bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
PR Case Study Election Results: South Africa and Namibia
Authors: Reynolds Andrew 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter and the previous one (Ch. 5) describe the political histories of the case studies presented in the book, paying particular attention to their democratic transitions, institutional choices, and experience of multiparty elections. Together with Ch. 7, they form the historical, empirical, and quantitative heart of the book, providing the foundational evidence against which earlier postulated theories are gauged (Chs 1 and 2), and upon which subsequent comparisons, recommendations, and conclusions are based. Chapter 6 describes and analyses elections held under proportional representation (PR) in South Africa and Namibia. For each case study, full numerical results are given, along with an explanation of the electoral system formula and how that system came to be used; also included are summaries of the implications, for both parties and government, of election results, defining aspects of each newly elected parliament, and the election campaign that preceded it; the question of the validity and legitimacy of each published result is also addressed. A re-running exercise is carried out in Ch. 7 that uses the results presented here, and is based on plurality SMD, AV-SMD, and AV-MMD, together with the list PR method not utilized in the actual elections.
Re‐running Elections Under Alternative Electoral Systems
Authors: Reynolds Andrew 
Published: October 2003

AbstractTogether with Chs 5 and 6, Ch. 7 forms the historical, empirical, and quantitative heart of the book, providing the foundational evidence against which earlier postulated theories are gauged (Ch 1 and 2), and upon which subsequent comparisons, recommendations, and conclusions are based. Chapter 7 deals with the methodology used for an election re-running exercise under alternative electoral systems, presents the results obtained for each of the five country case studies presented in the book, and discusses the practical implications of each set of re-running observations, as well as the positive and negative consequences for stability and representative government; further details of the methods used for crafting districts for re-runs are given in an appendix at the end of the book. The chapter first discusses the importance of re-running evidence, and second, outlines the range of alternative electoral systems used for the re-runnings, justifying their inclusion in the exercise, and addressing the underlying assumptions and methodological objections. Third, results are given of plurality single-member districts (SMD) elections re-run in Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe under the alternative vote in single-member districts (AV-SMD), the alternative vote in multi-member districts (AV-MMD), list proportional representation (PR) in regionally defined multi-member districts, and list PR in one national multi-member district. Finally, the results are given of re-running the list PR elections held in Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia under plurality SMD, AV-SMD, AV-MMD, and the list PR method not utilized in the actual elections.
Conclusion: The Case for Democratic Optimism
Authors: Reynolds Andrew 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis concluding chapter briefly makes a case for democratic optimism, showing that a clear pattern is emerging which suggests that contrary to the predictions of societal breakdown across sub-Saharan Africa, those countries with institutional mechanisms that create an atmosphere of inclusion are doing better than those that have opted for more exclusionary structures. South Africa and Namibia best exemplify the inclusive typology and have performed well on a number of fronts since multiparty democracy was introduced in 1994 and 1989, respectively. Drawing on these stories, it has become widely accepted that the only realistic solution for settling the problems of the war-torn, divided societies of Africa is the institution of inclusive arrangements. This thesis is discussed, with examples from across Africa, and the question is posed and discussed as to whether elections are nothing more than ethnic and racial censuses in Africa. The chapter ends by briefly looking at inclusion in practice – the nuts and bolts of constitutional design.
Introduction
Authors: McLean Iain 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Introduces basic concepts of social choice. Describes the median voter theorem for one issue dimension, and its chaotic failure in more than one. It explains what rhetoric and heresthetics are, also how veto games and credible commitments have operated in British politics since 1846. It introduces W.H. Riker's account of the triumph of Abraham Lincoln in 1860.
Dishing the Whigs: Disraeli, Salisbury, and the Relaunching of the Tory Party 1846–86
Authors: McLean Iain 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A case study of the relaunch of the Conservative Party, which had been shattered in 1846, under Disraeli and Salisbury. Explains how Disraeli enacted the Second Reform Act in 1867, although it damaged the material interests of the median MP and peer. Examines the rebasing of the Conservative Party under Disraeli and Salisbury as the party of popular imperialism.
The Patriot Game: Rhetoric and Heresthetic in the Anglo‐Irish Treaty Negotiations of 1921
Authors: McLean Iain 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The second of two case studies of Lloyd George. Explains how he was able to enact the Irish Treaty of 1921 in three parliaments and three executives, when he controlled a majority in only one of the six bodies, and that a very bare majority. Although his threat strategy was not credible, he forced the Irish delegate into a sequential game, because each Irish delegate, when forced to decide, in turn strictly preferred signing the Treaty to not signing it. Lloyd George succeeded in removing the Irish question from British politics for fifty years, and partly succeeded in removing the British question from Irish politics.
