bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
An Institute of Scientific Humanism
Authors: Reiser Oliver L. 
Published: November 2002

Recently I was asked by a somewhat disillusioned but well informed official of one of the important Foundations how long I thought it would be before we attained Utopia. My reply was that I thought we would make substantial progress toward a better world within the next one hundred years.The reply to this, as the reader may surmise, was that my estimate was much too optimistic, the intimation being that anyone who hopes for such rapid progress in this world must be rather naive in practical matters. Such a judgment represents a widely prevailing view, but one which is supposed to be “realistic.” According to this view, social advancement is a slow business. It will be said that there is no evidence that we are much better off than the ancients. Rather than that we have progressed beyond antiquity, we find that we, as of old, have our evidences of social degradation and maladjustment. Crimes, wars, unemployment, divorce, racial and religious conflicts, even W. P. A. projects—all these are as old as recorded history. Man cannot hope to go far in the next one hundred years because in the last one thousand years he has not improved his lot in terms of fundamental human values. All he has done is multiply his gadgets and invent some new ones. Perhaps—my critic opined—we can make some headway in the next thousand years, but it will be a slow and painful process.
A Theory on Causal Factors in the Origin of Life
Authors: Kavanau J. Lee 
Published: November 2002

In this paper a theory relating to the causal factors operative in the origin of living systems is presented.Let us consider living forms as material systems exhibiting, in addition to those properties held in common with all matter, systemic properties of a specific nature. If, then, the matter of the earth is classified from this standpoint, it is found that these systems are distributed only over the surface of the earth or in a shallow upper layer. This fact indicates that the special properties of these systems are related in some manner to factors introduced at the surface and not operative elsewhere.
A Note Concerning Winthrop's “Conceptual Difficulties in Modern Economic Theory”
Authors: Hull Clark L. 
Published: November 2002

In the article referred to in the title of this note, Winthrop quotes a paragraph from a recent article by me with italics inserted by him, and then proceeds to “translate” it into the language of an economic theory. Winthrop thoughtfully adds in a following paragraph the phrase, “… if I have not mistranslated him [Hull] into marginal terms.” The purpose of the present note is to correct what appears to have been a fundamental misunderstanding of the meaning of the passage, rather than an error of translation; at all events, it is only with the original meaning of the passage that this note is concerned. The paragraph as it originally appeared is as follows (p. 135) :“Economic value in one of its more obvious and primitive aspects involves the exchange of an amount of commodity X possessed by person No. 1 for an amount of commodity Y possessed by person No. 2. This type of behavior can come about voluntarily and continuously only on the condition that person No. 1 has a striving potential for Y which is greater than would be his striving potential for X when he no longer has X; and when person No. 2 has a striving potential for X which is greater than would be that for Y when he no longer has Y. Thus the total striving potential of both persons is reduced by the transaction.”
Whitehead's Theory of Actual Entities: Defence and Criticism
Authors: Johnson A. H. 
Published: November 2002

This article is an attempt to: (a) outline the essential elements in Alfred North Whitehead's theory of “actual entities“; (b) indicate the erroneous nature of a number of widely held interpretations and criticisms of his speculative scheme; (c) state criticisms which seem legitimately applicable to Whitehead's cosmology.Whitehead's theory of actual entities can only be understood if one continually bears in mind Whitehead's purpose in formulating this theory and the method which he uses in his project.
Hypothesis vs. Problem in Scientific Investigation
Authors: Smith Mapheus 
Published: November 2002

It is widely stated that a hypothesis is necessary to the execution of a scientific investigation. However, the dogmatic acceptance of this, as of every other proposition, is to be condemned until its implications have been adequately explored.It is the writer's view that hypotheses are not prerequisite to every study which contributes to organized and systematic knowledge of the observable world. It is also concluded that the recognition of a problem requiring a solution or a question deserving an answer is a step that must be taken in every sort of systematic study, and, therefore, that a problem is a more important characteristic of scientific method than a hypothesis.
The Semiotic Status of Commands
Authors: Bohnert Herbert Gaylord 
Published: November 2002

