bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Conscious Hero and the Rites of Man Ellison’s War
Authors: Wright John S 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The psychogenesis o f Invisible Man, Ralph Ellison has reiterated periodically, lies in a World War II furlough’s tonic state of “hyperreceptivity”: Sent home from the Merchant Marines in the winter of 1944 to recuperate from wartime stress, Ellison had “floundered” into a powerful intuition. With the aesthetic conviction that “war could, with art, be transformed into something more meaningful than its surface violence” (IM, xiv), he had begun work on a recalcitrant war novel. That work was subverted, he says, by a punning inner voice that brooded over the perennial conundrum of black soldiers fighting for the right to fight for freedom in a war designed to return them home unfree. The voice announced irrepressibly, “I am an invisible man.” Its words rebutted sharply the sociological truism that most Afro-American troubles sprang from the group’s “high visibility,” and spurred Ellison to abandon his planned war novel for a highly experimental, panoramic, and picaresque fictional “memoir.” The new work concerned itself more broadly “with the nature of leadership, and thus with the nature of the hero... [and] with the question of just why our Negro leadership was never able to enforce its will. Just what was there about American society that kept Negroes from throwing up effective leaders?” Absorbed at the same moment with Lord Raglan’s The Hero: A Study in Tradition, Myth, and Drama (1936), Ellison turned his explorations into modern myth, mores, and caste codes to the specific subject of American “race rituals.” His probings subsequently yielded, as a narrative embryo, the grotesque high school graduation rites undergone by a young, would-be leader of his people in the tale “Battle Royal,” which Ellison published in 1947, five years before the novel for which it would serve as the opening chapter.
Notes on the Invisible Women in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man
Authors: Tate Claudia 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Questions about t he female characters in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man seem to elicit two types of response: The initial one is “What women?” since women clearly occupy peripheral roles in the novel. And then after Mary Rambo and the other female characters—that is, the old slave woman, the magnificent blonde, the rich sophisticate Emma, the anonymous seductress, and finally the prophetic and pathetic Sybil— are recalled, the second response is something like “Oh, those stereotypes” (Sylvander, 77-79). Both replies are virtually automatic and both are legitimate, given the factual details of the narrative. But we must not be misled by what can be seen with a quick glance; we must not neglect what lies hidden behind the mask and proclaim that the mask is the face. Instead, we must remember Ellison’s own witty admonition that the rind is not the heart and look for the concealed truth which lies beneath the stereotyped exteriors of his female characters. In his essay “Twentieth-Century Fiction,” Ellison contends that stereotypes, though indisputably one-dimensional and therefore oversimplified, frequently hide complex aspects of human character. Moreover, he adds that “the Negro has been more willing perhaps than any other artist to start with the stereotype, accept it as true, and then seek out the human truth which it hides” (S&A, 43). Perhaps this is also an appropriate procedure to follow when examining the female characters in Invisible Man; that is, “start with the [female] stereotype[s], accept [them] as true, and then seek out the human truth which [they] hide.” Perhaps by following this example, we will not be attempting merely to define female humanity but to recognize, as Ellison suggests, broader aspects of the humanity of all of us.
Luminosity from the Lower Frequencies
Authors: Forrest Leon 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I should like to discuss certain intellectual, cultural, and historical influences upon Ralph Ellison’s sense of the hero’s character in process and the structure of the major chapters throughout his monumental novel, Invisible Man. Several influences come to mind: Kenneth Burke, Lord Raglan, Dostoevski, and Faulkner, as well as the artistic and jazzlike rendering of folkloric sources. From the literary critic Burke, Ellison came to see the possibility of using a formula to structure a chapter. Burke held that a pattern could be employed to achieve character-in-process progression through the formula of purpose, passion, and perception: each chapter begins with a purpose for the hero, but then much of the action of the middle section involves a struggle, or passion, over this purpose, or quest. Out of this mix or confrontation with others and the self, the hero comes away with a heightened perception, a keener awareness about his life, so that a metamorphosis, or rebirth, is implied. But these moments are stages of his processing into life, and the cycle, once completed, unleashes new problems and struggles.
“Segregation Is Per Se Inequality”
Authors: Yarbrough Tinsley E 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
While Judge Waring was dismantling South Carolina’s white primary, urging total racial integration, and in the process becoming something of a southern pariah, the U.S. Supreme Court had been steadily chipping away at segregation in transportation, housing, and higher education. In 1950, the Court decided two extremely significant cases. McLaurin v. Oklahoma held that a state could not admit a black student to its previously all-white graduate school, then segregate the black student from his white classmates within the institution. On the same day that the McLaurin case was decided, the Court handed down an even more important decision in Sweatt v. Painter, ordering Herman Sweatt admitted to the University of Texas law school even though the state had recently established a law school for blacks. Chief Justice Vinson had observed for the Sweatt Court that, in determining whether segregated facilities were equal, trial judges were to consider not only tangible factors, but also intangible factors-”those qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.”
