bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Ethics with Aristotle
Authors: Broadie Sarah 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book turns a philosophical lens on to the main themes of Aristotle's Ethics, offering detailed discussions of happiness as an end, virtue, character development, voluntary agency, prohairesis (rational choice), practical wisdom, incontinence, pleasure, and the theoretic ideal. It shows how Aristotle's essentially practical orientation in ethics affects the content as well as the method of his inquiry. Closely examined topics include the difference between practical thinking (about particulars) and the thinking of the “statesman,” the category of “the noble,” the Aristotelian roots of justice in human development, the ambiguities of the craft analogy, how pleasure relates to value judgment, human happiness versus that of God, the uses of leisure, and the eccentricity of the theoretic ideal in the eyes of many of Aristotle's contemporaries. The discussion mainly follows the Nicomachean Ethics, but explores some distinctive doctrines of the Eudemian Ethics too.
Introductory Themes
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Sketches a view of the relationship between the interests of the individual and the demands of morality, a view according to which morality and self‐interest stand in a relation of potential congruence. In adopting this view, Scheffler rejects two extreme positions, one that sees morality and self‐interest as ultimately coinciding and another that sees them as diametrically opposed. The complete exposition of Scheffler's view is left for subsequent chapters, but in this introduction he proposes that a proper treatment of the relationship between morality and self‐interest, which must address morality's authority, content, scope, and deliberative role. Scheffler also situates his view in relation to the debate between defenders of contemporary moral theories, such as Kantian and utilitarian outlooks, and critics who claim that these positions neglect important ethical notions, such as virtue. Though he notes certain affinities between his view and the views of the critics, Scheffler denies that the defects in modern moral thought warrant its repudiation in favor of an ethics of virtue.
Morality's Demands and Their Limits: Competing Views
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
One response to an unusually demanding moral theory is to reject it on the ground that the content of morality is moderate rather than stringent, while a second response is to claim that a stringent theory may be acceptable, provided morality is thought of as limited in scope rather than as pervasive.In this chapter, Scheffler provides a general argument against the second response and in support of the view that morality is pervasive. In the process, he distinguishes the idea that morality is pervasive from the idea that it is overriding, which is a claim about morality's authority rather than its scope. He also replies to an argument of Bernard Williams against the pervasiveness of morality. On one interpretation of Williams's argument, Scheffler notes that the argument rests on the implausible assumption that to deem a certain action morally permissible is to imply that the agent should be motivated, at least in part, by the thought of the action's permissibility.
Overridingness, Human Correctness, and Motivational Naturalism
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The “claim of overridingness” (CO) is the claim that it is never rational to knowingly do what morality forbids. Although Scheffler doubts that CO is true, in this chapter he develops two criticisms of the usual arguments against CO. The first is that many of these arguments are inconclusive because they take for granted the controversial claim that morality is stringent. The second criticism is that many of the arguments against CO derive their inspiration from Hume's naturalistic account of moral motivation, and are therefore vulnerable to Kant's objections to motivational naturalism. Scheffler discusses what he calls standard naturalistic accounts of moral motivation – those that explain moral motivation in terms of desire or sympathy – and observes that these accounts run into difficulty not only in answering the Kantian challenge to motivational naturalism but also in explaining certain ordinary psychological phenomena that he calls the “resonance” and “fragility” of morality.
Reason, Psychology, and the Authority of Morality
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Scheffler begins this chapter by arguing that less turns on the question of morality's overridingness than some have supposed. Even if the claim of overridingness were shown to be true, that would not guarantee that all sane human beings would act morally. And even if the claim were false, most people would not abandon their moral beliefs and concerns. The question of what kind of authority morality would have if CO were false is further illuminated by Scheffler's extended discussion of moral motivation and psychoanalytic theory. Although Scheffler remains agnostic on the truth of this theory, Freud's classic account of moral motivation serves as an example of a naturalistic account that, unlike the standard accounts, is responsive to Kant's challenge to naturalism and can offer viable explanations of the resonance and fragility of morality.
Purity and Humanity
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Turning to the question of morality's content, Scheffler undertakes a defense of the view that morality is moderate – that it makes demands and imposes constraints but still allows people, under favorable circumstances, to do as they please within broad limits. Those who oppose this view and see morality as stringent are, according to Scheffler, attributing a kind of purity to the moral point of view, and so he presents the contrast between the stringent and moderate views as a contrast between an Ideal of Purity and an Ideal of Humanity. Scheffler considers and rejects two argumentative strategies that are frequently used in defense of the Ideal of Purity, one that derives stringency from an allegedly uncontroversial property of morality, such as universality or impartiality and another that derives it from ordinary moral language and ordinary moral concepts. Scheffler suggests that, because the claims of stringency and moderation each have a place in our moral consciousness, neither claim can be adequately defended by appealing either to formal properties of morality or to facts about ordinary usage.
