bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Wartime Transition
Authors: Eichengreen Barry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWorld War I transformed the international economic and political environment. This chapter analyzes the major changes in domestic and international finance and their implications for the economic balance of power. It also describes the changes in domestic political institutions that channeled the pressures felt by policy makers. The six sections of the chapter look at the disintegration of the prewar international monetary system based on the gold standard, domestic finance, foreign finance, trade and competitiveness, domestic political changes, and the implications for postwar international monetary relations.
The Interwar Gold Standard in Operation
Authors: Eichengreen Barry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis is the first of three chapters that consider the operation of the reconstructed gold standard system following World War I; it documents the decline in its credibility and in international cooperation over it, in comparison with the prewar era. Britain joined the USA on the gold standard in April 1925, and by the end of that year, nearly three dozen countries had effectively restored convertibility; the French franc was stabilized de facto in 1926, the Italian lira in 1927, and by the beginning of 1928, the reconstruction of the gold standard system was essentially complete. However, from the outset, it was apparent that the new gold standard was not having the beneficial effects so widely envisaged; the most glaring problem was its failure to maintain price stability, and the adjustment mechanism did not succeed in swiftly eliminating balance‐of‐payments surpluses and deficits. The obvious solution was international cooperation, but the requisite level was not forthcoming. The different sections of the chapter look at the form of the reconstructed system, problems of its operation – liquidity and adjustment, the role of international cooperation, monetary policy in 1927, 1928–1929, and impediments to cooperation.
Cracks in the Facade
Authors: Eichengreen Barry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis is the second of three chapters that consider the operation of the reconstructed gold standard system following World War I. It analyzes the role of the gold standard in the onset of the Great Depression and shows how, in turn, the slump undercut the foundations of the gold standard system. The first section of the chapter looks at the setting, and the second at the three options available to heavily indebted countries: the orthodox response – to boost exports and limit imports, cut public spending, raise taxes (especially import duties), and apply export bounties; action to suspend export debt service to devote foreign exchange to essential imports; and action to suspend the gold standard. The next three sections look at Australia as a prototypical primary producer – the first country to suspend the gold standard, the suspension of the gold standard by Argentina, Brazil, and Canada, and the situation in Germany. The last two sections discuss the acceleration into Depression, the US policy response, and European repercussions.
Tentative Adjustments
Authors: Eichengreen Barry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter traces the consequences of the disintegration of the gold standard system, contrasting economic recovery in countries that jettisoned gold with continued depression in countries that retained it. An attempt is made to account for their respective policy decisions. The case of the USA emerges as something of an anomaly, and is addressed further in the next chapter. The first section of the chapter looks at the new international economic environment following sterling depreciation and the abandonment of the gold standard by many other countries from 1932 onward. The remaining sections look at the pressure on the dollar, the spread of devaluation, the initial responses to abandonment of the gold standard in the countries concerned, and the responses of the remaining ‘gold bloc’ countries.
Toward the Tripartite Agreement
Authors: Eichengreen Barry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBy 1934, it was impossible to ignore the contrast between the persistence of depression in gold standard countries and the acceleration of recovery in the rest of the world; the continued allegiance to gold by several European countries, led by France, has consequently been regarded as an enigma. This chapter shows how domestic politics combined with collective memory of inflationary chaos in the 1920s to sustain resistance to currency depreciation. Indeed, inflation anxiety in the gold bloc was not entirely unfounded, and sometimes it proved self‐fulfilling. When currency depreciation finally came to France in 1936, it was accompanied by inflation and social turmoil, but not by the beneficial effects evident in other countries. Here, as in the rest of the book, historical and political factors, not just economics, bear the burden of explanation.
Perfectionism
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Perfectionism is one of the leading moral views of the Western tradition, defended by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Green. Defined broadly, it holds that what is right is whatever most promotes certain objective human goods such as knowledge, achievement, and deep personal relations. Defined more narrowly, it identifies these goods by reference to human nature, so the human good consistsin developing the properties fundamental to human beings. If it is fundamental to humans to be rational (Aristotle), to labor (Marx), or to exercise power (Nietzsche), developing these traits is best. This book tries to formulate the most defensible version of perfectionism using contemporary analytic techniques. It first examines narrow perfectionism, asking what kind of properties human nature consists in (distinctive? essential?); how these properties are identified; and what they are. It then explores issues relevant to both broad and narrow perfectionism, including whether each person should pursue just his own perfection or everyone's; how perfectionist goods are compared and aggregated; and in what particular times they are. On the last topic it develops an “Aristotelian” theory of the value of theoretical and practical rationality, as embodied in beliefs and ends with specified formal properties. The book closes by examining perfectionism's implications for political questions about liberty and equality.
