bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Quasi‐Genera and the Collapse of Substance and Attribute
Authors: Lloyd A. C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The core of the third chapter is the study of the P‐series. This theory is presented after a detailed discussion of the relationship of individuals to species and genus. A P‐series is a sequence of terms classified according to priority and posteriority starting from the most universal one. This theory is the result of the evolution of the Aristotelian doctrine of pros en done in order to fit with the not strictly Aristotelian notion of ‘genus’ of some Neoplatonic philosophers (Plotinus, Plotinus).
The Spiritual Circuit
Authors: Lloyd A. C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Investigates how, given their ontological status between the One and animals, men can either ascend to the intellectual life or fall into the inferior kinds of life. Different issues involved in the doctrine of the rise to the intellectual life are considered. Firstly, the restriction to men of the possibility of an intellectual life is explained through the reference to Neoplatonists’ own personal experiences. Secondly, the experience of the ascent is defined by the term ‘inclination’ rather than the too broad ‘reversion’ used by most of the scholars. The former term, indeed, seems to fit better in the case of men. Finally, the experience of inclination is explained in terms of logical necessity.
Mysticism and Metaphysics
Authors: Lloyd A. C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In contrast with the different views of some recent scholars, Ch. 7 constitutes an important attempt to point out the importance played by non‐discursive thought in Plotinus and Proclus in several ways. Firstly, the differences between the doctrines of Plotinus and Proclus are investigated. Secondly, it is considered the role of the ‘Loving Intellect’ in both Plotinus’ and Proclus’ philosophy. Thirdly, it is indicated how the One plays a crucial role in the mystical experience and how this kind of experience may be an evidence of the activity of the One. Finally, it is shown how some problems and difficulties of Plotinus’ philosophy may be explained through reference to the mystical experience.
The Light of the Soul
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The concept of an idea plays a central role in seventeenth‐century theories of mind and knowledge. However, philosophers of the period were seriously divided over the nature of ideas. The Light of the Soul examines the important but neglected debate on this issue between Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes. In reaction to Descartes, Malebranche argues that ideas are not mental but abstract, logical entities. Leibniz in turn replies to Malebranche by reclaiming ideas for psychology. Nicholas Jolley explores the theological dimension of the debate by showing how the three philosophers make use of biblical and patristic teaching. The debate has important implications for such major issues in early modern philosophy as innate ideas, self‐knowledge, scepticism, the mind–body problem, and the creation of the eternal truths. Jolley goes on to consider the relevance of the seventeenth‐century controversy to modern discussions of the relation between logic and psychology.
Introduction
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Cartesian–Lockean conception of the mental may have won out in the seventeenth century, but only after encountering a powerful current of opposition. Here, the most important figure is Malebranche, who reverts to the Augustinian tradition by espousing vision in God and divine ideas. This study focuses on Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz as major participants in a dialogue on the nature of ideas, and ultimately, on the nature of the mind. One central issue in the debate is whether intentionality is the mark of the mental. By isolating the view of these three thinkers, it is possible to tell a historically important story, which is also philosophically coherent.
Malebranche
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the first part of this chapter, I shall argue that Malebranche takes over three central doctrines from Descartes and transforms at least two of them; when they are combined, the result is vision in God. The three central doctrines are the distinction between primary and secondary qualities; the representative theory of perception; and the conclusion of the wax meditation—the thesis that bodies are perceived through the intellect, not the senses. In the second half of the chapter, I shall show how Malebranche uses Cartesian innovations to extend Augustine's theory of divine illumination. With the help of Descartes's teaching, Malebranche is able to argue that we can see bodies—changing and corruptible things—in God, without falling foul of divine immutability. In this way, he can overcome Augustine's scruples about the theological dangers of seeking to extend his theory of divine illumination.
Malebranche
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is characteristic of both occasionalism and vision in God that they place man in a condition of extreme dependence on God; indeed, they might be seen respectively as ontological and epistemological versions of this theme. Further, both doctrines can be seen as pushing Cartesian themes to extreme lengths. Occasionalism is a radical version of the continuous creation doctrine of the ‘Third Meditation’; vision in God is a radical version of Descartes's thesis in the ‘Fifth Meditation’ that all knowledge depends on the prior knowledge of God. We shall see that Malebranche does not achieve a fully satisfactory account of the relations between his two most famous doctrines because he sometimes has difficulty acknowledging that the realm of the psychological is not simply coextensive with the sensory; when he does try to accommodate this insight, the result is that he sets up tensions with his most basic commitments. The two doctrines may be flawed, but they are free from the arguably more serious conflations and inconsistencies that bedevil Descartes's treatment of the same issues.
