bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Defence of the Enterprise
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, conceived originally as the introduction to chapters 3 to 7, Hare shows how philosophical questions arise from the consideration of practical moral problems, such as war and euthanasia. The main task of moral philosophy, Hare argues, is to study the logical form of moral arguments and, in particular, the logical properties of moral words, such as ‘ought’, ‘right’, and ‘good’. All argument, including moral argument, depends on logic, and logical validity depends on the meaning of words. The investigation of the meaning of the words and concepts, and thus the logic, employed in moral and other value judgements is, according to Hare, the distinctive contribution of the moral philosopher to the discussion of substantive moral questions.
Emotivism
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The thesis of Emotivism, a species of non‐descriptivism, is that there is more to the meaning of moral statements than syntax and truth conditions; in particular, moral statements have an expressive, and a causative aspect. Drawing upon J. L. Austin's distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, Hare argues that emotivists try to explain the meaning of moral statements, which they assimilate to imperatives, in terms of their perlocutionary effect. The difficulty with this is that, firstly, the emotivists hold a false theory of imperatives, and secondly, perlocutionary effect cannot explain meaning. Furthermore, emotivists deny the possibility of rational moral argument, and therefore embrace irrationalism. Towards the end of this chapter, Hare identifies six essential features of moral language, and its logic, that must be recognized and accounted for by an adequate moral theory: (1) Neutrality, (2) Practicality, (3) Incompatibility, (4) Logicality, (5) Arguability, and (6) Conciliation.
Rationalism
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Hare presents his own position, a theory that incorporates all the truths of the other theories that have been discussed, together with ‘prescriptive logic’, which is what makes rationality in moral thinking possible. Hare calls this position ‘universal prescriptivism’, and he identifies it as an adaptation of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Universal Prescriptivism gives a completely formal account of the meanings of moral words such as ‘ought’; i.e. it defines them purely on the basis of their logical properties. Of the theories considered, this is the only one that satisfies all six of the requirements for an adequate ethical theory, and it also guarantees universalizability. Prescriptivity and, in particular, universal prescriptivity, enables us to examine moral intuitions objectively; furthermore, because the prescriptivity of moral statements is culturally invariant, it allows us to avoid relativism.
‘A New Species of Logic’
Authors: Howson Colin 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis is the central chapter of the book. It contains an extended argument to show that in formal probability theory we have an authentic logic of uncertain inference, of the same species as deductive logic. A soundness and completeness theorem is given for this logic, akin to the soundness and completeness theorems of deductive logic. The logical view of probability was propounded by Leibniz in the seventeenth century, and revived in the twentieth century by Keynes, Carnap, and Ramsey. It is Ramsey's view, that the rules of probability are consistency constraints, that is upheld.
Deliberative Conflict: Some Recent Philosophical Concepts
Authors: White Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kantian and Hegelian responses to Greek ethics have been carried on—against the backdrop of Joseph Butler, J. S. Mill, Henry Sidgwick, T. H. Green, and others—right through the Twentieth Century. Although other philosophical notions have also been important in the historiography of Greek ethics—‘morality’, ‘ethics of virtue’, ‘contingency’—an overriding theme has been the notion that in Greek ethics a way was found to eliminate deliberative conflict, and to show that in the end all rational human aims are reconcilable within a single notion of happiness of eudaimonia. Various harmonizing strategies have been attempted, and ascribed to the Greeks.
Individual Good and Deliberative Conflict through the Time of Plato
Authors: White Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Before Plato there are ample cases in which Greek poets, philosophers, and politicians recognize the possibility that individual and social good can conflict. Nor does Plato think that a full understanding of the notion of one's good must demonstrate that it cannot conflict with standards of justice. On the contrary, Plato holds that such conflicts can occur even in the case of the rulers of his ideal city‐state. This idea is not contradicted by evidence of other works, such as the Meno, the Symposium, and the Philebus. Nevertheless, although Plato's view admits what is normally thought to be a characteristically Kantian conflict of ethical standards with one's good, it still possesses some distinctly eudaimonistic elements that are at variance with the Kantian view.
Towards an Understanding of the History of Greek Ethics
Authors: White Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Thus far it has been shown that Greek ethics is not as different from modern ethics as is commonly held, and that we cannot oppose a harmonizing Greek ethical outlook with a modern view that involves a conflict between happiness and adherence to ethical standards. Greek ethics has universalistic features—though they are different from the egalitarian characteristics of modern positions and do not focus on the notion of benevolence in the way that modern ethics does—and it mostly distinguishes self‐referential and non‐self‐referential aims. Moreover, there is not in any case such a thing as a monolithic ethical view of ‘the Greeks’, and the idea of a straightforward contrast between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ ethics is best avoided.
