bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Mad Pain and Martian Pain
Authors: Lewis David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Lewis invites us to consider two ostensible challenges to any materialist theory of the mind. The madman feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its characteristic causes and effects; the Martian also feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its physical realization. Lewis argues that his functionalist theory is adequate to meet the challenges presented by both cases. In the postscript, Lewis considers how advocates of phenomenal qualia respond to the functionalist account he defends; in particular, he responds to Frank Jackson's ‘knowledge argument’.
Mathematical Change and Scientific Change
Authors: Kitcher Philip 
Published: October 2003

AbstractChapters 7–9 offer a general account of the growth of mathematics. Introduce the notion of a mathematical practice, a multidimensional entity consisting of a language, accepted statements, accepted questions, accepted means of inference, and methodological maxims. Mathematics grows by modifying one or more components in response to the problems posed by others. So new language, language that is not initially well understood, may be introduced in order to answer questions taken to be important but resisting solution by available methods; in consequence, there may be a new task of clarifying the language or taming the methods that the extended language allows. The chapters attempt to show how such processes have occurred in the history of mathematics, and how they link the rich state of present mathematics to the crude beginnings of the subject. In Chapter 7, in particular, Kitcher compares mathematical change with scientific change, attempting to show that the growth of mathematical knowledge is far more similar to the growth of scientific knowledge than is usually appreciated.
Philosophical Papers Volume II
Authors: Lewis David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A collection of 13 papers by David Lewis, written on a variety of topics including causation, counterfactuals and indicative conditionals, the direction of time, subjective and objective probability, explanation, perception, free will, and rational decision. The conclusions reached include the claim that time travel is possible, that counterfactual dependence is asymmetrical, that events are properties of spatiotemporal regions, that the Prisoners’ Dilemma is a Newcomb problem, and that causation can be analyzed in terms of counterfactual dependence between events. These papers can be seen as a “prolonged campaign” for a philosophical position Lewis calls “Humean supervenience,” according to which “all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact,” with all global features of the world thus supervening on the spatiotemporal arrangement of local qualities.
Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision
Authors: Lewis David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues that the difference between veridical hallucination and genuine seeing cannot be accounted for in terms of the absence of the normal causal process for seeing, since that process is also absent in cases of prosthetic vision. It is proposed instead that the difference lies in the pattern of counterfactual dependence of visual experience on the scene before the eyes. The paper contains a postscript with further considerations on the notion of a “suitable pattern of counterfactual dependence.”
The Economics of Financial Markets
Authors: Houthakker Hendrik S. , Williamson Peter J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book puts economics to work on the daily problems faced by investors, traders, speculators, and brokers as they wrestle with increasingly diverse and complex financial markets. Drawing mainly on data direct from the financial behavior of households, corporations, and governments in the USA, the authors show how accessible but rigorous economics can help in making sense of the financial markets (including those in equities, bonds, mutual funds, options, and futures) and of the ways in which these markets are organized. The authors contend that many of the approaches that might seem random or counter‐intuitive at first sight are in fact rational and often predictable responses to events – but they also find that real markets stray from the rational economic path – financial markets make mistakes, and inefficiencies do exist. When they do, unique profit opportunities arise that the authors demonstrate throughout the book. The book differs from many works on financial markets in that it provides a systematic framework for analyzing the impact of events on security prices and trading volumes; explains how the value of a firm's assets and dividend flow will influence the prices of its securities; provides the tools to identify and manage different types of risk; discusses what protection investors can expect from financial market regulators and what happens when a clique tries to squeeze or corner a market; includes a detailed treatment of futures and their role at the core of today's financial markets, and explains why they should be of concern to more and more investors and traders; shows how to use modern corporate strategy tools in security analysis; and shows how to discover inefficiencies in financial markets and profit from them. By bringing together information on the institutional details of financial markets with the concepts and tools of economic theory, the book will be of value to practitioners and students of financial markets alike.
The Supply of Securities
Authors: Houthakker Hendrik S. , Williamson Peter J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The supply of securities is examined both in terms of the contractual characteristics and importance of each main type and the way in which the actual performance and supply of each over time is influenced by the behavior of issuers. The analysis presented is with respect to the USA. The securities explored include government securities – municipal bonds and bonds of foreign governments and international organizations; corporate securities – equities and senior debt, takeovers, bonds, junk bonds, convertible securities; mutual fund shares; mortgages and mortgage‐backed securities. The chapter also includes discussion of the implications for the supply of securities of corporate financial policy, partnership units and business taxation, and claims on financial institutions.
