bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Idea of the European Social Model: Limits and Paradoxes of Europeanization
Authors: Wincott Daniel 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBoth positive and negative integration can produce Europeanization, but while the former, which generally implies the specification of a European model, is more likely to be politically loaded with explicit normative content, the latter relies upon social and economic agents taking advantage of the opportunities provided by the removal of barriers to generate Europeanization from below. The European Social Model (ESM) is arguably the clearest example of a normatively loaded (putative) European model. Partly as a result, the lessons that the history of the ESM can teach are not those of Europeanization producing a gradual and steady convergence of national practices and policies based on a positive model; instead, it suggests that the processes of European integration and of Europeanization are not wholly distinct and neatly separated stages or phases, nor is Europeanization itself necessarily clear and coherent. The author, however, suggests that there is considerable analytical value in distinguishing between European integration and Europeanization. The chapter is developed in five main sections: the first considers the concept of Europeanization, emphasizing both its analytical value and the difficulty of applying it to the European Union (EU); the second section, ‘Is There a Common Social Model in Europe’, analyses whether a common ESM can be identified across the states of the EU; the third section, ‘Is the European Social Model a Product of Europeanization?’, turns to the question of whether the ESM was a product of Europeanization; the fourth section, ‘The European Social Model II: A ‘Triumphant Return’ or ‘Second Time as Farce’, analyses the reappearance of the ESM on the European Union policy agenda as a part of the legitimizing discourse surrounding the ‘Open Method of Co-ordination’ (OMe), introduced at the Lisbon meeting of the European Council in 2000; a brief conclusion returns to issues of and debates about Europeanization.
Doubts About the Legacy of Scepticism
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A reply to a paper by Thompson Clarke, in which he argues that the reason it is so difficult to identify uniquely the philosophical question of knowledge is that complexes of words, even with apparently the same meanings, can be seen to have different connotations in ordinary natural language from what they have in the philosophical pursuit into knowledge. Stroud doubts that Clarke's argument can be used to explain, or even resolve, the challenge of scepticism, and argues that even if we accept the difference in point or implication Clarke appeals to, the theoretical challenge is as real as ever.
Taking Scepticism Seriously
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Stroud reviews Peter Unger's Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism in detail. Stroud describes Unger as attempting to demonstrate the compatibility of de facto scepticism with human agency and thought and as arguing that not only are the meanings of epistemic words compatible with a sceptical epistemology that combines them, but that our understanding of these words actually commits us to such a theory. Stroud argues against Unger that such a semantic exercise is insufficient to establish the philosophically weighty conclusion of scepticism and offers suggestions as to how Unger's argument might be improved.
Reasonable Claims: Cavell and the Tradition
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses Stanley Cavell's imminent response to scepticism as it appears in his The Claim of Reason, and makes explicit the relation between Cavell's discussion of scepticism and a number of general themes he touches upon in his book. Stroud affirms Cavell's starting point, namely the Kantian insight that once the question about our knowledge is allowed to stand as legitimate and intelligible, we are easily but inevitably forced to a sceptical answer, but reveals a slight disappointment with Cavell's rather schematic conclusion. Stroud suggests improvements by exploring the conditions under which an answer to the question in the way in which Cavell sets it up would count as successful.
Scepticism, ‘Externalism’, and the Goal of Epistemology
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Stresses again the unavoidability of scepticism in a pursuit to defend a philosophical theory of knowledge and casts doubt on attempts to find solutions to the epistemological question other than scepticism itself. Ernest Sosa has given an externalist response to this stance, which Stroud attempts to refute, arguing that epistemological externalism does not succeed in explaining why we have knowledge and hence does not address the epistemological challenge in the first place.
Kantian Argument, Conceptual Capacities, and Invulnerability
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Stroud reviews the problem of transcendental arguments in general and develops Peter Strawson's account of such arguments. Stroud attempts to make a case for ‘invulnerability’, an epistemological status our beliefs might have, which on the one hand disarms scepticism and on the other does not go as far as pretending to lift our beliefs into the realm of knowledge of the external world. Strawson has previously doubted that even such a status can be given to our beliefs; in response Stroud, while maintaining a respectful sympathy with Strawson's stance, argues that this conclusion might have been arrived at too hastily and explores possibilities for which invulnerability can be ascribed to some of our beliefs.
