bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Atomism in Crisis: An Analysis of the Current High Energy Paradigm
Authors: Shrader-Frechette K. 
Published: November 2002

Since the appearance of T. S. Kuhn'sThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions, scholars from various fields have sought to evaluate their disciplines in the light of Kuhnian criteria for scientific change. In this paper I argue that a new paradigm seems needed in high energy physics, and that there is no more reason to say that matter is made of elementary particles, than to say that it is not.My argument, that high energy physics is approaching a state of crisis, and that a new paradigm is needed, is based on an examination of two events which, according to Kuhn, presage a conceptual revolution: (1) the “old” paradigm of normal science becomes unclear; and (2) this paradigm fails to support normal problem solving research, and scientists begin to use it as if it were merely definitional. After examining the elementary particles paradigm in the light of these two criteria, I conclude that high energy physics is moving from “normal science” to “extraordinary science.” I argue neither that a new paradigm has been found, nor that a return to normal science is imminent; instead I attempt to briefly outline some of the conceptual problems in high energy physics to which Heisenberg, Feynman, and others have alluded, but which so far have not been spelled out in any greatphilosophicaldetail. No attempt is made to argue about what thespecific consequencesof these difficulties might be, but merely to begin to clarify the problems facing scientists dealing with elementary particles.
Traces of Things Past
Authors: Heil John 
Published: November 2002

This paper consists of two parts. In Part I, an attempt to get around certain well-known criticisms of the trace theory of memory is discussed. Part II consists of an account of the so-called “logical” notion of a memory trace.Trace theories are sometimes thought to be empirical hypotheses about the functioning of memory. That this is not the case, that trace theories are in fact philosophical theories, is shown, I believe, in the arguments which follow. If this is so, one may well wonder about psychologists' insistence that any empirical theory of memory must involve the postulation of traces (or trace-like entities: engrams, schemata, etc.).
On the Empirical Significance of Pure Determinism
Authors: Kukla Andy 
Published: November 2002

In response to the growing number of paradoxes relating to the hypothesis of universal predictability, Sellars has written:
… conceptual difficulties do arise about universal predictability if we fail to distinguish between what I shall call epistemic predictability and logical predictability. By epistemic predictability, I mean predictability by a predictor in the system. The concept of universal epistemic predictability does seem to be bound up with difficulties of the type explored by Gödel. By logical predictability, on the other hand, is meant that property of the process laws governing a physical system which involves the derivability of a description of the state of the system at a later time from a description of its state at an earlier time, without stipulating that the latter description be obtained by operations within the system. It can be argued, I believe, with considerable force that the latter is a misuse of the term ‘predictability’, but it does seem to me that this is what philosophers concerned with the free will and determinism issue have had in mind, and it simply muddies up the waters to harass these philosophers with Gödel problems about epistemic predictability. ([6], pp. 143–144)
Solutions to the Paradoxes of Confirmation, Goodman's Paradox, and Two New Theories of Confirmation
Authors: Chao-Tien Lin 
Published: November 2002

1. Confirmation Theory One, which we shall construct, when applied to the Raven Hypothesis yields the following results:
(1.1)Any black raven confirms the Raven Hypothesis.(1.2)Any black non-raven confirms the Raven Hypothesis.(2)Any non-black raven disconfirms the Raven Hypothesis.(3)Any non-black non-raven is neutral to the Raven Hypothesis.Theory One consists of two parts: (A) six basic concepts from confirmation theory proper, and (B) the underlying logic.
Dretske on Laws of Nature
Authors: Niiniluoto Ilkka 
Published: November 2002