‘There Is No Alternative’: Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair
Authors: McLean Iain 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A case study of the rhetoric and heresthetics of Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, and Gordon Brown. It examines Thatcher's slogans: the free economy, where she succeeded, and the strong state, where she failed. The first changed the universe of political debate; the second destroyed the Conservative Party, as it split into its Europhile and Eurosceptical wings. The most successful heresthetic since 1997 has been Brown's grant of central bank independence within days of taking office.
From the 1920s to the 1950s
Authors: Cassis Youssef 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Analyses the development of big business in Britain, France and Germany from the 1920s to the 1950s. Companies with a share capital of £3 million or more in 1927 and £5 million or more in 1953 and a workforce of 10,000 or more for both years have been considered as large. While the number of large companies, especially in the new industries, increased everywhere, this was the period when Britain's advance, both in quantity and diversity, was most evident. German big business displayed remarkable stability given the political upheavals experienced by the country during this period. The foundations of modern big business in France were laid during these years and not, as too often assumed, in the 1960s.
Recent Developments
Authors: Cassis Youssef 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines the more recent developments of European big business, from the 1960s to the late 1980s, which can be seen as the golden age of the industries of the second industrial revolution. The number of large as well as giant (with a workforce of 100,000 or more) companies increased significantly, and greater convergence in the size and sectoral distribution of the largest companies can be observed.
Survival
Authors: Cassis Youssef 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers the ability of large firms to survive and grow in the long term. Survival has been defined as a company's ability to remain both independent and sufficiently large to enjoy big business status. The French large firms of the pre‐1914 years were the most successful in that respect, but of the large European corporations of the 1920s, the British proved the more resilient. Interestingly, this longevity was not achieved at the expense of growth.
Competence
Authors: Cassis Youssef 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It looks into the shaping of businessmen's individual skills from a comparative perspective. Particular attention is given to family and socio‐professional backgrounds (whether they were founders, inheritors or salaried managers), education and training (with a discussion of the role of the public schools in Britain, the grandes écoles in France and technical education in Germany), and early career patterns (private firms, corporate ladder and state administration).
Wealth, Status, and Power Before 1914
Authors: Cassis Youssef 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The pre‐1914 years were the formative years, the years of big business social and political apprenticeship, the period during which accumulated wealth translated into social status and political influence. Ch. 8 compares the socio‐political position reached by the British, French, and German business leaders at the beginning of the twentieth century. A specific configuration had already emerged, though it was still to evolve in the course of the century.
Business Élites in Contemporary Europe
Authors: Cassis Youssef 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers how business elites have fared in upheaval and prosperity. While business leaders have clearly been at the top of the social hierarchy since 1918, wealth, or at least great wealth, has no longer been the primary source of the business leaders’ status and power. Relations with other elite groups could be conflictual, and lead to temporary setbacks. Above all, business leaders have been confronted with a much higher level of state intervention, which has heavily affected their own political involvement.
Convergence has been an uneven process, which only gathered pace after the Second World War, and did not eradicate national singularities.
Is Universalism Ethnocentric?
Authors: Hollis Martin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Martin Hollis (in one of his last writings before his untimely death) opens up the first section, Is Universalism Ethnocentric?, with a fiery defence of Enlightenment universalism and an attack on the relativist who says ‘Liberalism for the liberals; cannibalism for the cannibals.’ Focusing especially on universal claims about human nature, civil society, and the best forms of government, Hollis argues for a substantive and not merely procedural liberalism as a ‘fighting creed with universalist pretensions’ that can justify ‘robust and sharp‐edged moral declarations’. As Hollis argues, universalism works for minorities too. This is because excluded minorities must show that they have been wrongly excluded; they need a standpoint that is ‘not cognitively arbitrary’ to exclude racists and sexists.
‘Nous’ et ‘les Autres’ The Politics of Complex Cultural Dialogue in a Global Civilization
Authors: Benhabib Seyla 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Seyla Benhabib's case for universalism is somewhat more cautious. She approaches the lead question through the negative, by contesting various fashionable versions of cognitive relativism, radical incommensurability, and untranslatability. She then shows the untenability of the (mosaic) multicultural version of relativism. Such relativism, Benhabib says, is ‘poor man's sociology’, relying upon a holistic view of cultures and societies (even evident in the work of Kymlicka) that is at odds with our mixed‐up global world, a context‐transcending ‘pluralist universalism’ becomes ever more a necessity, but fortunately also a reality.
