bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Motivational Strength
Authors: Mele Alfred R. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Develops an account of the motivational strength of the desires most closely associated with intentional actions. The motivational strength of a desire is distinguished from such things as the agent's evaluation of what she desires and the affective quality of a desire. The general idea that desires differ in motivational strength is defended against a variety of objections, including the objection that the idea is vacuous because the only measure of motivational strength is what the agent does. It is argued that the position defended on motivational strength does not diminish human agency and is compatible, with practical reasoning playing a major role in producing many actions.
Control and Self‐Control
Authors: Mele Alfred R. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe primary purpose of this chapter is to show that data generated in well‐known experiments by physiologist Benjamin Libet can be used to support the idea that an independently plausible thesis about the connection between motivational strength and intentional action leaves ample room for self‐control. Aspects of Libet's interpretation of his data are criticized, but Libet's work does give us a sense of how much time might elapse between the acquisition of a desire to do something straightaway and the beginning of an overt action motivated by that desire. More important, it gives us a sense of possibilities for practically relevant motivational change during that span and adds to the extant case for the view that a plausible principle of the kind at issue does not place agents at the mercy of their strongest desires.
Deciding
Authors: Mele Alfred R. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter's aim is threefold: to articulate and defend an account of what it is to decide to do something; to defend the thesis that there are genuine instances of deciding so understood; and to shed light on how decisions are to be explained. This chapter defends the idea that to decide to do something is to perform a momentary mental action of forming an intention to do it. Actively forming an intention is distinguished from passively acquiring one, and the bearing of reasons and motivational strength on deciding is discussed.
Motivated Belief and Motivational Explanations
Authors: Mele Alfred R. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Drawing on work in cognitive and social psychology, this chapter explains the bearing of motivationally biased beliefs on the project of producing an account of motivational explanation. It is argued that the core of ordinary motivational explanations is the following compound feature: motivation‐constituting items make a causal contribution to the explanandum that (1) helps to explain the explanandum at least partly by revealing (sometimes in conjunction with an instrumental belief) an agreeable feature, from the perspective of the agent's desires, either of the explanandum itself or of its object and (2) is of such a kind that our learning of contributions of that kind tends to improve our folk‐psychological understanding – that is, the understanding we have in, roughly, commonsense psychological terms – of why the explanandum came to be.
Natural Goodness
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPhilippa Foot sets out a naturalistic theory of ethics, which she calls ‘natural normativity’ and which is radically opposed to the subjectivist, non‐naturalism tradition deriving from David Hume and to be found in G. E. Moore and modern theories of ethics influenced by Moore, such as emotivism and prescriptivism. Natural normativity involves a special form of evaluation that predicates goodness and defect to living things qua living things, and Foot argues that this is the form of evaluation in moral judgements. Moral evaluations thus share a conceptual structure with evaluations of the characteristics and operations of living things, and can only be understood in these terms. The thesis of the book, then, is that vice is a natural defect, and virtue goodness of will; therefore propositions to do with goodness or badness in human character and action are not to be understood in psychological terms. In Ch. 1, Foot discusses and criticizes the subjectivism and non‐cognitivism that has dominated the past 60 years of analytical moral philosophy. Ch. 2 provides a sketch of an account of natural normativity in plants and animals, while Ch. 3 applies this to human beings, including a discussion of Elizabeth Anscombe's discussion of promising. Ch. 4 exhibits the constraint that this account of natural normativity imparts to any adequate view of practical rationality. Ch. 5 attempts to dissolve any meaningful distinction between the domain of practical rationality and the domain of morality. Ch. 6 deals with the connection between goodness and happiness, while Ch. 7 discusses Nietzsche's immoralism.
A Fresh Start?
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFoot criticizes G. E. Moore's anti‐naturalism and the subjectivist or non‐cognitivist theories influenced by Moore, such as emotivism, prescriptivism, and expressivism. Foot traces the roots of non‐cognitivism to a desire‐based, egoistic interpretation of David Hume's practicality requirement, i.e. that morality is necessarily practical. Foot eschews this interpretation of Hume's requirement for an alternative, cognitivist, notion of practical rationality that nevertheless still meets this requirement. Foot also denies that moral evaluation is opposed to descriptive statements, or matters of fact, as the non‐cognitivists argue; it has to do rather with facts about a particular subject matter, i.e. human life. Her main argument, which she will pursue throughout the book, is that the grounding of a moral argument is ultimately in these facts, or in what Elizabeth Anscombe refers to as ‘Aristotelian necessities’, i.e. the moral virtues; and thus the evaluation of the human will should be determined by facts about the nature of human beings and of the life of our species.
