bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Heaven
Authors: Walls Jerry L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Christian doctrine of heaven has been a moral source of enormous power in Western culture. It has provided a striking account of the ultimate good in life and has for two millennia animated the hope that our lives can be fully meaningful. Recently, however, the doctrine of heaven has lost much of its grip on the Western imagination and has become a vague and largely ignored part of the Christian creed. Not only have our hopes been redefined as a result, but also our very identity as human beings has been altered. In this book, Jerry L. Walls argues that the doctrine of heaven is ripe for serious reconsideration. He contends not only that the orthodox view of heaven can be defended from objections commonly raised against it, but also that heaven is a powerful resource for addressing persistent philosophical problems, not the least of which concern the ground of morality and the meaning of life. Walls shows how heaven is integrally related to central Christian doctrines, particularly those concerning salvation, and tackles the difficult problem of why faith in Christ is necessary to save us from our sins. In addition, heaven is shown to illumine thorny problems of personal identity, and to be an essential component of a satisfactory theodicy. Walls goes on to examine data from near‐death experiences from the standpoint of some important recent work in epistemology, and argues that they offer positive evidence for heaven. He concludes that we profoundly need to recover the hope of heaven in order to recover our very humanity.
Introduction
Authors: Walls Jerry L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The first part of this introduction puts forward some examples of conflicting historical and contemporary views on Christian belief in heaven. The second part goes on to discuss the two basically different images of heaven that have recurred down the ages: the theocentric view, which in its extreme version casts heaven as a timeless experience of contemplating God, and requires no human dimension; and the anthropocentric view, where the emphasis is on being reunited with family and friends, and heaven being essentially like this life, but without the evil and suffering. The third part discusses the question of why, though many still profess belief in heaven, this belief is now more vague and ambivalent than it has ever been, and has been entirely rejected by some on philosophical, cultural, intellectual, or moral grounds. The author believes that the transmutation of belief in heaven from a vitally positive, spiritual, and moral source into a decidedly negative one represents a religious and cultural shift of cosmic proportions, and that from this viewpoint alone, the doctrine is ripe for serious consideration.
Heaven and God's Goodness
Authors: Walls Jerry L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A critical examination is presented of the case made against heaven by the naturalistic philosopher David Hume (who can be described as a minimal theist), arguing that his case rests mainly on his views on God, which are discussed at length. A brief consideration is then given to two contemporary views of God: those of Paul Davies, the 1995 recipient of the Templeton Prize for Progress in Religion and a scientist, who could be described as a contemporary deist, and sees God's relation to the world rather as Hume does; and Richard Swinburne, who has recently produced a philosophical defense of revelation. The main thrust of the chapter is to show that any meaningful account of God's goodness implies some notion of heaven, and that the notion of heaven is not just an appendage to the main body of Christian doctrine, but pervades it through and through.
Heaven, the Nature of Salvation, and Purgatory
Authors: Walls Jerry L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The first part of the chapter discusses the debate on how to get to heaven, and whether salvation is by moral transformation and good works, or by faith alone. The answer to this question obviously has implications for our view of what heaven is like – in other words, there is a natural connection between heaven and the nature of salvation. This connection is explored, and then arguments are put forward to show that true Christian faith is morally and spiritually transforming, focusing on the atonement, and the claim that Jesus is the Son of God incarnate, both of which are discussed in some detail. The last part of the chapter discusses the doctrine of purgatory.
Heaven and the Problem of “Irredeemable” Evil
Authors: Walls Jerry L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Arguments are then put forward to show that heaven is an essential resource for a satisfactory theodicy, and for making sense of, and resolving horrendous evil. The central issue is that of how God can be perfectly good even though he created a world in which terrible things happen that have a permanent place in history. It is contended that none of these evils are in principle irredeemable, even though the fixity of such evils is a problem, since Christians are encouraged to hope that not even evils with deep roots in the permanence of the past are beyond the resolution of God's grace; in heaven God will wipe every tear from the eyes of the redeemed. At the heart, the case made is the basic Christian notion that true happiness is found in a relationship with God, and nothing that happens to us on earth can separate us from God or destroy this relationship, which is entered into by accepting the grace of Christ, and allowing him to transform us into persons who will eventually be perfect like him. These truths provide the framework that makes it possible for us to forgive the things that have been done against us, even things of extreme wickedness or cruelty.
