bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Highest Sustainable Basic Income
Authors: Van Parijs Philippe 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAs a first cut, how close a society's institutions are to the ideal of a free society is determined by how high an unconditional basic income it manages to sustainably give to all its members. There are good reasons to give this income in the form of a demogrant rather than of a negative income tax, to distribute it in the form of regular instalments rather than as a one‐off capital grant, and to give part of it in kind, in particular, in the form of free education and health insurance rather than as a cash benefit.
Undominated Diversity
Authors: Van Parijs Philippe 
Published: October 2003

AbstractCan one really claim to give as much real freedom as possible to those with least real freedom by giving to all the same basic income? What about those with less talents than others? What about the handicapped? This challenge can only be met by introducing a constraint under which the maximization of the basic income needs to operate: undominated diversity. Targeted transfers and other measures must make sure that no person's lifetime internal endowment is regarded by all as inferior to that of someone else.
Decline and Revival
Authors: Viroli Maurizio 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The mid‐sixteenth to seventeenth centuries in Europe saw a general decline in republican patriotism due to the emergence of the modern state, which was disassociated with civic virtue and common liberty. Neo‐Stoicism also criticized patriotism as an illusory passion, which subordinated the higher life of the mind. On the other hand, the republican spirit was revived wherever there was a struggle for liberty, as in the English Revolution. Thinkers like Milton, Shaftesbury, and Bolingbroke contemplated the tension inherent in questions of patriotism, between particular, natural attachments, and universal, political principles.
Patriotism and the Politics of the Ancients
Authors: Viroli Maurizio 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explores the contrast between the ‘politics of the moderns’ and the ‘politics of the ancients’ in eighteenth century republican thought. Montesquieu and Rousseau are two great thinkers who attempted to revive ancient patriotism within a modern context. The question for both was how to make modern patriotism compatible with individuals’ private interests, given that modern men are incapable of the ancients’ heroic self‐sacrifice for their country.
The Nationalization of Patriotism
Authors: Viroli Maurizio 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses the development of patriotism and its relationship with nationalism in the nineteenth century. Guiseppe Mazzini criticized the narrowness of German patriotism and argued that, while national culture is important, it must serve as an instrument for the liberty of humanity across national boundaries. Meanwhile, patriotism was increasingly associated with loyalty to the monarch and Conservative nationalist ideology in England, France, and Germany. Despite the dominance of the ‘patriotism of the right’, however, thinkers like Renan carried on the spirit of political patriotism as the will of the people.
The Value of Life
Authors: Viscusi W. Kip 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Individual trade‐offs between risk and money provide the economic basis for assigning a value of life to the benefits of mortality risk reduction associated with government policies. Compensating wage differentials for job risks provides the most common empirical basis for such assessments, and a survey of these values of life estimates is reported. Use of these values for policy purposes raises a variety of challenging issues, particularly regarding heterogeneity in the value of life. The value‐of‐life estimates differ by income group and by age, for example, but how these differences should be reflected in policy decisions remains controversial.
Risk Analysis and Regulatory Policy
Authors: Viscusi W. Kip 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Analysis of carcinogen regulations implies that regulation is often not driven by the magnitude of the risk, but by whether the chemicals involved are synthetic chemicals. Risk assessments are often based on conservatism in which worst‐case scenarios are used. These biases in risk assessment are illustrated with examples from the US hazardous waste cleanup effort. The cost per life saved of US regulatory policies often exceeds any reasonable estimate of the value of life. Safety levels have improved over time, but these gains are largely attributable to greater societal wealth.
Bulgaria
Authors: Ganev Venelin I. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe semi‐presidential regime in Bulgaria is of recent origin: it was established in July 1991, when a Great National Assembly adopted a new constitution, which proclaims that ‘Bulgaria shall be a republic with a parliamentary form of government’; the emphasis on ‘parliamentary’ highlights the subordinate role of the president, who is elected directly by the voters for period five years. Even though the framers of the constitution deliberately created a dual structure of the executive branch, the text of the fundamental law envisages a mode of distribution of prerogatives that is heavily skewed in favour of the legislature and a cabinet accountable to the deputies. It is difficult, however, to sustain a claim that a general pattern of leadership is beginning to emerge under Bulgarian semi‐presidentialism, since the country has only had two presidents under its new constitution; the closest to a valid generalization which may be ventured in the light of the evidence is that, while parliament enjoys supremacy over law‐making and the government remains the primary site of executive decision‐making, the rapports between these two institutions and the presidency have varied dramatically, with the influence of the head of state running the gamut from almost complete exclusion to a palpable ability to shape agendas. The purpose of this chapter is to identify and analyse the ways in which constitutionally designed patterns of institutional interaction shift in response to changes in the social and economic environment rather than to chronicle events—the analysis is conceived as a chronology of the successive problems with which political actors had to cope. The three sections of the chapter are: Constitutional Balance of Power; Presidential/Parliamentary Relations; and Conclusion.