The Goal of Transcendental Arguments
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Stroud distinguishes between two different sources of ‘invulnerability’, which correspond to two different ways of demonstrating that at least some of our beliefs are invulnerable. Stroud argues that even if the natural source, the indispensability of a belief to any conception of an independent world, does not contribute to answering the sceptic, there might be a second source, the kind and degree of resistance to scepticism, which Stroud explores in his essay.
Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Community
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Tries to ravel out Wittgenstein's dictum that meaning is used in an attempt to forestall Kripke's ‘sceptic’, who draws the conclusion that there is no such thing as meaning on the grounds that mental objects cannot be brought to bear on the question of what a person means, and that mere conformity to linguistic practice is not sufficient for the determination of meaning. It is argued that the indeterminacy or problematic nature of meaning with respect to a certain class of facts does not entail that meaning is indeterminate or problematic.
Mind, Meaning, and Practice
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The first half of the essay contains a discussion of Wittgenstein's views on how we misconstrue the mind. It looks to the conception of meaning as use for resistance to the distorted picture of the mind we get by thinking that something must accompany the sounds or marks we make, or the actions we perform in order to make them appropriately meaningful. The second half addresses Kripke's sceptic, who is someone who claims that there is no such thing as a speaker's meaning, or understanding something by a particular expression.
St John Damascene
Authors: Louth Andrew 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A study of the theological achievement of St John Damascene, set in its historical context. John Damascene was born between 650–75 in Damascus and died in or near Jerusalem about 750. His early life was spent as civil servant under the Umayyad caliphate, the rest as a monk in one of the monasteries of the Palestinian Desert. Palestinian monasticism had acquired a reputation of support for the Christian orthodoxy defined by the church councils of the Byzantine Empire, a reputation that it retained after the Middle East passed from the Byzantines to the Arabs. John Damascene is the most notable representative of this tradition. The bulk of the book explores in detail John's understanding of Christian Orthodoxy, as set out principally in his three‐part Fountain Head of Knowledge. This includes the logical tools needed to argue theologically, set out in the first part, the Dialectica, an understanding of the nature and variety of heresy, in the second part, On Heresies, which includes the first Christian reflection on the new religion of Islam, and an exposition of Christian doctrine, in the third part, On the Orthodox Faith, which was to become immensely influential for all later Christianity, both East and West. Three final chapters discuss John's understanding of Christian art (icons), developed in opposition to Byzantine iconoclasm, his preaching, for which he was famous in his lifetime, and his enormous contribution to Byzantine liturgical poetry, especially the canon. A final chapter draws the threads together by means of a comparison between John Damascene and his nearly exact contemporary in the West, the Venerable Bede.
Hume's Reason
Authors: Owen David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Reason plays a central role in Hume's account of human understanding but just what that role is is a matter of continuing controversy. Many of the most famous problems that Hume discusses, and many of the positions he advocates, are expressed in terms of reason. It is central to his arguments about induction, belief, scepticism, the passions, and moral distinctions. Hume's Reason provides a new look at Hume's account of reason and discusses the first three of the aforementioned issues. Hume's theory is introduced by looking at the logic of ideas developed by Descartes and Locke. Hume followed them in rejecting a formal, deductive account of the workings of the inferential faculty of reason. His account of demonstration is similar to their treatment. But he went farther, in what we now call the argument concerning induction, by showing that no account of reason as a separate faculty could explain our inferences to beliefs in the unobserved. Hume offers instead an associationist account of probable reasoning and a new account of belief. In the process, the picture of reason as an independent faculty is replaced by an explanation of reasoning in terms of properties of the imagination.
Descartes's New Theory of Reasoning
Authors: Owen David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Descartes rejected syllogism and its associated formal account of deductive reasoning. One of his main reasons was his concern for truth, and the ability to recognize new truths and to distinguish truths from falsehoods. Formal logic is non‐ampliative; the conclusion of a deductively valid argument does not impose any constraints on the truths that we know are not already imposed by the premises. Instead of rejecting deduction in favour of induction, like Bacon, Descartes developed a new, ampliative theory of deduction in the Regulae. This theory of inference was based on intuition, a forerunner of his later account of clear and distinct perception. One directly intuited that two ideas were related in a certain way. One deduced that one idea was related to another by forming a chain of ideas, the connection between each idea and its neighbour being perceived by intuition.
