bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Paradoxical Proposals and Consent
Authors: Dougherty Tom 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
An agent makes a paradoxical proposal to a deliberator when (i) the agent wrongs the deliberator by proposing to perform an action on condition that the deliberator chooses an option, even though (ii) the agent would ordinarily be permitted to perform this action. For example, a citizen wrongs a criminal with blackmail by threatening to inform on them unless the criminal pays the citizen money, even though the citizen would not wrong the criminal by informing on them outright. This chapter defends a two-pronged account of paradoxical proposals. For the first prong, this chapter defends a principle that some paradoxical proposals can invalidate consent by unjustifiably worsening the situation in which the deliberator makes their choice. For the second prong, this chapter argues that other paradoxical proposals do not invalidate consent, but these can be wrong in other ways, e.g. in virtue of wrongfully taking advantage of the deliberator’s vulnerability in order to secure their compliance to an arrangement that unjustifiably sets back their interests.
Manipulation, Disrespecting Autonomy, and Deliberative Projects
Authors: Aboodi Ron , Cohen Shlomo 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This chapter helps to illuminate the practical meaning of respecting a person’s autonomy, by focusing on manipulation. Many instances of manipulation are intuitively morally worrisome in virtue of disrespecting the manipulee’s autonomy. On the basis of such normative intuitions, this chapter argues that “the manipulee’s autonomy” here can be understood as the manipulee’s “deliberative project”: her interrelated ongoing efforts to manage her conduct by committing and adhering to normative stances, ideals, policies, plans, goals, and the like. The significance of this precisification comes out in comparison to various alternatives. For example, it may be argued that some manipulations disrespect the manipulee’s autonomy merely due to diminishing the manipulee’s rationality. But this chapter suggests that the relevance of rationality in a particular type of situation depends on the extent to which being rational is important from the manipulee’s perspective, in light of the manipulee’s particular deliberative project. So diminishing the manipulee’s rationality is not necessarily disrespectful toward her autonomy
Moral Theorizing and the Limits of Coherence
Authors: Buss Sarah 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
Is there any more compelling way to critique a moral theory than to point out that it cannot offer a fully coherent account of moral agency? This essay suggests that we should be wary of the assumption underlying such critiques. Coherence is an ideal, and there is good reason to think that it does not trump all other ideals. In particular, given the heterogeneity of the virtues, we have good reason to endorse a conception of moral agency according to which an ideal moral agent is vulnerable to conflicting requirements. Once we appreciate this fact, we are faced with the task of distinguishing the unacceptable forms of incoherence from the forms we have reason to endorse. The essay’s second half argues that coherence constraints rule out the possibility of supererogatory action as it is generally understood. But it concludes with the tentative suggestion that moral agents may be justified in cultivating a stance toward their own actions which is incoherent in the relevant respect. This gives us one more reason to doubt that we can dismiss a moral theory simply because it implies that the moral point of view is not a fully coherent point of view.
Satisficing Virtuously
Authors: Conee Earl 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
Some objections to maximizing consequentialism (MC) about moral permissibility seem to call for a satisficing theory. These objections are presented. Candidates for a satisficing theory that overcomes the objections are criticized. The aim of the chapter is to find the best moral theory that we can develop, when we set out with the aim of finding a plausible way to overcome the objections to MC that suggest a satisficing response. A theory emerges that adequately avoids the objections that suggest satisficing. It is a disjunctive theory with a virtue condition. The theory can be improved to avoid trouble that arises from its having two sufficient conditions for moral permissibility. The virtue condition is argued to do all of the needed work. The resulting account is argued to succeed, whether or not it gives an ultimate explanation.
Two Conceptions of Rights
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
Rights play an important role in moral, political, and legal debate. But we think of rights in two quite different ways. On one conception, rights are important inputs to debate that often, but not always, determine the outcome of that debate. These are contributory rights. Another conception represents rights as the outcome of debate about the entitlements of parties to the debate. These are resultant rights, which are verdictive. Both conceptions of rights are legitimate. The important point is not to confuse them. Some adjudicative contexts employ the resultant conception of rights. However, other contexts employ the contributory conception. Contributory rights are presupposed by moderate deontology, conflicts of rights, and constitutional rights. Finally, the appeal to rights as a justification of adjudicative outcomes presupposes the contributory conception of rights, inasmuch as the resultant conception would render such appeals circular. Resultant rights represent the proper weighing and outcome of potentially conflicting contributory rights and other morally relevant factors.
