bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Are Whales Fish?
Authors: Dupré John 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This chapter discusses the relationship between ordinary language classification of biological organisms and scientific classification. In a recent book (Dupre 1993) I argued at length for a pluralistic view of biological classification. This thesis has two parts, a pluralism about biological taxonomy and the insistence that folk taxonomies are as legitimate, and can be interpreted as realistically, as scientific taxonomies. A consequence of this, which I shall emphasize in this chapter, is that there is no reason to expect folkbiological categories to converge towards scientifically recognized kinds. Although there are certainly cases in which this happens, the removal of whales from the category of fish being a standard example which I shall consider in some detail, I argue that such changes are, at least, philosophically unmotivated.
The Mental Lives of Non-Human Animals
Authors: Dupré John 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is commonly supposed that the question whether animals other than ourselves have minds is perfectly simple to understand, but very difficult to answer. We suppose that we know exactly what is at issue, since we know from our own experience what it is to think, or more generally have mental lives; but we are very uncertain how we might ever discover whether animals do the same. In large part, we may also suppose, this is because, being dumb, they are unable to tell us. I want to argue in this paper that almost everything about this set of views is wrong. Our difficulty with this question is hardly at all to do with lack of evidence, but has everything to do with a lack of clarity about what is really involved in the attribution of mental states. I do not, of course, mean that the question about animal minds could be settled independently of any evidence. But I do want to suggest that the empirical facts in question may, in many cases, be quite banal. The trick is to decide what the relevant facts are.
The Calendar
Authors: Harding Jason 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
John Gross was correct to question respectfully the ‘underground reputation’ enjoyed by the Calendar of Modern Letters. The origins of that reputation can be traced to F. R. Leavis’s admiring introduction to his 1933 selection of critical essays and reviews from the Calendar. Comparing the Calendar to the Criterion, he spoke of its ‘superior liveliness’ and of ‘its great critical superiority’. In 1961, Malcolm Bradbury, who had interviewed Eliot, Leavis, and the Calendar’s chief editor, Edgell Rickword, described the journal as ‘in many ways’ the best literary review of the 1920s.
Introduction: The Developl\Ilent Of ‘I’He Inexpressiblli’I’Y Topos In European Literature
Authors: Brook Clodagh J 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Then Eugenio Montale, in his review of. Joyce’s Dublin, wrote that ‘ii sense detail composition e in quell fringier di parole non date’, he was drawing attention to the unsaid in literature, hinting that some firm of truth is harbored beyond the word.1 It is a concern that echoes across his writing, finding its clearest articulation, perhaps, in the poem ‘So lore in cui’ (La bodega e alto) where he affirms that ‘la piuveraragione di chit ace’. Here Montale challenges the power of language, his primary medium of expression, to reveal truth, and his as section raises a number of important theoretical questions.
Introduction
Authors: Clark Peter , Hawley Katherine 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Most of the articles in this volume were previously published in a special supplement of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Vol. 51, 2000), intended to mark the Journal’s fiftieth birthday; the articles by Brandon and Rosenberg, Campbell, Hall and Paul, and Shapiro are additional pieces, commissioned especially for the book. The range of articles is not intended to provide exhaustive coverage of current work in philosophy of science and allied disciplines —for example, there is little discussion of philosophical issues arising from cognitive science, and no mention of new developments in the philosophy of chemistry.
‘New Age’ Philosophies of Science: Constructivism, Feminism and Postmodernism
Authors: Koertge Noretta 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This paper surveys three controversial new directions in research about the nature of science and briefly summarizes both the intellectual and sociological impact of this work. A bibliographic introduction to the major literature is provided and some fruitful directions for future research are proposed. Philosophers of science are also exhorted to perform ‘community service’ by correcting misunderstandings of the methods of science fostered by these new approaches.
As Kuhn has taught us, one quick way to find the center of gravity of a field is to look at its textbooks. When I came to the HPS department at Indiana in 1970, Nagel’s Structure of Science ([1961]) was recommended as summer reading for entering graduate students and provided the background for the set lectures on logical empiricism. To learn about new trends, students read Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions ([1962]),
Geographical Introduction
Authors: Fodor Jerry , Lepore Ernest 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
COMPOSITIONALITY is the property that a system of representation has when (i) it contains both primitive symbols and symbols that are syntactically and semantically complex; and (ii) the latter inherit their syntactic/semantic properties from the former. For example, it is part and parcel of the compositionality of English that the symbol ‘dogs’ is complex, that it has the symbols ‘dog’ and ‘s’ as constituents, and that its meaning (viz., dogs) is inherited from the meanings of ‘dog’ (viz., dog) and ‘s’ (viz., plural). Likewise, it is part and parcel of the compositionality of English that the symbol ‘John jumps’ is complex, that it has among its constituents the symbols ‘John’ and ‘jumps ‘, and that its meaning (viz., John jumps) is inherited from the meanings of these sub sentential parts. The details are moot, but the general intuition will suffice for our present purposes: It seems clear (and we assume in what follows) that all the systems of representation that philosophers/cognitive scientists are professionally concerned with are more or less compositional. In particular, natural languages are, and so too is the system of mental representations that presumably mediates such mental processes as perception and thought.