The large number of writers who have in recent years attacked the problem of the logical nature of commands appear generally in agreement in accepting the distinction of common grammar between imperative and declarative sentences as representing, albeit in no clear one-to-one manner, some real difference in the logical character of the two types of expression, and possibly in the psychological sign-functioning mechanism itself. The crucial logical difference adduced is that commands can apparently rot be classified as true or false. One is then, however, confronted with the problem of interpreting arguments involving imperatives which appear syllogistic in form, such as:Keep your promises!You promised to pay on Wednesday.Pay on Wednesday!
On the Non-Existence of the Atomic Secret
Authors: Malisoff William Marias 
Published: November 2002

My contention in what is to follow is that in a very important sense we have no atomic secret whatsoever. It is not ours to hide or to share. More than ever it is ours to seek. So far it remains quite undiscovered.Like good philosophers we must pay attention to the terms used in our assertions. We must point out where we meet the requirements of usage and where we decide to use terms in a definite way, although usage is vague. Thus, the term “atomic” is a misnomer, but it is a misnomer here to stay. It means “nuclear.” Like all good people we must continue saying “atomic” in this connection when we mean “nuclear,” but we must not forget this fact and substitute what we know about the atom for what we do not know about the nucleus. We must also realize that the term “secret” has at least a double use: one, which means that the knowledge is possessed by an exclusive few; another, which means that the knowledge is possessed by no one, as in the expression “a secret of Nature.”
The Philosophy and Physics of Relativity
Authors: Sellars Roy Wood 
Published: November 2002

There will be more philosophy than physics in this paper for I make no pretentions to an expert knowledge of physics. Categories are, however, in my line; and here I may have some insight.In the theory of relativity much depends upon the conception of the velocity of light in empty space. Such is the expression Einstein employs. If this velocity is to be a quantity independent of the choice of the inertial system to which it is referred, no absolute meaning can be assigned to the conception of the simultaneity of events that occur at points separated by a distance in space. Rather a special time must be allocated to every inertial system. “It is in consequence of this that space and time are welded together into a uniform four-dimensional continuum.” Thus succinctly does Einstein express the c hoice in his article in the Encyclopedia Britannica.
Corism
Authors: Randall John A. 
Published: November 2002

The theory of specifying an organization of meaning by reporting the relationship of elements of meaning to a specified central meaning bears the coined name, ‘corism’.'Meaning’ is here used as a collective noun and its referent is assumed to be an organized body of increments of meaning rather than a mere heterogeneous aggregation. Many such organized bodies with which we are concerned in this article are called either concepts or concept structures. The specification of the theory called ‘corism’ will be expanded by an illustration in which it is applied to recording and communicating meaning as organized in selected concepts and concept structures. The selected bodies of meaning relate to ‘operations called scientific’.
Problem-Centering vs. Means-Centering in Science
Authors: Maslow A. H. 
Published: November 2002

ResumeMeans-centered approach to science is contrasted with a problem-centered orientation. Overstress on and too exclusive concern with method, instrument, technique or procedure fosters the following mistakes:1) Emphasis on polish and elegance rather than on vitality, significance and creativeness.2) Giving the commanding positions in science to technicians rather than discoverers.3) Over-valuation of quantification for its own sake.4) Fitting problems to techniques rather than vice-versa.5) Creation of a false and pernicious hierarchical system among the sciences.6) Overstrong compartmentalization between the sciences.7) Emphasis on the difference rather than the similarities between scientists and other truth-seekers (poets, novelist, artists, philosophers).8) Creation of a scientific orthodoxy, which in turn a) tends to block the development of new methods, b) tends to exclude many problems from the jurisdiction of science and c) tends to make scientists “safe” rather than daring and unconventional.9) Neglect of the problems of values, with a consequent blurring of the criteria for judging the worth or importance of an experiment.
Entity and Aspects
Authors: Biser Erwin 
Published: November 2002

