bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Moral Relativism
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines various definitions of moral relativism, first discussing the views of Charles Stevenson and Walter Stace and suggesting that neither of these two authors deals with the most troubling form that relativism can take. The important question is whether societies with widely differing moral codes may ultimately simply face each other without there being any common standard to which both must answer. Bernard Williams has argued in favour of the possibility of this ultimate confrontation and so supports a radical form of moral relativism. Foot, however, challenges it, suggesting that the use of the concept of morality brings with it the relevance of more or less determinate considerations of human goods and evils. During the discussion of Stace's views, there is also consideration of the important relativistic idea that rightness and wrongness is relative to each person's conscience. This too is denied, in agreement with Aquinas’ argument that even an erring conscience binds but cannot excuse. It is always wrong to go against one's conscience, but when conscience errs, it may also be wrong to do what one thinks one should do.
Killing and Letting Die
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers the moral relevance of a distinction between killing and letting die, which distinction is sometimes morally critical, as shown in the difference between killing one to save five and leaving one to die while rescuing them (here labelled Rescue I and Rescue II.) A more basic distinction is, she thinks, between initiating a harmful sequence of events and not interfering to prevent it. The latter is sometimes permissible where the former would not be, because in general we have a stronger right not to be interfered with than positively to be helped.
Von Wright on Virtue
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines and criticizes von Wright's attempt to distinguish virtues from skills, and to shape (as he thinks desirable) a new concept of a virtue. She points out that it will not help to connect skills particularly with activities as opposed to ends, and again that a concept of the virtues that links each virtue to the overcoming of a particular passion, as Von Wright suggests, excludes justice from the list. He also seems to err in ignoring Aristotle and Aquinas’ crucial insistence on the fact that skills differ from virtues in that it is possible to possess a skill but deliberately fail to exercise it, whereas a virtue necessarily ‘gives its use.’
Locke, Hume, and Modern Moral Theory:
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Analyses in detail the accounts given respectively by Locke and by Hume of the mental factors such as pleasure, pain, uneasiness, and desire, which they see as causing all human actions. Foot argues that this enterprise was misconceived. Philosophers should no more try to describe a mechanism underlying acting on a reason (as e.g. a prudential or moral reason) than a mechanism underlying believing on a reason. Practical and theoretical reasoning are here on a par, the first issuing in action and the second in belief.
Nietzsche's Immoralism
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An in‐depth assessment of Nietzsche's attack on morality. Foot takes up the challenge by asking the fundamental question, ‘Can morality be discredited?’ Historically, Anglo‐American analytic philosophy has overlooked the significance of Nietzsche's views on morality by dismissing or ignoring his arguments. The central thrust of Nietzsche's attack is, according to Foot, that no kinds of action are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ in themselves, whoever does them. This Nietzschean idea, Foot contends, puts us in a dangerous position. It cannot give a proper account of injustice and therefore seems tacitly to license it. By examining the central thesis of Nietzsche's immoralism and elucidating many of his key ideas, e.g. ‘the will to power’, ‘master–slave morality’ and the ‘overman’ (superman), Foot argues that although Nietzsche's immoralism should be given serious consideration, the emphatic conclusion is that, in the last analysis, no part of his attack on morality is convincing.
Rationality and Virtue
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers the age‐old problem of the rationality of obeying the precepts of justice even when this conflicts with self‐interest and desire. If this is irrational action, how can it be good action? And if not good action, how can it be an action required by the virtue of justice? Was Thrasymachus in Plato's Republic right to argue that justice is not a virtue? Foot suggests that we should ‘turn this problem on its head’ starting from an argument that shows the connection between justice and human goodness and insisting that an account of practical rationality in terms of individual desire and self‐interest is therefore shown to be deficient. In the course of the argument, Foot outlines the theory of human goodness that is to be central in her book Natural Goodness.
Moral Dilemmas Revisited
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay is a continuation of one Foot had written ten years earlier under the title ‘Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma’. Foot attacks Ruth Marcus’ notion that some moral dilemmas involve circumstances in which one is guilty whatever one does: being ‘damned if one does something and damned if one doesn’t’. Foot's opposition to Marcus’ thesis rests on the argument that the guilty feelings one may experience when coping with some serious moral dilemma do not imply that one is indeed guilty. She expands this argument in order to attack Bernard Williams’ thesis that such feelings of guilt show that there are cases of ‘inescapable wrongness’. Re‐thinking the nature of moral dilemmas, Foot denies the existence of cases that involve inevitable wrongdoing.
Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Foot examines the moral theory known as ‘non‐cognitivism’ (a form of subjectivism). Her central thesis is that all non‐cognitivist moral theories are based on the same serious mistake. This mistake is traced to a distinction taken for granted by non‐cognitivist moral philosophers such as A. J. Ayer (an emotivist) and R. M. Hare (a prescriptivist). Such philosophers wrongly believed that there is a logical gap between ‘descriptive language’ (which states facts) and ‘evaluative language’ (which expresses evaluations). Foot argues that this supposed gap between facts and values, which crucially gives a logical gap between a moral judgement and its grounds, is a chimera.
Introduction
Authors: Wedin Michael V. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWedin's main point in this book is that the question of Metaphysics Zeta, ‘what is substance?’, should be understood as the question, ‘what is the substance of c‐substances?’. In other words, in virtue of what are the substances of the Categories the sort of things they are—in virtue of what do they have the central, salient features mentioned but not explained in the Categories? Aristotle's answer is that it is in virtue of a structural component of the c‐substance—the form: form, then, is primary substance, but this primacy is explanatory and not ontological. Thus, in Zeta, c‐substances are subjected to hylomorphic analysis, i.e. in terms of form and matter, two entities that are not even mentioned in the Categories: for Wedin this shows that Aristotle in the Categories has no interest in the structure of primary substances, because it is irrelevant to the purpose of the treatise. Hence, the treatises are complementary because ontological primacy is given to c‐substances, and explanatory primacy to their forms.
Commitment and Configuration in the Categories
Authors: Wedin Michael V. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWedin considers the relation between the ontological commitment in the Categories and the semantical theory of underlying ontological configurations for standard categorical statements. According to Wedin, Aristotle's fourfold division of beings, which divides things according to whether they are, or are not, said of, and/or present in a subject, is a meta‐ontology that is concerned with beings per se, i.e. the fundamental things that are. Wedin explains that the primacy of c‐substance involves an asymmetry in the relation between c‐substance and everything else, or between the substantial and the nonsubstantial. This is because there is an ontological dependence of non‐substances, and also of secondary substances, on substances: everything is either said of, or in, primary substance. The argument of this chapter, then, is that the world of the Categories is a world of individuals: all ontological relations needed for semantics can be accommodated by appeal to individuals only.
Tales of the Two Treatises
Authors: Wedin Michael V. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWedin considers the problem of the compatibility of the Categories account of primary substance with the theory of substantial form of the Metaphysics. Wedin collects from the secondary literature the most important arguments for incompatibilism, and offers some proposals for restoring their harmony. While admitting the evident differences in the way Aristotle treats the question of substance in each treatise, Wedin is keen to argue that these differences are not sufficient to conclude that the treatises are incompatible. Wedin singles out for particular attention, and criticism, Michael Frede and Gunther Patzig's account of Metaphysics Zeta, according to which the primary substance of the Metaphysics and the basic subject of predications is the form. Wedin considers two ‘philosophical’ arguments and one ‘Aristotelian’ argument for the subjecthood of forms, and argues that the textual evidence does not support the claim that form is the subject of accidents.
The Structure and Substance of Substance
Authors: Wedin Michael V. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn the Metaphysics, Aristotle often says that ‘form is substance’: in this chapter, Wedin argues that ‘substance’ in this context means the ‘substance‐of’ c‐substances. Wedin begins by examining Aristotle's use, and retention, of the framework of the Categories in Metaphysics Zeta (Z.1), before turning to discuss Z.3, which is crucial to understanding the relation between the Categories and Metaphysics theories of substance, because it is usually thought that here Aristotle departs from the substance of the Categories. Wedin denies that Z.3 involves a rejection of the Categories subjecthood criterion for primary substance: Aristotle rejects only the claim that one thing is the substance of another simply if it is the primary underlying subject of the other. Wedin argues that in Z.3 Aristotle introduces the idea of the ‘substance‐of’ a thing, and identifies as candidates for the substance of c‐substances the internal structural components form, matter, and the compound of form and matter.
Form as Essence
Authors: Wedin Michael V. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWedin argues that Aristotle makes form the substance of c‐substances because it is the essence of the c‐substance. Much of this chapter consists of a careful examination of a passage in Metaphysics Zeta 4, which Wedin calls the ‘New Primacy Passage’ (Z.4, 1030a2–17), that is crucial to Wedin's overall thesis, because here Aristotle appeals to a notion of definitional primacy, as opposed to the ontological primacy of the Categories. Z.4 focuses on this claim that form must be essence: Wedin argues that essence is a certain kind of form, a form of a genus (genous eidos); this does not mean ‘species’, as some commentators have thought. This is because the species is a combination of form and matter, whereas the genous eidos, Wedin argues, is the formal part only (i.e. the differentiae) of the definition that applies to the thing. On Wedin's account, Aristotle introduces the notion of explanatory primacy of form in Z.4.
