bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Derivations or Constraints, or Derivations and Constraints?
Authors: Roca Iggy 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Revolutionary change appears to have moved in on phonology, the rule-and-derivation tradition of the past thirty-odd years now seemingly being discarded for constraint-based approaches, Optimality Theory notable among them. Indeed, both the speed of transmission of OT and the explosion in research it has triggered in a short time-span are remarkable by any standards in the field of phonology, and probably in the whole of linguistics.
Questions of Priorities: An Introductory Overview of Optimality Theory in Phonology
Authors: Sherrard Nicholas 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Optimality Theory (OT—Prince and Smolensky (P&S) 1993, McCarthy and Prince (M&P) 1993a) is an approach to grammar, most notably phonology, based on the parallel evaluation of possible output forms with regard to a ranked system of violable constraints. This chapter aims to provide a brief working introduction to some of the leading current ideas and applications of phonological OT. Concepts and techniques are emphasized, rather than results or detailed argumentation. The structure of the article is as follows. Section 1 presents an overview of the essential architecture of OT. Section 2 introduces and classifies, for expository purposes, some of the major types of constraint commonly found in OT analyses. The following four sections delve further into constraints of each type, based upon this classification scheme: markedness, alignment, constituency and correspondence. Lastly, section 7 surveys some more advanced applications drawing on much of the earlier discussion, and poses some challenges for the future development of the theory.
Expressing Phonetic Naturalness in Phonology
Authors: Myers Scott 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In comparing sound patterns across languages, a phonologist develops a sense of what patterns are ‘natural’, in that they occur frequently in the world’s languages, and what patterns are ‘unnatural’, in that they are unlikely to occur. In many cases, we would agree that what distinguishes a natural pattern from an unnatural one is that the former is phonetically natural, in that it corresponds to a phonetic pattern. In this chapter I will argue that Optimality Theory (OT: Prince and Smolensky 1993) is better able than traditional derivational models to express the correspondence between phonetically natural phonological patterns and their phonetic counterparts. This makes OT better suited than derivational models to distinguish natural phonological patterns from unnatural ones.
Berber Syllabification: Derivations or Constraints?
Authors: Clements G N 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This chapter addresses one of the central questions raised by the recent development of constraint-based approaches to phonology: is it possible to eliminate derivations from phonological analysis? As is well known, classical generative phonology and many of its offspring proposed to characterize the sound patterns of natural languages—understood both as static patterns of phoneme distribution and as regular patterns of alternation—in terms of grammars consisting of ordered (or in some versions, unordered) rewrite rules, applying one after the other to an input form to derive a sequence of lines, the last of which is the surface form. The ordered sequence of lines created in this way constitutes a derivation.
Correspondence and Compositionality: The Ga-gyo Variation in Japanese Phonology
Authors: Itô Junko , Mester Armin 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This chapter is a contribution to the study of surface-to-surface, or output-output, correspondence constraints in Optimality Theory (see McCarthy and Prince, 1995 for an authoritative statement of the original proposal, as well as numerous other works cited there). The particular question to be investigated concerns the tension between two widely shared theoretical assumptions about the computation of phonological form, which, taken together, seem to lead to a contradiction. First, there is the central tenet of OT summarized in (1): phonological constraints are constraints on outputs.
Conjunctions as Heads
Authors: Johannessen Janne Bondi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter, I wll investigate the idea that conjunctions may be heads. The term head has been used a long time; Hudson (1987:109) dates it back to Henry Sweet (1891) (quoted in Matthews 198 I : 165), who used it to refer to any word to which other words are subordinate. In recent years, the term has had a renaissance, being used for the most prominent and super-ordinate word in endocentric constructions. The emergence of X-bar syntax (Chomsky 1970; Jackendoff 1977) has made its existence absolutely crucial, since the head is what projects into an X-bar phrase. Other modem, syntactic theories also rely on the notion head, e.g., Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar (Gazdar et al. 1985), Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (Pollard and Sag 1987), and dependency grammar (see references in Hudson 1987:109).
Extraction out of CoP
Authors: Johannessen Janne Bondi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In Section 6.2, we shall investigate the principles themselves, and see that there have in fact been several examples in the literature which seem to violate them. In Section 6.3, it will become clear that there are two kinds of extraction, the acceptability of which is determined by different factors. Section 6.3.1 contains an analysis of what appears to be extraction of whole conjuncts. It is inspired by facts from unbalanced coordination, and is basically what was presented in Johannessen (1993b). In this analysis, the position of the extracted element within the CoP is of prime importance. Section 6.3.2 contains a revised analysis of the data in 6.3.1, arrived at because of some serious problems in the first analysis.
