bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Welfare and the Value of Life
Authors: Cavalieri Paola 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe way being open to reconsider in an impartial way the moral status of the members of other species, I offer a critical survey of the main attempts to do so within the field of animal liberation ethics. After distinguishing between obligations concerning welfare and obligations concerning the continuation of life, I examine Peter Singer's utilitarian stance, Tom Regan's deontological view, and David DeGrazia's mixed approach. Though agreeing with these authors as far as equal consideration for the interest in welfare is concerned, I raise doubts about their settling on unequal consideration for the interest in life, and I point to difficulties with formulating an acceptable theory of overall moral status. I end the survey with a discussion of the notion of personhood, which is found unable to overcome such difficulties.
Concepts of Evidence, or How the Electron Got Its Charge
Authors: Achinstein Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Using as an example the results of Hertz's experiments on cathode rays in 1883, in which no electrical effects of these rays were observed, four concepts of evidence are introduced: ES (epistemic situation), subjective, potential, and veridical. It is argued that although all four types are used in science, veridical evidence, which is entirely objective and requires the truth of the hypothesis, is the most important for scientists.
Two Major Probabilistic Theories of Evidence
Authors: Achinstein Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Two standard probabilistic theories of evidence are introduced: increase‐in‐probability (positive relevance) and high‐probability. These theories must be augmented by some definition of probability if a full theory of evidence is to be formulated and evaluated. Four popular theories of probability are presented: Carnap's a priori theory, the frequency theory, the propensity theory, and the subjective theory. It is shown how each yields a different concept of evidence.
Objective Epistemic Probability
Authors: Achinstein Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A new concept of probability ‐ objective epistemic probability ‐ is introduced and defended. It is epistemic because it is a measure of the degree of reasonableness of believing something; it is objective because it is independent of the beliefs of any person or group. The view is contrasted with several others, including the subjective Bayesian theory of probability, which is epistemic but not objective; with the propensity theory, which is objective but not epistemic; and with Carnap's view, which, like the view defended, is both epistemic and objective but, unlike it, is relativized to a potential epistemic situation.
Evidence, High Probability, and Belief
Authors: Achinstein Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is argued that evidence must supply a good reason for belief, and that the latter requires that the objective epistemic probability of the hypothesis on the evidence be greater than half. Conflicting views are examined and rejected, including a standard Bayesian view that associates probability with degrees of belief, the likelihood view of Richard Royall, Deborah Mayo's error‐statistical account, and a view of Mark Kaplan that divorces belief from probability.
The Explanatory Connection
Authors: Achinstein Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Although necessary for evidence, a probability of the hypothesis on the putative evidence greater than half is not sufficient. What is required, it is argued, is that there be a probability greater than half that there is an explanatory connection between the hypothesis and the evidence, given the evidence. The concept of an ”explanatory connection” is defined, and it is shown how this condition yields a good reason to believe and avoids counterexamples against standard probability views of evidence.
Final Definitions and Realism
Authors: Achinstein Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A final definition of ”potential evidence” is proposed, and it is shown how veridical, ES‐, and subjective evidence can all be defined using the concept of potential evidence. Hempel's ”conditions of adequacy” for a definition of evidence are examined to see which ones are appropriate. Finally, it is shown that the definitions of the evidence proposed commit one to scientific realism, and that instrumentalist interpretations of evidence that employ the concept of an ”explanatory connection” will not be possible.
Evidence for Molecules: Jean Perrin and Molecular Reality
Authors: Achinstein Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Jean Perrin's argument for the existence of molecules on the basis of his 1908 experiments with Brownian motion is examined. Various interpretations of that argument, including hypothetico‐deductive, Wesley Salmon's common‐cause idea, and Clark Glymour's bootstrapping claims, are examined and rejected. The argument is reconstructed as an eliminative‐causal one, and it is shown how it conforms to the requirements of potential evidence. It is also argued, against antirealist interpretations of Perrin, that Perrin himself was applying a realist argument to the existence of unobservable molecules rather than an instrumentalist one to the truth of the observational consequences of the molecular theory.
Killing and Letting Die: Methodology of Comparable Cases and Conceptions of Moral Equivalence
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBegins by considering the methodology of comparable cases used to test for the Thesis of the Moral Equivalence of Killing and Letting Die (Thesis E). Consideration is given to how to create cases that are properly equalized for all factors besides killing and letting die, analysing how this is done standardly, and also how it might be suggested that it should be done non‐standardly by equalizing cases cross‐definitionally as well as contextually. Arguments are presented against using non‐standardly equalized kill and let‐die cases as test cases for Thesis E, and distinctions are made between a strong and a weak version of that thesis. In addition, consideration is given to whether terminating aid is killing or letting die, and an examination made of Joel Feinberg's views on the right to be aided.
