bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
One Way to Read Hegel
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 4 relates Hegel, the great spokesman and philosophical champion of the Weltbild of his literary contemporaries, to the two major themes of the book. On the one hand, it shows how he picked up the idea of the divinity of man, a prominent feature of the romantic Weltbild, and interpreted it in such a way as to keep contact with the Similarity Thesis. In Hegel’s philosophy, it is reason that constitutes the link between God, nature, and man. On the other hand, the chapter shows how Hegel added impetus and theoretical weight to a style of thought that, by stressing human autonomy and creativity, turns the view away from the divine mind, and on to the works of man. At the textual level, a close reading of the famous chapter on Sense-Certainty in the Phenomenology of Spirit reveals the centrality of the concept of activity: the reason why purely passive sense-certainty collapses is that its content turns out to be always universal, and so cannot be the product of mere passivity.
Sensations and Brain‐Events
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
If we are to give a full history of the world, we need to count two properties as distinct, if possession of one does not entail possession of the other. Hence, mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and so mental events including sensations are distinct from physical events. So functionalism is rejected. And (New Appendix A shows) mental events do not supervene on, are not constituted by, or realized in, physical events
Desires
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Desires are natural inclinations, hard to change, to do certain actions or allow certain events to occur. Enjoyment consists in the believed satisfaction of present desire. We always act on our strongest desires, unless we have good reason for not doing so and then we have to choose between reason and desire. Weakness of will consists in yielding to desire when reason suggests that we should not do so. Modification of desire is distinguished from forming an intention for the future, which in turn is distinguished from having an intention in one's present actions.
Beliefs
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Beliefs are people's maps of the world. They are passive and involuntary; agents have infallible beliefs about their own beliefs, but only fallible beliefs about the beliefs of others. All other mental events, such as memories and emotions, can be analysed in terms of the five components of the mental life – sensations, thoughts, and purposes (which are all conscious events in that we are aware of them while we have them) and beliefs and desires (which are both mental states that continue and we are unaware of them).
Language, Rationality, and Choice
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Part 3 (Chs. 11–15) analyses the capacities of human souls, not possessed by animal souls. Animals do not have a structured language; and hence we have no reason to suppose that they have the concepts of past and future, truth, universality, and logical inference; or the distinction between what one desires and what one thinks most worthwhile.
The World as Will
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This material object, my body, is no different in the constitution of its matter from the rest of the physical universe. And my knowledge of it uniquely from inside has led us to the conclusion that what in its outer nature is matter in motion is, in its inner nature, activity of will. This puts into my hand the key to understanding the inner nature of the world: the whole empirical world, what we have called the phenomenal, appears to be matter in motion, but in its hidden inner nature it is will. The noumenal will, however, is unknowable, not self‐experiencing but a blind, purposeless force, such as moves the galaxies. In keeping with this, in human beings it is the Unconscious.
Some Criticisms and Problems
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Schopenhauer's chief mistake derived from his acceptance of Newtonian science and lay in his belief that the empirical world must be deterministic. This deprived his assumptions of any basis for moral judgements in this world, and led to inner contradictions in his ethics: it means that we are not free to reject the world, as he believes we should; and in any case, if we did, that would constitute a rejection of compassion, which he is not in favour of. There is also a contradiction in his theory of music: if music is the direct voice of the metaphysical will, and the metaphysical will is inherently evil, there should be something nightmarish about music, yet Schopenhauer considers it uniquely marvellous. There are other errors in his philosophy too: for instance, he underestimates the importance of history. But, as Voltaire said, it is the privilege of a great genius to make great mistakes.
Additions and Omissions
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In addition to his large‐scale system of metaphysics, Schopenhauer produced many essays, and it was eventually these that made his name and drew attention to his philosophy. The biggest collection of them is called Parerga and Paralipomena. They are of help in understanding the philosophy, because they often contain bolder, more clear‐cut statements of the same points. They are written in an aphoristic style and are the source of many epigrams. For a long time they were more widely read than the philosophy itself.
Schopenhauer and Later Thinkers
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Schopenhauer was the first, and to the end the greatest philosophical influence on Nietzsche, who said it was Schopenhauer who had turned him into a philosopher. For many years the young Nietzsche was a thoroughgoing Schopenhauerian; but then he rebelled against this influence, attacked it and tried to overthrow it. Other substantial intellectual figures of the nineteenth century who were significantly influenced by Schopenhauer include the historian Jacob Burckhardt, author of The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy; Hans Vaihinger, author of The Philosophy of ‘As If’; Edward von Hartmann, author of The Philosophy of the Unconscious; and Sigmund Freud.
