bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Assessing Capability Change
Authors: Alkire Sabina 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThe sixth and seventh chapters that make up Part II of the book consist of one practical and much narrower application of the capability approach, namely, a discussion of how economic analysis (cost‐benefit analysis) and systematic qualitative information on human impacts can be combined in order to assess the relative effectiveness of particular development activities in expanding human capabilities. This sixth chapter on assessing capability change first gives an introduction to Part II. It goes on to defend the necessity of efficiency considerations, such as those that are incorporated in cost‐benefit analysis and in project evaluation, and then looks at capability set analysis by reviewing two prominent participatory assessment methodologies that have been developed to supplement economic considerations with social data: one by the World Bank (participatory social assessment), the other as a result of US legislation governing public expenditure (social impact assessment). Both of these lack a systematic method for identifying changes valued by participants themselves and for devolving real control over a decision to the lowest level capable of making it, and this lack increases the chance of significant bias in gathering and interpreting value judgements. In response, a novel method of impact assessment is described that would complement and improve available assessment tools; the method of impact assessment represents one way in which the framework of the preceding chapters could be used.
Institutionalizing the Treaty of Rome
Authors: Fligstein Neil , Stone Sweet Alec 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
The general process of institutionalization in the European Union is examined from a macro perspective, building on the theoretical materials developed in the earlier book European Integration and Supranational Governance, and examining the extent to which linkages between rule-making (legislation), dispute resolution, and different forms of transnational activity have created a dynamic, inherently expansionary system. The process is evaluated from the standpoint of institutionalist theory by testing specific hypotheses against relatively comprehensive quantitative measures of integration: trading, legislating, litigating, and lobbying within the context of the Treaty of Rome. The main findings are that (1) increasing economic transactions, (2) the construction of the Brussels complex, (3) the capacity of supranational authorities to produce legislation, and (4) the operation of the European Commission (EC) legal system have become linked through a complex set of feedback loops that binds them together in a self-reinforcing system that broadly determines the course of integration. Although the perspective used is a macro one, the authors emphasize actors and agency: as increasing numbers of actors learn how to be effective in the EC, they build and consolidate new arenas for political activity, thereby bolstering the centrality of supranational governance.
Institutionalizing Promiscuity: Commission‐Interest Group Relations in the European Union
Authors: Mazey Sonia , Richardson Jeremy 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
The relationship between the European Commission and the various lobbying groups in Brussels is explored, and it is argued that there is now a ‘mature’ institutionalized policy-making style governing interactions between the Commission and interest groups. The formal and informal rules by which the Commission receives and seeks to organize lobbyist’s views, and interest groups influence the Commission’s development of legislative proposals are catalogued. It is found that there has been a steady evolution of some formal, but more often informal, rules and procedures for lobbying organizations. These include: willingness to participate in early discussions; presenting rational/technical arguments based on reliable data; viewing European policy as an opportunity, not a threat; formulating European, not national or particularistic, solutions; understanding the problems and perspectives of other stakeholders in the process; and investing in the entire policy-making process. This development of a stable system of interest group representation for the European Union (EU), sited in Brussels, impinges heavily not only on policy processes and outcomes but also on how democracy in the EU will be conceived and debated.
Where Do Rules Come From? The Creation of the European Central Bank
Authors: Mcnamara Kathleen R. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
An analysis is presented of the creation and development of rules governing the organizational form and the policy content of the European Central Bank (ECB). The establishment of the ECB and the launching of the Euro constitute an extraordinary innovation, one that opens and organizes a new institutional space in Europe. The ECB system is assessed in the light of three broad theoretical approaches emphasizing, respectively, power politics, institutions as rational solutions to collective problems, and pre-existing normative (social) structures. Power politics and functional rationality approaches are found to fail to account for important aspects of the ECB’s rules and policy mandates, while, in contrast, a sociological emphasis on institutional context is useful in explaining the continuities linking the ECB to the normative structure that had previously developed – largely within the network of central-bank governors – and diffused throughout the organizational field in which monetary policy-making was embedded. It was the need to legitimize the new ECB in terms of these broader norms that shaped the ECB’s organizational structure and governing rules: in particular, pre-existing norms influenced three key aspects of the ECB – its political independence, its criteria for membership, and its rules for price stability.
Policing and Immigration: The Creation of New Policy Spaces
Authors: Turnbull Penelope , Sandholtz Wayne 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
An analysis is made of the creation of new European Union (EU) spaces for cooperation in policing and immigration policies. The Treaty of Rome was silent on both topics, and before the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU), European Community (EC) states had begun to coordinate their responses to specific problems – such as terrorism, drugs, and asylum seekers – usually on a bilateral basis, with multilateral forms of cooperation fragmented, ad hoc, and outside EC structures. The chapter has three main sections, the first of which briefly describes the institutional landscape in policing and migration in Europe before the TEU. Section 2 assesses the major internal and external changes – the Single Market and the collapse of the Iron Curtain, respectively – that provoked the move toward institutionalizing police and migration cooperation at the EU level; it devotes particular attention to the domestic crisis in Germany resulting from massive migrations from the east, and the policy entrepreneurship of Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Section 3 analyses how the Third Pillar of the TEU, that on Justice and Home Affairs (in which policing and immigration policies were combined) borrowed from existing institutions – most notably the Second Pillar (the Common Foreign and Security Policy); the Amsterdam Treaty (1996) then partially separated policing and migration again – but with a completely different institutional structure within the European Union.
Conclusion: Institutional Logics of European Integration
Authors: Caporaso James A. , Stone Sweet Alec 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This concluding chapter examines the use that is made in the book of institutionalist theory to address the question of European integration, a use that is described as not typical in the study of the European Union, which is usually approached via international relations and integration theory. Issues that result from taking this institutional approach (i.e. analysing European political integration as institutionalization rather than as international relations) are briefly discussed, before going on to see how the Europe of the last half of the twentieth century has provided social scientists with rich opportunities for evaluating how new political systems evolve and emerge. Some of the aspects examined are: the concept of institutions; the impact of institutions; feedback effects (feedback loops liking actors to organizations, to institutions, and back again); institutional coherence; institutions and society; and the demand for, and supply of, institutions.
The Determinants of Privatization
Authors: SINISCALCO BERNARDO BORTOLOTTI DOMENICO 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThis chapter studies the economic, political, and institutional determinants of privatization. The analysis begins with a discussion of the link between privatization and economic development, then it studies the role of government’s budget constraints, showing how public finance conditions may bear on the decision to privatize. The chapter then focuses on the role of financial markets and governments’ political orientation in triggering divestiture. Finally, it takes into account institutional aspects, such as a country’s legal tradition, and political regimes. The various hypotheses are discussed sequentially. Their empirical validity, however, is assessed through an original panel data econometric analysis.
Private Ownership, Public Control
Authors: SINISCALCO BERNARDO BORTOLOTTI DOMENICO 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThis chapter presents updated empirical evidence on the transfer of ownership and control in privatized companies. The transfer of ownership is measured by the stake sold in the various sales in different countries. The transfer of control, instead, is analyzed through the government’s voting rights in privatized companies, and by the special powers and statutory constraints such as “golden shares”. The analysis allows us to conclude that the large scale privatization cycle of the 1990s has been important but incomplete, Indeed, the state still controls – by direct and indirect means – large chunks of national strategic sectors, where the largest and most valuable corporations operate.
The Problem of Induction
Authors: Foster John 
Published: August 2004