Malebranche
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Malebranche is sometimes classified as a Cartesian, but on the issue of self‐knowledge he departs radically from Descartes; Malebranche completely rejects the thesis that the mind is better known than the body. On this issue at least, he belongs, not with Descartes or the other ‘rationalists’, but with the ‘empiricists’ Gassendi, Locke, and perhaps even Hume. Not surprisingly, Malebranche's position on self‐knowledge was subjected to vehement criticism from a Cartesian standpoint; in On True and False Ideas, Arnauld singled out Malebranche's denial that we have an idea of our mind as one of the main targets of his polemic. Among other criticisms, Arnauld argued cogently that, on Malebranche's view, it is difficult to see how we can have knowledge of such vital truths about the mind as its freedom and immortality, yet Arnauld failed to come to grips with Malebranche's central claims. Arguably, Malebranche had more insight into the weaknesses of Descartes's philosophy of mind and for this reason alone Malebranche's discussion of self‐knowledge is an important contribution to the subject.
Leibniz
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWe cannot really understand Leibniz's polemic against Locke unless we grasp Leibniz's concept of ‘idea’. Moreover, the exclusive focus on the New Essays is historically misleading because it tends to obscure the fact that much of Leibniz's discussion of ideas is a response to issues raised by Malebranche and Arnauld. We shall see that much of Leibniz's discussion of ideas has wider philosophical significance, for his views are shaped by his nominalism; unlike Malebranche, Leibniz cannot tolerate irreducibly abstract entities. Like Malebranche, Leibniz attempts to do justice to the Augustinian doctrine of divine illumination, but in adapting the doctrine to his own philosophical commitments, he tends to change its content, thereby depriving the doctrine of much of its real point. But it would be quite wrong to suppose that Leibniz's theory of mind has no significant theological dimensions, for we shall see that Leibniz's distinctive philosophical claims put him in a strong position to defend the Christian doctrine that the human mind is made in the image of God.
Leibniz
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIt would be foolish to try to pretend that Malebranche is always Leibniz's primary target in his writings on innate ideas. Obviously, the arguments of the New Essays are powerfully shaped by the polemical needs of replying to Locke, but it is surely significant that Leibniz has the resources in his philosophy for answering all Malebranche's objections, and it is not uncharacteristic of Leibniz to fight a war on two fronts. Indeed, the fact that Malebranche is a target can throw new light on Leibniz's sometimes obscure defence of innate ideas; for many features of Leibniz's case fall into place when they are seen as part of a coherent strategy for answering Malebranche's objections. In the first part of this chapter, we shall analyze Leibniz's strategy for defending a dispositional theory of innate ideas against both Locke and Malebranche; in the last part of the chapter, we shall see how Leibniz's defence of innate knowledge is supported by a psychologistic theory of necessary truth.
Meaning
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe aim of this work is to demystify linguistic meaning—to characterize the underlying nature of this phenomenon in such a way that its familiar attributes become intelligible. To that end, one must consider whether a word's meaning derives from what it refers to, from the way it was defined, from some associated mental image, from its evolutionary function, from a prototype structure, from an inferential role, or from something else. The basic strategy adopted here for answering this question is to scrutinize a range of general features of meaning that have often been thought to provide clues to its origin—facts concerning the relationships between meaning and understanding, truth, a priori knowledge, complex expressions, what ought to be said, and actual word usage. It is a striking result, however, that only the last of these characteristics proves to be capable of guiding us towards a theory of how meaning arises: namely, that all our particular applications of a given word result, in part, from what we mean by it. This characteristic is explained—and can only be explained—by the theory presented here, whereby meaning properties are reduced to law‐like regularities of word use. More specifically, the theory is that each word means what it does in virtue of the fact that a certain ‘acceptance property’ of the word is explanatorily fundamental vis‐à‐vis its overall deployment (where an ’acceptance property’ specifies conditions in which designated sentences containing the word are held true). This proposal is forced to confront a formidable barrage of objections; but in each case an adequate reply is shown to be available.
