bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Limits of Morality
Authors: Kagan Shelly 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book is a sustained attack on two of the most fundamental features of ‘ordinary morality’, the common‐sense moral view that most of us accept. According to this view, morality involves two different kinds of limits. First, morality imposes certain limits on our actions, ruling out various kinds of acts – for example, harming the innocent – even if more good might be brought about by performing an act of this kind. Second, there are limits imposed on morality, limits to what morality can demand of us; in particular, we are not required to make our greatest possible contribution to the overall good. I argue that despite their intuitive appeal, neither sort of limit can be adequately defended.
Everydayness
Authors: Richardson John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The first chapter gives Heidegger's account of our (Dasein's) everyday or ordinary condition. This requires laying out the system of Being and Time's first Division, which offers that account; I try to give its terms and claims (relative) analytic clarity. Heidegger stresses the pragmatic character of our everyday stance: we know things by way of knowing how to do things with them. We ‘project’ towards certain ends, and understand things in being able to use them as ‘ready‐to‐hand’ equipment within those projects; this understanding is implicit and largely inarticulate. The full network of this know‐how is our world; our relation to this world is one of concern or ‘care’.
Inductive Arguments
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Inductive arguments are arguments from premises that add to the probability of conclusion and may render it probable overall (i.e., more probable than not). I consider in this book, how far arguments from contingent phenomena (such as the existence of the Universe and its conformity to natural laws) render probable the existence of God. They are all arguments to God as purported explanation of the phenomena. The structure of such probabilistic argument is elucidated by the probability calculus.
The Nature of Explanation
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There are two kinds of explanation of phenomena – the scientific explanation in terms of laws of nature and initial conditions, or better in terms of things and their process as bio?; and personal explanation in terms of pe?. their capacities, intentions, and beliefs. Some observable phenomena explained as brought about by pe, others as brought about by natural laws. But there can only be two explanations of a phenomenon if one explains the operation of the factors involved in the other. Explanations of phenomena as brought about by God are personal explanations.
Complete Explanation
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In a full explanation, the explaining factors necessitate the phenomena to be explained. A special kind of full explanation is a complete explanation, one where none of the explaining factors can themselves be explained by factors operating at the time in question. A special kind of complete explanation is an ultimate explanation, one in which one of the explaining factors has any explanation at all by further factors, and the explaining factors constitute the ultimate brute facts. A special kind of ultimate explanation is one where the explaining factors are either self‐explanatory or logically necessary. There can be no absolute explanations of contingent phenomena. Our grounds for believing that we have reached a complete or ultimate explanation is that we have reached a probably true explanation, and that there is a good reason to suppose that there is no probably true explanation of it.
The Intrinsic Probability of Theism
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The major factor determining the probability of a hypothesis is its simplicity. The hypothesis of theism is a very simple hypothesis. It postulates one personal being, God, essentially omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly free, and eternal. Having powers, beliefs, and intentions are essential for being a person at all; theism postulates a person of such a kind that there are no limits to his powers, beliefs, and choice of intention, and his temporal existence except those of logic. God's perfect goodness follows from the other properties.
The Cosmological Argument
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The cosmological argument is the argument to God from the existence of a complex physical universe. God can create such a universe (by keeping it in existence as long as it exists ‐ whether for a finite or infinite time) and has some reason to do so because it is a theatre for finite agents which they can shape and in which they can develop. But it is a far less simple beginning of things than is God, and so a priori not to be expected but for the action of God.
Teleological Arguments
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The argument from temporal order (from the operations of laws of nature) is one form of teleological argument, expanded by Aquinas as his ‘fifth way’. God can make a universe subject to laws of nature, and has reason to do so in that only thereby can finite agents grow in power and knowledge. But it is extremely improbable that the universe would be governed by laws of nature if there is no God.
The Argument from Providence
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is good that there should be a world in which agents have the opportunity to help themselves and each other to grow in power and knowledge, and in other ways to benefit or harm each other. In order to prevent too much harm happening too soon, it is good that humans should be subject to deter to bad action. Our world is in this way providential, and that provides a further argument for God: if there is a God, we have reason to expect all this, but otherwise not. Death is not such an evil, but merely the end of a good state.
The Balance of Probability
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
If we ignore religious experience, there is enough evidence considered in this book, to make the existence of God as probable as not. Theism is a simple hypothesis that leads us to expect many phenomena, which are not otherwise to be expected. The principle of credulity considered in Ch. 13 has the consequence that we ought to believe that what we appear to experience is really there unless there is on balance counter‐evidence. Hence, the religious experience (of ourselves or others) when added to the other evidence makes it probable on balance that there is a God.
