bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Consultation and Accountability: Building Democracy Through Benevolent Autocracy
Authors: Chesterman Simon 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
Once control has been established, how should the territory be governed? What treaties and conventions bind the temporary administration? The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (untaet) was granted a period of benevolent autocracy to prepare East Timor for local democratic rule. In Kosovo, ongoing security concerns and the absence of a clear future made the UN‐administered province an oddity: the depository of human rights treaties itself detained persons without trial for over a year at a time and acted with impunity. Different attempts have been made to restrain the power of the United Nations, including ombudspersons in East Timor and Kosovo (with varying degrees of success) and a Timorese Office of the Inspector General to oversee the trust fund set up with the World Bank. In addition to concerns about abuse of power, questions also arise about the impact of such rule on the development of mature political actors within the population under international administration.
Unifying Noun Phrases
Authors: Barker Stephen J 
Published: August 2004

AbstractI outline a unified treatment of descriptive noun phrases: definite, indefinite, universal noun phrases, quantitative phrases like most Fs, phrases featuring any, and noun phrases in the scope of adverbs of generality, like usually or invariably. The analysis does not utilise quantification theory, but is a speech-act analysis in which surface grammar is reflected in logical form.
Intentional States and Natural Representation
Authors: Barker Stephen J 
Published: August 2004

AbstractHere I deal with the foundations of an intention-based semantics–the representational properties of intentional states–by describing a hypothetical pre-linguistic, natural representation system, or NR system, insofar as it underpins the denotative and representational intentions of simple sentences. I provide a description of how the NR system structures the intentions underpinning proto-acts.
Troubles for the Quantifier–Variable-Binding Model
Authors: Barker Stephen J 
Published: August 2004

AbstractI develop a general argument that the quantifier-variable-binding approaches available within the Frege model are unable to analyse a whole class of donkey pronouns. I call this the double-bind problem. I demonstrate this by looking at two major approaches to anaphora–E- and D-type pronoun theory and Discourse Representation theory–but the conclusions apply to other approaches.
Hedonism and the Shape of a Life
Authors: Feldman Fred 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
Many philosophers have claimed that the value of a life for the person who lives it is not simply a matter of total amounts of good and evil in that life; the pattern in which those goods are distributed within the life also matters. This objection, if it were sound, would refute any axiological theory that contained a purely additive principle for the evaluation of lives. The forms of hedonism discussed in the book are all understood to contain such additive principles. Attempts to explain why the forms of attitudinal hedonism defended here are not refuted by the ‘shape of a life’ objection.
INTRODUCTION
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This introductory chapter presents a brief background on T. H. Green, one of the most important and influential 19th-century British idealists at Oxford, and his major philosophical work, The Prolegomena to Ethics, published posthumously in 1883. The Prolegomena has been out of print for over thirty years and has become a neglected classic in the history of ethics. This neglect means that Green's ethical theory is not widely understood or appreciated. The book seeks to help renew interest in and appreciation of Green's ethical theory.
GREEN'S LIFE AND WORK
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This introductory chapter presents a brief background on T. H. Green, one of the most important and influential 19th-century British idealists at Oxford,and his major philosophical work, The Prolegomena to Ethics, published posthumously in 1883. The Prolegomena has been out of print for over thirty years and has become a neglected classic in the history of ethics. This neglect means that Green's ethical theory is not widely understood or appreciated. The book seeks to help renew interest in and appreciation of Green's ethical theory.
GREEN'S METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of Green's attack of empiricism and defence of idealism in Prolegomena. It then identifies Green's four main aims in the first book of Prolegomena. Firstly he wants to reject the common-sense view, inherited from the empiricists, that knowledge can be analysed into two separable components — the deliverances of the senses and the operations of the understanding — in which what is given by nature is real and the contributions of the understanding are not. Secondly, the attack on empiricism and atomism is supposed to support the idealist claim that in some sense nature is the product of the understanding. Thirdly, in order for the idealist to distinguish between appearance and reality, it is necessary to posit an ‘eternal’ and ‘unalterable’ system of relations in a self-conscious corporate agent that includes the finite systems of relations contained in the self-conscious minds of individual agents. Finally, much of the first book of the Prolegomena is concerned with the role of self-consciousness in the possibility of apparently discrete episodes of experience, but Green is also concerned with the role of self-consciousness in knowledge.
