bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry
Authors: Hookway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractCentral to Peirce's rejection of the Cartesian obsession with scepticism is the claim that sceptical arguments do not produce real doubt. This chapter provides a detailed examination of the role of doubt in the regulation in inquiry, claiming that states of real doubt involve immediate cognitive evaluations that are manifested in emotional reactions such as epistemic anxiety. Many of our most important epistemic evaluations reflect habitual standards of evaluation that are not explicitly articulated and that are expressed in emotional evaluations.
On Reading God's Great Poem
Authors: Hookway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAn exploration of Peirce's defence of religious belief and of how this is compatible with his pragmatist principle and with his claim that all responsible inquiry should use the method of science. There is a discussion of his ‘common‐sensist’ insistence that we should not trust theoretical reflection in connection with ‘vital question’ and his assumption that instinctive beliefs are innocent until proved guilty. Much of the chapter is devoted to an analysis of his ‘neglected argument’ for the reality of God, which consists in recognizing that religious belief is instinctive and its instinctive character contributes to its authority. There is also a discussion of Peirce's account of sentiments and emotions and his claim that the reality of God is comprehended in ‘feeling’.
Avoiding Circularity and Proving Pragmatism
Authors: Hookway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPeirce's pragmatist principle is defended as a methodological rule for clarifying concepts and hypotheses. He claimed that, unlike other versions of pragmatism, his could be proved, and much of his work after 1900 is devoted to the search for a proof. The chapter discusses what sort of proof he required: it must be sufficiently strong to convince the champions of a priori metaphysics and nominalists who reject the form of realism that Peirce took to be essential to pragmatism. Later sections of the chapter discuss the resources that Peirce took to be available for constructing the proof: phenomenology, results in normative sciences like ethics and logic and semiotic.
The Resurrection of God Incarnate
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth from the dead involved a violation of natural laws, and so could have happened only if natural laws depend for their operation on God, who set them aside on this occasion. The main reason he would have for setting them aside would be any reason he had himself to become incarnate; the Resurrection would then be the divine signature on his work, showing that he had become incarnate. So any evidence from natural theology that there is a God with a certain nature, and any reason to suppose that having that nature would lead a God to become incarnate, is evidence (background evidence) that some sort of super‐miracle like the Resurrection would occur. Any evidence against the existence of God or against him being such as to become incarnate would be evidence against the Resurrection. I argue that God does have reason to become incarnate—to provide atonement, to identify with human suffering, and to reveal truth. Our evidence about the life of Jesus (the prior historical evidence) is such that it is not too improbable that we would find it if God was incarnate in Jesus for these reasons. Our evidence about what happened after the death of Jesus (the posterior historical evidence) is such that it is not too improbable that we would find it if Jesus had risen from the dead. For no other prophet in human history, is there anything like this combination of prior and posterior historical evidence. Given a moderate amount of positive background evidence, it then becomes very probable that Jesus was God Incarnate who rose from the dead.
Principles for Weighing Evidence
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Evidence about what happened on a particular occasion is provided by memory, testimony, physical traces, and background evidence (whether the world as a whole shows that sort of thing very likely to occur). Apparent testimony claims should be taken as genuine claims and should be believed in the absence of counter‐evidence. If Jesus rose from the dead, this was a miracle—a violation of natural laws brought about by God. If there is no God, there cannot be such a violation. If there is a God, violations can occur but in general do not. But, in so far as the evidence of natural theology suggests that there is a God, and that he has reason to bring about this sort of miracle on this occasion, then positive evidence for the Resurrection from the testimony of witnesses may make it overall very probable that Jesus rose from the dead.
God's Reasons for Incarnation
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There are three reasons why an omnipotent and perfectly good God might choose to become incarnate (to become human, as well as divine). The first is to provide atonement for our sins. All humans have wronged God, and the resulting guilt requires repentance, apology, and reparation. We can repent and apologize, but we have not the time or the will to ‘make it up’ to God. He must himself provide the reparation in the form of a perfect life of the kind that we should have lived. The second reason is to identify with our suffering, and the third is to reveal to us moral and theological truths that we need for living.
The Historical Sources
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Most of St Paul's epistles are totally reliable historical sources. The synoptic gospels are basically historical works, though they do sometimes seek to make theological points (especially in the Infancy narratives) by adding details to the historical account. St John's Gospel is also basically reliable, at any rate on the later events of the story of Jesus, but it contains more ‘theologizing’ than the others.