It is too often forgotten that even the most “objective” science such as physics is but a description, interpretation and ordering of physical reality from a selected point of view.In founding terrestial dynamics, Galileo, the father of modern experimental physics, selected concepts that could be given exact mathematical definitions and cast in a form conducive to quantitative results. The qualitative aspects of observed phenomena, such as the color of an accelerated body, and the ultimate cause of motion—a purely metaphysical problem—do not enter into the mathematical dynamical system of Galileo.
A. N. Whitehead and the Concept of Metaphysics
Authors: King Hugh R. 
Published: November 2002

W. E. Hocking has written recently that Whitehead's descriptive generalization of concrete fact, namely, his actual occasion, is “… not a term of description in the direct sense. It is an hypothesis. It cannot be kept in place by pointing to its presence as a datum: it can only hold its own if it proves to be a valuable conceptual tool.” I further advance the thesis that all generality is hypothetical, and holds it own only if it proves to be conceptually useful. This is in accord with Whitehead's statement, the full implications of which have not been taken seriously enough, that metaphysical categories are not dogmatic statements of the obvious; they are tentative formulations of the ultimate generalities. But when these tentative formulations prove conceptually useful or are conceptually employed, they lose their “hypothetical air,” and often pass into what Whitehead calls a false state of “sober obviousness:”“An old established metaphysical system gains a false air of adequate precision from the fact that its words and phrases have passed into current literature. Thus propositions expressed in its language are more easily correlated to our flitting intuitions into metaphysical truth. When we trust these verbal statements and argue as though they adequately analysed meaning, we are led into difficulties which take the shape of negations of what in practice is presupposed. But when they are proposed as first principles they assume an unmerited air of sober obviousness.”
Learning—Acquisition or Selection—Possibility versus Probability
Authors: Klee James B. 
Published: November 2002

It is quite common in our texts and periodicals to run across formulations of the learning process in which the word acquire is used in some way as part of the description. Individuals are said to “acquire” habits or skills or languages or attitudes or solutions or emotions. The organism is said to “acquire” certain of its traits from the environment (sometimes through experience, sometimes not) and even to “acquire” from heredity. Such usage is not technically incorrect. Webster defines acquire as follows:
acquire. 1. To gain by any means, usually by one's own exertions; to get as one's own. 2. To take on as part of one's nature or qualifications; to establish by means of repetition or effort, as characteristic in one's behavior or range of ability; as to acquire a habit. Syn., attain, procure, win, earn, secure; receive, learn, adopt, cultivate, affect. See obtain.
The Locus of Mathematical Reality: An Anthropological Footnote
Authors: White Leslie A. 
Published: November 2002

“He's [the Red King's] dreaming now,” said Tweedledee: “and what do you think he's dreaming about?”Alice said, “Nobody can guess that.”“Why, about you!” Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands triumphantly. “And if he left off dreaming about you, where do you suppose you'd be?”“Where I am now, of course,” said Alice.“Not you!” Tweedledee retorted contemptuously. “You'd be nowhere. Why, you're only a sort of thing in his dream!”“If that there King was to wake,” added Tweedledum, “you'd go out—bang!—just like a candle.”“I shouldn't!” Alice exclaimed indignantly. “Besides, if I'm only a sort of thing in his dream, what are you, I should like to know?”“Ditto,” said Tweedledum.“Ditto, ditto!” cried Tweedledee.He shouted this so loud that Alice couldn't help saying “Hush! You'll be waking him, I'm afraid, if you make so much noise.”“Well, it's no use your talking about waking him,” said Tweedledum, “when you're only one of the things in his dream. You know very well you're not real.”“I am real!” said Alice, and began to cry.“You won't make yourself a bit realler by crying,” Tweedledee remarked: “there's nothing to cry about.”“If I wasn't real,” Alice said—half laughing through her tears, it all seemed so ridiculous —“I shouldn't be able to cry.”“I hope you don't suppose those are real tears?” Tweedledum interrupted in a tone of great contempt.—Through the Looking Glass
Atemporal Processes in Physics
Authors: Schlegel Richard 
Published: November 2002

