bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Prototype Categories: I
Authors: Taylor John R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Chapter 2 presented the classical theory of categories, according to which a category is deﬁned in terms of a set of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for membership. The chapter also raised a number of critical issues with respect to classical categories. What is the status of the features which deﬁne a category? Are they conceptually primitive? Do all members of a category necessarily share a set of criterial properties? Are word meanings reducible to sets of primitive semantic components? What is the status of ‘expected’, as opposed to ‘necessary’ features? Is it legitimate to make a distinction between a person’s linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge? Can we ever know the meaning of a word independently of our acquaintance with the relevant facts of the world? The classical theory of categorization has also been challenged by experimental work in psychology (Smith and Medin 1981). In this chapter we review some of the better-known empirical ﬁndings and introduce an alterna-tive to the classical approach, namely categorization by prototype. We will also consider, in a preliminary fashion, the potential relevance of prototype categorization to linguistic inquiry.
Prototype Categories: II
Authors: Taylor John R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This chapter continues the discussion of prototype categories begun in Chapter 3. A number of issues need to be dealt with. Firstly, the notion of prototype itself needs to be given more substance. What exactly are proto-types? The discussion will lead us to reconsider the status of classical cate-gories. If all kinds of entities – natural and artefactual, those denoted by nouns as well as those denoted by verbs and adjectives, even, as we shall see in later chapters, the categories of linguistic structure itself – are categorized by prototype, what, if anything, is left of the classical model? Do all categories have a prototype structure, or are there still categories which conform with Aristotelian principles, i.e. categories with necessary and suﬃcient conditions for membership, with clear-cut boundaries, and with only two degrees of membership, i.e. member and non-member? We shall see that Aristotelian categories may still need to be recognized, although their status will need to be reassessed. First, though, I shall spell out in more detail exactly what is meant by a prototype, and consider some of the diﬃculties associated with prototype categorization.
Polysemous Categories in Intonation
Authors: Taylor John R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Although polysemy is generally regarded as a property of lexical items, we have seen (Chapter 9) that the association of more than one meaning with a single linguistic form is not limited to the lexicon. Polysemy also characterizes morphological, morph syntactic, and even syntactic categories. In this chapter we explore the polysemy of prosodic categories involved in a description of intonation. The main burden of the chapter will be, ﬁrstly, to demonstrate that the formal categories employed in an analysis of intonation are indeed polysemous, and, secondly, to show the inadequacy of attempts to state the semantic contribution of intonation in terms of core meanings. Some data pertinent to an important component of English intonation will be analysed with a view to explicating the family resemblance structure of the category. Intonation is one of the most diﬃcult areas of linguistic description. Even linguistically naïve speakers are aware that intonation contributes, in some vaguely felt way, to the total meaning of an utterance. It is the task of the linguist to explicate this semantic contribution. This involves setting up a formal descriptive apparatus, associating a meaning, or range of meanings, to each formal element of the descriptive system.
Gerunds
Authors: Hudson Richard 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This chapter is adapted from Hudson 2003b, where I offer a WG account of English gerunds1 such as having in (127). (127) (We were talking about) John having a sabbatical. What makes gerunds interesting and challenging is that they combine the internal characteristics of a clause with the external characteristics of a noun phrase. Previous analyses have tried to recognize the mixed character of gerunds by assigning them two separate nodes, one verbal and the other nominal. However dependency analyses such as WG syntax allow only one node per word, so they do not allow analyses of this kind. Twonode analyses would be strong evidence against dependency analysis so it is important to be sure whether they are needed. This chapter presents an analysis similar to the one proposed by Malouf in which the verbal and nominal classifications are combined on a single node which inherits both verbal and nominal characteristics (Malouf 2000); but unlike Malouf’s analysis it does not assume phrase structure. Like his, it exploits the logic of multiple default inheritance which allows a single node to inherit from two supercategories—in this case from both Verb and Noun. As Malouf points out, multiple inheritance works because English grammar is organized in such a way that the characteristics of these categories are orthogonal.
Meaning: Semantics and Sociolinguistics
Authors: Hudson Richard 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
What do semantics and sociolinguistics have in common? Very little, to judge by traditional approaches to the two subjects. Semantic studies of quantifiers, anaphora, and even lexical semantics seem to be located in a different intellectual world from sociolinguistic studies of accents and dialects, politeness forms, and the like. However I think this separation misses an important point which has been made strongly by functional and cognitive linguists, and perhaps especially by Halliday (Halliday 1978).