Locke on Reasoning
Authors: Owen David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Although they differed about the intellect and the nature of ideas, Locke's account of demonstrative reasoning is very similar to Descartes's account of deduction. Locke's demonstration is unlike both syllogistic and modern versions of deduction. It is not formal; the quality of a demonstration depends on the content of the ideas seen to be related. Like Descartes, Locke has an account of demonstration based on intuition. In some cases, one intuitively perceives the connection between two ideas. In other cases, one constructs a chain of ideas such that one indirectly perceives the connection between two ideas at the ends of the chain by directly or intuitively perceiving the connection between any idea in the chain and its neighbour. There is no probable analogue in Locke to intuition. There are no direct beliefs; all beliefs are the result of probable reasoning or judgement. The connection between two ideas is presumed, rather than perceived, in belief. This presumption is caused by the evidence for the belief.
Hume and Ideas: Relations and Associations
Authors: Owen David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Hume had a particularly rigorous empirical methodology of refusing to go beyond experience. This is first realized in his derivation of all ideas from impressions. But it also results in his refusal to treat an appeal to a faculty as explanatory of the characteristic activity of that faculty. Instead, he traces the observable connections among perceptions of the mind. Ideas stand in certain relations to each other; some of these are the natural relations of association, others are philosophical relations. Hume makes a further distinction between two classes of relations: the members of the class remain the same as long as the related ideas remain the same, while the members of the other class can change even if the ideas do not.
Intuition, Certainty, and Demonstrative Reasoning
Authors: Owen David 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn general, intuition and demonstration are explained in terms of the class of relations of ideas that remain the same as long as the ideas remain the same. The main negative point is that our concept of a deductively valid argument, even one with necessarily true premises, has little to do with Hume's conception of demonstration. Following Descartes and Locke, the emphasis is on content and certainty, not necessity and formal validity. Two ideas are intuitively related if the relation between them is immediately conceived. Two ideas are demonstratively related if the relation between them is conceived, not immediately, but via other intermediate ideas. The link between each pair of adjacent ideas in the resulting chain must be intuitive. With this background, some of Hume's more infamous claims are explained: we know in advance that two ideas cannot be demonstratively related if we can conceive one without the other; the causal maxim is neither intuitively nor demonstratively known; the only relation capable of sustaining demonstrations is that of quantity and number.
The Meaning of ‘Right’
Authors: Ross W. D. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This first chapter of Ross's book is devoted to an inquiry into the meaning of right. The interest throughout is ethical, with value only being discussed as far as it seems relevant. The first aspect addressed is the ambiguity inherent in any definition of the meaning of right. G. E. Moore's three definitions of a horse are discussed: these may be designated the arbitrary verbal definition, the verbal definition proper, and the definition that involves the sense of being reduced to elements simpler than itself. These three types of definition are applied to the subsequent discussion of the meaning of right, which includes looking at the difference between right and duty, at moral goodness, at the reduction of right to elements simpler than itself, at right definable as productive of a certain outcome (the greatest good), at ethical principles, at hedonistic utilitarianism, and at the sociological school.
The Nature of Goodness
Authors: Ross W. D. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is the second of five chapters on good, and starts by making the point that it is around the question of the intrinsically good that the chief controversies about the nature of goodness or value revolve, for most theories of value may be divided into those that treat it as a quality and those that treat it as a relation between that which has value and something else (which is usually some state of mind); Ross says that it seems clear that any view that treats goodness as a relation between that which is good and something else denies that anything is intrinsically good. The chapter first discusses R. B. Perry's relational view of value—in the sense of good, and other theories that also identify goodness with some relation, either as a relation between that which is good and some or all of its elements, or as a relation between some or all of its elements, or as a relation between it or some or all of its elements and something else. Next, the psychological theories of good are discussed; these, as a rule, hold that a thing being good means either that some person or persons have some feelings towards it, or some person or persons think it to be good; this is an objective view of good. The rest of the chapter looks at both R. B. Perry's and G. E. Moore's arguments on these theories, at Ross's own views, at badness as incompatible with goodness or as an element of a good thing, at W. M. Urban's work on the question of values (value often being considered as qualities of goodness or badness), and at B. Croce's arguments on value judgements. Ross concludes that the arguments in favour of thinking of value as an objective are no more successful than those in favour of treating it as a relation, and presents a lengthy validation of his conclusion, based largely on discussion of beauty and goodness.
What Things Are Good?
Authors: Ross W. D. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is the third of five chapters on good, and inquires into what kinds of things are intrinsically good. The first thing claimed as intrinsically good is virtuous disposition and action; the second is pleasure in itself. These two approaches are briefly analysed, with the goodness or badness of pleasure given particular attention. Ross concludes that four things can be seen to be intrinsically good—virtue, pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knowledge (and to a lesser degree right opinion). He is unable to discover anything that is intrinsically good that is not either one or a combination of these.