Heaven and Visions of Life After Life
Authors: Walls Jerry L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An examination is made of data from near‐death experiences from the standpoint of some important recent work in epistemology, and arguments are presented that they offer positive evidence for life after death (heaven). Among the persons whose work on near‐death experiences is discussed are Raymond Moody, Allan Kellehear, Carol Zaleski, Susan Blackmore (a critic who believes that near‐death experiences can be explained in purely naturalistic terms), Bruce Greyson, Alvin Plantinga, and William Alston. The views of Carol Zaleski (who offers a sympathetic account of near‐death experiences intended as an alternative to naturalistic approaches), and of Alvin Plantinga and William Alston (who are leading Christian epistemologists) are examined in detail.
The Theory of Natural Knowledge
Authors: Vinci Thomas C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Cartesian epistemology comprises three main divisions: (1) an a priori theory, discussed in Chs. 1–3, (2) a psychological theory of error explanations in judgment induced by features of our sense experience discussed in Chs. 4, 5 and 7, and (3) a theory of natural reasons (natural knowledge), discussed here. The theory of natural reasons, based on Descartes's notion of natural inclinations (natural propensities), is expressed here in terms of a series of warrant principles of which there are two main kinds: those that warrant action (reasons of goodness) and those that warrant claims for what is true (reasons of truth). This chapter traces Descartes's epistemically ambivalent attitude to cognitive dispositions from the early treatment in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind through to the final treatment in The Passions of the Soul. The chapter focuses special attention on the appearance of one kind of natural reason, reasons of truth, in the proof of the external world in Meditation VI and the striking absence of same in the proof of the external world in the Principles of Philosophy II. The chapter also considers whether natural reasons apply to particular aspects of corporeal things, concluding with a discussion of the Cartesian Circle.
Socrates Dissatisfied
Authors: Weiss Roslyn 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe personified Laws in the Crito who make the case for Socrates' remaining in prison and accepting his execution rather than fleeing at the urging of his friend Crito, speak not, as is generally thought, for Socrates, but represent instead the city of Athens and its laws. The Laws are, indeed, in style and substance, Socrates' adversaries: whereas Socrates defends dialectically the claim of the individual to exercise and follow his own reason, the Laws defend rhetorically the absolute authority of law. Socrates has his own reasons for remaining in prison—escape would involve him and his friends in unsavory and unworthy activities and would violate Socrates' publicly announced agreement to “abide by” his penalty (Ap. 39b)—but Crito cannot accept reasons of this kind. Caring most about helping his friend and not allowing his friends' enemies to win, Crito flouts the law in his willingness to engage in bribery and stealth. Recognizing the utterly unphilosophical nature of his friend, Socrates works to repay Crito's friendship by bringing him up to the level of law‐abidingness, hardly the highest level of morality but at least not the very lowest. The speech of the Laws that Socrates fashions to this end has the same effect on Socrates as Corybantic rites do on those exposed to them; it does not, however, provide a rationally convincing argument.
Running the Risk for Friendship
Authors: Weiss Roslyn 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Crito is Socrates' friend. Though Crito laments the possible loss of an irreplaceable friend, he worries too about the bad reputation he will surely acquire should he not help his friend to escape death. Crito is unphilosophical: he cares about life, money, reputation, and family. Moreover, he cares neither about law nor about justice except in the most vulgar sense of “helping friends and harming enemies.” Although Crito will risk everything to save his friend, he is a friend to Socrates' body—not to his soul.
The Philosophical Argument Against Escape
Authors: Weiss Roslyn 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSocrates' reasons for remaining in prison appeal to old logoi, to principles that affirm the value of justice, the greater importance of the soul as compared with the body, and hence the lesser evil of death as compared with injustice. Socrates' reasons for not escaping are made explicit before the Laws make their speech. Because escape defies the will of the Athenians, it requires stealth and bribery, shameful practices that are unjustified in the current situation. By escaping, Socrates will hurt himself and his friends insofar as they will be compelled to engage in practices whose injustice will harm their souls. Moreover, he will violate his just agreement with the city of Athens to abide by his penalty.
“Whatever We Bid”
Authors: Weiss Roslyn 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe Laws admit finally that Socrates is innocent. For them, however, Socrates' escape would nevertheless be unjust since justice requires the unqualified submission of the citizen to the city and its laws: the citizen is the city's child and slave; in addition, the citizen has agreed to do “whatever we bid.” The tone of the Laws' speech is sarcastic, bitter, and mocking. Their paramount concern is with their own survival: their demand for absolute obedience derives from this overriding concern. For Socrates, law derives validity only from its fostering of justice; mere survival, whether of the individual or of the Laws, cannot supersede the claims of justice.
