bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Contact and Continuity
Authors: Kilborn William 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This chapter develops a new approach to the Brentanian puzzle of contact and continuity. Various versions of the puzzle or closely related considerations thereof have received discussion in the works of Bolzano, Brentano, Leonardo, and Peirce, and more recently in Casati and Varzi’s Parts and Places, in Hawthorne’s ‘‘Before-Effect and Zeno Causality’’, in Hudson’s The Metaphysics of Hyperspace, in Kline and Matheson’s ‘‘The Logical Impossibility of Collision’’, in Varzi’s ‘‘Boundaries, Continuity, and Contact’’, and in Zimmerman’s ‘‘Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts? An Argument for ‘Atomless Gunk’ ‘‘. In his ‘‘Simply Possible’’, Theodore Sider has proposed a prima facie plausible solution to the Brentanian puzzle. In the present work, I point out that there are other intriguing puzzles of contact and continuity. An interesting result is that Sider’s proposal cannot help solve every puzzle of contact. It seems that this undercuts much, if not all of the motivation for endorsing Sider’s proposal stemming from certain considerations regarding the original Brentanian puzzle. Another interesting result is that a solution championed by some earlier authors to the Brentanian puzzle appears now to be quite plausible as the correct solution to every puzzle of contact. The proposed solution is that it is metaphysically impossible for space to be continuous. But, as it will become clear, there are important costs that come with endorsing any response to the puzzles of contact.
Introduction: Approaching inflectional identity
Authors: Bachrach Asaf , Nevins Andrew 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The topic of this volume is inflectional identity. We group together under the term inflectional the morphological markers that participate in a “paradigmatically-related” alternation to express case, person, number, gender, or class distinctions. Identity covers and classifies a range of identity and similarity relations among the phonological form of these items. We refer, informally, to any n-way classification of verbal or nominal inflection as a paradigm, where the two (or more) dimensions could be tense and agreement (on verbs) or conjugation class and case (on nouns).
Russian genitive plurals are impostors
Authors: Bailyn John F , Nevins Andrew 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Our primary focus in this chapter is on the distribution of allomorphs for the Russian genitive plural. The Russian genitive plural has been a topic of interest to morphological theory because various authors have claimed that its derivation involves some or all of the following grammatical principles:
(8.1) a. Inflectional paradigms aspire to “avoid homophony”. The Russian nominative singular and genitive plural endings reflect a transderivational attempt to minimize homophony across inflectional endings.
Socrates’ Profession Of Ignorance
Authors: Forster Michael N 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In a previous article in this journal I developed an account of the historical Socrates’ demand for definitions of ethical terms. The present article is interdependent with the previous one, but turns to a further topic. It is a well-attested fact that Socrates professed ignorance about the matters on which his enquiries focused, and indeed about all matters of real importance. Among those who knew him personally, both Plato and Aeschines of Sphettus depict this profession of ignorance, and a generation later Aristotle reports it as well.
Phronēsis As A Mean In The Eudemian Ethics
Authors: Pearson Giles 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The title of this paper might appear to suggest something absurd. Surely it is virtues of character that are means, on Aristotle’s view, not intellectual virtues. That thelatter could be means surely ‘seems un-Aristotelian’ (Broadie) and ‘hard to believe’ (Woods). However, some well-attested texts suggest that Aristotle may at some point have considered phronēsis, at least, a mean, and it seems time to give them a run for their money. In EE 2. 3 Aristotle provides a catalogue of all the various character virtues and their two related vices. And the last virtue on the list, appearing alongside the vices of euētheia (‘simplicity’) and panourgia(‘cunning’),is phronēsis(1221a12).2 In a subsequent gloss, a little later in the same chapter, Aristotle tells us:
Representation in Perception and Cognition Task Analysis, Psychological Functions, And Rule Instantiation
Authors: Hatfield Gary 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There is disagreement over how the notion of representation should be understood in cognitive science. Many investigators equate representations with symbols, that is, with syntactically defined elements in an internal symbol system (Fodor 1975; Pylyshyn 1984). Some urge that representation be understood wholly in terms of syntactic elements (Fodor 1980; Stich 1983, ch. 8), while others implicitly adopt this position (Newell and Simon 1976; Newell 1980). This strictly syntactic symbolist view has provided a powerful tool for modeling psychological processes as governed by internal rules expressed in a symbolic medium.