It can scarcely be said to be a self-contradictory property to be in two places at the same time any more than for an object to be at two times in the same place. The perplexities of the quantum theory of energy sometimes seem to suggest that the possibility ought not to be overlooked; …A. S. Eddington, Space, Time and Gravitation, Cambridge, 1920There are three elements involved in physical time. The most primitive of the three is the fact of extension in time. We express this fact by saying that things “endure” in time, or by saying that the universe is not an event of one moment only. Extension in time is such a fundamental and pervasive element of our experience, that we can hardly define it other than by denotatively indicating it. Time extension is basic to the other two elements of time.
Discussion
Authors: Ackoff Russell L. 
Published: November 2002

The papers given at this symposium have been directed to two problems:
(1)the needs of the physical sciences which the social sciences should fulfill, and(2)the capacity of contemporary social science to satisfy these needs.Consideration of the first problem divided itself into two parts: (a) the needs involved in the process of answering questions in the physical sciences, and (b) the needs involving application of information gained by questions in physical science. The role of social science with respect to (b) is generally recognized, but the role with respect to (a) is not. Many, in science and philosophy, still hold to the notion of a non-evaluative, non-normative, purely objective, or what-have-you physical science. Professor Littauer, however, raised a critical problem in this regard: on what basis is the decision made to accept or reject a scientific hypothesis? We are in a position today to assert that such decisions do involve an evaluative judgment. Recent developments in mathematical statistics, as represented in Wald's On the Principles of Statistical Inference, indicate that the selection of the best statistical testing procedure involves at least a knowledge of the social consequences for the various mistakes one might make in using any specific testing procedure. The introduction of the “weight function” into the method for selecting among alternative hypotheses points in a striking way to one door through which knowledge and evaluation of possible social phenomena enters physical science. The social scientist is badly needed here. It is true that today this aspect of experimental method is seldom self-consciously faced. Where it is, the evaluations are generally intuitive and are not based on sound sociological knowledge. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the continued development of experimental methods in all sciences depends on our reducing the question of what constitutes a “best” test to experimental terms.
Concepts as Involving Laws and Inconceivable Without Them
Authors: Sellars Wilfrid 
Published: November 2002

Formal implication is usually represented by symbolization such as ‘(x) φx ⊃ Ψx,’ which may be read, “for all values of ‘x’, φx (materially) implies Ψx.” If the values of the variable ‘x’, in ‘φx’ and ‘Ψx’ be ‘x1’ ‘x2’ ‘x3’, etc., then … ‘φx’ formally implies ‘Ψx’ if and only if, whatever values of ‘x’, ‘xn’, be chosen, ‘φxn’ materially implies ‘Ψxn’ …However, this still leaves it doubtful which of two possible interpretations of expressions having the form ‘(x) φx ⊃ Ψx’ is to be taken as correct. … It means one thing to say, “Every existent having the property φ … has also the property Ψ,” and it means quite a different thing to say, “Every thinkable thing which should have the property φ must also have the property Ψ.” The second of these holds only when having the properly φ logically entails having the property Ψ; when ‘Ψx’ is deductible from ‘φx’. … The first of them, however, holds not only in such cases … but also in every case where among existent things, one property is universally accompanied by another. (C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Evaluation, pp. 217–8. I am responsible for the italicizing of the sentence, otherwise the italics follow Lewis.)
Descriptions in Nonextensional Contexts
Authors: Bergmann Gustav 
Published: November 2002