Natural Norms
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFoot defends her proposal to meet Hume's practicality requirement with a cognitivist ethical theory. The central feature of Foot's theory is that she places the evaluation of human action in the wider contexts not only of the evaluation of other features of human life, but also of evaluative judgements of the characteristics and operations of other living things. She focuses on the description of natural goodness in plant and animal life, and argues that such judgements of goodness and badness are normative and indeed evaluative. Thus, Foot shows that these norms can be explained in terms of facts about natural things, i.e. without recourse to speech acts or the expression of psychological states. Natural goodness, Foot argues, is attributable only to living things themselves and their parts, characteristics, and operations; it is an intrinsic or autonomous goodness that depends directly on the relation of an individual to the life form of its species.
Transition to Human Beings
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFoot proposes to transfer the conceptual patterns of natural normativity discussed in the preceding chapter to the realm of human action. Foot argues that we can evaluate features and operations of humans in relation to the part they play in human life, according to the schema of natural normativity found in the case of plants and animals. In support of her thesis, she draws upon Anscombe's discussion of the institution of promising, taking care to distinguish this from utilitarianism. The same normative pattern, that of natural normativity, Foot concludes, is to be found in the evaluations of plants, animals, and human beings; although human good is different to the good in the world of animals and plants, nevertheless there is a common conceptual structure.
Practical Rationality
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Foot considers an objection to the suggestion that the same normative pattern is to be found in plants, animals, and human beings: i.e. human beings, because they are rational creatures, can question and indeed reject ‘natural goodness’. This is a problem about the rationality of doing what virtue demands. To meet the challenge, Foot embarks on a discussion of practical rationality, or the nature and provenance of human reasoning. Foot argues that an objective theory of morality can establish an intelligible connection between objective moral evaluations and what we have reason to do as individuals. Rational choice is an aspect of human goodness, and at the heart of the virtues, rather than set apart from it as something to which goodness should conform.
Human Goodness
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFoot considers the difference between calling a plant and an animal ‘good’ and calling a human being ‘good’; in the former case we think of the plant or animal as a whole, while in the latter we are evaluating the person with respect to his or her rational will. This particular type of evaluation may be called ‘moral evaluation’, although Foot is keen to show that ‘moral’ judgements belong to a wider class of evaluations of conduct with which they share a common conceptual structure. Foot discusses and criticizes J. S. Mill's understanding of the word ‘moral’, as an example of the modern view that contrasts ‘moral’ and ‘prudential’ considerations. Thus, Foot denies the expressivist view that moral evaluation must be understood in terms of the expression of special mental states such as approval, or mental acts such as endorsing. Drawing upon Aquinas's theory of the sources of good and bad actions, Foot argues that there is no reason to think that Mill's ‘moral’ evaluations should be treated differently from other evaluations concerning the human will.
Happiness and Human Good
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFoot considers the view that practical rationality is nothing but the pursuit of happiness, which constitutes an objection to the account of practical rationality developed in the preceding chapters. Foot considers the different ways happiness is predicated of human beings, distinguishing happiness as humanity's good from enjoyment and contentment. She argues that the common view that happiness is a state of mind, detachable from beliefs about special objects, is in error because happiness does not have the same logical grammar as words like excitement or pleasure. Foot concludes that happiness is a protean concept, appearing in many different forms; however, happiness may be thought of as humanity's good in such a way that combining happiness with wickedness is ruled out a priori. This understanding of happiness as humanity's good is close to Aristotle's eudaimonia, insofar as it means operation in conformity with the virtues; as Foot understands the term, happiness is the enjoyment of good things, meaning the pursuit and attainment of right ends.
Words and Ideas
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter explores the difference between two kinds of signs that Berkeley followed Locke in recognizing: words and ideas. I argue that Berkeley does not assume that ideas are images of things but concludes it, as part of a deliberate attempt to explain how at least some of our thoughts succeed in referring to the world. For Berkeley, representation—the intentionality or ‘aboutness’ of thought—is sometimes a matter of resemblance.