A Theory of Properties
Authors: Inwagen Peter van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
1. IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT TO BELIEVE IN ABSTRACT OBJECTS IF WE COULD GET AWAY WITH IT
In their book A Subject without an Object: Strategies for the Nominal istic Interpretation of Mathematics (the main topic of the book is well conveyed by its subtitle), John Burgess and Gideon Rosen suggest that-in fact, they argue at some length for the conclusion that-the motivation for undertaking nominalistic reconstructions of mathemat ics has not been clearly and persuasively formulated.2 This seems to me to be wrong. At any rate, it seems to me that it is not hard to formulate the motivation (or a sufficient motivation) for this project clearly and persuasively. Suppose one could show this: it would be better not to believe in abstract objects if one could get away with it. Or this, if it is not the same: it would be philosophically desirable to accept only philosophical positions that do not require their adherents to affirm the existence of abstract objects. I will take it that it is evident why someone who accepted this conclusion (or either of them, if they are different) would have a strong motivation for wishing that a nominalis tic reconstruction or interpretation of mathematics were available.
How Do Particulars Stand to Universals?
Authors: Armstrong D M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The theory advanced in this paper is not mine. It was put forward by Donald Baxter in a remarkable paper read to a departmental meeting at the University of Connecticut in the spring semester of 1999. It is now, I am glad to say, published (Baxter, 2001). Illuminating discussions with Baxter have continued, including his comments on this paper, but I will present what I take to be his central inspiration in my own way. (We diverge on one important point, to be indicated.) His theory seems to me to be very attractive, and well worth further investigation.
The Cartesian God and the Eternal Truths
Authors: Walski Gregory 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Throughout his works, from his letters to Mersenne as early as 1630 to a letter to More dated 5 February 1649 just months before his death), Descartes advances his doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths, according to which the laws and truths of mathematics, logic, and metaphysics-what we call ‘necessary’ truths-were determined by God’s free will. In his letter to Mersenne of 27 May 1630, he writes that God ‘was free to make it not true that all the radii of the circle are equal-just as he was free not to create the world’ (AT i. 152; CSMK 25).1 In theSixth Replies, he claims that God’s will is responsible for ‘all order, every law, and every reason for anything’s being true or good’ (AT vii. 435; CSM ii. 293-4). And in his letter to Arnauld of 19 July 1648, he asserts that ‘every basis of truth and goodness depends on [God’s] omnipo-tence’, and so that he ‘would not dare say that God cannot make a mountain without a valley, or bring it about that I and 2 are not 3’ (AT V. 223―4; CSMK 358―9).
The First Condemnation of Descartes’s CEuvres: Some Unpublished Documents from the Vatican Archives
Authors: Armogathe Jean-Robert , Carraud Vincent 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is well known that some of Descartes’s Latin writings were placed on the Catholic Church’s Index of Prohibited Books in 1663. The condemnation decree has been published many times in the modern era, in particular by Francisque Bouillier, and then (in a corrected version) by Georges Monchamp. The circumstances around the condemnation have been closely studied by Monchamp, working from the archives at the University of Louvain. The opening of the historic archives of the Archives of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith (ACDF) has now made possible the discovery of the Church’s secret dossier on the condemnation,3 which in turn allows us to illuminate the motives and circumstances surrounding it.
Family choices: What do children really want?
Authors: Almond Brenda 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
What many of the choices made about children, whether at the embryonic, infant, or teenage stage, have in common is that they are grounded in the preferences and needs of adults. The previous chapter illustrated the way in which possibilities inherent in the new technologies of reproduction mean that rights it has never before been necessary to claim can be nullified at the earliest stage of a person’s life by adult choices. But these are not the only ways, and this is not the only stage, when children’s rights and interests can be preempted by others before they acquire a ‘voice’ for themselves. Later stages of infancy, and even children’s growing years, are vulnerable.
The Mechanism of Social Appropriation and its Role in Hellenistic Ethics
Authors: Algra Keimpe 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the historiography of philosophy Hellenistic ethics has often been characterized as rather narrowly focused on the (good) life of the individual. As the cliche would have it, the demise of the Greek polis structure deprived the traditional political or social branches of ethics of their vitality and fostered the development of ethical systems that were solely concerned with individual happiness.
Simulating quantum mechanics by non­contextual hidden variables
Authors: Clifton Rob 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Bell’s theorem (Bell 1964) establishes that local hidden variable theories are committed to Bell inequalities violated by quantum correlations. Since violations of Bell inequalities can be verified without requiring that the observables whose correlations figure in the inequalities be measured with arbitrarily high precision, Bell’s theorem yields a method of falsifying local hidden variable the­ ories. Moreover, the evidence for violations of Bell inequalities We thank J. Finklestein, N. D. Mermin, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. A. K. was supported by a Royal Society University Research Fellow­ ship and thanks the Oxford Centre for Quantum Computation for much appreciated hospitality.