Objections and Conceptions of Moral Equivalence
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe first section of Ch. 3 is concerned with objections and alternatives to the arguments and analyses presented in the first two chapters on the moral equivalence of killing and letting die. Two issues are dealt with first: the issue of self‐ownership and the negative/positive rights distinction, and the issue of per se moral differences only sometimes making a difference in kill and let‐die cases depending on contexts. The relation that there might be between the killing/letting‐die distinction and the intention/foresight distinction (whose moral significance is described by the Doctrine of Double Effect) is considered. Particular attention is paid to the objections Shelly Kagan has made to the author's proposals and to the alternative views on positive and negative agency that Warren Quinn developed. The second section of the chapter returns to examine the stronger and weaker notions of per se moral equivalence, their differential relation to the moral equivalence of cases, and what they reveal about explanation in ethics and aesthetics.
Killing and Letting Die in Standardly Equalized Cases
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Presents four different tests to use on standardly equalized kill and let‐die cases to determine the truth of Thesis E (Thesis of the Moral Equivalence of Killing and Letting Die). The first is the Post‐Efforts Test, (which is contrasted with the defeasibility test); results obtained from this test are considered on varied cases, including cases where there are no wrong acts (this is related to issues of strict liability and agent regret); objections to the test are also examined. Second is the Pre‐Efforts Test, which requires foregoing benefit, making sacrifices, or being imposed on to prevent behaviour; after showing how this test might distinguish morally between killing and letting die, objections raised to it by Bruce Russell and Joel Feinberg are considered; consideration is also given to what moral difference is being measured by both the Post‐Efforts and the Pre‐Efforts tests — a difference in moral objectionableness or in some other moral property — and to the significance of not imposing losses on someone when he is dependent on some people but independent relative to others. The Choice Test comes third; this is in some ways more sensitive than the first two tests and may also yield different results; it gives the first indication that there are (at least) two different measures for the stringency of prohibitions on acts — an efforts measure and a precedence measure (this issue is also addressed in Ch. 12); again, the question arises as to whether the tests measure differences in moral objectionableness of killing and letting die or some other morally significant property (i.e. one related to how much we may require people to do). The final test presented is the Good Motive Test; this considers killing and letting‐die cases in which we act either for greater good or for paternalistic reasons (e.g. in euthanasia); Philippa Foot's views on the contrasting virtues of justice and charity are also considered here.
Constraints and You
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines the question of whether it is morally permissible to treat people in ways ruled out by the Principle of Permissible Harm (PPH; this was introduced in Ch. 7 and provides an account of certain restrictions/constraints on killing) only for the sake of minimizing violations of the PPH itself, or whether there is a constraint on doing this. Ch. 9 examines further one approach to the Selection Problem introduced in Ch. 8 that arises in justifying restrictions/constraints, namely, agent differentiation: the fact that something would be done by me rather than by someone else. Traditional victim‐focussed views (the victim's right or the inappropriateness of the relation in which he would stand to those for whom he would be sacrificed constrain and make it wrong for the agent to kill) are contrasted with four revisionist (agent‐relative and agent‐focussed) views on dealing with cases in which one person is killed in order to save others from being killed. Different notions of the self, act‐scenes, negative factors to be avoided, temporal dimensions, doomed victims, and degrees of self‐indulgence are examined in relation to the problem of justifying the constraint. One revisionist view is shown to bear a crucial similarity to the traditional view.
Agreements
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
If it is in one way in people's interest that there be constraints on killing (because it gives them a more sublime and elevated status), is it still possible for them to agree ex ante to alienate those rights for the sake of other interests they have? Can we do away with constraints protecting an individual not because it is for the greater good of others, but because ex ante it is in his own interest for there to be no constraints? This is the question that prompts Ch. 11. Both agent‐focussed objections and victim‐focussed objections to agreements to use oneself at one time for one's own good at another time are addressed, although the emphasis is on victim‐focussed reasons against such agreements, and on the limits to a strategy of founding morality on agreements and allowing duties to be overridden by agreements. The outline is plotted of the types of agreements permitted by ‘common‐sense morality.’
