bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Introduction: Perspectives on Hegel's Idea of Freedom
Authors: Patten Alan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Introduces the problem of freedom and community in Hegel's thought. Hegel claims that a particular form of community membership is necessary for individual freedom, but this leads to several puzzles. The chapter contrasts and criticizes several standard interpretations of Hegel's theory of freedom and sketches the alternative interpretation to be advanced in the book. It discusses Hegel's views on the connections between freedom, conventionalism, history, and spirit, and it introduces the ‘civic humanist’ aspect of his thought.
Freedom as Rational Self‐Determination
Authors: Patten Alan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractOffers an interpretation of the core conception of freedom found in Hegel's social and political philosophy. It argues that to an extent that is sometimes underestimated in the secondary literature Hegel follows Kant in conceptualizing freedom as rational self‐determination. Through a study of Hegel's claim that there is an opposition between freedom and authority, the chapter explains why freedom is associated with rational self‐determination and it considers and responds to various standard objections (e.g. those of Isaiah Berlin) against understanding freedom in this way.
The Reciprocity Thesis in Kant and Hegel
Authors: Patten Alan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Hegel shares in common with Kant an understanding of freedom as rational self‐determination. For Kant, this view of freedom implies that freedom and morality are reciprocal concepts: if you are free, then you are subject to morality, and vice versa. Although Hegel is famous for dismissing the Kantian formula for freedom/morality (the Categorical Imperative) as an ‘empty formalism’, he too endorses a version of the reciprocity thesis. The chapter reconstructs and defends Hegel's ‘empty formalism’ critique of Kant and it offers an interpretation of Hegel's own alternative strategy for establishing that freedom and ethical requirements are reciprocally connected.
Hegel and Social Contract Theory
Authors: Patten Alan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConsiders how Hegel could both accept the starting point of social contract theory (the commitment to freedom) and reject what contractarians take to be an obvious implication of that starting point (the social contract theory of political legitimacy). It also explores the alternative account of social and political legitimacy that Hegel draws from the principle of freedom. A major theme of the chapter is the importance that Hegel attaches to the ways in which the major institutions of the modern community work to develop and sustain individual free agency. Hegel's main objection to the social contract theory is that it ignores the function community plays of constituting free individuals. Through an exploration of Hegel's theory of recognition, the chapter shows that Hegel's own alternative theory of political legitimacy involves determining what a community must be like if it is to be successful in fulfilling this function.
Hegel's Justification of Private Property
Authors: Patten Alan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Hegel subscribes to the view that the justification of private property is in some way grounded in the value of individual freedom. The chapter reconstructs Hegel's understanding of, and reasons for holding, this view and partially defends Hegel's position. The interpretation builds critically on a reading of Hegel's view of property developed by Jeremy Waldron. It stresses Fichte's theory of property as essential background to an understanding of Hegel's, and it also emphasizes the role played by recognition in Hegel's view of property.
A Civic Humanist Idea of Freedom
Authors: Patten Alan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explores and partially defends Hegel's claim that freedom is most fully realized through membership in the modern state. It contrasts Hegel's ‘civic humanist’ understanding of this claim with the social contract theory's view of the relationship between freedom and the state. The chapter also argues against those commentators (e.g. Isaiah Berlin and Allen Wood) who see something sinister in the Hegelian association of freedom with the state. In developing its interpretation, the chapter considers Hegel's distinction between state and civil society and it offers an overview of the basic structure of Hegel's main work of political philosophy—the Philosophy of Right.
Theory and Truth
Authors: Sklar Lawrence 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSceptics base their claims against taking our best scientific theories as true on several grounds: the positing of unobservable entities and features in these theories, the idealizations made in constructing and using these theories, the fact that we believe these theories to be only temporary occupants of our scientific canon of accepted theories. Arguments familiar from such abstract scepticism play a role within the scientific project of theory construction and evaluation itself. But they take on a very different form when they function internally to science than they have in abstract philosophy.
Idealization
Authors: Sklar Lawrence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The construction of our scientific theories, the justification for accepting them, and their application in description and explanation of the world, all often rest upon our idealization of the world the theory is to deal with. We idealize systems as perfectly causally isolated from their environment when they are not. We idealize theories as describing the world completely when they do not. And we deal with systems ‘in the limit’ of such things as infinite time, infinitely low density, and so on. Is the employment of such idealizations grounds for taking our theories as not truly descriptive of the world but only of ‘models’ of it? Or are there, rather, subtler and more important things to say about how idealization in science impacts the way in which our theories characterize the real world?
