bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Nutritional content of gluten-free cookies as an alternative snack for undernourished children
Authors: Elisanti A D , Rindiani  , Purnasari G , Amareta D I , Permadi M R 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
Undernourishment is one of the nutritional problems that often occurs in developing countries. In Indonesia, the undernourished is defined as underweight (17.1%), stunting (21.6%), and wasting (7.7%). The rising number of children's food allergies is one of the factors. One symptom of the body's immunological system is allergies. Food sources can act as triggers, with gluten being the most prevalent. The purpose of this study was to determine the amount of gluten, protein, vitamin C, sodium, and calcium in cookies. Through laboratory analytical research, an analysis of the nutritional content of cookies will be carried out based on SNI 01-2891;1992, Iodimetry, AAS, while the best organoleptic test results are analyzed descriptively. The results showed that 100 g of cookies contain 7.48 g of protein, 988.15 mg/kg of calcium, 90.03 mg/100g of vitamin C, 67.81 mg of sodium, and no quantitative gluten was detected. Nutritional content of gluten-free cookies are source of protein, high in calcium, high in vitamin C, low in sodium, and gluten-free, so it is safe for consumption by children, in 100 grams of cookies can fulfill the daily needs of vitamin C and calcium for children.
Parental Morality
Authors: Clayton Matthew 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
This chapter introduces some central questions in the philosophy of upbringing, particularly the permissibility of parents’ shaping children’s values and enrolling them into controversial conceptions of religion or human flourishing. It draws attention to the distinction between moral principles that apply directly to parents and those that inform how governments ought to regulate upbringing. It proceeds to draw two further distinctions that clarify different positions within the debate: first, the distinction between directive and non-directive approaches to parenting and education; second, the distinction between morality and ethics. Finally, the chapter provides a brief overview of three prominent positions within the philosophy of upbringing that independence for children challenges: parentalism, perfectionism, and what is termed ‘the liberal consensus’.
The Argument from Self-Rule
Authors: Clayton Matthew 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
This chapter presents the central argument for independence for children, particularly anti-perfectionist parenting. After a summary of the central features of an anti-perfectionist liberal political morality, which is informed by John Rawls’s influential conception, it proceeds to set out an argument for parental anti-perfectionism animated by the same ideal of individual self-rule. That argument rests on the idea that, from the point of view of parental morality, we ought to exclude from consideration principles that individuals might retrospectively reject as adults. In religiously and ethically plural societies, the avoidance of retrospective rejection requires parental anti-perfectionism. Various objections to the individual self-rule argument for parental anti-perfectionism are raised and rebutted, and the chapter ends with a discussion of some possible misinterpretations of independence for children.
The Attitudinal Requirement
Authors: Clayton Matthew 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
This chapter asks whether, from a moral point of view, it matters whether parents exclude religious and ethical ideals when deliberating how to raise their children. Answering affirmatively, it presents an argument for the view that parents ought to display an anti-perfectionist attitude towards their children, which deploys the argument developed by Quinn and Tadros that individuals are wronged if they are incorporated into others’ plans without their consent, at least when they have no duty to pursue the end they are made to serve. After a brief discussion of the debate in moral philosophy concerning whether intentions or motives are relevant in identifying the permissibility of people’s conduct, the chapter concludes by responding to the objection that parents’ intentional shaping of children’s values is not morally impermissible because children’s values will inevitably by shaped by external factors.
Conclusion
Authors: Clayton Matthew 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
In previous chapters, religion is treated as the primary case for elaborating the nature and appeal of independence for children. This concluding chapter explores how independence for children extends beyond the case of religion, by considering the implications of anti-perfectionist parenting for other conceptions of the good such as those concerning consumption, work, gender, and diet. The central thought is that we need to identify the public reasons in play when addressing these issues, but within the limits of public reason, and giving due attention to the moral claims of non-human animals, independence for children supports the view that parents should adopt an anti-perfectionist stance: as parents, they should not take a stand on whether a Protestant work ethic, or materialist attitude towards consumption, is helpful or harmful; and their gendering their children is morally problematic.
