bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Effects of light availability on host plant chemistry and the consequences for behavior and growth of an insect herbivore
Authors: Jansen Margo P. T. , Stamp Nancy E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWe examined how light availability influenced the defensive chemistry of tomato (Lycopersicon esculentum: Solanaceae). Tomato plants were grown either in full sunlight or under shade cloth rated at 73%. Leaves from plants grown in full sunlight were tougher, had higher concentrations of allelochemicals (chlorogenic acid, rutin and tomatine), and had less protein than leaves from plants grown in shade. We determined how these differences in host plant quality due to light availability affected the behavior and growth of a Solanaceae specialist, Manduca sexta. Both in the greenhouse and in the field, caterpillars on shade‐grown plants grew heavier in a shorter amount of time than those on plants that had previously been grown in full sunlight. In contrast, the effects of previous light availability to plants on caterpillar behavior appeared to be minor.To further investigate how light availability to plants influenced herbivore growth, we examined the effects of leaf‐powder diets made from tomato leaves of different ages (new, intermediate, or mature) grown in full sunlight or shade on caterpillar performance. Caterpillars fed diets made from plants grown in shade consumed less but grew faster than larvae fed diets made from tomato plants grown in full sunlight. Caterpillars fed diets made from new leaves grew larger in less time than caterpillars fed diets made from intermediate aged leaves. Caterpillars did not survive on the mature leaf powder diets. There were plant‐light treatment by larval thermal regime interactions. For example, at 26:15 °C, plant‐light treatment had no effect on stadium duration, but at 21:10 °C, stadium duration was prolonged with the full sunlight‐new leaf diet compared with the shaded‐new leaf diet. In a second diet experiment, we examined the interactive effects of protein and some tomato allelochemicals (rutin, chlorogenic acid and tomatine) on the performance of caterpillars. There were food quality by thermal regime interactions. For instance, at 26:15 °C, neither protein nor allelochemical concentration influenced stadium duration, whereas at 21:10 °C, stadium duration was prolonged with the low protein‐high allelochemical diet, which simulated full sunlight leaves. In sum, light availability to plants affected defensive chemistry and protein concentration. The difference in food quality was great enough to influence the growth of a specialist insect herbivore, but the effects were temperature‐dependent.
Fitness consequences of superparasitism and mechanism of host discrimination in the stemborer parasitoid Cotesia flavipes
Authors: Potting R. P. J. , Snellen H. M. , Vet L. E. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe fitness consequences of superparasitism and the mechanism of host discrimination in Cotesia flavipes, a larval parasitoid of concealed stemborer larvae was investigated. Naive females readily superparasitized and treated the already parasitized host as an unparasitized host by allocating the same amount of eggs as in an unparasitized host. However, there was no significant increase in the number of emerging parasitoids from superparasitized hosts due to substantial mortality of parasitoid offspring in superparasitized hosts. Furthermore, the developmental time of the parasitoids in a superparasitized host was significantly longer than in a singly parasitized host and the emerging progeny were significantly smaller (body length and head width). Naive females entered a tunnel in which the host was parasitized 4 h previously and accepted it for oviposition. Experienced females (oviposition experience in unparasitized host) refused to enter a tunnel with a host parasitized by herself or by another female. In experiments where the tunnel and/or host was manipulated it was demonstrated that the female leaves a mark in the tunnel when she parasitizes a host. The role of patch marking in C. flavipes is discussed in relation to the ecology of the parasitoid.
Chemical cues from Spodoptera litura larvae elicit prey‐locating behavior by the predatory stink bug, Eocanthecona furcellata
Authors: Yasuda Tetsuya 
Published: October 2003

AbstractTwo chemical compounds eliciting prey‐locating behavior of the predatory stink bug, Eocanthecona furcellata, were isolated from solvent extracts of Spodoptera litura larvae and identified. A hexane eluted fraction from silica gel chromatography of the solvent extracts of S. litura larvae was attractive to E. furcellata nymphs when assayed with a linear track olfactometer. The hexane fraction was found to contain n‐pentadecane (2500 ng/larva), n‐tetracosane (54 ng/larva), n‐heptadecane (41 ng/larva), n‐heptacosane (61 ng/larva), n‐nonacosane (147 ng/larva), n‐hentriacontane (200 ng/larva) and squalene (323 ng/larva). The synthetic n‐pentadecane was attractive to the bugs, although its activity was slightly lower than that of the hexane fraction. A mixture of synthetic n‐pentadecane and the other six hydrocarbons was also attractive, although no improved attractiveness was observed by the addition of the latter compounds. On the other hand, a 15%‐ether‐in‐ hexane eluted fraction from silica gel chromatography stimulated bugs to display a proboscis‐protruding behavior. A neutral‐layer fraction of the 15% fraction, which contained E‐phytol (480 ng/larva), also elicited this behavior. Synthetic E‐phytol had the same effect on the predators as the neutral‐layer fraction.
Marcinkiewicz’s theorem on operator multipliers of Fourier series
Authors: Dostanić Milutin 
Published: October 2003