Judge Waring had followed the line of Supreme Court cases closely, avidly reading the Court’s opinions as well as briefs secured from Walter White, Thurgood Marshall, and other sources. He had been particularly impressed with an amicus curiae brief filed by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America and the council’s assertion that segregation itself “necessarily predicates inferiority rather than equality.”
What the Book Is About
Authors: Gordimer Nadine 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The theme of my novel is human conflict between the desire to live a personal, private life, and the rival claim of social responsibility to one’s fellow men-human advancement. Through the personage of Rosa Burger, the question is posed and explored: What is a meaningful life? Is there a cause greater than the gift of life itself Can one fulfill oneself simply by earning a living, falling in love, marrying, and producing the next generation, with no concern for anyone outside the family circle?
Still Waiting for the Great Feminist Novel
Authors: Gardner Susan 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In July 1979 , Nadine Gordimer’s novel Burser’s Daushter—the story of a young Afrikaner woman from a Communist family, focussing on her personal and ideological rebellion after her father’s death during life imprisonment-was banned for import and distribution in the author’s country, South Africa. The Publications Control Board’s accusations declared the book “undesirable” on every count under section 47(2) of the Publicatons Act of 1974.
Burger’s Daughter Lighting a Torch in the Heart of Darkness
Authors: Liscio Lorraine 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In Nadine Gordimer’s First Novel, The Lying Days, the protagonist, Helen Shaw, lists the writers who shaped her literary heritage: Auden, T. S. Eliot, Donne, Hemingway, D. H. Lawrence, Chekhov, Smollett, and Pepys. She is puzzled to find that “in nothing that I read could I find anything that approximated to my own life; to our life on a gold mine in South Africa.” If she failed to recognize her world in European narratives, Helen felt equally alienated from the pictures of Africa portrayed by books she read: “What did the great rivers, the savage tribes, the jungles and the hunt for huge palm-eared elephants have to do with the sixty miles of Witwatersrand veld that was our Africa?” (96-97).
The completeness of the axioms of the functional calculus of logic1 (1930)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Whitehead and Russell, as is well known, constructed logic and mathematics by initially taking certain evident propositions as axioms and deriving the theorems of logic and mathematics from these by means of some precisely formulated principles of inference in a purely formal way (that is, without making further use of the meaning of the symbols). Of course, when such a procedure is followed the question at once arises whether the initially postulated system of axioms and principles of inference is complete, that is, whether it actually suffices for the derivation of every logicomathematical proposition, or whether, perhaps, it is conceivable that there are true propositions (which may even be provable by means of other principles) that cannot be derived in the system under consideration. For the formulas of the propositional calculus the question has been settled affirmatively; that is, it has been shown2 that every correct formula of the propositional calculus does indeed follow from the axioms given in Principia mathematica. The same will be done here for a wider realm of formulas, namely those of the “restricted functional calculus” ;3 that is, we shall prove Theorem I.
Über die Vollstandigkeit des Logikkalkiils (1930a)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Bei der axiomatischen Begriindung der Logik, wie sie z. B. in den Principia Mathematica vorliegt, taucht die Frage auf, ob die an die Spitze gestellten Axiome ‘‘vollstandig” sind, d. h. wirklich dazu ausreichen, jeden richtigen Satz der Logik auf formalem Wege zu deduzieren. Dieses Problem ist bisher nur fiir die einfachsten logischen Satze, namlich die des Aussagenkalkiils, gelost. Die Antwort fallt positiv aus, d. h.: Jede richtige (allgemeingiiltige) Aussageformel folgt aus den Axiomen der Principia Mathematica. Vortragender zeigt, wie man diesen Satz auf die Formeln des engeren Funktionenkalkiils (Formeln ohne gebundene Funktionsvariable) ausdehnen kann.
Introductory note to 1931a, 1932e, f and g
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The items considered in this note all concern events that took place during the second Conference on Epistemology of the Exact Sciences, a meeting organized by the Gesellschaft fur empirische Philosophie (Society for Empirical Philosophy) and held in Konigsberg on 5-7 September 1930. Most interesting among them is 1991a, which contains Gödel’s unexpected announcement, during a discussion session at the conference, of the existence of formally undecidable propositions.