What Can’t Be Valued Can’t Be Valued, and it Can’t Be Super valued Either
Authors: Fodor Jerry , Lepore Ernest 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
THIS is a long paper with a long title, but its moral is succinct. There are supposed to be two, closely related, philosophical problems about sentences with truth value gaps (tv gaps): If a sentence can ‘t be semantically evaluated, how can it mean anything at all? And how can classical logic be preserved for a language that contains such sentences? We are neutral on whether either of these supposed problems is real. But we claim that, if either is, super valuations will not solve it. There are many sentences that contain empty names; there are many sentences whose presuppositions fail, and there are many sentences whose predicates are vague (by some authors’ lights all predicates are, see Kamp and Partee 1995: 129-91). It seems plausible that at least some of these sentences are incapable of semantic evaluation; a fortiori, that they lack truth values. Let ‘s suppose for a working example that ‘The present king of France is bald’ is one of these.
Paul Churchland and State Space Semantics
Authors: Fodor Jerry , Lepore Ernest 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A NUMBER of philosophers believe that the notion of identity of meaning should be replaced by some graded notion of similarity of meaning. With a graded notion of similarity of meaning, intentional generalizations would be viewed as subsuming individuals in virtue of the similarity of their mental states; translation and paraphrase would be viewed as preserving not identity but similarity of meaning, and so forth. The prospects, however, for constructing a ‘robust’ notion of similarity of meaning-one adequate to the purposes of semantics and cognitive science-are, we believe, remote. This prognosis is n ‘t widely shared, perhaps because friends of semantic similarity have generally been careful not to say what they take semantic similarity to consist in. Paul Churchland, however, has proposed a sketch of the sort of similarity theory that is required, a notion of mental (or, anyhow, neural) representation that ‘embodies ... metrical relations ... and thus embodies the representation of similarity relations between distinct items thus represented’ (1989b: 102).
Epistemic Reflection and Transcendental Proof
Authors: Westphal Kenneth R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
After initial enthusiasm sparked by Professor Strawson ‘s The Bounds of Sense , Kant ‘s transcendental arguments have been sharply criticized by analytic commentators. Barry Stroud has observed that ‘it is not easy to incorporate the depth and power of Kant ‘s transcendental deduction into present-day philosophical attitudes and preconceptions ‘. However, this may be less a problem with Kant ‘s transcendental proofs than with our understanding of them. Instead of incorporating Kant ‘s transcendental proofs into present-day philosophical attitudes, it may be more illuminating to reconsider some of our current philosophical attitudes in order to under-stand and benefit from Kant ‘s transcendental proofs.
How are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?*
Authors: Boghossian Paul 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Epistemic relativism has the contemporary academy in its grip. Not merely in the United States, but seemingly everywhere, most scholars working in the humanities and the social sciences seem to subscribe to some form of it. Even where the label is repudiated, the view is embraced. Sometimes the relativism in question concerns truth, sometimes justification. The core impulse appears to be a relativism about knowledge. The suspicion is widespread that what counts as knowledge in one cultural, or broadly ideological, set- ting need not count as knowledge in another.
Etymology and History: For a Study of ‘Medical Language’ in Indo-European
Authors: Langslow D R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
‘The desire to use linguistic facts to reconstruct prehistoric events is old’ (Morpurgo Davies 1998: 174). And it persists. In her vivid and thought-provoking history of nineteenth-century linguistics Anna Davies shows how attitudes to language-based history-writing, or ‘linguistic palaeontology’, changed significantly from the confidence of the eighteenth and the first half of the nineteenth centuries, so as to yield in the last part of the nineteenth century a much more cautious approach to the notion of reconstructing Indo-European culture on the basis of reconstructed lexical items. It is tempting to see something of a mirror image of this nineteenth-century trend at the end of the twentieth century.
The Attitude of the Athenian State towards the Attic Dialect in the Classical Era
Authors: Crespo Emilio 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In a magnificent article, Anna Morpurgo Davies has studied the way in which the classical Greeks regarded their own dialects (Morpurgo Davies 1993; cf. 1987). The article compiles data which indicate that ‘in Attica then the dialect was an object of pride’ (1993: 264), and it goes on to describe, in as much detail as the scant remaining evidence allows, the attitude of the Spartans, the Boeotians, and the inhabitants of Oropus towards their dialects. Most of the sources and data refer to the attitudes of individuals, and only a few to those of states.The present contribution, whose sole merit lies in attempting to continue along the same path, aims to gather and present data on the attitude of the Athenian state towards the Attic dialect in the classical epoch, and to formulate a hypothesis that might account for the observed facts.