Semantic and Thematic Issues
Authors: Johannessen Janne Bondi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter. we shall take a look at some semantic and thematic issues. The first part Section 7.2, deals with semantic issues. We shall discuss the difference between coordination and subordination, and show that the difference may not be as marked as one might have thought. Evidence is taken from a number of languages, in which the distinction between coordination and subordination is drawn at different places. Also, coordinating conjunctions have often developed from subordinating ones. We shaH also discuss issues that have been viewed as problematic for some theories of coordination. These issues are to a large extent not a problem for the present theory (or for other modem approaches), but they are still interesting, and well worth looking at.
On Sociolinguistic Change
Authors: Tsitsipis Lukas D 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Our basic knowledge of the linguistic structure of Arvanítika is primarily due to the scholarship of Eric Hamp (see above, Ch. 2 n. 2, and references throughout this book; also Sasse 1990). Significant early contributions were also made by the Arvanítika philologist Phourikis (1932: 28 –76, 1933: 49–181) who collected a large amount of material on lexicon, dialect problems, social customs, and the like (for wedding symbols see his early description, 1927: 3 –59). Phourikis represents a typical case of philological erudition and thorough scholarship combined with a prelinguistic understanding of certain issues. Thus, whereas Hamp (1961: 102) admires his work on Arvanítika, he finds Phourikis at times ‘excessively puristic’, particularly when the latter attempts to criticize Weigand’s (1926: 167–220) Arvanítika forms as non-conforming to the proper Arvanítika morphological shapes. It is, indeed, not unusual for philologically-minded theorists of an earlier period not to be sensitive fieldworkers (see Hamp 1974: 390–433, for a detailed discussion of Neogrammarians as fieldworkers with a special reference to Meyer, whose etymologicalphilological background made him a rather poor phonetician).
Plato’s Instrumental Notion of Signs
Authors: Keller Rudi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Symbols do not occur in nature. They are made; or, to express it less misleadingly, they emerge. As the American philosopher and sign theorist Charles Sanders Peirce wrote, “Symbols grow” (CP 2.302).1 In the social and cultural sciences of the nineteenth century, as well as in linguistics, the word growth had a particular meaning-the sense in which we use the word today when we say that a city “grew naturally” in order to convey that it was not “artificially” plotted out on a drawing board. This is one of the organismic metaphors so popular in the nineteenth century, and as long as it is allowed to stand unexplained, it explains little itself. One of the goals of this study is to decipher it. The metaphor of growth correctly suggests, at any rate, that symbols generally are not created by people according to plan or intent, and that their development is a process. This is just as true for the so-called status symbols examined in the Introduction as it is for linguistic symbols. Of course, there are also artificially and intentionally generated symbols, such as company logos or the terms of scientific definition. But it is exactly their artificial generation that makes such symbols relatively uninteresting for sign theory. One of the feeble myths of the linguistic disciplines is the belief that language’s history began with a phase of Urschöpfung, typically followed by one of decay (cf. Ehrismann 1986). The residue of this linguistic creation myth is still around today.
Frege’s Representational Notion of Signs
Authors: Keller Rudi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Frege presented his theory of signs in a series of essays, the most important of which is entitled “Über Sinn und Bedeutung.” Its English title is “On Sense and Reference.” I will introduce the basic thoughts of Fregean sign theory by means of this essay, referring to his other writings at points where further explanation seems necessary. Frege was primarily a mathematician and logician, and only secondarily a philosopher of language. His thoughts on language were motivated essentially by his aspiration to formulate the fundamentals of mathematics and logic clearly and rigorously. Evidently it was not common among the mathematicians of his time to differentiate clearly between “form” and “content,” for example (Frege 1966a: 21), specifying whether a number sign meant the numeral (that is, the written character) or what the numeral stands for (the number). As Frege writes, this can lead to “numerals being taken to be numbers, the proper objects of our discussion; and then, I admit, 7 and 2 +5 would indeed be different. But such a conception is untenable, for we cannot speak of any arithmetical properties of numbers whatsoever without going back to what the signs stand for” (Frege 1966a: 21). In other words, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish between “form and content, sign and thing signified” (Frege 1966a: 21). Yet the distinction of form and content frequently does not suffice for the adequate interpretation of a sentence. Frege makes this clear with the example of statements of equality of the form a=b: “Is it [equality] a relation.