Representation And Constraints The Inverse Problem And The Structure Of Visual Space
Authors: Hatfield Gary 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
At an ecologically relevant scale, the physical world is spatially three dimensional, and human beings (along with other animals) perceive a world in three dimensions when light appropriately affects the eyes. The light obeys known laws of transmission, which form a set of constraints (C) on the proximal stimulus patterns (Sp) that light reflected from surfaces of objects (distal stimuli, Sd) can present to the visual system. Perceptual psychologists have investigated the processes (P) that take those patterns (or aspects of them) as input and yield perceptual representations (R) as output. Various proposals have been made about the relations among objects O, environmental constraints C, processes P, and perceptual representations R (along with the use of such representations to guide action). These proposals constitute the theories or subtheories of visual perception.
Introduction
Authors: Hatfield Gary 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The papers in this third part consider aspects of the history of psychology in relation to the philosophy of psychology. These chapters examine theoretical concepts in cognitive and perceptual psychology, underscore the autonomy of psychological theorizing from physiological reduction, and make a case for the methodological priority of psychology over physiology and physicalistic description. The first two chapters establish connections across historical periods within theories of spatial vision and of attention. Chapter 12 seeks the origin, in the theories of Ibn al-Haytham (Alhazen), Descartes, and Berkeley, of two-stage theories of spatial perception, which hold that visual perception involves both an immediate representation of the proximal stimulus in a two-dimensional “sensory core” and also a subsequent perception of the three dimensional world.
Postscript (2008) on Ibn al-Haytham’s (Alhacen’s) Theory of Vision
Authors: Hatfield Gary 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Ibn al-Haytham— who was widely known in the Latin West as Alhazen, now often rendered as Alhacen— was the most important visual theorist between Ptolemy (second century) and Kepler and Descartes (seventeenth century). His work set the framework for visual geometry and the psychology of vision for more than six centuries after his death (c. 1040 – 1). The present chapter uses a diagram from Witelo to illustrate Ibn al-Haytham’s visual geometry (Fig. 12.1). As explained in note 28, the diagram does not precisely render the geometry. The same holds true of the manuscript diagrams from the earlier Arabic editions, the oldest of which dates to 1083 (Sabra 1989, lxxxi), more than forty years after al-Haytham’s death.
Separating tissues
Authors: Tulloh Bruce , Lee David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The secret to separating tissues is to identify and stay in the correct plane. This relies on sound anatomical knowledge and good assistance. An understanding of local anatomy is important not only from the point of view of recognizing landmarks but also to help select the appropriate technique for dissection, and good assistance is necessary not only to ensure adequate display of the operative field but also to provide traction on the tissues to be separated. Sometimes keeping to the plane may be difficult, such as when operating in an obliterated congenital plane or in one destroyed by inflammation and scarring.
Haemostasis
Authors: Tulloh Bruce , Lee David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Bleeding is inevitable with every operation. Less is better, but don’t let an obsessive desire for a dry field prevent the operation from progressing at a reasonable pace. Minor bleeding will stop if the patient’s own haemostatic mechanisms are intact. Pre-operative questioning should establish whether patients have a bleeding tendency or are taking anticoagulant drugs such as warfarin or aspirin. It is reasonable to perform a coagulation screen before any major case and even to cancel an elective procedure if the clotting is abnormal, but consult the operating surgeon first! Don’t hesitate to summon help when faced with such a coagulation problem in an emergency situation.
Putting it all together
Authors: Tulloh Bruce , Lee David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The manoeuvres described in the previous chapters should be thought of as building blocks with which one can ‘construct’ an operation. Putting them together in different ways will allow a variety of operations to be performed. This chapter describes several common general surgical operations in terms of sequences of fundamental manoeuvres as described earlier. There are many, many variations on how to do these operations, and this chapter describes just one way; the authors do not make any claim that it is the right way. Remember, the focus here is on the instrument usage and the handling of tissues, not the procedure itself.
Overview
Authors: Culicover Peter W 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The conventional answer to the question “What is syntax?” in theoretical linguistics is something along the lines of, “It is the system that governs the relationship between form and meaning in a language”. What this actually means in practice is something that you will appreciate in some depth as you work through this book, but at this point it is likely to be rather obscure. So let us start with a concrete example.
Basic sentential structure
Authors: Culicover Peter W 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter we lay out some basic structural properties of simple sentences. We assume for this purpose that sentences contain phrases such as noun phrases (NPs), verb phrases (VP), and prepositional phrases (PP), although we have not worked out the internal structure of these phrases. Once we have developed the basic sentential structure in this chapter, we will turn in Chapter 4 to how these and other phrases are made up. Contemporary theorizing about linguistic structure draws on the presumption that this structure is abstract, that it is in the mind, and that speakers are able to use this structure in order to form intuitions about whether a string of sounds and words is a legitimate expression in their language.