On Some Greek nt-Formations
Authors: nt-Formations On Some Greek 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the revised version of my Ph.D. thesis I followed the claim made by members of the Erlangen School and, most notably, Helmut Rix that in PIE nt-participles built on athematic non-Narten root presents or root aorists simply inflected the hysterokinetic way, i.e. added the e-grade variant of the suffix *-ent-to the zero grade of the verbal root in the strong cases, and the zero grade of the suffix *-nt-to the very same zero grade of the root in the weak cases (Peters 1980: 2‡4–5).1Reasonable as such a view might seem at first sight, since it is capable of explaining why it is the zero grade of the root that regularly shows up in nt -participles of a non-Narten pedigree,2 I abandoned it immediately upon the publication of my monograph, and this was mostly due to a careful (re)reading of Anna Morpurgo’s seminal
Dal nome comune al nome divino, proprio e locale: il caso di taskuin anatolico
Authors: Poetto Massimo 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
La sua rispondenza al termine comune (UZU)tasku-(anim.), che designa un componente anatomico, risulta immediata. Quest’ultimo vocabolo compare in due rituali magici eteo-luvi del milieu kizzuwatneo, KUB 9. 4 I e nel parallelo KUB 9. 34 II—come ta-as-ku-us, nom. sg. (9. 4 I 12, 29/9. 34 II 30, con UZU); gen. sg. ta-as-ku-wa-[as] (9. 4 I 28); dat. sg. ta-as-ku-i(9. 4 I 12)/UZUta-as-ku-wa-ia (9. 34 II 30)—in cui una se rie di parti del corpo d’un montone viene disposta, a scopo terapeutico, sui corrispettivi organi d’un paziente.
The Classical Approach to Categorization
Authors: Taylor John R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Chapter 1 contrasted two very diﬀerent approaches to colour categorization in language. On the one hand, one can appeal to the physical continuity of colour space in support of the view that it is the language system itself that arbitrarily cuts up the colour space into discrete categories. Alternatively, one may focus on the role played by non-linguistic factors (perceptual and environmental) in the structuring of colour categories. But whichever stand-point one sympathizes with, it is clear that one can hardly base a theory of linguistic categorization on the evidence of, at most, a dozen or so lexical items in a given language. Even the most convinced structuralist must concede that a physical continuum, which contains no natural breaks for categorization (as is the case with three-dimensional colour space), is probably the exception rather than the rule. Conversely, there are going to be very few categories that have such an obviously physiological and neurological base as colours. Berlin and Kay (1969: 13) themselves observe that colour terms, and perhaps also words for some other perceptual domains like taste, smell, and noise, might be atypical of language as a whole.
Polysemy, or: How many meanings does a word really have?
Authors: Taylor John R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
At the beginning of Chapter 6 I deﬁned polysemy as the ‘association of two or more related senses with a single linguistic form’. A number of problems lurk behind this seemingly straightforward deﬁnition, and the apparently clear-cut phenomenon which it describes. One of these we have already touched on, namely, the question whether two diﬀerent uses of a word exemplify two distinct senses, or contextual modulations of one and the same sense. Since the degree of distinctiveness of diﬀerent uses is a gradient notion, the question how many senses a word has may not have a clear-cut answer. A related question concerns the knowledge that a speaker of a language needs to have in order to be able to use a word appropriately. Does the knowledge of a word’s meaning take the form of a fairly general, or ‘schematic’ representation, with contextualized senses being derived on the basis of what the speaker takes to be conceptually plausible, in a given situation? Or could it be the case that at least some of the contextually elaborated senses are separately stored by the speaker? In this chapter, I present some arguments in favour of the latter possibility. I begin, however, with the question of compositionality, and the ways in which our treatment of polysemy impinges on our understanding of compositionality.
Grammatical Categories
Authors: Taylor John R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The prototype model of categories was developed in the early 1970s in response to evidence concerning the way people categorize things in their environment. Important landmarks in this research were Labov’s studies of the categorization of household receptacles, Berlin and Kay’s ﬁndings on colour categories, and the work of Rosch and her associates, which reﬁned and extended the insights of Berlin and Kay.There were, from the outset, two orientations that prototype research could take. The direction of cognitive psychology (cf. Smith and Medin 1981) was to focus on the way concepts are structured and represented in the mind. Alternatively, research on categorization could be channelled into linguistics. Here the emphasis came to be placed, not on concepts per se, but on the meanings of linguistic expressions. The two orientations are closely inter-twined. As we saw in the discussion of hedges (Section 4.4), linguistic data and the psychologist’s experimental ﬁndings mutually complement each other. Indeed, one of the main sources of evidence for conceptual structure is linguistic; conversely, any reasonable account of linguistic semantics needs to make reference to the conceptual structures which linguistic forms conventionally symbolize.