Diskussion zur Grundlegung der Mathematik (1931a)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Nach formalistischer Auffassung fiigt man zu den sinnvollen Satzen der Mathematik transfinite (Schein- )Aussagen hinzu, welche an sich keinen Sinn haben, sondern nur dazu dienen, das System zu einem abgerundeten zu machen, ebenso wie man in der Geometrie durch Einfiihrung der unendlich fernen Punkte zu einem abgerundeten System gelangt. Diese Auffassung setzt voraus, daB, wenn man zum System S der sinnvollen Satze das System T der transfiniten Satze und Axiome hinzufiigt und dann einen Satz aus S auf dem Umweg iiber Satze aus T beweist, dieser Satz auch inhaltlich richtig ist, daB also durch Hinzufiigung der transfiniten Axiome keine inhaltlich falschen Satze beweisbar werden. Diese Forderung pflegt man durch die der Widerspruchsfreiheit zu ersetzen. Ich mochte nun darauf hinweisen, daB diese beiden Forderungen keinesfalls ohne weiteres als aquivalent angesehen werden diirfen. Denn wenn in einem widerspruchsfreien formalen System A (etwa dem der klassischen Mathematik) ein sinnvoller Satz p mit Hilfe der transfiniten Axiome beweisbar ist, so folgt aus der Widerspruchsfreiheit von A bloB, daf3 non-p innerhalb des Systems A formal nicht beweisbar ist. Trotzdem bleibt es denkbar, da6 man non-p durch irgendwelche inhaltliche (intuitionistische) Überlegungen einsehen konnte, die sich in A nicht formal darstellen lassen. In diesem Falle ware trotz der Widerspruchsfreiheit von A in A ein Satz beweisbar, dessen Falschheit man durch finite Betrachtungen einsehen konnte. Sobald man den Begriff “sinnvoller Satz” hinreichend eng fa6t {z. B. auf die finiten Zahlgleichungen beschrankt), kann etwas Derartiges allerdings nicht eintreten. Hingegen ware es z. B. durchaus moglich, daB man einen Satz der Form (Ex)F(x), wo F I eine finite Eigenschaft natiirlicher Zahlen ist (die Negation des Goldbachschen Satzes hat z. B. diese Form), mit den transfiniten Mitteln der klassischen Mathematik beweisen und andererseits durch inhaltliche Überlegungen einsehen konnte, daB alle Zahlen die Eigenschaft non-F haben, und zwar bleibt dies, worauf ich eben hinweisen mochte, auch dann noch moglich, wenn man die Widerspruchsfreiheit des formalen Systems der klassischen Mathematik nachgewiesen hatte. Denn man kann von keinem formalen System mit Sicherheit behaupten, daB alle inhaltlichen Überlegungen in ihm darstellbar sind.
Discussion on providing a foundation for mathematics (1931a)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
According to the formalist view one adjoins to the meaningful propositions of mathematics transfinite (pseudo-)assertions, which in themselves have no meaning, but serve only to round out the system, just as in geometry one rounds out a system by the introduction of points at infinity. This view presupposes that, if one adjoins to the system S of meaningful propositions the system T of transfinite propositions and axioms and then proves a theorem of S by making a detour through theorems of T, this theorem is also contentually correct, hence that through the adjunction of the transfinite axioms no contentually false theorems become provable. This requirement is customarily replaced by that of consistency. Now I would like to point out that one cannot, without further ado, regard these two demands as equivalent. For, if in a consistent formal system A (say that of classical mathematics) a meaningful proposition p is provable with the help of the transfinite axioms, there follows from the consistency of A only that not-p is not formally provable within the system A. Nonetheless it remains conceivable that one could ascertain not-p through some sort of contentual (intuitionistic) considerations that are not formally representable in A. In that case, despite the consistency of A, there would be provable in A a proposition whose falsity one could ascertain through finitary considerations.
Review of Betsch 1926: Fictions in mathematics (1931d)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This comprehensive work, which was awarded a prize by the Vienna Academy, reaches in all directions far beyond the theme “fictions in mathematics”. On the one hand, it discusses fictions in general and, in connection with them, the philosophical problems of reality and of truth; on the other, it treats in detail the problems of the foundations of mathematics. The method of presentation is chiefly historical. As concerns the theme proper, that is, the question whether and in what sense there are fictions in mathematics, the author’s attitude is predominantly negative. With respect to genuine fictions (contradictory but expedient assumptions), his answer always comes out negative, and all of Vaihinger’s assertions in this regard are shown to be erroneous. Whether unreal fictions (assumptions not in accord with reality) can be admitted to occur in mathematics depends, as the author seeks to show, upon one’s attitude toward foundational questions, conventionalism and empiricism (in Mill’s sense) in the end allowing such fictions the widest scope. In conclusion it is pointed out that fictions in a quite different sense (as tentative assumptions or provisional definitions) play a large role in the historical development of mathematics.