AbstractInduction is that form of inference by which we move from the premise that the world has been regular in a certain respect in the cases we have so far examined to the conclusion that it will continue to be regular in that respect in a certain unexamined case or a group of cases. This extrapolative form of inference is one on which we heavily rely both in the course of our everyday lives and in our scientific theorizing. The problem is that, on reflection, it is hard to see what, if anything, entitles us to think of such inferences as rational. The sceptic insists that they are not. Attempts to resist the sceptical challenge can take the form either of offering what purports to be a rational justification of induction or of insisting that induction is a basic form of sound reasoning that does not stand in need of justification.
Some Attempted Solutions
Authors: Foster John 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThere are various ways of trying to justify induction by appeal to certain a priori principles of probability. But all such appeals fail, either by being irrelevant to the issue or by begging the question. A seemingly more promising approach would be to take induction to be a basic form of sound reasoning, which, like deduction, does not stand in need of justification. I call this the simple view. But this view too can be shown to fail. For instance, consider a case in which we know that a regularity that has held in our experience so far has done so by mere coincidence (i.e. for no reason). Because we know that the regularity is just a coincidence, we know that we cannot rationally use it as a basis for predicting outcomes in the future. But this is not something that can be adequately accounted for if we accept the simple view.
The Nomological-Explanatory Solution
Authors: Foster John 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThe right way to deal with the problem of induction is to adopt what I call the nomological‐explanatory solution (NES) . This holds that when an inductive inference is rational, it can be shown to be so by breaking it down into two further steps of inference, neither of which is as such extrapolative. The first step is an inference to the best explanation of the hitherto exemplified regularity, where the regularity calls for explanation because it is too extensive to be deemed coincidental, and where the explanation offered is one which involves the postulation of some law or set of laws of nature, construed as forms of natural necessity. The second step is a deduction from this explanation that the regularity will continue to hold for the relevant unexamined case or cases, or will do so subject to the continued obtaining of certain standing conditions.
Two Objections to NES
Authors: Foster John 
Published: August 2004

