bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Correlations Between Genetic and Linguistic Data
Authors: McMahon April , McMahon Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
An approach which can diagnose and use even unknown loans turns out to be of considerable relevance when we turn to another area of controversy, this time moving beyond linguistics per se to a set of observed though contentious interdisciplinary correlations. It is easy to see language families as abstractions, and perhaps our conventional representation of each language, reconstructed or attested, as a single node encourages that kind of thinking. But reconstructed languages in the past, like languages today, must have had speakers; so it follows that human histories, rather than simply linguistic histories, are necessarily involved. However, it is impossible to find out about those human histories through linguistic work alone: we have to take an interdisciplinary approach. One possibility, which is much in the scientific news at the moment, is the ‘new synthesis’; and its proponents argue that we can bring together evidence from linguistics, genetics, and archaeology, assess whether meaningful correlations exist between these disciplines, then use this cumulative evidence to provide clues to the histories of human populations. Moreover, work of this kind might help us understand the features of populations today, by revealing prehistoric affiliations and contacts.
Ramsey’s Legacies on Conditionals and Truth
Authors: Edgington Dorothy 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Two ideas associated with Frank Ramsey have been very influential, and further developed in recent years, one about conditional judgements, the other about truth. The two ideas can appear to be in tension with each other, for the former has a consequence which it has seemed hard to square with the latter. Philosophical descendants of Ramsey on truth have found it hard to be philosophical descendants of Ramsey on conditionals.1 It is this tension which I want to discuss and try to defuse. A footnote in Ramsey’s ‘General Propositions and Causality’ (1929a) has had a great impact on thinking about indicative conditionals since the 1960s. The idea it propounds has come to be known as the Ramsey Test. Here it is: If two people are arguing ‘ If p will q?’ and are both in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. ( p. 155)
Hume and Hutcheson: The Question of lnfluence
Authors: Norton David Fate 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One important aspect of the continuing attempts to delineate David Hume’s philosophical character has been the effort to clarify the relationship of Hume’s views to those of his older contemporary Francis Hutcheson. Throughout the second half of the past century commentators routinely concluded that, at least early on, Hume was influenced or stimulated by the moral philosophy of Hutcheson. There is good evidence that prior to the publication of his first work, A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), Hume was reasonably familiar with Hutcheson’s Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), and perhaps also with his Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections (1728).There have also appeared to be several significant similarities between Hutcheson’s views and those of Hume. These facts led Norman Kemp Smith to conclude that ‘it was under the direct influence of Francis Hutcheson that [Hume] was led to recognise that judgments of moral approval and disapproval, and indeed judgments of value of whatever type, are based not on rational insight or on evidence, but solely on feeling’. And, Kemp Smith, went on, what opened up ‘a new Scene of Thought’ for Hume was ‘the discovery that this [Hutchesonian] point of view could be carried over into the theoretical domain’ where he used it to solve problems raised by Locke and Berkeley. Kemp Smith modified his thesis, however, by observing that Hume drew consequences from Hutcheson’s philosophy that Hutcheson himself ‘had refused to draw’.
From Fleece To Fabric: Weaving Culture In Plato’S Statesman
Authors: Blondell Ruby 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The Statesman is a lumpy dialogue, oddly constructed with digressions of various kinds, several disparate methodologies, and a long, strange myth in the middle of it all. This paper will focus on an interlinked set of themes which, I shall argue, supply it with a dynamic overarching unity. In seeking a definition of the ideal statesman, the dialogue begins with herding-which provides wool-and ends with weaving, the wool-working craft par excellence. These two poles in fabric production provide us with a pas sage from the solitary, marginal world of the herdsman, with his transient way of life and tangential relationship to culture, to the settled, complex world of civilization. In each case, a human be haviour characteristic of that world is projected onto the ruler, who is imagined first as a herdsman and then as a weaver. In between lies the cosmic myth, which describes the pre-cultural, pastoral age of Cronus, followed by the age of Zeus with its institution of techne,1 reinscribing the passage from nature to civilization as the principal cultural matrix in which the dialogue’s arguments are embedded.
What is aristotle’s "third man" argument against the forms?