The Corybantic Cure
Authors: Weiss Roslyn 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAlthough Socrates acts as the Laws recommend, their reasons are not his reasons. The Laws' speech holds for Socrates no rational appeal: its effects are merely Corybantic. Its booming loudness produces a deafening effect that makes it difficult for Socrates to hear: it is for this reason that he advises Crito not to continue to speak. To be sure, Socrates will, in refusing to escape, be following the lead of “the god”; to him, however, what this means is that he will be doing as his own principled reasoning directs: what his god commands of him is to pursue justice and to practice philosophy.
A Fool Satisfied
Authors: Weiss Roslyn 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Since Crito proves himself to be thoroughly unphilosophical and Socrates' argument against escape fails to persuade him, Socrates tries in a nonphilosophical way to persuade Crito of the rightness of his decision not to escape. The speech of the Laws speaks to Crito in terms that Crito can understand: it respects Crito's concerns for life, money, reputation, friends, family, and power. And it protects him: it scolds only Socrates. The Laws even address Socrates in a tone similar to the one Crito used. Yet, in the long run, Socrates seeks through the Laws' speech to benefit his friend: the life of uncritical obedience to the law is a less corrupt life than the one Crito currently leads, a life in which he cares for neither justice nor law.
Introduction
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Starts with an outline of the book, and then discusses the philosophical approach taken in it. Three methods used by philosophers to approach problems are considered: the first is a theory whose correctness is immediately apparent to the philosopher concerned, and whose implications for any particular cases will be accepted, even if they lead to uncomfortable results; in the second case, the philosopher starts with a theory, but one to which commitment is not so great, and whose implications for particular cases may be examined, and if they conflict, lead to alterations in the theory; and the third starts with responses to cases (practical or theoretical) with just enough detail for philosophical purposes, rather than total or tentative commitment to a theory. The method used in this book is closer to the third than any other, and is outlined.
Is It Worse if More Die: Agent Relative or Non‐Relative Views?
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers arguments for the following radical claim: the fact that we could save a greater number of lives is not a reason to save some people rather than others when we cannot save everyone. Against this view, an argument is presented that claims to prove that it is worse if more die than if fewer do, but then a counterargument is given that considerations of justice and fairness might stand in the way of preventing this worse state of affairs, requiring us to give to a group with the greater number of people and to a group with the smaller number equal chances to be saved. This means there would be a conflict between considerations of the right (e.g. justice, fairness), and considerations of the good (e.g. maximizing lives saved). The arguments offered are based around the claims of John Taurek on conflict situations in which some can be helped and some cannot: his brand of consequentialism, which involves an evaluation of outcomes relative to an individual's interests combined with an agent‐neutral theory of permission to act. The aspects addressed all centre around the aggregation argument — aggregation vs non‐aggregation.
Is It Right to Save the Greater Number?
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the situation that we have to choose between the numbers of lives saved (is it right to save the greater number?), Ch. 6 argues against the existence of the conflict between considerations of the right (e.g. justice, fairness) and considerations of the good (e.g. maximizing lives saved). This is the aggregation argument put forward in Ch. 5. The argument is presented in two ways: the modest way is to show that considerations of the right do not demand equal chances; the strong way is to show that considerations of the right require us to count numbers of lives in order to save the greater number and to engage in substitution of lives that are equivalents from a certain perspective. In discussing the modest approach, consideration is given to what makes a policy unfair and the significance of the distinction between direct and indirect need for aid.
Ideal Procedure, Nonideal Alternatives, and Proportional Chances
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines two alternatives to the ‘majority rule’ situation described in the Ch. 7, i.e. that numbers count in any consideration of saving lives. It looks at two procedures that, other than straightforwardly saving the greater number of lives, still consider the number of people that can be saved. The first is what the author calls the ‘Ideal Procedure’ for non‐Taurek situations, in which some compromise between conflicting groups is possible; this can only be used when there is some chance of saving everyone. The other procedure is an alternative way to give numbers weight: distribution by proportional chances. Finally, the difference that present vs future need may make is considered.
