bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
ESTIMATING THE TAX BENEFITS OF DEBT
Authors: Graham John 
Published: April 2005

The standard approach to valuing interest tax shields assumes that full tax benefits are realized on every dollar of interest deduction in every scenario. The approach presented in this paper takes account of the possibility that interest tax shields cannot be used in some scenarios, in part because of variations in the firm's profitability. Because of the dynamic nature of the tax code (e.g., tax‐loss carrybacks and carryforwards), it is necessary to consider past and future taxable income when estimating today's effective marginal tax rate. The paper uses a series of numerical examples to show that (1) the incremental value of an extra dollar of interest deduction is equal to the marginal tax rate appropriate for that dollar; and (2) a firm's effective marginal tax rate (and therefore the marginal benefit of incremental interest deductions) can actually decline as the firm takes on additional debt.Based on marginal benefit functions for thousands of firms from 1980–1999, the author concludes that the tax benefits of debt averaged approximately 10% of firm value during the 1980s, while declining to around 8% in the 1990s. By taking maximum advantage of the interest tax shield, the average firm could have increased its value by approximately 15% over the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the consequences of being underlevered are significant. Surprisingly, many of the companies that appear best able to service debt (i.e., those with the lowest apparent costs of debt) use the least amount of debt, on average. Treasurers and CFOs should critically reevaluate their companies' debt policies and consider the benefits of additional leverage, even if taking on more debt causes their credit ratings to slip a notch.
THE RISE OF FUTURE FLOW ASSET SECURITIZATIONS
Authors: Gandy Steven L. , Festa Jerome F. 
Published: April 2005

Since their debut in 1987, future flow asset securitizations (FFS) have found growing acceptance in markets worldwide. FFS are defined simply as the forward sale of hard currency receivables to be generated in the future through normal business operations by an exporter of goods or services. The most widely used receivables include export receivables for corporations, and credit card vouchers, electronic transfers, and paper‐based remittances for financial institutions. While companies in emerging markets have led the way in embracing FFS, the instrument's versatility has also made it valuable in industrialized countries where both companies and governments have begun to employ these structures for a variety of purposes.This article surveys the use of future flow asset securitizations in both emerging and highly developed markets, outlines its basic structure and applications, and evaluates the benefits of the structure to each party to the transaction. Among the most significant advantages in emerging markets is the financial discipline that countries and companies alike must practice in order to qualify for a future flow asset securitization. The authors present three cases where FFS have been employed successfully by companies in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey.The risk management features of FFS make this instrument particularly valuable in times of economic stress. In fact, no investment‐grade FFS transactions have defaulted, despite volatile economic conditions in many countries where FFS have been issued. The authors predict that FFS will continue to find broad applications in a wide variety of markets.
WHY ISSUE TRACKING STOCK? INSIGHTS FROM A COMPARISON WITH SPIN‐OFFS AND CARVE‐OUTS
Authors: Chemmanur Thomas J. , Paeglis Imants 
Published: April 2005

In recent years, tracking stocks, which amount to a new form of corporate restructuring, have been gaining in popularity. In 1999 alone, 17 companies announced new tracking stock issues, and by February 2000 there were 40 tracking stocks trading in the U.S. equity markets. Why have tracking stocks become so popular in recent years? In this article, the authors present new evidence on the effectiveness of tracking stock issues in creating shareholder value as compared to the record of two other closely related forms of corporate restructuring—spin‐offs and equity carve‐outs.The authors find that the parents and subsidiaries of tracking‐stock firms are more “related” than those that undertake the other two forms of corporate restructuring, that there is a positive announcement effect (similar in size to that of spin‐offs but greater than that of equity carve‐outs) on stock prices, and that the number of analysts following the firm increases following the issuance of tracking stock. These findings are interpreted as suggesting that the main corporate motives for issuing tracking stock are the valuation benefits from providing investors with more information about the newly listed subsidiary, while at the same time preserving the existing synergies between the business units involved.This maintenance of existing synergies, however, appears to have come at a significant price. Under the tracking stock structure, there seem to be no benefits attributable, as in the case of spin‐offs, to improvements in corporate governance. While spinoffs significantly increase the probability that the parents or subsidiaries will later be taken over (with its disciplining effect on management), there is no such increase in takeover probability for firms issuing tracking stock. Consistent with this difference, the authors find that the market‐adjusted two‐year holding period return for tracking stock parents and subsidiaries is significantly lower than the corresponding return for spinoffs and their corporate parents.
COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE U.K. ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY (WITH A BRIEF LOOK AT CALIFORNIA)
Authors: Littlechild Stephen C. 
Published: April 2005

