bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Good, Better, or Best?
Authors: Caplan Arthur L 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Excellence has come in for a lot of bad press recently. A torrent of books and articles have appeared [see list of References, 1 – 10, 20] all raising serious ethical questions about the wisdom and morality of trying to use new biomedical knowledge to perfect ourselves or our offspring. Of course, beating up on the literal pursuit of perfection is silly. As the artist Salvador Dali famously pointed out, ‘ ‘Have no fear of perfection— you ‘ll never reach it ‘ ‘. Critics of those who allegedly seek to perfect human beings by means of bioengineering know this. Nonetheless, they often invoke the rhetoric of ‘perfection ‘ in their critiques since the pursuit of perfection seems arrogant at best and silly at worst. Perfection, however, while an easy target, is not their real target. What they really are attacking is the far more frequently expressed, albeit far less lofty, and, notably, far less controversial goal— improvement.
Paternalism in the Age of Cognitive Enhancement: Do Civil Liberties Presuppose Roughly Equal Mental Ability?
Authors: Wikler Daniel 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Advances in genetics and biotechnology may enable scientists to augment our cognitive powers. If this does become feasible, it is virtually certain that many people will want this kind of intervention for their children, or indeed if it proves feasible, for themselves. Perhaps the maximum enhancement will be minor, say a 5 to 10 per cent increase in memory capacity, ability to concentrate, or speed of calculation. Some of us can achieve performance enhancements of this magnitude now, with training, coffee, or a good night ‘s sleep. If many people achieved these gains, they might be more productive, and perhaps fewer accidents would occur. The aggregate benefit might be impressive. But their effect on our social institutions and relationships would be minor or non-existent.
Life
Authors: Hedges S Blair 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This the earliest and most controversial portion of the tree of life and few details can be regarded as well established. It involves the relationships and times of origin of the three super kingdoms, Eubacteria, Archaebacteria, and Eukaryota. But the key to understanding how these earliest events unraveled is to know how eukaryotes arose and their relationship to prokaryotes. Despite the availability of hundreds of completely sequenced genomes from prokaryotes and dozens from eukaryotes, the answers are not yet in hand. New models for the origin of eukaryotes appear frequently. For ease of discussion they are classified here as merger models (1–11) and deep-root models (12, 13). The former ascribe the origin of eukaryotes to a merger between two prokaryotes whereas the latter minimize the role of mergers and instead postulate an ancient origin of eukaryotes, at least as old as the earliest divergences among living prokaryotes. The goal of this brief synopsis is to review the evidence bearing on the earliest aspects of the time tree of life. Details concerning differences among the many proposed models, as well as different points of view, can be found elsewhere (2, 14, 15).
Magnoliids
Authors: Forest Félix , Chase Mark W 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The magnoliid clade attaches to one of the basal-most nodes in the angiosperm tree and comprises four orders, Magnoliales, Laurales, Piperales, Canellales, and a total of ca. 8000 species grouped in 20 families, of which Piperaceae (black pepper family; 3000 species), Lauraceae (laurel family; 2500 species), and Annonaceae (custard-apple family; 1200 species) are by far the largest (1). Many species in this group are widely cultivated as ornamentals (e.g., Magnolia, Magnoliaceae (Fig. 1); Peperomia, Piperaceae) for spices and Pavorings such as nutmeg (Myristica, Myristicaceae), cinnamon (Cinnamomum, Lauraceae), and bay (Laurus, Lauraceae), and for their fruit (e.g., avocado; Persea, Lauraceae) (2). Representatives of this clade have various habits ranging from trees and shrubs to lianas and herb, and are widespread in tropical and temperate regions of the world (3). Here, relationships and divergence times of the four orders and 20 families forming the magnoliids are reviewed.
Sturgeons and paddlefishes (Acipenseriformes)
Authors: Penga Zuogang , Diogob Rui , Ludwigc Arne , Hea Shunping 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The extant sturgeons (Acipenseridae, containing four genera—Acipenser, Huso, Pseudoscaphirhynchus, and Scaphirhynchus) and paddleAshes (Polyodontidae, containing two monospeciAc genera—Polyodon and Psephurus) with some extinct families form a monophyletic group of the ray-Anned Ashes, the Order Acipenseriformes. Sturgeons are diagnosed by presenting Ave rows of bony scutes or plates on their body, four barbels in front of mouth, and absence of teeth in adults. PaddleAshes are diagnosed by their paddle-like snout, absence of large scutes on their body, and minute barbels on their snout (1). Additionally, Polyodon is best known for its Altered-feeding habit based on numerous thin, elongate gill rakers unique to them among sturgeons and paddleAshes (2). Acipenseriforms only inhabit the Northern Hemisphere, and the present biogeographic distribution of the extant species of this group repects ancient relationships among Ash faunas of Europe, Asia, and North America. Extant representatives are in two families with six genera and 27 species. Here, we review the relationships and divergence times of the major groups of acipenseriforms (Fig. 1).
