bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Mergers, Acquisitions, and Inter‐Firm Technology Agreements in the Global Learning Economy
Authors: Mytelka Lynn K. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Assesses the contribution of international interfirm technology agreements to enterprise learning and innovation by situating these agreements in the broader context of changes in the structure of industry on a global scale and of competition within it. The first section presents a taxonomy that distinguishes traditional forms of one‐way interfirm agreements from two‐way collaborative partnerships in research and development (R&D), production, and distribution, and illustrates the way in which the latter have contributed to joint knowledge production and sharing in industries as diverse as information technology, biopharmaceuticals, and automobiles. The second section explores in greater depth the role that R&D‐consortia play in strengthening the potential for innovation, particularly in small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises, and in industries undergoing a process of catch‐up; as firms encounter each other across multiple technology partnerships, opportunities for learning each other's strategies also increase and so, too, do the incentives for collusion. The third section draws a distinction between the static barriers to entry that result from mergers and acquisitions and traditional forms of oligopoly, and the dynamic entry barriers that are made possible through the emergence of knowledge‐based networked oligopolies on a global scale. These, the last section argues, have the potential to become powerful selection mechanisms that create differential access to learning across firms and geographical space.
The Learning Economy and International Inequality
Authors: Freeman Chris 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter argues that the phenomenon of international equality and the related problem of inequality within countries may best be understood in the light of a systematic theory of technical change and long cycles in economic growth. The first section briefly introduces the theme of widening gaps between rich and poor countries, and the next discusses the analogous problem of widening gaps in the distribution of income within countries. The third section links these problems of inequality to long‐term changes in technology and to the problems of ‘catch‐up’ by countries that have fallen behind. The fourth section relates this discussion to contemporary problems of catch‐up in information and communication technology (ICT). The final section presents conclusions and points to some important differences between the international and national dimensions of inequality.
Innovation Policy in the Knowledge‐based Economy—Can Theory Guide Policy Making?
Authors: Nyholm Jens , Normann Lars , Frelle‐Petersen Claus , Riis Mark , Torstensen Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter discusses features of the evolving knowledge‐based economy as perceived from a European policy maker's perspective, and confronts these features with two different economic research traditions: mainstream economic theory (including neoclassical and new growth theories) and evolutionary economics (in particular, the ‘national innovation system’ approach). The discussion shows that mainstream economic theory is more concerned with issues of allocation and market clearing than with the complexity of innovation processes and business dynamics. As a consequence, the resulting ‘market failure’ approach to business and innovation policy has led to policies that seem to be misguided in the light of features that characterize the knowledge‐based economy. Evolutionary theory is more successful in capturing the characteristics of the innovation process, and of the factors leading to failures and successes in the current complex competitive environment, although the policy recommendations remain somewhat too abstract and general to provide policy makers with a clear sense of direction. The authors see the solution in the expansion into new areas of research and in new cooperative patterns of interaction between social scientists and policy makers; the Danish LOK (Management, Organization, and Competencies) initiative is presented as an example of such a new type of interaction.
A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConditionals are of two basic kinds, often called ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’. This book expounds and evaluates the main literature about each kind. It eventually defends the view of Adams and Edgington that indicatives are devices for expressing subjective probabilities, and the view of Stalnaker and Lewis that subjunctives are statements about close possible worlds. But it also discusses other views, e.g. that indicatives are really material conditionals, and Goodman's approach to subjunctives.
Introduction
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Gives an inconclusive discussion of how to define ‘conditional’. Conditionals fall into two groups (here reluctantly labelled ‘indicative’ and ‘subjunctive’), though there is dispute over just where the line falls (relocation thesis). ‘Independent’ conditionals, in which the relation between antecedent and consequent does not depend on any unstated matter of particular fact, are identified and set aside as uninteresting.
The Equation
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe Ramsey test for indicative conditionals suggests that they are to be understood in terms of subjective probability. This concept is explained, and elements of probability logic expounded. Indicative conditionals are mostly zero intolerant, meaning that such a conditional is useless to someone who is really sure that its antecedent is false. The Equation is introduced: i.e. the thesis that your probability for ‘If A, C’ (indicative) is your conditional probability for C given A.
