bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
An Ecological Perspective on New Product Failure: The Effects of Competitive Overcrowding
Authors: Redmond William H. 
Published: October 2003

Practitioners and researchers have carefully explored the causes of new product failures. Studies have been conducted, results analyzed, and recommendations offered. Yet despite these efforts, new product failure rates have not decreased. In fact, they appear to be increasing in some product categories. Are we missing something?Noting that most research on new product failures has focused on a firm's activities in specific projects, William H. Redmond proposes that new product outcomes might also be influenced by macro‐level or environmental factors. By focusing on environmental factors rather than a firm's activities in specific projects, we might better understand why competent firms in one industry consistently experience higher failure rates than those of firms that are no more competent, but operate in a different industry. For example, failure rates for new food products are consistently higher than those for new industrial products. With no evidence that product development professionals in industrial firms are simply superior to their counterparts in the food industry, Dr. Redmond suggests that we need to look beyond specific product development projects and consider the effects of the market in which these products are introduced.Encouraged by past successes, many firms in the food manufacturing business seek sales growth through the development and introduction of additional new products. Over time, this creates a market in which customer demand is fragmented into increasingly small niches and distribution channels are flooded with product choices. As a result, the failure of a new product is more likely than it might have been under less crowded conditions. In much the same way that the population of deer on an island is limited by the available food and physical space, food products are apparently faced with the market equivalent of natural selection. In the absence of available market niches and a clear competitive advantage, a new product's chances for success are meager. In a market that is overcrowded by existing products and new product introductions, it becomes increasingly difficult and uneconomical to identify opportunities for meaningful differentiation.On the other hand, industrial products face a much different set of environmental conditions. Compared to the food manufacturing business, relatively few new industrial products are introduced, and those introductions are typically successful. In most cases, the new products are simply replacements for inefficient or obsolete products. In such an environment, failed introductions are probably the result of errors in the product development process.
From Experience Dreams to Market: Crafting a Culture of Innovation
Authors: Zien Karen Anne , Buckler Sheldon A. 
Published: October 2003

Do certain common principles guide uncommonly innovative companies down the risk‐riddled road to value creation? Or do successful innovators break boldly through the barriers to new product development along pathways of their own unique making? Karen Anne Zien and Sheldon Buckler discern a strikingly consistent model of how companies craft and sustain cultures in which innovation is nurtured, rewarded, even demanded.An article by the authors in the September 1996 issue of JPIM recounts seminal tales from the cultures of innovation consciously nourished by 12 leading‐edge corporations in the United States, Europe, and Japan. Gathered through an extensive series of interviews with key personnel in the management, technical, manufacturing, and marketing divisions of each firm, the stories revealed seven traits widely shared from one company to the next, irrespective of business focus, geography, or nationality. These traits, as discussed in this article, not only serve to reconcile the culturally contradictory demands of the three critical stages of innovation—the “fuzzy front end,” the product development process, and marketplace operations—but also condition the company as a whole to sustain its innovative capacity over time.The principles at work in highly innovative companies encompass corporate as well as individual attitudes and behaviors. On the one hand, company leaders demonstrate in every decision, action, and communication that innovation propels profitability. So, for the CD project at Sony, the R&D general manager heeded “a voice from above that does not question the possibilities and absolutely believes” in the potential of the enterprise.On the other hand, actively helping individuals create a linkage between their “work life” and longer term “life work” is a crucial step in generating an environment where innovation and high productivity flourish together. Thus, a divisional chief executive at ICI/Imperial Chemicals Industries recognizes the need to “create an environment where people will work at what they are best at doing and what they like doing best.”Although the trail to successful innovation inevitably follows the unique contours of any company's environment, some universal guideposts point the way.
Teamwork Barriers in Japanese High‐Technology Firms: The Sociocultural Differences Between R&D and Marketing Managers
Authors: Song X. Michael , Parry Mark E. 
Published: October 2003