Transience
Authors: Sklar Lawrence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is a platitude of scepticism that our theories are never more than transient holders of our scientific esteem, soon to be replaced by newer, incompatible theories. What are some ‘global’ responses one can make to such a version of scepticism? How does science deal with the apparent transience of its best theories in its project of going onward to ever better theoretical characterizations of the world? Given the transience of our theories, how would it be best to characterize our epistemic attitude toward our theories: perhaps as believing them to be the appropriate starting points to be reconstructed as the source of our future theories. Science itself can provide theories about our current best theories as guides to the future.
Human Welfare and Moral Worth
Authors: Hill, Jr. Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe essays in this collection interpret and develop Kant's ideas on ethics. The first part of the book focuses on basic concepts: a priori method, good will, categorical imperatives, autonomy, and constructivist strategies of argument. The second part concerns issues regarding human welfare: the moral significance of altruistic sentiments, the source of other‐regarding and self‐regarding reasons, different conceptions of happiness and personal values, and interpretation of the duty of beneficence. The third part concerns the moral assessment of persons as guilty or innocent, deserving or undeserving, motivated in a worthy way or not. More specifically, these last essays compare Kant's conception of conscience with other conceptions, contrast his theory of punishment with utilitarian and deeply retributivist theories, and distinguish morally worthy from unworthy motivation by conscience and punishment. The final essay proposes a Kantian perspective on moral dilemmas, gaps in moral theory, and residual feelings of guilt and regret in cases of irresolvable moral conflicts. Although the essays are often critical of Kant's particular views, they show how many familiar objections miss the mark. They emphasize features of Kant's ethics that remain worthy of attention today. They attempt to develop these independently of Kant's more dubious beliefs, for example, his rigorism regarding particular substantive principles and his transcendental idealism. The essays often propose readings of specific controversial texts and challenge common interpretations, but they also explore ways that Kantian ethics can be valuable in addressing moral, social, and political problems.
Kantian Analysis: From Duty to Autonomy
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDistinguishes basic and more extreme ideas underlying three related Kantian themes: that fundamental questions of moral philosophy require an a priori method, that moral duties are conceived as categorical imperatives, and that moral agents have autonomy of the will. Arguably, an a priori method is needed for analysis and assessment of rationality claims, and we can act on moral reasons implicit in the humanity formula without a sense of constraint or an objectionably impartial attitude. The idea of a noumenal world is not a premise of Kantian ethics, but a conclusion to which Kant thought his ethics inevitably led.
Is a Good Will Overrated?
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractOffers a “practical” interpretation of Kant's famous thesis that only a good will is unconditionally good. Rather than providing a criterion for praise and blame, this thesis affirms the moral priority of a will to do what is right, no matter what it costs in terms of conditional goods. So understood, the thesis is not subject to many objections that critics have raised, for example, that it prescribes self‐righteous preoccupation with one's moral purity.
Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis essay regarding Kantian moral epistemology focuses specifically on one normative (rather than metaethical) version of Kantian constructivism. The aim is to examine the justificatory role of actual, hypothetical, and possible consent in Kantian ethics. The importance of actual consent is more limited and derivative than commonly thought, and the difference between possible and hypothetical consent standards has been exaggerated. Review of formulas of the Categorical Imperative and the idea of an original contract confirms these claims, and familiar objections to appeals to hypothetical consent are not decisive against the Kantian position. For example, arguably, hypothetical agreement does not serve merely as a dubious proxy for actual consent, reduce value to empirical fact, alienate us from common moral standards, or depend on circular reasoning.
Beneficence and Self‐Love
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractKantian responses to three related questions are considered: (1) Given the limits of our altruistic sentiments, is it possible for us to act beneficently as duty seems to require? (2) What are we morally required to do for others besides respecting their rights? (3) Why is this a reasonable requirement? Although the importance of empirical facts in deliberation is undeniable, the distinction between a practical deliberative point of view and the perspective of empirical inquiry proves to be crucial. Kant's grounds for an imperfect duty of beneficence are examined. From a deliberative perspective, we must assume that we can act beneficently, even when lacking altruistic sentiments, provided we understand the good reasons for doing so.
