bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Nietzsche’s Ethics and his War on ‘Morality’
Authors: May Simon 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Simon May presents a fresh and wide-ranging critique of Nietzsche's famous attack on traditional morality, and of his controversial ethics of 'life-enhancement'. He reveals Nietzsche as both revolutionary and conservative-as one who repudiates traditional 'moral' conceptions of God, guilt, asceticism, pity, and truthfulness, and yet retains a demanding ethics of discipline, conscience, 'self-creation', generosity, and honesty. In particular, May shows how Nietzsche rejects truthfulness as an unconditional value and yet celebrates it as one of his own highest values, whose worth is determined by who is pursuing it, for what end, and when in their lives. May is strongly critical of various aspects of Nietzsche's thought-his self-defeating conception of justice, his assumption that 'life-enhancement' necessarily demands world-affirmation, his ambition to de-deify the world, and the impossible and undesirable autonomy of the Übermensch. But Nietzsche is shown to offer modernity key elements of a coherent ethic, and to provide moral philosophy with important tools for reassessing some of its most cherished values and concepts. May's book will be illuminating not just for scholars and students of Nietzsche, in philosophy, literature, and history of ideas, but for anyone interested in current debates about ethics and modernity.
Objective Prescriptions
Authors: Hare R M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
R. M. Hare has brought together in this volume the best of his uncollected essays in moral philosophy, several of them previously unpublished or revised for this collection. They span the whole range of his ethical interests, from the most abstract to the most down-to-earth. The reader will find here the bases of his ethical theory in Kantian prescriptivism, utilitarianism, and the logic of imperatives, and will see that theory applied to issues of bioethics, medical ethics, business ethics, loyalty and obedience, and racism. The essays display the author's characteristic clarity and vigour; some of them are polemical, targeting particular opponents and rival theories. The volume provides a compelling demonstration of Hare's commitment to bringing together the theoretical and the practical in ethics.
Introduction
Authors: Nettle Daniel 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Humankind today speaks about 6,500 different, mutually unintelligible languages. These languages belong to at least 250 identifiable large families, though there are various proposals to group these into still larger units. Within these families, there are languages that use a dozen contrastive sounds, and languages that use 100. There are languages that place the subject of the sentence before the verb and languages that put the verb first. There are a few that place the object before either. Some languages mark the relationships between the constituents of the sentence, or between the sentence and the world, by extensive inflection, whilst others use almost none, and rely on independent particles and the order of words.
Structural Diversity
Authors: Nettle Daniel 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter we turn to the third and final type of diversity in the linguistic pool that was identified in Chapter. This is structural diversity. Just as phylogenetic diversity is not necessarily correlated with language diversity, so structural diversity is not necessarily correlated with diversity of the other two types. Lineages oflanguages that are unrelated can be identical on basic structural parameters, either because of areal convergence, or because of independent evolution to some favoured state. On the other hand, many structural states can exist within what is identifiably a single lineage of languages, since not all parameters are phlyogenetically conservative.
The Truth in Particularism
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
When reflecting on the way we come to do what we do, or to refrain from what we refrain from doing, it is natural to be torn between a particularist and a generalist tendency. We tend towards a generalist view when we feel that at least sometimes we are guided by general precepts and are inclined to believe that it is always possible to be so guided. ‘I must do this’ —I may say-’My son is relying on me.’ Or, ‘I cannot do this. It would be cheating.’ I am, and am conscious of being, guided in my decision by general precepts: ‘One should not cheat: ‘One should not let one’s children down: These principles may be too simple.
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Authors: Jackson Frank , Pettit Philip , Smith Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Information couched in descriptive terms plays a major role in determining our moral judgements. Perhaps we learn that an action involves breaking a promise and respond by forming the view that it is wrong. Later we learn that it was necessary to break the promise in order to save a life, and retract our earlier judgement and decide that the action was right. Later still we learn that, although a life was saved, many more were lost as result of the promise-breaking and we return to our original judgement. Here we have a simple example of the role of descriptive information in leading us to a moral judgement, and of how our judgement may change as more descriptive information comes to hand.