Building and maintaining internal harmony is a fundamental concern for managers in many Japanese firms. Discussions of Japanese management practices often point to the intense socialization of new recruits, the rotation of employees through different functions, and the significant role of seniority in determining salary levels and promotions. Considering this emphasis on harmony, can we reasonably assume that the orientations of Japanese R&D and marketing managers do not differ in any ways that may pose significant barriers to teamwork between their departments?X. Michael Song and Mark E. Parry test this assumption by examining the sociocultural differences between R&D and marketing managers in Japanese high‐technology firms. Using responses from both R&D and marketing managers in 223 firms, their study groups the respondents’ employers as either low‐ or high‐integration firms. They examine the sociocultural differences between the R&D and marketing managers in the study along five dimensions: time orientation, bureaucratic orientation, professional orientation, tolerance for ambiguity, and preferences for high‐risk, high‐return projects.Contrary to expectations, the responses reveal several significant differences between the R&D and marketing managers in this study. Compared to their colleagues in marketing, the Japanese R&D managers in this study generally have a stronger preference for high‐risk, high‐return investments. The R&D managers in the study also have a longer time orientation than the Japanese marketing managers. However, marketing managers from the high‐integration firms in the study have a longer time orientation than their counterparts in low‐integration firms. Compared to the R&D managers, Japanese marketing managers in the high‐integration firms studied have a greater tolerance for ambiguity. And relative to managers in low‐integration firms, marketing and R&D managers in the high‐integration firms in this study typically have a more bureaucratic organization.Perhaps most important, a significant number of R&D managers in this study perceive the marketing managers in their firms to have higher organizational status. Specifically, responses from R&D managers indicate that they perceive their marketing colleagues to have higher salaries, more power, and brighter career prospects. Such perceptions may foster morale problems among R&D professionals in these Japanese firms, and thus require management intervention to ensure that R&D performance does not suffer.
Incapability of Technological Capability: A Case Study on Product Innovation in the Japanese Facsimile Machine Industry
Authors: Kusunoki Ken 
Published: October 2003

Technological leadership in an industry certainly seems like a ticket to ongoing success. However, overemphasis on existing technological capabilities may produce a form of myopia in product development. In other words, by focusing primarily on developing and improving their core technologies, organizations miss opportunities to exploit new technologies and thus create breakthrough products.Ken Kusunoki proposes that problem‐solving approaches in a technologically leading firm paradoxically may impede radical product innovation. Suggesting that such firms are inherently oriented toward incremental innovation, he presents a conceptual framework of the dynamic interaction between technological and product development problem‐solving in the context of product innovation. He then illustrates this conceptual framework by examining a case of radical innovation in the Japanese facsimile industry.For a technological leader, product innovation typically is driven by technology development. In other words, such a firm quite reasonably relies on the technological advantage it holds over competitors as the basis for its product developments. By refining and enhancing its industry‐leading technological capabilities, the firm can successfully introduce incremental innovations in its products. Because of this strong emphasis on exploiting existing technological capabilities, however, the technological leader may fail to capitalize on new technologies that can produce radical innovations.In the race to develop high‐speed, digital facsimile equipment during the early 1970s, for example, Matsushita held a decided technological advantage over competitors such as Ricoh. Notwithstanding Matsushita's technological edge, however, Ricoh brought this radical innovation to market two years before Matsushita introduced its first digital machine, causing a serious decline in Matsushita's market share.Ricoh's approach to technological and product problem‐solving—an autonomous team structure, with a strong project manager and frequent transfers of engineers among interdependent units—contrasts dramatically with Matsushita's functional structure and strong emphasis on technological problem‐solving. Interestingly, Matsushita regained its technological advantage by 1976, thanks to a rapid series of incremental innovations in its product technologies.
The Keisho1 of Development Technology: The Case of the Japanese Aircraft Industry
Authors: Nakayama Takashi 
Published: October 2003