Authors: Sharma Ravi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Among Aristotle’s criticisms of the Forms, the argument labelled ‘the Third Man’ is commonly viewed as one of the most significant. Unfortunately, it is also one of the most obscure. Although the argument is mentioned several times in the Metaphysics and dis cussed once in the Sophistical Refutations, it is not fully explained in either work. At best, Aristotle offers several clues as to its proper interpretation. Things seem better if one looks to the tradition of ancient commentary, since the Third Man is treated explicitly by Alexander in his detailed exposition of the anti-Platonic arguments of Meta physics A 9. Alexander’s treatment is not without ambiguities of its own; but apart from its comparative level of detail, it has recently held a special attraction for scholars. For it readily accommodates, even encourages, an interpretation whereby the Third Man turns on the ascription of a "self-predication" thesis to Plato. And since a number of scholars have become convinced that Plato fell victim to self-predication, they have been quick to accord Aristotle the honour of being the first to diagnose that confusion.
Belief about Nothing in Particular
Authors: Kroon Frederick 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is easy nowadays-so Nathan Salmon declares approvingly in Frege’s Puzzle-to get caught up in ‘direct-reference mania’, the widespread philosophical conviction that the semantic content of a proper name, demonstra tive, or other simple indexical is not descriptive but directly involves the particular that the term refers to. This Direct Reference program (DR) faces enormous problems, of course-problems that persuaded Russell long ago to reject the program for all but the most immediate of referring devices (his logically proper names) and to prefer a description-theoretic treatment for ordinary proper names. With the demise of description theories, however, the question of how to deal with these problems has once again begun to occupy center stage.
Moorean Absurdity: An Epistemological Analysis
Authors: Almeida Claudio De 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In view of what the philosophical imagination has done with Moore’s paradox, there should be no doubt that Moorean Absurdity may be symptomatic of a number of philosophical ills (that is, the kind of flaw of intellectual or moral character that philosophers seek to understand). A main concern for those who have been influential in the debate about the problem is explaining why a Moore-absurd belief is a case of irrationality. Indeed, whatever else may truly be said about it, we will not have found a satisfactory account of Moorean Absurdity until we have an unobjectionable explanation of this peculiar form of doxastic irrationality.
The Aesthetic Value of Ideas
Authors: Schellekens Elisabeth 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In conceptual art the idea of the concept is the most important aspect of the work. When an artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all of the planning and decisions are made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. This kind of art is not theoretical or illustrative of theories; it is intuitive, it is involved with all types of mental processes. It is the objective of the artist who is concerned with conceptual art to make his work mentally interesting to the spectator, and therefore usually he would want it to become emotionally dry. There is no reason to suppose, however, that the conceptual artist is out to bore the viewer. It is only the expectation of an emotional kick, to which one conditioned to expressionist art is accustomed, that would deter the viewer from perceiving this art.
Kant After LeWitt: Towards an Aesthetics of Conceptual Art∗
Authors: Costello Diarmuid 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Conceptual Art is generally portrayed as a rejection of aesthetic theory as an adequate basis for understanding artistic value or significance. In what follows I want to see whether one can understand Conceptual Art, contrary to this orthodox art-historical and philosophical narrative, in aesthetic terms— but without fundamentally distorting the nature of the work. Perhaps even more outlandishly, I want to examine whether Conceptual Art’s aesthetic dimension can be understood by extrapolating from Kant’s enigmatic account of what works of art do in the third Critique — namely, ‘express aesthetic ideas’.
Structure and Identity
Authors: Shapiro Stewart 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to further articulate my preferred version of mathematical structuralism in light of some criticisms of my Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology (1997) and Michael Resnik’s Mathematics as a Science of Patterns (1997). Some of these criticisms are shortcomings in the original presentation, and so I take this opportunity to correct aspects of the view.
Vengeful Thinking and Moral Epistemology
Authors: Sinhababu Neil 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Six years later, in On the Genealogy of Morality, Nietzsche traces the historical development of contemporary moral beliefs from their “origin in unreason.” While the Genealogy may have impressed the feelings of many readers as “wantonly offensive,” its import for moral theory has not been fully understood, and the focus of this essay will be to make clear the signiﬁcance of histories like Nietzsche’s for contemporary debates about whether belief in moral properties is justiﬁed. One might worry that arguments against believing something whose premises involve the ways that the belief originated will commit the Genetic Fallacy, mistakenly claiming direct logical connections between the circumstances of the belief ‘s origin and its truth. There are, however, good arguments connecting the origins of beliefs to their justiﬁcatory status, and I will present two such arguments in this essay.