Cultural Pluralism and Partial Citizenship
Authors: Spinner‐Halev Jeff 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In his response to our second lead question, Does Multiculturalism Threaten citizenship? , Jeff Spinner‐Halev distinguishes between various kinds of multiculturalism in practice. ‘Thick’ multiculturalism (also dubbed ‘cultural pluralism’), which seeks state funds for group separation, is a threat to citizenship. ‘Inclusive’ multiculturalism, according to Spinner‐Halev, the mainline brand, enhances citizenship – an example being the turban‐wearing Sikh in the Canadian Royal Mountain Police. Discussing the case of Hutterites, Spinner‐Halev introduces a third kind of multiculturalism for insular communities that stay away from the society's common life and invoke what he calls ‘partial citizenship’. This is a variant of ‘thick’ multiculturalism, without, however, asking for state funds. If the exit for apostates is guaranteed, partial citizenship poses no threat to citizenship, and is to be tolerated. Spinner‐Halev's approach is pragmatic, not principled: if the context allows (say in ethnically homogenous Sweden), even thick multiculturalism may be exceptionally tolerated.
The Paradox of Multicultural Vulnerability: Individual Rights, Identity Groups, and the State
Authors: Shachar Ayelet 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAyelet Shachar is a good deal less ‘catholic’, pointing at the losses in individual rights that multicultural accommodation may entail. She calls a ‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability’ a situation in which group members may reap some benefits from multicultural accommodation, while individuals with ‘other’ identities (for instance, women) bear disproportionate costs for preserving their group's identity. Discussing religious family law in Israel, she puts her finger on a sore spot in Kymlicka's theory of multicultural citizenship, which prohibits individual rights violations in principle but lets them pass in practice.
Comments on Shachar and Spinner‐Halev: An Update from the Multiculturalism Wars
Authors: Kymlicka Will 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe author is commenting on the two previous chapters. He begins with the observation that the first wave of multiculturalists made arguments from justice; liberal states were charged with treating their minorities unjustly, and so justice required their accommodation. The previous two chapters indicate that, at the theoretical level, the first wave has been a success. Next, theorists and politicians must deal with the injustices caused by particular multicultural policies, as is illustrated in Ch. 4, as well as the general impact of multiculturalism on citizenship, as illustrated in Ch. 5. The author attempts to situate these two issues within the larger multicultural debate.
Against Collective Rights
Authors: Tamir Yael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Yael Tamir argues that the notion of collective rights, understood as entitlement bestowed on a group rather than the individuals that make up a group, should be rejected in principle. According to Tamir, the notion of a collective right is meaningless, because groups are not moral agents; it is unnecessary, because most morally relevant interests to be protected by such rights can be protected by individual rights, and those that cannot are better taken care of by contingent policies or institutional arrangements that are not couched in a discourse of rights; and it is dangerous, a threat to the individual rights of members and non‐members alike.
Minorities and Immigrant Incorporation in France: The State and the Dynamics of Multiculturalism
Authors: Schain Martin A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Martin Schain hammers the last nail into the coffin of hypostasized ‘national models’ of immigrant integration. His comparison of France and the US shows that the ‘pluralism’ attributed to the American model has been of very recent origins, and that the ‘Republicanism’ attributed to the French model has been hollowed out by the state's practical interest in incorporating (and controlling) its immigrant population, which has entailed de facto multicultural policies in allegedly ‘assimilationist’ France.
‘Good to Think’: The American Reference in French Discourses of Immigration and Ethnicity
Authors: Fassin Éric 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Eric Fassin tackles the same theme from a sociology of knowledge angle. He shows how the ‘rhetoric of America’ in France has served the political purposes of French intellectuals, who found in the discourse of culture and ethnicity a welcome replacement for their outworn discourse of class. Fassin thus hints at a sociology of multiculturalism, whose topic is not oppressed groups but intellectuals making claims about them on their behalf.
Comments on Glazer, Schain, and Fassin: How can We Be European?
Authors: Favell Adrian 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe author links the contextual evidence provided by the three previous chapters (which compare France and the US) to the more general philosophical questions concerning multiculturalism posed in the introduction to the volume. He argues that all the chapters point towards an even more relevant comparison that ought to be made, between the US and the European Union.