The Epistemological Objection to Opaque Teleological Theories of Content
Authors: Jackson Frank 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
After you’ve seen someone walk through a minefield, you have a pretty good idea where they think the mines are located. After you’ve dined regularly with someone, you have a pretty good idea of what they like to eat and drink. And so on and so forth. It is a commonplace that what people do and say tells the folk— that is, you and me, Shakespeare and Aristotle, most of us when we are not drawing on specialist knowledge in cognitive science or whatever— a good deal about the contents of the beliefs and desires of our fellow human beings, and more generally about what they think. The observation of behaviour in circumstances often grounds justified belief about the contents of intentional states, and, what is more, we qua members of the folk know this.
Fearing Fluffy: The Content of an Emotional Appraisal
Authors: Price Carolyn 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Harry was visiting his friend Mel. He had wandered into the kitchen to make a cup of tea, when he heard a sound behind him. He swung round to see Mel’s cat Fluffy hissing at him from the floor. Seeing Fluffy’s aggressive stance, Harry panicked: he kicked out at the cat and bolted from the kitchen. Later, Harry described to Mel what happened: ‘I evaluated the situation’, he said, ‘and judged that Fluffy presented a danger.’ Harry, it seems, was not being entirely honest: there is a difference between the dispassionate evaluation that he described to Mel and the emotional response that he actually produced. But what could the difference be? The problem is particularly puzzling if we accept that emotions are not simply bodily feelings or urges, but involve appraisals of some kind.
How many Lives has Schro dinger’s Cat? The Jack Smart Lecture, Canberra, 27 June 2001
Authors: Lewis David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
To reach the point I want to discuss, I must begin with a sketchy review of quantum mechanics. I apologise to those of you who know this material already, perhaps better than I do. But it will be an opinionated review: some of my opinions are eccentric. So there may be something in it even for those who are already expert. Quantum mechanics is, in a nutshell, the theory of suprpostons. To introduce this concept, I begin with the standard account of the benzene ring-an account so well entrenched in organic chemistry that it would probably survive even if its quantum-mechanical foundation crumbled away beneath it. The benzene ring is a hexagon of carbon atoms, each with a hydrogen atom attached. Replace two adjacent hydrogens with two different substituents, so that we can unambiguously number the sides of the hexagon. Two structures conform to the rules of valence: one with double bonds on the odd-numbered sides, another with double bonds on the even-numbered sides (see Figure 1).The molecule reacts sometimes as if it had one structure, sometimes as if it had the other. Yet we do not think that a population of molecules is a mixture of the two structures. Neither do we think that each molecule oscillates rapidly between one structure and the other. Neither do we think that the molecule has a betwixt-and-between structure- there is no such thing as a bond midway between double and single. Rather, we think that each molecule is in a superposition: a state objectively indeterminate between the two structures. Objective indeterminacy is multiplicity: a cloud of indeterminate extent, for instance, is really many clouds, almost but not quite identical to one another [Unger 1980; Lewis 1999b]. Likewise a molecule with an objectively indeterminate structure is really two coexisting molecules, one with one structure and one with the other. (Or at any rate, two things that are molecule-like except for from their coexistence with one another.)
Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties
Authors: Egan Andy 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Problems about the accidental properties of properties motivate us-force us, I think-not to identify properties with the sets of their instances. If we identify them instead with functions from worlds to extensions, we get a theory of properties that is neutral with respect to disputes over counterpart theory, and we avoid a problem for Lewis’s theory of events. Similar problems about the temporaryproperties of properties motivate us-though this time they probably don’t forceus-to give up this theory as well, and to identify properties with functions from (world, time) pairs to extensions. Again, the replacement theory is neutral with respect to a metaphysical dispute that the old theory (arguably) forces us to take a stand on-the dispute over whether objects have temporal parts. It also allows us to give a smoother semantics for predication, to better accommodate our intuitions about which objects temporary properties are properties of, and to make temporally self-locating beliefs genuinely self-locating. If you’re doing systematic metaphysics, problems for, and revisions to, one part of your theory will tend to have ramifications elsewhere. This paper is about a problem for Lewis’s theory of properties. It’s also about what happens to the Lewisian system when we revise the theory of properties in order to avoid the problem. So I’ll be concerned to do two things in what follows: First, I’ll argue that Lewis’s theory of properties has a fatal problem with accounting for second-order properties-the properties of properties. Second, I’ll trace the ramifications of the revision through the rest of Lewis’s system.