Ein Spezialfall des Entscheidungsproblems der theoretischen Logik (1932a)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Im Anschlufi an die fiir den Beweis der Vollstandigkeit des Funktionenkalkiils verwend te Methode (1990) kann man ein Verfahren entwickeln, welches fiir jede Formel mit einer Normalform der Gestalt: zu entscheiden gestattet, ob sie erfiillbar ist. Man fiihrt das Problem zunachst in bekannter Weise1 auf Formeln der Gestalt: problem is undecidable.
On completeness and consistency (1932b)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The introductory note to Gödel 1932b, as well as to related items, can be found on page 126, immediately preceding 1930b.] Let Z be the formal system that we obtain by supplementing the Peano axioms with the schema of definition by recursion (on one variable) and the logical rules of the restricted functional calculus. Hence Z is to contain no variables other than variables for individuals (that is, natural numbers), and the principle of mathematical induction must therefore be formulated as a rule of inference.
Introductory note to 1992c
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
We easily impose a true-false dichotomy on the truth-functional formulas of propositional logic by assigning arbitrary truth values to all the propositional letters and then letting the truth tables determine the truth values of all compound formulas. But now let us imagine, instead of the familiar formulas, a well-ordered but perhaps indenumerable supply. It is still to be closed under the operations’∼’ and’:::,’, but there need no longer be minimal units such as letters. Can we specify a true-false dichotomy for these formulas, conformable still to the truth-functional constraints on ‘∼’ and ‘:::,’? Gödel does so by a transfinite recursion based on Lukasiewicz’s three axioms (Lukasiewicz and Tarski 1990) and modus ponens.
Review of Klein 1931 : On the theory of abstract connectives (1932h)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The author investigates domains of individuals in which two operations, a U b and a n b, are defined and satisfy the axioms of the calculus of classes for union and intersection. The analog of complementation is introduced as a one-to-one symmetric mapping of the domain onto itself, by means of which the two connectives U and n are interchanged. In addition to the calculi of classes and of propositions, the operations max (a, b) and min (a, b), for example, or greatest common divisor and least common multiple, are considered as realizations of the axioms. After derivation of various simple theorems (for example, the uniqueness of the decomposition of elements of the domain into prime elements, if such a decomposition exists at all), what is called a “characteristic” mapping is introduced.
Review of Hoensbroech 1931: Relations between the content and extension of notions (1932i)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
If by an increase in the content of a notion we understand the adjoining of constituents without the existing connection between constituents being destroyed, then, as the author establishes in conjunction with a remark of Bolzano, extension need not be at all diminished by an increase in content. For example, in this sense “blue or red” has greater content than “blue”. The author then investigates the different kinds of increase in content that are possible from this point of view (conjunctive and disjunctive joining, negation, substitution of a name, adjoining of quantifiers) with regard to their effect on the extension of notions.
Review of Kalmar 1932: A contribution to the decision problem (1932l)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The decision problem for the restricted functional calculus is reduced to the case in which the expression under consideration possesses, in normal form, a prefix of the form That is, it is shown that for every expression A of the restricted functional calculus one can specify another expression B, with a prefix of the form displayed above, so that A is satisfiable (or satisfiable in a finite domain of individuals) if and only if the same is true of B. In particular, if B is satisfiable in a domain I, then A is satisfiable in that same domain I. If A is satisfiable in a domain I, then B is satisfiable in a more extensive domain I’, whose cardinality may easily be computed from that of J. B will contain a few more functional variables than A, but, as is shown, one can always ensure that B contains only two-place functional variables whenever A does.
[ Über die Parryschen Axiome ] (1933)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
“p impliziert q analytisch” kann man vielleicht so interpretieren: “q ist aus p und den logischen Axiomen ableitbar und enthiilt keine anderen Begriffe als p” und es ware, nachdem man diese Definition genauer priizisiert hat, ein Vollstiindigkeitsbeweis fiir die Parryschen Axiome [Parry 1933] zu erstreben, in dem Sinn, daB alle Siitze, welche fur die obige Interpretation von–gelten, ableitbar sind.
[ On Parry’s axioms] (1933)
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One can perhaps interpret “p analytically implies q” as follows: “q is derivable from p and the axioms of logic, and q contains no notions other than those in p”; and, after this definition has been made more precise, it would be appropriate to strive for a proof of the completeness of Parry’s axioms [Parry 1933], in the sense that all statements that hold when is interpreted as suggested above are derivable.
Introductory note to 1999a
Authors: Feferman Solomon , Dawson John W , Kleene Stephen C , Moore Gregory H , Solovay Robert M , Heijenoort Jean van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Hahn had asked whether every independence proof for formulas of the propositional calculus could be carried out with a finite model. Gödel here presents an independence proof using an infinite model and shows that no finite model would suffice. It was less than three months after this colloquium that Gödel answered a previous query of Hahn’s about the intuitionistic propositional calculus by again showing the inadequacy of finite models; see Gödel 1992.