THE ATTACK ON EMPIRICISM AND ATOMISM
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Green's attack on the empiricist programme that sees all knowledge as resting on the deliverances of the senses. In this view, knowledge is built up from a foundation of simple discrete sensory experiences. He believes that this empiricist programme suffers rot at the foundations, because simple sensory experience that is not relational and in which the mind plays a purely passive role is impossible. For Green, it is hard to see how there could be any mere or pure sensation that was not at least implicitly relational and, hence, the product of the understanding.
IDEALISM
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Green's views on idealism. Among these is his belief that that there are obstacles to the idealist conclusion that account for the plausibility of empiricist and Kantian dualisms between the world of appearances and things as they are independently of appearance. He believes that Kantian dualism is unnecessary. Green's views about moral responsibility also presuppose that the self is not outside space and time but rather plays a crucial role as the cause of responsible action.
ABSOLUTE IDEALISM
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Green's views on absolute idealism. Green's believes that knowledge and, hence, inquiry presuppose absolute idealism: ‘That there is an unalterable order of relations, if we could only find it out, is the presupposition of all our enquiry into the real nature of appearances; and such unalterableness implies their inclusion in one system which leaves nothing outside itself’. Green recognizes that this may not seem to answer the sceptic who doubts that there is such a system of relations. But he insists that in doubting that there may be an order of relations underlying our individual appearances, the sceptic necessarily presupposes the existence of such an order. This argument aims to show that attempts to articulate scepticism are self-refuting.
SELF‐CONSCIOUSNESS AND EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Green's arguments linking knowledge and self-consciousness via epistemic responsibility. Green argues that knowledge requires self-consciousness, inasmuch as epistemic responsibility seems to presuppose self-consciousness. For epistemic responsibility requires a cognizer to be able to distinguish and distance an appearance from herself, to frame the question of whether she should assent to the appearance, and to assess the reasons for assent by relating this appearance to other elements of her consciousness. Any extended piece of reasoning requires consciousness of different appearances as parts of a single system. For instance, I recognize and trust the results of previous deliberations as premises in my present deliberations. All this requires a self that is conscious of and synthesizes a set of appearances. On this view, knowledge presupposes epistemic responsibility, which presupposes self-consciousness.
SELF‐CONSCIOUSNESS AND PRACTICAL RESPONSIBILITY
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Green's arguments about the role of self-consciousness in practical responsibility or moral personality. Green denies that moral responsibility is threatened by determinism and requires indeterminism. He believes that indeterminism is a greater threat to responsibility, inasmuch as it is unclear why we should hold a person accountable for actions that are not due to his character. Green shows the influence of a long tradition of thinking about agency that extends back to the Greeks and is given forceful articulation by moderns, such as Butler, Reid, and Kant.
PURSUIT OF A PERSONAL GOOD
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Green's views about personal good. He believes that the responsible agent acts not simply on appetites or passions, but as the result of ought judgements or in light of a conception of goods. He also says that the deliberating agent takes the object of reflectively endorsed desire as his own good, indeed, his own greatest good, and that he aims at ‘self-satisfaction’. Green thinks that the agent's own good includes the good of others and that this undermines the popular contrast between self-love and altruism. It is argued that if these claims can be defended, then the egoist interpretation of the aim of responsible action should not be rejected on the grounds that it is inconsistent with a concern for the good of others or a willingness to engage in self-sacrifice.
PSYCHOLOGICAL HEDONISM AND THE GOOD
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Good's views about the content of good will. Green rejects the hedonism that he finds in the utilitarian tradition and that he associates with a naturalistic approach to ethics. He focuses his criticism of hedonism on Mill's claims in Utilitarianism. One of Green's main complaints is that the plausibility of evaluative hedonism rests on a commitment (perhaps implicit) to psychological hedonism, which rests on the fallacy, which Butler exposed, of inferring that pleasure is the object of desire from the fact that it is expected that pleasure will attend the satisfaction of desire. Green' s Butlerian doubts about psychological hedonism are examined.
MILL AND EVALUATIVE HEDONISM
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter examines Green's discussion of evaluative hedonism, which focuses on Mill's (alleged) defence of that doctrine. Green not only criticizes the evaluative hedonism he finds in Mill, but also rejects evaluative hedonism outright. He argues that evaluative hedonism is actually inconsistent with psychological hedonism. Evaluative hedonism says that our ultimate aim ought to be to maximize net pleasure or to seek the largest sum of pleasures, whereas psychological hedonism claims that pleasurable experience is the ultimate object of desire. But a sum of pleasures is not itself a pleasure, thus, according to psychological hedonism, we could not act on the requirements of evaluative hedonism.