Jesus Taught His Atonement
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Jesus sought to replace the system of Temple worship in which atonement was made by animal sacrifice. This is shown by, among other things, the accusation at his trial that he would destroy ‘this temple that is made with hands’. At the Last Supper he instituted a ceremony with the words ‘my body’ and ‘my blood’, implying that what was to be commemorated was the sacrifice of himself. Many strands of the New Testament contain the idea of the death of Jesus as an atoning sacrifice, so that it is natural to look for a common source of this in the actions and teaching of Jesus.
Jesus Founded a Church
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Jesus forming a community based on 12 leaders could only be regarded in first‐century Palestine as founding a new Israel, a church. His instituting the Eucharist at the Last Supper implied that he expected that church would continue after his death. While he may have hoped that it would absorb the old Israel and that the latter would convert the Gentiles, however, the result was to be achieved, Jesus intended his church for all peoples. He did not teach explicitly that the Parousia (his second coming) would occur in his lifetime, but he did warn his disciples to be ready for its coming. The later church, in teaching the three central Christian doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, developed the teaching of Jesus.
The Empty Tomb and the Observance of Sunday
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The first‐century Jewish understanding of ‘resurrection’ implied bodily resurrection. St. Paul did not mention that the tomb of Jesus was empty, because that was obviously implied by his claim that Jesus was risen. That Christians believed from the earliest days that women disciples had found the tomb empty on the third day (a Sunday) after Jesus’ burial is evidenced by the fact that all Christians subsequently celebrated the Eucharist on a Sunday. Their use of the phrase ‘on the third day’ to date the Resurrection was not due to the fact that Hosea prophesied a resurrection for Israel on the third day; rather they used Hosea's phrase to describe what they believed on other grounds to be the date of Jesus’ Resurrection.
Rival Theories of What Happened
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
If Jesus was not raised bodily, some rival theory of what happened to his body must be true. The only possible theories are that Jesus was not dead when taken down from the cross, the body remained in the tomb but the disciples misidentified the tomb, enemies stole the body, grave robbers stole the body, friends of Jesus (probably the ‘women at the tomb’ on the Sunday morning) stole the body. The latter is the least improbable of these alternatives to the traditional account. But it involves great deceit, which would probably have been recognized by the Christian leaders, and it involves those friends giving the body an improper burial. And it would still not account for the large number of appearances, some of them to many disciples together. The traditional account is certainly the simplest.
The Significance of the Resurrection
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
If the Resurrection of Jesus occurred, it was a miracle in the sense of a violation of laws of nature brought about by God. Other cultures than those of the modern world, including first‐century Judaism, while not having the concept of a law of nature, had a concept corresponding to the modern concept of miracle as an event that could be brought about only by God. The Resurrection, if it occurred, would be such an event. It would also have been seen as God's signature of acceptance of Jesus’ atoning sacrifice, and his approval of life and teaching; and it was so seen by some New Testament writers.
The Balance of Probability
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Summarizes the argument of the book. Given only a moderate amount of evidence from natural theology in favour of the existence of God and his having reason to become incarnate among humans, there is far more evidence that Jesus led the sort of life that God Incarnate would lead, and that that life was culminated by a super‐miracle, than there is for any other prophet in human history. In consequence, the overall balance of evidence in favour of the Resurrection having occurred is very strong. This is elucidated in the formalism of the probability calculus by Bayes's theorem.
Introduction: Centering Sexual Orientation Politics
Authors: Calhoun Cheshire 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This introductory chapter lays the groundwork for future chapters by suggesting that feminist theorizing must make a methodological shift from thinking that heterosexism is just a by‐product of sexism, to thinking of lesbian and gay subordination as a separate axis of oppression that intersects with gender, race, and class axes of oppression. It also introduces the two central features of lesbian and gay subordination. The first of these is that the principal damaging effect of a heterosexist system is that it displaces lesbians and gays from both the public and private spheres of civil society so that they have no legitimated social location. The second is that the principal ideologies rationalizing lesbian and gay displacement are that there are only two natural and normal sexes/genders; that lesbian and gay sexuality is excessive, compulsive, and disconnected from romantic love; and that, for a variety of reasons, lesbians and gays are unfitted for marital and family life. The last part of the chapter makes general remarks on how the book fits into the essentialist–constructionist controversy.
