bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Polemo, Champion of EthicalPraxis
Authors: Dillon John 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPolemo, who was converted to philosophy after hearing Xenocrates lecture, presided over the Academy for much longer than either of his predecessors (from 314–276 B.C.). Polemo is best known for emphasizing the practical application of ethics over theory, and for his doctrine that the purpose of life is to live ‘in conformity with nature’, which he may well have adopted from Xenocrates. While it is difficult to disentangle Polemo's ethical theory from that of Xenocrates, Polemo tends to be credited with an increase in the austerity of ethical theory, which anticipates and may have influenced the ethical theory of Zeno of Citium, who had been a pupil of Polemo. There is also a possibility that Polemo anticipated Stoic materialism. Dillon draws upon Cicero's De Finibus to point to many subtle distinctions between the ethics of Polemo and Zeno; nevertheless, it is clear that Polemo was an important bridge between Platonism and Stoicism.
Minor Figures
Authors: Dillon John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, Dillon considers four minor figures of the Academy: Philippus of Opus, Hermodorus of Syracuse, Heraclides of Pontus, who were all students of Plato; and Crantor of Soli, a contemporary of Polemo. Philippus is best known for editing Plato's Laws for publication, and he was the real author of the Epinomis: as a philosopher, he is distinguished for elevating the rational World‐Soul to the status of the supreme principle, and for identifying astronomy as the true path to the knowledge of God. Hermodorus composed a book on Plato's life and works; philosophically he is interesting for his interpretation of Plato's first principles, and in particular, his denial that matter, or the Unlimited, is a principle. Heraclides, who supervised the Academy during Plato's third trip to Sicily, was nevertheless remarkably free from academic orthodoxy: his most distinctive philosophical position is that the soul is light, or aether, and therefore a quasi‐material substance. Cantor's major contribution to the development of Platonism is the idea of the commentary; Proclus identifies him as the first commentator, because he wrote an exposition, as distinct from an exegesis, of Plato's Timaeus.
Epilogue: Arcesilaus and the Turn to Scepticism
Authors: Dillon John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Arcesilaus of Pitane succeeded Crates as head of the Academy in the mid‐270s, and is credited with instigating the era of the ‘sceptical’ Academy. Dillon shows that this radical change of direction was in fact inspired by Arcesilaus’ desire to return to the original spirit and methods of Plato's philosophy. Faced with the challenge of Zeno of Citium's nascent Stoicism, which in many ways was a logical development and intellectual heir of Platonism, Arcesilaus revived the dialectic of Plato's ‘Socratic’ dialogues and attacked the Stoic belief in the certainty of sense perception. Arcesilaus thus reinvigorated the sceptical and aporetic strand of his Socratic–Platonic heritage, as represented in a work like the Theaetetus, while eschewing the Timaeus‐inspired cosmological speculation that had characterized the preceding 70 years.
Images of Excellence
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe book is an examination of Plato's philosophy of art. Central to the book are Plato's arguments in the Republic that traditionally accepted forms of poetry, drama, and music are of questionable value, on the grounds that they do not arise from knowledge on the part of artists, and that they can be harmful because they appeal to the emotional side of the psyche. The book suggests that Plato has a better case for his views than has often been claimed, given the context of his ethics and epistemology, and that his views challenge much of what is accepted as good art in modern thought. To understand Plato's position, his views on inspiration, craft expertise (techne), beauty, moral education, and representation (mimesis) are examined through the discussion of a number of his early and middle‐period dialogues. It is argued that Plato's later writings do not significantly retract the critical views of the arts found in the Republic. Throughout, links are made with recent philosophical aesthetics, and the question posed is what defence of art modern thinking can or should make against Plato.
Rhapsody
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses Plato's dialogue Ion, in which it is claimed that poets and performers of poetry succeed in their arts not by knowledge or the expertise (techne) of a craftsman, but by inspiration. A link is suggested with modern views, stemming from romanticism, that art is the domain of irrationality and genius rather than the application of generalizable rational principles. However, Plato gives a low evaluation of poetry because of its alleged distance from this kind of knowledge.
