bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Regulation of Financial Markets
Authors: Houthakker Hendrik S. , Williamson Peter J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Most financial markets are highly competitive – there are hundreds or thousands of active traders and at any time and place prices vary only within a narrow range – the bid‐ask price spread. Regulation is usually associated with monopoly; it might seem, therefore, that regulation of financial markets is unnecessary. After an introductory section on the ethics of finance and the economic function of financial markets, the second section of this chapter explains why that conclusion is unwarranted. The third section discusses the various levels of US federal regulation (the exchanges, the regulatory commissions and the courts); the fourth looks at federal regulation of trading in corporate shares and bonds by the Securities and Exchange Commission; the fifth shows how futures markets are federally regulated in the US; and the sixth is a case study of an important regulatory failure – the silver manipulation of 1979–80 in the USA. The final section looks at regulation in the UK.
Puzzling Cases
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Feinberg considers hard cases in the application of the concept of harm, such as moral harm, vicious harm, posthumous harm, and prenatal harm. Regarding moral harm, he states that a person's interests are not necessarily set back if she becomes a worse person; to be morally harmed, she must have some antecedent interest in having a good character. Concerning vicious harm, however, Feinberg claims that it is possible to harm one person by harming another if the former has an interest in the latter's welfare. For posthumous harm, Feinberg claims that if a “surviving interest” remains after a person's death, the thwarting of it could lead us to revise our view of that person's well‐being in life. Finally, concerning prenatal harm, Feinberg argues that fetuses (even if they are not persons) can be harmed only on the assumption that they will be born and will suffer the harmful effects of their prenatal injuries.
Possible Worlds
Authors: Mates Benson 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
According to Leibniz, the actual world, which does exist, is only one of infinitely many possible worlds that could have existed. It is the best of the possible worlds, in the sense that any change in it, when considered with all its necessary preconditions and consequences, would be a change for the worse; and that is why God chose to create it instead of one of the other possibilities. This chapter examines Leibniz's notion of possible worlds. A possible world turns out to be a system of concepts, not of individuals satisfying those concepts. The chapter goes on to offer a numerical model of Leibniz's system of possible worlds in order to show that that system is consistent.
Identity in the Actual World
Authors: Mates Benson 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The so‐called salva veritate criterion for the truth of identity propositions, namely that A is the same as B if and only if A can be substituted for B in any proposition salva veritate, is considered in all its ambiguities and other puzzling forms. In particular, Leibniz's explanation of why the criterion breaks down when applied on Fregean “oblique contexts” is discussed.
Leibniz's Nominalism and the Lingua Philosophica
Authors: Mates Benson 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It was Leibniz's view that only individual substances exist. Accordingly, he thought that if there are meaningful sentences that include words seeming to refer to abstract entities, such sentences must be compendia loquendi for sentences not containing such terms. He devoted considerable effort to showing in particular cases how to eliminate the abstract term, e.g., “The heat of x has been doubled” is only a compendium loquendi for “x is twice as hot as it was”. More generally, Leibniz thought that, from a philosophical point of view, natural languages were unsatisfactory, in need of reform to eliminate unnecessary and confusing features such as inflections of nouns, adjectives, and verbs. He dreamed of constructing a perfect language, the Lingua Philosophica, in which sentences would perfectly mirror the propositions or thoughts they express. As examples of improved sublanguages, he mentions the languages of algebra and geometry, as well as the calculus notation he had introduced for derivatives and integrals (which, by the way, is still the notation mainly used).
Different Currents
Authors: Quinn Charlotte A. , Quinn Frederick 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSouth Africa's unique location helped shape the distinct character of Islam there, principally through contact with Asia, Egypt, Iran, and the Arabian Peninsula, allowing beleaguered South African Muslims to look beyond their borders for support. As early as 1626, Shaykh Yusuf, a Sufi saint brought from Indonesia by the Dutch East Indian Company, founded an active Muslim community. Later, Muslims from India came to Natal and the Transvaal, and differences between the communities remained pronounced over such issues as political activism, the place of women, and the use of Arabic. In recent times, Imam Abdullah Haron emerged as a martyr following his death at the hands of police in 1969. Extremist groups like Achmat Cassien's Qiblah and People Against Gangsters and Drugs (PAGAD) resorted to terrorism under the guise of Islam. Muslim numbers remain among the lowest in any country in Africa, and the historic split between ancients and moderns, conservatives and progressives, remains undiminished.
