bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Appearances and Calculations: Plato’S Division of the Soul
Authors: Moss Jessica 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Why does Plato divide up the soul in just the way he does? The question is complicated by the fact that it is not quite clear how he does divide it. Republic 4 famously uses cases of motivational conflict to show that the soulhas three parts: the rational part, which desires truth and the overall good of the soul, the spirited part, source of anger and ambition, and the appetitive part, which desires food, drink, sex, and other pleasures. In book 10, however, Socrates twice more argues for a divide between the rational part and some other part of the soul, without stating how these divisions relate to the one already established. At 602 c–603 A he gives an argument based on the cognitive dissonance that sometimes occurs when we experience optical illusions: the rational part calculates the truth and believes in accordance with its calculations, while an inferior part believes that things are as they appear. Then at 603 E–605 c he gives a third argument, based on what we might call emotional conflict: the rational part wishes to follow calm deliberation, while a non-rational part longs to indulge in violent emotion.
Aristotle’S Argument for a Human Function
Authors: Barney Rachel 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the famous ‘function argument’ of Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7 (1097b22–1098a18) Aristotle gives an outline account of human virtue and happiness by relating them to our function or work [ ergon ]. If something has a function, he argues, its function determines what counts as ‘the good and the well’ for that thing. Human beings do have a function; and since the function of a thing consists in the activity proper to or characteristic of it, the human function must consist in rational activity. The virtue or excellence [ aret ē ] of a thing is what makes it perform its function well; so, Aristotle concludes, the human good—that is, happiness—is activity of the soul involving rational virtue.
Superficialism in Ontology1
Authors: Hawthorne John 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Taken at face value, ontological disputes are substantive disputes about how theworld is, albeit disputes which are difficult to resolve. Superficialists in ontology think that, at least for very many disputes of this sort, this face-value construal of them is incorrect: very often disputants are talking past one another, on account of having attached different meanings to the key terms of the debate. In particular, quantifiers can shift their meanings in such a way that, for very many ontological debates, the most reasonable account of the languages of the disputants reckons each to speak the truth. One upshot is that a good deal of the ontological enterprise is pointless. Debates between ontologists are frequently terminological, and so-called challenges to the common sense image of the world are at best shifts to a new way of speaking that does not challenge the common sense image after all.
Ambitious, Yet Modest, Metaphysics
Authors: Hofweber Thomas 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There is a long history of worrying about whether or not metaphysics is a legitimate philosophical discipline. Traditionally such worries center around issues of meaning and epistemological concerns. Do the metaphysical questions have any meaning? Can metaphysical methodology lead to knowledge? But these questions are, in my opinion, not as serious as they have sometimes (historically) been taken to be. What is much more concerning is another set of worries about metaphysics, which I take to be the greatest threat to metaphysics as a philosophical discipline. These worries, in effect, hold that the questions that metaphysics tries to answer have long been answered in other parts of inquiry, ones that have much greater authority. And if they haven ‘t been answered yet then one should not look to philosophy for an answer. What metaphysics tries to do has been or will be done by the sciences. There is nothing left to do for philosophy, or so the worry. Let me illustrate this with two examples, one of which is our main concern here.
Values clarification
Authors: Llewellyn-Thomas Hilary A 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The background argument to this chapter relates to the context of preference-sensitive health care situations, where there is no single therapeutic action appropriate for all patients (Wennberg, 2002). Decision support is a systematic, theory-based clinical strategy for helping an individual in such a situation to arrive at an evidence-based patient choice among the relevant options – including the status quo (O’Connor et al., 1998a, 1998b).
The decision research ‘lab’
Authors: Llewellyn-Thomas Hilary 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Considerable progress has been made in the science and infra-structure needed to incorporate high-quality decision support (DS) and patients’ decision aids (PtDAs) into regular clinical practice in preference-sensitive situations. On the basis of these achievements, investigators can now justifiably focus future efforts entirely on the development and testing of pragmatic, sustainable strategies for the widespread introduction of DS and PtDAs into the mainstream of care.
Education and training of health care professionals
Authors: Towle Angela , Godolphin William 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The education of health professionals for shared decision-making (SDM) or Evidence Based Patient Choice (EBPC) has received increasing attention over the past decade. The knowledge, skills, and attitudes required for SDM, the gap between this ideal and current practice, and the types of training and education that are needed to bridge the gap were reviewed in the first edition (Towle and Godolphin 2001). We suggested approaches to teaching and assessment of SDM competencies, barriers to implementation, and strategies to overcome them. This chapter is an overview of how education and training of health professionals for SDM has developed since and how it has informed further understanding of the barriers and possible future directions.