Sobjectivity: The Anatomy of the Subjective and Objective in Moral Judgment
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractLooks at a two more approaches to justifying the Principle of Irrelevant Utility advanced in Ch. 8 with respect to the question of saving different groups of lives. Once again, it involves combining objective and subjective views. Here the combinations are designated ‘Sobjectivism2’ and ‘Sobjectivism3’. Sobjectivism2 differs from Sobjectivism1 (which was presented in Ch. 8), in that it pits the various subjective points of view against each other differently, taking into account each person's moral responsibility, rather than only his interests or desires. Sobjectivism3 provides an alternative principled distinction between losses of lives in order to distinguish relevant from irrelevant utilities: that certain utilities would be irrelevant in a life‐saving choice situation if they would receive no proportional weight on their own, no matter how many individuals were involved.
Distribution of Resources: Need and Outcome
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Begins the discussion of organ distribution for transplantation presented in the last four chapters of Part III of the book by analysing factors that may be relevant in three situations: true scarcity of resources, temporary scarcity of resources, and uncertainty as to the type of scarcity. The first two sections of the chapter consider the different concepts of need and urgency and their relation to each other: what makes one person needier than another and why is greater need a factor that should give one person a stronger claim to resources? Arguments are presented for and against the view that the younger are needier than the older, and proposals offered concerning a possible diminishing marginal utility of life and diminishing marginal value of life, fairness, and the relation between helping the worst off and equality. The last section of the chapter starts by examining the concept of outcome with an eye to deciding what effects of a transplant and differential effects between potential recipients are morally relevant and irrelevant. It then considers the relation between the factors of need and outcome, and presents several rationales for procedures that give outcome more weight relative to need — moving away from the maximin approach (that of aiding the much worse off before the better off).
Distribution of Resources: Urgency and Outcome
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Continues the discussion of organ distribution for transplantation presented in the last four chapters of Part III of the book. Discusses the relative weight that should be assigned to urgency and outcome when need is constant, although the discussion also bears on the relation of need to outcome. Various hypothetical cases are presented that involve varying outcomes in absolute numbers of years, and these are discussed in the contexts of a determining organ distribution by a maximin approach (the approach of aiding the much worse off before the better off) that is modified so that consideration is given to outcome. Aspects addressed include unavoidable inequality, chances, lending organs, and various alternatives to the modified maximin approach — Dan Brock's proposal of chances proportional to outcome, multiplying outcomes, and outcome as sole determinant. The last section of the chapter looks at the justification for moving from the maximin approach to the modified maximin approach and then even further toward an approach that shows an even greater concern for outcome.
Procedures for Distribution
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Brings to a close the discussion of organ distribution for transplantation presented in the last four chapters of Part III of the book. Presents the argument against using procedures in determining the distribution of resources, and then goes on to give a critical examination of two possible procedures for determining the distribution of organs: that of John Kilner, and that of T. Starzl (this is a points system for determining kidney distribution in which no one factor has lexical priority over another that is used in a major transplant centre); some modifications are suggested to the Starzl procedure. Next, an alternative distribution procedure is described for application in conditions where resources are scarce. The final section of the chapter moves on from discussing the situation where the decision to be made is which of two (or more) people should receive one organ, to the choice of situation where the choice is whether to assign multiple organs to one person or each of those multiple organs to other people.
A History of the ṣaḍ‐Aṅga‐Yoga of the Kālacakratantra and Its Relation to Other Religious Traditions of India
Authors: Wallace Vesna A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A brief history is given of the history of the ṣaḍ‐aṅga‐yoga (six‐phased yoga) of the Kālacakratantra, and its relation to other religious traditions in India (Hindu, and various Buddhist traditions) is discussed. Details are given of the variant types and components of the various ṣaḍ‐aṅga‐yogas. These are couched within different theoretical and practical frameworks, but all share some commonalities.
The Nature of Syncretism in the Kālacakratantra
Authors: Wallace Vesna A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Kālacakratantra has a prominent, syncretistic character, although close examination of the tantra and its commentarial literature shows that the Kālacakra tradition has preserved a distinctively Buddhist orientation, and that its affiliation with non‐Buddhist Indian systems is in form rather than content. The syncretism of this tantric system is a self‐conscious absorption, or appropriation, of the modes of expression that are characteristic of the rival religious systems of India. This self‐conscious syncretism variously permeates several areas of the Kālacakratantra, such as its theoretical system, language, medicine, and cosmology; it is also often inextricably related to Buddhist tantric conversionary efforts. The conversionary mission of the Kālacakratantra is not the sole basis of its syncretistic character; the growing pluralism within the inner life of Indian Mahayana communities could have been another contributing factor. The different sections of the chapter look at the theoretical syncretism of the Kālacakratantra, the syncretism of Kālacakratantra practice, and the syncretism of the Kālacakratantra's language.