In many respects, development of highly innovative products such as fighter aircraft comes down to a quest for technological superiority. If such products lack best‐in‐class technologies, they face almost certain defeat at the hands of the competition (or, in the case of fighter aircraft, the enemy). In addition to the latest and greatest technologies, however, this type of development effort must draw on the past.Takashi Nakayama explores the role that keisho—or inheritance—of development technology plays in the Japanese aircraft industry. He illustrates the concept of keisho through examples ranging from the projects that culminated in development of the famed Zero fighter aircraft during the 1930s to those that produced the FSX (recently renamed the F‐2) support fighter during the 1990s. Drawing on these historical perspectives, he addresses three key questions regarding keisho. First, why do Japanese manufacturers insist on keisho of development technology, even in the development of the latest aircraft? Second, what does the term development technology mean? And finally, how is keisho of development technology to be carried out? He then presents two models to show how keisho of development technology is carried out under different circumstances.The term development technology refers to the tacit knowledge that each member of the organization brings to a development effort. In other words, development technology comprises fieldwork knowledge, which consists of intuition, experience, and analogy. In essence, development technology represents the insight necessary for understanding the overall circumstances of a project and actively reframing or integrating various technologies to fit the needs of that project.During a development effort, each member of the organization internalizes this tacit knowledge (that is, development technology). By retaining and assigning these people to subsequent developments, an organization carries out the keisho of development technology. In this straight inheritance (optimal) model of keisho, engineers move from a completed project to another large‐scale, next‐generation project, continually using, refining, and enhancing the tacit knowledge shared by all members of the organization. The result is successive generations of new, excellent products. In intermediary inheritance (the minimal requisite keisho model), the core of development technology is inherited through various medium‐scale intermediate projects, rather than directly from one large‐scale project to the next.
Success Through Customer‐Driven New Product Development: A Comparison of U.S. and New Zealand Small Entrepreneurial High Technology Firms
Authors: Souder Wm. E. , Buisson David , Garrett Tony 
Published: October 2003

Although high‐tech, entrepreneurial firms may be small in size, they often play a large role in developing innovative products and thus spurring economic growth. Managers from firms of all sizes may gain useful insights by examining the new‐product development (NPD) practices of these small, technology‐based firms. And in an era of increasingly global competition, those managers can benefit from understanding the NPD practices of firms from various countries.William Souder, David Buisson, and Tony Garrett contribute to that understanding by describing the results of a study that compares the relative NPD proficiency of small, technology‐based firms in the United States and New Zealand. The firms participating in the study (26 from the U.S. and 29 from N.Z.) operate in rapidly growing, highly competitive markets characterized by evolving customer needs. The participating companies share similar goals: creating technically superior products with unique features for emerging markets, with the ultimate goal of becoming the product and market leaders within their respective industries. Despite these similarities, the study reveals several important differences between the U.S. and N.Z. participants.Overall, the N.Z. respondents had higher levels of NPD performance than those of their U.S. counterparts. In particular, the relationship marketing and customer‐focused NPD practices of the N.Z. firms set them apart from the U.S. firms. Top‐level managers from the N.Z. participants report higher levels of satisfaction than their U.S. counterparts with the results of their NPD efforts.The results of the study indicate that repondents from the two countries differ in terms of the focus of their NPD mangement systems and the manner in which they strive to achieve success. For the U.S. firms in the study, their NPD management systems focus on the characteristics of the project manager. The N.Z. respondents place greater emphasis on marketing skills and NPD proficiencies. The results suggest that the higher levels of NPD performance acheived by the N.Z. firms in the study arise from greater insights into their users' needs, together with better capabilities for acting on those insights.
Adoption of New Products by the Sales Force: The Construct, Research Propositions, and Managerial Implications
Authors: Atuahene‐Gima Kwaku 
Published: October 2003

Some firms take salesforce commitment to any new product as a given, seemingly adopting the attitude, “If we build it, they will sell.” However, management has no guarantee of salesforce commitment to a new product. For various reasons, salespeople may fail to sell a new product, or they may engage in dysfunctional behavior during the selling process—for example, misrepresenting the product's benefits to gain short‐term sales. Ensuring salesforce adoption of a new product requires careful consideration of the characteristics of the product, the competitive environment, the firm, and the members of the salesforce. In other words, managers who hope to engender support for a new product would do well to view the salespeople as a first line of customers.Successfully launching a new product to the company's salesforce requires the same high levels of creativity, energy, and managerial insight as does the product's launch into the marketplace. Consequently, managers and researchers need to examine more closely the factors underlying the successful launch of a new product to a firm's salesforce. As a first stop toward gaining greater insight into those factors, Kwaku Atuahene‐Gima develops a model for exploring the characteristics that affect new‐product adoption by the salesforce.His model suggests that a salesperson's commitment to a new product depends, to a large extent, on the salesperson's learning style, performance orientation, and problem‐solving style. For example, he proposes that, compared to their colleagues with systematic problem‐solving styles, salespeople with intuitive problem‐solving styles are more likely to adopt a new product and are less likely to engage in dysfunctional behavior in the selling process.The model also suggests that the salesforce's perceptions of the firm's commitment to new products, tolerance for failure, and attitude toward intradepartmental conflict during the product development process play key roles in determining whether the salesforce will take an active, positive approach to selling the new product. For example, a firm that views occasional failures as opportunities for learning and growth offers an environment in which salespeople can accept the risks that selling a new product entails. The proposed model also takes into account the moderating effects of the product's innovativeness, the intensity of market competition, and the type of sales control systems that the firm uses.
Evaluating Customer Support During New Product Development—An Exploratory Study
Authors: Goffin Keith 
Published: October 2003