The Problem of Existence in Mathematics
Authors: Chihara Charles S. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConcerns the ‘problem of existence’ in mathematics: the problem of how to understand existence assertions in mathematics. The problem can best be understood by considering how Mathematical Platonists have understood such existence assertions. These philosophers (‘Literalists’) have taken the existential theorems of mathematics as literally asserting the existence of mathematical objects. They have then attempted to account for the epistemological and metaphysical implications of such a position by putting forward arguments that supposedly show how humans can come to know of the existence of mathematical objects. The reasoning of the most prominent philosophers in this Literalist tradition, Quine and Gödel, are critically discussed. By way of contrast, an alternative position, Heyting's Intuitionism, is examined.
Science Without Numbers
Authors: Chihara Charles S. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFocuses on Hartry Field's Instrumentalism. The ‘Conservation Theorems’, upon which Field bases so much of his form of Instrumentalism, are examined in detail, as is Field's attempt to ‘nominalize’ physics. Doubts are raised about the adequacy of Field's views of mathematics and physics, and a detailed comparison with the Constructibility Theory is presented.
Maddy's Solution to the Problem of Reference
Authors: Chihara Charles S. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPenelope Maddy has attempted to develop a form of realism in mathematics (Set Theoretical Realism) that is not plagued by the sort of epistemological problems that beset traditional Platonism. Maddy advances the radical doctrine that we can and do causally interact with sets. We can see them, feel them, smell them, and even taste them. This chapter raises a series of objections to Maddy's version of realism.
Russell, Idealism, and the Emergence of Analytic Philosophy
Authors: Hylton Peter 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn this book, the author seeks to shed light on the tradition of analytic philosophy by examining one important phase in its formation. This phase is Bertrand Russell's rejection of Absolute Idealism, and his development of a new philosophy based, in part, on the logic that he developed. The book begins by examining the British Idealism of T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley. Against this background, it discusses Russell's own early work, which was in this idealist tradition. The author then considers the philosophical views that G. E. Moore and Russell initially developed in reaction to that tradition (around 1900). In Russell's work, this philosophy was soon combined with the logic that he developed (following Peano) and with the thesis of logicism: that mathematics can be reduced to logic, and so makes no philosophical demands beyond those made by logic. The book examines subsequent developments in Russell's thought, to about 1912, in some detail; these include the theory of descriptions and the theory of types. It concludes with a less detailed discussion of the evolution of Russell's thought over the next few years. In this latter period, Russell develops a constructivist programme, which makes evident the continuity of this phase of his thought with that of later analytic philosophers.
Introduction
Authors: Hylton Peter 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA general discussion of the problematic relationship between philosophy and its history; an argument against a common view as articulated by Richard Rorty. By contrast with that view, the aim of this book is neither to refute Russell nor simply to appropriate aspects of his thought. It is, rather, to come to terms with his thought in this crucial period as a way of coming to terms with the beginnings of analytic philosophy. For those of us trained within the analytic tradition, this should be a route to an understanding of ourselves and our own philosophical position.
The Underlying Metaphysics
Authors: Hylton Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Deals with the initial phase of the reaction, by Moore and Russell, against Idealism. In opposition to that view, they developed an extreme form of realism, which the author calls ‘Platonic Atomism’. The idea of a ‘proposition’ is fundamental for this view. Truth is undefinable, and facts are merely those propositions that happen to be true. Among the most important works here are Moore's ‘Nature of Judgement’ and Russell's 1901 book on Leibniz; the same metaphysical view underlies Moore's Principia Ethica.
Russell's Principles of Mathematics
Authors: Hylton Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The focus of this chapter is on the book mentioned in its title. There, Russell combines the metaphysics of Platonic Atomism with the logic of relations, which he developed on the basis of Peano's logic and with logicism. Logicism is deployed as an argument against Idealism; in particular, it is used to defend the idea that the truths of mathematics are absolutely true, not merely relatively true as the Idealists had held. And it is also used to argue that consistent theories of space and time are available (contrary to the view Russell put forward in his 1897 book on geometry). This fact, Russell claims, undermines the Idealist claim that our ordinary knowledge is inconsistent. The chapter also raises some of the problems thrown up by Russell's view, in particular the paradox that bears his name.