Teleost fishes (Teleostei)
Authors: Penga Zuogang , Diogob Rui , Hea Shunping 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Teleosts are a modern group of Ashes including more than 26,000 species (1), which are grouped into 40 orders. They are typically grouped together with the garAshes (Lepisosteiformes) and BowAn (Amiifomes) in the Subclass Neopterygii. Teleosts are the most speciesrich and diversiAed group of all the vertebrates. 7ere are more teleost species than all the other vertebrates combined (2). 7ey dominate in the world’s rivers, lakes, and oceans. 7ere are four subdivisions within extant teleosts: Osteoglossomorpha (e.g., mooneyes and bonytongues), Elopomorpha (e.g., eels, tarpons, and boneAshes), Otocephala (e.g., ostariophysan and clupeomorph teleosts), and Euteleostei (the remaining teleosts, e.g., Argentiniformes, Osmeriformes, Salmoniformes, and Neoteleostei) (3). At least 27 anatomical shared derived traits were found by de Pinna (4) to support the monophyly of the Teleostei. Here, we review the relationships and divergence times of the major groups of teleosts (Fig. 1). Until recently, the classification of teleosts pioneered by Greenwood et al. (5) and expanded on by Patterson and Rosen (6) has followed the arrangement proposed by Nelson (7) and today is still rePected in Ash textbooks and papers. In it, species were placed in four major groups: Osteoglossomorpha, Elopomorpha, Otocephala, and Euteleostei. This is division was based on multiple morphological characters and molecular evidence.
Lizards, Snakes, And Amphisbaenians (Squamata)
Authors: Hedgesa S Blair , Vidal Nicolas 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The lizards, snakes, and amphisbaenians form a monophyletic group of scaly reptiles, the Order Squamata. 7ey are typically grouped together with the tuataras (Order Rhynchocephalia) in the Subclass Lepidosauria. Male squamates have a pair of unique copulatory organs, hemipenes, located in the tail base. Limb reduction or loss has occurred independently in multiple lineages. Nearly 8200 living species of squamates have been described and placed in 58 families: 4900 species in 26 families of lizards (Fig. 1), 200 species in six families of amphisbaenians, and 3070 species in 26 families of snakes (1, 2). Here, we review the relationships and divergence times of the families of squamates, excluding snakes (Serpentes), which are treated elsewhere (3).
Cranes, rails, and allies (Gruiformes)
Authors: Houde Peter 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The avian Order Gruiformes, as traditionally conceived, consists of as many as a dozen families of extant or recently extinct birds and nearly as many more families known only from fossils. theFamily Gruidae is represented by 15 species of cranes, which are found worldwide except in Antarctica and South America. thenearly cosmopolitan Family Rallidae comprises some 135–142 species of rails, crakes, coots, moorhens, gallinules, and Pufftails (1, 2). Cranes and rails comprise the genetically closely related and relatively morphologically homogeneous Suborder Grues (3), which in turn is divided into the stocky rail-like Superfamily Ralloidea (rails, Anfoots, adzebills) and the lanky crane-like Superfamily Gruoidea (cranes, Limpkin, trumpeters). Ralloids and gruoids represent extremes along a continuum of size from 139 to 1524 mm in length (4). Most are drab somber birds of wetlands or aquatic habitats, although gallinules are colorful and many others have pigmented patches of skin on the head (Fig. 1).
Primates (Primates)
Authors: Steiper Michael E , Youngc Nathan M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Living primates comprise an order of placental mammals characterized by forward facing eyes, a petrosal-derived auditory bulla, grasping hands and feet, nails instead of claws, a large brain relative to body size, and a slow life history (1). 7ere are over 350 extant primate species (Fig. 1). Aside from our own widely distributed species, primates are native to habitats throughout Central and South America, Africa, and Asia. Here, molecular divergence times of the 15 extant primate families (2) are reviewed. Currently, there is general consensus on the overall shape and structure of the subordinal through familylevel phylogeny of the primates, with some exceptions (Fig. 2) (3–6). Lemurs and lorises, collectively known as the strepsirrhines, are united by the presence of derived features including a toothcomb and grooming claw. Within the lemurs, there is as yet no consensus on the relationships among the Ave extant families, except that Daubentoniidae is likely to be the most basal taxon based on molecular evidence (7). 7erefore, we represent the relationships among the remaining four families as a polytomy and use the oldest date for included nodes given in each study (8–10).