Arts, Crafts, and the Production of Pleasure
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that Plato has the beginnings of a conception of aesthetic pleasure, but that he does not use it to assign autonomous value to the arts. In his Gorgias, Plato argues that rhetoric and music are not genuine exercises of craft‐like expertise (techne) because they do not work on general principles that can specify what is a good outcome and what steps will achieve it. Instead, he alleges, these art forms simply aim at providing pleasure or gratification to their audience. Aiming at pleasure is seen as a haphazard enterprise, quite distinct from aiming at the good, which requires generalizable knowledge rationally applied. In the later dialogue, Philebus Plato gives a complex account of pleasure, including some discussions of a ‘pure’ pleasure that is arguably aesthetic.
The Formation of Character
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Concerns Plato's discussion in Republic Books 2 and 3 of the role of the arts in education in his ideal city. He advocates widespread censorship of poetry, including the works of Homer, on the grounds that poetry should represent only the truth and be conducive to developing a moral character that fits the young for their role as rulers or guardians in the city. The other part of the discussion concerns mimesis, here construed as dramatic enactment or characterization, which Plato argues can diversify the individual too much and detract from a concern with what is ethically good. The chapter argues that Plato's assessment of the nature of poetry and its psychological impact is less problematic than his political programme, in which not only the arts are severely regulated.
Mimēsis
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractGives an analysis of the concept of mimesis, which in Book 10 of the Republic emerges as a wider concept of artistic representation, applicable to poetry and the visual arts. The practitioner of mimesis makes no real thing, for Plato, but only the image or appearance of a thing of some kind. The chapter also argues that there is no need to believe that Plato limits the arts to a crude or mechanical copying or to the making of literal illusions.
Against Mimetic Poetry
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A discussion of the arguments against mimetic poetry in Republic Book 10. Plato criticizes poetry and drama, especially tragedy and Homer, on the grounds that, in engaging the emotions, they appeal to an unstable emotional part of the psyche and subvert reason, while yet seeming to proceed from, and transmit, knowledge. He is concerned that poets are regarded as possessing and conveying knowledge in the sphere of ethics, when in fact they have only an ability to produce pleasurable and convincing ‘images of excellence’. On the basis of epistemological and psychological arguments, mimetic poetry is banished from the ideal city.
Myth, Madness, Pleasure, and Play
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In works later than the Republic, Plato continues to pursue many of the themes so far discussed in the book. In Phaedrus, he addresses issues concerned with rhetoric, poetry, and inspiration, seeming to give a more positive account. It is argued that his view is, however, not radically different from that taken in the Republic. Other later dialogues contain systematic discussions of mimesis and techne. The late dialogue Laws revisits the question of the place of the arts in the life of a community.
Plato and the Philosophy of Art
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Raises the question how to give a ‘defence of art’ against Plato's criticisms, drawing on elements of modern philosophy of art. It is argued that modern thinking is unclear over the nature of art: in particular, as to whether we should grant it the kind of ethical value and cognitive seriousness that Plato faults it for not having, or whether we should defend art's autonomy on the grounds of its providing aesthetic value. Plato is clearer than much modern thinking as to what he requires from art, and because of this, can still prompt us to think profoundly about the nature and value of art.
Providence and the Problem of Evil
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Unless he has very strong reason for supposing that there is a God, a theist needs a theodicy (or at least needs to begin to develop one) in order justifiably to believe that there is a God. Part 2 of this book describes the good goals that God might be seeking to produce in his Universe—beauty; creatures having knowledge (in a largely internalist sense), having their good desires satisfied, with a free will to do actions that promote each others’ well‐being, being of use to others, and worshipping God. Part 3 shows how the possibility of moral evil, and the actual occurrence of natural evil (providing knowledge of possible good and bad actions, and the scope for good response) are necessary to secure these ends. God has the right to allow some creatures to suffer for the benefit of others, so long as he compensates them in this life or after death. The expected value of allowing the evils in order to achieve the good goals is positive.
The Need for Theodicy
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In order for God to allow a bad state E to occur, (1) he must have the right to allow it (or an equally bad state) to occur, (2) to allow it must be the only morally permissible way in which he can bring about a good G, (3) God does everything else logically possible to bring about G, and (4) the expected value thereby of allowing E is positive. Unless he has strong prior reasons for believing that there is a God, a theist needs to have (or have to begin to construct) such a theodicy with respect to all known evils, explaining why a good God would allow them to occur, if his belief that there is a God is to be rational.