Judgement, Belief, and Knowledge: The Emergence of a Method
Authors: Hylton Peter 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDeals with the evolution of Russell's metaphysical and epistemological views, from roughly 1906 to 1913. In metaphysics, he gives up on the primacy of propositions and the undefinability of truth; facts become fundamental, and truth defined. Epistemology becomes a far more central concern of Russell's than before and is dominated by the idea of acquaintance, a presuppositionless relation between the mind and entities outside the mind. In both fields, Russell develops a constructivist method, greatly influenced by logic, which was to have a far‐reaching influence on later analytic philosophy.
Mathematics and Physical Reality
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey 
Published: October 2003

AbstractStrategies for extending the modal‐structural approach to applications of mathematics are explored. The basic idea is to entertain what relationships would hold between a non‐mathematical system of interest and ‘non‐interfering’ additional hypothetical objects that may be needed to carry relevant mathematical structure. Usually, structures for real analysis suffice, although still more ‘abstract’ structures may arise in modern physics. Certain interesting connections between the modal‐structural approach and a minimal scientific realism are exposed (the latter aiding the former), and comparisons are drawn with Hartry Field's nominalization program.
Moral Immorality
Authors: Stocker Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers a cognate issue, which is whether what is immoral can nevertheless be admirable. It is argued that admirable immorality, like dirty hands, does not pose special problems for ethical theories. At the heart of admirable immorality lies a conflict of moral virtues, which is unavoidable and necessitates conflict. Looks at two case studies, the painter Paul Gauguin and Winston Churchill.
Plurality and Choice
Authors: Stocker Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Engages with the thesis that plurality is an obstacle to choice. Tackles the worry that incommensurable values make sound comparisons and judgments impossible. It is argued that plural and incommensurable features are ubiquitous to moral life as well as ordinary practical deliberation. Despite this predicament, we are nevertheless able to make sound judgements and to bring together disparate and incommensurable values in complex wholes.
Akrasia: The Unity of the Good, Commensurability, and Comparability
Authors: Stocker Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractLooks at akrasia (weakness of will), monism, and pluralism. Many deem akrasia conceptually incoherent (the problem of the Protagorean Predicament). Others, notably David Wiggins, argue that coherence is secured in so far as incommensurable values are present. Against these views, it is argued that coherent akrasia is possible, and that it requires the distinction between the cognitive and the affective, and not between comparable and commensurable values. Akrasia extends to monistic theories––a monistic theory, e.g. hedonism, is compatible with akrasia. Akratic conflict does not require plurality. An account of reasons, which goes beyond value finality (the view that only what are seen as good reasons can motivate) and value maximization, emerges.
Preliminary Distinctions and Remarks
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I clarify the notion of necessity that I will be examining in the book. In the first section , I claim that the relevant notion of necessity is ‘broad logical necessity’, which I distinguish from causal necessity, unrevisability and a proposition being self‐evident or a priori. In the second section, I distinguish between modality de dicto and modality de re. An assertion of modality de dicto predicates a modal property of another dictum or proposition, while a claim of modality de re asserts of an object that it possess a property either essentially or contingently. I conclude by examining the use of the de dicto/de re distinction in the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, G.E. Moore, and Norman Malcolm.
Modality De Re: Explanations
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I explain modality de re in terms of modality de dicto because there are those who feel that modality de dicto is easier to understand. I argue that the de dicto properties of what I call the kernel proposition can indicate whether x has P essentially. I then provide directions on how to determine the kernel proposition for an object x and a property P. I conclude by addressing some objections. In particular, I argue that my account is not circular despite its reliance on proper names.
Worlds, Books, and Essential Properties
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I begin by introducing the ideas of possible worlds, books on worlds, and essential properties. A possible world is a broadly logically possible state of affairs that is maximal. Furthermore, for any possible world W and proposition p, let the book on W be the set S of propositions such that p is a member of S if W entails p. Finally, an object x has property P essentially if and only if x has P and has it in every world in which x exists. I use the above three concepts to give a sound argument for the conclusion that human persons are essentially immaterial.
Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 6 is an attempt to show that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals (TWI)—i.e. the theory that any object exists in exactly one possible world—is false, and that there's no good reason to deny that objects exist in more than one world. First, arguments that attempt to show that a denial of TWI entails a contradiction fail, and the so‐called Problem of Transworld Identity is no problem at all. Second, TWI should be rejected because it entails that all of an object's properties are essential to it. The defender of TWI may attempt to defend his view by adopting Counterpart Theory. I conclude by arguing that the Counterpart Theory is both semantically and metaphysically inadequate.