Introduction
Authors: Cureton Adam 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
An exceedingly large and complicated task that philosophers and others over generations can cooperatively pursue is this: First, explore and reflect on the many ordinary ways we think and speak about ideas of reason. Second, develop and study philosophical theories of reason, reasons, rationality, reasoning, reasonableness, and the like. Third, evaluate theories of reason by how well they fit with the ways we think and speak about reason and related concepts in reflective common sense and ordinary language. This introductory chapter highlights the many ways we think and speak about reason and related ideas, explores some gaps between standard philosophical theories of reason and reflective common sense, and explains the general aim of the book, which is to work back and forth between commonsense judgments about reason and key assumptions of the philosophical tradition that is associated with Kant to propose a partial theory of the mental power of reason that accords with some features of common sense and ordinary language. After explaining this approach and its limits, the chapter introduces the Sovereignty Conception of Reason and highlights its distinctive and unorthodox features, especially its emphasis on substantive interests of reason and the fundamental role they play in justifying many rational standards through a principle of justifiability to persons. The chapter also outlines the structure of the book and explains its unorthodox engagement with Kant’s ideas and texts.
Scope of Rational Self-Governance
Authors: Cureton Adam 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
The aim of this chapter is to consider our first main question, namely: What features of ourselves does our power of reason allow us to govern? Autonomy or rational self-governance, according to traditional Kantian views, concerns the ways our reason governs just one aspect of ourselves, namely our power to make choices. There is, in common sense and ordinary language, a broader idea of an autonomous or rationally self-governing person who governs herself by reason in many respects. Such a person is governed by her reason not only in the choices she makes but also in what she believes, notices, imagines, wants, and perhaps even feels. This chapter explores the first feature of the Sovereignty Conception of Reason, namely that our power of reason allows us to govern many of our powers of mind, including our powers of imagination, understanding, desire, and choice, through laws of reason. The chapter examines the general idea of a mental power, specifies some of the mental powers that humans typically possess as well as some of their connections to one another, and explains why it is initially plausible that our reason allows us to govern many powers of our minds besides our power of choice. This partial model of the human mind also serves as needed background for later chapters, especially those in Part II, where how the Sovereignty Conception of Reason can generate and explain many particular requirements of reason on our various mental powers will be illustrated.
Governing Abilities of Reason
Authors: Cureton Adam 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
The book’s second main question is: In what ways does our power of reason allow us to govern ourselves? The aim of this chapter is to specify some of the basic governing abilities that are part of our reason. Traditional Kantian conceptions of autonomy emphasize two governing abilities of reason, namely to legislate moral requirements about what we choose and to enforce in ourselves these moral laws. There is, in common sense and ordinary language, a much broader idea of a rationally self-governing person who governs herself as a whole in specific ways by standards of theoretical, prudential, and moral reason. The second feature of the Sovereignty Conception of Reason is that our power of reason includes many legislative, executive, and judicial abilities to govern our various mental powers through rational requirements of all kinds. This feature expands traditional Kantian conceptions of autonomy by incorporating additional governing abilities besides legislation and enforcement, by extending the set of mental powers that we can rationally govern in ourselves beyond the power of choice, and by expanding the set of rational requirements that we impose on ourselves to include moral, prudential, theoretical rational requirements. The chapter explains how our reason allows us to formulate, issue, and connect incentives with laws of reason, to interpret, apply, enforce, and police them, and to establish internal courts in which we attribute and impute mental acts to ourselves, render verdicts, and assign punishments to ourselves in the form of painful feelings of regret and self-reproach.
Laws of Reason
Authors: Cureton Adam 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
The book’s fourth main question is: What are the laws of reason through which we govern ourselves? Common sense and ordinary language suggest that requirements of reason are quite extensive and varied, but capturing and explaining them is notoriously difficult for Kantian theories of reason. The fourth feature of the Sovereignty Conception of Reason (SCR), which unifies the other three, is that our power of reason constitutively includes a set of formal and substantive principles of reason and that one of the substantive laws is a fundamental principle of justifiability that says mental acts of competent rational persons are required by reason if and because those mental acts or things suitably related to them could or would be rationally endorsed by a set of rational people on the basis of their interests of reason. This chapter considers the idea of a constitutive principle of reason by examining a special restriction that Kantian theories place on the kinds of things that can ground or explain such principles. It discusses the nature of formal and substantive principles of reason. Finally, it explores the idea that one of the fundamental substantive principles of reason has to do with ensuring that mental acts of all kinds are justifiable to persons. The chapter develops a schema for interpreting principles of justifiability and uses that schema to describe the novel but partial principle of justifiability that is part of the SCR. This principle assigns a fundamental role to our substantive interests of reason.