Introduction: Frames of reference
Authors: Brewer Bill , Pears Julian 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Suppose that my glasses are now on my nose, just as they were an hour ago, but an hour ago I was in a different room in the house. How should we answer the question whether my glasses are in the same place that they were an hour ago? Given that my glasses are still on my nose, we might say that they are still in the same place. But given that I was in a different room in the house an hour ago, we might equally say that my glasses are not still in the same place. In relation to my nose, my glasses are still in the same place; but in relation to the house they are not. To evaluate whether or not my glasses are in the same place, we need to know how places are being individuated here. When places are individuated by their spatial relations to certain objects, a crucial part of what we need to know is what those objects are. As the term ‘frame of reference’ is commonly used, these objects would be said to provide the frame of reference. In the above example, either (parts of) my nose or (pars.-s of) the house are to provide the frame of reference.
Reflections on the Neurobiology of Emotion and Feeling
Authors: Damasio Antonio R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
By the end of the nineteenth century Charles D3;rwin had made incisive observations on the expression of emotions in animals and humans and placed emotion in the perspective of biological evolution; William James had produced a scientific description of the phenomenon of emotion, thus opening the way to its experimental study; and Sigmund Freud was writing about the means by which emotion might play a role in psychopathology. Somebody freshly arrived on earth in 1994 and interested in the topic of emotion would have good cause to wonder why such groundbreaking devel opments did not lead to an assault on the neurobiology of emotion. What could possibly have gone wrong in the intervening century? The simplest answer to this question is that emotion has received benign neglect from neuroscience and been passed over in favor of the study of attention, perception, memory, and language. The not-so-simple answer would invoke the following reasons. First, in spite of the auspicious begin nings provided by Darwin, James, and Freud, there was a manifest difficulty in defining the phenomenon of emotion. What was the nature and substance of emotion? What was its scope? What were its component manifestations? William James made a brave attempt as one can see in the following passage: “If we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our con sciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no ‘mind-stuff out of which the emotion can be con stituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains” (James 1950).
What Thought Requires
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The true fly is dipterous, but it has halteres which have evolved from posterior wings. It had been thought that the astonishing rapidity with which a fly maneuvers must be due to a direct neural connection between the eyes and the wings, but recent experiments at Berkeley suggest something more sophis ticated (Chan, Prete, and Dickinson 1998). It was known before that the halteres, which beat antiphase to the wings, act as gyroscopes which stabilize flight on all three axes by feeding information directly to the wing muscles. Remove a fly’s halteres and it crashes. What is new is that apparently the visual system is directly connected to the halteres, which then control the wing muscles. This fancy setup distinguishes between the aerodynamic forces and the Coriolis forces acting on the wings, permitting the fly to evade the flyswatter with marvelous ease.
Mental Causation
Authors: Heil John , Mele Alfred 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Common sense and philosophical tradition agree that mind makes a difference. What we do depends not only on how our bodies are put together, but also on what we think. Explaining how mind can make a difference has proved challenging, however. Some have urged that the project faces an insurmountable dilemma: either we concede that mentalistic explanations of behaviour have only a pragmatic standing or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous. Although each option has its advocates, most theorists have sought a middle way that accommodates both the common-sense view of mind and the metaphysical conviction about the physical world. This volume presents a collection of new, specially written essays by a diverse group of philosophers, each of whom is widely known for defending a particular conception of minds and their place in nature. Contributors: Robert Audi, Lynne Rudder Baker, Tyler Burge, Donald Davidson, Fred Dretske, Ted Honderich, Jennifer Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Jaegwon Kim, Brian P. McLaughlin, Ruth Garrett Millikan, H. W. Noonan, Philip Pettit, Ernest Sosa, and Robert Van Gulick.
Thinking Causes
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In 1970 I proposed a theory about the relation between the mental and the physical that I called Anomalous Monism (AM). AM holds that mental entities (particular time- and space-bound objects and events) are physical entities, but that mental concepts are not reducible by definition or natural law to physical concepts. The position is, in a general way, familiar: it endorses ontological reduction, but eschews conceptual reduction. What was new was the argument, which purported to derive AM from three premisses, namely, (1) that mental events are causally related to physical events, (2) that singular causal relations are backed by strict laws, and (3) that there are no strict psycho-physical laws. The first premiss seemed to me obvious, the second true though contested (I did not present arguments for it), and the third true and worth arguing for. Many readers have found my arguments against the existence of strict psycho-physical laws obscure; others have decided the three premisses are mutually inconsistent. But the complaints have most often been summed up by saying that AM makes the mental causally inert. The criticisms are connected: if AM makes the mental causally inert, then AM apparently implies the falsity of the first premiss and hence the inconsistency of the three premisses. The third premiss seems to many critics the relevant offender, so they urge that it should be dropped.