Romania
Authors: Verheijen Tony 
Published: October 2003

AbstractRomania emerged from one of the darkest periods in its history in December 1989, when Ceauşsescu's regime was overthrown, leaving Romania with a traumatized population and a devastated economy, and the gradual establishment of a democratic system of government during the last seven years has been painful and not without setbacks. The new institutional system established in Romania is semi‐presidential in the sense of the definition used in this book: it has a directly elected fixed‐term president alongside a prime minister who is responsible to parliament. The semi‐presidential system of government was established gradually, initially on the basis of the Electoral Law of 14 Mar 1990 and the rules of procedure of parliament adopted after the May 1990 elections. The institutional provisions of the Electoral Law and the rules of procedure of parliament subsequently formed the basis of the semi‐presidential system of government established under the new constitution, which was approved in a referendum in December 1991. It is important to note that there is no historical precedent for the establishment of a semi‐presidential system of government in Romania, and the inheritance of the whole period between independence (in 1878) and the fall of the Ceauşescu regime generally provides an unsuitable basis for the development of a democratic system of government. The chapter is divided into three main parts, organised according to the three factors identified by Duverger as determining for the leadership style in semi‐presidential systems: the events surrounding the formation of the system; the constitutional powers of the president, prime minister, and parliament; and the nature of the parliamentary majority and the relationship between the president and the majority.
Russia
Authors: White Stephen 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe Russian presidency is of recent origin, although there was always a prime minister, or (in the Soviet period) a chairman of the Council of Ministers. The prime minister and his colleagues were elected by the Soviet parliament, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and in addition, there was a collective presidency or Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, with the chairman of that body carrying out the functions of head of state—although there was still no presidency as such. Neither the chairman of the Presidium nor the prime minister was accountable in any meaningful way to the parliament, or (still more so) a mass electorate; rather, decisions on matters of this kind were taken by the party leadership and routinely ratified. All this began to change in the late Soviet period: a presidency was approved with some haste in March 1990, and Gorbachev was elected as its first incumbent with the support of 71% of the Congress of People's Deputies who voted (there was no popular vote). The next president was Yeltsin, who had been elected chairman of the Russian parliament in May 1990, and in June 1991 was elected Russia's first‐ever president in a direct popular election against five other candidates. The presidency, as it was established by this time, was normally an elective office, and it was a position of executive authority, but its powers extended under Yeltsin. The four sections of this chapter look at the experience of the Russian presidency under the following headings: The Context of Semi‐Presidentialism in Russia; Constitutional Powers; Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Parliaments; and Yeltsin and the Russian Semi‐Presidency.
Slovenia
Authors: Cerar Miro 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn Slovenia the power of the state is divided along classical lines into a legislature, an executive and a judiciary: legislative power is exercised by the parliament, comprising a National Assembly, which is the general representative house, and a National Council, which is a body representing various interests and has very limited powers; executive power is divided between the president and the government; judicial power is exercised by the ordinary courts and the Constitutional Court, which rules on the conformity of legal enactments with the constitution and the law and decides constitutional complaints and certain other matters. It is generally accepted that Slovenia has a parliamentary system in which the focus of political decision–making lies with the parliament and the government. As in most other Central and East European countries in transition, in Slovenia the formal powers of parliament remain very strong, but, unlike the pure parliamentarism that certain countries opted for, the Slovene arrangements belong more to a group that could be characterized as parliamentarism with a directly (popularly) elected (or semi‐presidential) president. The role of the president is relatively small, and is to act as the head of state, whose function or powers are mainly of a representative, initiative, and protocol nature. After an introduction discussing whether Slovenia has a parliamentary or semi‐presidential system, this chapter focuses on the actual nature and features of the position and role of the president in the context of the constitutional and political system of the Republic of Slovenia, in six further sections: National Independence and Establishment of the First President of the Republic, Parliament and Government; Historical Factors and the Events Surrounding the Formation of the Regime; The Constitutional Powers of the President, Prime Minister, and Parliament; The Nature of the Parliamentary Majority and the Relationship Between the President and the Majority; and Conclusion.