In a recent article [4], Fred I. Dretske has proposed a new analysis of natural laws. Dretske rejects the more or less standard view which says that laws are universal truths with a special function or status in science. As an alternative account, he suggests that laws are expressed by singular statements describing the relationship between universal properties and magnitudes: the statement(1) It is a law that F's are G's3.is to be analysed as(2) F-ness ↦ G-ness.I shall argue, however, that Dretske's reasons for rejecting the standard account are not conclusive. Moreover, his own proposal seems to be either inadequate or reducible to that version of the standard account which takes laws to be nomically necessary generalizations.
A Reexamination of Causal Irregularity
Authors: Lauwers Steven 
Published: November 2002

Aaron Snyder and Fred Dretske present an argument for the proposition that singular causal sequences, such as S caused b, need not be related to a general regularity, that an event of type S is always followed by an event of type b. Therefore, they assert that a claim of causal relation does not require a regular observation of effect following cause or cause preceeding effect. To reinforce their assertion, they present the following case:
Box R contains a randomizing device; once activated it proceeds, in a perfectly random manner, to one of its one hundred different terminal states. Each of the terminal states may be supposed to be equally probable so that the probability of the box ending in state number 17 is .01. One can think of the device as embodying certain quantum mechanical processes—e.g. the emission of an electron … toward a screen which has one hundred different areas suitably marked off as terminal sights. Attached to Box R is a loaded revolver which fires when (and only when) the terminal state happens to be number 17. We take this device and place it next to a cat, point the revolver at the cat and activate the box. Things go badly for the cat; the improbable occurs and the cat is killed. The cat's master, if informed of our doings, would almost certainly insist that we had killed his cat… Though we designate our actions as the cause, and the cat's death as the result, there is no regular or uniform connection between actions of the first sort and results of the latter sort … We seem to have a situation which we are inclined to describe in a way which implies the presence of a causal connection between C and E and, yet, a situation in which it is clear that in identical circumstances something of type C will not even generally be followed by something of type E. ([1], pp. 69–70)
Micro-Particles and Picturability: A Reply
Authors: Noren Stephen J. 
Published: November 2002

In a recent paper, T. R. Girill ([2]) claims to have found some difficulties with an earlier paper of mine ([5]) in which I argued, against A. M. Paul ([6]), that in principle, micro-entities are unpicturable. Paul had argued that N. R. Hanson's view, frequently repeated in Patterns of Discovery, to the effect that
… atomic particles must lack certain properties; electrons could not be other than unpicturable. The impossibility of visualizing ultimate matter is an essential feature of atomic explanation. ([3], pp. 121–126)
A Theory of Conclusions
Authors: Dacey Raymond 
Published: November 2002

This paper presents a theory of conclusions based upon the suggestions of Tukey [21]. The logic offered here is based upon two rules of detachment that occur naturally in probabilistic inference, a traditional rule of acceptance, and a rule of rejection. The rules of detachment provide flexibility: the theory of conclusions can account for both statistical and deductive arguments. The rule of acceptance governs the acceptance of new conclusions, is a variant of the rule of high probability, and is a limiting case of a decision-theoretic rule of acceptance. The rule of rejection governs the removal of previously accepted conclusions on the basis of new evidence. The resulting theory of conclusions is not a decision-theoretic logic but does, through the aforementioned limiting property, provide a line of demarcation between decision and conclusion (i.e., nondecision) logics of acceptance. The theory of conclusions therefore complements decision-theoretic inference.The theory of conclusions presented here satisfies Tukey's desiderata, specifically:
(1)conclusions are statements which are accepted on the basis of unusually strong evidence;(2)conclusions are to remain accepted unless and until unusually strong evidence to the contrary arises;(3)conclusions are subject to future rejection, when and if the evidence against them becomes strong enough.Finally, the preferred theory of conclusions has a strong conservative bias, reflecting Tukey's aims.
Realism and Instrumentalism in 19th-Century Atomism
Authors: Gardner Michael R. 
Published: November 2002