Davidson’s Thinking Causes
Authors: Sosa Ernest 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Against anomalous monism (AM) I have drawn an analogy between the relevance of mental properties to the causal efficacy that AM grants to mental events and the relevance of loudness to the causal efficacy of a loud shot. Neither the mentality of mental events nor the loudness of the loud shot is causally relevant to the respective relevant effects. The point seems clear in the case of the shot: A gun goes off, a shot is fired, and it kills someone. The loud noise is the shot. Thus, if the victim is killed by the shot, it’s the loud noise that kills the victim Yes, in a certain sense the victim is killed by the loud noise; not by the loud noise as a loud noise, however, but only by the loud noise as a shot, or the like [The] loudness of the shot has no causal relevance to the death of the victim; had the gun been equipped with a silencer, the shot would have killed the victim just the same.
Explanation in Biopsychology
Authors: Millikan Ruth Garrett 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I Would like to explore implications for the science of psychology of the thesis that the categories of intentional psychology are function categories in the biologist’s sense of ‘function’, taking this to be a sense in which function is determined by evolutionary history rather than by current dispositions. I would like to explore, first, the general shape of the discipline that is psychology under this interpretation. What is its subject-matter? What kinds of explanations does it seek for what kinds of phenomena? Second, I would like to bring these reflections to bear on the classic question concerning in what way, if any, giving an individual’s reasons for action tells of the causes of that action. I will not attempt to defend the thesis that the categories of intentional psychology are biological function categories, nor the thesis that biological function categories are carved out by reference to evolutionary history, but some clarifications of these theses, will of course, be in order.
Who’s in Charge Here? And Who’s Doing All the Work?
Authors: Gulick Robert Van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There is nothing exceptional about such explanations and the everyday situations they describe. In each case a common-sense or folk psychological explanation of someone’s behaviour is offered that explains why someone acted as he or she did by appeal to one or more of the person’s mental states and their mental properties. Tom put the canteen to his lips because of his belief and because his belief had the propositional content that it did-that there still was water in the canteen. Greta picked the tomatoes that she did because of the visual experiences they had produced in her and because those visual experiences had the qualitative property of being phenomenally red–a property none of Henrik’s visual experiences has. Little Sonja rejected the fluffy rabbit because of her desire and because that desire had a particular toy as its intentional object—her own brown teddy bear.
Plato The Sceptic
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
From about 273 BC, when Arcesilaus of Pitane took over its headship, until it petered out in the first century BC, Plato’s school, the Academy, practised and taught a form of scepticism. This is surprising; even more so is the fact that the Academy regarded sceptical philosophizing as philosophizing in the spirit of Plato, doing what Plato did. Modern scholars tend to regard this as so surprising as to be an aberration, but it was not so regarded in antiquity. Middle Platonists like Plutarch respected and defended the sceptical New Academy. The Neoplatonist commentators, though they disagreed with the thesis that Plato was a sceptic, thought ofit as a familiar thesis requiring refutation. Even a hostile figure like Numenius, who regards the New Academy as a ghastly mistake, pays it the compliment of extensive attention.
Plato’s Arguments And The Dialogue Form
Authors: Frede Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Plato’s dialogues are works of art. They are pieces of powerful dramatic fiction which by their art manage to give us a strong sense of what it would be like to listen to a dialectical debate or even to participate in it; they perhaps give us a stronger sense of what is involved in such a debate than we could have acquired by actually attending an ordinary dialectical discussion. For they represent paradigmatic debates between model characters in characteristic settings in a most vivid and realistic way. To this end they display an impressive mastery of a wide array of literary techniques. The dialogues put themselves into the literary tradition, by their constant allusions to earlier literature, by their constant reworking of motifs and themes of traditional literature from Homer and Hesiod down to the tragedies. Even a dialogue dealing with such abstract and prosaic material as is handled in the Sophist is eminently literary in this way.
A Maieutic View Of Five Late Dialogues
Authors: Sayre Kenneth 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There are five dialogues of Plato’s late period, each consisting of a conversation with a master philosopher, in which the conversation is organized by methodological principles explicitly proposed by the philosopher himself. In the case of the Theaetetus, the method was stated by Socrates in earlier dialogues, notably the Phaedo and book 6 of the Republic. In each of the remaining four, however, the method is expounded and applied within the same onversation-by the Stranger from Elea in the Sophist and the Statesman, by Parmenides himself in his namesake dialogue, and by a renovated Socrates in the late Philebus. I shall refer to these five as the methodological dialogues. Although details vary from context to context, the method described and its manner of application remain more or less the same throughout these five dialogues.
