bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
G.E.Moore and Scepticism: ‘Internal’ and ‘External’
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, Stroud analyses the response to scepticism given by G. E. Moore in his famous ‘Proof of an External World’.
Moore seeks to prove that the proposition that there are no external things is in fact false. His proof consists of two premisses and a conclusion: ‘Here is one hand’, ‘And here is another’, therefore ‘Two human hands exist’; the conclusion follows from the premisses, and establishes conclusively that there are external things.
Contrasting his interpretation with those of N. Malcolm and A. Ambrose, Stroud argues that Moore in his proof fails to refute philosophical scepticism, but nevertheless makes a significant and legitimate use of the words ‘I know’ in formulating it and succeeds in establishing his conclusion from premisses he knows. Stroud argues that Moore, although he himself does not speak in those terms, can be understood to be giving a conclusive internal answer to the question whether he knows that there are external objects: a response from within his current knowledge to a question about knowledge that merely asks whether a piece of knowledge is already included among all the things he knows, or can be included among them by finding good reason to accept that thing on the basis of other things he already knows; but while this is a perfectly common and legitimate use of the expression ‘know’, it does nothing to answer the external question about knowledge that purports to cast doubt on all knowledge claims at once, and it is this question that must be answered if the sceptic is to be refuted.
Internal and External: ‘Empirical’ and ‘Transcendental’
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 4 considers the response to scepticism found in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.
According to Kant, all theories that leave the existence of things in space doubtful or insufficiently justified – Kant’s own terms for such views are ‘problematic idealism’ and ‘sceptical idealism’ – must be avoided if there is to be an explanation of how knowledge of the world around us is possible. In particular, Kant argues that in order to avoid scepticism all accounts of our knowledge as inferential or indirect must be rejected: the external things we know about must have a reality which is not inferred, but immediately perceived.
Stroud argues that this condition, which he refers to as the ‘conditional correctness of scepticism’, is indeed a condition of knowledge. Kant’s own attempt to meet the sceptical challenge, however, must be counted a failure: it is doubtful whether the doctrine of ‘transcendental idealism’, which is meant to establish ‘empirical realism’ and requires us to accept the ideality of all appearances, is even fully intelligible; more importantly, it is difficult to distinguish transcendental idealism, in its explanatory power, from the kind of scepticism that seemed inevitable to Descartes at the end of the First Meditation : it would not enable us to see any of the assertions or beliefs in science or everyday life as instances of knowledge of a mind-independent domain.
The False Prison Volume One
Authors: Pears David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is the first of David Pears's acclaimed two‐volume work on the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, covering the pre‐1929 writings. Part I of the first volume consists in a brief but eloquent overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole; Part II critically examines the earlier system, delineating and evaluating the central ideas (logical atomism, picture theory of meaning, and solipsism) with intellectual rigour and clarity. Pears succeeds in both offering an original realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's earlier thought, one that has found many followers, and in demarcating a structural framework that makes the internal organization of Wittgenstein's philosophy as a whole more accessible.
Close‐Up: The Early System
Authors: Pears David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Delineates Wittgenstein's earlier philosophy by relating its central ideas to the philosophies of his predecessors and contemporaries, most notably Russell. Concentrating mainly on Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus and the Notebooks, Pears sets the stage for his influential realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy.
The Morality of Freedom
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book explores, within a liberal framework, the nature, significance, and justification of political freedom or liberty. Against recent liberal positions, it is argued that political morality is neither rights‐based, nor equality‐based. What underlies rights, and the value of freedom, is a concern with autonomy. Autonomy requires, among other things, that individuals have an array of valuable options to choose from. The realm of values is marked by pluralism, incommensurability, and a dependence on social forms. Individualism is rejected and the importance of collective goods is given due emphasis. Though it is often assumed that liberal states must be committed to neutrality about valuable options, it is contended here that a concern with autonomy is perfectly consistent with perfectionism. The book also contains an extensive discussion of the connection between freedom and political authority.