Ukraine
Authors: Wilson Andrew 
Published: October 2003

AbstractUkraine can be said to have a semi‐presidential system insofar as it has direct presidential elections combined with a prime minister and a government answerable to both president and parliament. Since winning independence in 1991, Ukraine has also gained a reputation for political gridlock: both of the presidents elected since independence disappointed the initial hopes of their supporters, building up an impressive array of powers on paper, but proving unable to match this in practice. Conflict between presidents, prime ministers, and the chairmen of parliament has been an endemic feature of Ukrainian politics, as have the frustrations of a weak and fractious post‐communist party system. This chapter seeks to explain why semi‐presidentialism has nevertheless provided an attractive form of political compromise in Ukraine's ethnically, linguistically, and regionally divided society, despite the problems of political stasis that it has both reflected and helped to promote. The aim is to explain why circumstances have made it difficult for Ukraine to choose any other regime type, despite the residual enthusiasm of the Ukrainian Left for a Soviet (i.e. parliamentary) republic. The chapter first examines how semi‐presidentialism was established in Ukraine and then looks at Duverger's other key criteria of semi‐presidentialism: the constitutional powers of the key political actors, the nature of the parliamentary majority, and the relations between the president and that majority.
Liberalism, Justice, and Markets
Authors: Macleod Colin M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book presents a systemic and definitive critique of Ronald Dworkin's highly influential theory of liberal equality. Focusing on the connection Dworkin attempts to establish between economic markets and liberal equality, the book examines Dworkin's contention that markets have an indispensable role to play in the articulation of liberal ideals of distributive justice, individual liberty, and state neutrality. The book also examines the issues concerning individual responsibility and entitlement as well as the nature of justice with respect to persons with disabilities. The author argues that Dworkin's attempt to establish deep affinities between the market and equality is unsuccessful and his proposed solutions to some central controversies in political theory are seriously flawed. This powerful examination of the work of America's leading public philosopher reveals some timely lessons about the hazards and limitations of the market as a device for the articulation and realization of egalitarian justice.
Initial Equality
Authors: Macleod Colin M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines Dworkin's claim that what justice requires by way of an initial distribution of resources can be established by considering the operation of an ideal market. The special auction device used by Dworkin to articulate his theory of equality of resources fails because it does not display adequate sensitivity to the conditions under which preferences for goods expressed in even ideal market settings assume ethical significance.
Unequal Talents
Authors: Macleod Colin M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines Dworkin's analysis of, and proposed solution to, the problem for egalitarian justice by natural differences in individual talent. Egalitarians seek a distribution that is ambition (or choice) sensitive but endowment insensitive. Dworkin's diagnosis of the nature of the problem posed by unequal natural endowment is flawed and his attempt to develop a theory of redistributive taxation on a complex hypothetical insurance market scheme faces many serious objections.
The Basic Mechanisms
Authors: Blanchard Olivier 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 2 focuses on the basic mechanisms behind the initial decline in output and the later recovery. I argue that there have been two main mechanisms at work. The first is reallocation. Some sectors, such as manufacturing, need to decline; others, such as trade and services, need to expand. I argue that this reallocation process, and its many dimensions, can explain the initial output decline and the initial increase in unemployment. The second mechanism is restructuring. If they are to survive, existing firms need to change their product lines, to close old plants and build new ones and so on. I show how restructuring can explain both the recovery of output and the continuing high rate of unemployment.
The Modern Laws of War from 1874 to 1949
Authors: Nabulsi Karma 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is the first of three chapters that set out the differing contexts through which the dilemma in the laws of war over the distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants can be viewed: political and diplomatic (this chapter), social (Chapter 2) and intellectual (Chapter 3). The narrative begins by summarizing the diplomatic history of the conferences at Brussels in 1874, at the Hague in 1899 and 1907, and at Geneva in 1949. While the negotiations of the laws of war proved successful in many respects, they consistently failed to agree on a common legal understanding of a lawful combatant.