Plato, Socrates, and the Dialogues
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

AbstractChapter 1 examines both what is Plato’s fundamental moral problem and how to read the Platonic dialogues as philosophical works. Concerning the former aspect, it is observed that Plato articulates the basic moral question, “What is the good life?” into two different problems: an epistemological one, “How ought we to live?” and a normative one, “How can we know how ought we to live?” Respecting the way Plato’s writings have to be interpreted, the so-called doctrinal approach is followed, i.e., the most important doctrines are formulated by the principal speaker of the dialogue (usually Socrates), while the other characters present several steps relevant for the argument. In conclusion, both Plato’s and Aristotle’s ways of interpreting Socrates’ theories are taken into account.
Socrates' Method
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The goal of chapter 2 is to analyse Socrates’ method. Firstly, it is argued that theSocratic method is not able to reach definitive conclusions. Secondly, it is shown that this occurs because of the use of real rather than nominal definitions. Finally, it is noted that, although this method cannot provide any proper knowledge, it constitutes a very good starting point to address moral problems with great care.
Socrates' Arguments About the Virtues
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The main task of chapter 3 is to consider how Socrates regards virtues. To start with, the aporetic character of Plato’s early dialogues is recalled. Then, it is investigated why Socrates refuses to define virtues in moral terms and rather prefers non-moral terms. Finally, a careful consideration of how Socrates evaluates some virtues and how he defines them is offered.
Difficulties for Socrates
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The core of the fifth chapter is the study of the problems that appear to be involved in Socrates’ prospective. After a consideration of the difficulties that seem to emerge from Socrates’ instrumentalist approach to happiness, attention is devoted to the role played by the craft analogy. According to this analogy, virtue is similar to a craft since a knowledge of the means is necessary for a separate end. This doctrine is illustrated making reference to Aristotle because, although used by Socrates, the craft analogy is never defined in the dialogues.
The Argument of The Gorgias
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe purpose of chapter 7 is to outline the role played by the Gorgias in the development of Plato’s ethical views. To start with, the characteristics and the peculiarities of rhetoric are evaluated. Then, it is presented how Socrates, although he attacks Callicles’ hedonism, maintains an instrumentalist conception according to which virtues are means for achieving happiness. In conclusion, Socrates’ adaptive doctrine of happiness, which appears to imply that happiness consists in the satisfaction of one’s desires, is discussed.
Implications of The Gorgias
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

AbstractChapter 8 contains a detailed discussion of the consequences that may be inferred by the doctrines discussed in the Gorgias. The position of the Gorgias recalls that of the Protagoras. Then, it is claimed that, although the Gorgias tries to refute the earlier dialogue’s hedonist view, Plato nevertheless still holds that happiness is the state in which all desires are fulfilled. Consequently, virtues are considered valuable only because they are means to attain a further end. Finally, it may be suggested that the Gorgias makes a sort of transition from the early dialogues to the mature position of the Republic.
Socratic Method and Socratic Ethics: The Meno
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The core argument of chapter 9 is the thesis that the epistemological distinction between knowledge and beliefs introduced in the Meno plays a crucial role in the consideration of virtues. Thanks to this distinction, Plato can indeed dismiss the theory according to which virtues are only instrumental. Therefore, it is demonstrated that the theory of virtue of the early dialogues is the result of having knowledge of the importance of virtues but not a proper and true knowledge of them.
The Theory of Forms
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
With chapter 10, the author starts the long study of the Republic, which lasts for 9 chapters. This chapter discusses the relevance of the theory of forms for Plato’s ethics. Considering the crucial passages of the Republic book V but also of the Phaedo, it is argued that the distinction between sensibles and forms is significant for ethics. Socrates fails to provide proper definitions in ethics because, lacking the theory of forms, he unsuccessfully tries to make the definitions fit with sensible properties.
Republic IV: The Division of the Soul
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe aim of this chapter is to discuss the moral relevance of the theory of the division of soul. Firstly, it is examined why it is impossible to reconcile this doctrine with instrumentalism. Secondly, how the desires of the three different parts of the soul may be harmonised is investigated. Thirdly, after an elaborate study of the different parts of the soul, the reasons for this tripartition of the soul are introduced. Finally, it is examined whether or not the partition of the soul results in different kinds of happiness.