Argument Correspondences
Authors: Culicover Peter W 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
On the default linking, a single CS argument corresponds to the Subject grammatical function. When there are two arguments, the canonical correspondence is one in which the Agent corresponds to Subject and the Theme/Patient corresponds to Object. Other correspondences are possible, as well, such as Experiencer and Theme, in the case of verbs like know, and Goal and Theme, in the case of verbs like receive. In this chapter we look at a range of other ways in which CS arguments can be expressed syntactically. All but one involve arguments of a single CS relation; one, the causative, involves arguments of two CS relations.
Fragments
Authors: Culicover Peter W 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter we look at the syntactic properties of sentential fragments. A fragment can be used in place of a full sentence when its meaning can be inferred from the context. Example (1B) is a typical example of a construction called VP ellipsis. (1) A: Who will eat that pizza? B: I will. The English expression I will in B’s response in (1) is not a full sentence; it lacks a VP. The interpretation of I will in this case depends on a previous sentence. B’s response means “I will eat the pizza” because the context is “Who will eat that pizza?”. If the context was, for example, “No one will smell quite that bad”, or “Who will pay for the gas?” the response “I will” would have a very different interpretation.
General symptoms of inflammatory bowel disease
Authors: Langmead Louise , Irving Peter 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
As discussed in Chapter 3, many of the symptoms of inflammatory bowel disease (IBD), such as diarrhoea and abdominal pain, are easily attributable to inflammation of the gut. However, people with IBD may also experience a variety of other symptoms not obviously related to gut inflammation. Nevertheless these symptoms can be equally disabling.
A Moveable Speech
Authors: Machan Tim William 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Sometimes, the oddest questions, the ones that would seem to be the most easily dismissed, end up requiring unexpectedly complex answers. Here’s one: since the globe spins, could one travel around the earth by floating over the ground in a helicopter and waiting for the world to turn? Here’s another: if lime and orange are colors as well as fruit, why isn’t grapefruit? An intuitive response to both questions may well be that they’re simply naive and not worth answering. But the truth of the matter is that effective answers end up being anything but simple. Responses to the first question must draw on issues like the physics of time, friction, gravity, and relative motion, while cogent responses to the second depend on semantics, lexical history, and usage. Without recourse to these admittedly sophisticated heuristics, replies can take on the peremptory, even mystical quality of an answer like ‘because that’s the way it is’. And that quality only serves to make the questions appear even more complex.
Say the Right Thing
Authors: Machan Tim William 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
‘The rock-bottom practical truth’, Wilson Follett once wrote, ‘is that the lexicographer cannot abrogate his authority if he wants to. He may think of himself as a detached scientist reporting the facts of language, declining to recommend use of anything or abstention from anything; but the myriad consultants of his work are not going to see him so . . . the work itself by virtue of its inclusions and exclusions, its mere existence, is a whole universe of judgments, received by millions as the Word from on high.’1 By this reasoning, in orthography, sense, and usage, English is what the dictionaries say it is, and while thus general and theoretical in scope, Follett’s observation actually responded to a very specific event: the September 1961 publication of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. Deriving ultimately from Noah Webster’s 1828 American Dictionary of the English Language, which in turn derived from his 1806 Compendious Dictionary of the English Language, Webster’s Third (as it was and is called) represented a tradition of financial, linguistic, and even cultural achievement. For many Americans—and, for that matter, readers worldwide—the Merriam-Webster company stands next only to Oxford University Press as the pre-eminent maker of dictionaries, and the cry ‘Look it up in Webster’s’ serves as an emblem of the authority invested in it and in dictionaries in general.
Reducing Revenge to Discomfort
Authors: Maudlin Tim 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
My understanding of the Revenge problem is simple and prosaic. One begins with a stock of semantic predicates, for example ‘true’ and ‘false’, and uses some of them to construct a problematic sentence such as ‘F is false’, where F is stipulated to refer to that very sentence. One then considers the various hypotheses that attribute the different semantic predicates to the sentence: ‘F is true’ and ‘F is false’ in this instance. Each of these hypotheses is shown, by informal reasoning, to lead to an impossibility. Suppose we grant that no sentence is both true and false. Then since ‘F is true’ implies, by disquotation, F (i.e. ‘F is false’), the hypothesis that F is true implies that F is both true and false, an impossibility. So we cannot maintain that F is true.
Revenge, Field, and ZF
Authors: Priest Graham 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This chapter deals with three interrelated issues What is the ‘revenge’ phenomenon? Let us start with a statement of the simple liar paradox. This concerns a statement,L, of the form F ⟨L⟩, where F is the falsity predicate, and angle brackets indicate some name-forming device. If T is the truth predicate, then the T-scheme assures us that for any closed sentence,A :The meanings of these questions, and the connections between them, will become clear in due course.
