bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Kant and Transcendentalism
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, Mackie examines Kant's account of causation and also that of some more recent Kantian approaches such as those of Bennett and Strawson. He raises questions regarding certain assumptions involved in the formulation of a transcendental account of causation such as the requirement of self‐consciousness. The problematic nature of the contingency of the limits of human imagination is also raised. Strawson's examination of Kant's account of causation in the Second Analogy is discussed. Mackie concludes that the general Kantian approach is incapable of giving a satisfactory account of causation.
Functional Laws and Concomitant Variation
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, Mackie argues against Russell's claim that the concept of causation is redundant for scientific explanation and that it should be replaced with the notion of functions. Mackie draws the distinction between the ‘functional causation’ that Russell recommends and the more traditional ‘neolithic causation’ that Mackie has been concerned with in the preceding chapters. He argues that functional causation should be properly considered as merely a limiting case of neolithic causation. Mackie adopts another of Mill's methods, which is entitled the Method of Concomitant Variation, and claims that by means of this method, the concept of a functional notion can be shown to be a refinement of the neolithic concept of cause rather than an entirely different concept.
The Direction of Causation
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter addresses the issue of the direction of the relation between cause and effect. Mackie first argues for a conceptual distinction between causal priority and temporal priority and claims that the former is not reducible to the latter. Neither is it the case that causal priority is reducible to a mere asymmetry in the form of causal regularities. Mackie instead proposes an analysis of causal priority that relies on a contrast between the ‘fixity’ and ‘unfixity’ of events. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the relation between Mackie's notion of causal priority and determinism.
The Necessity of Causes
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 8 is concerned with providing a defensible account of necessity to accompany the account of causation already suggested. Mackie first examines notions of necessity found in regularity theories and lists seven tasks that necessity may be expected to perform. Mackie argues that one of the central tasks of the notion of necessity is the provision of a basis with which to distinguish causal from non‐causal regularities. Mackie puts forward his own theory of necessity and argues that although counterfactual conditionals can lend support to this account, they are not to be thought of as being identical with the account.
Statistical Laws
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, Mackie offers an analysis of what constitutes a statistical law. He suggests that the theory of limiting frequency is crucial to the notion of statistical laws. Mackie outlines three different types of statistical laws that he claims require distinguishing. He concedes that his analysis is in a sense incomplete and that there remains a lack of clarity regarding the intelligibility of the notion of what constitutes a statistical law. Nevertheless, Mackie concludes that the analysis of statistical laws given can be shown to accord with the account of causation developed in the previous chapters.
Teleology
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter considers the relevance of teleology for an account of causation. Mackie questions whether there are final causes that can be seen to operate in objective processes which are distinguishable from efficient causes. Examples from the natural world are considered and Mackie suggests that in each case an alternative explanation such as evolutionary theory or functional appropriateness of organs in organisms can provide a sufficient account of them. Mackie concludes that the account of causation that he has developed and argued for can provide a satisfactory account of all natural laws.
Prudence, Morality and Supererogation
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The relationship between morality and prudence and the extent to which a proper utilitarian account can accommodate acts of supererogation is examined. There are prudential principles that coincide with moral principles, which are supported by firm dispositions of character. Hare argues that the prescriptivity of moral judgements demonstrate the tight connection between moral judgements and dispositions to act, and shows how it is possible to reach certain conclusions if we do our moral thinking correctly.
The Problem of the External World
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 1 sets out the Problem of the External World to which scepticism is a natural response: the problem, first posed by Descartes in his First Meditation, of how to show that we have any knowledge about the world around us.
Reflecting on the nature of his sensory experiences, Descartes finds himself unable to rule out the possibility that he is dreaming and, on that account, driven to the devastating conclusion that he knows nothing at all about the world around him. Stroud argues that if Descartes is right to insist that in order to know something about the world around him he must know that he is not dreaming, then he is also right that he has no such knowledge, because the condition for knowledge that Descartes accepts can never be fulfilled: fulfilling it would require knowledge which itself would be possible only if the condition were fulfilled.
The more promising strategy in the face of the sceptical argument, therefore, is to examine more carefully the requirement that we must know that we are not dreaming if we are to know anything about the world around us.
