bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
A simplified development of a unified dust explosion vent sizing formula
Authors: Ural Erdem A. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractTraditionally, different formulae have been used to size the explosion vents for strong (Pred > 0.1 bar‐g or 1.5 psig) and weak (Pred < 0.1 bar‐g or 1.5 psig) enclosures. Recently, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 68 Committee has developed a simplified equation for strong and weak structures that may be subjected to full volume or partial volume internal explosions.This paper presents a simplified analysis which was used to develop the unified formula. The analysis provides insight into the form of the correlating parameters, as well as into the validity of the key hypotheses used in vented dust explosion data analysis.
Establishing a data farm to harvest quality reliability information
Authors: Thomas Harold (Hal) W , Moosemiller Mike 
Published: April 2004

AbstractObtaining useful reliability information from collected maintenance and inspection data requires effort. In the past, this has been referred to as data “mining,” as if the data can be extracted in its desired form if only it can be found. In contrast, this paper proposes data “farming,” and describes the “seeds” that are necessary to harvest the best possible crop of reliability information. The CCPS Equipment Reliability Database project provides valuable lessons on how to “farm” rather than merely “mine” data. The CCPS work processes for establishing failure modes, populations to track, event data to collect, and implementation are all reviewed. Attention is given to knowing up front the data objectives and the quality of information desired. Also, the treatment of equipment surveillance periods turns out to be a critical variable for data quantity and quality. Reasons for this and approaches to take are discussed. It will be seen that the quality and continuity of derived information is much greater when the data sources can be “farmed” rather than “mined”.
Selection and design of cost‐effective risk reduction systems
Authors: Antes Matthew K. , Miri Mahdi F. , Flamberg Stephanie A. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractWith the need to juggle design requirements, recommendations, personal opinions, and company preferences, how does one determine a safe, cost‐effective risk reduction design? A quick solution may be to incorporate all potential safeguards, but that is neither practical nor cost‐effective. Companies have turned to various methods to evaluate their mitigation options for fire, explosion, and reactivity hazards. Most methods simply identify the high‐risk issues; they do not determine the most cost‐effective risk reduction options.Whether it is for a capital project, regulatory compliance, or to define standards, cost‐benefit analysis (CBA) is a proven method for cost‐effective risk management. Three case studies are presented in this paper to illustrate the flexibility and benefits of this approach.
The effect of additives on the detonation hazard of some hydrocarbon‐air mixtures
Authors: Lizhong Yang , Xiaodong Zhou , Qing'an Wang , Weicheng Fan 
Published: April 2004

AbstractHazards caused by detonation of hydrocarbon‐air mixtures are a continuing problem. Of the factors affecting detonation hazards of hydrocarbon‐air mixtures, additives play an important role. In this paper, a series of experiments are described addressing the influence of chemical additives on the detonation of some hydrocarbon‐air mixtures under confined (rectangle shock tube tests) conditions. The experimental results show that NT (nitric ether or RONO2), PO (1,2‐epoxypropane), and BPO (benzoyl peroxide) have a clear sensitizing effect on the detonation hazards of these mixtures. The mechanistic influence of additives is simply described, according to the chain reaction theory of detonation.
Kinetics of the reactions of ethylene oxide with water and ethylene glycols
Authors: Melhem Georges A. , Gianetto Arturo , Levin Marc E. , Fisher Harold G. , Chippett Simon , Singh Surendra K. , Chipman Peter I. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThis study of the water‐contamination reactions of ethylene oxide was conducted by Arthur D. Little, Inc. with funding from, and under the auspices of, the Ethylene Oxide Industry Council, part of the American Chemistry Council. Significant experimental and technical contributions were also made by staff from Shell Chemicals' Westhollow Technology Center in Houston, Texas, and Union Carbide Corporation's Research Center in South Charleston, West Virginia. Unique fourth‐order kinetics for the reactions of ethylene oxide with water, and ethylene oxide with ethylene glycols were derived and validated, as were kinetics for the reactions of neat ethylene oxide and the decomposition of ethylene glycols. The latter data was incorporated into a reaction model useful for the determination of ethylene oxide storage stability and pressure relief system design under water‐contamination scenarios.
Regulations: Build a system or add layers?
Authors: Dowell A. M. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractMany government, industry, and self‐imposed regulations have been added to the chemical business, seemingly stacking massive three‐ring binders on top of our backpack of “making chemicals.” This paper proposes that we design work systems to include the needs of the various initiatives in the structure and fabric of our backpack. Examples will be given.
Safe design and operation of a cryogenic air separation unit
Authors: Schmidt William P. , Winegardner Karen S. , Dennehy Martin , Castle‐Smith Howard 
Published: April 2004