The Subjectivity of Indicative Conditionals
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscussion of reasons for approaching indicative conditionals in terms of subjective rather than objective probability. The reasons include stand‐offs of the sort Gibbard has presented: cases where two right‐thinking people with partial information accept conflicting conditionals. Discussion and rejection of the view that subjectivity comes in because in asserting an indicative conditional one says that one has such and such a probability for the consequent given the antecedent. What remains, and seems to be right, is the view that in asserting such a conditional one is expressing a conditional probability without asserting anything.
The Logic of Indicative Conditionals
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExpounds, mainly on the basis of Adams's work, the logic of indicative conditionals—with some help from his adaptation of Venn diagrams. Failure for indicatives of or‐to‐if, contraposition, transitivity, and antecedent strengthening. Controversy over whether modus ponens holds for indicatives. Independent indicatives identified and snubbed.
Subjunctive Conditionals—First Steps
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExtreme realism (Lewis), and abstract realism, about worlds. Introducing an approach to subjunctive conditionals through possible worlds; use of this to explain the failure of transitivity and antecedent strengthening. The notion of variably strict conditionals is explained, and the logical likeness of subjunctives to indicatives is explained. Discussion of subjunctive with disjunctive antecedents.
Unrolling from the Antecedent Time
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Defends the view that for the evaluation of a subjunctive conditional, the closeness of an antecedent world depends upon how much it resembles the actual world up to the time of the antecedent. Conditional excluded middle for subjunctives is discussed, and rejected because closest antecedent worlds may be objectively indeterministic, in which case each of the opposing conditionals may be false.
Reflections on Legality
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe primacy of causal laws in subjunctive conditionals is explained. Discussion of miracles at forks, and of counter‐legal conditionals: ones about what would have been the case if some actual causal law had been false. Subjunctives are ‘impossibility‐intolerant’; comparison of this with the zero intolerance of indicatives.
Backward Subjunctive Conditionals
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractCriticism of a popular argument for refusing to allow backward subjunctives conditionals, i.e. ones whose consequent pertains to a time earlier than that of the antecedent; and of accounts of such conditionals by Jackson and Davis. A tenable account of them is found to be nested within Lewis's analysis of forward subjunctives. Discussion of related issues concerning Lewis's notion of counterparts and of non‐historical conditionals (’If it were a ruby, it would be red’).
From an Ontological Point of View
Authors: Heil John 
Published: October 2003

AbstractImplicit in much contemporary philosophy is a Picture Theory of language according to which we can ‘read off’ features of the world from features of our ways of talking about the world. Predicates applying truthfully to objects, for instance, are taken to name properties of those objects possessed by every object to which the predicates apply. Such a principle might be thought to follow from a more general ‘truth‐making’ requirement (truths require truth‐makers) together with the idea that truth‐makers entail truths. I argue that truth‐making is not entailment and that the Picture Theory should be jettisoned and replaced by an attitude of ontological seriousness. Freed of constraints imposed by the Picture Theory, we are in a position to see our way through metaphysical difficulties associated with contemporary philosophy of mind. Following Locke (and C. B. Martin), I endorse a conception of properties as modes (or tropes): ways particular objects are. Modes are simultaneously qualities and powers: powerful qualities. Application of this thesis to familiar issues in the philosophy of mind yields surprising results.
Predicates and Properties
Authors: Heil John 
Published: October 2003

AbstractRealists take truth seriously, but what does realism require? Misguided commitment to a certain principle, (Φ), has led philosophers down the garden path. According to (Φ) predicates applying truly to objects do so by virtue of naming properties possessed by those objects and by every object to which they would apply. I provide reasons to reject (Φ) and thus to forego the hierarchical worldview (Φ) apparently implies.
Philosophical Analysis
Authors: Heil John 
Published: October 2003

AbstractOnly philosophers beguiled by the Picture Theory could imagine that we are in a position to discover deep truths about the world by analysing language. Absolutists hold that, for stretches of discourse concerning which we are ‘realists’, terms line up with mind‐independent objects and properties, or are analysable into terms that so line up; eliminativists, noting that such alignment is hard to come by, deny that the terms refer; relativists are suspicious of mind‐independence. I recommend a realism shorn of the Picture Theory.
The Identity Theory
Authors: Heil John 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIntrinsic properties of concrete objects are simultaneously dispositional and qualitative: properties are powerful qualities. This ‘surprising identity’ can be motivated by considering liabilities of the alternatives: properties as pure powers, as pure qualities, as both pure powers and pure qualities, and as contingently empowered qualities. Identity suggests itself when ‘higher‐level’ powers are relocated in ‘lower‐level’ realizers.