Tensed Accounts of the Nature of Time
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines the relation between certain tensed and certain tenseless concepts. It argues that the relation of temporal priority, i.e. the relation of one event being earlier than another, cannot be analysed in terms of tensed, temporal concepts. Neither can an analysis of tenseless quantifiers be given in such terms. On the contrary, the tensed concepts of past and future can be analysed in tenseless terms.
Past, Present, and Future
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractCompletes the defence of the claim that tenseless concepts are more basic than tensed ones. It argues for three theses. First, not all tensed statements involve indexicals, and those that do not are analytically more basic. Second, these non‐indexical tensed statements can be used to give truth conditions for indexical tensed statements. Third, non‐indexical tensed statements can be analysed in terms of tenseless statements together with the concept of what is actual as of, or true at, a given time. In particular, the tensed concept of lying in the present can be analysed following this strategy.
Past, Present, and Future: Alternative Accounts
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Contrasts the view defended in the book with alternative accounts, and rejects the latter. It argues that, while ordinary tensed statements involve indexicals, this does not constitute a reason for accepting a static conception of the world. Further, it rejects views according to which there are irreducible tensed properties, and the claim that only the present is real.
Causation and Temporal Relations
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractProvides an analysis of temporal relations in causal terms. Qualitative temporal relations, that is, the relations of simultaneity and temporal priority, are analysed in terms of actual causal relations and spatial relations. A reduction of quantitative temporal relations, such as the relation of temporal distance, in causal terms is feasible as well, but, the chapter argues, a realist view should be preferred. The causal theory of time put forward is defended against charges of circularity and against putative counterexamples.
The Special Theory of Relativity and the Unreality of the Future
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAccording to the Special Theory of Relativity, there is no such thing as absolute simultaneity, contrary to the view defended in the book. However, this chapter demonstrates that the Special Theory of Relativity can be modified so as to allow absolute simultaneity. This modification involves reference to absolute space and the causal relations between space‐time points, and drops the assumption that the one‐way speed of light is constant through all frames of reference. Contrary to the orthodox theory, the modified version has the additional advantage of avoiding a clash with quantum mechanics, such as brought out by the Einstein‐Podolsky‐Rosen thought experiment and Bell's Theorem.
Naturalism in Mathematics
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is well known that certain natural statements of set theory, like Cantor's continuum hypothesis (CH), cannot be proved or disproved on the basis of the standard axioms (Zermelo–Fraenkel with Choice or ZFC). Some philosophers take this to be the end of the story on these questions, but set theorists continue to look for answers by investigating candidates for new axioms. One way to understand this work, an approach pioneered by Gödel, is to embrace some brand of realism (sometimes called ‘Platonism’) about sets: there is an objective world of sets in which the CH is either true or false; ZFC does not completely describe this world; our job is to find new true axioms that will give a fuller description detailed enough to decide the CH. Recent versions of realism in the philosophy of mathematics have rested on Quine's indispensability arguments: the world posited by our best scientific theories includes mathematical entities. In this book, I argue that attention to the actual details of scientific methodology substantially undermines Quine's argument, leaving realism without its best support. As an alternative, I develop a naturalistic approach (drawing on other themes from Quine, Gödel, and Wittgenstein) that finds the justification for mathematical methods in mathematics rather than extra‐mathematical philosophy, and I apply this naturalism to the test case of a particular new axiom candidate (Gödel's Axiom of Constructibility).
Learning from Six Philosophers Volume 1
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book presents and analyses the most important parts of the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Volume 1: the shift from Aristotelian to Cartesian physics; Descartes on matter and space, on causation, and on certainty; Descartes and Spinoza on matter and mind, and on desire; Leibniz's metaphysics (monads) and physics, his theory of animals. Volume 2: Locke on ideas, on necessity, on essences, on substance, on secondary qualities, on personal identity; Descartes on modality; Berkeley's epistemology and metaphysics; Hume on ideas, on belief, on causation, on bodies, on reason; Hume and Leibniz on personal identity.
Cartesian and Aristotelian Physics
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Descartes's physics is set against the mainly Aristotelian ideas that preceded it, emphasizing six differences, three of which are the following. Aristotle's physics has many basic kinds of things, while Descartes's has only one—matter—with all variety coming from differences of movement and structure of that one. They also differ in how they view many basic laws they entertain. Teleology is central to Aristotelian physics and banished from Descartes's. Descartes's physics is compared with Democritean atomism.