Wittgenstein’s Instrumental Notion of Signs
Authors: Keller Rudi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
To say of a linguistic sign that it has meaning is to say that it is connected to an idea. The speaker’s idea gets packed up for shipping (encoded) in the linguistic sign and unpacked (decoded) by the addressee after the sign is received. This is how addressees come into possession of the ideas that correspond to the linguistic signs they receive. The meaning of a sign is thus the idea with which it is connected. So runs, approximately, the common-sense theory of meaning. “The characteristic traditional theory of signs was a theory of representation (Stellvertretertheorie): the sign represents (vertritt) something that could also be given independently of the use of this or some other sign, namely in representation (Vorstellung)”(Tugendhat 1982: 376). Generally speaking, such a view might be called an “ideational” theory of meaning. With the help of a few leading questions and comments, I would like to point out the problems involved with such theories. A detailed description and critique of such theories is provided by Tugendhat (1982).
Basic Techniques of Interpretation
Authors: Keller Rudi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Considered in their communicative aspect, signs are, as we have seen, an aid for inferring something not directly perceptible from something that is. This is as seen from the perspective of their interpreter. From the perspective of the speaker (in the widest sense of the word), signs are a pattern for the production of perceptible things, things given to the interpreters to bring them to infer the way in which the speaker intends to influence them. The ability to interpret is primary. The ability to communicate makes systematic use of the ability to interpret. The communicating person exploits the interpretive ability of the addressee for his or her, the speaker’s, own gain.’ Interpretation is (among other things) making inferences on the basis of systematic, or supposedly systematic, connections. In deciding to call meaning that which makes the interpretation of signs possible, we do nothing other than call meaning exactly that which serves the interpreters as the basis for their inferences. Thus we will view meaning as the systematic connections by virtue of which signs are interpretable.
Inferential Procedures
Authors: Keller Rudi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Communication is a risky business. How can I make sure that you will interpret my sentences in the way in which I mean them? How can I make sure that I have understood your utterances in the sense in which you mean them? One answer might be that it is like a game of chess. “To have a meaning is to have a place in a language game” (Rorty 1989: 18). Chess has rules. I know them, and so do you. I interpret your moves, and you interpret mine, on the basis of our knowledge of the rules. But that’s not how it works in the game of communication. Here, the chess analogy fails. Why is it inadequate? The answer is that the rules of chess apply strictly and timelessly, as it were; furthermore, they are codified. They exist as formulated rules, and in this sense, one can say that the rules of chess exist independently of whether you and I or anyone else knows them. It is somewhat different with the rules of a language. They do not apply strictly, they are not codified, they do not apply for all “players” in the same way, and many of them are subject to permanent historic change. Thus it is misleading, in a way, to say that there are rules of use for words like tea and but-rules that you and I both know. The rules do not exist outside and independently of those who follow them. For those who follow them are also the ones who produce, perpetuate and sometimes change them, through use or partial violation. (Incidentally, though, rules do not necessarily have to be broken in order to change. It suffices when, in the course of time, peripheral uses become central.) I am not able to speak German because I know the rules of German; rather, to be able to speak German is to know the rules.
Arbitrariness versus Motivatedness
Authors: Keller Rudi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
“In the language of humans, all tones are arbitrarily articulated.” Johann Peter Süβmilch knew this as early as the mid-eighteenth century (1766: 15).1 But languages also often have onomatopoeic words. Cuckoo is an example. One could make a game of it: which animal says gakol in Korean? Exactly the animal that Germans think says quak! In Englishspeaking countries people claim that it says ribbit. What do gäkol, quak and ribbit have in common? Each is held to be an imitation of the sound that frogs make when they croak.2 The words cuckoo and ribbit are symbols in the English language. As we concluded in Chapter 8, symbols are arbitrary. And as we have seen, arbitrariness is often raised to the defining aspect of the symbol. But are onomatopoeic symbols arbitrary, too? In order to answer this question, we must examine the concept of arbitrariness more closely. The issue of arbitrariness was first discussed by Plato in the dialogue Cratylus, as presented in Chapter 3. The question around which the dialogue revolves is whether names have “a truth or correctness in them, which is the same by nature for all,” or whether their correctness is based only on that “which men agree to use” (Plato 383b-d). To put it differently, is the criterion for the correctness of words the essence of the things they designate, or is it convention? According to Plato’s theory, a thing has its own naturally correct name if the name resembles the thing or represents the thing’s essence.
Iconification and Symbolification
Authors: Keller Rudi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
New linguistic signs need some kind of transparency in order to be interpretable at all. “In the beginning was the Word”, perhaps, but that word cannot have been unmotivated. There are various ways of communicating transparently. In this chapter, I will show how symbols emerge. My strategy will be to start with symptoms and to show, step by step, how the transitions from symptoms to icons and from icons to symbols are able to occur. Symptoms are the most primitive kind of signs. They are not there to be used, but are simply put to use. It is their actual use that makes them into symptoms. Blood test results, moving blades of grass, and yawns are examples of possible symptoms. The results of blood tests can be interpreted by a doctor as a symptom of disease (or of health); moving blades of grass can be interpreted as a symptom of wind; yawning can be a symptom of fatigue. The ability to use things and events as symptoms is not restricted to humans. In my experience, dogs in Spain can be chased away by bending down to the ground and making a movement as though to pick up a stone. Spanish dogs evidently interpret this motion as the start of a throwing a stone, and run away. This sort of interpretive ability plays an important part in the evolution of animal communication, as Robert Brandon and Norbert Hornstein write (1986). The signs of animal communication often arise through so-called ritualizations.