AbstractOne way of objecting to NES would be to claim that, contrary to what the solution assumes, extensive regularities do not automatically call for explanation, and that when we have reached the level of those regularities that cannot be explained in terms of others, there are no grounds for thinking that there is anything that accounts for them. But this is not something that we are able to endorse when we focus in more detail on a hypothetical case of an extensive regularity obtaining for no reason. Another way of objecting to NES would be to claim that, although it is rational to explain hitherto exemplified regularities by appeal to laws, we do not need to think of the laws as universal in scope, rather than restricted to some particular period or region or group of objects; and certain kinds of restriction would prevent our reaching any conclusions about the unexamined cases. But to postulate laws that are restricted in scope is much less plausible than postulating ones that are universal, since their obtaining would be inherently more puzzling.
The Problem of Laws
Authors: Foster John 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThe most crucial problem for NES concerns the relevant notion of a law of nature. In order to play the explanatory role assigned to them by NES, laws have to be construed not as mere regularities, but as forms of natural necessity. So the law of gravity has to be construed not as the fact that bodies always behave gravitationally, but as the fact that it is, in the relevant nomic way, necessary that they behave in that way. But how are we to understand this nomic necessity? It is not a form of strict, or absolute necessity, since even when it is a law that things behave in a certain way, there are possible worlds in which (with different laws) they do not. But a necessity that is less than strict–which allows for the possibility of things being otherwise–does not seem to be a necessity at all. Unless we can solve this problem, the relevant notion of a law will have to be rejected as incoherent.
Armstrong's Theory
Authors: Foster John 
Published: August 2004

AbstractOne way of trying to make sense of nomic necessity would be to adopt the account of laws offered by David Armstrong. Armstrong's claim is that laws are to be ultimately construed as relationships between universals. Specifically, he claims that there is a two‐place relation R such that any law to the effect that all Fs are G is to be ultimately construed as the state of affairs of F‐ness being R‐related to G‐ness, where this state of affairs is both contingent and logically entails (without being entailed by) the obtaining of the corresponding regularity (that all Fs are G). If this account were correct, it would eliminate the problem of laws. For each such relationship between universals would logically oblige things to be regular in the relevant way, and in that sense, make the obtaining of the regularity necessary; and, given the contingency of the relationship, the necessity involved would be nonstrict. But the decisive objection to Armstrong's account is that we cannot envisage a form of relationship between universals that would meet the required conditions; nor can we even understand how such a form of relationship would be possible.
The Scenario without Laws
Authors: Foster John 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
Let us consider how things would stand if we were forced to abandon the notion of a law of nature as incoherent. As well as having to abandon NES, we would have to look for a different–for a nonnomological–way of accounting for the presence of natural regularities. Some natural regularities can be explained in terms of others. But once we get down to the level of the basic regularities–those that cannot be explained in terms of others–there is no plausible way of accounting for them in natural terms. Rather, the only explanatory approach with any prospect of acceptability is to suppose that the basic regularities are deliberately brought about by some supernatural personal agent or group of agents. This is what I call the personal‐agency approach.
The Theistic Account
Authors: Foster John 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
The personal‐agency approach can be developed in a number of different ways. If we are aiming at plausibility, we need to develop the approach in a way that avoids unnecessary complexity and minimizes residual sources of puzzlement. On this basis, the most plausible version of the approach, and indeed the only one with any prospect of acceptability, is that which postulates a single supernatural personal agent, conceived of along the general lines of the Judaeo‐Christian God–an agent who is causally primitive, sempiternal, perfect in his rationality and moral goodness, unlimited in his power and knowledge (save for limitations imposed by logic), and who is the creator of the physical universe and the human persons embodied in it. This version of the approach is one that I call the theistic account.
God and Laws
Authors: Foster John 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThe only way to make sense of the notion of a law of nature is to adopt what I call the causal account, which claims that the obtaining of a law consists in the fact that there is something that causally imposes a certain regularity on the universe as a regularity. Given this, I can now offer an argument for the existence of God. Thus, on the one hand, we have already seen that if nomological explanations are excluded, the theistic account offers the only explanation of the basic regularities that has any prospect of acceptability. On the other hand, if we explain the regularities by postulating laws, we have to suppose that, for each law, there is something that causally imposes the corresponding regularity on the universe as a regularity; and the considerations that showed the theistic account to be the only plausible form of nonnomological explanation will now show that the theistic account provides the only plausible account of the source of causal agency. So, either way, we get a strong case for accepting the truth of the theistic account and the existence of the God it postulates. It can also be shown that, once we accept this account, we are obliged to think of God as imposing regularities on the world in the relevant law‐creating way.
Completing the Picture
Authors: Foster John 
Published: August 2004