Degrees of Goodness
Authors: Ross W. D. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is the fourth of five chapters on good, and looks at the question of whether goods are commensurable—measurable in degrees. As a preliminary, the question is asked as to whether pleasures are commensurable, and as a preliminary to that question, whether pleasures are comparable, and whether one pleasure can be said to be greater or more pleasant than another. The chapter examines two of three aspects of degrees of goodness: the commensuration (calculus) of pleasures against one another; and the commensuration of different states of knowledge against one another, including the dependence of the value of a state of knowledge on the nature of the state of mind, and the value of a state of opinion (which is regarded as inferior to knowledge); the third aspect, the balancing of virtuous actions and dispositions against one another, is examined in the next (and last) chapter. The question is then addressed as to whether virtue, knowledge, and pleasure can be compared in value—measured against one another; here, evidence is put forward to support Ross's view that pleasure is inferior in value to virtue and knowledge. The last part of the chapter looks at the relative value of moral goodness (which is discussed in the next chapter) and value as ends in themselves.
Actions as Inner Causes
Authors: Pietroski Paul M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractActions are mental events (tryings, volitions) that typically cause bodily motions. This is strongly suggested by the semantics of causative constructions, like ‘She raised her hand’, which require event analyses (and appeal to thematic roles). Objections to this view can be rebutted, while a range of intuitions about the individuation of actions are preserved, given the right conception of actions and action sentences.
Fregean Innocence
Authors: Pietroski Paul M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn a belief ascription like ‘Sam believes that Hesperus rises in the evening’, the complementizer ‘that’ is a device for referring to the sense of the embedded sentence. On this Fregean view, substitutivity of co‐referential terms need not preserve truth. This accounts for the opacity of propositional attitude ascriptions, while preserving what Davidson called semantic innocence.
Other Things Being Equal
Authors: Pietroski Paul M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractOne can often explain the fact that a certain event occurred by citing the occurrence of a prior event, along with a suitable ceteris paribus law. Far from being vacuous, such laws have substantive (and disconfirmable) consequences. Apparent exceptions to a ceteris paribus law must be explicable in terms of real interfering factors—factors we idealize away from, when stating the law. Given the proposed interpretation of such laws, the proposed sufficient condition for explanation (and causation) avoids familiar counterexamples to traditional covering‐law accounts.
Personal Dualism
Authors: Pietroski Paul M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWe can and should preserve certain Cartesian intuitions—e.g. that people are distinct from their bodies, and that at least many of our mental events are distinct from any biochemical events—while rejecting Descartes’ metaphysics. One can accept many dualistic conclusions, but follow Strawson in saying that our concept of a person is a primitive (irreducible) concept that applies to spatiotemporal individuals who have both physical and mental properties. Mental events are located in space, where they can bear causal relations to other events, including bodily motions. But mental events do not have the same spatial properties as biochemical events, which are ‘impersonal’ in ways that actions and their rationalizing causes are not.
Modal Concerns
Authors: Pietroski Paul M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractGiven the view urged in Chs. 3 to 5, a bodily motion (say, the rising of someone's arm) can have mental causes distinct from any of its biochemical causes. But effects of mental causes are not overdetermined, in any objectionable way, given a proper understanding of the relevant counterfactuals. A deeper question, stressed by Kim and others, is why the mental supervenes on the physical, if identity theories are false. But supervenience may reflect the nature of possibility: if a ‘possible world’ w1 is physically indiscernible from a possible world w2, then w1 is w2; in which case, w1 is mentally indiscernible from w2. This is a defensible view given by Kripke's, as opposed to Lewis's conception of possibility.
Morality and Art
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses the question of the objectivity or subjectivity of moral judgements, hoping to illuminate it by contrasting moral and aesthetic judgements. In her critical assessment of the nature of moral judgements, Foot concludes that some such judgements (as e.g. that Nazism was evil) are definitely objective. The concept of morality here supplies criteria independent of local standards, which function as fixed starting points in arguments across local boundaries, whereas by contrast aesthetic truths can ultimately depend on locally determined criteria. More problematic is the apparently different relation of moral and of aesthetic judgements to rational choice. Individuals may have no reason to choose what is beautiful, but we think that they must always have reason to choose what is morally right, which raises one of the most difficult problems in moral philosophy.