Happiness and Human Flourishing
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractReviews the role of happiness in Kant's moral and political philosophy and contrasts his ideas of happiness with ideas of human flourishing prominent in ancient philosophy. It considers possible reasons why Kant avoided the latter and worked instead with more subjective conceptions of happiness. This was apparently due not merely to historical influences or misunderstanding of ancient ethics but also to Kant's respect for the moral freedom of individuals to choose, within limits, the way of life they prefer. Kant's understanding of happiness affects his ideas of intrinsic value, prudence, beneficence, and the aim of government. Michael Slote's charge that Kantian ethics requires us to devalue our own happiness relative to others’ arguably rests on a flawed analogy between beneficence to others and promoting one's own happiness.
Meeting Needs and Doing Favors
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis essay, responding to recent work of David Cummiskey and Barcia Baron, defends the thesis that imperfect duty of beneficence in Kant's The Metaphysics of Morals is a rather minimal, indeterminate requirement but must be supplemented by judgement guided by the values expressed in Kant's formulas of the Categorical Imperative. So understood, Kant's ethics is neither as permissive nor as inflexibly demanding as various commentators have thought. Although Kant does not acknowledge supererogation as a moral category, arguably his position implies that some acts are meritorious and more than required.
Personal Values and Setting Oneself Ends
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe focus here is on what individuals value and pursue when considered apart from moral considerations. Personal values are contrasted with various kinds of moral values, but the central question is whether having the former commits one to the latter. Textual evidence casts doubt on the recently popular thesis that, in Kant's view, in setting ends (and adopting maxims) agents thereby express (or take on) a rational commitment to the objective goodness of their ends and acts. Unfortunately, influential Kantian arguments (notably, by Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood) seem to use that dubious thesis to argue that even minimally rational agents are rationally committed to moral standards. A further troublesome issue considered here is whether, independently of debates about free will, Kant's idea that we “set ends” as an “act of freedom” implies an untenable voluntarism about how we come to have our basic goals.
Four Conceptions of Conscience
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis contrasts Kant's view of conscience, and its merits, with alternative views. These alternatives are a popular religious view, a social relativist conception, and Joseph Butler's philosophical account. Kant's view avoids the epistemological problems of the first view, but accepts its idea that conscience is often experienced as an unsolicited voice. Kant denies the metaethical scepticism of social relativists, but agrees with them that conscience expresses a dissonance between our acts and our moral beliefs rather than an independent perception of what is truly right or wrong. Kant agrees with Butler that reason, in due reflection, is the source of justified moral beliefs, but he distinguishes moral reasoning and judgement about what acts are permissible from conscience, which is an inner forum in which a verdict of innocence or guilt is pronounced on the basis of the moral beliefs that we already have.
Wrongdoing, Desert, and Punishment
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractContrasts utilitarian, Kantian, and deep retributive views about the relations between wrongdoing and suffering because of one's wrongdoing. Kant maintains that, although wrongdoers are intrinsically liable to suffer self‐reproach and moral disapproval of others, wrongdoing does not entail “deserving to suffer” in a sense providing intrinsic practical reasons to inflict suffering. Arguably, even Kant's most infamous remarks on punishment fail to prove otherwise. Contrary to common impressions, Kant is best understood as holding a mixed theory in which the retributive policies that Kant endorses lack deep retributive justification. Some implications for the justice of current practices of punishment are explored.
Punishment, Conscience, and Moral Worth
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractReviews briefly Kant's conceptions of punishment and conscience and then considers the role of punishment and conscience as motives in a moral life. From a Kantian perspective, both motives seem to lack moral worth. We note, however, that some motives, such as anticipation of grief and a desire to do worthy deeds, can be interpreted in two ways, one commendable and the other less so. By analogy, the essay argues that anticipation of punishment and pangs of conscience can motivate us in two different ways, one morally worthy and the other not.
Moral Dilemmas, Gaps, and Residues
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractOffers an explanation of Kant's denial that there can be any genuine moral dilemmas and criticizes Alan Donagan's claim that we can put ourselves into a moral dilemma by our own wrongdoing. Although genuine moral dilemmas, in which one would be wrong no matter what one did, are impossible, “gaps” in moral theory may leave us with no resolution in tragic cases of moral conflict. Kantian moral theory has such gaps, but attempts to develop theories without such gaps are not necessarily desirable. Finally, the essay addresses “residues” of moral feeling and attitude after one has acted in a case of tragic conflict in which one could find no morally better option. Perhaps surprisingly, Kantians should affirm that, even though feeling guilty for the choice is inappropriate, there is an important sense in which one should feel especially bad about those one has harmed, and regret one's own role, in such cases.