The Determination of Equity Prices
Authors: Houthakker Hendrik S. , Williamson Peter J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Drawing on Chs. 4 and 5 (which discuss the supply and demand for securities separately), this chapter investigates whether economics has anything helpful to say about the prices of shares and related securities by reviewing the most important ideas suggested by economic theory in this area and assessing their usefulness in the real world. In the first two sections, two fairly ancient but still popular models of equity (share) prices are examined, one of which (the steady growth model) views shares as claims to future dividends and the other (the asset model) views them as claims to the underlying net assets (corporate net worth). For the most part, these models look at the shares of individual companies in isolation, not at the market as a whole, and that is their weakness, but the asset model in particular provides important insights into aggregate equity values; as an aside to this discussion it is shown that aggregate dividends have the intriguing feature of being an approximately constant percentage of national income, which means that corporate equities offer protection (though not perfect protection) against inflation as well as participation in the real growth of the economy. The third section looks at the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) – a discovery of the 1960s that, by considering equities in relation to each other, provided important new insights into the relation between risk and return. A more recent alternative approach known as Arbitrage Pricing Theory is discussed next, and finally there is a section (an appendix) on stock indexes.
Options and Options Pricing
Authors: Houthakker Hendrik S. , Williamson Peter J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The first section of this chapter discusses the basic features of option contracts, with special reference to stock options, including the way in which the contractual elements of an option (such as the maturity or exercise price) have been standardized to facilitate trading. The second section examines various methods of valuing options contracts and how the value of a option will be influenced by its maturity, striking price, market interest rates and the price of the underlying security; it also explores the ways in which call and put options may be combined to form various types of ‘spreads’ and ‘straddles’. The last three sections are quite short: the third briefly analyzes the way in which options might be used to hedge a portfolio of stocks, and hence their role as a risk management tool; the fourth explains how the shares in a levered firm can themselves be viewed as a type of option, and the implications of this for the pricing of stocks; and the last discusses options on objects other than stocks. The examples given refer to the USA and Europe.
Harms as Setbacks to Interest
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
According to Feinberg, we must distinguish between a nonnormative notion of harm as a setback to interests and a normative notion of harm as a wrong. The harm captured in the harm principle combines both these interpretations: it refers to setbacks to others’ interests that are also wrongs. Interests take one of two forms: welfare interests, which are minimal, and nonultimate interests, or ulterior interests, which are interests related to one's personal projects and goals. Feinberg identifies three ways in which someone may impair one's network of interests: (1) she may modify circumstances to make it difficult for one to satisfy competing interests; (2) she may reduce the degree to which prudential interests are protectively diversified; or (3) she may directly impair one's welfare interests to make it difficult for one to pursue one's ulterior interests. Noting the link between wants, dislikes, and interests, Feinberg argues both that one's interests are not always compatible with one's wants and that one's dislikes (including most hurts and offenses) are not always antithetical to one's interests.
Failures to Prevent Harm
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Feinberg addresses two questions. First, are bad Samaritan laws morally legitimate? He believes they are since it is important to avoid serious harm to personal interests, and persons in danger have a right to be saved by those who can do so without unreasonable risk. Second, does the harm principle cover blamable failure to prevent harm? Feinberg holds that requiring people to help prevent harm is sometimes as reasonable a legal policy as preventing people, by threat of punishment, from actively causing harm. This conclusion does not represent a departure from the harm principle, he argues, since, in some circumstances, omissions may cause harm.
Assessing and Comparing Harms
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Formulates some “mediating maxims” to guide a legislature in applying the harm principle to difficult cases. Supplemental criteria that restrict the application of the harm principle include the magnitude of the harm committed, the probability of the harm occurring, the relative importance of the harm, and the aggregative nature of the harm. The greater the probability of harm, for example, the less grave the harm need be to justify coercion. In addition to such moral principles, practical reasons and rules of common sense are relevant to the application of the harm principle. Since a limitation on liberty is itself a harm, the state is justified by the harm principle in invading citizens’ interests in liberty only if this action outweighs the greater harm that would be caused by proscribed actions.