But if that requirement is a fact of our ordinary conception of knowledge, as it seems to be, we must accept it, because there is no notion of knowledge other than the ordinary one that is embodied in the procedures and practices of everyday and scientific life; and unless we find a way of rejecting the problem altogether, we will have to accept with it the conclusion that no one knows anything about world around us.
Internal and External: Meaningful and Meaningless
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 5 considers the challenge to scepticism that both the sceptical conclusion and the problem about our knowledge of the external world to which it is a response are equally meaningless.
This line of criticism, which has been presented forcefully by Rudolf Carnap in his papers ‘Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology’ and ‘Pseudoproblems in Philosophy’, is inspired by verificationism in the philosophy of language: the view that a sentence that is not rendered at least more likely to be true by one possible course of sensory experience than another has no meaning, and thus cannot be considered either true or false. On the basis of the verifiability principle, Carnap argues that only ‘internal’ questions about knowledge – questions that pertain to some empirically verifiable matter of fact – can be meaningfully asked; by contrast, the question whether there are any material objects at all, taken as an ‘external’ question by the sceptic, is literally meaningless, and should instead be understood as a merely ‘practical’ question about which ‘linguistic framework’ to adopt.
Stroud observes, first, that this strategy not only appreciates the force of philosophical scepticism but is in fact in complete agreement with it: it denies that there is any theoretical justification for adopting one linguistic framework, such as that of a world of material objects, rather than another, which is precisely the point the sceptic wants to make; and it accepts a version of the ‘conditional correctness of scepticism’. The view that, if the traditional philosopher did manage to raise a meaningful question about our knowledge of the world, then his sceptical answer to it would be correct. Second, Stroud argues that neither the ‘internal’–‘external’ distinction used in the argument against scepticism nor the status of the verifiability principle itself on which it rests are made sufficiently clear to render them efficient and acceptable; moreover, as long as the verifiability principle is not independently shown to be a condition of meaningfulness, philosophical scepticism will itself provide a powerful objection to it.
Naturalized Epistemology
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, Stroud discusses W. V. Quine’s project of a ‘naturalized epistemology’, and assesses its consequences for philosophical scepticism.
According to Quine, science and everyday knowledge and the languages and thought processes in which they are pursued and expressed are to be seen as natural phenomena which can be studied and described and explained scientifically like any other part of the natural world: all attempts to find out about ourselves and the world must be made from within the conceptual and scientific resources we have already developed for finding out about anything.
Stroud points out that this can make it look as if Quine is simply changing the subject; that would leave open the possibility, sometimes apparently endorsed by Quine, that scepticism is and remains the only answer to the traditional question, and that nothing he says in his naturalized epistemology affects the answer one way or the other. But Quine also appears to want to resist scepticism on the grounds of his naturalized account of our epistemic situation; the argument is that scientific knowledge can be used to meet the sceptical challenge because the challenge arises from, and within, the domain of science itself.
This is ineffective as a response to scepticism, according to Stroud, because the fact that sceptical doubts are scientific doubts does not put the epistemologist who raises such doubts in the stronger position of being free to use scientific knowledge of the world in his effort to answer those doubts and explain how knowledge is possible; in fact, the view endorsed by Quine turns out not only to tolerate scepticism but to be committed to it: the argument is that I cannot understand my own knowledge of the world as a mere ‘projection’ from ‘meagre sensory data’, and since my own knowledge of what the world is like is required for me to be able to ascribe knowledge of the world to other people, I cannot ascribe knowledge to anyone, and this is scepticism.
Coda: The Quest for a Diagnosis
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 7 discusses two related attempts to diagnose a mistake in the sceptical reasoning on the basis of the insight that what an expression means is a function of what it is used to mean or to say on specific occasions by human beings.
S. Cavell argues that scepticism should be rejected because every claim to knowledge needs a specific context in which it is made; without such a specific context, no sceptical question can arise because no knowledge claim is made, and within such a context no sceptical question can arise either because every concrete claim to knowledge carries with it specific conditions that cannot be generalized. Stroud replies that the absence of a specific, concrete claim to knowledge does not make it impossible for us to assess our epistemic situation, and that it is so far unclear why the sceptic, in the course of such an assessment, cannot reach the kind of general conclusion he seeks.
