bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Serious Metaphysics and Supervenience
Authors: Jackson Frank 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSerious metaphysics is the business of giving an account of what our world is like, which is much more than a shopping list. A famous example is physicalism, the doctrine that our world is a huge aggregation of items that are purely physical or physical without remainder. This chapter uses physicalism to explore what such a claim comes to in terms of supervenience; how it leads to a necessitation doctrine; and how it raises the location problem—the problem of locating an item described in non‐physical terms in the physical account offered by physicalism.
The Location Problem for Ethics: Moral Properties and Moral Content
Authors: Jackson Frank 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter gives an account of what cognitivism in ethics is and argues that the a priori global nature of the supervenience of the ethical on the descriptive requires cognitivists in ethics to identify ethical properties with descriptive ones. It argues that we can locate ethical properties with descriptive ones in terms of the role ethical properties play in folk morality, a view of ethics I call, with Philip Pettit, ‘moral functionalism’.
Analytical Descriptivism
Authors: Jackson Frank 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter gives more detail on how to identify ethical properties with descriptive ones using the roles the former play in folk morality. The construction uses the Lewis–Carnap–Ramsey way of defining theoretical terms and implies that ethical terms are analyzable in descriptive terms. This approach is contrasted with Cornell Realism, and there is discussion of the open‐question argument and how belief about ethical properties connects with motivation on the version of analytical descriptivism being defended.
Chapter One
Authors: Moore A. W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractI begin by raising the question whether there can be ‘absolute representations’ and explain what I mean by this. I define a ‘representation’ as anything, which has content and which, because of its content, is either true or false. I define an ‘absolute’ representation as a representation whose content can be combined with that of any other possible representation ‘by simple addition’. This contrasts with the case of a ‘non‐absolute’ or ‘perspectival’ representation, whose content may not be combinable with that of another representation until the element of perspective has been eliminated. Thus if one person says, ‘I am English,’ and another says, ‘I am German,’ it is not possible for either of those people, nor indeed for anyone else, to combine the contents of their representations by saying, ‘I am English and I am German.’
Chapter Three
Authors: Moore A. W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThere is a temptation associated with the question, which must be exposed before the question can be properly addressed. This is the temptation to think that there are perspectival features of reality that figure in perspectival facts, and that what makes (some) true perspectival representations true is the obtaining of such facts. I argue that this is incoherent, and that the absolute/perspectival distinction applies exclusively to representations, not to what is represented. (To argue for this, I assume the unity of reality: this is an assumption that will reappear and receive further consideration in subsequent chapters.) I also consider why the temptation exists, and how it can be resisted.
Chapter Four
Authors: Moore A. W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractI distinguish my question from various others with which it might be confused, and then argue for an affirmative answer to it (in other words, that absolute representations are possible). My argument, which I call ‘the Basic Argument’, is an embellishment of an argument due to Williams. Its key premise, which I call ‘the Basic Assumption’, and which I express as the assumption that ‘representations are representations of what is there anyway’, involves a cluster of interrelated ideas about the unity, substantiality, and autonomy of reality. (This is the assumption I make in the argument of Chapter 3.) I end the chapter by considering the role of science, and specifically of physics, within what I have just argued.
Chapter Six
Authors: Moore A. W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractI argue that both Kant and, in his later work, Wittgenstein (the latter in spite of himself) indicate the possibility of just such a transcendental‐idealist response to the Basic Argument. I also argue, however, that transcendental idealism, for all its appeal, is incoherent. This is because its attempt to invoke the ‘transcendent’ is an attempt to invoke that which, by definition, cannot be invoked. So, it does not provide an alternative to unregenerate endorsement of the Basic Argument after all.
Chapter Seven
Authors: Moore A. W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThere remains the problem of accounting for the appeal of transcendental idealism. Transcendental idealists themselves may say that there is nothing wrong with the doctrine, but only with the attempt to express it, the point being that it is inexpressibly true: but I argue that this does not extricate them from the trap of self‐stultification. An importantly different proposal, which I derive from the earlier work of Wittgenstein, is this: while we cannot coherently state that transcendental idealism is true we are shown that transcendental idealism is true, where ‘A is shown that x’ is defined as ‘(i) A has ineffable knowledge, and (ii) when an attempt is made to put that knowledge into words, the result is: x.’ I try to indicate how, provided we can make sense of (i) and (ii), this proposal has the threefold merit of: avoiding self‐stultification; being compatible with the incoherence of transcendental idealism; and providing an account of transcendental idealism's appeal.