SELF‐REALIZATION AND THE COMMON GOOD
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter examines Green's views about the link between self-realization and a common good. He believes that full self-realization can take place only in a community of ends in which each person cares about others for their own sakes. Green suggests that this concern for others, at least for those within one's immediate circle, is given or natural.
THE SCOPE OF THE COMMON GOOD
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Green's rejection of Aristotle's account of the scope of the common good. Whereas Aristotle recognizes significant restrictions on the scope of the common good, Green thinks its scope should be universal; full self-realization and the securing of a really permanent good occurs only when each person respects the claims made by other members of a maximally inclusive community of ends.
IMPARTIALITY AND THE COMMON GOOD
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter examines whether Green's conception of the common good is impartial in the sense that it demands an equal weighting of everyone's good. Green's views on the philosophical and political influence of utilitarian and Kantian conceptions of impartiality are considered. It is argued that partiality of variable weight is consistent with impartiality of universal scope. Moreover, it fits the common view that even if morality has universal scope, the demands that it imposes are a function not simply of the amount of benefit that one can confer but also of the nature of the relationship in which one stands to potential beneficiaries. If we fill in the details of Green's claims about the role of the common good in self-realization with the help of Aristotle's eudaimonist justification of virtues that aim at the common good, then it is hard to see how Green can avoid endorsing this sort of partiality.
LIBERALISM AND EXTREME HARMONY
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Green's liberal political commitments. It is argued that Green's brand of liberalism mixes egalitarian social and economic reforms with a commitment to democratic institutions and a system of personal and civic liberties and opportunities. Egalitarian reforms establishing a decent minimum standard of living and a system of state-sponsored education provide each citizen with resources with which to pursue his own self-realization; democratic procedures allow for individual participation in collective decision-making; and individual liberties create space for individual self-determination. This kind of liberal regime would effect a division of moral and political labour that might accommodate the potentially conflicting demands of partiality and impartiality.
SELF‐REALIZATION VS. UTILITARIANISM
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Green's views on utilitarianism and his own ethics of self-realization. It argues that both Green's ethics of self-realization and self-referential altruism are agent-relative in so far as they claim that an agent's reasons to be concerned about someone depend essentially on the nature of the relationship that exists between the agent and that person. If so, then even if much of Green's perfectionist critique of hedonistic utilitarianism is compatible with a perfectionist utilitarianism, there are important strands in his conception and justification of the common good that do not admit of utilitarian interpretation.
FROM PERFECTIONISM TO LIBERALISM
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter examines Green's perfectionist liberalism. It argues that Green's perfectionist liberalism is part of a classical liberal tradition which grounds liberal essentials in a conception of the good that prizes the exercise of a person's rational capacities. In Green's version, the good consists of self-realization and the exercise of the very deliberative capacities that make one a moral agent. Like Mill, Green concludes that the state cannot foster this kind of good by regular use of paternalistic or moralistic intervention.
INFLUENCES ON GREEN
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter examines the various influences on Green's ethical theory. Green roots his ethical theory firmly in ancient and modern philosophical traditions. His method is dialectical and syncretic, examining different ethical traditions and forging his own view out of what he regards as the insights and resources in these traditions. Among strongest formative influences on Green's ethical theory are the Greeks (especially Aristotle), Kant, and Hegel.
GREEN AND KANT
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter examines Green's views toward Kantian doctrines. Green is clearly sympathetic to central Kantian doctrines. First, his criticism of empiricist metaphysics and epistemology is deeply indebted to Kant's views of empirical knowledge in the first Critique. Like Kant, Green also thinks that moral requirements apply to all moral agents in so far as they are agents — that is, in so far as they have capacities for practical reason and independently of contingent inclinations and interests. However, Green is not uncritical of Kant. The Prolegomena promises, but never really delivers, a critical discussion of Kant's ethical theory. A compilation of Green's reservations about Kant's ethical theory from his stray remarks in the Prolegomena and his lectures on Kant's ethics, is presented.
GREEN'S IMPACT
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter discusses the impact of Green's views on his contemporaries and subsequent generations of philosophers. Green's metaphysical and ethical views were sympathetically received and developed in Britain by Bernard Bosanquet, Edward Caird, R. B. Haldane, J. S. Mackenzie, J. H. Muirhead, R. L. Nettleship, Hastings Rashdall, D. G. Ritchie, and Arnold Toynbee. His metaphysical and ethical views also had an influence in the United States. The young John Dewey developed his form of pragmatism out of idealist metaphysical and epistemological claims, and he articulated an ethics of self-realization in conscious response to Green. Later, Brand Blanshard showed the influence of Green, among others, in reacting to the then dominant Logical Positivism by defending a form of absolute idealism and a form of ethical naturalism.