Nigeria: Ethno-linguistic Competition in the Giant of Africa
Authors: Simpson Andrew , Akíntúndé Oyètádé B 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Nigeria is a country with an immense population of over 140 million, the largest in Africa, and several hundred languages and ethnic groups (over 400 in some estimates, 510 according to Ethnologue 2005), though with no single group being a majority, and the three largest ethnic groups together constituting only approximately half of the country’s total population. Having been formed as a united territory by British colonial forces in 1914, with artificially created borders arbitrarily including certain ethnic groups while dividing others with neighbouring states, Nigeria and its complex ethnolinguistic situation in many ways is a prime representation of the classic set of problems faced by many newly developing states in Africa when decisions of national language policy and planning have to be made, and the potential role of language in nationbuilding has to be determined. When independence came to Nigeria in 1960, it was agreed that English would be the country’s single official language, and there was little serious support for the possible attempted promotion of any of Nigeria’s indigenous languages into the role of national official language. This chapter considers the sociopolitical and historical background to the establishment of English as Nigeria’s official language, and the development of the country over the subsequent post-independence era, and asks the following question. After five decades of experience of life with English as the nation’s sole official language, if people in Nigeria were to be given the opportunity to reformulate national language policy as they wished, might one expect a different official language structure to be requested, perhaps with one or a combination of indigenous languages as a replacement for English, or is the current English-centred structuring of officialdom felt to be satisfactory and appropriate given the ethnic configuration of the country? In approaching this question and the issues which relate to it, the chapter refers to the results of a range of revealing surveys carried out by sociolinguists in Nigeria in recent years which have attempted to probe public
Tanzania: The Development of Swahili as a National and Official Language
Authors: Topan Farouk 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Tanzania is a multilingual nation of approximately 35 million people (2002 census), of whom nearly a million reside in the semi-autonomous islands of Zanzibar (Unguja and Pemba). As Polomé (1980: 3) has noted, listing the languages of Tanzania ‘is a rather difficult task’; prevalent figures are 124 languages (Batibo 2005: 155) and 127 (cited in Ethnologue 2005). When Tanganyika achieved its independence from British rule in 1961, at least two positive aspects of its legacy from the former colonial rule were the stability of its national borders (although externally imposed) and the firm acceptance of Swahili, not only as lingua franca, but also as an aspiring national language of the new nation. The linguistic map of the time, and the national aspirations underlying it, were seen as a model for an emerging African country where the scourge of ‘tribalism’ was largely absent. None of the ethnic communities was significantly large enough to assume a politically dominant position; nor, it seems, was there a wish to do so. This chapter will explore the factors that brought about this situation, including trade, the presence of colonial powers, the proselytizing and educational endeavours of the missionaries, and the attempts of Julius Nyerere (d.1999), the first President of Tanzania, to create a socialist state whose citizens identify themselves first and foremost as ‘Tanzanians’. Language, and more specifically, Swahili, played a major facilitating role in these phases.
Rational Fools, Rational Commitments
Authors: Peter Fabienne , Schmid Hans Bernhard 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Skepticism about rational choice theory dates back to the subject’s very origins. One of the earliest predecessors of the theory was proposed by Thomas Hobbes. He defended the view that “all the voluntary actions of men tend to the benefit of themselves; and those actions are most reasonable, that conduce most to their ends” (Leviathan xv.4). Hobbes was aware, however, of the possible objection that this conception of practical reason neglects important aspects of human behavior, particularly the demands of morality.
Collective Intentions, Commitment, and Collective Action Problems
Authors: Gilbert Margaret 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Towards the end of his famous 1977 article “Rational Fools,” the distinguished economist Amartya Sen wrote: “The main thesis has been the need to accommodate commitment as part of behavior” (Sen 1977: 344). He means, of course, human behavior. Since Sen published these words, my own work in philosophical social theory has brought me to a conclusion that could in broad terms be similarly phrased.
Normativity and the Will
Authors: Wallace R Jay 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
If there is room for a substantial conception of the will in contemporary theorizing about human agency, it is most likely to be found in the vicinity of the phenomenon of normativity. Rational agency is distinctively responsive to the agent’s acknowledgment of reasons, in the basic sense of considerations that speak for and against the alternatives for action that are available. Furthermore, it is natural to suppose that this kind of responsiveness to reasons is possible only for creatures who possess certain unusual volitional powers, beyond the bare susceptibility to beliefs and desires necessary for the kind of rudimentary agency of which the higher animals are arguably capable.
Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason
Authors: Wallace R Jay 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There are two tendencies in our thinking about instrumental rationality that do not seem to cohere very well. On the one hand, the instrumental principle— enjoining us to take the means that are necessary relative to our ends—does not seem to apply indifferently to any end that we might be motivated to pursue. There is, for instance, no genuine requirement to take the means that are necessary for realizing ends that one merely happens to desire. This encourages what we might call a moralizing tendency in reflection about instrumental reason: the supposition that instrumental requirements come on the scene only in relation to ends that have themselves been endorsed in some way by the agent, as ends that it would be good or desirable to achieve.