Matter and Space
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses what Descartes wanted and how he defended his thesis that materiality equals extension. It tells us why he thought there is no vacuum and how Locke opposed him on this. It discusses the concept of solidity and gives four views of space: vacuum as a bulky nothing, space as a container, a system of relations, a separator. He concludes the chapter with Descartes's account of motion.
Descartes's Physics
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractReveals why Descartes must regard matter as infinitely divisible and describes the failure of his attempt to get qualitative variety out of structure or movement, when applied to an absolutely homogeneous mass of matter. Explains the loop theory (according to which all movement is of synchronously moving loops of matter) and the difficulty of relating it clearly to Descartes's theory of collisions. Rejects ‘traction’, Descartes's poor theory of weight, and Leibniz's charge that Descartes was a ‘new stoic’.
Descartes's Dualisms
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Descartes's property‐dualism is too deep in his thought to be defended. He defends his substance‐dualism twice, once from the premiss that minds are indivisible while matter is not (discussed in Kant's second paralogism), and once from the conceivability of there being mind and no matter. Different possible routes from conceivability to actuality are discussed, and Kripke's defence of one of them is criticized. The chapter discusses Voss's work on Descartes's concept of man.
Preparing to Approach Spinoza
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDescribes in what way Spinoza was a dualist and in what way a monist; his pantheism and its relation to atheism; his very special version of the so‐called ontological argument for the existence of God; his mind–body parallelism and rejection of mind–body interaction. His resolute naturalism: Wittgenstein's mockery about the mind as ‘a queer sort of medium’ hits Descartes but not Spinoza.
Explaining the Parallelism
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSpinoza's bad arguments for his thesis of mind–body parallelism are discussed. Then a close analysis of the great scholium to IIp7 leads to a much better argument. This brings in Spinoza's definition of ‘attribute’, a much‐controverted item, which can be seen to be plain and simple and the right thing for him to say, as soon as one attends carefully to its actual wording. The chapter also discuses and explains Spinoza's use of ‘express’: attributes that express God's essence, and so do modes.
Explanatory Rationalism
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractLike Leibniz and unlike Descartes, Spinoza was an explanatory rationalist: he held that there is a non‐trivial answer for every legitimate ‘Why?’‐question. This led him to causal rationalism, the view that causal necessity is logical necessity. He connects the concepts of necessity and of eternity; his way of doing so is explained. Spinoza was committed to thinking that this is the only possible world, but it is not clear whether he did. Leibniz was equally committed, and struggled hard to avoid the commitment, which he hated. His struggles are analysed.
Spinoza on Belief and Error
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSpinoza contends for something propositional in sensory intake; it is argued that he is moving towards the view of Armstrong and others that basic sensory intake consists in inclinations to believe. The chapter explains and criticizes his view that all so‐called error is a species of ignorance. His treatment of mental representation involves, but only covertly, two notions of ‘idea of’—an idea is directly of a state of one's body, and may be indirectly of some external thing that caused that state. His notion of ‘adequate idea’ and the associated notions of mutilation and confusion are dealt with. The chapter also describes his ingenious attempt to explain why reason is infallible.
Causation and Perception in Leibniz
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExplains why Leibniz rejected inter‐substance causation and occasionalism; and his account of how a monad develops. He is identified as a bottom‐up metaphysician—one who has a few basic concepts and seeks to construct all the rest out of those, moving upward. His accounts of perception and of appetite are explained and criticized, as are his various attempts to explain the appearance of passivity in the material world.
Leibniz's Physics
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Leibniz's grounding principle implies that any property of a phenomenon must be grounded in truths about the underlying monads. He took this to imply that empirically supported laws in physics must mirror, somehow, truths about monads. Leibniz vigorously defends mechanism and rejects teleology in physical explanations. He tries to bring teleology into physics (and biology) in a different way, partly through the wrong thesis that Snell's Law is teleological.
Harmony
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDeals with Leibniz's doctrine that all activities of each monad are correlated with activities of all the others, in a universal harmony. His reasons for this, and the work he makes it do, including his view that the universe is deterministic in both temporal directions is given. Monadic points of view and Leibniz's reasons for holding that some perceptions are insensible are also handled.
Leibniz and Relations
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractLeibniz held that there are no basic relational truths; his attempts to show that non‐relational truths supervene on relational ones are assessed. Criticism of the view that according to Leibniz there are basic truths in which relational properties are attributed to things is described. Leibniz's view that space is a system of relations and his concept of compossibility are explained and criticized, as is his thesis of the identity of indiscernibles.
Descartes's Theory of Modality
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Expounds and defends the thesis that Descartes, most of the time, accepted a subjectivist theory of modality according to which a proposition's being necessary is its relating in a certain way to our thought. Several difficult and long‐standing problems, and some others that have been neglected, are solved or lessened by this thesis. One is voluntarism—the thesis that God voluntarily gives modal truths their truth‐value. It is shown that Descartes is nearly always careful to say not that God cannot lie but that he does not lie.