Autonomy and Community
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Feinberg defends liberalism against the charge that, given its commitment to autonomy, it is incompatible with certain community ideals. While Feinberg grants that some conflicts between autonomy and community are undeniable, liberalism, he argues, recognizes the centrality of community in human life. Affiliation with various communities and subcommunities is an essential part of an individual's self‐identity, and therefore a political order like liberalism, which protects individual interests, will also protect collective interests of individuals in communities. Nothing in liberalism precludes the liberal from appealing to the common good in his political arguments. After examining the social nature of man, Feinberg considers concepts pertaining to the make‐up of communities including: tradition, alienation, and overlapping‐membership.
Oak Grove Church
Authors: Harrington Watt David 
Published: October 2003

AbstractOak Grove Church and the school that was associated with it (Oak Grove Christian Academy) were located in Olney – a Philadelphia neighborhood that had once been solidly working class, but which had in more recent decades fallen on hard times. Oak Grove Church and Oak Grove Christian Academy were both rooted in the traditions of fundamentalism. Both institutions embodied many of the attitudes associated with the New Christian Right. Although the church and the school were not places where people were taught that Christians always ought to do what corporations want them to do, they were places where the free enterprise system was greatly respected. The school and the church were also places where the importance of submitting to the authority of teachers and ministers was emphasized consistently. Both the school and the church naturalized the authority of men, of heterosexuals, and of nation‐states.
Introduction
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The introduction sketches the method of interpretation that will be used in the essays that follow. It employs the principle that there is a very strong presumption in favor of the dual claim that philosophers meant to say precisely what they did say and that what they did say means precisely what it seems to mean. This is called a semantic principle of charity. It combines a principle of local interpretation – an attempt to understand how each bit of text moves the enterprise along – with a principle of global interpretation – an attempt to see, if possible, how these various parts form a coherent whole. It is opposed to presentism in all its many forms.
Hume's Worries About Personal Identity
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the Appendix to his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume expressed his dissatisfaction with his treatment of the topic of personal identity. Unfortunately, he was not altogether forthcoming about what was bothering him, and, as a result, a variety of interpretations have been put forward on this matter. The suggestion presented in this chapter is that Hume's difficulties about personal identity are grounded in a rejection of the notion of a substantial soul or self in which ideas could inhere. Moreover, Hume also thinks that ideas themselves count as substances and thus neither need to nor can adhere in something else. Given this degree of separateness and looseness, it seems impossible to give any account of how the notion of personal identity could arise.
Wittgenstein on Identity
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Throughout his career, Wittgenstein harbored distrust for identity statements. In the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus, he banned a sign for identity from his system, declaring that “to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all.” His worry during the Tractarian period was that the use of an identity sign allowed the formulation of existence statements, e.g., that the world contains at least one thing. Later in his career he rejected F. P. Ramsay's attempt to introduce an extensionalized version of identity into logic. In his later period, he ridiculed the use of the law of identity as a paradigm of sameness.
A History of Backwardness
Authors: Amsden Alice H. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines how late industrialization in South Korea was at first retarded by a state too weak to intervene and stimulate capital expenditures. It also takes the position that when industrialization began to accelerate, it did so in response to government initiatives and not to the forces of the free market. The Korean state was able to consolidate its power in the 1960s because of the weakness of the social classes: workers were a small percentage of the population, capitalists were dependent on state largesse, the aristocracy was dissolved by land reform, and the peasantry was atomized into smallholders. The behavior of the Korean state became influenced by two forces outside the class structure: the student movement and the American occupation forces. The student movement kept the new government relatively honest, and the American occupation forces drove the Korean military toward developmentalism, the only realistic course to reduce dependence on American support.
The Dynamics of Growth
Authors: Amsden Alice H. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Late industrialization is characterized by three facets of growth, as South Korea exemplifies. The first relates to diversification, or entrepreneurial decisions concerning penetration of new industries – which ones to penetrate, when, and with what size investment. The second relates to stabilization or short‐run macroeconomic policies to maintain the level of economic activity. The third relates to the growth momentum itself. Once underway, growth gains a momentum whose properties are distinct depending on the presence or absence of new technological discoveries. This chapter is divided into three parts, each devoted to one of these facets of growth.