Possible But Unactual Objects: On What There Isn't
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 7 concluded with the claim that the Classical Argument for possible non‐existent objects depends on both the possibility of singular negative existentials and the Ontological Principle. The Ontological Principle is the principle that any world in which a singular proposition is true is one in which there is such a thing as its subject, or in which its subject has being if not existence. In this chapter, I show that the Ontological Principle is false and that whatever plausibility it enjoys is explained by the truth of a similar principle, namely, the Restricted Ontological Principle (which is the Ontological Principle applied only to predicative singular propositions). Thus, the Classical Argument fails. Moreover, I give an account of how fictional names function in order to show that statements about fictional subjects, for example, ‘Othello is a Moor’, do not express predicative singular propositions.
A Classical Form of Sceptical Argument
Authors: Unger Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses, and expands on, the Cartesian skeptical argument. According to this argument, we do not have knowledge about the external world since we cannot know that we are not being deceived into having false beliefs about the external world. The chapter strengthens this argument in order to establish that such knowledge is not even possible, and extends it to exclude knowledge about other times as well. It rejects G. E. Moore's reversal of the skeptical argument as counterintuitive. Anticipating the discussions in later chapters, a prima facie case is made for the impossibility of even reasonably believing anything about the external world, and for the consonance of the skeptical results with considerations about certainty.
An Argument for Universal Ignorance
Authors: Unger Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An argument for universal ignorance is defended, ruling out even the Cartesian knowledge that “I exist now.” This argument involves normative premises: if someone knows something to be so, then it is at least all right for the person to be absolutely certain that it is so. But, on pain of dogmatism, it is never even all right for anyone to be absolutely certain that anything is so. Therefore, nobody ever knows that anything is so. This result is supported by the analysis of “S knows that p” as “it is clear to S that p”.
Some Wages of Ignorance
Authors: Unger Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explores the consequences of universal ignorance that arise from the centrality of the concept of knowledge in the semantics of our language. For many verbs and adjectives, it argues, sentences of the form “S verbs (that) p’” and “S is adjective (that) p” entail “S knows that p.” For instance, “S regrets that p” and “S is happy that p” both entail “S knows that p.” However, since we cannot know anything, it follows that the sentences for which this entailment holds can never be true; for instance, it follows that we can never regret anything or be happy about anything.
The Cement of the Universe
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this book, J. L. Mackie makes a careful study of several philosophical issues involved in his account of causation. Mackie follows Hume's distinction between causation as a concept and causation as it is ‘in the objects’ and attempts to provide an account of both aspects. Mackie examines the treatment of causation by philosophers such as Hume, Kant, Mill, Russell, Ducasse, Kneale, Hart and Honore, and von Wright. Mackie's own account involves an analysis of causal statements in terms of counterfactual conditionals though these are judged to be incapable of giving a complete account of causation. Mackie argues that regularity theory too can only offer an incomplete picture of the nature of causation. In the course of his analysis, Mackie critically examines the account of causation offered by Kant, as well as the contemporary Kantian approaches offered by philosophers such as Bennett and Strawson. Also addressed are issues such as the direction of causation, the relation of statistical laws and functional laws, the role of causal statements in legal contexts, and the understanding of causes both as ‘facts’ and ‘events’. Throughout the discussion of these topics, Mackie develops his own complex account of the nature of causation, finally bringing his analysis to bear in regard to the topic of teleology and the question of whether final causes can be justifiably reduced to efficient causes.
Hume's Account of Causation
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter is concerned with examining Hume's analysis of causation. Mackie discusses the problems associated with Hume's two definitions of ‘cause’. Hume's argument regarding causation is set out as consisting of 15 distinct premises. Two concepts of necessity are distinguished: one that concerns the distinguishing feature between causal and non‐causal sequences, and a second that concerns the warrant for a priori inference. Mackie takes the Humean account of causation as bringing into focus the questions that he will be concerned with in the following chapters.
Causal Regularities
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter offers a consideration of the regularity theory of causation. Mackie argues for the claim that regularity can account only for part of our account of causal statements. Also discussed is Mill's treatment of causation, and in particular his contribution in raising certain complications associated with Hume's account. Mackie suggests a revised version of Mill's Method of Difference, with which he argues that we can establish generalizations of singular causal statements. He concludes that an account of causal regularities still has an important contributory role in giving an account of causation ‘in the objects’.