T. Clarke employs a distinction between a ‘plain’ and a ‘philosophical’ way of understanding knowledge claims to show that the dream possibility could not be used to bring all of our knowledge of the world into question in the way the sceptic intends. But, Stroud argues, the argument rests on the assumption that, in order to call some knowledge into question, some other actual or at least possible knowledge must be presupposed, and this assumption seems mistaken, or at least highly questionable. The traditional conception of objectivity, which is bound up closely with scepticism, seems to be correct: the truth of ‘I am dreaming’, which must be ruled out if I am to know, depends on what state I am in with respect to the world around me, but not on whether anyone else does or could know about that world.
Wide‐Angle View
Authors: Pears David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
‘Wide‐angle View’ introduces the reader to Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole, its general outlook, style, and conclusions. Pears argues that Wittgenstein's later thought is whole‐heartedly critical in the Kantian sense, while his earlier project, and the Tractatus in particular, are to be thought of as semi‐critical.
Solipsism
Authors: Pears David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Pears outlines Wittgenstein's argumentative move against the doctrine of solipsism, and connects the different lines of thought that accumulate in Wittgenstein's reaction to the doctrine. Pears examines the doctrine that the limits of one's language are the limits of one's world, and sets the stage for the discussion of Wittgenstein's later philosophy by critically examining the earlier conception of the subject.
The Problem of Political Freedom
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Central to liberalism is the concept of political freedom. Revisionists wrongly claim that liberty has only instrumental value, but they do nevertheless contribute several cogent arguments relevant to the question of how the value of liberty is to be justified. The doctrine of the presumption of liberty and the thesis that liberty ‘just has’ intrinsic value are rightly rejected by revisionists, since neither can ground distinctions between different freedoms. Linguistic analysis is of limited use to the justification of the value of liberty, since distinctions between notions of freedom and unfreedom do not match normatively relevant distinctions. This book seeks to defend a liberal theory of limited government without resort to the mistaken premises of individualism, which it rejects.
The Authority of States
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The normal justification of authority, as examined in Ch. 3, yields the conclusion that the extent of governmental authority varies from person to person. It cannot justify the authority that governments, in fact, claim for themselves in the case of most people. An analysis of consent is provided in order to explore the prospect that consent might serve to extend the scope of the authority of states. It is argued that consent can ground an extension of political authority only so far as it is non‐instrumentally valuable. Those who, as a mode of expressing identification with their community, consent to the authority of reasonably just governments or respect their laws, are subject to that authority since such modes of consent have non‐instrumental value.
The Exclusion of Ideals
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Political neutrality, conceived of as the exclusion of ideals, prevents governments from acting for reasons, which appeal to conceptions of the good, whether valid or invalid. Such a position relies on an elusive distinction between one part of morality, the good, and another, the right. Political welfarism, which allows governments to act specifically to increase want satisfaction, is mistaken in regarding want satisfaction as an intrinsic good. The Nozickean style aversion to coercion cannot be effectively grounded in autonomy, since no agents enjoy complete autonomy, and not only human intervention but also nature can restrict autonomy.
Liberty and Rights
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The doctrine of liberty is underpinned by the ideal of autonomy. While the rights that have traditionally been of concern to liberals serve the interests of the individuals protected by those rights, they also tend to promote collective goods, such as the good of toleration, and the good of membership. What accounts, in part, for the force of these rights is their ability to serve such collective goods. The connection between rights and collective goods shows that rights should not be constitutionally entrenched in such a way that they are forever beyond the reach of political action.
Consequentialism: An Introduction
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Against Rawls's ‘separateness of persons’ objection to consequentialism, it can be replied that consequentialism does take into account differing personal viewpoints in legitimating trade‐offs between persons’ interests. Nozick's Kantian‐inspired view of rights as side‐constraints is also indecisive, as this view can only proscribe trade‐offs between individuals’ interests that have already been deemed, on independent grounds, to be impermissible. The appearance of agent‐relativity, which underlies both Nozick's case for constraints, and Nagel's argument for partiality, can to some degree be rendered consistent with consequentialism's commitment to agent‐neutrality. More precisely, what might appear to be agent‐relativity may be just agent‐neutrality, but agent‐neutrality as applied to agents’ action's reasons, rather than to their outcome reasons. Williams's argument from integrity, despite its elusiveness, may offer more promising materials for challenging consequentialism.