Fairly Imputing Harms
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Feinberg identifies additional restrictions on the application of the harm principle. Thwarting competing interests, for example, is not a harm unless it is also wrong, which means that it is inflicted unfairly, not voluntarily consented to, or illegitimate. Accumulative harms (harms caused by the general performance of a given action that on an individual basis does not cause harm) must be assessed by the legislature according to the likelihood of people undertaking this action. Feinberg examines environmental pollution as an example of a public accumulative harm. The effort to minimize threats to public interest such as air and water pollution must operate within the limits of efficacy, equity, and fair play. Feinberg notes that, as a consequence of these criteria, the harm principle not only loses its character as a merely vacuous ideal but also loses all semblance of factual simplicity and normative neutrality.
Propositions and Concepts
Authors: Mates Benson 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Underlying Leibniz's entire logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of language is the traditional view that the essential role of language is to represent our thoughts about the extralinguistic world. In accord with this, he speaks of three distinct regions or realms: (1) reality, (2) the realm of ideas, and (3) language. Reality consists exclusively of monads; the realm of ideas consists of concepts, a subclass of which are propositions; and language consists mainly of words, which are phenomena or collections of similar phenomena. This chapter is a close study of Leibniz's notions of concepts and propositions.
“Two Great Principles” and Two Lesser Ones
Authors: Mates Benson 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The “two great principles” are the principle of contradiction (“every proposition is either true or false, and not both”) and the principle of sufficient reason (“nothing occurs for which it would be impossible for someone who had enough knowledge of things to give a reason adequate to determine why the thing is as it is and not otherwise”). The two lesser ones are the principle of Continuity (“there are no gaps in nature”) and that of The Best (“everything in the actual world is the best it can be”). The explication and criticism of these principles and their seeming consequences constitute the content of the present chapter.
Islam in Nigeria
Authors: Quinn Charlotte A. , Quinn Frederick 
Published: October 2003

AbstractModern Nigeria was cobbled together in the nineteenth century from over 350 ethnic and linguistic groups, including sizable Muslim populations, especially in the country's north. Formative early figures like Uthman Dan Fodio and the scholar‐jurist Mohammad Bello were important in establishing Islam among the Hausa and Fulani populations, from which it spread elsewhere. Today, Nigeria's Muslim community is divided, and the extent to which Sharia law should be implemented has proved a contentious battleground both within the Islamic community and with other Nigerians. Islam in Nigeria seeks a competitive edge in the struggle with a nearly numerically equal Christian community.
Islam in Senegal
Authors: Quinn Charlotte A. , Quinn Frederick 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIslam in Senegal is at the threshold of political change, as a shift in power takes place among the Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa). Within the next decade, the growing Mouridiya brotherhood, founded by Amadou Bamba (1850–1927), is likely to overwhelm its rivals, such as the Tijaniya, an outgrowth of a Sufi mystical movement led by El Hajj Umar Tall, and later led by the Wolof cleric, Malik Sy (c.1855–1922). In the near term, the traditional symbiotic relationship between mosque and secular state is likely to continue as leaders on both sides act together and contain extremist Islamist tendencies and urban unrest. President Abdulaye Wade has adopted this balancing act policy in a country that is 94 % Muslim. Support of the Muslim community with its multiple interests is critical to Senegal's continued presence as a moderate, stable West African state. Issues facing the brotherhoods include unresolved succession questions affecting aging leaders, urbanization and growing population pressures, destructive agricultural practices, and social tensions, such as caste and class tensions.
Eastern Approaches
Authors: Quinn Charlotte A. , Quinn Frederick 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFrom earliest times, Muslims were a visible presence along the Indian Ocean of East Africa, coming from different locations in the Arabian Peninsula, North Africa, and elsewhere. Islam moved inland in Kenya and surrounding countries during the nineteenth century, largely brought by traders. Kenyan Islam is divided along structural, ethnic, personality, geographical, and doctrinal lines, resulting in a divided community, accounting for perhaps 30% of the population. Despite the influence of Iran and Libya, Kenya has successfully contained radical Islam, especially following the bombing of the American Embassy in Nairobi, but Islamic discontent is unabated since the root causes of societal discontent remain unresolved. The short‐lived effort by Shaikh Khalid Balala proved more of an irritant than a threat to the government, which continues to dole out bits of patronage to coastal and Somali Muslims in the country's northeast.