The structure of quantifiers and nominalizations, and the role of the definite article
Authors: Giannakidou Anastasia , Rathert Monika 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One of the most fruitful ideas in formal semantics has been the thesis that quantifier phrases (QPs) denote generalized quantifiers (GQs; Montague (1974), Barwise & Cooper (1981), Zwarts (1986), Westerståhl (1985), Partee (1987), Keenan (1987), Keenan & Westerståhl (1997), among many others). GQ theory initiated an exciting research agenda in the 1980s, and the decades that followed featured extensive studies of quantificational structures, with attention to the constituents of QPs, and their scopal properties.
Properties, entity correlates of properties, and existentials
Authors: mcnally louise 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Setting aside obviously predicative uses of nominals, the claim that predicates can take property-type nominal arguments has been motivated on the basis of two very different kinds of data. On the one hand, Chierchia (1984) discussed cases in which a predicate such as fun or good can apply to a nominalized property such as in the following examples: Such examples, he argued, show that some predicates denote true properties of properties.
Moral Dependence
Authors: Zangwill Nick 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
What is the relation between moral and natural properties? And how do we conceive of this relation? By ‘moral’ properties I will mean properties such as being evil, just, or virtuous or having duties or rights; and by ‘natural’ properties I will mean properties such as psychological, sociological, and physical properties.¹Suppose we judge that Queen Isabella of Spain was evil in 1492, or at least that many of her actions in 1492 were evil. Then we do not think that she had various natural properties in 1492— such as being a torturer, a bigot, and desiring other’s pain— and by an astounding coincidence she or her actions also had the moral property of evil. Rather, we think that she or her actions were evil in virtue of those natural properties; we think that her moral properties depend on her natural properties; we think that she had her moral properties because of her natural properties. In general, when we make a moral judgment we judge not just that something has a moral property, but that it has a moral property because it has some natural property. This is a fundamental principle of our moral thought.
Constructivism about Reasons
Authors: Street Sharon 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Do valuable things possess their value independently of our valuing them? Or does their value always depend, at least ultimately, on our taking them to be valuable? I have argued elsewhere that Darwinian considerations settle this debate in favor of the latter, antirealist view.¹ Things are valuable ultimately because we take them to be. But the ultimately in this statement is important. While there are, ultimately, no normative truths that hold independently of our evaluative attitudes— while normative realism is false, in other words— it does not follow that it’s impossible to go wrong with one’s normative judgments. On the contrary, there is still a robust sense in which normative judgments can be, and often are, in error. This is the important core of truth in realism. The truth in antirealism, however— and what makes antirealism the right view in the end— is that the standards of correctness that determine what counts as an error are ultimately set by our own normative judgments. To put the point another way: A person does not have a normative reason merely in virtue of taking herself to have it; it’s easy to go wrong about one’s reasons, and we do so all the time.
Epistemological Foundations for the Cosmological Argument
Authors: Koons Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The cosmological argument— the argument from contingency to the existence of a necessary First Cause— forms the core of a long-standing research programme in philosophical theology. Even if such theistic arguments are, as Plantinga has demonstrated, unnecessary for the reasonableness of theistic belief, a successful proof would by all accounts have considerable significance. The cosmological argument has in recent years garnered considerable respect, both from theists and agnostics. However, the central assumption of that argument, a principle of sufficient reason or general causation, has failed to win universal acceptance. A recent book by Alexander Pruss (2006a), The Principle of Sufficient Reason, has addressed this question with a number of ingenious appeals to our metaphysical intuitions. In this paper, I will attempt to complement Pruss’s efforts through an appeal to epistemology.
Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism
Authors: Leuenberger Stephan 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In a slogan, microphysicalism is the view that there is nothing over and above microphysical facts in our world. But how are we supposed to understand this slogan? There is a popular picturesque explanation: once God had created all the microphysical facts, He was done creating the world as it is; there was nothing left for Him to do. Clearly, this is merely a metaphor, since God ‘s creating the universe is incompatible with physicalism. However, the metaphor has heuristic value, and can guide our search for an adequate formulation of physicalism.
