especially about the underlying quality of the evidence — whilst supporting informed decision making. Little is known about the effects that such scientific uncertainty has on people’s judgments of the information. In three experimental studies (totalN=6,489), we investigate the influence of scientific uncertainty about the quality of the evidence on people’s perceived trustworthiness of the information and decision making. We compare the provision of high, low, and ambiguous quality-of-evidence indicators against providing no such cues. Results show an asymmetric relationship: people react more strongly to cues of low quality of evidence than they do to high quality of evidence compared to no cue. While responses to a cue of high quality of evidence are not significantly different from no cue; a cue of low or uncertain quality of evidence is accompanied by lower perceived trustworthiness and lower use of the information in decision making. Cues of uncertain quality of evidence have a similar effect to those of low quality. These effects do not change with the addition of a reason for the indicated quality level. Our findings shed light on the effects of the communication of scientific uncertainty on judgment and decision making, and provide insights for evidence-based communications and informed decision making for policy makers and the public.
Thinking, good and bad? Deliberative thinking and the singularity effect
in charitable giving
Authors: Moche Hajdi , Gordon-Hecker Tom , Kogut Tehila , Västfjäll Daniel 
Published: January 2023

Abstract
Can deliberation increase charitable giving when giving is impulsive
(i.e., a one-time small gift in response to an immediate appeal)? We conduct
two studies in Israel and Sweden to compare two forms of deliberation,
unguided and guided, in their ability to decrease the singularity effect
(i.e., giving more to one than many victims), often evident in impulsive
giving. Under unguided deliberation, participants were instructed to simply
think hard before making a donation decision whereas participants in the
guided deliberation condition were asked to think how much different
prespecified decision attributes should influence their decision. We find
that both types of deliberation reduce the singularity effect, as people no
longer value the single victim higher than the group of victims.
Importantly, this is driven by donations being decreased under deliberation
only to the single victim, but not the group of victims. Thus, deliberation
affects donations negatively by overshadowing the affective response,
especially in situations in which affect is greatest (i.e., to a single
victim). Last, the results show that neither type of deliberation
significantly reversed the singularity effect, as people did not help the
group significantly more than the single victim. This means that deliberate
thinking decreased the overall willingness to help, leading to a lower
overall valuation of people in need.
Recalibrating probabilistic forecasts to improve their accuracy
Authors: Han Ying , Budescu David V. 
Published: January 2023

Abstract
The accuracy of human forecasters is often reduced because of incomplete
information and cognitive biases that affect the judges. One approach to
improve the accuracy of the forecasts is to recalibrate them by means of
non-linear transformations that are sensitive to the direction and the
magnitude of the biases. Previous work on recalibration has focused on
binary forecasts. We propose an extension of this approach by developing an
algorithm that uses a single free parameter to recalibrate complete
subjective probability distributions. We illustrate the approach with data
from the quarterly Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) conducted by the
European Central Bank (ECB), document the potential benefits of this
approach, and show how it can be used in practical applications.
Belief in karma is associated with perceived (but not actual)
trustworthiness
Authors: Ong How Hwee , Evans Anthony M. , Nelissen Rob M. A. , van Beest Ilja 
Published: January 2023

Abstract
Believers of karma believe in ethical causation where good and bad
outcomes can be traced to past moral and immoral acts. Karmic belief may
have important interpersonal consequences. We investigated whether American
Christians expect more trustworthiness from (and are more likely to trust)
interaction partners who believe in karma. We conducted an incentivized
study of the trust game where interaction partners had different beliefs in
karma and God. Participants expected more trustworthiness from (and were
more likely to trust) karma believers. Expectations did not match actual
behavior: karmic belief was not associated with actual trustworthiness.
These findings suggest that people may use others’ karmic belief as a cue to
predict their trustworthiness but would err when doing so.
Both better and worse than others depending on difficulty: Replication
and extensions of Kruger’s (1999) above and below average effects
Authors: Korbmacher Max , Kwan Ching (Isabelle) , Feldman Gilad 
Published: January 2023

Abstract
Above-and-below-average effects are well-known phenomena that arise when
comparing oneself to others. Kruger (1999) found that people rate themselves
as above average for easy abilities and below average for difficult
abilities. We conducted a successful pre-registered replication of Kruger’s
(1999) Study 1, the first demonstration of the core phenomenon
(N = 756, US MTurk workers). Extending the
replication to also include a between-subject design, we added two
conditions manipulating easy and difficult interpretations of the original
ability domains, and with an additional dependent variable measuring
perceived difficulty. We observed an above-average-effect in the easy
extension and below-average-effect in the difficult extension, compared to
the neutral replication condition. Both extension conditions were perceived
as less ambiguous than the original neutral condition. Overall, we conclude
strong empirical support for Kruger’s above-and-below-average effects, with
boundary conditions laid out in the extensions expanding both
generalizability and robustness of the phenomenon.