Policies, Institutions, and the Euro: Dilemmas of Legitimacy
Authors: Verdun Amy , Christiansen Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWhereas in democratic national systems institutions are legitimated by a political community, at the European level institutions are constructed in order to produce such a community. As a result, institutions like monetary union run a risk of having low popular legitimacy. The authors use this issue to consider the general problem of EU legitimacy.
Before Negative and Positive Liberty
Authors: Pettit Philip 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe negative conception of freedom as non‐interference and the positive conception of freedom as self‐mastery are not the only available ideals of liberty; a third alternative is the conception of freedom as non‐domination, which requires that no one is able to interfere on an arbitrary basis— at their pleasure—in the choices of the free person. This is the conception espoused in the long republican tradition. Thus republicans regarded all of those who are subject to another's arbitrary will as unfree, even if the other does not actually interfere with them; there is no interference in such a case but there is a loss of liberty. And, in cases where a regime of law did not subject people to an arbitrary will, they thought that legal coercion was not a compromise of people's liberty; there is interference in such a case but no loss of liberty. As the conception of freedom as non‐interference was introduced by Hobbes to defend Leviathan against republicans, it was used to defend British rule in the North American colonies against the republican criticism that Parliament had arbitrary power over the colonists. This new conception became respectable through the work of people like Bentham and Paley, who saw in it a way of conceiving of freedom that would allow even dominated agents like women and servants—so far as they did not suffer actual interference —to count as free. Unlike traditional republicans, Bentham and Paley did not feel able to limit the constituency of citizens to the mainstream, propertied males, and their inclusivism in this respect, which neo‐republicans must also share, may explain why they regarded the republican ideal of freedom too demanding.
Liberty as Non‐Domination
Authors: Pettit Philip 
Published: October 2003

AbstractInterference involves an intentional or quasi‐intentional worsening of someone's choice situation and occurs on an arbitrary basis to the extent that it is not forced to track the interests and ideas of those who suffer the interference. One party dominates another just so far as they have the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis in some of the other's choices; where such domination occurs, it will tend to be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties but that is not part of the definition. Domination in the sense defined may occur without actual interference: it requires only the capacity for interference; and interference may occur without any domination: if the interference is not arbitrary then it will not dominate. Non‐domination may be advanced in a society either through people coming to have equal powers, or through a legal regime stopping people from dominating one another without itself dominating anyone in turn. When someone enjoys non‐domination, it will usually be a matter of common knowledge among relevant parties, so that non‐domination has a subjective and inter‐subjective aspect: it is associated with tranquillity, in Montesquieu's phrase, and with the ability to look others in the eye. Notwithstanding the allegations of Paley and early liberals, freedom as non‐domination is not a confused ideal, it comes in degrees both of intensity and extent, and it is not an impossibly radical ideal; the rich demands that it would make on the state look capable of being satisfied in our world, even if they were not capable of satisfaction in Paley's.
Non‐Domination as a Political Ideal
Authors: Pettit Philip 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe superior value of non‐domination needs to be established in a comparison with freedom as non‐interference. It comes out in the fact that its maximization would require the promotion of three benefits that the maximization of non‐interference could ignore; these are the absence of uncertainty, the absence of a need to defer strategically to the powerful, and the absence of a social subordination to others. The connection between freedom as non‐domination and these benefits is such that that freedom is a primary good, in John Rawls's sense; it is something that people have reason to want for themselves, no matter what else they want. But freedom as non‐domination is not the sort of good that can be left to people to pursue for themselves in a decentralized way; all the signs are that it is best pursued for each under the centralized, political action of all: it is best pursued via the state. The political pursuit of freedom as non‐domination should be attractive, not just for small homogeneous polities but also in the modern, pluralistic state. The natural way to cast freedom as non‐domination is in the role of a value that the state should try to promote, not in the role of a constraint that it has to honour; this, moreover, is the way in which it is generally cast in the republican tradition: the tradition is consequentialist in character. There are two dimensions that need to be taken into account in the promotion of freedom as non‐domination—the intensity of non‐domination and the extent of undominated choice—but some plausible assumptions mean that we should look to intensity first and extent only in the second place. When non‐domination is promoted by certain political and other institutions—when people are guarded against possibilities of arbitrary interference in their lives—that effect is not causally distinct from the institutions; like the immunity produced by antibodies in the blood, the non‐domination is constituted by such institutional arrangements: it has an inherently institutional existence.