Moral Responsibility and the Practical Point of View
Authors: Wallace R Jay 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Moral responsibility, on the approach I favor, is a matter of normative competence. To be a morally accountable agent is to possess certain general capacities for moral reasoning, which we might refer to as powers of reflective self-control. These general powers include above all the capacity to grasp and apply moral principles, and the capacity to control one’s behavior by the light of such principles.1 Indeed, I would hope that proponents of many different views might agree with these abstract pronouncements. Disagreements, I believe, center not so much on the importance of the powers of reflective self-control as on their interpretation, in particular, whether and in what forms those powers presuppose freedom of the will.
Moral Reasons and Moral Fetishes: Rationalists and Anti-Rationalists on Moral Motivation
Authors: Wallace R Jay 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Ethical rationalism, to a first approximation, is the thesis that moral requirements are requirements of practical reason. This thesis has a long tradition in moral philosophy, but it also has long met with philosophical resistance. A particular crux for thinking about ethical rationalism is the phenomenon of moral motivation. It has been argued, in particular, that rationalism alone can provide a plausible interpretation of the motivations characteristic of the virtuous agent, and that those who reject rationalism treat the concern to act morally as a kind of fetish. My aim in this paper is to consider and assess this charge.
A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs
Authors: Lepore Ernie , Ludwig Kirk 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Rather than take for granite that Ace talks straight, a listener must be on guard for an occasional entrcnous and me or a long face no sec. In a roustabout way, he will maneuver until he selects the ideal phrase for the situation, hitting the nail right on the thumb. The careful conversationalist might try to mix it up with him in a baffle of wits. In quest of this pinochle of success, I have often wrecked my brain for a clowning achievement, but Ace’s chickens always come home to roast. From time to time, Ace will, in a jersksome way, monotonise the conversation with witticisms too humorous to mention. It’s high noon someone beat him at his own game, but I have never done it; cross my eyes and hope to die, he always wins thumbs down.
Inexpressible Properties and Propositions
Authors: Hofweber Thomas 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Everyone working on metaphysical questions about properties or propositions knows the reaction that many non-philosophers, even non-metaphysicians, have to such questions. Even though they agree that Fido is a dog and thus has the property (or feature or characteristic) of being a dog, it seems weird, suspicious, or confused to them to now ask what that thing, the property of being a dog, is. The same reservations do not carry over to asking what this thing, Fido, is. There is a substantial and legitimate project to find out more about Fido, but is there a similar substantial and legitimate project to find out more about the property of being a dog? Metaphysicians know that there is a straightforward way to motivate such a project, and much of the contemporary debate in the metaphysics of properties is in the ballpark of carrying it out. If we agree that Fido has the property of being a dog, then there is something that is a property and that Fido has. Thus we can ask about what this thing is that he has. How does it relate to Fido? Is it concrete or abstract? Is it fully present in each object that has it? And so on and so forth. Maybe the nonphilosophers are merely not used to asking such questions about unusual entities such as properties, but they are equally legitimate for them as they are for any other thing.
Parental Choice and Expert Knowledge in the Debate about MMR and Autism
Authors: Sorell Tom 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In democracies, conflicts between public opinion and expert opinion can be morally and politically charged. It is one thing for the public to be alienated from expert aesthetic opinion, as when millions in public funds are spent on an ‘artwork’ that ordinary observers dislike; in that sort of case, although the ‘artwork’ can appear to be to a waste of money, it is widely accepted, even by the general public, that aesthetic taste varies, and that different works of art should get exposure, even if they are unpopular. It is widely accepted, too, that exposure to new works widens aesthetic taste, rather than contributing to its deterioration. It is quite another matter where expert opinion supports a coercive policy that the public, or sections of the public, resist.
Vertical Transmission of Infectious Diseases and Genetic Disorder: Are the Medical and Public Responses Consistent?
Authors: Jacobson Jay A , Battin Margaret P , Botkin R Jeffrey , Francis Leslie , Mason James O , Smith Charles B 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Transmissible infectious diseases differ from most other diseases, not only by their etiology but by the risk they pose to others. Public policy, law, and ethics acknowledge this distinction by limiting the autonomy and diagnostic and treatment choices of individuals who potentially threaten others. For example, we may require patients with tuberculosis to wear a mask in the hospital. We may insist that they take their daily medicine under direct observation. If they refuse treatment, we may limit their movements to reduce exposure to others. Similarly, we have isolated patients with SARS and quarantined individuals who were exposed to this infection.