The Justification of Authority
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Legitimate authorities provide pre‐emptive reasons for action, in that the reasons they provide are not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and replace some of those other reasons. Furthermore, legitimate authorities are dependent in the sense that they ought to issue directives that are based on reasons applying independently to the subjects of the directives. The pre‐emption thesis and the dependence thesis are closely related to the normal justification thesis, which states that the normal justification for authority involves showing that the alleged subject is likely to comply better with reasons applicable to him if he accepts the authoritative directives rather than trying to follow the reasons directly. The chapter ends with a discussion of the nature of the explanatory‐normative reasoning employed in the book.
The Nature of Rights
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Begins with a definition of rights and a discussion of the relation between rights and duties. The right to promise, and rights generated by promising are used as examples to show how rights and duties function. Rights are held to be grounded in interests, since their instrumental value derives from the intrinsic value of well‐being. Thus only those whose well‐being is intrinsically valuable have rights, and rights cannot be regarded as trumps but must be weighed against other valuable ends. The view that rights should be grounded in respect for persons is discussed and rejected.
Equality
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Egalitarian principles should be distinguished from principles, which merely state relevantly complete grounds for the distribution of goods, and which thereafter enjoy a generality of application to those who meet the relevant conditions. Strict or paradigmatic egalitarian principles aim at an equal distribution of a certain good, on grounds generated by existing inequalities in the distribution of that good. Strict egalitarianism should be distinguished from rhetorical egalitarianism, in which equality is invoked simply as a way of drawing attention to the bad effects of inequality; effects that might have arisen in the absence of inequality. Strict egalitarian principles cannot be applied to diminishing principles of entitlement, which already have distributive commitments built into them. Strict egalitarian principles could be applied to non‐diminishing principles of entitlement, but these principles are of doubtful significance to political morality.
Personal Well‐Being
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A person's well‐being consists in his successful pursuit of valuable, willingly embraced goals. Many of these goals have a nested structure, and presuppose the existence of social forms or collective goods. Self‐interest is a narrower notion than that of personal well‐being. Self‐interest is advanced by fulfilment of a person's biologically determined needs and desires, including his feelings of satisfaction or contentment that arise from his pursuit of goals, which he was not biologically determined to have. Unlike the division between morality and self‐interest, there is no deep division between morality and personal well‐being.
Incommensurability
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Two options are incommensurable if it is neither true that one of them is better than the other, nor true that they are of equal value. A test of incommensurability between two options, which yields a sufficient but not necessary condition of incommensurability, is that there is, or could be, another option that is better than one but is not better than the other. Two incommensurable options may be of roughly equal value, but do not have to be. The existence of significant incommensurability is attested to in our refusal to compare the value of options, and this refusal to compare the value of options helps, in turn, to determine the nature of those values. Incommensurability also helps to illuminate the nature of moral dilemmas.
Freedom and Autonomy
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The ideal of autonomy, together with pluralism, underlies the doctrine of political freedom. Autonomy underlies both positive and negative freedom. Toleration is underpinned by the competitive pluralism that is essential to autonomy. Autonomy is consistent with perfectionism, yet also underlies the ‘harm principle’, which asserts that the only purpose for which the law may use its coercive power is to prevent harm. Perfectionism and the harm principle are consistent with one another because the recommended type of perfectionism abjures coercion, focusing instead on maintaining the framework conditions that are conducive for pluralism and autonomy.
Ideal Science: David Lewis's Account of Laws1
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAccording to Lewis's original account, the laws of nature in a given possible world are the principles of the best scientific theory of that world, where ‘best’ denotes an optimal combination of strength and simplicity. This serves to provide content to a notion of physical necessity, but needed to be qualified with a restriction of such possible descriptions to languages whose predicates have a special status (in the simplest case, that of standing for ‘natural’ classes of entities in that world). Lewis provides an anti‐nominalist metaphysics, while staying as close as possible to the nominalist preferences that had characterized e.g. Quine's philosophical work. This Chapter argues that his account is at best deceptively successful, and solves the problem of inference at the cost of an inability to address the problem of identification.
Universals: Laws Grounded in Nature
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractUniversals accounts of laws of nature begin with a robust anti‐nominalism: there are real properties and relations that are to be distinguished from sets or arbitrary classifications. Those real entities are then drawn on to provide a concept of laws operative in nature. Accounts of this sort here critically examined include those of Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and David Armstrong. These accounts display most saliently the impossibility of a simultaneous metaphysical solution to the joint problems of inference and of identification. Special attention is given to the failures of David Armstrong's account of probabilistic laws and of Michael Tooley's concept of probability inspired by Rudolf Carnap's views.