Knowledge, Error, and Enlightenment
Authors: Cureton Adam 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
Our power of reason includes substantive final interests in all people representing the truth, avoiding errors of judgment, and thinking for themselves. Our rational nature itself drives us to expand our knowledge and understanding, to discover and correct our mistaken beliefs, and to employ our own cognitive powers of reflection and investigation. Our rational nature also leads us to want all other people to do the same. Ascribing these substantive final interests in theoretical cognition to our power of reason allows for novel and promising ways of justifying some plausible requirements that concern not only how our cognitive capacities should operate but also how we should regard and treat one another. Rational and reasonable people who care about truth in everyone could or would rationally oppose lying and deception because of their concern for promoting knowledge as such. Our interests of reason in diminishing errors could or would also rationally lead us to support openness in scientific inquiry, educating children, taking the views of others seriously, and helping them to correct their mistakes. Rational and reasonable people could or would rationally support freedom of thought and speech out of our concern for ensuring that everyone thinks for themselves. These mental acts are presumptively required or prohibited by reason, according to the Sovereignty Conception of Reason’s Qualified Justifiability Argument, because rational and reasonable people could or would rationally endorse or reject them on the basis of their interests that all people acquire true representations, avoid errors in judgment, and achieve enlightenment.
Happiness
Authors: Cureton Adam 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
Our power of reason includes substantive final interests in the happiness or well-being of all people. Rational and reasonable people, simply as such, care about the happiness of everyone. Our interests of reason in the happiness of all could or would lead rational and reasonable people to endorse a variety of laws that concern the happiness of persons. There are several surprising features of these interests and the presumptive laws that they favor, including that rational and reasonable people as such are concerned to determine our own conception of happiness for ourselves, that our reason leads us to care about the happiness of all, and that our reason moves us to legislate presumptive laws that concern the kinds of feelings and desires that we have toward the happiness of others. The aim of this chapter is to explore this interest of reason in happiness and some presumptive laws of reason that it grounds. Rational and reasonable people could or would, on the basis of this interest, endorse presumptive laws to set the happiness of everyone as an end, to promote the happiness of all, to respect everyone’s right to promote their own happiness, to adjust our own conception of happiness to match our circumstances, to harmonize our own happiness with that of others, to take due care in applying these laws, to encourage and not discourage others from following them, and to have and avoid certain natural feelings and natural desires toward the happiness, unhappiness, and misery of everyone.
Solidarity
Authors: Cureton Adam 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
Personal relationships of various kinds are, from the perspective of reflective common sense, part of a fully reason-governed life. The aim of this chapter is to illustrate how the Sovereignty Conception of Reason can be interpreted and applied in ways that capture and explain a wide variety of judgments in reflective common sense about loving relationships. The chapter sketches several normative dimensions that loving relationships seem to have. It considers the charge that central features of Kantian theories of reason prevent them from adequately capturing and explaining these ordinary judgments. It draws on Kant’s discussions of various relationships to characterize a kind of solidarity and suggests that our power of reason includes final interests in each of us establishing relationships of solidarity, maintaining and perfecting ones we are in, promoting such relationships among others, and respecting relationships of solidarity themselves. The chapter then examines some presumptive laws of reason that are favored by our interests of reason in solidarity when they are combined with a principle of justifiability. Particular people in specific relationships presumptively should favor their friends over others, maintain their spouse’s trust, participate in joint projects, improve their relationships with their parents, promote the aims of their communities, avoid betrayal and duplicity, and otherwise maintain and perfect the social ties they have with others. The chapter ends by describing a fully general and universal social ideal that arises out of the Sovereignty Conception of Reason and reveals the deeply social nature of our power of reason itself.
Postscript
Authors: Cureton Adam 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
This book draws from Kant and common sense some features of a new way of thinking about what it is to govern oneself by reason and to lay some needed groundwork for a broadly Kantian normative ethical framework. This Postscript discusses the book’s main findings, why anyone should care about them, and the author’s future research directions. The Sovereignty Conception of Reason gives us a way of thinking about ourselves as autonomous or rationally self-governing people. Investigating the abilities, interests, and principles that make up our rational nature enhances our understanding of ourselves as rationally self-governing people who can establish in our own minds a rational and reasonable order that incorporates the fundamental interests of all people and forms the foundation for an ideal world of mutual love and respect. The picture of autonomy in this book is far more expansive and rich than traditional ideas of rational self-governance. It incorporates sociality and emotional attachment, encourages partiality toward our friends and family, extends to our attitudes as well as our actions, and reflects our ambivalence when we are pulled in different moral directions. The Sovereignty Conception of Reason also provides a foundation for developing a new kind of broadly Kantian normative ethical theory that reflects Kant’s idea of an ideal Kingdom of Ends. In such a world, our reason binds us with others through mutually agreeable standards that reflect the love, respect, and sense of fellowship we necessarily have for one another as rational and reasonable people.