In this article, the U.K.'s Director General of Electricity Supply from 1989 to 1998 assesses the effects of deregulation and competition on the U.K. electricity industry after about a decade. Expansion of existing competitors, new entry, and further restructuring have reduced the aggregate share of the largest two generation companies from nearly 80% to 26%. Efficiency has improved and wholesale prices have fallen after an initial increase. Voluntary bilateral contracts markets are about to replace the mandatory “Pool,” with centralised control limited to physically balancing the system and settling contract imbalances. Retail supply competition has been active for large industrial customers since the beginning, and 80% of them now buy from another supplier. The market for residential customers opened in early 1999, and already nearly a quarter of them have chosen another supplier. Incentive price controls on transmission and distribution have stimulated increased efficiency and significantly reduced use‐of‐system charges. Overall, prices for all classes of customers have fallen by 25–35% in real terms since privatisation, and quality of service has improved.California has adopted a policy that is similar in many respects, but with very different results. The problems there have stemmed partly from less favourable demand and supply conditions, but also from significant policy differences, including barriers to building new capacity, obstacles to the use of long‐term supply (or hedging) contracts, retail price controls at untenable levels, and the requirement that (after a transition period) utilities pass through wholesale spot prices directly to their customers. Changes in such policies will eventually enable both producers and consumers in California to benefit from competition.
A COMPARABLES APPROACH TO MEASURING CASHFLOW‐AT‐RISK FOR NON‐FINANCIAL FIRMS
Authors: Stein Jeremy C. , Usher Stephen E. , LaGattuta Daniel , Youngen Jeff 
Published: April 2005

Cashflow‐at‐Risk (C‐FaR) is an attempt to create an analogue to Value at Risk (VaR) that can be used by non‐financial firms to quantify various kinds of risk exposures, including interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity price risks. There are two basic ways to attack this problem. One is from the “bottom up,” which involves building a detailed model of all of a company's specific exposures. The C‐Far approach presented here is a “top‐down” method of comparables that looks directly at the ultimate item of interest—the companies' cashflows. The fundamental challenge facing the top‐down strategy is that, for any one company, there is not enough data on its own cashflows to make precise statements about the likelihood of rare events. To get around this problem, the authors match a target company with a large set of comparable companies that are expected to have similar cashflow volatility. The comparables are chosen to be close to the target company on four dimensions: (1) market cap; (2) profitability; (3) industry risk; and (4) stock price volatility.C‐FaR can be useful to managers addressing a variety of corporate finance decisions. For example, by providing estimates of the probability of financial distress, the C‐FaR method can be used in conjunction with capital structure data to help formulate debt‐equity tradeoffs in a more precise, quantifiable fashion. It can also be used to evaluate a firm's overall risk management strategy, including the expected benefits of using derivatives to hedge commodity‐price exposures or the purchase of insurance policies. Moreover, C‐FaR may even have a use in investor relations: by disclosing the results of a comparables‐based C‐FaR analysis ahead of time, a company may be able to cushion earnings shocks by furnishing investors or analysts with credible, objective estimates of what is likely to happen to their cash flows under different economic scenarios.
VALUING PUD RESERVES: A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF REAL OPTION TECHNIQUES
Authors: McCormack John , Sick Gordon 
Published: April 2005

Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) tools are fundamental to engineering and financial analysis in the oil industry, are well understood by managers, and generally provide accurate valuations of developed hydrocarbon reserves. Unfortunately, DCF techniques systematically undervalue proven undeveloped reserves (PUDs), may encourage premature development of certain reserves, and fail to identify important risk management opportunities. Real option valuation models overcome these shortcomings by providing a more complete picture of not only reserve values, but also of the drivers of that value.The authors of this paper collaborated in developing a PUD real option model for a large U.S. E&P company (referred to as “XYZ Petroleum”). Based on an analysis of XYZ's drilling costs and other major inputs over a 12‐year period, the authors show that PUDs are rich sources of option value. In addition to the volatility of oil and gas prices, a somewhat more surprising contributor to option value was the lack of correlation (which came as a surprise to XYZ's managers) between development costs and oil prices. During certain periods, the economic value of a PUD was more than twice the NPV estimated by static DCF techniques. In addition to valuing PUDs and explaining why undeveloped reserves are usually valued at more than their DCF value, the model can also be used to tell managers when is the value‐maximizing time to drill—or, alternatively, how much value is likely to be forfeited if managers choose to drill too soon.
CIVC PARTNERS ROUNDTABLE ON MANAGING PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENTS IN TURBULENT ECONOMIC TIMES
Authors: BOLIN LORI 
Published: April 2005

