bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Informant Problem
Authors: Fischer Steven Roger 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is anything but the end of the rongorongo story. A whole mind-set has been forgotten-that of the people who created the remarkable rongorongo artefacts. We have as much to learn about rongorongo from the Rapanui of the first half of the nineteenth century as we have gleaned from the many Western scholars investigating the matter as of the second half of the nineteenth century: if we can first learn how to filter the contaminated and corrupted information the Victorian Rapanui korohua and nuahine bequeathed us. With what we learn from the Rapanui themselves, together with the results of the succeeding 130 years of Western research into rongorongo, we shall perhaps slowly begin to approach a comprehensive appreciation of the premissionary rongorongo social context and its literary expression.
Songs
Authors: Fischer Steven Roger 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The categories of inscriptions mentioned above do not include the many types of additional songs or chants that perhaps comprised a portion of the original rongorongo corpus. It would be wrong here to separate song (‘a short musical composition of words and music’) from chant (‘a rhythmic monotonic utterance’), as one is wont to do with other societies’ oral literature. Ancient Polynesian music lacked those melodic and structural elaborations that would require such a distinction.
Language
Authors: Fischer Steven Roger 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
“Oh! how lovely their language appeared to us”, wrote the controversial Father Honorè Laval about the Mangarevan tongue in the mid-nineteenth century, though he might have been speaking of any Polynesian language, including Rapanui, once, by dint of work and patience, we were in a position to understand it! Today more than ever I admire its simplicity, distinctiveness, energy, and majesty. Each sentence is in itself an exact definition that explains the nature of the thing and gives a clear idea of it. The locutions are particularly rich and the same sentence can be rendered in a multitude of different ways. What renders this language succeptible to so many casts are the words that are at once nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs, and interjections. A sentence can even become a verb, an adjective, and a noun. And the particles of the nouns and verbs, to what marvellous effects they lend themselves! The article of the proper nouns and the nouns of number, the dual of the pronouns and three kinds of reduplications as well for the verbs as for the nouns and adjectives, give this language an expression of novelty that I have seen only in Oceania. (Laval, 1938: 209-ro).
The Epigones
Authors: Fischer Steven Roger 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There have essentially been two kinds of rongorongo “forgeries”: those that innocently imitated and those that purposely deceived. As early as 1877 the Abbès Lacombe and Tryphon were encouraging young island carvers to produce imitation rongorongo at their Catholic trade school on Tahiti. In the 1880s on Rapanui Alexander Salmon was instrumental in promoting the decoration of carvings with the imitative ta’u “script” in order to provide his Rapanui employees and friends with clothing and other valuable items from passing ships in exchange. And in 1934 “a man by the name of Araki was commissioned”, wrote Alfred Metraux years later, “to produce all objects his ancestors had used and we helped him by giving him books and photographs of specimens”.
Claims of Need*
Authors: Wiggins David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It has been felt for a long time that there must be some intimate connection between the needs of human beings and their abstract rights. H.L.A. Hart was giving voice to a strong and widespread intuition when he wrote: A concept of legal rights limited to those cases where the law... respects the choice of individuals would be too narrow. For there is a form of the moral criticism of law which ... is inspired by regard for the needs of individuals for certain fundamental freedoms and protections or benefits. Criticism of the law for its failure to provide for such individual needs is distinct from, and sometimes at war with, the criticism with which Bentham was perhaps too exclusively concerned, that the law often fails to maximize aggregate utility.
Truth, and Truth as Predicated of Moral Judgments*
Authors: Wiggins David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Do moral judgments admit of plain truth? And how is the answer to this question to be decided in a way that does not leave the feeling that, if we had gone about answering it in some other way, then the answer might have been exactly the opposite one? In his article ‘Truth’ (Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1959) Michael Dummett wrote: that we do not call ethical statements ‘true’ or ‘false’, and from this many consequences for ethics were meant to flow. But the question is not whether these words are in practice applied to ethical statements, but whether, if they were so applied, the point of doing so would be the same as the point of applying them to statements of other kinds, and, if not, in what ways it would be different.
Incommensurability: Four Proposals*
Authors: Wiggins David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The gist of the assertion that not all lengths are commensurable ... may be expressed as follows. If AB, AC be two lengths along the same straight line, it may happen that, if AB be divided into m equal parts, and AC into n equal parts, then, however m and n may be chosen, one of the parts of AB will not be equal to one of the parts of AC, but will be greater for some values of m and n, and less for others; also lengths equal to either may be taken along any given line and with any given end-points.
