bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Northern Ireland Agreement: Clear Consociational, and Risky
Authors: Horowitz Donald L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Horowitz's chapter is critical of the consociational aspects of Northern Ireland's Agreement. It views the ‘grand coalition’ executive at the heart of the Agreement as unwieldy because it includes the extremes, particularly Sinn Fein. The chapter describes the commitments contained in the Agreement as maximalists, and argues that these commitments will rebound, when they are not delivered, to the advantage of militants. Horowitz prefers, for Northern Ireland and elsewhere, what he calls an ‘incentives’ approach. The likeliest and most stable coalition resulting from this is one that includes moderates and excludes militants.
Unsung Heroes? The Role of Peace and Conflict Resolution Organizations in the Northern Ireland Conflict
Authors: Cochrane Feargal 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Addresses the integrationist complaint that academics focus too much on political elites and not enough on civil society. Cochrane gives a comprehensive analysis of the role that peace and conflict resolution organizations have played in Northern Ireland. He shows, in a conclusion that is at odds with integrationist thinking, that many of these organizations are as divided as political elites along national lines, and are committed to a solution that accommodates both communities rather than to one that transcends one. The chapter is a useful reminder that one can want peace without wanting a merger of identities.
From Conflict to Agreement in Northern Ireland: Lessons from Europe
Authors: Alcock Antony 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Compares Northern Ireland with a number of other divided societies in Europe, including South Tyrol, Cyprus, and the Hungarian regions of Romania, Slovakia, and Serbia. It argues that states are unlikely to accommodate minorities if their ethnic kin in neighbouring states pursue irredentist claims. An agreement became acceptable to Northern Ireland's unionists only when the Irish republic removed its constitutional claim to Northern Ireland. Alcock also argues that unionists were able to accept the all‐Ireland institutions in Northern Ireland's Agreement in the context of similar developments in other parts of the European Union. The chapter is an example of ‘linkage’ politics, i.e. it stresses links between exogenous factors and internal politics.
Northern Ireland and the Basque Country
Authors: Keating Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Compares Northern Ireland with Western Europe's other hot spot, the Basque Country. It links both regions with the process of European integration. Keating's view is that, as this promotes a move away from the traditional notion of single identities and sovereign nation‐states towards more complex multiple identities and forms of shared sovereignty; it offers a potential way out of both conflicts.
Making the Transition from Hegemonic Regime to Power‐Sharing: Northern Ireland and Canada in Historical Perspective
Authors: Noel S. J. R. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Compares Northern Ireland with prosperous and peaceful Canada. It shows that Canada's relative tranquillity was not inevitable but owes much to the development of consociational practices by its English and French Canadian elites. Noel argues that if consociationalism is to work in Northern Ireland, its elites must also embrace a consociational bargain, a desire to compromise. He sees limited evidence of this, and is sceptical of the Agreement's prospects. The chapter is a useful reminder that it is possible to support consociationalism normatively, while recognizing that it remains a difficult system to operate, particularly in sites of profound polarization.
Northern Ireland and Island Status
Authors: Guelke Adrian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Compares Northern Ireland with Cyprus, Puerto Rico, Corsica, East Timor, and Sri Lanka. Guelke argues that the fact that Northern Ireland is a partitioned part of an island helps explain why the international community tends to favour a united Ireland. This is because there is an international norm that islands, as natural units, should be under one jurisdiction. International support for the Agreement can be explained, according to Guelke, by its inclusion of all‐island political institutions. Any attempt to weaken these will result in reduced international support.
Taking the Gun out of Politics: Conflict Transformation in Northern Ireland and Lebanon
Authors: Schulze Kirsten E. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Concerns the issue of what is to be done with paramilitaries and their weapons in post‐settlement scenarios. It argues that Lebanon has lessons in this matter that are relevant for Northern Ireland. Schulze argues that the key to progress is a process that is inclusive of all groups, including the representatives of paramilitary organizations.
Northern Ireland and South Africa: ‘Hope and History at a Crossroads’
Authors: O'Malley Padraig 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Compares Northern Ireland's peace process with the transition to democracy in South Africa. The chapter details the ways in which Northern Ireland's political elites learnt from South Africa's negotiations, and argues that they have more to learn. It squarely rejects the claim of Irish republican militants that their position is analogous to that of South Africa's African National Congress.