Theodicy in Christian Tradition
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There have been various strands of theodicy in Christian tradition—that evil is simply the absence of good, that evil was caused by the Fall of Adam or of the angels, that human free will requires the possibility of moral evil, and that evil is needed to promote the growth of souls. The first strand is worthless, and the value of the second has been exaggerated; but the other two strands are important.
Action
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A third goal that a good God would have would be to give creatures the free will to choose between good and bad (or, alternatively, spontaneous desires to do what is good), so that by their actions they can make great differences to the characters, powers, and knowledge of themselves and each other. One way of doing this is to create finite embodied creatures. It is a great good for someone to be of use to others by their actions (chosen or unchosen) or by what they suffer.
Worship
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A final goal that a good God would have in creating would be to create creatures who could know, interact with, and worship their holy creator. He will thus sometimes answer their petitionary prayers, and give them the opportunity to discover and love him or to fail to do so, before giving to those who take that opportunity to enjoy the Beatific Vision of himself in life after death.
The Range of Moral Evil; and Responsibility
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
If God is to give to creatures significant responsibility for themselves and others, he must allow them to damage their characters, and to cause pain and ignorance. It is good that humans, who do not seek to benefit their fellow humans, should have the temptations of sloth—to hurt them by doing nothing, as well as the more serious temptation of actively causing them hurt.
Natural Evil and the Scope for Response
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The ‘higher‐order goods’ defence claims that natural evils (bad states caused by processes over which humans have no control) give humans the opportunity to react to them in the right way by actions, which otherwise they would have little opportunity to perform. Humans can show courage and sympathy in response to suffering, and by doing such good actions in difficult circumstances, gradually form their characters for good. It is good too that animals should have some opportunity for heroic actions.
Natural Evil and the Possibility of Knowledge
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The opportunity to study natural processes that produce good and bad effects gives humans the opportunity to acquire knowledge of how to produce good and bad effects themselves, and thus to make the efficacious choices, which the ‘free will defence’ sees as such a good thing. If God gave us this knowledge in some other way, this would give us too evident an awareness of his presence.
Weighing Good Against Bad
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
When we appreciate the great value of life itself, of having opportunities to make significant choices, and of being of use (a value stressed in the New Testament), we can see that for God to allow evils of the limited kind that occur on earth is compatible with God's perfect goodness. On a Christian view, the point of this life is to form ourselves so as to be capable of enjoying the Beatific Vision of God in a life after death.
Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Many themes in the papers collected here are negative: there is no a priori knowledge or analytic truth; logic is not a theory of reasoning; a theory of truth conditions is not a theory of meaning; a purely objective account of meaning or mind cannot say what words mean or what it is like to see things in colour. Other themes are positive: theoretical reasoning has important practical aspects; meaning depends on how words are used to think with i.e. on how concepts function in reasoning, perception and action; the relevant uses or functions relate concepts to aspects of the environment and other things in the world; translation plays a central role in any adequate account of mind or meaning.
Simplicity as a Pragmatic Criterion for Deciding What Hypotheses to Take Seriously
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Simplicity is used in curve‐fitting and can be illustrated by Goodman's ‘new riddle of induction.’ Taking the simplicity of a hypothesis to depend entirely on the simplicity of the way it is represented does not work, because simplicity of representation is too dependent on the method of representation, and any hypothesis can be represented simply. An alternative ‘semantic’ theory also has problems. A ‘computational’ theory is defended that considers how easy it is to use a hypothesis to get answers to questions in which one is interested.
Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses how to explain the distinction between epistemic and non‐epistemic reasons while allowing epistemic reasons to be affected by pragmatic considerations of simplicity, coherence, and conservatism. After noting difficulties with trying to explain epistemic reasons in terms of connections with truth or the goal of believing what is true, the chapter discusses issues about the nature of probability, suggesting that epistemic reasons connect with conditional probability in a way that non‐epistemic reasons do not.
The Death of Meaning
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractProvides a sympathetic account of Quine's rejection of analyticity, language‐independent meanings, and other intensional objects. Explains Quine's thesis of the indeterminacy of radical translation in terms of the example of various ways to translate number theory to set theory. Elaborates a positive Quinean theory of meaning, which puts weight on translation, where translation is not a strict equivalence relation.