Intentionality
Authors: Heil John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Dispositions ground the of‐ness and about‐ness of thought. What a thought is about can depend on the world, but a thought's trajectory is internally fixed. ‘Swampman’ is exhibited as a counter‐example to radically externalist accounts of intentionality and Kripke's Wittgenstein's attack on dispositions as bases for rules is defused.
Calvinism and Jonathan Edwards
Authors: Kuklick Bruce 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the eighteenth century, ministers dominated New England intellectual life, and their reflections on Calvinist theology reached a high point in the work of Jonathan Edwards. Edwards's earliest writings brought together John Locke and Isaac Newton in a defence of a religious metaphysics. Later, after a career as a practicing clergyman who led the ‘Great Awakening’, Edwards developed a Calvinist theology founded on the covenant of grace whose centre was the experience of an omnipotent God. His views were most significantly spelt out in Religious Affections (1746) and Freedom of the Will (1754).
Collegiate Philosophy, 1800–1868
Authors: Kuklick Bruce 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
For most of the nineteenth century, the study of theology dominated philosophy in American colleges. But collegiate philosophy did begin the process of professionalization, and had an enormous social impact in its elaboration of the moral sciences, a mixture of social science taught from an explicitly normative point of view, grounded in Christianity. The college philosophers, including Francis Bowen at Harvard, Noah Porter at Yale, and James McCosh at Princeton, also purveyed a version of Scottish Realism, which gave ground to German idealism as the century wore on.
The Consensus on Idealism, 1870–1900
Authors: Kuklick Bruce 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the new university system of the late nineteenth century, there was a consensus on idealism as the most effective response to the challenge of Charles Darwin. Nine older thinkers typified philosophy in the young American university: Borden Parker Bowne; J.E. Creighton, G.S. Fullerton, George Holmes Howison, George Ladd, G. S. Morris, Elisha Mulford, James Seth, and Jacob Gould Sherman. Two younger scholars, Josiah Royce and John Dewey, trained in the leading doctoral programme in the US at Johns Hopkins absorbed these conventional ideas.
Pragmatism at Harvard, 1878 –1913
Authors: Kuklick Bruce 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Although Charles Peirce never secured an appointment at Harvard, in 1872 his friend William James did, and made the institution known for a peculiar variant of pragmatism. James gathered around him a talented group of colleagues, including the leading proponent of idealism, Josiah Royce, and together they made Harvard central to the study of metaphysics, epistemology, and logic. The institution would remain the leading place to study professional philosophy until late in the twentieth century.
Instrumentalism in Chicago and New York, 1903–1934
Authors: Kuklick Bruce 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Another variant of pragmatism, instrumentalism, flourished under the auspices of John Dewey at the University of Chicago in the 1890s. Instrumentalism was less interested than pragmatism in saving religion and more committed to intervention in social life and politics. When Dewey moved to Columbia University in New York City in 1904, he soon commanded intellectual leadership for philosophy in that city and its many institutions of learning and culture. After his retirement in 1929, Columbia ‘Naturalists’ carried on his work and were leading secular liberals in the wider intellectual world.
Professional Realism, 1912–1956
Authors: Kuklick Bruce 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Of equal importance as the development of pragmatism and instrumentalism, although more narrowly and professionally focused, was the development of realism, a view that argued for the independent existence of the material world in space and time. This movement began in the first decade of the twentieth century led by Harvard's neo‐realist, Ralph Perry. It continued with the more significant Critical Realists of the second decade of the century—George Santayana, Arthur Lovejoy, and Roy Wood Sellars. C.I. Lewis, the most important inter‐war philosopher and another Harvard professor, known for his conceptual pragmatism, also embraced realistic ideas. In the second half of the century, Wilfrid Sellars influentially defended this point of view.
Europe's Impact on the United States, 1928–1964
Authors: Kuklick Bruce 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the inter‐war period and after, three movements of European thought were influential in the US because of the Nazi‐triggered exodus of intellectuals. The most important was that of European positivists, led by Rudolph Carnap. The Marxists of the Frankfurt School had less of an impact in America, except for Herbert Marcuse, who remained in the country. Varieties of existentialism finally reached the US after World War II, although individual thinkers did not permanently migrate. The conflict between positivism and existentialism was to have serious consequences for professional philosophy.