What if There Are No Laws? a Manifesto
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAn initial introduction to the semantic approach to science, this chapter provides a view of scientific theories in terms of classes of models and their relation to the phenomena. The main tasks of philosophy of science can be carried out within the framework of this approach without drawing on any metaphysical notions or principles. A specific problem examined here (which introduces a change from the author's previous book The Scientific Image) is how to characterize acceptance of a probabilistic theory. Probabilities in certain contemporary physical theories are irreducible and thus purport to stand for physical aspects of nature. But on and empiricist view, acceptance of such a theory does not need to involve belief in the reality of such objective chances. This problem is solved in an extension of the probabilist epistemology of the previous chapter.
Introduction to the Semantic Approach
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis approach, developed (under various names) in the twentieth century provides a model‐oriented view, identifying scientific theories in terms of classes of models and their relation to both nature and to the observable phenomena. Originally, it was offered in reaction to the syntactic, axiomatic view of theories that dominated logical positivist discussions of science; it has the merit of being equally hospitable to scientific realist and empiricist views. This chapter discusses specifically, theory structure, the relation between theoretical models and data models, interpretations of theories, and the many‐faceted character of experimentation.
Indifference: The Symmetries of Probability
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBasic to the idea of logical probability is the principle of indifference: equal possibilities are to be assigned equal probabilities. This principle appeared on the one hand to yield surprisingly fruitful results and on the other hand to engender paradoxes—the first, for example, in eighteenth‐ century empirical examples (Buffon's needle problem) and cosmological explanations (data concerning planets and comets), and the second, richly displayed by Joseph Bertrand. It is argued here, with reference to work by Henri Poincaré, Edwin Jaynes, Roger Rosencrantz, and others, that though refinable and restrictable in various useful ways, the principle of indifference cannot be salvaged so as to yield a foundation for probability judgements.
Intuitionism and Common Sense
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Thomas Reid and William Whewell were the two central figures in ethical intuitionism in the 19th century. Sidgwick was likely to have studied them during the early stage of his development, since his own ethical position incorporates much of the substance of Reid’s and some of the methodology of Whewell. This chapter discusses Reid’s moral philosophy and some of the problems its raises. It also traces briefly the history of the Scottish school to its end in the work of Alexander Smith.
The Early Utilitarians
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The understanding of the aims and limits of moral philosophy in Britain developed out of the 19th century debates between intuitionists and utilitarians. Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics attempted to reconcile these two schools, and marked the first time all the characteristics of a modern treatment of ethics that were fully and deliberately brought together in a single work. Sidgwick is often described as the last of the classical utilitarians, and may be considered the first modern moralist.
The Reworking of Utilitarianism
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An appeal to moral rules, which is far from being a reverence to common-sense maxims, may refute two serious criticisms of the utilitarian view — that we cannot actually use the utilitarian principle in specific cases to find out what to do, and that the principle leads to morally repugnant results. An appeal to rules to respond to the first criticism was readily acceptable even to utilitarians bent on reform. However, reference to the rules of common sense to answer the second criticism was not easily incorporated into the reformist outlook. It only became a fully acknowledged part of secular utilitarian theory in the work of John Stuart Mill.
Acts and Agents
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
James Martineau’s views strongly influenced the making of Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics. An account of Martineau’s position can provide a better understanding on Sidgwick’s controversy with his position. Martineau’s philosophy was shaped by his reaction against the associationistic and utilitarian views of the earlier Unitarian writers, and was firmly fixed by the times of the reviews of Whewell. He is a pre-Sidgwickian intuitionist, despite the late appearance of his major work in ethics.
The Self‐Evident Axioms
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An appeal to self-evidence and to what is intuitively given are not very satisfactory modes of solving philosophical problems; it often shuts off inquiry instead of answering ultimate questions. Sidgwick was aware of the shortcomings of the appeal to intuition and tried to avoid them. He interprets self-evidence in terms of the basic operations of ordinary reasoning, applied to practice. He takes the problem to be that of working out what the most fundamental demands of reason are, given the conditions of human life. He develops a traditional model of approach to basic axioms, and brings out new possibilities within it.
