bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Concept of Human Nature
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses different possible understandings of human nature, e.g., that it consists in the properties distinctive of humans, essential to them, or distinctive –and essential. In the end, it defends a version of perfectionism mandating the development of those properties essential to humans and conditioned on their being living things. It then uses this version to answer standard objections to perfectionism, e.g., that human nature includes trivial or morally repellent properties; it also rejects the traditional view that each person's perfection necessarily involves acting morally or virtuously toward others.
Accretions and Methods
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Many formulations of narrow perfectionism supplement the basic ideal of developing human nature with further claims about reality, freedom, desire, and, especially, teleology. This chapter argues that these claims are unhelpful accretions that should be set aside; doing so simplifies the theory and saves it from needless objections. The chapter also argues that perfectionism should reject metaethical naturalism, the view that claims about human nature entail claims about value. Instead, it presents itself as a substantive moral view, to be defended by substantive argument. The chapter concludes by discussing the epistemology of essential properties, arguing that they can be discovered either through intuition about thought‐experiments or by examining explanatory theories.
The Human Essence
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues for two claims about human essential properties that together constitute an “Aristotelian” theory of human nature. The first is that humans essentially have a physical nature involving circulatory, digestive, and other physiological systems; their functioning to a high degree constitutes good health and, beyond that, athletic excellence. The second is that humans are essentially rational, both theoretically (in how they form beliefs) and practically (in how they act). This last claim yields the two main “Aristotelian” values of theoretical and practical perfection, which develop theoretical and practical rationality. The claim is defended both intuitively, in thought‐experiments, and by the analysis of psychological explanation, in which rationality plays a central role.
Aggregation
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA time‐ and agent‐neutral perfectionism must aggregate values both across times in a life and across persons in a society or in the whole world. This chapter examines a series of ways of doing so, arguing that different principles are attractive given perfectionist rather than nonperfectionist values. It rejects additive principles for implying “repugnant conclusions” that are even more repellent for perfectionist than for other values, and defends a diminishing marginal value view that is intermediate between the additive view and averaging. It also examines Nietzsche's antiegalitarian maximax principle, which says society should maximize the excellence of its few most excellent individuals, and a single‐peak view that values the first achievement of a perfectionist good above any subsequent achievements.
Trying, Deserving, Succeeding
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapters 8–10 discuss the measurement of individual perfections, especially the theoretical and practical perfection that realize theoretical and practical rationality. This chapter introduces the basic structure of this measurement, which looks both to the number of certain states a person has – beliefs for theoretical perfection, intentions for practical perfection – and their score on a dimension of quality. It then elaborates on the dimension of number by discussing the further conditions a state must meet to count for perfection. Are all beliefs of a person relevant, or only those that are true, justified, or both? Do all the ends he intends count, or only those he achieves, is justified in believing he will achieve, or both? Discussion of these alternatives raises issues about romanticism, prudence, relations between the mind and world, and more.
Unity and Complexity
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractContinues the discussion of theoretical and practical perfection by examining the considerations that give some beliefs and intentions more quality and therefore value than others. It argues that Aristotelian considerations about rationality as essential to humans require measures of quality to be formal, considering only formal properties of beliefs and ends rather than their substantive content. There are two such measures: the extent of a belief's or end's content in space, time, and objects involved, and the degree to which different beliefs and ends are organized in a hierarchical structure. Together, these measures value explanatorily organized knowledge, a unified life, and complex, difficult activities such as games.
Politics, Co‐Operation, and Love
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConcludes the discussion of theoretical and practical perfection by connecting formal measures of extent and hierarchical organization to further specific values in political action, cooperation, and mutual love. (The chapter also continues to develop the two rational perfections in parallel, with parallel measures for each.) It concludes by answering objections to the account and connecting it to historical perfectionists such as Aristotle, Leibniz, Nietzsche, and Bradley.