Burali– Forti’s Revenge
Authors: Shapiro Stewart 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Typical attempts to provide a sufficiently comprehensive account of truth seem to be subject to a phenomenon called ‘revenge’. Although there is no agreed upon account of what the phenomenon of revenge is, the idea seems to be that either it is possible to formulate a so-called strengthened version of the Liar paradox that applies to the account in question, or else the framework forbids the expression of something that, intuitively, is not only manifestly expressible, but is needed to formulate or at least motivate the account in the first place. A particularly ironic form of revenge occurs when an account of truth has it that the theory itself is something other than true. Begin with a standard Liar sentence p which is equivalent to ‘p is false’. Consider a simple, perhaps simple-minded, account that simply says that sentences like p are neither true nor false. Now consider a sentence q that is equivalent to ‘q is either false or neither true nor false’ (or just ‘q is not true’). This, too, leads to paradox under plausible assumptions.
Does Murphy’s Law Apply in Epistemology? Self-Doubt and Rational Ideals
Authors: Christensen David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Formally inclined epistemologists often theorize about ideally rational agents—agents who exemplify rational ideals, such as probabilistic coherence, that human beings could never fully realize. This approach can be defended against the well-known worry that abstracting from human cognitive imperfections deprives the approach of interest. But a different worry arises when we ask what an ideal agent should believe about her own cognitive perfection (even an agent who is in fact cognitively perfect might, it would seem, be uncertain of this fact).
An Opinionated Guide to Epistemic Modality
Authors: Fintel Kai von , Gillies Anthony S 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Epistemic modals are interesting in part because their semantics is bound up both with our information about the world and with how that information changes as we share what we know. Given that epistemic modals are dependent in some way on the information available in the contexts in which they are used, it’s not surprising that there is a minor but growing industry of work in semantics and the philosophy of language concerned with the precise nature of the context-dependency of epistemically modalized sentences.
Two Sorts of Claim about ‘‘Logical Form
Authors: King Jeffrey C 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The notion of logical form broadly construed has been central to the enterprise of analytic philosophy. Indeed, much of what we call analytic philosophy can be understood as something like the attempt to characterize the logical forms of various classes of sentences. Thus mathematical investigations into the nature of moral goodness can be thought of as attempts to characterize the logical form of sentences such as x is morally good ; epistemological investigations into the nature of knowledge can be thought of as attempts to characterize the logical forms of sentences such as A knows that P , and so on.
False Belief in the Theaetetus
Authors: Fine Gail 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is often supposed that Plato regards knowledge as some kind of acquaintance, so that knowing consists in some sort of grasping or hitting, the only alternative to which is not hitting, or missing. Knowledge is an all or nothing, hit or miss affair. It is also often assumed that this model of knowledge underlies or explains Plato’s supposed inability to accommodate false belief in dialogues prior to the Sophist. Either one ‘hits’ what one is talking about, and so has knowledge, not false belief; or else one fails to grasp, and so has said nothing, and hence again does not have false belief.1
The Representational Character of Experience
Authors: Chalmers David J 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Consciousness and intentionality are perhaps the two central phenomena in the philosophy of mind. Human beings are conscious beings: there is something it is like to be us. Human beings are intentional beings: we represent what is going on in the world. Correspondingly, our specific mental states, such as perceptions and thoughts, very often have a phenomenal character: there is something it is like to be in them. And these mental states very often have intentional content: they serve to represent the world.
Toward an Ethics that Inhabits the World
Authors: Railton Peter 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The real world seems a long way from our moral ideals, and the challenge of making the world a better place is, of course, of the first importance. However, this should not be thought of as the only way in which reality and morality ought to be brought closer to each other. For surely our moral thinking has much to learn from the real world. Moral ideals would be arbitrary, perhaps even dangerous, if they owed nothing to a firm grasp of actual life and its possibilities. Indeed, the century just past perhaps even the millennium just past may hold as many tragedies born from fantasies of purity, virtue, or morality as from outright malice or shrewd self-interest. As Hobbes commented centuries ago, people mistaking their moral or religious “enthusiasms” for reality may cause more mischief than those better attuned to the actual world and their own interests in it.
The Emptiness of the Lexicon: Reflections on Pustejovsky
Authors: Fodor Jerry , Lepore Ernest 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A c ER TA IN metaphysical thesis about meaning that we will call inferential role semantics (IRS) is accepted practically universally in linguistics, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences: the meaning (or content, or ‘sense ‘) of a linguistic expression is constituted, at least in part, by at least some of its inferential relations. This idea is hard to state precisely, both because notions like metaphysical constitution are moot and, more importantly, because different versions of IRS take different views on whether there are constituents of meaning other than inferential role, and on which of the inferences an expression occurs in are meaning-constitutive.