Separating Lesbian Theory from Feminist Theory
Authors: Calhoun Cheshire 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter focuses largely on lesbian feminist theorizing in the 1980s. It is argued that feminist theorizing on gender oppression has worked to conceal, rather then reveal, lesbian specificity. An attempt is made to determine what it is in feminist thinking that makes it difficult to see the lesbian in the feminist subject of woman, so that she is regarded as a ‘not‐woman’, and also as the quintessential form of feminist revolt against patriarchy because she refuses to be heterosexual. It is argued that this placement of resistance to patriarchy at the heart of what it means to be a lesbian is wrong.
The Shape of Lesbian and Gay Subordination
Authors: Calhoun Cheshire 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIt is argued that lesbian and gay subordination differs substantially in form from gender and racial oppression. In particular, it does not materialize in a disadvantaged place that would sharply reduce the access of lesbians and gay men as a group to basic social goods. Instead, lesbians and gays are systematically displaced to the outside of civil society so that they have no legitimized place, not even a disadvantaged one. The displacement occurs because of the requirement that all citizens adopt at least the appearance of a heterosexual identity as a condition of access to the public sphere. Various aspects of this displacement are addressed in detail.
Constructing Lesbians and Gay Men as Family's Outlaws
Authors: Calhoun Cheshire 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe first two sections of this chapter summarize feminist and lesbian critiques of the family, marriage, and motherhood. The third section critiques lesbian‐feminist reasons for eschewing a political agenda that endorses family, marriage, and mothering. The fourth section traces the historical construction of lesbians and gays as outlaws to the family. In the concluding section, it is argued that making the family a political priority is not, as sometimes argued, a conservative move.
Boundaries and Allegiances
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book is a collection of 11 essays written from a perspective that is at once sympathetic towards, and critical of, liberalism and liberal political philosophy. The essays explore the capacity of liberal thought, and of the moral traditions on which it draws, to accommodate a variety of challenges posed by the changing circumstances of the modern world. Scheffler considers how, in an era of rapid globalization, we can best conceive of the responsibilities of individual agents and the normative significance of people's diverse commitments and allegiances. Some of the essays are primarily concerned with the role of individual desert in liberal theory. Others focus on the nature of people's special responsibilities to their families, communities, and societies, and assess the compatibility of such responsibilities with liberal ideas of justice and equality. Still others deal with the possibility of developing a liberal conception of justice that acknowledges the normative significance of social and global interdependencies, while reaffirming the values of personal life and the continuing importance of ideas of individual responsibility.
Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes, and Liberalism in Philosophy and Politics
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
During the 1980s, political liberalism in America came under heavy attack from conservatives, who claimed that liberal policies and programmes rested on a reduced conception of individual responsibility. Noting this trend, Scheffler examines the four major strands of American political philosophy since the 1970s and finds that the most prominent liberal theorists of this period—and, indeed, their most prominent critics—avoid any appeal to a pre‐institutional conception of desert. Scheffler proposes that the influence of naturalism may help to explain this surprising degree of convergence. He goes on to argue that philosophical liberalism, like political liberalism, appears to be in tension with ordinary notions of desert and responsibility. He examines the implications of this tension for liberal politics, for liberal philosophy's professed neutrality among conceptions of the good, and for the moral psychology of liberalism.
Liberalism, Nationalism, and Egalitarianism
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Liberalism today is criticized from the opposing standpoints of particularism and globalism, the former claiming that liberalism underestimates the importance of national, cultural, and communal ties, and the latter claiming that liberalism is not sensitive enough to questions of international morality. Each of these criticisms points to a different tension within liberal theory—the particularist criticism to the tension between liberalism's explicit voluntarism and its implicit nationalism, and the globalist criticism to the tension between liberalism's commitment to egalitarianism and its commitment to particularism about political responsibility. These tensions within liberal theory are explored through Scheffler's discussion of debates about associative duties. The two tensions reflect liberalism's difficulty in jointly accommodating the three values of autonomy, moral equality, and loyalty.