The Possibility of Metaphysics
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBegins with a defence of realist metaphysics against its many enemies. Metaphysics, it is argued, is an autonomous and indispensable intellectual discipline whose distinctive task is to chart the domain of real possibilities—a task which requires us to identify both the basic ontological categories into which all possible beings are divisible and the characteristic relations of ontological dependency in which beings of various ontological categories necessarily stand to one another. Central parts of this task are carried out in the rest of the book, which focuses especially on the key notions of substance, identity, and time. The unity of the concrete world as one world existing in time ultimately depends, it is argued, upon the existence of fundamental substances, which persist primitively through processes of qualitative change. And even abstract necessary beings, such as the objects of mathematics, ultimately depend for their existence, it is claimed, upon there being a concrete spatiotemporal world of enduring substances.
The Possibility of Metaphysics
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA positive answer to Kant's famous question, ‘How is metaphysics possible?’, is given—one that represents metaphysics as being an autonomous and indispensable intellectual discipline whose task is to chart the domain of real possibilities. The notions of ‘real’ or ‘metaphysical’ possibility and necessity are defended and distinguished from those of various other species of modality, such as physical, logical, and conceptual possibility or necessity. The enemies of metaphysics, from relativists to those who seek to subordinate metaphysics to empirical science, epistemology, or the philosophy of language, are argued to hold positions that are either incoherent or self‐defeating.
Objects and Identity
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExplores the fundamental metaphysical notions of an object and of identity, and the intimate way in which they are related. The central ontological distinction between concrete objects and abstract objects is brought to the fore, and is explained in terms of the distinction between existence in time and timeless existence. The notion of a criterion of identity, introduced by Frege, is explicated and its application is illustrated in the course of a discussion of the nature of cardinal numbers and their use in counting.
Identity and Unity
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe relationship between the notion of an object and the notion of unity is discussed. It is argued that we should acknowledge the possible existence of entities belonging to certain ontological categories whose members lack either the determinate identity or the determinate unity—and hence countability—that are characteristic of objects properly so‐called. Such categories, it is suggested, are needed, amongst other things, to make sense of some of the theoretical entities postulated by modern quantum physics. In this connection, a famous argument by Gareth Evans against ‘vague’ identity is countered.
Persistence and Substance
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that the very existence of time—and, more particularly, the temporal unity of the world as one world in time—is dependent upon the existence of concrete individual substances persisting through time, with the consequence that persisting substances cannot coherently be conceived to be mere sequences or aggregates of successively existing entities, their supposed ‘temporal parts’. An argument due to David Lewis being in favour of the latter view, appealing to the so‐called problem of intrinsic change, is criticized for failing to recognize a solution to this problem, which distinguishes between temporal and atemporal modes of property exemplification.
Substance and Dependence
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPresents and defends a rigorous definition of substance, by drawing on the notion of existential or ontological dependency. Various different species of ontological dependency are identified, including most importantly, the key relation of identity dependence. By appealing to a number of different species of dependency, an account is developed of the fundamental ontological relationships between substances and entities belonging to various other important ontological categories, such as events and properties.
Primitive Substances
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that certain fundamental kinds of substance—which might appropriately be called primitive substances—must exist in order to provide the ultimate existential grounding of all concrete existence. Such substances are argued to be distinctive in that their persistence or identity through time must itself be primitive or ungrounded. But it is acknowledged that actually identifying such substances, as opposed to arguing in a general way for the necessity of their existence, is no easy matter.
Categories and Kinds
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe account of the ontological categories begun earlier in the book is completed and it is explained why and how such categories, which have an a priori status, must be distinguished from the empirically discoverable natural kinds into which objects—and, more particularly, naturally occurring individual substances—are divisible. By focusing on the problem of substantial change and associated questions concerning the persistence‐conditions of different kinds of object, the indispensable role that a system of ontological categories has in enabling us to understand the fundamental structure of reality is illustrated, thereby providing further and indeed conclusive evidence of the indispensability and autonomy of metaphysics as an intellectual discipline.
Matter and Form
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractHere, attention is drawn to the Aristotelian distinction between matter and form, a version of which is defended in providing an account of the nature of composite substances. It is argued that a composite substance cannot be identified with the mereological sum of its component parts, nor with a bundle of compresent ‘tropes’ or property instances. A ‘four‐category ontology’, inspired by Aristotle, is defended, according to which four fundamental and mutually irreducible categories of entity need to be acknowledged: substantial particulars, non‐substantial particulars (or ‘modes’), substantial universals, and non‐substantial universals.