Liberty
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The book's final three chapters address the common objection that perfectionism is unacceptable because it is hostile to the central political values of liberty and equality. This chapter argues that perfectionism can give considerable positive support to liberty if it treats autonomous choice as a perfection, as there are independent reasons to do, and emphasizes how little the state can do to promote a person's perfection; as Green and others emphasize, that is mostly for him to do. The result is not an absolute commitment to the “harm principle” but considerable support. The chapter concludes by contrasting perfectionism's commitment to liberty with its rejection of the stronger ideal of state neutrality, which forbids even noncoercive promotion of the good; perfectionism strongly favors such promotion.
Equality: Co‐Operation and the Market
Authors: Hurka Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter further develops the perfectionist case for distributive equality by arguing that different people's perfections do not compete but often cooperate, so one person's achieving perfection encourages or requires others to do so. This cooperativeness is the core of Marx's argument for distributive equality and strengthens the case from natural abilities and diminishing marginal utility given in Ch. 12. The chapter then considers perfectionist arguments of Green and Bosanquet for private property and the free market, arguing that while these have some merit they do not overturn the general perfectionist case for equality; its arguments here echo those of Hobhouse.
When National Politics Met Crime
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Crime first became a major national issue in the 1964 presidential contest between incumbent Democrat Lyndon Johnson and Republican challenger Barry Goldwater. The rising crime rates prompted Goldwater to speak frequently about the problem. Johnson won the election handily, but he recognized the seriousness of the issue and named a blue‐ribbon commission on law enforcement and the administration of justice to study it. The study panel was resisted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) director J. Edgar Hoover, but it proceeded nevertheless. The commission's 1967 report laid out a compelling critique of the criminal justice system but watered down many of its long list of recommendations. Still, it established the groundwork for shifting anticrime policy from what had been predominantly a local issue to a federal focus.
The Rise and Fall of LEAA
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A major federal anticrime agency had its roots in an Office of Law Enforcement Assistance established in the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. The agency was enacted into law in a wide‐ranging crime law enacted in 1968. Its name was changed to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA); its purpose was to distribute federal aid to state and local criminal justice programs. But Congress ordered the agency to be headed by an unwieldy troika of administrators. A succession of leaders over a decade frequently changed policy directions, setting an erratic course while spending almost $1 billion annually in some years. The agency funded some pioneering programs, such as units in prosecutors’ offices to help crime victims and witnesses. Eventually, however, its programs lacked sufficient proof of significant impact on the crime problem or the justice system. President Jimmy Carter proposed its elimination in 1980 and Congress agreed.
The “Get‐Tough” 1980s
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBy 1980, the violence rate had reached its highest level in memory, including a modern record of more than 23,000 homicides. The victor in the presidential race that year, Ronald Reagan, was surrounded by key supporters and advisers who wanted to make crime a high administration priority. The administration named a violent crime task force that called in August 1981 for a stronger federal role and changes in the law to favor the prosecution side. Three years later, a coalition of Republicans and moderate Democrats used a parliamentary maneuver to enact the most far‐ranging federal anticrime law in 16 years. Key players in pushing the anticrime agenda included Republicans like Edwin Meese, a longtime Reagan aide who later became Attorney General; Representative Dan Lungren of California, and prosecutor/crime victims advocate Lois Herrington; on the Democratic side were Senators Joseph Biden of Delaware and Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, and Representative William Hughes of New Jersey. An important provision of the law was a requirement that “sentencing guidelines” restrict federal judges’ power to set penalties in criminal cases. Others created a federal fund to support programs that aided crime victims and set up a “forfeiture” procedure by which law enforcers could seize the assets of suspects and convicts.