Achieving Global Justice in Health through Global Research Ethics:
Authors: Meslin∗ Eric M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
International research raises challenging ethical issues for researchers, study participants, review committees, investigators, sponsors, institu- tions, and the countries in which the research is undertaken. This is so because in addition to the problems of informed consent, recruitment of participants, and protection of confidentiality, additional features such as geography, economic status, culture, and politics influence the conduct of research.1 But even more than this, we have come to appreciate that international research—in its simplest form, research undertaken by researchers from one country in another country—is inextricably linked to broader questions of international health and health care. Ruth Macklin recognizes this link and argues forcefully for the ‘‘interconnectedness of the research enterprise and global health.
Reid’s Rejection of Intentionalism
Authors: Ganson Todd Stuart 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One of the central disputes, if not the central dispute, in contemporary philosophy of mind concerns the distinctive mark of the mental.According to intentionalism, a view usually traced back to Franz Brentano, intentionality is what sets mental states apart from everything else.Thomas Reid is sometimes heralded as the forerunner of the rival view that some mental states are non-intentional, not about anything.For he claims that sensation, unlike other mental states, ‘has no object’ (EIP 38, 196).
Practical Truth in Aristotle
Authors: Kenny Anthony 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In 1965, having been newly appointed a philosophy tutor at Balliol, I was assigned to teach the Nicomachean Ethics to Jonathan Barnes, then in his final year of Literae Humaniores. One week I assigned as a topic ‘Practical Truth ‘, with special reference to chapter 6. 2 of the Ethics. The essay he handed in was one of the best I ever encountered in a dozen years of Greats tutoring: I was so impressed that I asked him if I could keep it. Its theme was that Aristotle had no concept of practical truth: that was a fiction foisted on him by commentators. Sadly, I can no longer find the essay among my papers, so I cannot refresh my memory of the arguments it contained. However, in Barnes ‘s recently published Locke lectures On Truth etc the index contains no entry for practical truth, and there is no reference in the Index Locorum to NE 6. 2. So I conclude that the John Locke lecturer is in agreement with the fourth-year undergraduate: there is no such thing as practical truth.
‘ As If We Were Investigating Snubness’: Aristotle On The Prospects For A Single Science Of Nature
Authors: Lennox James G 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This paper began as a presentation to a Werkmeister conference in March 2003 honouring Russ Dancy. I thank Michael Ruse for the opportunity to take part in that wonderful event. I thank Myles Burnyeat, John Cooper, Mary Louise Gill, Deborah Modrak, and Steve Strange for helpful questions and comments on that occasion. I am also grateful for invitations to present these ideas from the Departments of Philosophy at the University of Texas, Austin, Ohio University, the University of Pisa, the University of Bologna’s Institute of Advanced Studies, which also provided support for work on them, and the Department of Philosophy at Concordia University. Most recently I presented some of these ideas to a seminar on Aristotle’s conception of natural science in my department, co-taught with Allan Gotthelf.
Prologue:
Authors: Scull Andrew 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
London, Friday, April 30, 1602. The last year of Elizabeth I’s reign. A 14-year-old girl, Mary Glover, the daughter of a well-to-do shopkeeper, left her house on Thames Street to run an errand for her mother. She soon arrived at her destination, the house of Elizabeth Jackson, a neighbor with whom she had quarreled in the past, where she sought to deliver her message. Seizing the opportunity, however, the old woman drew the teenager indoors, “locked the dore upon her,” and rained down imprecations and threats on the young girl’s head, cursing her for damaging her reputation in the community and for meddling with her own daughter’s apparel, and “wishing an evill death to light upon her.” For upwards of an hour, the old crone ranted and raved at Mary, till finally she relented and let her go, with the parting injunction that “My daughter shall have clothes when thou art dead and rotten.”
Reflexly Mad
Authors: Scull Andrew 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The famous French philosopher Michel Foucault first rose to prominence by asserting that a Great Confinement of the mad was one of the defining features of the eighteenth century. Like many of his oracular pronouncements, the claim was factually mistaken, but on this occasion he was only off by a century or so. All across Western Europe and North America, the first half of the nineteenth century witnessed what David Rothman has called “the discovery of the asylum.”Differences in national cultures and political and social structures meant that the pathways to the incarceration of the insane in what was held to be a therapeutic isolation varied considerably, but the new commitment to locking up the lunatic, most often at state expense, could be seen in France and Germany just as easily as in England or the United States.
A Hysterical Circus
Authors: Scull Andrew 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It was Jean-Martin Charcot (1825–93), the august Professor of Pathological Anatomy and later of Diseases of the Nervous System of the Paris Medical Faculty, the leading international neurologist of the nineteenth century, who made hysteria a spectacle and a circus. It was a scandalous circus that attracted the attention of tout Paris, one that regularly featured scantily clad women disporting themselves in unmistakably erotic cataleptic poses, or writhing and moaning in ways that mimicked orgasms on a public stage, before an understandably rapt audience—an audience soon drawn not just from the highest ranks of French society, but also from those attracted to Paris by news of these extraordinary Leçons du Mardi. The photographs of these occasions, captured in carefully staged arrangements before the supposedly objective lens of the camera and thus transmuted into indelible visual representations for a vastly greater virtual audience, have survived for later generations to inspect, and have become the iconic images of a disorder seen as at once sexual and feminine.