Harvard and Oxford, 1946–1975
Authors: Kuklick Bruce 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
From the end of World War II until the 1970s, professional philosophy was dominated by a form of speculation called ‘analytic philosophy’. This school of thought brought together the philosophical analysis dominant in England and certain aspects of the pragmatism institutionalized at Harvard. Harvard and Oxford University became the dominant, interacting centres of English‐speaking philosophy, and a unique form of analytic philosophy, pragmatic analysis, evolved at Harvard, focusing on the work of Nelson Goodman and Willard Quine.
The Tribulations of Professional Philosophy, 1962–1999
Authors: Kuklick Bruce 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
At the end of the twentieth century, professional philosophy fragmented and lost its hold on the educated public in the US. Analytic philosophy split into many competing groups, while a group of ‘pluralists’ denounced analytic philosophy itself, and many thinkers outside the discipline of philosophy proclaimed themselves as philosophical theorists. In this climate, two thinkers were universally regarded as important, Thomas Kuhn and Richard Rorty.
Descartes's Theory of Mind
Authors: Clarke Desmond 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Descartes argues that no explanation of any phenomenon may assume or merely re‐describe what needs to be explained. He cannot, therefore, propose substance dualism as a theory of mind. To explain mental activities such as sensation, memory, or imagination, one must hypothesize how they result from interaction between the environment, the senses, and the processing of the brain. Descartes initiated such a naturalized account. However, given the state of neurology in the seventeenth century, his efforts were doomed. The failure to construct a scientific theory that bridges the theoretical gap between mental events and matter (as understood by Descartes) results, by default, in a property dualism that marks the limits of his scientific efforts.
Sensation: Ideas as Brain Patterns
Authors: Clarke Desmond M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Cartesian explanation of sensation includes a speculative account of how external and internal phenomena transmit information to the brain by triggering flows of animal spirits from the pineal gland. The distinctive patterns in the flow of spirits are called ‘ideas’. There is no reason to think that ideas resemble the realities that cause them. All animals have sensations in this sense, and exhibit corresponding behaviour.
Imagination and Memory
Authors: Clarke Desmond M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Descartes explains memory and imagination, as ideas, by patterns in the flow of animal spirits through the brain that are caused by traces of former sensations (memory) or by other bodily conditions that are more active when we sleep or daydream. Despite the contrast with intuition, imagination constructs reliable images of perceptual phenomena, by synthesizing incoming signals from different senses.
The Will as a Power of Self‐Determination
Authors: Clarke Desmond M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Since all events are caused, an action is said to be free if it is caused by a determining factor that is internal to the agent. Thus, freedom is not the same as indifference; human agents are more free when their choices are determined more clearly by the relevant evidence. Cartesian compatibilism relies on innate mind–body connections, on the ability to establish new mind–body connections by conditioning, and on the limited power of human agents to control some of their thoughts.
Descartes's Use of the Concept of Substance
Authors: Clarke Desmond M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Cartesian substances are ultimate subjects of predication, not things in themselves (substrata) apart from their properties. Our knowledge of substances is limited to knowledge of their qualities. Since the concept of a material substance cannot explain anything about the properties of material things, so likewise the concept of an immaterial substance cannot explain anything about the mind or God. Substances may be combined if their properties are compatible.
Property Dualism
Authors: Clarke Desmond M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Mental and material qualities co‐exist in human beings. Descartes could not provide any account of how they co‐exit in the same subject and could not therefore support an identity theory. The property dualism with which he concludes is not a metaphysical theory but an indication of the limits of his explanatory project. The source of the problem is the Cartesian theory of matter and the undeveloped state neurology.
American Exceptionalism and International Organization: Lessons from the 1990s
Authors: Luck Edward C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConsiders how domestic political processes affect American behaviour in and towards multilateral organizations. The author first discusses the nature of American exceptionalism and looks at the ways in which what he describes as a deeply ingrained sense of American exceptionalism coupled with pragmatism affects the country's approach to multilateral institutions. An examination is then made of the ups and downs of US policies towards UN over the course of the 1990s, the contrasting politics of the 1994 decision to join the newly created World Trade Organization (WTO), and US financial withholdings in the 1990s and the steps taken towards partial payment of the resulting arrears in 1999–2000. Far more positive attitudes are noted towards the WTO than the UN, the latter being perceived as a riskier venue for the promotion of US interests. It is concluded that, while the US is generally reluctant to defer to multilateral processes, it cannot be accused of being hostile to all forms of multilateral organization: it is pragmatic and peacekeeping case‐specific in its choice of foreign policy tools.