Supererogation, Obligation, and Intransitivity
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractReturns to a problem first raised in Ch. 8, namely, reconciling the existence of prerogatives not to maximize overall good (allowing for some such acts to be supererogatory) with restrictions on the pursuit of one's personal good. This problem becomes especially pressing since, despite the earlier emphasis on the existence of restrictions to pursuing the greater good, it is sometimes the case that greater good may permissibly take precedence over restrictions, for example, negative and positive duties (obligations) or rights; if personal good may take precedence over greater good (allowing some acts for greater good to be supererogatory), and these supererogatory acts may take precedence over restrictions, why may not personal good take precedence over restrictions — why does transitivity fail here? An attempt is made to prove each premise in this argument separately, and the associated objections and duties are presented. The third section of the chapter considers whether the intransitivity arises only because different factors account for precedence relations in each step of the argument, or whether the results obtained in the first two sections of the chapter are more general, and, indeed, another instance of the Principle of Contextual Interaction; consideration is also given to whether the intransitivities discussed share the cycling property characteristic of other intransitivities. Concludes by applying these results to a further discussion of those who never allow duty to be subordinated to supererogation, to Scheffler's Hybrid Theory, and to Parfit's problem of the Repugnant Conclusion.
The Bonds of Freedom
Authors: Miles Rebekah L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Feminist theologians have commonly identified Reinhold Niebuhr's Christian realism as a prime example of a patriarchal theological ethic that promotes domination. In this study, the author claims that Niebuhr's thought can be usefully appropriated and revised in service of a new ethic – a feminist Christian realism. This new ethic is offered as an answer to the loss of moral grounding and critical judgment within some North American feminist theologies. She contends that an increasingly radical feminist emphasis on divine immanence and human boundedness has undercut key assumptions upon which feminism rests. Niebuhr's realism, she believes, can be the source of a necessary correction. Feminist theologians. Miles argues, would be better served by using the categories of Christian realism to retrieve critically, a more positive understanding of divine transcendence and human self‐transcendence while maintaining their emphasis on human boundedness and divine presence. This position is developed by drawing together the contributions of Niebuhr, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Sharon Welch (two prominent feminist theologians). Ruether's turn to creation and Welch's turn to community together provide an important corrective to Niebuhr's Christian realism.
Freedom and Boundedness
Authors: Miles Rebekah L. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis introductory chapter starts by describing the setting within which the book was written, and provides an outline of the main contents. It the next two sections, it goes on to give the historical background to and definitions of Christian realism, and describe the assumptions and methodology used. The next section sketches a general argument about transcendence and immanence that is common to many, but not all, Christian theologies, and the following one argues that common feminist rejections of radical human self‐transcendence are bad for feminism because they undercut that which makes the feminist experience possible. The last four sections of the chapter discuss feminists on freedom, feminists on divine transcendence, Reinhold Niebuhr as a feminist resource, and feminist Christian realism as it emerges in the book from a mutually critical interaction among Niebuhr, Rosemary Radford Ruether, and Sharon Welch.
What's So Bad About Reinhold Niebuhr?
Authors: Miles Rebekah L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Because Reinhold Niebuhr has been so widely criticized by feminist theologians, a critical retrieval must first examine the extensive charges against him. To this end, this chapter outlines feminist criticisms of Niebuhr and develops a framework for a feminist reappropriation of Niebuhr that takes into account these criticisms. It is suggested that feminist criticisms of Niebuhr's understanding of gender roles do not fundamentally challenge Niebuhr's model of the free and bound self (human self‐transcendence and boundedness). Indeed, these criticisms actually exemplify the need to recognize the moral significance of both our given bodily reality and our human freedom partially to transcend and transform that givenness. Niebuhr's understanding of human moral experience provides a framework for that recognition.
Freedom for the World
Authors: Miles Rebekah L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter begins with Reinhold Niebuhr's claim that human experience is both bound and free (human boundedness and human self‐transcendence), and goes on to examine the broader ethical implications of this claim for feminist theologians and others. Though Niebuhr is drawn on as the primary resource for this position, the alternative offered is not simply Niebuhr dressed up in feminist vocabulary or feminism disguised by Niebuhrian concepts. Niebuhr's “hermeneutic of suspicion” creates a greater ambivalence about the moral status of the natural world and human communities than is necessary in a realist position. Instead, the alternative, a feminist Christian realism, accounts both for feminist criticisms of Niebuhr and for feminism's positive contributions to a realist ethic.