This roundtable brings together four representatives of CIVC Partners to discuss strategies for private equity investing in the current economic environment. As one of the seven private equity investment arms of Bank of America, CIVC Partners manages over $700 million in private equity capital provided exclusively by the bank. CIVC's primary investment focus is leveraged buyouts and growth equity investments in mid‐sized corporations in North America.Following a brief report on the state of the private equity market, the discussion begins with an “open book examination” of CIVC's response to the current market reality. From the fundamentals of their investment strategy to the pursuit of “relative values,” CIVC's partners explain how their approach attempts to deal with the reduced margin for error in equity investing. In the second half of the discussion, the partners describe their focus on portfolio company investing and the importance of the due diligence process in contributing to their track record.
TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE MODEL OF OPTIMAL CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Authors: Heine Roger , Harbus Fredric 
Published: April 2005

Most corporate finance practitioners understand the trade‐off involved in making effective use of debt capacity while safeguarding the firm's ability to execute its business strategy without disruption. But quantifying that trade‐off to arrive at an optimal level of debt can be a complicated and challenging task. This paper develops a simulation model of capital structure that starts by generating multiple estimates of market rates (LIBOR, currency rates) and corresponding company operating cash flows. To arrive at an optimal capital structure, the model then incorporates the shareholder value effects of alternative financing decisions by directly measuring the costs of financial distress, including the costs of missed investment opportunities and higher working capital requirements.The model generates both a target credit rating and a lower fallback rating that permits a higher level of debt to maintain investments and dividends when operating cash flows are weak. As the model shows, companies with volatile cash flows and significant investment opportunities can add substantial shareholder value by establishing a fallback credit rating that is one or two notches below the target rating. The model also optimizes the mix of fixed versus floating debt, the maturity structure, and the currency composition. Another distinctive feature of the model is its ability to estimate the expected cost of alternative liability structures that can provide the liquidity insurance necessary to sustain the firm through periods of severe stress. This cost turns out to be quite small relative to the total market capitalization of the average firm.
RETURNS ON PROJECT‐FINANCED INVESTMENTS: EVOLUTION AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS
Authors: Esty Benjamin 
Published: April 2005

In the past, project finance was used primarily to fund relatively low‐risk natural resource projects with highly predictable cash flows. Today project finance is used for a wide range of assets, such as satellite telecommunications systems, amusement parks, and microprocessor factories, and in developing as well as developed countries. The author explores how the evolution into riskier assets has changed expected returns on project‐financed investments. Higher return variability and greater failure rates have caused project debt capacities to fall. What is notable about project‐financed investments, however, is that the best returns are not very high. And because the nature of most projects limits the upside potential, a much higher fraction of project‐financed investments must be successful for capital providers to earn acceptable returns on their investments.The move into riskier assets has also led to increased emphasis on the risk management role of project finance; that is, through careful structure and design, a firm can use project finance to reduce the collateral damage caused by a failing investment and also to limit sovereign risks. But even so, the author suggests that the original structures were never designed to handle projects with significant asset risk. For this reason, in cases of riskier projects, single‐asset project loans are likely to be replaced by either traditional corporate financing vehicles or hybrid structures involving elements of both project and corporate finance. One example of such hybrid financing is Calpine's revolving construction facilities that are used to finance portfolios of merchant power plants.
HIGH‐TECH IPOS: A TALE OF TWO CONTINENTS
Authors: Aaij Sybren , Brounen Dirk 
Published: April 2005

The typical price behavior of an initial public offering (IPO), consisting of a price upsurge on the first trading day followed by subpar performance in the (longer‐run) after‐market, is one of the most intriguing puzzles in corporate finance. This study focuses on high‐tech IPOs in Europe and the U.S. over the period 1998–2001, both to compare the European and U.S. IPO markets and to determine how the price behavior of high‐tech IPOs compares to that of IPOs in general. Average initial‐day returns were 39% and 64% for the European and U.S. samples, respectively. The median returns were significantly lower, however, indicating that the sample averages are affected by a small group of exceptionally strong performers. But, for the first full year of trading, the median market‐adjusted returns were negative for both samples. Not surprisingly, this substandard aftermarket performance was most apparent in companies that failed to generate operating profits.As with IPOs in general, high‐tech IPOs showed higher initial‐day returns in “hot” markets than in “cold.” Strong first‐day performance was a good predictor of IPO volume in the high‐tech market, with strong first‐day returns triggering a flood of IPOs in subsequent months. Overall, then, the authors' study concludes that the price behavior of high‐tech IPOs provides an exaggerated version of the general tendency of IPOs to be underpriced initially but underperform over the longer term.
INTEGRATING RISK MANAGEMENT AND CAPITAL MANAGEMENT
Authors: Shimpi Prakash 
Published: April 2005