The Basic Structure
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractGiven some perfectionist values, whether derived from human nature or not, what is the structure of a moral view centered on them? This chapter argues that the most plausible perfectionism is consequentialist, identifying right actions by the quantity of good they result in; tells us to maximize the good rather than satisfice; and is time‐ and agent‐neutral, so we should care equally about perfections at all times and in all lives. That we should pursue others’ perfections as much as our own goes against a common view of narrow perfectionism as egoistic, but is necessary if the view does not make each person's perfection involve acting virtuously toward others. It can also be obscured if people can promote others’ perfection less well than their own and if their perfections often cooperate, so one's achieving them encourages rather than retards others’ doing so.
The Well‐Rounded Life
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses how different perfections are compared within a single life. After arguing that physical perfection has less value than theoretical or practical rationality while those are roughly equal in value, it defends a “balancing” view that prefers a well‐rounded achievement of different perfections and, beyond that, of different instances of the same perfection. Its key is the idea, represented on indifference graphs, that the relative value of an extra unit of perfection A as against B depends on the relative extent to which A and B have already been achieved. To the objection that this idea promotes dilettantish mediocrity, the chapter replies that two plausible empirical factors imply that the best practically available lives will usually specialize moderately on one perfection or perfectionist activity. Nonetheless, well‐roundedness remains in principle a perfectionist ideal.
Crime and Politics
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The crime rate in the US has exploded since 1960. Despite decreases in recent years, reported violence in 2001 exceeded the levels of the late 1970s. Government at all levels has tried to address the crime problem, with mixed success. Police forces that formerly focused on patrol cars’ responding to citizen calls embraced the proactive approach of community policing; courts set up specialized branches, hearing cases relating to narcotics, guns, and domestic violence; criminal sentences sharply increased, filling prisons and jails with more than 2 million people. Yet, crime rates continue to rise and fall, seemingly without regard to government programs. Strikingly, little evidence has been collected about which anticrime activities are truly effective and which are not. Instead, members of Congress and state legislators, who set the tone for the fight against crime, tend to base their actions on what sounds good in political advertisements rather than what has proved to work through scientific experiment. Still, there are a number of promising ideas in law enforcement, juvenile crime, corrections, and other areas that could help prevent crime if they could obtain adequate financial support.
Not Getting Them Young
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Violent crime is committed disproportionately by young men, but government never has conducted a coherent, aggressive campaign against serious juvenile delinquency. The fragmentation has been evident since the late 1960s, when federal authority was divided between health and justice agencies. A 1974 law created a federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) to take charge. The law set progressive standards, but the administration of Ronald Reagan tried to kill the agency in the early 1980s and downgraded it after Congress refused to end funding. The Reagan Justice Department did forge an alliance with the MacArthur Foundation to start a long‐term study of juvenile crime's causes. Meanwhile, a steady increase in arrests of juveniles prompted to require that more teen suspects be tried in adult courts, even when studies showed the tactic ineffective in preventing repeat criminality. Congressional Republicans helped enact a large “juvenile accountability” program designed to provide federal aid to programs that got tough on young lawbreakers. Some measures failed on a broad scale, such as ‘boot camps’ aimed at instilling more discipline in delinquents. Despite many promising crime prevention programs, the Congress under Republicans control starting in 1995 generally refused to fund them. Juvenile crime arrests declined sharply since the mid‐1990s, but there was no solid proof of what caused the change, whether government programs, the improved economy, or a lower number of teens in the population.
Drugs: Is the War Winnable?
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The federal government asserted a role in fighting narcotics abuse since the early 20th century, but it was not until the Richard Nixon administration starting in 1969 that a federal “war on drugs” became high profile. Nixon stressed drives against smuggling heroin from counties like Turkey and Mexico. His administration's efforts were marred by raids on erroneous locations by a new federal Office of Drug Law Enforcement. A successor agency called the ‘Drug Enforcement Administration’ jockeyed with the FBI for supremacy in the drug enforcement field. Drug treatment generally had lower priority when it came to funding. A scourge of “crack” cocaine spread in the mid‐1980s, causing Congress to increase penalties for drug abuse in such a way that black people who primarily used crack were punished much more severely than whites who tended to use cocaine's powder form. An effort to coordinate federal antidrug resources better resulted in the establishment of a White House director of drug control policy (“drug czar”) in 1989; the first to hold the position was former education secretary William Bennett. Drug abuse declined in the 1990s, but there was disagreement over the primary cause. Advocates credited a combination of more‐intense law enforcement, better treatment, and establishment of more than 500 “drug courts” that could ride herd on offenders. The numbers of drug abusers were creeping back up by 1999.