Metaphorization, Metonymization and Lexicalization
Authors: Keller Rudi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The ability to communicate consists in (among other things) exploiting the interpretive ability of the addressee for one’s own ends. Up to this point, we have acquainted ourselves with three forms of the exploitative use of interpretive ability: (1) I know that you are capable of making causal inferences. I stage a symptom and try in this way to bring you to infer what the symptom is supposed to be a symptom of. (2) I know that you are capable of making associative inferences. I give you a perceptible expression (a sound, a gesture, a representation, etc.) and try in this way to bring you to an associative inference of what I want you to recognize. (3) I know that you are capable of making causal and associative inferences. I give you a representation of a symptom (a simulation, for example), and try in this way to bring you to (a) make a causal inference as to what the represented symptom is supposed to be a symptom of, and (b) make an associative inference as to what I might be trying to get you to recognize with it.
Literal and Metaphorical Sense
Authors: Keller Rudi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
“The metaphorical use of a word changes its meaning. The literal meaning is transferred to the metaphorical one.” This theory is as widespread as it is inadequate. I will try to show why it cannot be correct.* Let us consider an example. If I were to read the sentence, The face of his new car smiled at him contentedly, I would, under normal circumstances, interpret it as a metaphorical utterance. What does it mean to interpret an utterance as metaphorical? We discussed this question in detail in the last chapter. It means that two interpretive techniques must be used in succession: one must know the rules of use of the employed words, including syntax, and then, on the basis of one’s knowledge of the sentence meaning, associatively infer what it could mean to relate the idea of a contentedly smiling face to a car. However, in order to do this, the words face, smiled, etc. must be understood with their normal meanings. If the interpreter assumed that, in this sentence, face “really” means grille, the metaphor would be destroyed. For the metaphoricity of the utterance consists precisely in the invitation to see the car as having a contentedly smiling face. For this, it must be assumed that the words face, smiled, etc. have their normal meaning. “[I]n a genuine metaphorical utterance it is only because the expressions have not changed their meaning that there is a metaphorical expression at all” (Searle 1979: mo). The awareness of the metaphoricity of the meaning of the utterance requires awareness of the normal meaning of the sentence.
Costs and Benefits of the Metaphorical Technique
Authors: Keller Rudi 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the long run, all signs become symbols, as we have seen. With sufficiently frequent occurrence, sense once created with pragmatic means becomes semanticized, that is, rule based. The process of semanticization is a one-way street. It is true that, under certain conditions, the possibility exists to “re-literalize’‘ metaphors ad hoc, such as in the headline “Don’t Get Scalped” for an article dealing with balding treatments (Men’s Health, July/August 1997, p. 82). But I know of no case in which a reliteralization itself has become lexicalized. If the evolutionary trend necessarily moves towards semanticization and lexicalization,’ the question arises as to why we haven’t been communicating exclusively with lexicalized symbols for a long time already. The rash answer is that new situations demand ever new, creative, linguistic means, such as the aforementioned Green Berets as the designation for a certain kind of military company. But what seems plausible at first glance proves upon closer examination to be an overgeneralization. We could just as well have called this military group a US Army Special Force.
Thomas Spence: His Life and Works
Authors: Beal Joan C 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Thomas Spence was born on 21 June 1750 on the Quayside, then one of the poorest areas of Newcastle upon Tyne. His father was a Scot who had settled in Newcastle some eleven years previously, and who had followed the occupations of netmaker and shoemaker, later becoming a hardware dealer. Whatever he earned at these occupations would not have gone far, as there were besides Thomas eighteen other children to support. This places Spence, almost uniquely amongst eighteenth-century orthoepists and grammarians, firmly in the lower classes. Little is known about such formal education as Spence might have received: Ashraf (1983: 12) notes that he ‘began his working life at his father’ trade of netmaking at the age of ten after some schooling”. We do, however, know from Spence’s own account in The Important Trial of Thomas Spenre that his father had his own method of educating his sons. ‘My father used to make my brothers and me read the Bible to him while working in his business, and at the end of every chapter, encouraged us to give our opinions on what we had just read. By these means I acquired an early habit of reflecting on every occurrence which passed before me, as well as on what I read’ (Spence 1803: 65; quoted from Waters 1917: 65).