The Transition to Utilitarianism
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The transition from unexamined, unsystematized, positive moral opinion towards a fully examined rational morality begins with a critique of common sense morality. The second step in the transition is to determine first moral principles of a kind common sense cannot provide. As part of this step, Sidgwick obtains basic axioms for a maximizing consequentialist ethical theory. The nature of the good, which the axioms require rational agents to maximize, must be determined. This chapter examines how this part of the transition is carried out.
Utilitarianism and its Method
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The attention given to utilitarian theory in the last decades by economists, political scientists, and philosophers has made much of Sidgwick’s account of the doctrine outmoded. This chapter focuses on how Sidgwick’s development of utilitarian theory shows the way he would complete a systematic morality. Sidgwick’s chapters provide interesting anticipations of may themes and techniques of more modern discussions.
The Dualism of the Practical Reason
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Sidgwick believes that the most profound problem in ethics arises from the relations between the fundamental principles of utilitarianism and rational egoism — a problem he has referred to as ‘the Dualism of the Practical Reason’. This chapter examines Sidgwick’s position on rational egoism. He has argued that when we finally abandon the neutral stance and ask to a synthesis of methods, we will see that intuitionism and utilitarianism join together easily and firmly. However, there remains a ‘fundamental opposition’ between the system resulting from this synthesis and the system that can be built on the principle of rational interest.
Sidgwick and the History of Ethics
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Sidgwick’s position is a synthesis of the major aspects of the work of the great thinkers of the past. However, his knowledge of the history of ethics does more than give an additional kind of argument in favour of his conclusions. The way the problems of ethics are viewed and treated in the Methods of Ethics is affected by his general idea of the development of moral philosophy. This chapter looks at Sidgwick’s sketch of this development.
Kantian Subjects
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Looks at the legacy Kant left for theorizing about the subject, taken in two senses: the subject of will and action, and the subject of experience and knowledge. Kant argues for transcendental freedom, producing a conception of the self as subject of free will, while claiming that the agent's actions, as part of the empirical world, are causally determined. He argues also that the ‘I’ is not a substance, but must be conceived as existing over and above its experiences as their unitary subject. Both discussions of the subject are extremely influential on Schopenhauer.
Subject and Object in Schopenhauer
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Shows how Schopenhauer uses the concepts of subject and object to describe experience and knowledge and to argue for idealism. The world of things in space and time is the world as representation, comprised of objects for the subject. There can be no subject without object and no object without subject. Schopenhauer's argument that this supports idealism is assessed critically on the grounds that ‘no subject without object’ is ambiguous.
Knowing the Thing in Itself
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The central claim of Schopenhauer's metaphysics is that the thing in itself is will. He arrives at this by way of an observation about self‐knowledge: I can know myself only as willing or active, not as subject of knowledge. He claims that this unique knowledge gives access to my essence, and moves from this to the claim that the world in itself is will, of which the plurality of empirical things is an objectification. The chapter examines the problem of knowing the thing in itself at all. It is argued that Schopenhauer's conception of the thing in itself as will is a response to questions familiar in post‐Kantian philosophy, and there is a brief comparison with Schelling's conceptions of will and nature.
Determinism and Responsibility
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Gives an account principally of Schopenhauer's essay On the Freedom of the Human Will. He argues that human willing is determined by the combination of motives (representations that cause actions) and the character of the agent. Self‐consciousness is not capable of deciding whether or not the agent could have willed otherwise, but an objective view dictates that all actions are necessitated by their cause. Despite this, Schopenhauer argues that our sense of being responsible for our actions remains, and he attempts to account for it in terms of a responsibility for our intelligible (non‐empirical) characters.
The Primacy of Will
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Schopenhauer conceives the will as metaphysically primary, as the thing in itself that underlies all phenomena, but also as having primacy over the intellect in human psychology. Experience is a function of the brain, which receives a teleological explanation as furthering the life of the organism. This is one example of Schopenhauer's conception of will to life, a blindly striving principle that manifests itself throughout individuals in the empirical world. The chapter examines the coherence of Schopenhauer's philosophy of the self as will with his notion of the pure subject or ‘I’.