Guns Don't Kill?
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Gun control has stirred intense emotions in the war on crime, even though many controls have only a marginal impact on firearms violence. Laws and their enforcement have been influenced most dramatically by assassinations and mass killings rather than by careful study. The first major modern federal gun regulations were approved by Congress in 1968 after the Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., assassinations. The National Rifle Association (NRA) worked hard to ease what it considered overly aggressive enforcement, finally succeeding with a 1986 law known as McClure‐Volkmer. The NRA offended many law enforcement leaders in the process. The combination of police support and a federal executive branch and Congress, both controlled by Democrats, helped enact two major gun control measures in 1993 and 1994: the Brady Act, which required a waiting period for handgun purchasers to enable checks of potential buyers’ records, and a ban on assault‐style weapons blamed in the deaths of police officers and others. Yet “copycat” assault weapons were manufactured, blunting the law's impact. Congress failed to enact proposed laws that would require trigger locks on handguns or to regulate gun shows, where firearms were sold with minimal regulation. The NRA argued for more enforcement of existing antigun laws, pointing to a federal program in Richmond, VA, called ‘Project Exile’.
A Cop on Every Corner?
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Before the 1960s crime wave, American police officers were little trained and spent much of their time responding to citizen calls about crime. A Law Enforcement Education Program (LEEP) in the 1970s began to upgrade police education. A round of studies questioned the effectiveness of police patrol tactics. Analysts advocated more sophisticated methods, called ‘problem‐oriented policing’ and later the more general ‘community policing.’ New York lawyer Adam Walinsky promoted a concept called the Police Corps that would encourage more college‐educated officers. The reform ideas coalesced in the presidency of Bill Clinton, who successfully argued for federal funding for an additional 100,000 community‐oriented local officers, an idea that Walinsky complained was a watered‐down form of his concept (which still was instituted on a smaller scale). Clinton's Attorney General, Janet Reno, was initially skeptical of the massive federal program called ‘Community Oriented Policing Services’ (COPS), but she eventually backed it. It was not certain how many officers were hired and permanently funded—it may have been closer to 50,000—but the program did have a significant impact on police hiring in the nation. Less clear was the effect of COPS on the crime rate. The program's supporters asserted success, but other factors like the economy, demographics and alternate policing methods might have been just as important.
Three Strikes : Baseball to Crime
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Much of the increase in crime that hit the US in the 1980s and 1990s was blamed on habitual offenders. For many years, prison wardens and parole boards had decided when most inmates would be released. Legislators came to believe that this system was too lenient and enacted tougher penalties. When even these extended terms behind bars did not seem to work, activists came up with a new formulation, “three strikes and you’re out,” meaning that a third serious crime would bring a life term. Commentator John Carlson started a campaign for such a scheme in Washington State in the 1980s; it was enacted in 1993, the height of modern‐day crime totals. The concept quickly spread in California after the infamous kidnapping and killing of 12‐year‐old Polly Klaas that same year. President Bill Clinton embraced the idea for federal crimes, and at least two dozen states adopted some form of it. Experts disputed how much three strikes or any other tough sentencing laws affected the crime declines of the 1990s. Still, prison building continued at a high rate during the 1990s, with the combined population in prisons and jails approaching 2 million. Critics argued that three strikes and ‘mandatory minimum’ prison term laws were incarcerating far too many low‐level offenders who would end up back on the streets committing more crimes after years of imprisonment with little vocational or educational training. As the costs of running prisons mounted, some policymakers were seriously rethinking the punitive practices of the late 20th century, but no dramatic turnaround was in sight.