1. In his paper “On Denoting” Russell points out what he calls a puzzle every satisfactory theory of denoting will have to solve. Of the three sentences
(A)George IV. wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley(B)Scott is the author of Waverley(C)George IV. wished to know whether Scott was Scott the first two, (A) and (B), are presumably true, while the third, (C), is presumably false. The reason given for considering this arrangement of truth values a puzzle is (1) that the ‘is’ in (B) signifies identity; (2) that the proper name ‘Scott’ and the descriptive phrase ‘the author of Waverley’ denote the same object; and that, therefore, (3) if the latter is replaced by the former in the true sentence (A), the resulting sentence, (C), should again be true. Yet (C) is false, or, as one also says, the context considered is nonextensional with respect to this replacement.
The Place of the Expert in a Democratic Society
Authors: Frank Jerome 
Published: November 2002

In their adversely critical attitude towards administrative agencies, many lawyers and judges disclose a distrust of the expert, the specialist. That distrust is curious, for the position of our profession in society rests on the fact that we ourselves are specialists.In the famous colloquy (perhaps partly apocryphal) which is said to have occurred about three hundred years ago between King James I and Judge Coke, the King remarked that, if “law was founded upon reason, he and others could reason as well as the judges,” and Coke loftily replied that lawsuits “are not to be decided by natural reason, but by the artificial reason and judgement of the law, which law is an art that requires long study and experience before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it.” The King, an intelligent amateur, was angered, for doubtless he saw that, as McIlwain observes, “if ... the law was to be supreme, at the same time a mystery open only to the initiated, it is clear that, if the claim of the lawyers were to be admitted, the supreme authority would be their exclusive possession.” Demos, now King, sometimes echoes James’ anger at the idea of a government of lawyers, not of men.
The Social Neurosis: A Study in “Clinical Anthropology”
Authors: Burrow Trigant 
Published: November 2002

“The end of society is peace and mutual protection, so that the individual may reach the fullest and highest life attainable by man. The rules of conduct by which this end is to be attained are discoverable-like the other so-called laws of Nature-by observation and experiment, and only in that way.”THOMAS HUXLEYThe present moment is a portentous one in the history of human relations. Only yesterday the armies of half the world were locked in a death struggle with the armies of the other half. And even now, as the representatives of the various governments gather together in attempts to organize an international State, the shadow of a weapon that threatens to end all life upon this earth lies athwart their deliberations. The moment with which we are faced is the more portentous because of the persistent hope man vainly entertains that a world of wholeness and peace will somehow issue out of these two warring and divided half-worlds. Even the student of behavior fondly believes that out of this divided world an undivided peace will come. Along with the rest of mankind even the seasoned psychiatrist fails to see that the overwhelming impetus to man's behavior—to his feeling and thinking—now stems from a social artifact of division. He does not see that, owing to a discrepancy in man's mental and social processes, the artificial world man has created is necessarily a world of conflict. In this hour of universal confusion and discord it would appear that we who study the problems of human adaptation are confronted with nothing less than a false, unilateral principle of motivation affecting the organism of man throughout.
Formal and Non-Formal
Authors: Rudner Richard 
Published: November 2002

In some ways, I think, the analytic method in philosophy and science suffers from an embarrassment of riches. It has too many distinctions—in the sense that any distinction which is infirm, but which is yet carted about along with the necessary apparatus of a method, is (at its most innocuous) superfluous. In these pages I propose to examine one such distinction.A principle which is subscribed to by almost all of the “analysers” with whose work I am acquainted is that which is constituted by a certain kind of dichotomization between what we may for the present loosely characterize as the “formal” and the “non-formal.” Sometimes this distinction is presented as one existing between the “formal sciences” and the “non-formal sciences”; more frequently, perhaps, it is taken as a distinction holding between certain kinds of expressions, i.e., analytic and synthetic statements. It will be the thesis of this paper that there are good reasons for believing that this distinction in either of its forms is not a cogent one.