Legal Moralism and Non‐Grievance Evils
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The liberalism that Feinberg espouses denies that preventing evils other than harms and offenses is a good reason for establishing criminal prohibitions. Feinberg contrasts the straightforward denial of this view, which he calls “legal moralism in the broad sense,” with a narrow or strict conception of legal moralism, according to which the state may legitimately prohibit conduct on the ground that it is inherently immoral, although it causes neither harm nor offense to anyone. Taking the broader conception as his main target, Feinberg considers this principle in relation to the three liberty‐limiting principles discussed in the other volumes of his work – the harm principle, the offense principle, and legal paternalism – to demonstrate that these principles cannot encompass the evils that the legal moralist wishes to eliminate. After offering a taxonomy of evils (i.e., states of affairs to be regretted), Feinberg considers in detail two types of evils: free‐floating evils and welfare‐connected nongrievance evils. Feinberg maintains that, although there is a theoretical case to be made for legal moralism, nongrievance evils do not have enough weight to justify an invasion of personal autonomy.
Strict Moralism: Enforcing True Morality
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Feinberg's target here is the strict legal moralist, who defends (1) true morality (the set of rational norms that apply equally to all peoples) (2) a retributive theory of punishment, and (3) the view that criminal law may legitimately prevent free‐floating evils on the ground that they are immoral. According to Feinberg, the full doctrine of strict legal moralism is internally inconsistent since one cannot cling to both retributivism and moralism, as this would involve retributive punishment for victimless crimes. After contrasting pure strict moralism with impure strict moralism (which appeals to the indirect effects on public welfare of allowing harmless immoral conduct), Feinberg discusses Patrick Devlin's claim that liberals are inconsistent given their exclusion from the law of the consent defense for some crimes. To this, Feinberg replies that liberals, who permit this defense for all crimes except where it is not workable or would harm third parties, are not prey to this objection.
Legal Perfectionism and the Benefit Principles
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A possible liberty‐limiting principle that Feinberg targets is legal perfectionism, according to which a state should promote the virtues and so may legitimately impose criminal prohibitions that will improve citizens’ characters. Feinberg defines character as the set of dispositions to act or feel in certain ways: commendable dispositions are excellences or virtues and blameworthy dispositions are flaws or defects. He opposes perfectionism as a form of moralistic paternalism that restricts liberty from the need to confer on the individual the benefit of a better character. Turning to the divergence in the views of B.F. Skinner and John Stuart Mill on character, Feinberg shows that, although they both reject legal perfectionism, Skinner holds that personal excellence doesn’t much matter and Mill claims that good character matters, but the law has a very limited role to play in realizing it. Mill's outlook resembles Feinberg's more complicated position, and values human liberty as an essential prerequisite for personal virtue. Other topics Feinberg considers here include: the educative function of law, ethical relativism, and the moral education of the theory of punishment.
Conclusion
Authors: Feinberg Joel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this final chapter of the four‐volume work The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Feinberg returns to his main thesis that liberalism offers a tenable account of the moral limits of the legitimate power of the state to establish criminal prohibitions. In acknowledging certain weaknesses in the case for liberalism, Feinberg does not claim to have shown that either legal paternalism or legal moralism is false. The most persuasive version of liberalism, he claims, is not the “one very simple principle” option offered by John Stuart Mill, but a more complicated theory that (1) regards individual autonomy as absolute personal sovereignty, (2) recognizes the offense principle as a morally relevant reason to restrict autonomy, and (3) makes concessions to nonliberal views on both harm to self and harmless wrongdoing. Feinberg highlights two resistant counterexamples to his thesis that relate to welfare‐connected nongrievance evils and free‐floating evils. He concludes by defending the place of liberalism in nonpluralistic, nonsecular societies on the grounds that if personal sovereignty exists anywhere, it exists everywhere, in both traditional societies and pluralistic, secular ones.
Bible-Carrying Christians
Authors: Watt David Harrington 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book focuses on the relationship between conservative Protestants and social power in the U.S. The book, which is particularly concerned with which sorts of power relationships seem natural and which do not, is based on fieldwork (conducted in the early 1990s), in three Philadelphia churches: Oak Grove Church, Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship, and the Philadelphia Church of Christ. The data drawn from that fieldwork suggests that in the early 1990s, Bible‐carrying Christian churches tended to naturalize (to various degrees) the authority of heterosexuals and men. The data also suggested that under certain (relatively rare) circumstances Bible‐carrying Christian churches denaturalized the authority of ministers, corporations, and nation‐states.
Fieldwork
Authors: Harrington Watt David 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book examines the relationship between conservative Protestants and social power in the U.S. The book, which is particularly concerned with which sorts of power relationships were made to seem natural and which were not, is based on fieldwork in three Philadelphia churches: Oak Grove Church, Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship, and the Philadelphia Church of Christ. The fieldwork was conducted in the early 1990s.