And we must at all costs avoid over-simplification, which one might be tempted to call the occupational disease of philosophers if it were not their occupation.(Austin 1965, p. 38).Sometimes a theory is interpreted realistically—i.e., as literally true—whereas sometimes a theory is interpreted instrumentalistically—i.e., as merely a convenient device for summarizing, systematizing, deducing, etc., a given body of observable facts. This paper is part of a program aimed at determining the basis on which scientists decide on which of these interpretations to accept a theory. I proceed by examining one case: the nineteenth-century debates about the existence of atoms. I argue that there was a gradual transition from an instrumentalist to a realistic acceptance of the atomic theory, because of gradual increases in its predictive power, the “testedness” of its hypotheses, the “determinateness” of its quantities, and because of resolutions of doubts about the acceptability of its basic explanatory concepts.
Generality and Nomological Form
Authors: Wilson Mark 
Published: November 2002

It is usually supposed that the ‘fundamental’ laws of nature must be general, i.e. must essentially begin with a universal quantifier (Hempel and Oppenheim 1965, p. 272). Other ‘derivative’ laws may not satisfy this requirement but only because they are the logical or mathematical consequences of a set of fundamental laws. As it stands, this requirement is either too strong or trivial. Consider the Newtonian gravitational law:

where FG(x, y, t) is the impressed gravitational force on x due to y at t, ms(x) is the mass of x, d(x, y, t) is the displacement of the center of mass of x from the center of mass of y at t, and G is the universal gravitational constant. (For simplicity, we ignore the vector nature of FG). What is the role of the constant “G”? Reflection shows that it is actually a disguised existential quantifier, or, more precisely, a Skolem function replacement for one. Rendering Newtonian mechanics in a parsimonious language, we could drop the “G” and rewrite (1) as
The constant “G” could then be defined, if desired, as the unique r satisfying (2) (the propriety of this definition is guaranteed by (2)). Such a theory would have exactly the same deductive consequences as (1). But (2) has an initial existential quantifier essentially.
Jackson and Pargetter's Criterion of Distant Simultaneity
Authors: Torretti Roberto 
Published: November 2002

Frank Jackson and Robert Pargetter (1977) propose a method for synchronizing clocks at rest at distant points of an inertial system in Euclidean space, which, they claim, (i) does not depend on Einstein's signalling method (Einstein 1923, pp. 27–29) and (ii) provides a basis for denying the conventionality of distant simultaneity. I am afraid, however, that the new method presupposes that the simultaneity of distant events relatively to the chosen inertial system has been already determined by Einstein's or some other method. Jackson and Pargetter describe their method as follows:
Let UA, UB be clocks at A, B, respectively. Let XY be an axis perpendicular to AB, passing through C, the midpoint of AB. Take a rigid straight rod A′B′ with midpoint C′ and length equal to the length AB. Move A′B′ with uniform velocity such that C′ travels along XY towards C, and A′B′ is perpendicular to XY (i.e. parallel to AB); then if the reading … on UA just when A′ coincides with A is the same as the reading … on UB just when B′ coincides with B, clocks UA and UB will be synchronous. (Jackson and Pargetter 1977, p. 468).
A Probabilistic Theory of Extensive Measurement
Authors: Falmagne Jean-Claude 
Published: November 2002

Algebraic theories for extensive measurement are traditionally framed in terms of a binary relation ≲ and a concatenation (x,y) → xy. For situations in which the data is “noisy,” it is proposed here to consider each expression y ≲ x as symbolizing an event in a probability space. Denoting P(x,y) the probability of such an event, two theories are discussed corresponding to the two representing relations:

with
Axiomatic analyses are given, and representation theorems are proven in detail.
The Role of Normative Assumptions in Historical Explanation
Authors: Currie Gregory 
Published: November 2002

This paper concerns the problem of how to give historical explanations of scientist's decisions to prefer one theory over another. It is argued that such explanations ought to contain only statements about the beliefs and preferences of the agents involved, and, in particular, ought not to include evaluative premises about the theories themselves. It is argued that Lakatos's attempt to build into such historical explanations premises of an evaluative kind is deficient. The arguments of Laudan to the effect that such explanations depend crucially upon evaluative assumptions about the rationality or irrationality of decisions are examined. It is argued that they do not establish the need for such assumptions.Similar criticisms are then shown to be applicable to a version of the ‘hermeneutical’ model of explanation for human actions.
Optimal-Design Models and the Strategy of Model Building in Evolutionary Biology
Authors: Beatty John 
Published: November 2002