Dueling Realisms
Authors: Miles Rebekah L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This final chapter points toward an alternative position that critically retrieves the realisms of Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sharon Welch, and Reinhold Niebuhr, and finds a middle way between the idealistic realism about moral grounding found in Ruether and some early feminists, and the radically relative political realism of Welch and some other postmodern feminists. This alternative joins an appeal to human self‐transcendence and divine transcendence with an affirmation of human boundedness and divine presence. At the same time, it takes seriously, Ruether's turn to creation and Welch's turn to community. In this alternative model – a feminist Christian realism – the author hopes to maintain both substantive grounding for moral claims and critical judgment of them.
Introduction
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMost studies of Islamism have focused on the role of oppositional forces. Increasingly, states are also important Islamist actors. States pursue Islamization not only in reaction to Islamist challenges but also because in Islamism they see the opportunity to address the inherent weaknesses of the postcolonial state structure, and to significantly increase the power and capacity of the state. This trend is most evident in Pakistan and Malaysia where both the weakness of the postcolonial state and the opportunity inherent in Islamization have been greatest. These cases deviate from other models of state formation in the Muslim world, and provide new insights not only into state formation in the Muslim world but also into the study of the role of religion in state expansion in comparative politics.
The Islamist Challenge in Malaysia and Pakistan
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe 1970s was a period of Islamic resurgence in Malaysia and Pakistan. In Malaysia, ABIM and dakwah movements, and in Pakistan, the Jama`at‐i Islami spearheaded Islamist challenge to the secular state. These movements grew in popularity, and became the voice of the disgruntled political elements. They also floated new and powerful political concepts and ideas that quickly gained in popularity and framed public debates and influenced political culture.
Pakistan, 1977–1997
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe Zia ul‐Haq regime adopted state‐led Islamization to shore up waning state power. It adopted aspects of Islamist ideology to reshape the country's judicial and political structures. This strategy expanded state power after years of domestic strife and at a time when Pakistan was involved in the Afghan War. The policy was also used to legitimate military rule, providing a justification for its continuation as demands for democratization grew. The Islamization strategy firmly entrenched the postcolonial state in Islamic ideology and allowed the military to ally itself with Islamist forces to achieve its goals.
Conclusion
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWhy did only Malaysia and Pakistan adopt state‐led Islamization as a strategy for expansion of state power? How did this strategy serve their interests? What was the impact of this strategy on these countries and their societies? In the end, Islamization did serve state interests, but at the cost of laws and procedures that were neither viable in the long run nor were they socially beneficial. Furthermore, Islamization strategy ultimately proved untenable as interests of the state and those of Islamist actors began to diverge, especially with the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis, and implementation of IMF reforms.
Lessing's Philosophy of Religion and the German Enlightenment
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–81) is held in high esteem as one who marks the cutting edge of the German Enlightenment. He was the very first German to achieve a spiritually and intellectually mature state of being, the hallmark of which is independent and responsible use of one's own reason. He also stands as a key figure in German intellectual history, a bridge joining Luther, Leibniz, and German idealism. Yet despite his well‐recognized importance in the history of thought, and despite a substantial body of in‐depth studies, Lessing as theologian or philosopher of religion remains an enigmatic figure. Even today, his theology or philosophy of religion is a subject of dispute. With regard to the genuine core of his theological or religious‐philosophical thought, researchers hold diametrically opposed interpretations. It is not without reason that scholars refer to the “riddle” or “mystery” of Lessing, a mystery that has proved intractable because of his reticence on the subject of the final conclusions of his intellectual project. Confronted with this perplexity in Lessing studies, this book seeks to resolve the enigma. On the basis of intensive study of the entire corpus of Lessing's philosophical and theological writings as well as the extensive secondary literature, it leads the reader into the systematic core of Lessing's highly elusive religious thought. From a detailed and thoroughgoing analysis of Lessing's developing position on Christianity and reason, there emerges a fresh image of Lessing as a creative modern mind, both shaped by and giving shape to the Christian heritage.
The Roots of Reference
Authors: McCarthy Timothy , McCarthy Timothy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Applies the ‘Conformal Framework’ developed in Ch. 2 to some problems of the classical theory of reference, namely, to the question of how the reference of expressions in specific problem categories, in particular, proper names, observational predicates, and natural kind terms, is determined. McCarthy proposes interpretationally motivated accounts of the reference of these terms that cut across the conflicting accounts presented by causal and descriptive theories of reference. The striking feature of these accounts is their ‘local holism’: in each of the three cases under consideration, the answer provided takes the form of saying how the reference of expressions of the given sort is fixed relative to the interpretations of expressions in one or both of the other sorts. The reference mechanisms suggested stand in a dialectical relation to the Conformal Framework, in the sense that they are justified by the latter and at the same time lend support the Framework's constitutive principles proposed in Ch. 2.