The Paradox of “Unlimited” Labor and Rising Wages
Authors: Amsden Alice H. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The forces behind the operation of the labor market and real wage increases in South Korea are examined. It is argued that in industries in which the technology transfer problem was fairly complicated and in which Korea lacked experience, workers were paid relatively high wages, not because of a shortage of particular skills, but in order to induce them to exercise their intelligence and make imported technology work. The wage rate in Korea was driven up especially fast by the exigencies of learning because the learning experience was especially intense since it was undertaken by local rather than foreign firms, happened in a great spurt, and occurred in large, bureaucratic enterprises. Business was also pressured by government to share its wealth with labor. Because scarcity and demand alone cannot explain the operation of the labor market, the chapter ends with a discussion of the imperatives of technology and the skill set of late industrialization that have driven big businesses to pay more.
The Boom in Education
Authors: Amsden Alice H. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
One reason why Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea appear to have industrialized rapidly is that they have invested relatively heavily in education. A well‐educated work force, both white‐ and blue‐collar, is a general property of late industrialization, distinguishing it from earlier industrial change, and premised on the learning of production processes and procedures that are characteristic of more advanced economies. Thus, formal education of the workforce and the apprenticeship of firms to foreign technical assistants (rather than the apprenticeship of workers in particular crafts) lie at the heart of late industrial expansion. This chapter, therefore, is devoted to both formal education and foreign technical assistance, and ends with a firm‐level illustration of interaction between the two. Learning is explored in the second manufacturing affiliate of the Samsung Group, the Cheil Wood Company, founded in 1954.
Classical Chisholmian Internalism
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In order to examine the relationship between warrant and justification, I turn, in this chapter, to the views of Roderick Chisholm, or, more precisely, to the classical Chisholm (as expressed in editions one and two of his Theory of Knowledge and in his The Foundations of Knowing). In important respects, the classical Chisholm's internalism displays much continuity with the deontological internalism of Descartes and Locke. The classical Chisholm's official position on warrant (or positive epistemic status, as he calls it) is that warrant is a matter of fulfilling epistemic obligation – a matter of a proposition's being so related to a person that he can better fulfill his epistemic duty by accepting the proposition in question than by, e.g., withholding acceptance. Against Chisholm, I argue that (1) most of Chisholm's epistemic principles are false if warrant is what Chisholm officially says it is, and that (2) the fulfillment of epistemic duty (i.e., epistemic justification in its original and most natural sense) is neither sufficient nor necessary for warrant.
Exploring the Design Plan: Myself and My Past
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the first two chapters of Warrant and Proper Function, I presented my account of warrant; in the next seven chapters, I provide an explanation of how my account works in the main areas of our cognitive life. In this chapter, I begin this explanation by examining how warrant works with respect to self‐knowledge (or introspection) and memory. In the course of examining self‐knowledge and its relationship to warrant, I first argue against Derek Parfit's claim that we do not know and cannot justifiably believe that there is such a thing as a persisting subject of experience that is distinct from any of those experiences of which it is the subject. Second, I briefly argue that the beliefs that we are neither our brains nor our bodies (nor something like computer programs) are beliefs that have a good deal of warrant for us. Turning next to memory, I (first) provide a brief discussion of the phenomenology of memory and (second) argue that typical memory beliefs are basic (i.e., not accepted on the evidential basis of other beliefs) and are capable of having a great deal of warrant for us.
Other Persons and Testimony
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, I continue my explanation of how my account of warrant works in the main areas of our cognitive life, here examining how warrant works with respect to beliefs about other persons (or other minds) and beliefs furnished by testimony. As regards the first topic, I am concerned with the question of how our beliefs ascribing mental states to others acquire warrant. I examine three possible answers to this question, namely, (1) that such beliefs acquire warrant by means of analogical arguments, (2) that they do so by way of being (or being like) scientific hypotheses, or (3) that they do so by means of Wittgensteinian criteria. I argue that none of these answers is correct, and then suggest an answer that is both closer to the truth and more in line with the general theory of warrant I propose. Turning next to testimony, I explore some of its salient characteristics, argue that testimonial evidence is a basic sort of evidence for us (the warrant furnished by testimony is not and could not be furnished by induction, analogy, or abduction) and, finally, show how my account deals with Gettier problems (or semi‐Gettier problems) involving testimony.
Epistemic Probability: Some Current Views
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In circumstances where one proposition A (or group of propositions G) is propositional evidence for another proposition B, my believing A (or G) can confer warrant (for me) upon B. I use the term “epistemic probability” to refer to the relationship between a pair of propositions A and B when A is propositional evidence for B; more precisely, in those cases, I shall say that the epistemic conditional probability of B on A is high. In this chapter and the next, I concern myself with an analysis of epistemic conditional probability. The first thing to see, in trying to get a general grasp of this topic, is to note the divide between epistemic probability and objective probability. In this chapter, I distinguish the former from the latter and point out some debilitating problems with the three main accounts of the former (Bayesianism, the logical theory of probability, and the account of Henry Kyburg); in the next chapter, I propose what I hope is a better substitute.