Republic IV: The Virtues
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe mature version of Plato’s doctrine of the virtue is examined through a detailed study of the several virtues. The theory of virtues expressed in the Republic represents a definitive improvement of the position of the early dialogues. Plato does not reduce any more virtues to something else but rather considers them as ends in themselves. This change is due to the different perspective according to which the definitions of the virtue have not to be expressed in non-moral language. Moreover, a key role is played by the doctrines of the tripartition of the soul, which suggests virtue to be the condition of the soul in which each part acts properly.
Republic VIII–IX on Justice
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter studies the later books of the Republic in order to see how the distinctions between the different kinds of justice, presented in previous chapter, work in the last part of the dialogue. To start with, it is demonstrated that deviant souls are “c-unjust,” while democratic souls are “p-unjust.” Then, the rational part of the soul is extensively analysed in order to explain why it is the more comprehensive. Finally, it is underlined that the just man is the one in whom prevails the rational soul, which is the only one able to provide a good balance to the all human beings.
Pleasure, Intelligence, and the Good
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter focuses on how some crucial doctrines of the Republic are then developed in the Philebus. Firstly, the problem of whether pleasure or intelligence is the good in a more articulated way than the one of the Republic is treated. Secondly, the different types of knowledge and their role in the good life are examined. Thirdly, more generally, it is discussed how the Philebus presents a more exhaustive and precise account of what are, in Plato’s view, intelligence, pleasure, and good. Finally, it is underlined how the Philebus is important for understanding the connection between Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethics.
Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This work addresses the following question: What would be the consequence of allowing a representative of ancient Pyrrhonian scepticism to become a party to contemporary debates in theory of knowledge? The conclusion of this work is that most of our contemporary epistemologists would fare badly in this encounter.
Part 1 concerns the analysis of knowledge claims. It defends the almost universally rejected view that knowledge is simply justified true belief. This analysis is generally thought to be untenable because it yields skepticism or Gettier problems (or both). In response, it is argued that everyday knowledge claims are protected from both difficulties by placing limits on the level of scrutiny, that is, limits are placed on the range of possible defeators that are taken seriously. Conversely, when these constraints are set aside, as epistemologists often do, skepticism and Gettier problems understandably arise. Three chapters are dedicated to examining and criticizing alternative analyses of knowledge claims: various fourth‐clause analyses, externalist analyses, and subjunctive (possible‐world) analyses.
Part 2 concerns theories of justification. It presents a confrontation between Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief (as found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism) and three contemporary theories of justification: Chisholm's foundationalist theory, BonJour's internal coherentism, and Davidson's external coherentism. The conclusion of this examination is that none of these accounts of justification makes serious headway in responding to Agrippa's Five Modes.
Gettier Problems
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter examines Gettier's objections to defining knowledge as justified true belief – the so‐called Gettier problems. In response to these objections, a distinction is drawn between two kinds of justification. A person can be justified in coming to believe that p if he has been epistemically responsible in doing so. This is how Gettier understands justification. A person can also be justified in the sense that he commands grounds or reasons that establish the truth of p. Knowledge claims are, however, sensitive to levels of scrutiny. What counts as adequate grounds in one context may not in another because of its nonstandard features. Gettier problems in all their forms arise when a person, S, responsibly judges that p, but in a context where we, who are privy to information S lacks, see that his grounds do not meet the standards appropriate for the situation he in fact is in.
Fourth‐Clause Theories
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines a series of attempts to produce an analysis of knowledge that avoids Gettier problems by adding some further restriction (fourth clause) to the doctrine that knowledge is justified true belief. The common feature in all Gettier examples is that S's claim to know that p is defeated by some fact he is not privy to (though not negligent in failing to check on it). To avoid such defeators, an indefeasibility clause is added to the standard definition. This produced a long series of new and more complex fourth clauses that were met with new, more exotic counterexamples. The chapter examines the contributions of Lehrer, Paxson, Swain, and Pappas in this endeavor.
Subjunctivism and Subjunctivitis
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter begins with an examination of Dretske's important article “Conclusive Reasons.” Dretske's key move is to offer a subjunctive analysis of his notion of a conclusive reason: “R is a conclusive reason for P if and only if R would not be the case unless P were the case.” It seems, however, that a counterexample produced by Martin shows that while this biconditional holds left to right, it does not hold right to left. Dretske uses his analysis conclusive reasons to deny the principle of epistemic closure under known implication. He then uses this result in a response to skepticism. Reasons are given for rejecting his argument against epistemic closure. Nozick offers essentially the same subjunctive analysis that Dretske did, wrapped in possible‐world semantics. It is rejected on similar grounds.