Abstract Entities
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA return is made in this chapter to the subject of abstract entities. A number of different senses are distinguished in which an entity may be said to be ‘abstract’ and the nature and existence of certain important varieties of abstract entities are discussed, including universals, sets, and numbers. Natural numbers, it is argued, are not to be identified with sets but rather with kinds of sets: that is to say, we should think of numbers as universals which have as their particular instances, sets of appropriate cardinality.
Facts and the World
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn this chapter, consideration is given to the nature of facts or states of affairs. Some philosophers who acknowledge the existence of such entities treat them as abstract entities, while others think of them as being the ultimate building blocks of the concrete world, as the relata of causal relations, and as the truth‐makers of contingent truths. Difficulties with the latter view are identified, but a modest ontological role for facts is preserved, whereby they may be seen as ‘ways things are’ rather than as items that are the fundamental constituents of reality.
The Puzzle of Existence
Authors: Lowe E. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDeals with one of the deepest of all metaphysical problems, the question of why there should be anything at all—that is to say, why there should be a world of concrete objects existing in space and time. After querying another recent approach to this question favoured by Peter van Inwagen, an answer is offered which appeals to the distinction between concrete and abstract entities and proposes that, while some of the latter (such as numbers) but none of the former are necessary beings, abstract entities can exist only in a possible world that is populated by at least some concrete entities.
Justice, Posterity, and the Environment
Authors: Beckerman Wilfred , Pasek Joanna 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn rich countries, environmental problems are seen as problems of prosperity. In poor countries, they are seen as problems of poverty. This is because the environmental problems in poor countries—such as lack of clean drinking water or decent sanitation—are problems that affect them here and now, whereas in rich countries the environmental problems that people worry about most—largely as a result of current prosperity and economic growth—are those that seem likely to harm mainly posterity and hence violate our obligations to future generations.But what exactly are our obligations to future generations? Are they determined by some sort of ethical system, such as the ‘rights’ of future generations, or justice between generations, or intergenerational equity, or sustainable development? The first part of this book is addressed to these questions. It is argued that while ethical ‘systems’ do not provide much help, we still have moral obligations to take account of the interests that future generations will have. But an appraisal of these interests in the light of probable future developments suggests that, while environmental problems have to be taken seriously, our main obligation to future generations is to bequeath to them a more decent society in which there is greater respect for basic human rights than is the case today throughout most of the world.Furthermore, it cannot serve the interests of justice if the burden of protecting the environment for the benefit of posterity is born mainly by poorer people today. More resources devoted to the environment means fewer are devoted competing claims for, say, health care or education or housing, not to mention plain private consumption. And in poor countries millions of people suffer from acute lack of sanitation, clean drinking water, shelter, and basic infrastructures to prevent or cure widespread disease. Neither generations nor nations are homogeneous entities. The later chapters of this book, therefore, are addressed to the ethical aspects of the way that resources ought to be shared out between environmental protection and competing uses in all countries, and how the burden of dealing with global environmental problems ought to be shared out between rich and poor nations.
Introduction: Ethics and Economics in Environmental Policy
Authors: Beckerman Wilfred , Pasek Joanna 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDuring the last two or three decades, various developments in the environmental sphere have led to increasing concern with our obligations to posterity and to the non‐human part of the natural world. These developments have exposed gaps in both traditional, moral, and political theory and in conventional economics. Environmental issues have exposed these gaps and have brought to the fore questions such as how far the society, with whose welfare we are concerned, includes future generations or is limited to individual nations or human beings. This book examines these questions as well as related ethical aspects of environmental policy, such as environmental valuation or the equitable allocation among nations of the burden of environmental protection.
The Rights of Future Generations
Authors: Beckerman Wilfred , Pasek Joanna 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIt is widely believed that environmental conservation has to be guided by respect for the ‘rights’ of future generations. But it is argued in this chapter that it may not be plausible to think in terms of the ‘rights’ of future generations in general or their rights to any specific environmental assets. Future generations may well have rights when they come into existence, but these will only be rights that can be satisfied at the time. But ‘rights’ do not exhaust the whole of morality, and future generations will certainly have interests, which means that we are under moral obligation to take account of them and of the effect that our environmental policies may have on them. Thus, the problem is to predict what the main interests of future generations will be and how to weigh them up against the interests of people alive today. It is argued that this approach will lead to a very different ranking of priorities among our moral obligations to future generations.