On the Concept of Pre-embryo: The Basis for a New ‘Copernican Revolution’ in the Current View about Human Reproduction
Authors: Mori Maurizio 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The term ‘pre-embryo’ was introduced in the mid-1980s as a general word to denote the earliest stages of human life from fertilization up to a few days afterwards. The upshot of such a proposal is a new partition of pre-natal life: instead of the usual twofold distinction between pre- and post-fertilization (with embryonic and fetal stage), now we have a threefold distinction: pre-fertilization, pre-embryonic stage, and post pre-embryonic stage.
OED Sources
Authors: Brewer Charlotte 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One of the many ways in which the OED differed from its predecessors was in the attitude it took towards its sources, both in selecting and in recording them. The earliest English monolingual dictionaries, from Cawdrey (1604) onwards, had taken lists of words and of definitions, without acknowledgement, from preceding dictionaries (mono- and bilingual) and from glossaries to printed works (see Starnes and Noyes (1946) and Schafer (1989) ). But no hint of this was to be found in their texts, which printed definitions only, without supporting quotations. It is clear from both the title-pages and the prefaces to these works that they were initially conceived as ‘hard-word’ dictionaries, designed to help women, boys, and less-well educated men to improve their use and understanding of the English language; consequently the range of words was limited. By the early eighteenth century, dictionaries had become far more comprehensive works, vying with each other in their boasts of including vast numbers of words which were drawn from a much wider range of registers. But not until Johnson’s dictionary of 1755 did a lexicographer substantiate definitions with quotations from (mostly) documented sources, and this development brought about a profound change in lexicographical principle and practice. Johnson’s ‘chief intent’, as stated in his Plan of a Dictionary (1747), was to ‘preserve the purity and ascertain the meaning of our English idiom’ by registering the usage of writers from the golden age of Elizabeth to the best usage of his own day.
The Compass of the Vocabulary
Authors: Curzan Anne 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The apparent objectivity of dictionaries rests on an extensive series of subjective editorial decisions. In the seventeenth century, when the aim of dictionaries of English shifted from being collections of ‘hard words’ to being comprehensive compilations of ‘the language’, one of the most fundamental decisions in the dictionary-making process became what words should be included as ‘English’ and what words excluded. Lexicographers came to wield authority not only over how to define words but also over what words merited definition-an authority that belies Samuel Johnson’s description of the lexicographer as a ‘harmless drudge’. In fact, dictionaries and dictionary makers define what constitutes ‘the language’ as much as they do any individual word in the lexicon.
Epistemic Freedom1
Authors: Velleman J David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Epistemic freedom is the freedom to affirm any one of several incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong. We sometimes have this freedom, strange as it seems, and our having it sheds some light on the topic of free will and determinism. I think that there are two equally important reasons why we seek an alternative to determinism as an account of how our actions come about. One reason is phenomenological: we just feel free. Determinism seems incompatible, in the first instance, with what it’s like to be an agent. Our other reason for seeking an alternative to determinism is conceptual. We fear that if determinism is true, then we shall have no grounds for applying concepts such as responsibility and desert to ourselves and our fellows.
What Happens When Someone Acts?1
Authors: Velleman J David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A familiar answer goes like this. There is something that the agent wants, and there is an action that he believes conducive to its attainment. His desire for the end, and his belief in the action as a means, justify taking the action, and they jointly cause an intention to take it, which in turn causes the corresponding movements of the agent’s body. Provided that these causal processes take their normal course, the agent’s movements consummate an action, and his motivating desire and belief constitute his reasons for acting. This story is widely accepted as a satisfactory account of human action—or at least, as an account that will be satisfactory once it is completed by a definition of what’s normal in the relevant causal processes. The story is widely credited to Donald Davidson’s Essays on Actions and Events (1980), but I do not wish to become embroiled in questions of exegesis. I shall therefore refer to it simply as the standard story of human action.
The Definition of Morality
Authors: Skorupski John 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
We use such terms as good, bad, right, wrong, should, ought, in many ways other than moral: good evidence and bad argument, right answers and wrong notes, novels which should be read, and policies which ought not to be adopted. The moral is a sphere of the practical and the practical itself only a sphere of the normative. Norms guide us in all we believe, feel, and do. Do these normative words then have a specifically moral sense? If so can it be defined?