A Note on Schopenhauer and Buddhism
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Schopenhauer did not believe in the existence of God or the soul, yet he thought Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism to contain some of the profoundest of all truths, in symbolic form. He is the only major Western philosopher to take account of the Hindu and Buddhist religions and he shares a number of fundamental doctrines with them. Perhaps surprisingly, some of these have been confirmed by modern science. So there are three‐way comparisons to be made between Schopenhauerism, Buddhism, and modern science.
Schopenhauer and Wagner
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Outstanding among the many creative artists on whom Schopenhauer exercised influence was the opera composer Richard Wagner (1813–83), who, rarely for a composer, was an intellectual and studied Schopenhauer's philosophy seriously. He was already composing operas in accordance with a published theory of his own, which involved treating all its constituent elements as of equal importance. Schopenhauer persuaded him to accept not only hitherto rejected metaphysical ideas but also the supremacy of music over the other arts. In response, Wagner composed works such as Tristan and Isolde and Parsifal whose libretti are pervaded with Schopenhauer's ideas and whose music dominates the opera. Although the first of these Schopenhauerian works, Tristan and Isolde, was published in 1859, and therefore before Schopenhauer's death in 1860, it is virtually certain that he never knew of its existence.
Descartes: An Intellectual Biography
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Stephen Gaukroger traces the development of Descartes's thought in the social, religious, and intellectual context of seventeenth‐century Europe. Gaukroger describes Descartes's upbringing and his education at the Jesuit La Flèche collège, and shows the role these played in the development of his ground‐breaking work in philosophy and science. The book details the effects of his relationships with others on his work, both through collaboration and through conflict. It discusses the history of the composition of his major works and details their structure and content. It documents the correspondence, which played a major part in the development of his thinking, both before and after publication. The book concludes, as it begins, with his correspondence with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia on the subject of the passions.
The Search for Method 1619–1625
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Reveals the beginnings of several important projects during Descartes's time in the army of Maximilian I, stationed at Ulm. These include the composition of the first part of the Regulae ad directionem ingenii, a general theory of method, which provoked a series of dreams, a doctrine of analysis, a work on solid geometry and figurate numbers and, possibly, the discovery of the sine law of refraction. Discusses the relationship between deduction and intuition, Descartes's doctrine of cognition and that of the Stoics, and Descartes's doctrine of clarity and distinctness in comparison with Aristotle's and Quintillian's doctrine of vividness and particularity.
The Paris Years 1625–1628
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Describes Descartes's time in Paris and the intellectual milieu in which he moved. Reconstructions by Schuster and Shea of his discovery, whilst collaborating with Mydorge on optics, of the law of refraction. Detailed account of the latter part of the Regulae, in which he dealt with cognition and mechanism in the form of a general natural philosophy, the problem of mortalism, and his preference for algebra over geometry in problem‐solving. His search for certainty is ascribed to his interest in the relationship between mechanism, and clarity, and distinctness, rather than an interest in scepticism.
The Defence of Natural Philosophy 1640–1644
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses the Meditationes, its reception, and Descartes's response. In this work, Descartes avoided theological questions (except for the doctrine of transubstantiation). Describes the structure of the Principia, the culmination of his metaphysics dealing with the cogito, freedom of the will, divine predestination, inertial principles, the conservation of motion, dynamic relativism, and his theory of vortices, which he used to account for planetary orbits, weight or gravity, tides, and magnetism. Chronicles Descartes's religious controversy with Voetius and his dispute with Regius, whom he accused of plagiarizing his work.
Melancholia and the Passions 1643–1650
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines Descartes's later years through the large volume of correspondence from that period, much of it with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. This correspondence was mainly concerned with the passions, mind/body dualism, the nature of the soul, automata, and the doctrine of substantial union. Mind/body dualism is discussed in the usual seventeenth‐century context of the passions, in his work Passions, which also deals at length with the problem of evil. Reviews the work Descartes undertook at the end of his life—unfinished works on botany (no longer extant), anatomy, physiology, and a reply to Regius’ disagreement with him on the need for a metaphysical grounding for natural philosophy that expanded on his doctrine of innate ideas.