AbstractCryogenic Air Separation Units (ASUs) frequently supply oxygen and nitrogen to chemical, petroleum and manufacturing customers. Typically, the ASU is located remotely from the use point, and the products are supplied via a pipeline. This paper provides the basic design and operating methods to safely operate an ASU. The four primary hazards associated with these units are: (1) the potential for rapid oxidation, (2) interfaces between the ASU and the downstream systems, (3) pre s s u re excursions due to vaporizing liquids, and (4) oxygen enriched or deficient atmospheres. Requirements for safely handling oxygen within the air separation facility and at the product use point are also discussed in this paper.
Flame propagation in industrial scale piping
Authors: Chatrathi Kris , Going John E. , Grandestaff Bill 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe use of pipelines to connect vessels and transport material is a common practice in the processing industry. Often, these pipelines carry potentially hazardous materials, such as flammable gases. The potential of fires and explosions in the process industry has been well recognized and is addressed in consensus guidelines such as N F PA 68 – Guide for Venting of Deflagrations and N F PA 69 – Explosion Prevention Systems. Both of these guides differentiate between vessels and piping systems by providing diff e rent rules to address the differences in explosion propagation behavior. Both NFPA 68 and NFPA 69 are based on an understanding of explosion propagation behavior developed from empirical or experimental evidence.The purposes of this paper are to present experimental evidence and to further develop a detailed understanding of combustion propagation in industrial scale piping, primarily deflagration propagation in pipes. However, it is also the intent to understand the transition points between fires and deflagrations, and between deflagrations and detonations as related to piping systems. In order to study combustion propagation in industrial scale piping, three pipe diameters and three fuels were selected. Although, gaseous fuel mixtures are often transported in waste streams, only pure fuels were used in this study. The effect of bends was evaluated but other piping system components were not evaluated.
Case history: PTFE‐lined pipe failure
Authors: Schisla Robert M. , Ernst Steven C. , Lodal Peter N. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractA recent incident at the Eastman Chemical Company's Kingsport site involved a 20‐foot section of PTFE‐lined pipe that failed at a flange joint, resulting in a leak, but no injuries. Initial scene observations indicated that a section of the liner had disintegrated, leaving an open space where the liner forms the flange gasket. More detailed analysis showed that the entire liner was intact, but had retracted approximately 2.5 inches into the pipe.This paper will discuss the physical mechanisms (thermal cycling, viscoelastic properties of PTFE) that explain the liner retraction, as well as the installation factors (electrical tracing, liner length), which influenced the timing and nature of the failure mechanism.
Safety management in a hazardous experimental environment: The Borexino case
Authors: Caputo Antonio C. , Pelagagge Pacifico M. , Tartaglia Roberto 
Published: April 2004

AbstractApplying a methodological approach for process plant safety improvement and management in a high risk underground experimental facility is described using as a reference case the Borexino experiment in the Gran Sasso National Laboratory, Italy. The adopted procedure involved utilization of both qualitative (HAZOP and FMEA) and quantitative techniques (FTA) in order to improve process safety in a high technology experimental setting where no previous experience on similar plants was available. In the paper, we describe a complete process characterization and detail the safety analysis phases that identify the main problem areas and suggested and adopted corrective actions.
Explosion and fire in a gas‐oil fixed roof storage tank: Case study and lessons learned
Authors: Riezel Yigal 
Published: April 2004

AbstractOn November 2, 1997, a fixed roof gas‐oil tank located in the tank farm of Ashdod Oil Refinery exploded, causing the death of one Sample Man, and a fire in two adjacent tanks located in the same dike. The fire lasted less than 3 hours, but there was significant public concern about the necessity for emergency evacuation from two neighboring settlements.Emergency operations of the refinery and outside services were very effective, and fires in both tanks and the dike were put out without any additional damage to other equipment in the tank farm. The source fire was classified as a heavy top phase pool fire.The investigation pointed out that hydrogen was the source of the explosive mixture in the tank. Hydrogen penetrated the tank as a result of non‐complete gas‐oil stripping at the exit of a hydro treating unit. The source of ignition was an electrostatic spark initiated by synthetic rope (instead of a cotton one) used with a device to obtain samples from the tank.After the accident, it was found that a similar scenario was reported about 15 years earlier. However, it was not disseminated widely enough through accident databases.
Layers of protection analysis for human factors (LOPA‐HF)
Authors: Baybutt Paul 
Published: April 2004