I think they do have a moral sense. That calls for some supporting argument, but I shall not go into it here.1 I want rather to consider an attempt to define that sense. It is not a definition which illicitly reduces the nor mative to the non-normative. It purports rather to define moral senses of goodness, rightness, wrongness, and obligation in non-moral but still normative terms. ‘Definition’, however, will turn out not to be quite the right word. We shall see, I think, that ‘moral’ is strictly speaking indefinable, and why it is un definable. Nevertheless, I shall defend the spirit of the definition; even though ‘moral’ cannot be defined I shall argue that we can still construct its sense (as one might say) using only non-moral normative concepts.
Authors: Skorupski John 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The history of liberalism is the history of an ethical ideal as well as a set of political and social arrangements. In the latter sense liberalism entrenches the juridical equality of all citizens, their equal civil and political rights including among those rights a set of liberties strong enough to restrict the authority of society over the individual in a fundamental way. How to express in institutions this politically fundamental restriction is an important matter of debate, but that debate will not concern us. For present purposes I assume I can refer to liberalism as a set of political and social arrangements without further examination. Our concern will instead be the liberal ethical ideal and its present prospects.
Autotroponomy
Authors: Fellbaum Christiane 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Reflections on polysemy necessarily raise questions about the principles that govern the mappings of concepts and labels (lexemes, or word forms). In an idealized lexicon, one might expect a one-to-one mapping of distinct concepts and word forms, but polysemy packs several meanings together under the same label. By definition, these meanings are related, unlike in the case of homonymy, where unrelated meanings share the same word form. But just how are the meanings associated with a polysemous word related? A look at the entries for polysemous words in different dictionaries shows that lexicographers cannot agree on how to divide up the semantic space covered by a polysemous word; dictionaries disagree with respect to the number of senses and subsenses and with respect to the way these senses are distinguished. The lexicographers’ disunity is mirrored in linguistically naive speakers’ judgements about polysemous words. Jorgenson (1990) asked speakers to distinguish senses of highly polysemous words and found that they consistently refused to recognize more than about three senses, even after being shown the dictionary entries for polysemous words that differentiated a dozen or more senses. These speakers lumped arguably distinct meanings together and failed to carve up the conceptual space as finely as the lexicographers had done. Fellbaum et al. (1995; 1997; 1998) asked speakers to select the appropriate dictionary sense for each polysemous noun, verb, adjective, and adverb in a text. The annotators showed considerable disagreement both with each other and with a control group of experienced lexicographers. Cross-dictionary comparisons and the results of sense sorting experiments and semantic annotation tasks all show that there is no agreement among proficient speakers in dividing the semantic contents of polysemous words into distinct senses. Yet polysemy does not pose a problem for language users, who disambiguate polysemous words in their contexts without apparent difficulties, indicating that speakers easily accommodate a lot of meaning in the space of one word, and do so with sufficiently high agreement to permit effortless and efficient communication.
Lexical Representations for Sentence Processing
Authors: Miller George A , Leacock Claudia 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A rhetorical question will take us quickly to the topic of this paper. The question is simple: Why isn’t a dictionary a good theory of the lexical component of language? We can offer two answers, a short answer and a long answer. The short answer is that a dictionary is not a good theory of the lexical component of language because it does not deal with lexical aspects of sentence processing. The long answer explains why lexical aspects of sentence processing must be part of any adequate theory of the lexical component of language. Before embarking on the long answer, however, the question needs to be clarified. To those who would complain that a dictionary is a book, not a theory, we must agree. But the book could not be written unless its authors held some kind of theory-implicitly, if not explicitly-about the lexical component of language. Without a theory, how could the authors decide what to include and what to omit? It is that theory we want to examine. But, since the theory is expressed only via the book that results, the theory can only be criticized by criticizing the book itself.
Particularizing Particularism
Authors: Crisp Roger 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Although particularism has come under a good deal of scrutiny in the last quarter of a century, particularizing it is not easy, since the arguments and positions advanced by those known as particularists vary considerably. In this essay, I shall discuss three different but related forms of particularism, concerning, respectively, rules, reasons, and motivation. My conclusion will be that particularism has fewer implications for normative ethics than have sometimes been claimed,3 because its true forms are largely uncontroversial. I shall end with a brief defence of a form of Rossian generalism.
Ethics as an Inexact Science: Aristotle’s Ambitions for Moral Theory
Authors: Irwin T H 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, (hereafter EN), Aristotle warns that we must not demand too much exactness in ethical inquiry (1094bll-14). The difficulty of finding an exact account in ethics results not from our lack of diligence, but from an ineliminable feature of the subject matter. The variability of fine, just, and good things makes it impossible to reach necessary and universal principles; we must say something ‘roughly and in outline’, contenting ourselves with ‘usual’ (or ‘for the most part’: hos epi to polu) rather than necessary principles (1094bl4-27).