Relative clauses
Authors: Sato Yutaka , Cho Sungdai 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
Chapter 8 sketches Japanese and Korean noun modification constructions, i.e., externally headed relative clauses, appositive clauses, and internally headed relative clauses. In addition to gapped relative clauses, the two languages have gapless relative clauses, which are not observable in European-type languages. The gapped relative clauses in both Japanese and Korean behave similarly in the range of relativizable syntactic positions (or in terms of the Noun Phrase Accessibility). Appositive clauses (or noun complement clauses) are characterized in contrast with relative clauses, particularly focusing on a difference in structure. These languages also have internally headed relative clauses. This chapter refers to the question of relativization from a complex noun phrase in these languages (i.e., whether or not subject to the complex NP constraint), which has been debated between those who propose movement and in-situ analyses.
Negation
Authors: Sato Yutaka , Cho Sungdai 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
Chapter 10 contrasts the different ways in which Japanese and Korean negate sentences. Japanese uses a morphological method; i.e., a morphologically bound negator is attached to a verb. To negate adjectival or nominal predicates, a negative form of the copula is used. Korean utilizes two different ways of sentential negation: long form of negation (LFN) with a negative verb, and short form of negation (SFN) with a negative particle. The type of sentential negation employed, i.e., LFN or SFN, or both, also varies depending on the syntactic category of the predicate in Korean. For example, verbs and adjectives can be negated with LFN, whereas the copula (a nominal predicate) cannot. Japanese and Korean have similar sets of Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) but differ from each other in some respects, e.g., Japanese disallows a certain type of Multiple NPI Constructions.
Concertation as a foundational/fundamental institution
Authors: Cooper Andrew F. 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This chapter builds on the pivotal conceptual question that animates this book: whether the impulse towards concertation is not just a foundational institutional format looking backwards to the nineteenth century but also a fundamental institution in the context of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The chapter devotes attention to the distinctive modes of concert types of institutions, especially modified pluralist and solidarist alternatives to state-based plurilateral summitry. Of particular significance are the impetus and constraints on concertation ‘owned’ not by traditional incumbent states as in previous eras but by non-incumbents positioned in the Global South generally and ‘aspiring great powers’ more specifically.
Aspirations of a BRICS solidarity concert/hanging together as a pluralist club
Authors: Cooper Andrew F. 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This chapter examines the connections (and disconnections) between the aspirational notion of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as a putative solidarity-orientated institutional concert type and the institutional evolution towards a far more limited club-mode of operation by which it evolved. Through this extended examination, it is the deficiencies in the US-centric literature that once more surface. The BRICS members are not just a reflection of images of economic transition on an individual basis, as witnessed by the animation of the Goldman Sachs predictions. Instead, the BRICS as a group has built up a collective institutional personality, the full implications of which still lie ahead, with the meaning of the members ‘concerting among each other’—with Russia ambitiously (if awkwardly) the prime animator—remaining very much in play.
Conclusions
Authors: Cooper Andrew F. 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
Conceptually, whereas the book assesses the recovery of Bull’s analysis on the patterns of institutional design, and on the privileging of concertation as a putative fundamental institution, as highly valuable for addressing the core features played out in contest over institutional design, it judges the contribution of the entire body of institutional international relations (IR) to this core debate far more critically. Operationally, accentuated by the intensification of tensions between China and Russia, the debate over concertation has become fractured, with a number of partial (and polarized) notions of institutional concert types in play in line with some possible revival. Conversely, the chapter illuminates that, given that the death of the Group of Twenty as an institutional concert format is not totally out of the question, it is far more likely that this plurilateral summitry process will continue to evolve towards what institutionalist IR depicts as a focal point. Although continuing to be stigmatized, the concertation impulse will continue to be recalibrated.
A System of Conflict Resolution and the Search for Peace
Authors: Forster Marc R. 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
Although everyone recognized the reality of conflict within rural communities, there was also an intense desire for peace. This desire permeated society, from the highest levels down to the villages. After the Thirty Years’ War, all German states brought local elites into the system of governing. In the villages studied here, people developed a flexible system of conflict resolution that aimed at finding a settlement (a Vergleich) for disputes. This system involved mediation, negotiation, and legal action, sometimes all at the same time. The courts studied here were highly local, sometimes with juries of peasants, and worked quickly and fairly inexpensively. They were also flexible, often encouraging or even arranging compromises, and rarely resorting to legal principles. The examples used in this chapter show this “culture of settlement” at work. Ultimately, the contribution of local courts to the resolution of conflicts meant that local people supported (at least some) state structures that they found useful and effective.