Smarter Ways to Fight Crime
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
By 2001, the federal government was spending more than $5.3 billion each year to help states and cities combat crime, on top of the many billions allocated locally. In many instances, the money was going to programs that had not been shown to have much effect on crime. Many ideas have been proved worthwhile, however, and deserve more support. They include cohesive community anticrime campaigns, targeted drug treatment, prevention aimed at young people who show crime tendencies, plugging leaks in the criminal justice system, better news media reporting of crime issues, wiser use of the private sector, and dampening the political rhetoric on crime. As crime has become such a political football, relatively little attention has been paid to serious research on the issue compared with the amount devoted to medicine, for example. The danger in the early 21st century was that as crime rates went down, government would downgrade even further its efforts to determine what worked and did not work in the past four decades. That could be a big mistake if crime rates started again to increase, a distinct possibility in view of downturns in the economy and more young people in the population.
De Re et De Dicto
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I begin the chapter by considering the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto in the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas, G. E. Moore, and Norman Malcolm. I then consider two similar objections to modality de re brought by William Kneale and W. V. Quine. Both of these objections fail because they depend on a de re/de dicto confusion. Moreover, I formulate a general rule for correlating propositions that express modality de re with propositions that express modality de dicto. The formulation I offer relies heavily on proper names and I conclude by suggesting further routes of inquiry into the connection between proper names and essentialism.
World and Essence
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I begin the essay by introducing the ideas of states of affairs, possible worlds, and truth in a possible world. Making use of these concepts, I argue that each object not only has some properties essentially but also has an essence. (An essence is a property that an object x has essentially and which is such that it is not possible that there be an object distinct from x that has it.) I then respond to the objection that my account suffers from the Problem of Transworld Identification. I end the essay by giving a sound modal argument for the claim that human persons are essentially immaterial.
De Essentia
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this essay, I raise three topics with regards to Roderick Chisholm's account of the idea of an individual essence. First, I give an argument for the claim that objects have more than one essence. Second, I defend the view that someone can know a proposition entailing someone else's essence. Third, I argue that existentialism (a view committed to the claim that a proposition or state of affairs P directly about an object is ontologically dependent upon x in that it is not possible that P exist and x fail to exist) is false. I demonstrate this by pointing out that existentialism's central claim – that the proposition E exists and the object x does not (where E is a state of affairs or proposition which is dependent on x) is impossible – is false; this proposition turns out to be possible after all on the existentialist account of possibility.
Two Concepts of Modality
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn the first part of this chapter, I sketch out three grades of modal realism. After developing modal realism, I examine David Lewis's modal theory. I argue that Lewis's theory satisfies none of the grades of modal realism, and that it is really a case of modal reductionism. In particular, I demonstrate that Counterpart Theory is a rejection of the view that objects have properties accidentally or essentially. Moreover, I claim that Lewis merely models things such as propositions, possible worlds or state of affairs, and that he, in fact, is an antirealist with regard to such entities.
The Threatened Downfall of Privacy: Judith Jarvis Thomson's “The Right to Privacy” and Skepticism About Privacy
Authors: Inness Julie C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Do we have any reason to believe that the claims assembled under the heading “privacy” are conceptually and morally coherent, or are they simply a jumble of disparate claims and their heterogeneous values, which should be abandoned for the sake of clarity? Privacy skeptics such as Judith Jarvis Thomson hold that the meaning and value accorded to privacy claims are irreducibly heterogeneous since privacy is merely a composite of unrelated elements, such as property rights and interests in self‐ownership. I argue against such privacy skepticism.
Intimacy: The Core of Privacy
Authors: Inness Julie C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Why do we have a privacy interest in making our own decisions about who we kiss or to whom we show our diaries? If these decisions are private because they are intimate, then our new question is clear: what constitutes an intimate decision? In this chapter, I argue that things are intimate when they draw their meaning from someone's love, liking, or care.
Living High and Letting Die
Authors: Unger Peter 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThat our unexamined moral intuitions often lead us to commend conduct that is seriously wrong and to condemn conduct that is not wrong indicates the extent to which these intuitions clash with our Basic Moral Values. The view known as Liberationism, which holds that moral intuitions are often unreflective of basic values, contrasts with the more common view known as Preservationism, which maintains that our moral intuitions accord with our basic moral values. This book explores the inconsistencies in the Preservationist position by highlighting disparities in the responses that our intuitions generate for relevantly similar moral cases. These misleading responses are generated by psychological tendencies, such as projective separating and protophysical thinking, that distort the features of moral problems. In distorting our responses, the Preservationist position allows us to think erroneously that it is not difficult for well‐off people to lead a morally good life in a world in which serious suffering may easily be reduced. In fact, a moral life is extremely costly for well‐off people given how much we efficiently may do to alleviate the distant serious suffering of others.