The Conflict Between Justice and Responsibility
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Members of affluent societies are often resistant to claims of global justice, and their resistance is frequently expressed in normative terms, in the claim that one has special responsibilities towards the members of one's family, community, or society. In this essay, Scheffler develops one argument, the distributive objection, which might be offered in support of claims of global justice and against the idea of special responsibilities. He then considers four possible responses to the distributive objection and concludes that the objection does not serve to invalidate all claims of special responsibility. Nevertheless, both the distributive objection and the idea of global justice are rooted in a commitment to the equal worth of persons, and the objection does demonstrate that the relationship between that commitment and the recognition of special responsibilities is more problematic than is often supposed.
Relationships and Responsibilities
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In opposition to the voluntarist view that special responsibilities must be based on consent or some other voluntary act, this essay sketches a non‐reductionist account of such responsibilities. The non‐reductionist account begins with the idea that to value non‐instrumentally one's relationship to another person is to see that person's needs, interests, and desires as providing one with reasons for action and thus, in effect, to see the relationship as a source of special responsibilities. Scheffler then argues that one's relationships to other people do in fact give rise to special responsibilities when they are relationships that one has reason to value. Towards the end of the essay, he considers how a non‐reductionist might respond to two objections to special responsibilities, the voluntarist objection and the distributive objection. In meeting both objections, the non‐reductionist could concede that there are other moral values in addition to special responsibilities while still maintaining that special responsibilities must be part of any adequate moral scheme.
Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Distinguishes between cosmopolitanism about justice and cosmopolitanism about culture, identifying moderate and extreme forms of each of the two views. The extreme versions of cosmopolitanism, Scheffler argues, are implausible because they conflict with a notion of special responsibility that is deeply embedded in common‐sense moral thought. In arguing that a commitment to the equality of persons is neither substantively or conceptually incompatible with the recognition of special responsibilities, Scheffler seeks to undermine the case for these extreme forms of cosmopolitanism and to build the case for the moderate forms. But he notes that the moderate forms of cosmopolitanism, despite being much more plausible than the extreme versions, still face a number of philosophical and practical challenges, among them that of devising institutions and practices that take seriously both equality and special responsibilities.
The Appeal of Political Liberalism
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Attempts to ground liberal toleration in pluralism about value, in scepticism about value, or in the simple need for a modus vivendi are all subject to various difficulties. John Rawls, in his book Political Liberalism, develops a fourth proposal, one that aims to give toleration and other liberal institutions a basis in moral reasons without presupposing any controversial moral outlook. In this essay, Scheffler critically examines Rawls's argument that the principles of justice can rest on an overlapping consensus of comprehensive moral and religious doctrines. Among the issues Scheffler discusses are the possibility of including classical utilitarianism in an overlapping consensus, the relationship between such a consensus and the ideal of public reason, and the relevance of political liberalism for societies that lack liberal, democratic traditions.
Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Scheffler identifies and interprets the core ideas in John Rawls's discussion of desert in A Theory of Justice. The conjunction of these ideas, which Scheffler terms the ‘Liberal Theory’ of desert, denies that the principles of distributive justice make reference to a ‘prejusticial’ notion of desert but allows a place for prejusticial desert in our thinking about retributive justice and the criminal law. Scheffler investigates this asymmetry between distributive and retributive justice, noting that desert is an individualistic notion that may not fit into a holistic theory of distributive justice. But retributive justice, concerned with the imposition of punishment on particular human beings, can perhaps accommodate such an individualistic notion.
Morality through Thick and Thin: A Critical Notice of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Bernard Williams criticizes the ‘morality system’ and the associated philosophical enterprise of constructing ethical theories. Williams argues that we would be better off replacing the ‘thin’ concepts favoured by the morality system and its theorists, concepts such as ‘right’ and ‘good’, with ‘thick’ concepts of the sort that were prevalent in the ethical thought of ancient Greece, such as ‘courage’ and ‘treachery’. In this critical essay, Scheffler presents several arguments against Williams's view; among them is the argument that the distinction between thick and thin concepts is not a clear one, and that the elimination of ethical theory would leave Williams without adequate conceptual resources to engage in the kind of social criticism that he himself regards as necessary.
Three Red Herrings
Authors: Brighouse Harry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines, and refutes, three a priori arguments against school choice: the argument from commodification, the argument from democracy, and the argument from the common good. It argues that markets are inevitably involved in the delivery of educational services, and that although democracy is valuable its value does not justify the level of local control many critics of vouchers favour. It argues that a defensible notion of the common good cannot do the work required to ground a theory of justice for education, and is therefore not immediately pertinent to the evaluation of school reform.