Sir William Petty, the Restoration in Ireland, and the Corporate Commonwealth
Authors: Ward Matthew 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This chapter concentrates on Petty’s first significant engagement with Hobbes in two texts composed around the time of the Restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660. The chapter sets the first, a paper on ‘systems of government’, within the context of the constitutional debates that followed the collapse of the Third Protectorate parliament. In his paper, Petty developed a case for democracy by engaging with Hobbes’s De cive. Though Hobbes preferred government by monarchy, his concept of the commonwealth as a corporation of all its subjects was inspired by, and in turn inspired, theories of democracy; and Petty used the concept to argue for democracy in his paper. Following the Restoration, in the context of debates about Irish land and finance, Petty drew on the same concept in A Treatise of Taxes and Contributions to argue that a general excise tax, amongst other policies, conformed to ‘Natural Justice’.
John Vesey and Anglican Royalist Discourse in Restoration Ireland
Authors: Ward Matthew 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
In this chapter, the focus of the book shifts to Hobbes’s reception amongst Irish Anglicans. The chapter examines the Restoration writings of John Vesey, an Anglican prelate. The first of these writings is a biography of John Bramhall, an old adversary of Hobbes, which introduces the intellectual context of Vesey’s engagements with Hobbes throughout the Restoration: Anglican discourses of natural law and the divine nature. Hobbes corrupted these discourses to arrogate ethical and ecclesiastical authority to the sovereign. While Hobbes’s arguments repelled some Anglican royalists, such as Bramhall, they appealed more to men like Jeremy Taylor and the ‘Latitudinarians’, at least when it was convenient or necessary to defend the ecclesiastical authority of the crown and to subordinate religious policy to the requirements of civil peace. This was the case more consistently in Ireland than England, and Vesey was more willing than most English Anglicans to engage with Hobbesian arguments.
John Vesey and the ‘Revolution’ of 1688
Authors: Ward Matthew 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This chapter establishes the significance of their engagements with Hobbes to the responses of Irish Anglicans to the rule of James II and the ‘Revolution’ of 1688. Though the focus remains on Vesey, the chapter also examines the responses of Vesey’s contemporaries, including William King. Vesey’s own discourse was eclectic in this period. He initially responded to James’s reign by defending his ecclesiastical authority as king. However, a dispute with James’s government over the privileges of urban corporations and the church turned him against James and prompted his departure to London in 1689. In London’s public prints, Vesey associated James’s approach to the church and his treatment of Protestants with ‘Hobbian principles’. Following William III’s victory over James in Ireland, however, Vesey resumed his sympathy for the crown and, this chapter suggests, for Hobbes. Vesey produced a distinctively Hobbesian version of the ‘de facto’ argument for allegiance to William.
Introduction
Authors: Carruthers Peter 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This short opening chapter introduces the topic of the book, drawing distinctions and elucidating the main claims that are at stake. It explains what motivational egoism and motivational hedonism are, and how they contrast with motivational pluralism (including altruism), as well as with the everyday sense in which people can be described as hedonists. The chapter also explains why these issues matter for issues of moral responsibility, as well as for our understanding of the sources of motivation quite generally. Finally, the appropriate methodology for resolving the issue is outlined (theorizing the science rather than common-sense intuitions), and the sequence of topics covered in the book is described.
Traditional Critiques Critiqued
Authors: Carruthers Peter 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This chapter shows that the scientifically informed version of motivational hedonism that emerged from the discussion in Chapter 3 is impervious to all of the main arguments that have been advanced previously against hedonism and in support of altruism, by both philosophers and psychologists. These include: evolutionary arguments; arguments from the fact that people sometimes sacrifice themselves for others in full knowledge of the consequences; the argument that pleasure is caused by the satisfaction of desires for things other than pleasure, and so is not itself the object of all desires; the famous “experience machine” argument; and an extensive body experimental evidence concerning the role of empathy in producing altruistic behavior. The final section of the chapter then shows that experience-directed imperative theories of valence (discussed in Chapter 6) can also evade standard critiques.
Indicatives Versus Imperatives
Authors: Carruthers Peter 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This chapter has two main goals. One is to defend the value-representing theory of valence outlined in Chapter 5, comparing it with accounts that construe valence, not as indicative (representing—correctly or incorrectly—properties of the world), but rather as a kind of imperative. While developed initially to provide theories of the painfulness of pain, imperative accounts have now been extended into theories of pleasure and displeasure more generally. It is these generalized accounts that are considered here. The second main goal of the chapter is to articulate and then critique forms of imperativism about valence that entail motivational hedonism (in fact, only experience-directed kinds of imperativism do). The upshots of the chapter are twofold: the value-representing account provides the best overall theory of valence, and pluralism rather than hedonism provides the best account of human (and animal) motivation, thus making room for altruism.
Conceptual Engineering: Ambitious or Anodyne?