Chapter Eight
Authors: Moore A. W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractI argue that we can make sense of (i). I give a very general account of knowledge, and then identify ineffable knowledge as a kind of practical knowledge (though, in the course of doing this, I try to make clear that the relation between practical knowledge and the idiom ‘knows how to’ is not as straightforward as is commonly supposed). What distinguishes ineffable knowledge, on my account, is that it has nothing to answer to. Prime examples are certain states of understanding.
Chapter Nine
Authors: Moore A. W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractI further argue that we can make sense of (ii). This requires a critique of nonsense, since, for reasons that I give, what replaces ‘x’ in the schema must be nonsense. I endorse an austere view of nonsense whereby there is nothing more to nonsense than sheer lack of sense, as in ‘phlump jing ux’. The point is this: because our ineffable knowledge is a mark of our finitude, and because we have a shared aspiration to transcend our finitude, we also have a shared temptation to put our ineffable knowledge into words, which in turn gives us a shared sense of when a piece of nonsense is ‘apt’ to replace ‘x’ in the schema, where ‘aptness’ is a quasi‐aesthetic attribute. This is enough for instances of the schema to count as true or false—and, arguably, for ‘We are shown that transcendental idealism is true’ to count as true.
Chapter Eleven
Authors: Moore A. W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractI identify and discuss three principles that underlie these ideas: first, that we are finite; secondly, that we are self‐conscious about our finitude; and thirdly, that we aspire to be infinite. I argue that the third of these explains the value of certain things to us, and that it leads to our being shown that these things are of unconditioned value (even though they are not). Finally, by addressing the question what value our aspiration to be infinite itself has, I make some suggestions about the relationship between our ineffable knowledge and God.
Scepticism
Authors: Poellner Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Presents Nietzsche's critical reflections directed at traditional metaphysical categories such as the external world, substance, causation, and self. Targeted theories include the doctrine of substance qua substratum for properties; the Lockean ontology of powers inherent in external objects; the construal of the self as either mental substance or transcendental subjects; atomism; and the belief in the explanatory powers of Newtonian force. It is argued that there is a pervasive general line of scepticism in Nietzsche's later thought concerning the possibility of knowledge as rationally justified true belief. The chapter concludes with a defence of Nietzsche's general scepticism against a variety of countervailing arguments.
Beyond Scepticism: ‘For—There Is No “Truth” ’
Authors: Poellner Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
As well as drawing sceptical conclusions, Nietzsche rejects the concept of absolute or metaphysical truth as unintelligible. Nietzsche's views are elucidated by contrasting his arguments with alternative accounts of ‘objective reality’ belonging to the philosophical canon. It ensues that Nietzsche espouses a variety of anti‐metaphysics premised on the mutual determination of reality and interest. He believes that objective reality cannot be conceived without volitional and intentional agency on the part of subjects who experience themselves as acted upon (‘resisted’) by the contents of their representations. Having elaborated and explained the prominence of Nietzsche's denial of metaphysical fact, the discussion turns to the origin and significance of the desire for metaphysical truth. In identifying the embracing of metaphysical truth for its own sake (the ‘will to truth’) with the ascetic ideal, Nietzsche intends to contrast practical engagement with the world with a preference for evaluation divorced from the subject's actual experiences and desires. Belief in objective value and ‘the will to truth’ are subsumed under a general psychological disposition designated ‘the ascetic ideal’, characterized by self‐deception or ressentiment.
Truth, Survival, and Power
Authors: Poellner Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In contrast with views that attribute the biological utility of beliefs to their truth, Nietzsche maintains that their relative utility renders them proportionately more likely to be idiosyncratic expressions of species‐relative concerns. Nietzsche's sceptical ‘argument from utility’—the inference from the practical utility of beliefs to the improbability of their being metaphysically true—is examined and rejected. It is argued that Nietzsche is an early proponent of naturalized epistemology. His objections to the ‘best explanation’ defence of metaphysical realism are discussed. It emerges that the ‘evolutionary’ strand of thought is incompatible with his other sceptical arguments. The chapter pursues Nietzsche's doctrine that the ‘ruling drives’ representing the dominant manifestation of the will to power in an individual determine the standards for validation, evidence, and truth. The discussion proceeds to an examination of Nietzsche's remarks that the external world is created in a manner depending on the specific form of the will to power instantiated by the empirical subject.
The Nature of ‘Inner Experience’
Authors: Poellner Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues that Nietzsche's pronouncements on psychology advert to basic facts about the constitution of inner experience and are thus incompatible with his anti‐essentialism. Nietzsche's analysis of non‐egoistic behaviour, his proto‐Freudian presentation of mental life as driven by processes inaccessible to self‐consciousness, and his analysis of the ascetic ideal, ressentiment, and self‐deception amount to a picture of human agency in which all significant aspects of inner experience are ‘in reality’ desires for the experience of power.