Coherence, Foundations, and Evidence
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, I (1) examine the contrast between foundationalism and coherentism, and (2) consider evidentialism, a special variety of foundationalism. After arguing that the central tenet of coherentism is that the sole source of warrant is coherence, I argue that coherentism is mistaken and endorse foundationalism. I then offer some brief comments on the inadequacy of classical foundationalism and contrast classical foundationalism to the sort of foundationalism I endorse, which I call Reidian foundationalism. I next turn to an examination of evidentialism, specifically the evidentialism of William Alston, Richard Feldman and Earl Conee (which version of evidentialism I refer to as the AFC view). Taking “evidence” in a sufficiently broad sense, I concur with the AFC view in its claim that whenever some belief B has warrant for an agent S, it is the case that S has evidence for B; I also argue, however, that having evidence is not sufficient for warrant – proper function is also required (and here I part company with the AFC view).
Assessment, Deliberation, and Theory
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The general argument of the previous chapter is here supplemented by a fuller discussion of the relationship between the moral assessment of action and agents’ deliberations about what to do. Scheffler begins by distinguishing between five different ways in which overtly moral considerations may impinge on an agent's deliberations, and he observes that no general rule tells us when moral considerations should function in these different ways. In light of this discussion, he rejects the idea that, in formulating a moral assessment of a person's action, we commit ourselves to thinking that the person himself should deliberate in explicitly moral terms. Accordingly, he argues, we need not worry that the pervasiveness of morality implies an overmoralized conception of deliberation or of the self.For similar reasons, Scheffler rejects a family of views that object to the very idea of a moral theory, understood as a system of general principles that can be combined with information about specific circumstances to yield moral verdicts.
The Case for Moderation
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
According to Scheffler, the view that morality is stringent derives its appeal from the sharp contrast it draws between morality and prudence, and also from its grounding in a notion of radical self‐transcendence. In arguing for the competing view that morality is moderate, Scheffler points to a basic tenet of our commonsense moral outlook, which holds that individuals are justified in devoting attention to their own basic projects and commitments out of proportion to the value of those projects from an impersonal standpoint. Just as a stringent morality is responsive to a notion of radical self‐transcendence, a moderate morality is responsive to a certain conception of personal integration and to a conviction that living morally is a realistic possibility for most people. Scheffler points out that moral beliefs shape our projects, commitments, and, ultimately, even our interests themselves, and he argues that this illustrates the way in which moderate morality serves to promote integrated lives. He concludes that the construal of morality as moderate makes better sense of the totality of our moral thought than does the view that morality is stringent.
Morality, Politics, and the Self
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Develops the idea that it is in part a social and political task to achieve a measure of fit between the demands of morality and the individual's interests. The psychological bases of moral motivation are, in Scheffler's view, influenced by social institutions and practices. Social institutions and practices can help individuals to develop the psychological structures that will lead them to shape their interests so as to minimize conflicts with morality. Social institutions can also work more directly to reduce the degree of conflict between the demands of morality and individuals’ interests, insofar as a just and well‐ordered society minimizes the occasions on which it would be rational for people to violate moral requirements. These considerations support the conclusion that there are close and complex relations between social integration and personal, psychological integration; the smooth operation of each process conduces to and enhances the smooth operation of the other.
Socrates: From Happiness to Virtue
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

AbstractChapter 4 focuses on the Euthydemus to discuss Socrates’ theories of happiness and wisdom. Firstly, it is pointed out that Socrates may be labelled as “eudamonist” because of the claim he makes in the Euthydemus that happiness is a general and not a particular virtue. Secondly, Socrates’ instrumentalist view according to which the different virtues may be means to one end, i.e., happiness, is examined. Thirdly, several arguments are discussed according to which Socrates demonstrates that wisdom is the only good.
Republic I
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 11 considers book I of the Republic and mainly treats the role book I plays in the dialogue. It is argued that book I is written to illustrate how the Socrates of the early dialogues would have tried to find a definition of justice. Hence, the goal of this book appears to show the limits of a certain way of searching for definitions and to dismiss it. The role of the other characters of book I--Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus-- is relevant in order to describe fully the aporetic character of this approach.