The Purification of Form
Authors: Wedin Michael V. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractChapters 10 and 11 are critical to the argument of Metaphysics Zeta: these chapters are concerned with the purification of form. Z.10 introduces the apparatus of part and whole and consists of an argument to the end that form and its parts have priority over the other internal structural components of c‐substances, i.e. matter and the compound of form and matter; while in Z.11 Aristotle argues that form and its parts cannot involve any admixture of matter. Wedin argues that the causal role of form presupposes its purity: if form is to explain why a certain portion of matter constitutes a c‐substance of a given kind, then matter—whether this latter is understood as functional, or remnant matter—cannot already be contained in the form. This is the ‘purity thesis’, as Wedin calls it: matter cannot be included in the definitions of natural organisms, Wedin points out, because that would make the explanandum a part of the principle that explains it. Wedin also argues that form must be sufficiently complex to provide definitions of the natures of particular compounds, which are complex, even though form itself is a kind of universal.
The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment
Authors: Dalton Russell J. , McAllister Ian , Wattenberg Martin P. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Assembles cross‐national data to demonstrate the behavioural consequences of partisan dealignment. Without the reinforcement of habitual party ties, more voters are waiting longer to decide for whom they will vote, and in the countries where ticket splitting is possible, more are dividing their party choices. Candidate‐centred politics appears to be on the rise, although this is much more pronounced in presidential than parliamentary systems, and signifying the different style of dealignment politics, participation in campaigns and volunteer work for political parties is decreasing. In short, partisan dealignment is transforming the relationship between some voters and political parties—a relationship that was once seen as an essential element in the process of representative government.
The Decline of Party Mobilization
Authors: Wattenberg Martin P. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPresents evidence that political parties are no longer performing their function of electoral mobilization as effectively as in the past. For instance, in 18 out of the 20 countries examined, recent turnout has been lower than those of the early 1950s. Party systems that are notoriously weak have seen the most pronounced drops in electoral participation, while the presence of strong parties appears to have dampened the decline of turnout. While mass attitudes may shift gradually over time, it takes a major shock to impact a habitual behaviour like participation in elections. Recent shake‐ups in the party systems of the OECD democracies may have provided the necessary jolt to send turnout plummeting.
Parties Without Members?
Authors: Scarrow Susan E. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines how parties have fared as membership organizations over the past half century. The most comprehensive series of party‐reported membership and survey data for the OECD nations finds that party membership rolls generally had decreased by the end of the 1990s. The chapter concludes by investigating the extent to which membership declines have diminished the organizational capacity of local parties and with a warning against overstating either the rise or obsolescence of membership‐based party organizing. It is true that membership parties are not what they once were, but it is also the case that strong membership parties were never as widespread as some accounts suggest.
Parties in Legislatures
Authors: Bowler Shaun 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Assesses the degree to which parties still structure the legislative process. Party cohesion and party dominance within legislatures has usually been grounded in one of two explanations. One explanation sees legislative party discipline as a feature of the importance of party organization in fighting elections, which carries through to the legislative chamber itself, while a second explanation sees party discipline as a product of incentives facing individual legislators inside the legislative arena. The first argument would predict that party discipline inside the legislature should begin to falter because of the changes described in the previous chapters of this book. The second argument would predict that very little change should be seen and, further, that formal rules inside legislatures should underpin the importance of parties. In examining a range of behavioural data, such as roll‐call voting and internal Rules of Procedure, there is little evidence to support the view that party discipline has weakened or that parties are less important today in determining legislative outcomes. Changes in electoral behaviour, then, are not reflected in changes in the importance of parties inside legislatures where parties remain dominant actors.
Parties at the Core of Government
Authors: Strøm Kaare 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines whether the behaviour of parties in cabinet formation and in control of the executive branch have changed over time. The evidence indicates that parties remain entrenched in the core of the executives studied, but party control seems to wane the further we move from this institution. The chapter concludes by examining the implications such changes have on the primacy of parties in government, arguing that among the several alternatives to representative democracy, pluralist democracy seems to be the most likely alternative to party government.