Staking Out: The Distinctiveness of Analysing Ideologies
Authors: Freeden Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis is the first of three chapters on theorizing about ideological morphology. It looks at the challenges awaiting the student of ideology, what can be gleaned from the most salient theories and views in circulation, and where the state of the art raises questions and leaves gaps to be filled. The material presented demonstrates that there are manifold ways of answering the question ‘what is an ideology?’ There are eight sections: (a) The Conceptual histories of ideology; (b) In search of a single concept; (c) Analytical misconceptions; (d) Rival epistemologies; (e) Philosophy [political philosophy] and ideology: the unholy alliance; (f) Unconscious and rhetorical components of ideology; (g) Ideology and the limits on logic; and (h) The ubiquity and specificity of ideology.
Assembling: From Concepts to Ideologies
Authors: Freeden Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe previous chapter examined some of the conflicting approaches to the analysis ideology and explored several boundary problems of ideology and philosophy, and in the wake of that examination, this chapter starts in the realization that ideologies are, in terms of their forms and the meanings they contain, relatively untouched. It has been a feature of the ‘black box’ approach to suggest what objects of research can do, even to predict their behaviour accurately, while remaining agnostic as to what they are, and what the inside of the box looks like. That reticence or quiescence often reflects apprehension in the face of the great complexity of both the structure and the mechanisms assumed to prevail inside the black box. This chapter is an endeavour to open the black box of ideology and assess its contents. There are six sections: (a) Political words and political concepts; (b) Reassessing essential contestability; (c) The morphology of political concepts; (d) Logical and cultural adjacency; (e) The morphology of ideologies; and (f) The escape from strong relativism.
Applying: The Contexts of Ideological Meaning
Authors: Freeden Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExplores further the consequences of conceptual contestability and determinacy in conjunction with questions of ideological meaning. The eight sections of the chapter are: (a) The inevitability of [the contribution of] history [to the meaning of ideology]; (b) Contextual history and intentionality; (c) Ideology and hermeneutics; (d) The contribution of Begriffsgeschichte [the school of conceptual history]; (e) Competing viewpoints and the path to integration; (f) Structure and morphology; (g) Meeting some objections; and (h) Ideologies as vehicles of political theory.
The Challenge of Philosophical Liberalism: Contextualizing the Contemporary American Variant
Authors: Freeden Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPhilosophical liberalism poses a challenge for the ideological analyst since it illustrates the divide between ideology and political philosophy discussed in Part I of the book, even though at least one of its most representative formulators (R. Dworkin) refers to its distinct ideological features. It is almost entirely ahistorical despite superficial allusions to the historical liberal tradition, and adopts the conceptual purism of some philosophers in its attempts to isolate the synchronic constitutive principles of liberalism ‘as such’; it is formalistic and rule bound. It is currently the most carefully argued and academically the most widely discussed liberal theory, and moreover, follows the academic trend of resurrecting major ideologies—Marxism is the best‐known example—within the confines of philosophical discourse and, like twentieth‐century Marxism, it exhibits the scholastic tendency of relatively circumscribed circles to focus detailed and often repetitive debate on a small number of texts, so that liberal principles are stated in such a way as to blur the distinctions between the theory and the ideology. Significantly, American philosophical liberalism is both similar to and different from other American liberal counterparts and a comparison between the two is therefore of some interest. Philosophical liberalism, it is contended, has borrowed a false horizon for American liberalism, stretching back to Kant but unrelated to the thought‐behaviour of American liberals; the hitherto existing horizons of those liberals, whether accumulative or diminishing, and whether compatible or incongruous, hark back instead to Locke, to progressivism and the New Deal, and to the civil rights movement of the 1960s.
Mistaken Identities and Other Anomalies: The Liberal Pretenders
Authors: Freeden Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe last three chapters have examined a number of examples of liberal ideology, including an American version, which contains considerable departures from what has normally been identified as liberalism; there is now sufficient evidence to confirm the hypothesis advanced in Ch. 4 that J. S. Mill's morphology is central to the liberal family. However, there is a further category—libertarianism—which is addressed in this chapter and claims to be part of the liberal family, but which on closer observation appears to be seriously attenuated, lacking many of the attributes that bestow on the liberal profile its distinctive contours. It is etymologically related to liberalism through the concept of liberty, but eschews the unique configuration of concepts that typifies liberalism, preferring instead to overemphasize heavily one concept (liberty) at the expense of the others. In some of its variants, libertarianism can lean towards anarchism, when the core concept of power as dispersed (or, if centralized, accountable) is replaced by the absence of any centralized power; in others, organized political power is retained, but as the guarantor of individual liberty alone, and the question of accountability diminishes in importance. Libertarianism may also differ from liberalism in surrounding liberty with adjacent concepts drawn from a political culture that displays conservative characteristics, without itself being wholly conservative.