Against Deriving Particularity
Authors: Blum Lawrence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Since the mid-1980s, the distance in substantive ethical views between impartialists or adherents of principle-based ethics (generally, Kantians and consequentialists) and partialists or particularists has greatly diminished. There is general agreement that compassion, friendship, generosity, and familial devotion are good things that should play a part in any morally adequate life. Both sides agree that virtue is a central moral idea, and that an adequate account of the moral life can not jettison it. At the same time, both sides seem to agree that concern for the welfare of strangers, commitment to some general principles, and a concern for the general good must play their part as well.
The integration of spatial vision and action
Authors: Brewer Bill 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Spatial vision and action are normally extremely well integrated. So much so that William James’ suggestion of a mysterious, immediate psychophysical link between them has some intuitive plausibility (James, 1890, ch. 26). But this intuition is notoriously difficult to accommodate theoretically. In this chapter I bring together two important psychological insights into the subpersonal organization of visuo-motor control with more general philosophical reflection on its personal level structure, to get a better understanding of how the spatial components of the visual and motor systems interact so smoothly.
Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues
Authors: Churchland Paul M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
These are the early days of what I hope will be a long and fruitful intellectual tradition, a tradition fueled by the systematic interaction and mutual information of cognitive neurobiology on the one hand and moral theory on the other. More specifically, it is the traditional sub-area we call metaethics, &gt;including moral epistemology and moral psychology, that will be most dramatically informed by the unfolding developments in cognitive neuro biology. And it is metaethics again that will exert a reciprocal influence on future neurobiological research-more specifically, into the nature of moral perception, the nature of practical and social reasoning, and the development and occasional corruption of moral character.
Rationality and Action
Authors: Searle John R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A certain conception of rationality and of the relationship between rationality and decision making is pervasive in our philosophical tradition. This Classical Model, as I will call it, begins with Aristotle’s claim that deliberation is always about means and never about ends; it receives its most famous formulation in Hume’s slogan: Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions; and it has its most sophisticated contemporary expression in mathematical decision theory. I believe that the Classical Model is mistaken, that at best it describes only a very special class of cases and does not give us a general account of the role of rationality in action. I do not have the space here to expose all of its weaknesses but will concentrate on one major feature.
Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice
Authors: Burge Tyler 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In recent years a number of philosophers have worried about whether we can reasonably believe that mental properties are causally efficacious. They are concerned whether the intentional ‘aspects’ or qualitative ‘aspects’ of mental events are epiphenomenal-that is, lacking in causal power and irrelevant to causal transactions. They typically assume that mental events themselves are causes. But this is supposed to be ensured by the prior assumption that mental events are physical events. Individual mental events are assumed to be instantiations or tokens of physical event-kinds. The doubt is whether the mental ‘aspects’ of these states and events play any significant role in causal processes.
The Union Theory and Anti-Individualism
Authors: Honderich Ted 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There is something called psychoneural intimacy. Hence what you may now recollect, the mental or conscious event M of your intending to turn to this page, was bound up with a simultaneous neural event N–certain activity in a certain neural locale. More precisely, there was some necessary and direct connection between M and N. This conviction of psychoneural intimacy is an assumption of neuroscience, and denials of it are rare enough to be strange. There is also something called mental indispensability. Hence M is an indispensable part of what explains your action A of having turned to this page. More precisely, taking explanations of A which include only events at the time of M, none is complete without M, and, taking complete explanations of A after M, all include something explained partly by M. The conviction of mental indispensability, which concerns the explanation not only of actions but of many mental events, is a denial of epiphenomenalism. The conviction has hardly ever been questioned by philosophers. It is not explicitly or implicitly questioned in the practice of neuroscience, mainly since neuroscience does not seek complete explanations. Nor is the epiphenomenalism which turns up in neuroscientific philosophizing the real thing.
Object-Dependent Thoughts: A Case of Superficial Necessity but Deep Contingency?
Authors: Noonan H W 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One version of externalism is the Evans-McDowell doctrine of ‘object-dependent’ or ‘Russellian’ thoughts: thoughts about a particular concrete object, or objects (other than the thinker and the time of the thought), which are possible for a thinker only if he stands in some relation to that object, or those objects—a relation perhaps appropriately thought of, in Russellian terms, as one of ‘acquaintance’ (see Evans 1982 and McDowell 1984, 1986).