Necessity
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I suggest that in his early, unpublished notebooks, Berkeley experimented with a radically formal conception of necessity, according to which necessity is nothing more than the inclusion of one idea within the definition of another. Berkeley's experiment was defeated by the same objective connections (and oppositions) that rule out the existence of simple ideas. Although Berkeley was left without an understanding of the nature of necessity, he never wavered in his conviction that necessity is something objective—that ideas and the world have an inherent, inescapable structure.
Immaterialism
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter reviews and assesses Berkeley's main arguments for immaterialism, his arguments against the existence of matter or material substance. I place particular emphasis on the themes of earlier chapters: intentionality, abstraction, necessity, and intelligibility. My aim is to show that Berkeley's thinking about these topics made a powerful contribution to his immaterialism, even if they seem, on the surface, to be distant from it. I provide an account of immediate perception as Berkeley understands it, and emphasize the phenomenalist elements in Berkeley's development of immaterialism.
Unperceived Objects
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is the first of three chapters examining the consequences of Berkeley's immaterialism and the problems to which it gives rise. In the present chapter, I defend a phenomenalist interpretation of Berkeley on unperceived objects. Appealing to his denial of blind agency, I show that a phenomenalist interpretation can be reconciled with texts that seem to go against it. I provide a modest interpretation of Berkeley's doctrine of archetypes, and argue briefly that even in Siris, Berkeley's doctrine of archetypes is unambitious and not especially Platonic.
Corpuscularianism
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
After describing the corpuscularian background of Berkeley's work (in, for example, the writing of Boyle, Newton, Locke, and Malebranche), I consider whether Berkeley can endorse the existence of immaterial atoms or corpuscles. I suggest that he hopes to avoid a definite commitment. He wants his position to ‘float’, its level to be determined by the kind of empirical evidence that would strike materialists and immaterialists with equal force. This chapter foregrounds the role played by the notion of intelligibility, both in the defence of modern corpuscularian science (including the distinction between primary and secondary qualities) and in Berkeley's critical response to it.
Spirit
Authors: Winkler Kenneth P. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I offer an interpretation and partial defence of Berkeley's belief that he is a mind or spirit—a spiritual substance—distinct from his ideas. I argue in particular that the arguments examined in earlier chapters, particularly the account of representation or intentionality developed in Ch. 1, and the immaterialist arguments reviewed in Ch. 6, do not force Berkeley to conclude that spiritual substance is no less impossible than matter.
The Rejection of Consequentialism
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The term ‘consequentialism’ refers to a class of moral theories that rank states of affairs from an impersonal standpoint and require agents to produce the best states of affairs they can. Many philosophers have criticized and rejected consequentialist theories, but Scheffler wishes to reconsider the rejection of consequentialism. He begins by discussing two objections to consequentialism, one having to do with the integrity of agents and the other with distributive justice. From there, he outlines a hybrid moral theory that avoids these two objections. Scheffler's hybrid theory agrees with consequentialism in so far as it always permits agents to produce the best states of affairs, but it departs from consequentialism by including an ‘agent‐centred prerogative’, allowing each agent to assign greater weight to his own interests than to those of others. Scheffler argues that this prerogative rests on a principled rationale—namely, that it is a rational strategy for taking into account the independence of the personal point of view. But this rationale does not support ‘agent‐centred restrictions’—norms that sometimes forbid agents from doing what would have the best outcome overall. Scheffler searches for, but does not find, a separate rationale for agent‐centred restrictions.
The Project and Its Motivation
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The term ‘consequentialism’ refers to a class of moral theories that rank overall states of affairs and require agents to produce the best states of affairs they can. Bernard Williams and others have criticized consequentialism, saying that it undermines agents’ integrity by requiring them to view cherished personal projects from an impersonal perspective. In addition, the most well‐known consequentialist theory, classical utilitarianism, can be criticized for its insensitivity to questions of distributive justice. Scheffler examines these two objections and proposes that the first might be avoided by a hybrid theory—one that agrees with consequentialism in so far as it rejects agent‐centred restrictions and permits agents always to produce the best available outcomes, but that departs from consequentialism by including an agent‐centred prerogative. To avoid the second objection, a hybrid theory must employ a distribution‐sensitive conception of the good.