Musical Works in the Worlds of Performers and Listeners
Authors: Martin Robert L 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Familiar problems arise when we ask what sort of an object a musical work is (for example, Beethoven’s String Quartet in C, Op. 59 No. 3).1 The work itself is not any particular score of it (the autograph score, or the plates of the first edition, or any other score or set of parts), or the type of which any actual scores are tokens; this is clear because a person can be familiar with the work without being familiar with the score. The work itself is not any performance or set of performances; this is clear because there can be works that are never performed; it is possible for a person to admire the work without admiring any particular performance or set of performances of it. A musical work is none of the relevant physical objects or acoustical events.
Introduction
Authors: Romaine Suzanne 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Papua New Guinea is, like many Third World nations, engaged in a struggle to ‘develop’. This struggle for development is intimately bound up with the history of Tok Pisin, an English-based pidgin which is the product of nineteenth-century colonialism in the Pacific. This language has since come to serve as the most important lingua franca, spoken by more than a million people in a highly multilingual society. This book deals with some of the changes that are taking place in Tok Pisin as it becomes the native language of the younger generation of rural and urban speakers. These linguistic processes, which are by no means complete, have to be understood in the sociohistorical context of colonial expansion and strategies for socio-economic development in the post-colonial era.
Lexical Expansion, Borrowing, and Change
Authors: Romaine Suzanne 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In Chapter 2 I noted Miihlhausler’s claim that the lexicon of Tok Pisin was still impoverished up to the time of World War I. He suggests that it had a vocabulary of around 750-1,000 words, while others like Clark (1987) and Crowley (1990) believe that Melanesian Pidgin had already expanded to 1,000 words in the 1880s. While I will have little to say about earlier stages of the language in this chapter, it will be clear that there is a great deal of variability in both size and source of items in the lexicon of present-day Tok Pisin. Both size and composition vary according to sociolect (sec Romaine 1985 for discussion of similar variation in the history of English). The fact that urban and rural varieties of Tok Pisin have different sources for lexicalization has created a major dialect boundary in the modern period of the language’s development. This gap has arisen as part of the process of lexical expansion which involves the creation or borrowing of new linguistic resources to fulfil the new functions to which the language is put.
Syntactic Change
Authors: Romaine Suzanne 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter I will discuss three of the major syntactic structures of Tok Pisin: the use of bai to mark futurity (8.1), predicate marking (8.2), and strategies of relative clause formation (8.3). With regard to bai and predicate marking a case has been made for ongoing grammaticalization of new syntactic categories (sec Sankoff and Laberge 1980 and Sankoff 1980e, respectively). In the case of the predicate marker, however, a process of degrammaticalization seems to be operating now to dismantle an earlier system that was in the process of becoming more generalized. Similarly, my discussion of relative clause formation strategies documents a case of syntactic expansion, whereby new complex sentence types are introduced.
Unity in the Parmenides: The Unity of the Parmenides
Authors: Mccabe Mary Margaret 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The Parmenides is a dialogue about what there is. It asks two different kinds of question about what there is. Firstly, how do we count what there is—how many things are there? Secondly, how is what there is arranged, so that it is susceptible to reason—how are we to explain what there is? The relation between what there is and reason, therefore, is expected to be well formed, structured, and thus unified; indeed, a large part of the work is an intricate discussion of just what unity is. Yet the Parmenides is all too often treated as ill formed and fragmented. It seems, in the first place, to be not one but two dialogues: the first, a vigorous attack on the theory of Forms which is at least comprehensible, even if its exact philosophical purpose is difficult to discern; the second, a thoroughly peculiar discussion of ‘the one’, better left either to Neoplatonists or to enthusiastic analytic philosophers. In practice, even if not on principle, scholars deal with one or other of these ‘dialogues’; and the overall purpose of the Parmenides-if indeed there is one--is lost to view.
Afterword: Dialectic and the Dialogue Form in Late Plato
Authors: Gill Christopher 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this concluding chapter, I offer an independent account of the use of dialectic and the dialogue form in late Plato, though one that is couched in general terms. I also respond to certain issues raised in earlier chapters, as well as commenting on the project of this volume as a whole, considered in relation to some previous work on Plato’s use of dialogue form.