Musical Phases
Authors: Glass Philip , Reich Steve 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Freeman’s support of American forms of minimalism. The musical figures featured here include Philip Glass and Steve Reich. Contemporary opera becomes a major theme in these salons, as does the development of minimalism as style and movement, thanks in part to Freeman’s salons hosting conversations such as these. Some highlights from this chapter include Glass’s introduction of his impending opera Satyagraha, Reich’s telling of Jewish ideals in Tehillim, and an open conversation between Reich and audience about the role of emotion in his work. The chapter also revolves around a reading of Lichtenstein’s painting Frolic, which Freeman displayed in the music room.
Setting the Scene
Authors: Loporcaro Laura 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
Chapter 1 examines the start and overall construction of the Institutio, arguing for the artfulness of both. First, it analyses how Quintilian, introducing his project and his persona, closely follows his own advice for the orator’s self-staging at the start of a speech. He presents himself as well-connected, competent, modest, and practically minded. This is a prime example of how Quintilian performs the rhetorical theory he teaches. He also sets his work into a literary context beyond rhetorical handbooks, and subtly engages in polemic against predecessors. Second, this chapter demonstrates how Quintilian, who at the start of the Institutio advertises it as proposing a coherent educational programme gradually increasing in difficulty, throughout the work indeed creates the sense that it unfolds in parallel with the pupil’s training and with his own life. Finally, this chapter suggests that Vergilian allusions may indicate the orator’s educational trajectory to have an epic quality.
In the Shadow of Cicero
Authors: Loporcaro Laura 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
Chapter 2 considers Quintilian’s reception of Cicero, showing how he promotes his model’s excellence while also striving to assert his own authority. First, it shows how Quintilian ‘canonizes’ Cicero as an orator by constantly quoting him, praising him as the best Latin orator who ever lived, and giving him a central place in early education, but also sometimes criticizes Cicero and denies that he was the ideal orator. This balancing act is key for the didactic framework of the Institutio, which would be undermined if the ideal orator had already existed. Second, the chapter examines how in his reception of Cicero as a theorist, Quintilian similarly acknowledges a strong debt to his model while striving to assert his own independence as a writer, advertising his treatment of single topics as more ‘didactic’ in a strict sense and setting the Institutio as a coherent whole against Cicero’s beautiful but contradictory writings.
Conclusion
Authors: Loporcaro Laura 
Published: January 2025

Abstract
This chapter concludes Reading Quintilian, showing how the separate thematic chapters of the book together contributed to the study of didactic authority in the Institutio oratoria. Overall, it concludes, the book argued that the Institutio is an intrinsically persuasive work with high literary ambitions and aimed for a holistic reading of this important cultural artefact, proposing a new, ‘linear’ way to reengage with it.
2822 Improving bone health assessments in Parkinson’s clinic
Authors: Chisanga B , Walters R , Adhi S , Pugh L 
Published: January 2025

Abstract

Introduction
People with Parkinson’s disease are more likely to have osteoporosis and falls. They also have a higher risk of fractures, and their outcomes are poorer than in the general population. Despite this, only half of the patients seen in Parkinson’s clinic have a bone health assessment. The aim of this project was to improve bone health assessments in the Parkinson’s clinic at Mansfield Community Hospital.

Method
One plan-do-study-act cycle was completed with the implementation of a Parkinson’s fracture risk assessment tool in the clinic. 19 clinic notes were evaluated over an 8-week period. The notes were scored on whether bone health was addressed using the assessment tool. Feedback was collected from the clinicians about utilising the assessment tool in clinic. The FRAX (Fracture risk assessment) tool was also used to calculate the risk of fractures in the patients selected.

Results
16/19 (84%) notes had used the risk assessment tool in clinic. There was an improvement in the bone health assessments in clinic from 5% (1/19) at baseline to 29% (5/17). The Parkinson’s risk assessment tool’s identification of individuals who were high risk of fractures, correlated with those identified as high risk using FRAX. The clinicians had positive reviews of the tool, but they highlighted the time constraints.

Conclusion
Whilst the use of the assessment tool has shown some improvement in the number of bone health assessments happening in clinic; it hasn’t resulted in all patients having an assessment. This is likely due to the time constraints in clinic. This project was successful in highlighting the current problem to the clinicians and has led the development of a further separate clinic, where bone heath can be addressed. The risk assessment tool plays an important role in identifying high risk patients who would be referred into this service.