Eternal God
Authors: Helm Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractEternal God offers an exposition and philosophical defence of the idea that God is timeless. This is the traditional Christian position, though under widespread contemporary attack on both theological and philosophical grounds. The book begins by considering certain issues of method and exploring the very idea of timeless eternity. The defence of the idea of divine timelessness involves arguing against a number of claims, notably that it is incoherent and incompatible with the idea of personhood and freedom. Both these arguments are rebutted. It is argued that if God is in time, then by parity of argument this carries the unacceptable consequence that he is in space. The idea of omniscience, the propriety of speaking of an eternal God's foreknowledge, and of God's knowledge of the future are all discussed. It is argued that while divine foreknowledge is compatible only with some form of determinism, such determinism poses no greater threat to human responsibility than does atheistic determinism. The book concludes with an examination of the conditions under which one might make successful reference to such an eternal God.
The Issue of Divine Eternity
Authors: Helm Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses two methodological issues. The first is whether a non‐philosophical text such as the Bible may be said to express or imply philosophical ideas about God. An example is taken from a recent discussion of the doctrinal implications of certain passages in the New Testament. The second is whether God's greatness or perfection is an argument that favours him being timelessly eternal.
Indexicals and Spacelessness
Authors: Helm Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis Chapter is concerned with omniscience and the problem raised for divine timeless eternity by temporal indexicals such as ’now’ and ’yesterday’. Can an eternal God know what is happening now? Does it matter if he cannot? It is claimed that some arguments used to establish that God is in time prove too much, for they prove that God is also in space.
Eternity, Immutability, and Omniscience
Authors: Helm Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The chapter is concerned with the consistency of timeless eternity, omniscience, and immutability. Arguments from certain kinds of proposition and an attempted reductio ad absurdam of the idea are considered. It is argued that God's timeless eternity in one way restricts his knowledge, though in no material respect, and in another way significantly enlarges it. Difference senses of immutability and of change are considered and a conceptual connection between one of these and timeless eternity is established.
Timelessness and Foreknowledge
Authors: Helm Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter is concerned with the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. It is argued that an appeal to timelessness does not remove that problem, for it is claimed that there is a clear sense in which we can say that a timeless God nevertheless has foreknowledge. Talk of God's foreknowledge, though legitimate and necessary, has no metaphysical implications for God. It is argued that such foreknowledge is inconsistent with human indeterministic freedom.
Omniscience and the Future
Authors: Helm Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis is a continuation of the discussion of the previous chapter. It explores the consequences for omniscience if God is in time and discusses various reformulations of omniscience made to accommodate human indeterministic freedom. The metaphysical status of the future is discussed, in particular whether there is a future to be known, and arguments are formulated against those who deny that there is. Further, it is argued that the claims that the future does not already exist, and that the future is determinate, are distinct claims.
Divine Freedom
Authors: Helm Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn what sense is an eternal God free? Does God have the freedom to choose between alternative universes? It is claimed that there are coherent universes that God has a reason for not choosing. A sense is given to how, if God is eternal, he can make choices. Further, if God is self‐sufficient, then his choice to create is not the result of any need that he has, but the result of his overflowing goodness.
Referring to Eternal God
Authors: Helm Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses the issue of whether an eternal God could be successfully referred to. To argue that such reference may be successful, a distinction between identity and identification is drawn, and Kripke's distinction between giving the meaning of an expression and fixing its reference is employed. It is argued that God's reference may be fixed, and so reference to particulars and to God (assuming that God is a particular) is not necessarily empirical and spatio–temporal in character.
Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle's Politics
Authors: Miller Fred D. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues that nature, justice, and rights are central to Aristotle's political thought. Challenges the widely held view that the concept of rights is alien to Aristotle, arguing that his theory of justice supports claims of individual rights, which are political and based in nature. Begins with an examination of three main elements in Aristotle's political theory: nature, justice, and rights. The discussion of Aristotle's political naturalism seeks to show how Aristotle can consistently argue that the polis (city‐state) exists by nature and yet is, in a way, the product of human reason. The discussion of justice focuses on the distinction between universal and particular justice and the political applications of each type of justice. The discussion of rights offers evidence of ‘rights’ locutions in Aristotle and contrasts Aristotle's theory of rights with modern theories of natural rights. The book next investigates the constitutional applications of Aristotle's theory, including a discussion of Aristotle's general account of citizenship and constitutions, followed by a study of the best constitution, the second‐best constitution, and deviant constitutions. The main thesis is that Aristotle's theory of political rights is a form of moderate individualism and thus a noteworthy alternative to the extreme‐individualistic theories of rights advanced by many modern philosophers. There is also a separate discussion of Aristotle's views on property rights. The final chapter considers the prospects for neo‐Aristotelian political theory through an examination of Aristotle's main presuppositions––natural teleology, perfectionism, community, and rulership––concluding that Aristotle's political principles may still be defensible, albeit in a circumscribed and qualified manner.