From Platform Declarations to Policy Outcomes
Authors: Caul Miki L. , Gray Mark M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines whether the role of parties in policy‐making has changed substantially since the 1950s. The chapter uses data from the Comparative Manifestos Project and aggregate policy measures to assess long‐term trends in parties’ policy positions, and governing parties’ impacts on policy outcomes for 15 advanced industrial democracies. The chapter first analyses how the parties’ policy profiles have changed over time. Second, it examines whether parties are becoming increasingly flexible in terms of the issues they emphasize, moving from a strategy of selling a consistent package of policies toward marketing an increasingly volatile variety of issues. Third, it analyses changes in the degree of partisan impact on policy outputs, concluding that despite a pattern of ideological convergence, there is less evidence that the policy impact of parties has eroded over time.
Candidate Evaluations and Presidential Electoral Choices in France
Authors: Pierce Roy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There have been only six French presidential elections between 1965 and 1995, but there has been considerable variation between these in the extent to which the candidates’ leadership attributes might have contributed to voter choice and electoral outcomes, and during the same period there has been an unusual degree of constancy in the nature and strength of the underlying social and political forces. The theme of this chapter is the collision between these two forces (transient candidate qualities and long–term electoral forces), but before this analysis is made, a brief account is given of how presidential elections are conducted in France. The main part of the chapter is an analysis of the six elections between 1965 and 1995: the 1965 de Gaulle election; the 1969 election won by Pompidou; the 1974 election won by Giscard d’Estaing; the 1981 and 1988 elections won by Mitterrand; and the 1995 election won by Chirac. Constraints on personal candidate appeal are then discussed, before presenting a further analysis of the 1988 election. The study focuses on the extent to which the traditional left–right dimension has affected the electorate’s behaviour and electoral outcome, and whether there were elections in which one candidate had a clear advantage over the other in terms of personal popularity or leadership attributes; the objective was to determine whether the left–right factor was weaker at elections where personal qualities were presumed stronger, and this hypothesis received some support from the analysis presented.
The Challenges of Globalization and Europeanization: The Impact on National Autonomy and Control
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWhile globalization has been a major economic, institutional, and ideational force for change, Europeanization has been an even more significant force for European Union member‐states, both as a conduit for global forces and as a shield against them. But however much sovereignty has been undermined by globalization and Europeanization, the resulting losses in national autonomy and control are largely offset by gains in shared supranational authority and control. This chapter considers the changing relations of power and influence between national and supranational authorities as it examines the debates on globalization with regard to the internationalization of financial markets and trade, the ‘statelessness’ of multinationals, and their spillover effects on the welfare state. It then contrasts the impact of globalization with the greater impact of Europeanization on European member‐states while discussing European monetary and market integration and their effects on the welfare state.
Still Three Models of Capitalism? The Impact of Changing Policies and Growing Pressures on Economic Practices
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter adds to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature by demonstrating that economic practices of countries are not converging on a one‐size‐fits‐all neo‐liberal model of capitalism, despite the fact that all have become more market‐oriented. Instead, they continue to be differentiable into not just two varieties of capitalism, conforming to liberal or coordinated market economies, but three, along lines of development from the original three postwar models of capitalism. The chapter contrasts the three varieties of capitalism in terms of interfirm relations, business‐government relations, and management‐labour relations; outlines the differential national pathways of adjustment of the countries conforming to the three varieties; highlights their continuing differences using indicators related to the financial markets and production systems; and considers their comparative advantages and disadvantages. It concludes that while British market capitalism has gone farther in its traditional market‐oriented direction, German managed capitalism is under strain, while French state capitalism has been transformed but has become neither market nor managed capitalist.
The Dynamics of Adjustment in Economic Practices in Britain, Germany, and France
Authors: Schmidt Vivien A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter details the different dynamics of economic adjustment in Britain, Germany, and France from the postwar period until today. For Britain, it describes the problems of business in the postwar period and the impact of the radical therapy of the Thatcher years that brought the country closer to the market capitalist ideal by making business relations more distant, government relations more arm's length, and labour relations more market‐reliant. For Germany, it outlines the minimal change from the postwar period until the 1990s, followed by efforts to make the managed capitalist system more competitive, which have left the system under strain, as interfirm relations have loosened, labour‐management relations have become less cooperative, and government has sought to facilitate adjustment, often unsuccessfully. For France, finally, the chapter examines the major transformation in state capitalism since the mid‐1980s with the move away from state‐led capitalism to a more state‐enhanced variety, where business is more autonomous and labour more market‐reliant, but the state still has a role to play.