GREEN AND SIDGWICK
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter focuses on the relation between Green and Sidgwick. Both Green and Sidgwick were schoolmates at Rugby. Their friendship lapsed during their undergraduate studies, but was renewed during a vacation together in Switzerland in 1862. Although they seemed to have had intellectual respect for each other, this was insufficient to enable them to form a just assessment of each other's views. Most of Sidgwick's criticisms focus on some genuine obscurity or ambiguity in Green' s argument; he has a good eye for philosophical extravagance; and some of his criticisms pose significant worries. It is argued that Sidgwick never manages to engage Green's perfectionism sympathetically, which prevents him from recognizing its strengths and from seeing potential weaknesses in his own hedonism.
GREEN'S LEGACY
Authors: Brink David O. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter discusses Green's legacy to students of ethical theory and the history of ethics. One is the way he blends systematic and historical concerns. Though his primary concern is systematic, he draws heavily on various ancient and modern ethical traditions. Green's Prolegomena also deserves continued study for its contribution to the perfectionist tradition. It offers distinctive ideas about the justification, content, and implications of perfectionism.
Introduction: Consociational Theory and Northern Ireland
Authors: McGarry John , O'Leary Brendan 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThe chapter is divided into three sections. The first shows what consociationalists can learn from Northern Ireland. The second shows what critics of consociational theory can learn from Northern Ireland. The authors argue that a revised consociational theory provides the most sensible basis for understanding and prescribing for Northern Ireland and similar conflict zones. The third section suggests a number of ways in which Northern Ireland's Agreement may be best stabilised following the uncertainty of the first phase in efforts to implement it (1998-2003)
Comparing Northern Ireland
Authors: McGarry John , O'Leary Brendan 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
The chapter discusses the use of the comparative method by Northern Ireland's political partisans and academics. It shows how analogies with other conflicts have been used by partisans to further their political agendas. These analogies are tied to important international norms, and their use by Northern Ireland's politicians are an attempt to influence international opinion, as well as cement group solidarity. The second part of the chapter summarizes how Northern Ireland has been analysed by academics employing important comparative political theories, including consociationalism and integrationism.
Political Settlements in Northern Ireland and South Africa
Authors: McGarry John , O'Leary Brendan 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
The chapter offers a comparative evaluation of Northern Ireland's Agreement and the one reached in South Africa, and underlines the differences between them. It argues that the analogy between Northern Ireland and South Africa should be read in different ways than it is by nationalist and unionist integrationists, and by social transformationists. It explains that the Northern Ireland conflict has important exogenous dimensions that are missing in South Africa, This is illustrated by two central points: (i) while South Africans reached agreement because of endogenous factors, cooperation by the British and Irish governments was essential to the attainment of agreement in Northern Ireland; (ii) while South Africa's settlement required new political institutions internal to the country, a vital part of Northern Ireland's agreement involved the construction of trans-border political institutions linking Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland.
A History of Sociology in Britain
Authors: Halsey A. H. 
Published: August 2004

AbstractLiterary claims to ownership of the third culture of sociology are considered and the rise of scientific method traced. The institutional history is summarized from the establishment of a chair of sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 1907. Phases of expansion (1950–67), revolt (1968–75) and uncertainty (1976–2000) are described. Analysis of the professors—their origins, careers and fame—is presented. A content analysis of three leading British journals of sociology is reported. An epilogue is finally added of eight essays by well‐known sociologists—A. H. Halsey, Z. Bauman, C. Crouch, A. Giddens, A. Oakley, J. Platt, W.G. Runciman, and J. Westergaard.
Introduction
Authors: Halsey A. H. 
Published: August 2004

AbstractIt is becoming standard for sociologists to preface their books with a brief autobiography. This I have done, emphasizing belief in the potency of politics as the atmosphere of LSE in the 1940s. A strong tradition of empirical sociological enquiry has existed since the ‘invisible college’ of the seventeenth century. But sociology belongs to all human civilization, not only to Britain, which was arguably slow in promoting academic sociology.Five themes will be elaborated in the following chapters: (1) The consequences of Darwin; (2) the division of ownership of the subject between science and literature; (3) methods in the study of society focussing on the scientific and statistical history of the sample survey; (4) the use of sociology in social policy and its characteristic capture by the Fabians and (5) the institutionalization of academic sociology at LSE before 1950.