The prevalence of optimality models in the literature of evolutionary biology is testimony to their popularity and importance. Evolutionary biologist R. C. Lewontin, whose criticisms of optimality models are considered here, reflects that “optimality arguments have become extremely popular in the last fifteen years, and at present represent the dominant mode of thought.”Although optimality models have received little attention in the philosophical literature, these models are very interesting from a philosophical point of view. As will be argued, optimality models are central to evolutionary thought, yet they are not readily accomodated by the traditional view of scientific theories. According to the traditional view, we would expect optimality models to employ general, empirical laws of nature, but they do not. Fortunately, the semantic view of scientific theories, a recent alternative to the traditional view, more readily accomodates optimality models. As we would expect on the semantic view, optimality models can be construed as specifications of ideal systems. These specifications may be used to describe empirical systems—that is, the specifications may have empirical instances. But the specifications are not empirical claims, much less general, empirical laws.Although philosophers have yet to discuss the general features and uses of optimality models, these topics have stimulated much recent discussion among evolutionary biologists. Their discussions raise a number of precautions concerning the proper use of optimality models. Moreover, many of their caveats can be interpreted as general reminders that 1) optimality models specify ideal systems whose empirical instantiations may be quite restricted, and that 2) optimality models should not be construed as general, empirical laws. As G. F. Oster and E. O. Wilson caution, “the prudent course is to regard optimality models as provisional guides to further empirical research and not necessarily as the key to deeper laws of nature.” It seems, then, that the semantic view of theories is more sensitive to the nature and limitations of optimality models than is the more traditional view of theories.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism
Authors: Laudan Larry 
Published: November 2002

This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly ‘naturalistic’ forms of scientific realism.The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle.-H. Putnam (1975)
Information Theory and Redundancy
Authors: Partridge Derek 
Published: November 2002

This paper argues that Information Theoretic Redundancy (ITR) is fundamentally a composite concept that has been continually misinterpreted since the very inception of Information Theory.We view ITR as compounded of true redundancy and partial redundancy. This demarcation of true redundancy illustrates a limiting case phenomenon: the underlying metric (number of alternatives) differs only by degree but the properties of this concept differ in kind from those of partial redundancy.Several other studies are instanced which also imply the composite nature of ITR. We thus provide broadly based but particular support for earlier generalized suggestions that it is the underlying calculus of Information Theory rather than the ill-named concepts themselves that provides something of a unitary language for the description of phenomena.
What Price Substitutivity? A Note on Probability Theory
Authors: Leblanc Hugues 
Published: November 2002

Teddy Seidenfeld recently claimed that Kolmogorov's probability theory transgresses the Substitutivity Law. Underscoring the seriousness of Seidenfeld's charge, the author shows that (Popper's version of) the law, to wit:If (∀D)(Pr(B,D) = Pr(C,D)), then Pr(A,B) = Pr(A,C),follows from justfive constraints on Pr of the most elementary and most basic sort.
The Reduction of Phenomenological to Kinetic Thermostatics
Authors: Kuipers Theo A. F. 
Published: November 2002

Standard accounts of the micro-reduction of phenomenological to kinetic thermostatics, based on the postulate relating empirical absolute temperature to mean kinetic energy (ū = (3/2)kT), face two problems. The standard postulate also allows ‘reduction’ in the other direction and it can be criticized from the point of view that reduction postulates need to be ontological identities.This paper presents a detailed account of the reduction, based on the postulate that thermal equilibrium is ontologically identical to having equal mean kinetic energy. In particular, it is shown that this postulate enables reduction only in the appropriate direction, but leaves room for ‘evidence transport’ in the other. Moreover, it makes possible the derivation (explanation) of the standard postulate, using the existential kinetic hypothesis and phenomenological laws with which it turns out to be laden.
Discussion: A Reply to Frankel's Criticism of Harré's Theory of Causality
Authors: Smith Joseph Wayne 
Published: November 2002