The Will to Power: Nietzsche and Metaphysics
Authors: Poellner Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines Nietzsche's anti‐essentialism (the denial of metaphysical truth) in the context of the metaphysics of the will to power, which posits an ontology of interactive and causally efficacious quanta of force characterized exclusively by relational properties. It is argued that this ontological model is marred by a fundamental incoherence. The concluding remarks touch upon the problem of relativism of truth and self‐reference. An attempt is made to situate the metaphysics of the will in the context of Nietzsche's whole philosophy.
Biblical Faith and Natural Theology
Authors: Barr James 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Natural theology is the idea that human beings ‘by nature’, just through being human, know something of God, or alternatively that they gain such knowledge through experience of the world we live in. An opposite is revelation, a knowledge of God communicated through special channels such as the Bible. Natural theology was long accepted as a basic ingredient in theology and indeed in science, but in modern times was widely rejected, notably in Barthianism. But what if the Bible itself uses, depends on and supports natural theology? This book examines the biblical materials (Hebrew Bible, Apocrypha and New Testament) that seem to give an affirmative answer. On biblical grounds, it argues, the importance of natural theology is undeniable.
The Thought of Thomas Aquinas
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The aim of this book is to give a general and introductory overview of the teaching and thought of Thomas Aquinas (1224–26 to 1274), a Dominican friar, and one of the greatest Western philosophers, and Christian theologians. Books on Aquinas invariably deal either with his philosophy or his theology; Aquinas himself, however, made no such arbitrary division, and this book allows him to be seen as a whole, in introducing almost the full range of his thinking, and relating this to writers both earlier and later. The author points out that all Aquinas’ major conclusions can be found in his first important work – Commentary on the Sentences, and that he did not change his mind radically throughout his writings, although some emphases shifted. Nevertheless, in this book, Aquinas’ thinkings are followed broadly in accordance with the scheme he provides in Summa Theologiae, which is considered to be his greatest achievement and is the best‐known synthesis of his thinking. Ways in which the thinking in Summa Theologiae differs from his thinking presented elsewhere are noted, and some of the treatment is selective (for example politics and aesthetics are not dealt with directly). Discussion is also omitted of Aquinas’ contribution to thirteenth‐century debates on the legitimacy and running of certain religious orders in the Catholic Church, which is now merely of historical interest.
The Shape of a Saint
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This first chapter gives an outline of Thomas Aquinas’ life and work. The different sections of the chapter cover his early years and his adoption of Aristotle's thinking at the University of Naples, where he also joined the Dominican Order of friars, his progression from student at Naples to teacher at the University of Paris, his life in Paris and return to Naples, and the last phase of his life. There is also a section on his character (philosopher or theologian, saint and thinker), and lastly, a discussion of the meaning of his writings today.
Getting to God
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter starts by addressing Thomas Aquinas’ idea of God, and then discusses ways in which we cannot defend belief in his existence. It goes on to expand on the basis on which we can claim knowledge of God's existence, through looking at the cause of effects that are evident to us; these are Aquinas’ ‘Five Ways’ (Quinque Viae), which are discussed in detail. Further sections of the chapter cover the existence argument, creation, and the beginning of the world.
What God Is not
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The view of Thomas Aquinas that we can only know what God is not, rather than what he is, is discussed. The first part of the chapter outlines Aquinas’ basic position on this matter in relation to his theological background and the range of human knowledge. It then goes on to discuss the doctrine of divine simplicity, first giving the reasoning behind this, and then giving the details of Aquinas’ view on the matter. This is that God is pure form and he is his nature, so that the substance of God is his existence. Although God may be unknowable and incomprehensible, he is still there.
Talking About God
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Since Thomas Aquinas considers God to be entirely mysterious and unknowable, the question is discussed of his position on how we can think of, or indeed say anything about him. The attitude of earlier Christian writers to this matter is outlined, and then Aquinas’ thinking on the subject is discussed: he says that in talking of God in a positive way, we do, in a sense, describe him – even though God is above naming, our statements about him can signify the divine nature. This amounts to what is known as the doctrine of analogy: that words are used of God and creatures in an analogical way. In essence then, Aquinas holds to three theses: (1) We do not know what God is, for he cannot he defined and he differs quite radically from the things to which we compare him; (2) As the source of his creatures, however, God may be said to resemble them, though he lacks all creaturely limitations; and (3) There is room for arguing that certain specific predicates can be ascribed to him. The chapter ends with comments on the conclusion propounded by Aquinas that while creatures are really related to God, God is not really related to them.