Introduction
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWe begin by mentioning various important philosophical problems whose solutions call for an account of meaning: problems concerning the nature of truth, thought, justification, and philosophy. The chapter continues with a list of notorious puzzles about meaning that were highlighted by Frege, Brentano, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine, Davidson, Dummett, Grice, Kaplan, Putnam, and Kripke. Then there is a summary of the main elements of the theory to be presented in the following chapters, which is designed to resolve these puzzles.
Truth
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The reference or extension of a term—what that term is about—is determined by the concept it expresses: e.g. x means DOG → x is true of dogs. However, the minimalist/deflationary theory of truth (the theory that designates such conditionals as conceptually fundamental) shows that reference‐determination will take place regardless of how meaning properties are constituted. It is argued that only from an unreasonable ‘inflationary’ point of view (in which truth, satisfaction, and reference are not defined by such conditionals, but are instead assumed to be susceptible of reductive analysis) can there be a question (the ’problem of error’) about how to reconcile the basic nature of meaning (e.g. the analysis of ’x means DOG’) with its referential import (e.g. its capacity to ensure that x is true of dogs).
Norms of Language
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIt is often maintained (following Dummett and Kripke) that the normative aspects of language put a substantial constraint on our conceptions of meaning and truth—to the extent, some would say, of altogether precluding purely ’naturalistic’ or ’descriptive’ accounts of them. The purpose of this chapter is to establish that this is not so. It is not here denied that language is pervaded with normativity—with oughts and ought‐nots. But these phenomena are explained without supposing that truth and meaning are intrinsically normative notions. What is suggested, in other words, is that the evident normativity of language can give no reason to reject wholly non‐normative accounts of those notions—accounts such as the deflationary theory of truth and the use‐regularity theory of meaning.
A Straight Solution to Kripke's Sceptical Paradox
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kripke argues (in his Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language) that there are no genuine facts as to what words mean. The present chapter begins with a discussion of how this conclusion should be construed and proceeds to criticize the various considerations marshalled in favour of it. The central flaw is shown to be Kripke's explicit assumption that a given property of a word may provide it with a given meaning only if two interrelated conditions are satisfied: (a) that, from the information that some word possesses the given property, we may read off what it must mean, and (b) that we can explain why this property will engender that particular meaning. It is concluded that there are, after all, perfectly genuine empirical facts of meaning.
Kantian Pluralism
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis essay characterizes the type of ethical theory that Kant developed, comparing it with contemporary theories along several dimensions. The essay distinguishes several senses in which an ethical theory might be pluralistic and argues that, in some important senses (but not others), Kant's theory is pluralistic. Issues considered are whether there is one basic principle or many, whether there are incommensurable values, in what sense the right is prior to the good, and to what extent Kantian ethics is intrusive, dogmatic, and judgemental. Kant's ethics, perhaps surprisingly, is responsive to many of the practical concerns commonly advocated under the label pluralism.
Kant on Responsibility for Consequences
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Moves beyond time‐worn debates as to whether we can determine what we ought to do independently of the predicted consequences. Rather, the questions concern moral blame and liability for the bad consequences of our deeds after we have acted. The essay interprets and examines objections to the answers suggested by Kant's remarks in The Metaphysics of Morals. If Kant's principles are construed as moral (rather than legal) guidelines, some objections miss the mark, but Kant's position is not adequately sensitive to differences in contexts.
The Problem of Stability in Political Liberalism
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines the relation between two of the most influential Kantian works in political philosophy in this century, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice and his Political Liberalism. The rationale for Rawls's shift in position from the earlier book to the later, it is argued, is a recognized need to satisfy a deeply Kantian requirement on the legitimate exercise of state coercive power. In a pluralistic world where reasonable people differ about the truth of religion and morality, the requirement can be met only by showing the possibility of an overlapping consensus on shared political principles. Contrary to what Rawls at times suggests, the reason for his move from a ‘comprehensive moral theory’ to a ‘political conception’ of justice was not an (perhaps doubtful) expectation that consensus on his principles would be a stabilizing force, but instead a recognition of the need to provide a justification of these principles that is respectful of the diversity of moral and religious opinions among reasonable people.