AbstractProcess hazard analysis (PHA) performed to meet the requirements of OSHA and EPA regulations must address human factors. Both the human failures that can cause accidents and the human factors that can influence them must be addressed. This is important because it is generally believed that 50% to 90% of process accidents can be attributed to human failures. Human failures are usually identified in a PHA by simple brainstorming. However, PHA teams have a tendency to focus on equipment failures. A better approach is needed. Common approaches for identifying the human factors that influence human failures involve the use of checklists during the PHA. Unfortunately, these approaches have proven problematic. There is a need for an improved method that is both efficient and effective in helping to control process risk.This paper describes improved approaches for identifying human failures in PHA and human factors issues that impact on the hazard scenarios identified by PHA. The former is accomplished using an approach that conceptually identifies human failures in a manner analogous to generating deviations in a hazard and operability study. The latter is achieved by the application of the framework and methods of Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA), a simplified risk assessment method. These approaches are described and illustrative examples are provided.
Risk evaluation of decomposition of hydroxylamine/water solution at various concentrations
Authors: Iwata Yusaku , Koseki Hiroshi 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe thermal property of HA/water solution was studied from the calorimetric data obtained using differential thermal analysis (DTA). The intensity of decomposition was studied from results of a mini closed pressure vessel test (MCPVT), and a pressure vessel test (PVT), in addition to the steel tube test.The thermal analysis was conducted to evaluate the ease of thermal decomposition using DTA. The heat‐release onset temperatures using the no‐treated stainless steel cells were more than 70° C below those measured using the gold‐coated stainless steel cells. This result implies that the heat‐release onset temperature depends on the materials of the sample cell.The intensity of the thermal decomposition was investigated using the MCPVT, the PVT, and the steel tube test. The intensity of the thermal decomposition increased as the HA concentration increased in the MCPVT. The intensity of the thermal decomposition increased greatly when the HA concentration was beyond 80% (wt.) in the MCPVT. It was determined that the thermal decomposit ion of HA 70%/water solutions was very violent in the PVT. In addition, HA/water solutions of more than 80% concentration could detonate in the steel tube test.
Potential impacts to process safety management from mergers, acquisitions, downsizing, and re‐engineering
Authors: Philley Jack 
Published: April 2004

AbstractCorporate organizational mergers, acquisitions, downsizing, and re‐engineering can greatly impact Process Safety Management (PSM) programs and, ultimately, PSM performance. Almost every organization has experienced some degree of change in organizational staffing. A primary objective of this paper is to identify potential adverse impacts to PSM resulting from ineffectively managed organizational changes. Several process safety incidents are examined from an organizational change perspective. In addition, options and strategies are offered for preventing or mitigating adverse consequences associated with these changes.
Fire in secondary reformer outlet line to waste heat boiler
Authors: Singh Jagmohan , Basu P. , Rao B. M. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThis paper describes the failure of the pressure shell of an interconnecting pipe between the secondary reformer and primary waste heat boiler that led to a fire in Ammonia Unit I after 13‐and‐a‐half years of operation. The fire incident resulted at KRIBHCO in a plant shutdown of 15 days. It also describes analysis, the repair work carried out to put the plant back in service in the least possible time, and the remedial measures taken.
An index‐based method for assessing exothermic runaway risk
Authors: Kao Chen‐Shen , Duh Yih‐Shing , Chen Thomas J. H. , Yu S. W. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThis paper proposes a simplified mathematical and tabular method for assessing the risk of exothermic runaway reactions, based on the calculated hazard index. Intrinsic elements, such as reactivity, stability, exothermic enthalpy, etc., are presented as measures of severity of a potential runaway event. Similarly, extrinsic elements, such as risk and safety factors associated with operating conditions, are considered as measures of the likelihood of an event. All intrinsic and extrinsic parameters, with proper weightings, are converted into a runaway risk index (RRI). The chemical process risk can therefore be quantified and divided into six levels based on the normalized RRI: extremely high, high, moderate, mild, low, and very low. They can be further classified into tolerable and intolerable risks. Sample runs on methanol‐acetic anhydride esterification, cumenehydroperoxide decomposition, and decompositions of ammonium nitrate, are presented to illustrate the validity of the method.
Efficiency of flameless venting devices
Authors: Going John E. , Chatrathi Kris 
Published: April 2004

AbstractOver the last 10 years, several flameless venting devices have been globally available to extinguish flames discharged from a deflagration vent. These devices have primarily been used on industrial equipment located indoors with the potential for explosions or deflagrations. Both NFPA 68 and VDI 3673 guidelines prohibit the discharge of deflagration vents inside of buildings, and prescribe the use of vent ducts to direct the discharge outdoors to a safe location. This, however, requires an increase in vent area to overcome inefficiencies due to the discharge restrictions of the vent duct. The use of devices to extinguish flame from deflagration vents also results in less efficient venting. The efficiency of these devices was evaluated via large‐scale deflagration testing. Volumes from 0.5 m3 to 4 m3 were utilized with vent area ratios (A/V⅔) in the range of 0.1 to 0.3. Tests were conducted with fuel dusts having Ksts of up to 300 bar.m/sec. The effect of vent static burst pressure was also evaluated. Several methods of validating flame extinguishment were utilized and external effects were measured, including pressure and sound measurements outside the flameless venting device, and temperature on the surface of the device.
Connections: How a pipe failure resulted in resizing vessel emergency relief systems
Authors: Hendershot Dennis C. , Keiter Alan G. , Kacmar Jim , Magee Joseph W. , Morton Paul C. , Duncan Warren 
Published: April 2004