Anyone who has struggled with a balky computer understands the importance of product support. Useful support for a high‐tech product may take various forms, including installation, documentation, field service, user training, and product upgrades. All these forms of support share a common goal: achieving customer satisfaction with the product. To increase the likelihood of customer satisfaction with a high‐tech product, a firm must carefully consider the product's support requirements during the design stage of the new‐product development (NPD) effort.As Keith Goffin points out, however, relatively little research has been published about the manner in which product design influences product support. He suggests that firms may benefit from considering product support requirements during the design stage, in much the same way as design for manufacturability (DFM) techniques enable firms to increase ease of manufacture. In a survey of high‐tech firms, he explores the ways in which companies evaluate product support requirements during the design stage. The study also examines whether firms use quantitative goals to focus the design team's attention on a product's support needs. To provide deeper understanding of the interrelationship between support requirements and product design, he also presents a case study involving Hewlett‐Packard's development of a complex medical device.With responses from 66 companies, the survey offers the first empirical data on how companies plan for product support. Whereas DFM techniques involve consideration of manufacturability during the early stages of design, more than two‐thirds of the companies in the study begin planning for support during the second half of the product development process. Only slightly more than one‐half of the respondents report the use of a formal product support plan, although use of this type of document is more prevalent among the computer firms in the study.The companies in this study do not consider all aspects of support during product planning. The respondents also do not set quantitative goals for all aspects of support during the design stage. They typically set quantitative goals for service‐related aspects of support—for example, product reliability targets such as annual failure rate—rather than for such support areas as user training. The survey responses identify a range of measures which could be used for performing a more comprehensive evaluation of support requirements during the design stage.
Towards Holistic “Front Ends” In New Product Development
Authors: Khurana Anil , Rosenthal Stephen R. 
Published: October 2003

Any firm that hopes to compete on the basis of innovation clearly must be proficient in all phases of the new‐product development (NPD) process. However, the real keys to success can be found in the activities that occur before management makes the go/no‐go decision for any NPD project. In other words, the most significant benefits can be achieved through improvements in the performance of the front‐end activities—product strategy formulation and communication, opportunity identification and assessment, idea generation, product definition, project planning, and executive reviews.Noting the inherent difficulty of managing the front end, Anil Khurana and Stephen R. Rosenthal discuss findings from in‐depth case studies of the front‐end practices in 18 business units from 12 U.S. and Japanese companies. They offer a process view of the activities that the front end comprises, and they discuss the insights that their case studies provide regarding key success factors for managing the front‐end activities. The case studies involved companies in industries ranging from consumer packaged goods to electronics and industrial products.Foremost among the insights provided by the case studies is the notion that the greatest success comes to organizations that take a holistic approach to the front end. A successful approach to the front end effectively links business strategy, product strategy, and product‐specific decisions. Forging these links requires a process that integrates such elements as product strategy, development portfolio, concept development, overall business justification, resource planning, core team roles, executive reviews, and decision mechanisms.The case studies suggest that firms employ two general approaches for achieving these links. Some companies rely on a formal process to lend some order and predictability to the front end. Other companies strive to foster a company‐wide culture in which the key participants in front‐end activities always remain focused on the following considerations: business vision, technical feasibility, customer focus, schedule, resources, and coordination. This cultural approach is more prevalent among the Japanese firms in the study; the U.S. firms tend to rely on formality of the front‐end process. The case studies also suggest that the front‐end approach must be compatible with the firm's product, market, and organizational contexts. For example, standardized approaches seem to work best for incremental innovations.