Justice Between Generations
Authors: Beckerman Wilfred , Pasek Joanna 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Although there are many theories of justice, one crucial feature of those that are most widely accepted is that they lay down principles that determine the allocation of rights and obligations in society. They do not eliminate conflicts of interest between different groups but, by specifying such principles, they are designed to enable conflicting interests to be resolved in a peaceful and harmonious manner. But insofar as future generations cannot be said to have any rights, their interests cannot be protected within the framework of any theory of intergenerational justice. This chapter discusses the general relationship between ‘rights’ and ‘justice’, and the obstacles to any theory of intergenerational justice.
Intergenerational Equity
Authors: Beckerman Wilfred , Pasek Joanna 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses one principle that has been suggested as a guide to the way we ought to take account of the interests of future generations, namely the principle of intergenerational ‘equity’ and its related claim of intergenerational equality, particularly in spheres such as the way we should share out ‘finite’ resources among generations. This chapter examines the possible arguments in favour of intergenerational egalitarianism and concludes that they are difficult to defend. It is proposed that egalitarianism should be replaced by the principle of ‘threshold prioritarianism’, so that our moral obligation to future generations should be based on a humanitarian concern to avoid policies that may impoverish them.
Sustainable Development
Authors: Beckerman Wilfred , Pasek Joanna 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAnother widely suggested principle governing our obligations to future generations is ‘sustainable development’. The first part of this chapter argues that the mainstream interpretations of the concept of sustainable development are open to serious objections on ethical grounds. The chapter also shows that even if intergenerational egalitarianism were a viable objective there is nothing intergenerationally egalitarian about sustainable development.
How Much Richer Will Future Generations Be?
Authors: Beckerman Wilfred , Pasek Joanna 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter leaves the ‘safe’ world of philosophical speculation and turns to the dangerous world of economic prediction. It outlines the economic reasons for believing that, in the very long term—i.e. abstracting from cyclical or other transitory fluctuations in economic activity—future generations will be incomparably richer than people today. Reasons are also given for believing that there will be no significant obstacles to future growth on account of popularly feared environmental developments, such as running out of ‘finite’ resources, or climate change.
The Intrinsic Value of the Environment
Authors: Beckerman Wilfred , Pasek Joanna 
Published: October 2003

AbstractGenerations are not homogeneous entities and are composed of individuals and nations that have conflicting interests in the way in which resources are allocated among competing uses. This chapter discusses whether ‘the environment’, or ‘nature’, should enjoy special status in any allocation; whether the economist's approach is too anthropocentric; the concept of ‘intrinsic’ values; and the application of these concepts to environmental valuation. It is argued that while many environmental assets are ‘public goods’, so that the free market is unlikely to supply the socially optimal amount, the same applies to many other things, such as public health or education services or the arts, not to mention the fact that most people in the world are, anyway, in dire need of a simple increase in their ability to buy simple basic private goods. This means that the allocation of resources to environmental objectives ought to take into account some form of cost‐benefit analysis.
Plural Values and Environmental Valuation
Authors: Beckerman Wilfred , Pasek Joanna 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter discusses critically the main criticisms of the use of cost‐benefit analysis in environmental policy, such as the incommensurability of environmental values with the values born by marketable goods, and the related unreliability of estimates of peoples’ willingness to pay for environmental protection. While it is found that there is some strength in these criticisms, it is still necessary to take account of the resource constraint involved in decisions concerning public goods. Furthermore, a democratic society needs some impartial and transparent process for solving allocation problems. However, the need to reconcile the valid objections made by environmentalists to cost‐benefit analysis with the problems raised by resource constraints raises new problems of political theory and institutions.
International Justice and Sharing the Burden of Environmental Protection
Authors: Beckerman Wilfred , Pasek Joanna 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Some current environmental problems are global and have public good elements that raise, in an acute form, the question of how the costs of a collective effort from which the world as a whole will benefit should be shared out among poor and rich countries. This chapter discusses how far theories of justice provide guidance to this question. It argues that the answer seems to be ‘very little’ and that, in order to arrive at some ground rules for allocating the burden of global environmental protection between countries—as between generations—we are forced back on humanitarian principles of concern for the poor.