The Wounds of War
Authors: Scull Andrew 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
On August 14, 1914, the war to end all wars began. It was destined to be, in the words of the eminent German sociologist Max Weber, a "great and wonderful war."1 Civilization (whichever version of civilization one’s side was defending) would triumph, and the barbarians on the other side would be decisively defeated. And it would all be over by Christmas. Perhaps sooner: the Kaiser, seeing his troops off to the front in the first week of August, informed them: "You will be home before the leaves have fallen from the trees."
L’hystérie Morte?
Authors: Scull Andrew 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Diseases disappear. Occasionally they vanish when public-health campaigns succeed in eliminating all existing outbreaks, and the pathogen responsible for the illness needs a human reservoir and vector to survive. Such was the case with smallpox, whose last remaining case was documented in 1977, and whose demise was announced by the World Health Organization in May 1980. Only the survival of the virus in biological warfare laboratories gives us reason to be concerned about the possible reappearance of an illness that once disfigured and killed on a massive scale. Perhaps polio may soon follow, for new cases of the disease now number in the low hundreds each year, compared with the ten million cases reported as recently as 1988. Occasionally, the discovery of a medical magic bullet ushers a dread disease off the stage. In the early twentieth century, between 15 and 20 per cent of male admissions to New York State̓s mental hospitals suffered from the ravages of general paresis. In its early stages, the disorder was visible only through subtle signs, overlooked by all but the trained eye—minor disturbances of gait and articulation, the unequal reaction of the pupils to light.
Introduction
Authors: Shafer-Landau Russ 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is designed to provide an annual selection of some of the best new work being done in this exciting field. I think that the articles collected here have done an excellent job in fulfilling the aims of this series. They also display, perhaps more than any previous volume in the series, the breadth of issues that nowadays falls within the boundaries of metaethics.
We begin with Andrew Sepielli’s “What To Do When You Don’t Know What To Do.” Sepielli considers a little-discussed problem in metaethics—how to behave when we are unclear about which normative considerations are most relevant to the situations we encounter. We often receive differing advice from competing normative theories, while unsure of which (if any) theory is correct.
Introduction. The boy companies
Authors: Chambers E K 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The present chapter contains detailed chronicles-too often, I fear, lapsing into arid annals of performances at Court or in the provinces-of all the companies traceable in London during any year between 1558 and 1616. The household and other establishments to which the companies were attached are taken as the basis of classification. This principle is open to criticism. Certainly it has not always the advantage of presenting economic units. It is improbable that there was any continuity as regards membership between the bodies of actors successively appearing, of ten after long intervals, under the names of Sussex or Hunsdon or Derby. On the other hand, particular associations of actors can sometimes be discerned as holding together under a change of patrons.
Kan T: From Freedom To Morality
Authors: Rwin Terence I 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
We have seen that not all of Kant’s views on freedom depend on his acceptance of incompatibilism or on the aspects of noumenal causation that involve indeterminism. He is right to claim that his conception of freedom is not the simple compatibilist conception of Hobbes and Hume; he does not identify practical freedom with the causation of our actions by our thoughts and desires. In his view, freedom is independence of non-rational desire in our choice and motivation. The source of this independence is our capacity to act on practical reason apart from non-rational motives.
KAN T: Meta-Ethical Questions
Authors: Rwin Terence I 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
After examining the connexions between Kant’s moral philosophy and his metaphysics, in discussing his views on freedom and God, we may turn to his metaphysics of morals in a narrower sense; does he take moral principles to correspond to facts about reality independent of the moral beliefs of rational agents? We have already given some reasons, explicitly or implicitly, for attributing this realist view to Kant, but we need to examine these reasons more closely. The questions that arise here renew a theme that we have pursued through the chapters on Kant, about the relations between his views and traditional eudaemonism and naturalism. We have noticed some important differences, especially on the relation of the moral law to the good.
Schopenhauer
Authors: Rwin Terence I 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Schopenhauer’s attitude to morality is most strongly influenced by Kant. He does not discuss any of Kant’s predecessors in any detail. He has more to say about Kant’s successors, but he believes they are misguided; he disagrees both with previous attempts to develop Kant’s general position and with Hegel’s attempt to treat problems of moral theory historically. He believes he knows which parts of Kant’s philosophy are genuine insights, and which parts are errors that need to be discarded. He attacks Kant’s rationalist conception of morality, and argues that morality is based on the feeling of compassion, not on rational principle. Here he seems close to the view of Hutcheson and (in some places) Hume.