Meaning and Semantics
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Rejects several arguments for the claim that a theory of meaning ought to take the form of a theory of truth. Sketches a conceptual role semantics in which the meanings of logical constants are determined in large part by implications involving those logical constants, where implication is to be explained in terms of truth. Although truth‐conditions are sometimes relevant to meaning, this is only the case for the meanings of logical constants.
(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe use of symbols in calculation and other thinking is to be distinguished from the use of symbols in communication. Grice's analysis of speaker meaning fails for certain uses of symbols in calculation. Words and concepts have uses, not sentences or whole thoughts. Concepts have uses or functional roles in perception; inference and practical reasoning are to be understood in terms of ways an organism functions in relation to a presumed normal environment.
Wide Functionalism
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Psychological explanation is a kind of functional explanation, like some biological explanation, where the relevant functions tend to have to do with perceiving and acting in relation to the environment. Pain serves as a kind of alarm system; perception allows an organism to get information about the environment etc. Although there are defenders of a narrow, more solipsistic psychological functionalism, the dominant trend has involved the wider version. In any event, the wider functionalism is clearly more plausible and methodological solipsism in psychology is incoherent.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractReplies to three related arguments against wide functionalism. The first says that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and points out that there is no way to account for such an awareness in a purely functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third holds that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. All three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object.
Explaining Value
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers the following questions: What accounts for the existence of basic moral disagreements? Why do most people think it is worse to injure someone than to fail to save them from injury? Where does the right of self‐defence come from? Why do many people think it is morally permissible to treat animals in ways we would not treat people? Why are some people moral relativists and others not? What is it to value something and what is it to value something intrinsically? How are a person's values (noun) related to what the person values (verb)? How much of morality can or should be explained in terms of human flourishing or the possession of virtuous character traits? For that matter, are there character traits of the sort we normally suppose there are? How do people come to be moral? Is morality something one learns or does it arise in everyone naturally without instruction?
Moral Relativism Defended
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A version of moral relativism can be formulated as an intelligible thesis, the thesis that morality derives from an implicit agreement and moral judgements are true or false only in relation to such an agreement. This thesis explains otherwise puzzling aspects of some of our own moral views, in particular, why we think that it is more important to avoid harm to others than to help others avoid harm. Traditional objections to implicit agreement theories can be met.
Justice and Moral Bargaining
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSubstantive principles of justice derive from actual agreements that result from an actual usually tacit moral bargaining, contrary to arguments by Gewirth, Nagel, and Kohlberg, for thinking that all rational or normal people must recognize certain requirements of justice. Mere hypothetical agreements could not give people reasons. Moral bargaining explains moral concern and respect in a way that does not undermine the moral force of the principles we accept. Being more explicit about moral bargaining will improve moral argument and lead to greater tolerance.
Is There a Single True Morality?
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAlthough people appear to be quite evenly divided between moral relativists and moral absolutists, there is a tendency to suppose that the view one takes about relativism is obviously correct and that who takes the opposite view is just denying the plain truth. Some of the disagreement can be traced to methodology and to the attitude one takes about how ethics fits with a scientific conception of the world. Those who take it to be important how one's moral views cohere with science tend to be moral relativists; those who do not take that issue to be all important tend to be moral absolutists.
Toward a Theory of Intrinsic Value
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Concerned with what would or would not be a good or worthwhile or desirable states of affairs, as when one says, ‘It would be a good thing if P’. Some theorists have attempted to provide such a theory by providing a theory of intrinsic value. It is not clear whether a theory of intrinsic value can be developed along the lines of what has been the standard account. If one is to develop such a theory, one will need to introduce a notion of ‘basic intrinsic value’ in addition to the notion of ‘intrinsic value’. Several different theories of intrinsic value may account for the same judgements concerning desirability and it may be arbitrary to choose one such theory over another.
Desired Desires
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues against appeals to second‐order desires in order to explain freedom of the will, valuing, or values. Further points are that positive intentions are reflexive or self‐referential, that intrinsic desires are not just non‐instrumental desires, that to value something is in part to want it, that there is sometimes a difference between believing that something is good and valuing it, and that there is a difference between valuing something and having something as one of your values.
Intrinsic Value
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractGood news might be desirable to you even though it is not of value to you. Something not valued intrinsically might be valued as contributing to a larger whole that is valued intrinsically in the sense that the whole with that part is intrinsically preferred to the whole without that part. These points shed light on the value of some good news, to retributive punishment, and Dworkin's account of sacred value.