AbstractEarly on a Saturday morning, a two‐inch pipe in an unoccupied building in a plant shut down for the weekend ruptured violently. There were no injuries because nobody was in the building at the time. Nearby piping was bent and ruptured by impact from the failed pipe, and there was other minor equipment damage. The released material did not ignite, and was contained by the building spill containment system. The initial investigation of the incident determined that the ruptured pipe had been liquid‐filled, blocked in by closed valves, and overheated. The investigation could have stopped at that point, blaming the rupture on thermal expansion of the trapped liquid. However, a more detailed root cause investigation that yielded significant new knowledge of the thermal stability of the material was performed. This knowledge also resulted in redesign of the plant piping and the emergency relief systems on a number of plant vessels.
Flammability potential of halogenated fire suppression agents and refrigerants
Authors: Ural Erdem A. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractHalogenated hydrocarbons are often used as fire suppression agents or refrigerants due to their low‐ or no‐flammability potential at atmospheric pressure and room temperature. However, these substances can form highly flammable mixtures with air at sufficiently high pressures—even at room temperature, and in the absence of other flammable vapors.General flammability behavior indicates that there is a critical pressure (also referred to in the literature as the pressure limit of flammability), below which all possible mixtures of the Agent and air are non‐flammable. Above the critical pressure, a range of mixtures are explosible at room temperature. While this behavior does not affect the intended use and performance of these agents, recognizing this property, and determining the critical pressure are vital to establishing safety procedures that can avoid accidental explosions.This paper presents an analysis, supporting data, and a screening method to evaluate the explosibility potential that may arise from deliberate or unintentional elevated pressure handling of refrigerants and fire protection agents. The data and the accompanying analysis suggests that even a fire protection agent such as HFC‐227ea may form an explosible mixture with air at room temperature if the pressure is above approximately 60 psig.There is a definite need for the systematic characterization of refrigerant and fire protection agent flammability at elevated pressures, using appropriate experimental techniques discussed in the text.
Evaluation of available indices for inherently safer design options
Authors: Khan Faisal I. , Sadiq Rehan , Amyotte Paul R. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractInherent safety is a proactive approach for loss prevention during process plant design. It has been proven that, considering the lifetime costs of a process and its operation, an inherent safety approach can lead to a cost‐optimal option. Application of inherent safety at the early stages of process design yields the best results with respect to process selection, conceptual design, and engineering design. However, in spite of being an attractive and cost‐effective approach to loss prevention, it is not widely used. Reasons have been suggested for this lack of widespread use, but the lack of systematic tools to apply inherent safety principles is perhaps the most important one.A detailed study was conducted to analyze the performance of available hazard indices with reference to various inherent safety principles (guidewords). The performance of four main indices (Dow, Mond, Inherent Safety, and Safety Weighted Hazard [SweHI] indices) was studied for five inherent safety guidewords. None of the indexing procedures can capture all of the inherent safety guidewords, although the SWeHI and Dow Index were found to be robust on many accounts. It is recommended that a new specific index be developed for inherently safer design evaluation. The SWeHI and Dow indexing procedures may be a good basis on which to build.
CSB'S reactive chemical hazard investigation: Description and lessons learned
Authors: Joseph Giby , Long Lisa A. , Mitchell Kevin , Murphy John F. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) began operations as an independent federal agency in 1998. Its primary mission is to prevent chemical‐related incidents (fires, explosions, or toxic releases) in commercial or industrial settings by conducting incident investigations, reporting on causes, and issuing safety recommendations. This paper discusses some findings of the reactive chemical hazard investigation that originated from CSB's investigation of a runaway reaction at Morton International in 1998. As a result of this investigation, the Board made recommendations to promote the safe handling of reactive chemicals. Incident data sources were surveyed to determine the number and impact of reactive chemical incidents. Through site visits and surveys, the Board gathered information about reactive chemical hazard management for select small, medium, and large companies within the chemical industry. OSHA and EPA were also surveyed to determine current regulatory approaches for managing reactive chemical hazards and to identify future agency plans. This paper focuses on evidence that supports the Board's findings and recommendations on improving reactive chemical process safety.