Perfection and Goodness
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Thomas Aquinas thinks that God defies our comprehension, but, as has been discussed earlier in the book, he also holds that we are still able to make true statements about him. So far, the book has only looked at how Aquinas defends this thesis in general terms, but here some particulars are addressed. What Aquinas thinks that we can say of God deal with assertions of two types: (1) those that can be made and defended on rational grounds without recourse to special (Christian) revelation; and (2) those that derive from revelation. In this chapter, and the three chapters following, the first group of assertions are considered, starting with the assertions ‘God is perfect’ and ‘God is good’. The last part of the chapter discusses the ancient and much discussed problem of God and evil.
Ubiquity to Eternity
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Continuing with the theme of what can be known of God apart from Revelation, this chapter turns to three beliefs that are absolutely fundamental to the thinking of Thomas Aquinas. These are: (1) that God is everywhere; (2) that God is unchangeable; and (3) that God is eternal. The third topic is addressed in some detail, and includes discussion of Aquinas on time, and on why God is eternal (because he has no duration or temporal location). The last part of the chapter discusses Aquinas’ views on eternity in the light of contemporary criticism, indicating the objections most frequently raised, and what Aquinas might have said against these.
Oneness to Knowledge
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Thomas Aquinas accepts the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, so he believes that divinity somehow contains distinction within itself. He thinks that there are three who are God, and he also thinks that, if we ask, ‘three what?’, the answer is, ‘three persons’. However, also in line with Christian orthodoxy, Aquinas is a monotheist: he believes that there is but one, powerful, knowledgeable God. This chapter investigates why Aquinas takes the resolutely monotheistic position that he adopts everywhere, before turning in Ch. 10 to his treatment of the Trinity. The three main sections of the chapter are: God is one; God has power; and God's knowledge.
Will to Mercy
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The book has so far shown that Thomas Aquinas had plenty to say about what we need to affirm of God from a philosophical viewpoint and without explicit reference to, or dependence Christian revelation. According to him, there are good philosophical grounds for saying that God is the creator of the world, and that he is perfect, good, ubiquitous, eternal, unique, powerful, and knowledgeable. This chapter turns to his philosophical treatment of God's will, God's love, and God's justice and mercy, for what he has to say presupposes, and connects with, much that he teaches concerning God's changelessness, power, and knowledge. His philosophical case for ascribing will to God rests, for example, on his view of God's knowledge or understanding, and he develops it by drawing on the conclusion that God is wholly immutable.
Providence and Freedom
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Thomas Aquinas maintains that God's mercy and love are aspects of his providence, but he has more to say about providence than that. In this chapter, his teaching on providence is examined, first from a general viewpoint, and then looking at the three implications of this for Aquinas – those concerning chance, the action of created secondary causes, and predestination. Finally, a look is taken at what he says on three topics that fall within the notion of providence as he, and others, have understood it – miracles, human freedom, and prayer.
The Eternal Triangle
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
For Thomas Aquinas, the heart of Christian teaching is the doctrine of the Trinity, and this is the first specifically Christian topic that he turns to in Summa Theologiae. Historically speaking, Aquinas is one of the most important writers on the doctrine of the Trinity, and it is these writings that are addressed in this chapter. Aquinas takes for granted the substance of early texts on the Trinity such as the Creed of Asthanius, so his position is thoroughly orthodox. Consequently, his own treatment of the Trinity deals with three main topics, each of which is discussed separately: (1) the relevance of philosophy to the doctrine; (2) the divine processions, and hence the relations, involved in the Trinity; and (3) the persons of the Trinity taken individually.
Being Human
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Thomas Aquinas maintains that we share in the life of the Trinity as human beings, and in order to grasp the implications of that notion, this chapter examines what he thinks human beings are. First, it looks at the concepts of Dualism (Descartes’ view that people are composed of a separate mind and body) and Physicalism (which says that people are made up of one kind of matter – or body – and that this includes the mind, or mental processes), and concludes that Aquinas occupied a viewpoint between these two extremes. Next, it looks at the position that he held on people as having both soul and body, which he does not treat as distinct things, but nevertheless feels obliged to distinguish. Following on from this, Aquinas’ thinking on death and the soul is examined. The last part of the chapter looks at desire and action; here, Aquinas is shown to treat human action both as voluntary (free) and as occurring on the basis of dispositions, which are determined by past events and by choice.