Syntactic Constructions as Prototype Categories
Authors: Taylor John R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In reviewing the evidence for the prototype structure of grammatical cate-gories, we saw in Chapter 11 that members of a grammatical category do not necessarily exhibit a common set of syntactic properties. Not every noun can be inserted with equal facility into the possessor slot of the possessive construction, not every transitive verb has a passive counterpart, and so on. Possibility of occurrence in a construction is a matter of gradience, some items being readily available, others being totally excluded, with, in between, a range of items whose use is dubious or sporadic. As a consequence, constructions, no less than other kinds of linguistic objects, need to be regarded as prototype categories, with some instantiations counting as better examples of the construction than others. The main body of this chapter examines the prototype structure of some selected English constructions. First, however, it is necessary to say a few words about the notion of construction within cognitive linguistics, and why we need to recognize constructions in the ﬁrst place.
Conflict and reconciliation: two theories compared
Authors: Fischer Olga 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Both grammaticalization and the various generative models, among which is the P&P approach, are seen as ‘theories’ by their practitioners. In spite of this, Newmeyer (1998: 240) states that ‘grammaticalization is not a theory’. It may therefore be appropriate, before we compare the two approaches that are the subject of study in this volume, to consider what is meant by ‘theory’.
What Do the Expressions of the Passions Tell Us?
Authors: Shapiro Lisa 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this essay I examine Descartes’s treatment of the expressions of the passions. Descartes takes our emotions to be made manifest by what he terms ‘the external signs of the passions’-that is,’the actions of the eyes and face, changes in color, trembling, languor, fainting, laughter, tears, groans and sighs’(Passions a.II2;AT xi. 4u).There is a puzzle in under-standing just how these manifestations can be signs of the passions. While it seems clear that our expressions signify our passions in virtue of the body’s relation to the soul-they are expressions of the passionsof the soul after all-what is not clear ishow our emotive expressions gain content. I aim to work through this puzzle here.
False Enemies: Malebranche, Leibniz, and the Best of All Possible Worlds
Authors: Scribano Emanuela 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
When trying to identify the polemical target of Discours de métaphysique § 3,where Leibniz rebuts the thesis of those who ‘believe that God could have made things better’, editors and commentators are unanimous in identifying Malebranche as the author who would have sustained that God could have done better than He did with the creation of this world. This conviction is not shaken by the doubts which might arise from the variants in the text, which these same editors accurately note and which seem quickly to lead one in a completely different direction. ‘Nor can I approve the opinion of certain moderns’ writes Leibniz in the final version of the Discours, correcting an earlier version which reads: ‘nor can I approve the opinion of certain scholastics’. And again: ‘I also believe that a great many passages from Sacred Scripture and the holy fathers will be found favoring my opinion, but scarcely any will be found favoring the opinion of these moderns. ’This time the ‘moderns’ substitutes for the ‘new scholastics’ from the previous version. In the final version of the Discours,Leibniz has rendered his critique more general, alluding to all those in recent times who held that God could have created a better world.
Family
Authors: Almond Brenda 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It would be difficult to understand the decline and fragmentation of the family without first taking a broad look at the way conceptions of the family have changed. Experts on the family have recently come to regard the definition of ‘family’ as a serious problem and to propose a surprising variety of possibilities. There are, of course, valid sociological distinctions to be made, for example, between the extended and the nuclear family, as well as legal distinctions, for example, between the adoptive and the natural family, but the process of drawing distinctions in these areas appears to have moved from recognizing straightforward differences based on matters of fact to legitimizing more controversial categories, including wholly unrelated groups, simply by choosing to call them families.
Arcesilaus: Socratic and Sceptic
Authors: Cooper John M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
At least since the time of Cicero the interpretation of what we call Academic scepticism has been uncertain and subject to dispute. For us today the central disputed question, or related set of questions, concerns the relationship between the philosophical views of the Academics, and their argumentative practices— from the time of Arcesilaus, when Plato’s Academy First‘went sceptical’,1 down through his successors Carneades and Clitomachus in the late second century— to the self-styled Pyrrhonism inaugurated by Aenesidemus in the Firsthalf of the Firstcentury.
Introduction
Authors: Mccabe Anne 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The text known as the Hippiatrica is the principal monument which remains of technical literature in Greek devoted to the care and healing of the horse. Compiled probably in the fifth or sixth century ad by an unknown editor out of excerpts from seven Late Antique veterinary manuals, the Hippiatrica is a vast work of reference organized ailment-by-ailment and author-by-author, ending with lists of recipes for drugs. The text is preserved in five recensions, in twenty-two manuscripts (containing twenty-five copies) which range in date from the tenth century to the sixteenth.