Capital management and risk management are two sides of the same coin. But by treating them separately, the conventional theory and practice of corporate finance fails to account for important connections between them. Moreover, an exclusive focus on debt and equity ignores the full range of capital resources available to a corporation, thus distorting management's view of the firm's cost of capital (and its return on equity).An understanding of the role of corporate capital–including off‐balance sheet as well as paid‐up capital—and its relationship to the riskiness of a firm's activities provides the foundation on which the author builds a corporate finance framework that ties together both the insurance and capital markets. This framework, called the “Insurative Model,” captures the economics of both conventional insurance and corporate finance instruments and embraces a wide variety of solutions and instruments—be they debt, equity, insurance, derivative, contingent capital, or any other—and allows managers to evaluate their effectiveness in a consistent, unified way.The Insurative Model demonstrates that a company's decisions on insurance and risk retention can be just as important as its decisions about its debt‐equity mix. In fact, the determination of a firm's optimal debt‐equity ratio should be the last in a series of capital and risk management decisions. Earlier decisions should address risk retention, risk transfer, and the optimal amounts and structure of off‐balance‐sheet capital used to support the company's retained risks.
REVISITING MARKET EFFICIENCY: THE STOCK MARKET AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM
Authors: Mauboussin Michael J. 
Published: April 2005

Well‐functioning financial markets are key to efficient resource allocation in a capitalist economy. While many managers express reservations about the accuracy of stock prices, most academics and practitioners agree that markets are efficient by some reasonable operational criterion. But if standard capital markets theory provides reasonably good predictions under “normal” circumstances, researchers have also discovered a number of “anomalies”—cases where the empirical data appear sharply at odds with the theory. Most notable are the occasional bursts of extreme stock price volatility (including the recent boom‐and‐bust cycle in the NASDAQ) and the limited success of the Capital Asset Pricing Model in accounting for the actual risk‐return behavior of stocks.This article addresses the question of how the market's efficiency arises. The central message is that managers can better understand markets as a complex adaptive system. Such systems start with a “heterogeneous” group of investors, whose interaction leads to “self‐organization” into groups with different investment styles. In contrast to market efficiency, where “marginal” investors are all assumed to be rational and well‐informed, the interaction of investors with different “decision rules” in a complex adaptive system creates a market that has properties and characteristics distinct from the individuals it comprises. For example, simulations of the behavior of complex adaptive systems suggest that, in most cases, the collective market will prove to be smarter than the average investor. But, on occasion, herding behavior by investors leads to “imbalances”—and, hence, to events like the crash of '87 and the recent plunge in the NASDAQ. In addition to its grounding in more realistic assumptions about the behavior of individual investors, the new model of complex adaptive systems offers predictions that are in some respects more consistent with empirical findings. Most important, the new model accommodates larger‐than‐normal stock price volatility (in statistician's terms, “fat‐tailed” distributions of prices) far more readily than standard efficient market theory. And to the extent that it does a better job of explaining volatility, this new model of investor behavior is likely to have implications for two key areas of corporate financial practice: risk management and investor relations. But even so, the new model leaves one of the main premises of modern finance theory largely intact–that the most reliable basis for valuing a company's stock is its discounted cash flow.
THE DETERMINANTS OF SELECTIVE EXCHANGE RISK MANAGEMENT–EVIDENCE FROM GERMAN NON‐FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
Authors: Glaum Martin 
Published: April 2005

Survey studies of both corporate exchange risk management and the corporate use of derivatives in general have shown considerable variation in managerial practices. Some firms do not hedge open positions at all, and some hedge their exposures completely. Most companies, however, hedge only those positions on which they expect a currency loss, while leaving open positions on which they expect a currency gain—a practice known as “selective hedging.” Finally, there is a small minority of firms that engage in outright speculation, deliberately creating risk exposures in addition to those arising from their normal business operations.Such findings are consistent with survey studies that suggest that a majority of corporate financial managers appear to believe that they are able to “beat the market”—a belief that, of course, is inconsistent with efficient markets theory. So why do some companies follow selective risk management strategies while other firms hedge open positions without recourse to exchange rate forecasts?In an attempt to answer this question, the author surveyed 74 German non‐financial companies about their exchange risk management practices. He found that highly levered firms were less likely to take bets in the currency markets, while bank‐controlled firms were more likely to use a selective risk management strategy. There was a negative relationship between profitability and the use of selective hedging—a finding that could be interpreted as suggesting that selective hedging does not generally benefit the firm's shareholders. Finally, there was a weak tendency for larger firms to be more inclined to use forecasts in their foreign exchange risk management.