Agrippa and the Problem of Epistemic Justification
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter lays out Agrippa's Five Modes Leading to the Suspension of Belief as they are found in Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism. The five modes are discrepancy (differences of opinion), regress ad infinitum, relativity, hypothesis (mere assumption), and circular reasoning. In the Pyrrhonist's hands, these five modes are used (either singly or in concert) to show that any effort at justifying philosophical beliefs is bound to fail. On the contemporary scene, three of these modes, arbitrary assumption, infinite regress, and circular reasoning are set up as a challenge to be met by a theory of justification. We get various kinds of theories of justification depending on how this challenge is met.
External Coherentism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter examines Davidson's attempt to develop a coherentist response to skepticism within an externalist or reliabilist framework. His position has two main components. The first depends on the principle of charity: In interpreting the utterances of others, we must assume that most of that person's beliefs are true. It thus makes no sense to attribute massive error to people whose utterances we are trying to interpret. (The third‐person argument.) For similar reasons, it is incoherent to entertain the possibility that one's own beliefs are massively in error. (The first‐person argument.) The second component in Davidson's response to skepticism involves his externalist semantics. In a context where one person is acquiring a concept from someone who already possesses it, the conditions for a belief's being the belief it is can be the same as the conditions for the belief's being true. Beliefs of this kind, Davidson thinks, are immune to skeptical attack. In response, the chapter challenges the transition from the third‐ to the first‐person argument and notes that the semantic argument provides only limited protection from skepticism.
Pyrrhonism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The central thesis of Part 2 of this study is that no justificatory theory seems to show any prospects of solving the Agrippa problem. Does this show that there is no fact of the matter in knowing? At restricted levels of scrutiny, there are facts of the matter in knowing. However, if the Agrippa problem cannot be solved, then in the sense in which philosophers have sought a fact of the matter, it seems that there is none. Pyrrhonism or Neopyrrhonism seems to be the terminating point of the epistemological enterprise. As indicated in the introduction, Pyrrhonism is taken to be urbane, not rustic. The Pyrrhonist is not concerned with the everyday use of words like “know,” “certain,” and “justified,” which are not freighted with extreme philosophical commitments. He can use them as freely as anyone.
Morality and Rationality
Authors: Slote Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Commonsense views about practical rationality are self‐other asymmetric in a way diametrically opposed to the asymmetry involved in commonsense or Kantian morality. What is likely to harm others does not count as irrational in the same fundamental way that what is likely to harm oneself does. Commonsense or Kantian morality is agent sacrificingly asymmetrical, whereas commonsense rationality is agent favouringly asymmetrical. This means that these two parts of ordinary thinking tug in opposite directions, but a virtue‐ethical approach that focuses exclusively on commonsense thinking about what is admirable or counts as a virtue lacks this sort of tension, and such greater unity counts in its favor.
Incoherence in Kantian and commonsense Moral Thinking
Authors: Slote Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kantian and commonsense moral thinking are incoherent because self‐other asymmetry does not cogently combine with the belief that we owe more to people the closer they are to us in familial or personal terms. The latter is commonsensically explained by the claim that it is natural or inevitable that we should care about those closer to us more than about those less close to us, but this seemingly plausible assumption tends to undercut the justification that is typically and intuitively offered for self‐other asymmetry, namely, that we naturally care more about ourselves than about others, so that there is no need to assume any duty to avoid harming oneself. A commonsense ethics of virtue avoids this and other incoherences or tensions in Kantian and commonsense moral thinking.
Virtue‐Ethical Luck
Authors: Slote Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Just like commonsense morality, commonsense virtue ethics faces complicated issues about luck. However, if luck plays a role in our development of virtuous or vicious traits of character, then we can evaluate such traits in virtue‐ethical terms without blaming or condemning those, e.g., whom we wish, in favored terms, to criticize. This approach is very reminiscent of Spinoza.
Reduction vs. Elimination
Authors: Slote Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Most utilitarianism is reductionist in character, reducing virtue and morality to terms of human or sentient well‐being; but an eliminative form of utilitarianism that simply refuses to make moral judgments and focuses exclusively on what produces better or good consequences is also possible. The virtue‐ethical approach of the present work is eliminative of moral terminology, though not of all aretaic evaluations.