Authors: Ball Derek 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
A number of philosophers have suggested that we ought to change the way we approach discussions about matters of definition. On their view, we ought to adopt the novel methodology of conceptual engineering, which involves evaluating and trying to improve the meanings of our words. OI consider one prominent defencse of this claim is considered: Herman Cappelen’s “Master Argument”. TI reject the argument is rejected on the grounds that there is can be no novel and distinctive methodology of evaluating and improving the meanings of words. TI motivate this claim is motivated by evaluating the Master Argument in the context of the Ramsey-Carnap-Lewis method of defining theoretical terms, and it is showning that the feature of this method that makes conceptual engineering impossible generalises to the temporal externalist view defended in this book.
Why Are Paradoxes Hard?
Authors: Ball Derek 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
One motivation for thinking that our practice of engaging in definitional disputes, including many philosophical discussions, is in need of revision is that it can seem like we have made little progress on the issues. This line of thinking is especially prominent in recent work on paradoxes such as the Liar, where a number of philosophers have suggested that the attraction of paradoxical reasoning is due to the inconsistency of certain words or concepts. It is shown that appeals to inconsistent concepts cannot explain why we are attracted to paradoxical reasoning: the most plausible attempt at explanation is circular. It is suggested that the fact that paradoxes are hard to solve is not qualitatively different than the hardness of problems in other fields, such as the problem of curing the common cold.
The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Backwards Determination
Authors: Ball Derek 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This chapter addresses metaphysical and epistemological issues raised by temporal externalism. How can the future make a difference to the past? It is suggested that thereir are innocent analogues of the temporal externalist’s commitments. How does temporal externalism relate to questions about the metaphysics of time? It is argued that it is compatible with a wide range of metaphysical views. What should temporal externalists say about mental causation and self-knowledge? These issues are no different for temporal externalists than for other forms of externalism. How can the temporal externalist view that isI endorsed, which emphasises cases in which meaning does not change over time, make sense of cases in which meaning does change? AI develop a view is developed of meaning continuity, and discuss how this view relates to similar questions about the persistence of physical objects is discussed.
The Categorical Imperative, Empty Formalism, and Happiness
Authors: Guyer Paul 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This chapter focuses on issues raised in the first reviews of Kant’s first two books in moral philosophy. Of special interest are the reviews of the Groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason by Herman Andreas Pistorius, the first published quickly in 1786 while the second, although apparently written in timely fashion, did not appear until 1794. Pistorius developed the charge that the categorical imperative is an “empty formalism,” and more generally argued that a conception of what is right must presuppose an account of the good, and that morality must be founded on the recognition that happiness is the natural end of human beings, not merely an incidental object of morality. Kant’s amplification of the conception of the highest good in the Critique of Practical Reason is already a response to Pistorius’s criticism of the Groundwork, while the “empty formalism” objection would be repeated by Hegel in both 1802 and 1821, and by many since.
Moral Feelings in Kantian Ethics
Authors: Guyer Paul 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This chapter reviews the debate between Kant and Friedrich Schiller over whether morally worthy motivation allows, requires, or excludes moral feeling, for example feelings of benevolence and sympathy. The debate was triggered by Schiller’s 1793 essay “On Grace and Dignity,” which was itself as much a response to the treatment of grace in Lord Kames’s 1762 Elements of Criticism as it was a response to Kant. The 1793–4 debate between Kant and Schiller is somewhat of a comedy of errors, as Kant thinks that Schiller is criticizing him when he is not and ends up taking the position—that morally worthy action must always also be graceful, without any sign of having had to overcome resistance (which is mere dignity)—that Schiller never took, and which Kant otherwise did not defend either. If anything, Kant generally thought that we ordinary humans would always experience some degree of resistance to the demands of morality. Kant took a better position four years later in the Metaphysics of Morals when he argued that moral action requires the refinement and strengthening of a complex of “aesthetic preconditions of the mind’s susceptibility to concepts of duties”—or moral feelings (and conscience).
Fichte
Authors: Guyer Paul 
Published: January 2024

Abstract
This is the first of three chapters on the reception of Kant’s moral philosophy in German idealism. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who initially thought of himself as a Kantian, thought that the categorical imperative needed both more content and a better proof or “deduction” than Kant had provided. He argued that conceiving of oneself as a conscious agent at all required recognition the existence and “summons” of others, thus that the basic demand of morality—to treat others as one would treat oneself—is built into the very basis of self-consciousness itself. Fichte also thought that he could give a transcendental and not merely empirical argument for the existence of moral feeling. He also tried to demonstrate the spontaneity and thus freedom of human choice without resorting to Kant’s distinction between how things appear and how they may be “in themselves” (for Kant, possibly free according to theoretical reason, actually and necessarily free according to practical reason).