Mill: a Revised Version of Utilitarianism
Authors: Rwin Terence I 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
If we approach Mill’s Utilitarianism in the light of his earlier essays, its strategy is easier to understand, and some relevant questions emerge. Mill may have begun work on it around the time of his essay on Whewell. In that essay, Mill tries a new defence of utilitarianism. In his view, Whewell’s criticisms of Paley and Bentham do not damage the basic utilitarian position. Though Mill dissociates himself from Paley, he defends Bentham, on the ground that Whewell’s criticisms attack Bentham’s strong points, but overlook Bentham’s real weaknesses (174). He offers an indirect utilitarian defence of Bentham’s appeal to utility as the test of rightness, and he supports Bentham’s view on the pleasures of animals against Whewell. He alludes to Bentham’s philistinism and disregard of character (173–4), but this criticism does not take Mill far from Bentham’s principles.
Sidgwick: Axioms of Morality
Authors: Rwin Terence I 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One aspect of Sidgwick’s dialectical strategy is close to the method that Rawls calls Aristotelian. According to Rawls, its aim is to achieve ‘reflective equilibrium’; the principles we find by reflexion on common sense are those that make most sense of the common-sense judgments we start with, though our initial judgments may also be adjusted in the light of the theory. In some cases, we may achieve equilibrium either by adjusting our initial judgments to fit the theory or by the reverse process.
Green
Authors: Rwin Terence I 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Green’s Prolegomena to Ethics is different from Bradley’s Ethical Studies in its structure. It begins with a long discussion (in Book i) of metaphysics, arguing for a Hegelian conclusion, and only then (in Book ii) turns to the will and (in Book iii) to moral theory. Hegelian metaphysics forms (as Green’s title for the whole book might suggest) the prolegomena to ethics. The rest of the work, however, appears, at first sight, to be less metaphysical than Ethical Studies. It appears to be intelligible without constant reference to the metaphysical argument, and it does not seem to be part of a cumulative metaphysical argument of the sort that Bradley develops.
Ross
Authors: Rwin Terence I 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Ross is an objectivist in the metaphysics of morality, a cognitivist and descriptivist in semantics, and an intuitionist in epistemology. He develops his position by a close criticism of Moore. His comments often throw light on Moore and on the difficulties that his position raises. Like Moore, he discusses Sidgwick’s non-naturalism, intuitionism, and utilitarianism. But, in contrast to Moore, he revives the ‘dogmatic intuitionism’ (as Sidgwick calls it) of Price, Reid, and Whewell, and defends a non-utilitarian doctrine of the right. In contrast to Sidgwick and Moore, Ross and other 20th-century intuitionists believe that appeals to intuition support a pluralist conception of moral first principles, and so they reject Sidgwick’s defence of utilitarianism on an intuitional basis.
Existentialism
Authors: Rwin Terence I 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In 1946, Sartre published a short essay, ‘The humanism of existentialism’ (literally, ‘Existentialism is a humanism’). He mentions three reasons for writing it: (1) ‘Existentialism’ was widely used, but little understood. (2) The philosophical position referred to with this term was widely believed to have distinctive implications for morality. (3) These implications were widely believed to be hostile to morality. In Sartre’s view, an accurate understanding of existentialism shows that the second popular belief is true, and the third is partly false. He admits that existentialism supports the rejection of some traditional conceptions of morality, both theistic and non-theistic; but he insists that existentialism is not hostile to morality as such, but in fact supports a distinctive outlook on morality.
Feeling Fantastic? Emotions and Appearances in Aristotle
Authors: Dow Jamie 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This paper takes up the claim of some recent commentators that Aristotle, in the Rhetoric, supposed that emotional experience involved things merely appearing to the subject to be as they are represented, rather than the subject’s actually taking them to be so. Supposedly this represents a better interpretation of the Rhetoric (especially Aristotle’s use of phantasia (appearance) and cognates in connection with the emotions) and a better philosophical position for Aristotle. I shall argue that the claim has neither of these merits.
Charcoal Adsorption for Separating Bound and Free Radioligand in Radioligand Binding Assays
Authors: Strange Philip G 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
As discussed extensively in this book, there is a requirement for accurate, reproducible, rapid, and cheap methods for separating bound and free radioligand in radioligand receptor binding assays. In other chapters (Chapters 6, 7) methods have been described for the assay of membrane bound receptors based on collection of the bound radioligand by filtration or centrifugation of the membranes. When studying a soluble receptor (either a naturally soluble cytosolic receptor, such as a steroid hormone receptor, or a detergent solubilized receptor, formerly membrane bound) these methods are not applicable. A popular technique in such studies is the charcoal adsorption assay which relies on the ability of charcoal to selectively remove the free radioligand from the mixture of bound and free radioligand.