We give some sufficient conditions on the operators

A

m

∈

B

(

L

p

(
0
,
1
)

)

A_{m}\!\in \!\mathcal {B} \left ( L^{p}\left ( 0,1\right ) \right )

which for each

Φ

m

∈

L

p

(
0
,
1
)

\Phi _{m}\in L^{p}\left ( 0,1\right )

imply the inequality
\[

∫

0

1

∫

0

2
π

|

∑

m

e

i
m
x

⋅

A

m

Φ

m

(
y
)

|

p

d
x
d
y
≤

c

p

p

∫

0

1

∫

0

2
π

|

∑

m

e

i
m
x

⋅

Φ

m

(
y
)

|

p

d
x
d
y
,

\int \limits _{0}^{1}\int \limits _{0}^{2\pi }\left | \sum \limits _{m}e^{imx}\cdot A_{m}\Phi _{m}\left ( y\right ) \right | ^{p}dxdy\leq c_{p}^{p}\int \limits _{0}^{1}\int \limits _{0}^{2\pi }\left | \sum \limits _{m}e^{imx}\cdot \Phi _{m}\left ( y\right ) \right | ^{p}dxdy,

\]

1
>
p
>
∞
.

1>p>\infty .
The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law Volume 3: Harm to Self
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is the third volume of The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, a four‐volume series in which Joel Feinberg addresses a complex question: What kinds of conduct may the state make criminal without infringing on the moral autonomy of individual citizens? In Harm to Self, Feinberg discusses various problems about self‐inflicted harm, covering topics such as legal paternalism, personal sovereignty and its boundaries, voluntariness and assumptions of risk, consent and its counterfeits, coercive force, incapacity, and choice of death.
Legal Paternalism
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There are a number of diverse meanings of “paternalism.” Feinberg attempts to bring some precision to the meaning of the term. He examines the liberal position, which maintains that prevention of harm (physical, psychological, or economic) to the actor himself is always a good reason for prohibition. Feinberg argues that legal paternalism is a “presumptively blameable” view because it implies that the state often can know the interests of individual citizens better than the citizens know them themselves. The most promising strategy for the antipaternalist is to construct a convincing conception of personal autonomy that can explain how that notion is a moral trump card.
Autonomy
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Philosophers have long had a term to label the realm of inviolable sanctuary that most of us sense in our own beings: personal autonomy. Feinberg sets out a number of closely related views of personal autonomy. It can refer to either the capacity to govern oneself, or to the actual condition of self‐government and its associated virtues, or to an ideal of character derived from that conception, or to the sovereign authority to govern oneself, which is absolute within one's own moral boundaries.
Personal Sovereignty and Its Boundaries
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Using the concept of personal sovereignty sketched in previous chapters, in which an autonomous individual is viewed as analogous to an autonomous state, Feinberg claims that the self‐regarding and other‐regarding distinction can be used as a guide to map the boundaries of personal autonomy. He goes on to examine autonomy contrasted with liberty and de facto freedom, personal sovereignty compared with constitutional privacy, autonomous forfeitures of liberty, and deciding for one's future self.
Voluntariness and Assumptions of Risk
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Feinberg deals with the problem of reconciling our repugnance for legal paternalism with the seeming reasonableness of some apparently paternalistic regulations. One way of accounting for the reasonableness of apparently paternalistic restrictions is to apply a “soft paternalistic strategy” to show that there is a rationale for protective interference that gives decisive significance to respecting autonomy. The reasonableness of the restriction consists in the protection it provides the actor from dangerous choices that are not truly his own.
Failures of Voluntariness: The Single‐Party Case
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Should the law permit autonomous persons to act on their own in ways that are harmful or unreasonably dangerous to themselves but not directly threatening to other persons? The most plausible liberal answer is boldly in the affirmative. Entirely self‐regarding and voluntary behavior is none of the criminal law's business. However, there are times when harmful or unreasonable risky behavior is a good deal less than voluntary, and the soft paternalist would justify interference with it. The concern of this chapter is the problem of determining voluntariness in single‐party cases.
Failures of Consent: Coercive Force
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Acts of consent, like acts generally, are involuntary when the actor is forced to do what he does, whatever his own preferences in the matter. In this chapter, Feinberg discusses cases in which an actor expressly gives his consent, but the consent lacks moral or legal effect because it was forced rather than free (thus, rendering it invalid). The line between forcing to act and merely getting to act is drawn somewhere in the manipulation or persuasion part of the scale, possibly moving within a narrow range as our purposes shift. Feinberg also examines the effect of second‐party coercion, differential and other coercive pressure, and moralistic theories of coercion on consent.
Epistemic and Moral Duty
Authors: Russell Bruce 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Is in part about the relation between epistemic and moral justification. Begins with the distinction between subjective and objective moral justification, and then moves on to examine the difference between subjective and objective epistemic justification, which are, respectively, a function of freedom from epistemic blameworthiness and the adequacy of the subject's evidence. Main thesis is that knowledge requires the combination of both subjective and objective justification. This requirement allows the writer to rebut counterexamples suggested by Alvin Plantinga, according to whom justification is not necessary for knowledge.