Making a Federal Case of It
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Over the years, Congress has consistently increased the jurisdiction of federal courts over crime, from 17 specified offenses when the nation was founded to several thousand now. More than 40% of federal criminal provisions enacted since the Civil War have appeared since 1970. The most dramatic growth was in drug cases, which composed 5% of the federal caseload in 1947 but amounted to 36 percent just 50 years later. An Armed Career Criminal Act in 1984 allowed federal prosecutors to charge suspects who had three local felony convictions. Later laws made carjacking a federal crime and gave the FBI authority over “deadbeat dads” who cross state lines and terrorism involving abortion clinics. A few measures were struck down by the Supreme Court, including one involving use of firearms at schools and another allowing federal civil cases by sexual‐assault victims. In the executive branch, the administration of President George H. W. Bush created a program called ‘Operation Triggerlock’ to pursue firearms cases, and both Bush and successor Bill Clinton directed the FBI to put more emphasis on investigating local violent crime. By 2001, the federal government had taken a prominent role in many categories of crime prosecution that once were the province of states and localities.
Capitol Crime Extravaganza
Authors: Gest Ted 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe high crime rates of the early 1990s and a string of sensational crimes from coast to coast set the stage in 1994 for the most extensive and costly federal anticrime bill ever. Bill Clinton had made crime fighting a top priority, particularly after his health care reform bill had faltered. Congress had taken the initiative, led by Democrats Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware and Representative Charles Schumer of New York. The Democrats came up with a way to put $30 billion for anticrime programs into a ‘trust fund’ created by a reduction in the federal bureaucracy. Soon it seemed that Clinton's 100,000 community police officers, a Republican demand for more prisons, and various other programs to combat violence against women and other crime problems all could be funded. Republicans backed off support of big allocations for crime prevention ideas like ‘midnight basketball’ for teens, and the National Rifle Association fought against a proposed ban on assault‐style weapons. The result was a donnybrook that kept Congress in session through most of the summer. Republicans eventually won a series of concessions on funding, although the assault weapon provision survived and the law was passed. In the process, Democratic leadership on Capitol Hill was seen as so flawed that the crime law played a significant part in the Republicans’ seizing control of the House of Representatives in the 1994 elections. Five years later, the crime law's impact on crime rates was uncertain; in fact, crime had begun to fall long before many of its provisions could have had much effect.
Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W. V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.
Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Theory of Worldbound Individuals (T.W.I.) is the view that each object exists in just one possible world. In this chapter, I argue that (a) there is no good reason to accept T.W.I. and (b) T.W.I. has implausible consequences. I begin by demonstrating that traditional arguments for T.W.I., including the Problem of Transworld Identification, are based on confusion and do not pose problems for the thesis that objects exist in more than one possible world. In the final section of the chapter, I argue that T.W.I. entails that every object has all of its properties essentially. Moreover, T.W.I. entails this even if it is fortified with David Lewis's Counterpart Theory.
Actualism and Possible Worlds
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. I begin by demonstrating how on the Canonical Conception of possible worlds one is committed to the idea that there are, or could have been, nonexistent objects. I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences. In particular, I deny that properties are set theoretical entities; something that the Canonical Conception endorses. Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as there could have an object distinct from each object that actually exists – an understanding that does not commit one to belief in nonexistent objects.
The Boethian Compromise
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Fregean view of proper names is that proper names express properties. I begin the essay by pointing out the inadequacies of anti‐Fregean views with respect to puzzles presented by empty proper names, negative existentials containing proper names, and by propositional identity in the context of propositional attitudes. I then develop the Boethian view, which claims that (1) proper names do indeed express properties, (2) proper names express essences, and (3) different proper names of an object can express logically equivalent but epistemically inequivalent essences of that object. The Boethian view is a compromise because it holds that proper names only express essences and that the reference of proper names, in at least some cases, is determined in the way the anti‐Fregeans suggest. Finally, in light of the Boethian compromise, I revise my account of proper names given in The Nature of Necessity , and endorse the position that different proper names of the same object can express different essences.
Replies to My Colleagues
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this essay, I consider several objections raised by John Pollock against my account of modality. I define possibilism – i.e., the view that there is a property that does not entail existence, but is entailed by every property – and then give a more adequate definition of actualism based on its disagreement with possibilism. Pollock argues that the property of nonexistence is such that objects exemplify it in worlds in which they do not exist and based on this fact concludes that serious actualism is false. I give an argument that nonexistence is necessarily unexemplified and a separate argument for the conclusion that serious actualism is true. I conclude the essay by arguing that it does make a difference whether we accept existentialism or essentialism.
Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation
Authors: Inness Julie C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
From the Supreme Court to the bedroom, privacy is an intensely contested interest in our everyday lives and privacy law. Some people appeal to privacy to protect such critical areas as abortion, sexuality, and personal information. Yet, privacy skeptics argue that there is no such thing as a right to privacy. I argue that we cannot abandon the concept of privacy. If we wish to avoid extending this elusive concept to cover too much of our lives or shrinking it to cover too little, we must come to understand it. After exploring the privacy arguments of philosophers and constitutional and tort privacy law, I argue for a new definition of privacy and an explanation of its value that clarifies and resolves many of our conflicts. Privacy is critical because it allows us to protect a realm in which we can have intimate relations with others.
Common Debates in the Philosophical and Legal Privacy Literature
Authors: Inness Julie C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Are there any common threads to the legal and philosophic privacy arguments? Careful exploration of the legal and philosophical privacy debates reveals that they express common concerns and that a framework for thinking about the definition and value of privacy can be constructed from them. In this chapter, I show how this framework emerges from thinking about such theorists as Anita Allen, Ferdinand Schoeman, and William Prosser.
Beyond Isolation: A Control‐Based Account of Privacy
Authors: Inness Julie C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is often argued that privacy is antithetical to publicity, that it works by separating the individual from others, restricting the access others have to particular areas of her life. While thinking of privacy in terms of separation may appear inescapable, there is an alternative: privacy may function by providing the individual with control over certain aspects in her life. Faced with this rift between separation and control‐based definitions of privacy, I argue that privacy should be understood in terms of control over a realm of our lives.
Information, Access, or Intimate Decisions About Our Actions? The Content of Privacy
Authors: Inness Julie C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Someone possesses privacy to the extent that she has control over certain aspects of her life. What is the content of privacy? Does privacy regulate information about ourselves, access to ourselves, or does it focus on intimate decisions about our actions? Philosophers such as James Rachels, Ruth Gavison, and the Supreme Court all disagree about the scope of privacy. I suggest that the various areas protected by privacy are linked by the common denominator of intimacy – privacy's content covers intimate information, access, and decisions.
Personhood or Close Relationships? The Value of Privacy
Authors: Inness Julie C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Privacy provides us with control over intimate decisions, such as becoming a parent. These decisions are intimate because they derive their meaning and value from our love and liking. The privacy literature contains two differing arguments about the value of privacy. Privacy might be valuable because of consequentialist reasons – it promotes the creation of close relationships. There is also a deontological account of privacy's value – privacy is valuable because agents are free beings. I suggest that privacy is valuable because it acknowledges our respect for persons as autonomous beings with the capacity to love, care, and like.
Intimacy‐Based Privacy: The Answer to Legal Privacy Debates
Authors: Inness Julie C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Since the legal evolution of privacy in the work of such diverse individuals as Samuel Warren, Louis Brandeis, and Estelle Griswold, the contentious realm of tort and constitution privacy law has continued to grow. Despite, or perhaps because of, the rapid growth of privacy law, the right to privacy has been, and continues to be, widely criticized by thinkers such as Hyman Gross and William Prosser. According to my account, intimacy is the feature that links together much tort and constitutional privacy law.
The Common Mind
Authors: Pettit Philip 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book is in three sections, with two chapters in each. It begins with questions of psychology: questions to do with what it means to be an intentional agent and, in particular, what it means to be an agent with the capacity for thought. Having sketched an overall view of the intentional, thinking agent, it then goes on to explore the difference that social life makes to the mentality of such agents; in effect, it outlines a social ontology. And, having developed a picture of the mind in society – of the common or social mind – it turns, finally, to the lessons of this picture for the pursuit of social and political theory: for the explanation of what happens on the social scene and for the evaluation of the different ways in which that scene may be structured.