Aristotle on Perception
Authors: Everson Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this book, Stephen Everson offers a comprehensive investigation of Aristotle's account of perception. Everson explains how Aristotle accounts for our ability to perceive such things as colours and sounds, as well as material objects. Everson has two main aims: the first is to place Aristotle's theory of mind within the context of his natural science, in particular, to show that Aristotle's account of perception is an application of the explanatory method of the Physics. To this end, Everson is keen to emphasize, against recent interpretations, that Aristotle explains perception in terms of material changes in the organs that possess perceptual capacities. The second aim is to argue that Aristotle's resulting method of explaining mental activity has substantive advantages over contemporary accounts in the philosophy of mind, such as functionalism and supervenience. Much of Everson's argument is directed against Myles Burnyeat's interpretation of Aristotle’ philosophy of mind. According to Burnyeat, Aristotle argues that the sense organs undergo alteration without undergoing any material change: Everson calls this reading, the ‘spiritualist’ reading. Everson opposes this with the ‘literalist’ reading, according to which a sense organ is physically altered whenever it perceives something; it therefore takes on a property of the sensible object that affects it. In order to defend this reading, Everson presents a detailed account of the role of matter and material change in the perceptual activities of the each of the individual senses, and also of the perceptual system as a unified whole, including the activities of phantasia or imagination.
Perception and Its Proper Objects
Authors: Everson Stephen 
Published: October 2003

AbstractEverson discusses the five senses and their proper objects; e.g. sound for hearing, colour for sight. The senses, Everson argues, are essentially related to their proper objects because they are essentially such as to be affected by them. There is thus an intrinsic (kath’hauto) relationship between a proper object and its proper sense, and this, Everson argues, is causal, rather than conceptual or logical. This being so, perception requires a scientific investigation.
Perceptual Change and Material Change
Authors: Everson Stephen 
Published: October 2003

AbstractEverson introduces the ‘spiritualist’ and the ‘literalist’ readings. He offers some criticism of the ‘spiritualist reading’ in this chapter. The spiritualist must explain why the matter of a sense organ is not affected in perception. Everson argues that Aristotle's account implies that there is material change of the sense organ in perception. Firstly, there is Aristotle's insistence that each sense organ has a particular material constitution, and secondly, there is the claim that, in perception, the sense organ becomes like the object.
The Perceptual System
Authors: Everson Stephen 
Published: October 2003

AbstractEverson gives an account of the perceptual system as a whole, and also examines the connection between perception and phantasia, or imagination. Everson argues that Aristotle has two notions of phantasia, a technical sense, and a more general sense. The technical sense refers to quasi‐perceptual states, such as dreams, or remembrances, where no sense object is present to the perceiver. The general sense takes phantasia in the sense of appearances generally speaking; thus in this sense, take all perceptions as a sub‐class of phantasia.
Knowledge and the State of Nature
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book is an inquiry in epistemology directed at understanding the concept of knowledge. Its point of departure is that the standard philosophical project of analysing the concept of knowledge arbitrarily restricts the subject matter and is based on risky theoretical presuppositions. Craig develops an alternative approach, akin to the ‘state of nature’ method in political theory, which builds up the concept from a hypothesis about the social function of knowledge and the needs that it fulfils. Included in Craig's attempt to understand the concept is the endeavour to explain, in the light of his own theory, much that philosophers have written about knowledge, its analysis, the obstacles to its analysis, and scepticism. Moreover, the book aims to show not only why many languages have such constructions as ‘knows whether’ and ‘knows that’ but also why they have equivalents of ‘knows how to’ and ‘know’ followed by a direct object.
Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with State‐of‐Nature Theory in Political Philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Raises two problems for the standard approach to the concept of knowledge, which consists in attempting to provide an analysis in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. First, it is difficult to make intuitive ‘extensional’ ascriptions of knowledge mesh with ‘intensional’ intuitions about what makes for knowledge. Second, the approach gives no answer as to why the concept of knowledge enjoys such widespread use and to which needs of human life and thought it answers. The suggested alternative approach is the naturalistic one of practical explication, i.e. to start with a reasoned hypothesis about the answer to this last question by considering the state of nature, and then to ask what conditions would govern the application of such a concept.
Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Outlines the core of the author's theory, according to which the concept of knowledge arises because of our interest in having true beliefs about our environment and thus in evaluating sources of information, and is used to flag approved ones. The hypothesis is used to account for epistemologists’ disagreement over the precise nature of the belief condition for knowledge. Ground is conceded to those who play down the requirement, in so far as an informant's being confident that p is not always taken as necessary for her to be a good informant. Equally, cases in which an informant is regarded as good, yet lacks belief entirely, are freakish and thus of little practical use, which explains both the attraction of the requirement and the feeling that there are genuine counter‐examples to it.