Practical Reality
Authors: Dancy Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPractical Reality is about the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. It claims that, in order to understand this relation, we have to abandon current conceptions of the reasons why we act—our motivating reasons, as they are commonly called—as mental states of ourselves. Belief/desire explanations of action, or even purely cognitive accounts in terms of beliefs alone, drive too great a wedge between the normative and the motivational. Instead, we have to understand a motivating reason as the sort of thing that could be a good reason, for instance, that the train is about to leave. This, rather than my belief that the train is about to leave, must be my reason for running. Motivating reasons are not mental states of the agent, but states of affairs.
Reasons for Action
Authors: Dancy Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIntroduces various distinctions: between the reasons why we should act (normative reasons), those for which we act (motivating reasons), and (more generally) the reasons why we act. It also distinguishes between Humeanism and anti‐Humeanism in the theory of motivation, psychologism, and anti‐psychologism in the theory of motivation, internalism, and externalism (Williams‐style) and desire‐based and value‐based theories of normative reasons.
The Theory of Motivating States
Authors: Dancy Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that cognitivism is the best form of psychologism; that is, that Humean accounts of motivation in terms of belief–desire combinations should be rejected in favour of cognitive ones that take motivating states to consist entirely of beliefs. Desire is understood as a state of being motivated, and is therefore not a state that motivates, even though motivation without desire is impossible.
Acting for a Good Reason
Authors: Dancy Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that motivating reasons are not mental states of the agent but (real or supposed) states of affairs. The main argument for this appeals to the normative realism established earlier. Since a reason to act (a good reason) is a state of affairs, the reasons in the light of which we act must also be capable of being states of affairs, for otherwise it would be impossible to act for a good reason. Our reasons are what we believe rather than that we so believe, or our so believing. I also consider and reject the view that our motivating reasons are the contents of our beliefs; in this context, I argue that a good reason cannot be a proposition.
As I Believe
Authors: Dancy Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConsiders and rejects the view that motivating reasons are best specified in psychological form (S's reason was that he believed that . . .) rather than in non‐psychological form (S's reason was that . . .). Asks how we should then explain the fact that, if S acts for the reason that p, S must believe that p. It also asks whether the fact that the agent can be mistaken forces us to prefer the psychological form of explanation. It is argued that it does not, because explanation in terms of reasons is not factive; we explain S's action by appeal to what he believed even when he is wrong.
How Many Explanations?
Authors: Dancy Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConsiders the idea that, in addition to the ‘normative’ explanation of action as characterized in this book, there might not also be causal explanations that appeal to psychological states of the agent as causes. Argues that such causal explanations cannot be accounts of the reasons for which the agent acted; we cannot have two such accounts in play at once. But, if they are merely causal, they are no longer attractive. Ends by considering the possibility of other causal explanations of action and their relation to normative explanations.
Order in Multiplicity
Authors: Shields Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAristotle regularly identifies philosophical and scientific concepts as homonymous; indeed, his preoccupation with homonymy influences his approach to many subjects and clearly structures his philosophical methodology. In this book, Christopher Shields offers the first full‐length investigation of homonymy in Aristotle's work, in which he explicates and assesses Aristotle's commitment to homonymy in both critical and constructive contexts. Shields identifies homonymy as both a critical tool, with Plato as the target, by means of which Aristotle can emphasize the complexity of core philosophical concepts; and as a constructive method for the discovery of order in multiplicity, which is crucial for genuine scientific inquiry and philosophical progress. In Part I, Shields establishes and examines the general theoretical framework of Aristotle's approach to homonymy. In Ch. 1, Shields discusses the first characterization of homonymy in the Categories, with a view to assessing the role of homonymy in Aristotle's later works; in Chs. 2 to 4 Shields examines some objections to Aristotle's reliance to homonymy, the connection between homonymy and signification, and the notion of core‐dependent homonymy. Part II is an examination of five cases in which we see homonymy at work: Ch. 5 discusses Aristotle's appeal to the homonymy of the body, Ch. 6 to the concept of life, Ch 7, to the concepts of oneness and sameness, and Ch. 8 to goodness. Shields argues that Aristotle is successful in each of these endeavours, particularly so in the case of the homonymy of life, but only partially so in the case of goodness. In Ch. 9, Shield argues that Aristotle fails to establish that being is homonymous. Shields argues that, aside from the attempt to apply homonymy to being, Aristotle's commitment to homonym is well motivated, and it introduces a method of definition that is of genuine and lasting importance. Shields argues that Aristotle is right to advocate homonymy as a form of constructive philosophical analysis, and that it is a framework of enduring value and with prospects for genuine philosophical progress.