Outline of a New Theory of Normative Ethics
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Provides an outline for a hybrid moral theory of the sort described in Ch. 1; Scheffler calls this theory the ‘distributive hybrid’. In order to accommodate concerns about agents’ integrity, the distributive hybrid incorporates an agent‐centred prerogative, allowing each agent to assign proportionately greater weight to his own interests than to those of other people. In order to accommodate concerns about distributive justice, the distributive hybrid incorporates a distribution‐sensitive conception of the good. Scheffler points out that some forms of consequentialism also incorporate distribution‐sensitive conceptions of the good.
The Independence and Distinctness of the Personal Point of View
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explores the considerations underlying an agent‐centred prerogative and the considerations underlying a distribution‐sensitive conception of the good. Scheffler argues that, whether or not the integrity‐based objection to consequentialism succeeds, that objection nevertheless reveals a principled rationale for an agent‐centred prerogative: the prerogative is a rational strategy for taking into account the independence of the personal point of view. (Scheffler calls this strategy the ‘liberation strategy’, and he contrasts it with a ‘maximization strategy’, which tries to accommodate the personal point of view within the framework of a sophisticated consequentialism.) The personal point of view and the distinctness of persons also provide a principled rationale for favouring distribution‐sensitive conceptions of the overall good.
The Defence of Agent‐Centred Restrictions: Intuitions in Search of a Foundation
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Scheffler searches for, but does not find, a principled rationale for including agent‐centred restrictions in a moral theory. He considers and rejects rationales that appeal to the disvalue of violating agent‐centred restrictions, to the independence of the personal point of view, and to other features of victims and agents. Overall, the chapter is a defence of what Scheffler calls the ‘independence thesis’, which holds that Ch. 3's principled rationale for an agent‐centred prerogative is consistent with the rejection of agent‐centred restrictions. Scheffler's arguments may also lend support to the ‘asymmetry thesis’, which denies the possibility of grounding agent‐centred restrictions in a rationale comparable to that which grounds an agent‐centred prerogative.
The Project Reconsidered
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Defenders of agent‐centred restrictions might respond to the arguments of Ch. 4 by questioning the whole enterprise of trying to find a principled rationale for agent‐centred restrictions. Specifically, they might argue that the very idea of ranking states of affairs is flawed, and thus no rationale is required for agent‐centred restrictions. Scheffler responds that the idea of ranking states of affairs is not misguided, and that even if it were, there would still be a basis for questioning the rationality of agent‐centred restrictions. Along these same lines, Scheffler maintains that the search for a rationale for agent‐centred restrictions does not reflect an antecedent bias in favour of consequentialism. It is much easier, he argues, to find a rationale for an agent‐centred prerogative than for agent‐centred restrictions.
The Christian God
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book is about what it is for there to be a God, and what reason there is to suppose that God to be the traditional Christian God. Part 1 (Chs.1 to 5) analyses the metaphysical categories needed for this purpose – substance, cause, time, and necessity. Part 2 (Ch. 6 to 10) begins by setting out some of the different ways in which the doctrine that there is a divine individual (an individual with the traditional divine properties) can be developed. There can be more than one divine individual so long as a first such individual is necessarily the cause of the existence of the others. Given the supreme moral goodness of cooperating with one individual in sharing everything with a third individual, it follows that if there is one divine individual, there will be three and only three such individuals; hence the necessity of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity – that there is one God consisting of three divine persons. One of these persons may choose to become incarnate, i.e. human, and there are reasons why he would do so.
Substances
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A substance is a concrete individual thing that exists all at once. Although the world can be cut up into substances in different ways, any full description of the world will include both material objects and immaterial souls as substances. Souls have essentially mental properties, ones to which the subject has privileged access such as thoughts and sensations. The essential part of a human being is a human soul, one with a structure and a capacity for logical thought, moral belief, and free will, and (typically but not necessarily) certain limited powers exercised through a human body. No human being is essentially human.
Causation
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Causation is a basic category, not reducible to anything else. Intentional causation is a species of causation of which we are aware when we try to move our limbs. Talk of ‘laws of nature’ is reducible to talk of the causal powers and liabilities of substances. A perfectly free (and so rational) agent will inevitably do only (what he believes to be) good actions – the best action or one of a number of equal best actions, if there are such.
Time
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Everything that happens, happens over a period of time, and never at an instant. Time must have a topology, but it only has a metric if there are laws of nature. The future is what we can causally affect; the past is what causally affects us (and so neither backward nor simultaneous causation are possible). There are both indexical and non‐indexical temporal facts (the A‐series of events is not reducible to the B‐series.) Necessarily, time has no beginning and no end.