Desire Beyond Belief
Authors: jek Alan Ha’ , Pettit Philip 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the ‘Desire-as- Belief Thesis’. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis’s. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing background on evidential decision theory and on Lewis’s negative results. We then introduce what we call the indexicality loophole:if the goodness of a proposition is indexical, partly a function of an agent’s mental state, then the negative results have no purchase. Thus we propose a variant of Desire-as- Belief that exploits this loophole. We argue that a number of meta-ethical positions are committed to just such indexicality. Indeed, we show that with one central sort of evaluative belief-the belief that an option is right-the indexicality loophole can be exploited in various interesting ways. Moreover, on some accounts, ‘good’ is indexical in the same way. Thus, it seems that the anti-Humean can dodge the negative results. David Hume’s rejection of necessary connections between distinct existences was thoroughgoing. He was as wary of them among psychological states as he was of them among external events. In particular, he argued that there are no necessary connections between beliefsand desires, even those of a perfectly rational agent; thus, he maintained, there are no beliefs that rationally require corresponding desires, and there are no desires that rationally require corresponding beliefs. So one way of being an anti-Humean about mental states is to insist that rationality doesplace certain constraints on which beliefs and desires can be simultaneously held. For example, one sort of anti-Humean might insist that a state of believing (perhaps to a certain degree) something to be good requires a corresponding desire (or degree of desire) for that thing. Or, conversely, she might insist that every (degree of) desire requires a corresponding (degree of) belief in the goodness of the object of that desire.
Introduction
Authors: Goldberg Sanford C 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Almost forty years have elapsed since the publication of the papers and books initiating the internalism/externalism debate in epistemology,1 and it has been a bit more than thirty years since the publication of the papers initiating the internalism/externalism debate in the philosophy of mind and language.2 Until very recently little attention has been paid to whether there are any interesting connections between these two debates.3 (Until recently, what discussion there was on the topic of connections between the two I/E debates focused primarily on semantic externalism‘s implications for self-knowledge and skepticism.)4
Psychological Externalism and the Role of Belief in the Analysis of Knowledge
Authors: Owens Joseph 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Psychological externalism is a metaphysical thesis—one to the effect that physically identical individuals can differ in their psychologies, in their beliefs and desires, even though they are molecule for molecule physical replicas.1 Metaphysical or not, an astonishing array of epistemological claims have been linked to externalism. Some of the better-known examples: Hilary Putnam has argued that it provides for a refutation of Cartesian skepticism; Michael McKinsey and Anthony Brueckner have argued that rather than leading to a refutation of Cartesian skepticism it deepens the skeptical quagmire, undermining selfknowledge; Davidson has argued for a split decision: the kind of externalism usually associated with Burge (arguments which turn on subjects having incomplete or incorrect conceptual understanding) tells against self-knowledge, while examples of the Putnam kind, examples in which the subject merely fails to have any scientific understanding of something (e.g. water), don’t generate any new kind of skepticism, and indeed are part of the answer to skepticism.2
Socrates the Sophist
Authors: Taylor C C W 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In his speech against Timarchus, delivered in 345, Aeschines asserts baldly that ‘You, Athenians, killed the sophist Socrates because he was seen as having educated Critias, one of the Thirty who overthrew the democracy’ (Tim. 173). So a little over fifty years after Socrates’ death, an orator can take the description of him as a sophist for granted, as something which his audience will accept as uncontroversial. Now it is commonplace that Plato regarded the perception of Socrates as a sophist as having contributed to the hostility which led to his being accused and his death, and that it was consequently central to his apologetic programme to distance Socrates from the sophists.
The Self and Time
Authors: Robinson Howard 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I start this paper from the assumption—which I and others have defended elsewhere—that the human subject—the self—is immaterial and simple.1 I also want to stay as close as possible to Descartes’s intuition that the essence of the self is consciousness. Because he thinks that immaterial substances are essentially conscious, he feels obliged to maintain that we are never wholly unconscious, but, even in the deepest sleep, are dreaming. It is setting out from this problem that I wish to investigate the relation between the self and time. The nature of the problem can be expressed as an argument.
The Sources of the Hippiatrica
Authors: Mccabe Anne 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The Hippiatrica is a chorus of many voices: apart from lemmata added by the editor, the compilation is made up entirely of the text of its sources, each of which retains a distinct identity. Some personalities emerge clearly, others are less distinct; but the form of the encyclopaedia, by juxtaposing parallel passages, helps to emphasize similarities and differences between them. The similarities are striking: the treatises belong within the same scientific tradition, a tradition of which the Hippiatrica represents a codification. At the same time, the diversity of their opinions is readily apparent, as is that of their language: some texts are coloured by rhetorical artifice, while others are plain- spoken.