Deciding to Believe
Authors: Ginet Carl 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Defends the thesis that we are sometimes in the state of believing that p simply because we have decided to believe that p. To this end, employs, within the framework of a dispositional analysis of belief, the notion of counting on its being the case that p. Although, according to the writer, deciding what to believe is something we can do, it is something we do only rarely. In the last two sections, the writer discusses and rejects arguments for doxastic involuntarism by Williams and Alston.
Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation
Authors: Feldman Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Feldman defends the view that epistemic justification is analyzable in terms of an epistemic ‘ought’ against the objection that, unlike action, belief is not under voluntary control, which it would have to be if epistemic justification is indeed a function of what we ought to believe. In response to Steup's argument that we do enjoy voluntary control over our beliefs because we can deliberate, Feldman argues that for belief to be voluntary, it would have to be intentional, which typically it is not. So Feldman holds that belief is not, in any significant sense, under our voluntary control. However, he rejects the other premise on which the objection is based: that for belief to be under the scope of an epistemic ‘ought’, it must be under voluntary control. He suggests that the epistemic ‘ought’ is a role ‘ought’ – an ‘ought’ that simply tells us what we should do in our role as believers – and thus crucially differs from the moral ‘ought’ because it does not require voluntary control.
Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief
Authors: Audi Robert 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Attempts to find a place for an ethics of belief given that belief is not under voluntary control. Distinguishes between a behavioral and a genetic version of doxastic voluntarism and rejects both. According to the writer, belief formation is not causing oneself to believe something, but simply a belief's forming. How, then, can there be an ethics of belief? Suggests the following: We may say that it is morally objectionable to conduct one's intellectual life sloppily, and that we should accept an epistemic obligation to be attentive to one's evidence, from where we will be led to an ethics of inquiry.
Internalism Exposed
Authors: Goldman Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Goldman sets forth a penetrating critique of internalism: the view that what makes beliefs justified or unjustified must be internal to the subject, where internality is typically defined in terms of a suitably strong accessibility relation. First, Goldman argues that internalism – as derived from what Goldman calls the “guidance‐deontological” conception of justification – presents its defenders with a dilemma: the needed accessibility will either be too weak to identify reliabilism as an externalist theory, or so strong that it will be difficult to derive it from the guidance‐deontology. Second, Goldman argues that internalism breeds skepticism, as can be seen when we consider its implications with regard to forgotten evidence, probabilistic relations, epistemic principles, and the availability of methods. In the last section, Goldman questions the a priori methodology that is associated with internalism.
Truth as the Epistemic Goal
Authors: David Marian 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines the difficulties involved in explaining what is distinctive about epistemic – as opposed to prudential or moral – justification by invoking the truth goal: roughly, the goal of believing what is true and not believing what is false. One set of problems concerns psychology: do all subjects really aim at having true beliefs? Another set of problems concerns the truth goal itself: what, exactly, is the goal? A third set of problems has to do with the relation between justified/unjustified beliefs and the truth goal: is it a causal ends–means relation, or the relation of constitution? The former option, according to the writer, faces serious objections, whereas the latter option collapses justified belief into true belief. Examines various ways in which this collapse can be blocked, and concludes by considering a subjunctive truth goal and a subjunctive conception of reliability.
Value Monism in Epistemology
Authors: DePaul Michael R. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Value monism is the view that truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and justification is valuable only as a means to true belief. Argues against this view. The two propositions – (1) truth is the only intrinsic epistemic good, and (2) knowledge is better than mere true belief – cannot, according to the writer, both be true. Since (2) is obviously true, we must reject (1), and embrace value pluralism, which asserts that in addition to truth, there are further intrinsic goods, such as knowledge and justification.
Commonsensism in Ethics and Epistemology
Authors: Lemos Noah 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Addresses the question of how we can derive criteria of knowledge and justification. Identifies a range of propositions – commonsense propositions – which include epistemic propositions such as “I know that I have hands”, and suggests that they are suitable starting points for deriving the criteria we seek. To the objection that we cannot rely on such propositions without first showing how we know them, replies that this objection rests on an unacceptable theory of justification. In addition, explains how a commonsense philosopher would proceed in ethics, and discusses important arguments by Brandt, Hare, and Alston. Towards the end of the paper, examines the circularity problem that arises when we attempt to argue for the reliability of our faculties.