Autonomy and Pluralism
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Autonomy is an ideal of self‐creation, or self‐authorship; it consists in an agent's successful pursuit of willingly embraced, valuable options, where the agent's activities are not dominated by worries about mere survival. Autonomy in its primary sense is to be understood as the actual living of an autonomous life; autonomy in its secondary sense is to be understood as the capacity to live autonomously. To be autonomous, agents have to meet three conditions: they must possess certain mental capacities, they must have an adequate range of valuable options, and they must enjoy independence from coercion and manipulation. Autonomy should be distinguished from self‐realization, as autonomous persons may choose not to realize their capacities. Autonomy itself, in an environment that supports autonomy, is not similarly optional, as living autonomously is the only way of flourishing within an autonomy‐supporting environment.
Laws and Symmetry
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMetaphysicians speak of laws of nature in terms of necessity and universality, and that conception played a role in the birth of modern physics some centuries ago, but today physicists speak in terms of symmetry, transformations, and invariance. Laws and Symmetry's three main objectives are: first, to show the failure of current philosophical accounts of laws of nature; second, to refute arguments for the reality of laws of nature; third, to contrib ute to an epistemology and a philosophy of science antithetical to such metaphysical notions. The latter involves an inquiry into the character and role of symmetry and of symmetry arguments in the physical sciences.
Introduction
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe historical role of the concept of a law of nature in medieval and early modern physics engendered a view of science as continuous with metaphysics, which has tended to dominate philosophy of nature and of science. Meanwhile, with the development of mathematical methods, the advanced sciences began to focus on the structural characteristics and constraints of models, now generally described in terms of symmetry. Simple historical examples illustrate this trend.
What Are Laws of Nature?
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter concentrates on isolating criteria of adequacy for any philosophical account of what laws of nature are. Sources include David Hume, Charles Sanders Peirce, Hans Reichenbach, Donald Davidson, David Armstrong, and David Lewis. Criteria examined pertain to universality, necessity, intensionality, explanation, prediction, confirmation, counter‐factuals, objectivity, and inference to the best explanation. Two main problems are presented: the problem of inference (that it is a law that A should imply that A is the case) and the problem of identification (there should be some identifiable aspect of nature that makes for laws). These two problems together constitute a dilemma, since a solution to one tends to pre‐empt any solution to the other.
Necessity, Worlds, and Chance
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter concentrates on philosophical theories of laws of nature that take for granted certain concepts of possibility, possible worlds, necessity, or physical probability. The accounts of Wilfrid Sellars, Storrs McCall, Peter Vallentyne, and Robert Pargetter are criticized. Crucial to any such account that draws on a notion of objective chance or probability is the ’horizontal‐vertical problem’ (of accounting for statistical predictions based on assumptions about chance). It is argued that if the metaphysical point of view is maintained, then this problem is unsolvable.
Inference to the Best Explanation: Salvation by Laws?
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractInduction has given way to Infere nce to the Best Explanation (IBE) in the epistemology hospitable to realism, or to metaphysics in general. Both Dretske and Armstrong provide severe critiques of traditional notions of Induction, and offer new foundations for inductive methods. This chapter and the next argue that neither Induction nor IBE qualifies as a rational strategy for change of opinion.
Towards a New Epistemology
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe underground river of probabilism, slowly growing in force over three centuries, burst forth above ground in the twentieth century and brought new hope for epistemology. Probabilism sees its historical origin in the work of Blaise Pascal in the seventeenth century, but has for the main part been developed in the last 100 years, notably by Leonard Savage, Rudolf Carnap, Bruno De Finetti, Isaac Levi, Richard Jeffrey, and many other writers on the interface of statistics, probability theory, and epistemology. This chapter provides a liberal version of probabilism, as basic framework for descriptive epistemology. Benefits include proofs of the incoherence of Inference to the Best Explanation and related ideas pertaining to Induction or, in general, to rule‐governed notions of rational opinion change. It is argued that this is not a form of scepticism and does provide a basis for an empiricist epistemology adequate for philosophy of science.
Symmetry Arguments in Science and Metaphysics
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractStarting with the paradigm example of mirror image symmetry, this chapter provides a sustained analysis of the different forms of arguments that draw on, or exploit symmetries in, nature and in theoretical models. Specific applications are made to the postulation of hidden variables, the role of invariance in the scientific representation of nature, and the problem of adequately characterizing the notion of determinism.