Berkeley's Uses of Locke's Work
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Berkeley attacked Locke's theory of abstract ideas, partly sound though partly unfair. He held, apparently wrongly, that the issue over abstract ideas generates the other philosophical issues between himself and Locke. He used Locke's supposed view about secondary qualities against him in the debate over immaterialism, but his way of doing so depended on attributing to Locke the textually least visible and philosophically worst of his views on this topic, namely, that secondary qualities are in the mind. On the topic of substance as substratum, Berkeley utterly conflates two distinct issues: substratum that supports qualities, and matter that causes ideas.
Hume on the Existence of Bodies
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Hume's great section on why we believe in the existence of bodies outside ourselves is a masterpiece of controlled complexity; and this chapter analyses it. Starting with the same foundationalism as Berkeley and Locke, Hume thinks he must choose between the two: either our impressions are the only things we perceive, or we conjecture the existence of other things through an inductive inference across the veil of perception. Neither option is satisfactory, he concludes, but he can see no third way. En route to this conclusion he discovers something much better, and gives a curiously weak reason for rejecting it. The section involves a treatment of identity, which is deeply flawed but also brilliantly impressive.
Limitations, Presuppositions, and Method
Authors: Williamson H. G. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExplains the decision to focus on the first two major parts of the Book of Isaiah (Chs. 1–55) at the expense of the third (Chs. 56–66), examines research into the question of the unity or multiple authorship of Deutero‐Isaiah (Chs. 40–55) and its theological implications, highlighting the work of H.J. Hermisson, and sets out the criteria for the discussion in the following three chapters of the extent to, and ways in which, Deutero‐Isaiah was influenced by Proto‐Isaiah (Chs. 1–39).
Further Examples of Isaianic Influence
Authors: Williamson H. G. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractProceeds to examine further examples (from Chs. 1–39) of the influence of the literary inheritance of Isaiah of Jerusalem on the rest of the Isaianic text in order to set out the consensus view of the development of the Book of Isaiah as a whole. It considers various themes and linguistic elements and compares their usage in Isaiah and other Old Testament texts such as Jeremiah, Psalms, and Ezekiel. It concludes that merely belonging to a single school of tradition is not in itself sufficient explanation of the influence of Proto‐Isaiah on Deutero‐Isaiah.
Deutero‐Isaiah and Isaiah 13–27
Authors: Williamson H. G. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Continues the examination begun in the previous chapter, this time focusing on Chs. 13–27, which contain the ‘oracles against the nations’ (13–23) and the so‐called ‘Isaiah Apocalypse’ (24–27). Presents the case for Deutero‐Isaianic influence in the former group of chapters and assesses recent studies (such as that by B. Gosse) that challenge this hypothesis. Parallels both within the Book of Isaiah and in other Old Testament books (such as Hosea, Joel, Jeremiah, Genesis, and Amos) are then assessed in a search for evidence of the hand of Deutero‐Isaiah in the second group of chapters.
Conclusions
Authors: Williamson H. G. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSummarizes the arguments made in the book for the influence of the literary inheritance of Isaiah of Jerusalem on the work of Deutero‐Isaiah in continuing the role of prophesying a time of judgement and salvation and for his editorial work in combining the earlier prophecies with his own in order to present a unified vision of the dealings of God with Israel. Acknowledges the influence of other texts such as the Psalms, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel on Deutero‐Isaiah's expression of his message and concludes by noting the continuing challenges posed to scholars by the probability of multiple authorship and the various proposals for the exilic and post‐exilic redaction of the book.
Modernity's Responses to the Problem
Authors: Evans C. Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The last chapter looked briefly at the challenge posed to the historicity of the incarnational narrative by Enlightenment epistemology and metaphysics; this one takes a brief look at the responses to this problem that have been characteristic of modernity. In one sense, the variety of responses has been immense; the corpus of ‘historical Jesus’ material and theological and philosophical literature bearing on the issues related to the incarnational narrative is so massive as to make it virtually impossible for one individual to master all of it. However, the author believes that most of this material can be usefully classified into four types of response, each with their own correlative attitudes towards traditional Christian faith. These are: (1) Defence of the narrative as historical – defence of traditional Christian faith (orthodoxy); (2) Rejection of the narrative – rejection of Christianity; (3) Revision of the narrative – revision of Christianity; and (4) Divorce of the meaning of the narrative from its historicity – divorce of Christian faith from its historical foundations. These four responses are analysed in turn.