Recovering Understanding
Authors: Zagzebski Linda 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Proposes an analysis of the concept of understanding. Finds three important, relevant strands of thought in the works of Plato and Aristotle, among which the most important one is that understanding involves representing the world nonpropositionally, e.g. through visualization or diagrams. Taking this to be the defining characteristic, proposes that understanding is a state of comprehending nonpropositional structures of reality, such as automobiles, pieces of music or art, the character of a person, or a causal nexus. Argues that virtue epistemology is better suited than traditional epistemology to help us develop a successful analysis of understanding thus conceived. For unlike the theories from which it departs, virtue epistemology takes the objects of valuable epistemic states to consist of both propositional and nonpropositional objects.
C.S. Lewis Then and Now
Authors: Kort Wesley A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The argument of this book is that a primary goal in the work of C. S. Lewis is to articulate a Christian worldview. Lewis based this project on his positive view of culture, nature, and human relations. He addresses deficiencies in modern culture and the largely distorted relations of modernity to nature in order to restore culture as a supportive base for a Christian worldview. The book offers discussions of seven interests in Lewis's work: retrieval, reenchantment, houses, culture, character, pleasure, and celebration. The topics provide not only an analysis of Lewis's work but also a basis upon which readers who want to construct a worldview here and now can draw inspiration and direction from him.
Reenchantment
Authors: Kort Wesley A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Disenchantment is a condition resulting from the unwarranted elevation of scientific and rational strategies of analysis to the level of determining the general position of people in the world. This dissolves the basic relations people have with their world and allows for the exercise of power and extension of self‐interest. He counters with proposals that would allow for the reenchantment of the world.
Character
Authors: Kort Wesley A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Lewis sees culture and character as interrelated. This relation is clearest in the formation of the person's “heart,” which is the base, for Lewis, of personal identity and the locus of virtue. As culture relates Christian beliefs to reality, the heart relates a person's mind to feelings and the body. Character is the consequence of morality that has been learned but has also become second nature.
Pleasure
Authors: Kort Wesley A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Moderns assume that good is repetitious and evil is innovative, but for Lewis, the opposite is true. His theory of pleasure forms the basis of his relational view of life and for several other interests: reading, epistemology, and joy. Pleasure, under the category of gift, also relates his cultural theory to his Christian theology, since they share a common pattern or structure.
Beyond Idols
Authors: Fenn Richard K. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explores the possibilities for a secular society. Such a society is radically open to its environment, to a wide range of opportunities and dangers, and it is therefore agnostic about the boundaries between the possible and the impossible. Its own beliefs and ethics would also be open, evolutionary, procedural, and open to contestation and revision. There would be opportunities for individuals to give their own accounts of their personal experience without seeking recognition and legitimacy from institutionalized sources of authority. The individual's identity would be able to develop with being shaped by ritual or conformed to a society's pantheon of heroes. The present would be open to the past without being controlled or obligated to it, and the future would be an emergent aspect of the present rather than a reservoir of unfulfilled aspiration. Language would be subject to negotiation and contest, even regarding the meanings of sacred speech. The mysterious and the occult, along with other aspects of the sacred, would be subject to discourse rather than veneration. The political and cultural center would lose its monopoly on the sacred, and the periphery would become more assertive in defining is own forms of the sacred against those of the center. Religious institutions would become less successful in reducing the sacred to particular interpretations, times, and places.
Introduction
Authors: Fenn Richard K. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Tendencies toward fascism in modern societies make it imperative to investigate the role of religion in the public sphere. Religion tends to limit the range of possibilities open to any social system and to provide a false sense of transcendence over time. The process of secularization opens a society to the full range of possibilities, both positive and negative, that define the Sacred. Secular societies are therefore both more open to the Sacred and more subject to the passage of time.
Heroes, Charismatic Figures, and Celebrities as Cultural Idols
Authors: Fenn Richard K. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Civil religion uses public religiosity, national holidays, and public education to guard against deviant and autonomous expressions of individualism. Civil religion seeks to co‐opt the heroes and celebrities, both living and dead, as representatives and defenders of the social order. However, in societies that lose their monopoly on the sacred, heroes and celebrities represent hitherto forbidden or hidden possibilities for selfhood and satisfaction. The less successful the churches and the nation are in institutionalizing the sacred, the less likely individuals are to surrender their autonomy in return for recognition and support from the larger society.