The Argument of Aristotle's Politics
Authors: Miller Fred D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDescribes Aristotle's life and historical context. Discusses the place of politics––the science of the polis (city‐state)––within Aristotle's taxonomy of science and of virtue. Provides an overview of Aristotle's argument, emphasizing the role of nature, justice, and rights. Describes the four main presuppositions of Aristotle's argument: natural teleology, perfectionism, community, and rulership. Also distinguishes and explains the different modes of interpretation employed in this book and in other works on the history of political thought.
Justice
Authors: Miller Fred D. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Justice is central to Aristotle's political theory because he holds that all constitutions are a form of justice. In so far as it is just in the universal sense, the constitution aims at the happiness of the political community; in so far as it is just in the particular sense of distributive justice, the constitution assigns rights to offices, property, or honours to the citizens in accordance with their worth (merit or desert). Aristotle also claims that political justice is partly natural and partly legal, but adds that ‘one constitution only is everywhere according to nature the best’, thus implying that the polis is in a natural condition when it has the best constitution and laws. Aristotle recognizes that justice may exist outside the polis, but he regards political justice as the highest form of justice.
Constitutions and Political Rights
Authors: Miller Fred D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAristotle's constitutional theory applies his theory of justice and rights to the unifying institutions of the polis (city‐state). He defines a citizen as one who has a liberty right to partake in deliberative or judicial office. He distinguishes between constitutions in terms of whether they are correct (just) or deviant (unjust) and on the basis of whether political rights are assigned to one, few, or many persons––resulting in a six‐fold classification of constitutions: kingship versus tyranny, aristocracy versus oligarchy, and polity versus democracy. In Politics IV, Aristotle develops a more complicated system of classification involving different modes of deliberation, adjudication, and magistracy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the tasks of politics, including legislation in ideal and realistic situations and reform of defective constitutions.
Deviant Constitutions
Authors: Miller Fred D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn addition to his study of correct constitutions, Aristotle investigated the entire spectrum of regimes existing in his day. Aristotle believes that it is a proper task for politics and legislation to deal with deviant or imperfect constitutions such as oligarchy and democracy (which he distinguished from polity or correct rule by the many). In seeking to preserve and reform imperfect constitutions and prevent revolution, Aristotle employs a maxim of superiority: that the part of the polis (city‐state) that supports the constitution ought to be superior to the part that does not. Although this maxim can clearly come into conflict with justice, Aristotle regards it as a defensible normative precept when it is the closest feasible approximation to justice that is attainable under adverse circumstances.
The Act Itself
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe distinction between the consequences of an act and the act itself is supposed to define the fight between consequentialism and deontological moralities. This book, though sympathetic to consequentialism, aims less at taking sides in that debate than at clarifying the terms in which it is conducted. It aims to help the reader to think more clearly about some aspects of human conduct—especially the workings of the ‘by’‐locution, and some distinctions between making and allowing, between act and upshot, and between foreseeing and intending (the doctrine of double effect). It argues that moral philosophy would go better if the concept of ‘the act itself’ were dropped from its repertoire.
Demands
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
If making/allowing lacks basic moral significance, morality seems to be terribly demanding. It could be demanding in either of two ways: by answering too many practical questions, leaving too few to be resolved on non‐moral grounds, or by thwarting too many of our natural, non‐moral desires. The former is irrelevant to making/allowing but the ‘thwarting’ kind of demandingness is not, and attempts by Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick to fend off the threat are failures. The ‘thwarting’ threat might be countered by adopting a morality that requires or permits more attention to one's own interests than to others’, but when that is combined with the moral neutrality of making/allowing, the result is requirement or permission for behaviour that no decent person would agree to.
Porphyrian Semantics
Authors: Lloyd A. C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFocuses on Porphyry's semantic and more specifically on his theory of ‘imposition of names’, i.e. how names are related to things. Examines Porphyry's treatment of genus and species and also of individual, singular, and general terms to emphasize his peculiarity in Neoplatonic philosophy. Infers that Porphyry's attitude is not to develop a metaphysical and a logical semantics, but only a metaphysical one. Finally, considers how Porphyry's metaphysical approach towards semantics was maintained by eleventh and twelfth century Byzantine Neoplatonists.