AbstractIn order to make provision for laws, we have to suppose that God creates the universe by directly creating it in its initial state and prescribing certain modes of transition by which its state at one time gives rise to its states at subsequent times. For various reasons, we have to think of this as only the main part of God's creative work. The most interesting reason is that it is plausible to suppose that, in prescribing the modes of transition, he adds a qualification that leaves him the freedom to subsequently intervene, on any particular occasion, and deflect things from their provisionally ordained course. This would allow us to think of God, in accordance with the orthodox theological view, as exercising direct control over all that happens in the universe. Finally, now that we are accepting that laws are created by God, we need to transform the nomological‐explanatory solution to the problem of induction into a theological‐explanatory solution.
Ethics, Economics, and Politics
Authors: Little I. M. D. 
Published: August 2004

AbstractStudies the three interfaces of ethics, economics, and politics. Any well‐considered view of the most desirable role for the state in various aspects of our lives implies some serious thinking about these subjects, and the way in which they interact. This can be done without formal academic training in any of them.A central issue is the extent to which the state is entitled to, and should, control individual behaviour, and to what end. To a greater or lesser extent, and for differing reasons, states are concerned with the welfare of the people. However, the measurement of welfare, both individual and collective, involves ethical judgements; and various theories of social justice are therefore discussed. Utilitarianism is defended as a guiding principle for government behaviour, albeit with some constraining respect for rights. But welfare considerations do not require that the state be deeply involved in the production of goods and services. Excessive government can be a threat to democracy. The book ends with a sketch of the advocated boundaries of state responsibility and control.
Collective Utility and Welfare
Authors: Little Ian Malcolm David 
Published: August 2004

AbstractNormative economics is mainly concerned with the welfare of communities. Somehow the happiness or utility of individuals has to be compared, and amalgamated or added up. The status of the interpersonal comparisons involved is discussed. The mathematical conditions required for making sense of a general measure of the welfare or utility of a community are outlined. It is concluded that the concept makes sense, but the conditions are very demanding.
Welfare Economics
Authors: Little Ian Malcolm David 
Published: August 2004

AbstractWelfare economics is that large part of economics that is concerned with the well‐being of groups of people and is therefore closely related to normative economics and economic policy. Theoretical welfare economics derives the necessary conditions for achieving a Pareto‐optimum in society, which is a situation such that it is impossible to make anyone better off without making someone else worse off. There are an infinite number of Pareto‐optima that can be compared only if given a measure of the value of different distributions of welfare. Applied welfare economics, also called cost‐benefit analysis, compares sub‐optimal situations to determine whether a move from one to the other would be an improvement, taking account of differences in distribution.
Utilitarianism, Justice, and Equality
Authors: Little Ian Malcolm David 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThe 1970s saw a wave of attacks on utilitarianism and consequentialism, favouring theories of good government based on contract, whereby what was good followed from what was right, rather than vice versa. There was emphasis on social and distributive justice, seen largely in terms of equality of resources somehow defined, rather than welfare. The various meanings of justice are discussed, and the theories of two leaders of this contractarian movement, namely John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, are found to be flawed. There are serious difficulties with the measurement of equality (of anything). For this and other reasons, the concept of equality is not an acceptable unifying social end.