Frankel (1976) has argued that the theory of causality developed by Rom Harré (Harré 1970) and his colleague Edward Madden (Harré and Madden 1975) is incoherent, since the proposal that causal claims are naturally necessary leads to a vicious infinite regression“which ends by requiring that for any causal claim to be accorded the status of natural necessity an infinite number of causal claims must be accorded the status of natural necessities.” (Frankel 1976, p. 560)
Substitution and Truth in Quantum Logic
Authors: Pitowsky Itamar 
Published: November 2002

If p(x1, …, xn) and q(x1 …, xn) are two logically equivalent propositions then p(π(x1), …, π(xn)) and q(π(x1), …,π(xn)) are also logically equivalent where π is an arbitrary permutation of the elementary constituents x1, …, xn. In Quantum Logic the invariance of logical equivalences breaks down. It is proved that the distribution rules of classical logic are in fact equivalent to the meta-linguistic rule of universal substitution and that the more restrictive structure of the substitution group of Quantum Logic prevents us from defining truth in a classical fashion. These observations lead to a more profound understanding of the Logic of Quantum Mechanics and of the role that symmetry principles play in that theory.… Its decisive difference in comparison to the Classical-Model is the fact that gratings in vector-space defy superposition.—Hermann Weyl (1949)
On The Space-Time Ontology of Physical Theories
Authors: Manders Kenneth L. 
Published: November 2002

In the correspondence with Clarke, Leibniz proposes to construe physical theory in terms of physical (spatio-temporal) relations between physical objects, thus avoiding incorporation of infinite totalities of abstract entities (such as Newtonian space) in physical ontology. It has generally been felt that this proposal cannot be carried out.I demonstrate an equivalence between formulations postulating space-time as an infinite totality and formulations allowing only possible spatio-temporal relations of physical (point -) objects. The resulting rigorous formulations of physical theory may be seen to follow Leibniz’ suggestion quite closely. On the other hand, physical assumptions implicit in the postulation of space-time totalities are made explicit in the reconstruction of the space-time versions from the physical-relation versions.
Empirical Adequacy
Authors: Hanna Joseph F. 
Published: November 2002

In his book, The Scientific Image, Bas van Fraassen argues for an anti-realist view of science according to which the sole epistemological aim of science is to “save the phenomena”. As originally conceived, his constructive empiricism is strongly extensional, but in his account of the empirical adequacy of probabilistic theories, van Fraassen reluctantly abandons this extensional position, arguing that modal (intensional) notions are unavoidable in interpreting probability. I argue in this paper that van Fraassen has not presented the strongest possible case for a fully extensional account of empirical adequacy. On the present account, a probabilistic theory is empirically adequate just in case there is no theory that has a higher likelihood relative to all the phenomena in the actual world. I prove that a theory is empirically adequate if and only if the probability attributed to each observable event that occurs in the actual world is its limiting relative frequency. Thus, in so far as one is concerned with the empirical adequacy (rather than with the literal truth) of probabilistic theories, strict relative frequencies provide an adequate basis for “interpreting probability”.Probabilistic theories are treated in a genuine measurement context. In this connection I distinguish between worlds that are “strongly infinite” and worlds that are only “weakly infinite”. It is characteristic of the former worlds that there is no limit to the precision of actual measurements. I show by example that in some “strongly infinite” worlds, theories will be empirically adequate only if observables are represented by continuous (rather than discrete) random variables. The range of such examples is clarified by a theorem which states necessary and sufficient conditions under which the “phenomena can be saved” without recourse to continuous random variables and real numbers.