Truthmakers and Predication
Authors: Nolan Daniel 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A theory of truthmakers has often gone hand in hand with a theory of facts, or states of affairs. In one direction, this seems understandable: if, for whatever reason, one thinks that there are facts in the world, and especially if they are abundant, so that whenever a proposition p is true, there exists a fact that p (and if no ‘ ‘false facts ‘ ‘ or other such things exist), then facts make for tempting truthmakers: whenever a proposition is true, then necessarily there is something which makes that proposition true: there is a fact that p. Truthmaker theorists would typically like something stronger: they would like the necessity connecting the existence of truthmakers and the truth of the corresponding proposition to be de re rather than de dicto: not just that necessarily, when p is true there is a fact that p, but also that for any fact that p, necessarily when it exists p is true.
Suarez Law And Obligation
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Discussion of natural law reaches a new level of sophistication in Suarez’s elaborate and careful treatment. He takes account of Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and their successors, and claims to defend Aquinas’ views on the main issues. Since his discussion is usually fuller than Aquinas’ discussion, and explores questions that Aquinas does not discuss at length, Suarez deserves careful study. We may not always agree with his claim to defend Aquinas’ position. Indeed, some readers, especially among those sympathetic to Aquinas, have argued that Suarez does not simply disagree with Aquinas on some details, but radically alters Aquinas’ views on natural law and the foundations of ethics, and alters them for the worse.
Hobbes: From Human Nature To Morality
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Hobbes tries to follow an ‘idoneous principle of tractation’ in moral philosophy, by beginning with an account of human nature and human motives. On this basis he hopes to improve the lamentable situation in which knowledge of the law of nature has failed to grow ‘beyond its ancient stature’. He assumes that sound moral philosophy will discuss natural law, but will reject previous views of natural law. In claiming that knowledge of natural law has not advanced beyond its ancient stature, Hobbes implies that Scholastic discussions of natural law have not advanced moral philosophy. We can perhaps clarify his aims in moral philosophy if we see what he rejects in Scholastic views of natural law.
Cudworth
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Cudworth died in 1688, but his main work on moral philosophy, A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality, was not published until 1731. The first major moral philosopher who is clearly influenced by this book is Price. Cudworth’s Treatise of Freewill was published only in 1838. These facts about his posthumous works, however, may give a misleading impression of Cudworth’s influence on the development of ethical thought. For Locke and Clarke may have been acquainted with Cudworth’s main ideas, either through reading his manuscripts or through oral dissemination of ‘Cambridge Platonism’.
Pufendorf
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
When Barbeyrac praises Grotius as the pioneer in the theory of natural law, the standard against which he compares Grotius is the doctrine of Pufendorf. His comparisons of Grotius and Pufendorf argue that their two positions agree in substance. We have found some reasons to question his interpretation of Grotius. It will be useful to examine Pufendorf’s views, and then to consider Barbeyrac’s reasons for claiming that Grotius and Pufendorf agree. Barbeyrac’s view of Grotius and Pufendorf appears to differ from Pufendorf ’s view of his relation to Grotius. For Pufendorf rejects the naturalist position that he ascribes to Grotius. He rejects intrinsic rightness, and claims that whatever is right is right only because it is imposed by divine command. On this point he agrees with Cumberland (whom he cites).
Balguy And Clarke: Morality And Natural Theology
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Rationalism is important for Balguy because it allows him to explain how God is good, and why we can expect the moral demands of God to be morally right. Since basic moral principles are accessible to reason, and since a rational agent who grasps these principles will also be moved to act on them, God, being a rational agent, knows basic moral principles and acts on them. Being wise and just, God also wants us to act on them; hence God enjoins action on the principles that commend themselves to natural reason. If this argument succeeds, however, it seems to present Balguy with a difficulty. In his defence of intrinsic morality that is accessible to natural reason, he has to explain why he does not make Christianity superfluous to morality.
Butler: Superior Principles
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Butler explains his conception of superiority by appeal to the difference between mere power or strength and authority. Authority belongs to the lawful government, even if it happens that a tyrant or brigand has greater power. The lawful authority has the right to command and we have reason to obey it, even if in fact we do not or cannot always obey it. Butler appeals to the contrast between power and authority in order to emphasize the normative character of superior principles; this is their claim to motivate us by something other than their psychological strength. If there were no superior principles, we would have to suppose ‘that there was no distinction to be made between one inward principle and another but only that of strength’ (ii 16).
Hume: Errors Of Objectivism
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the section ‘Moral distinctions not derived from reason’, Hume strengthens his defence of Hutcheson. He now defends anti-rationalism not only about practical reason and motivation, but also about morality. His discussion of reason and passion implicitly attacks Butler’s views on superior principles and self-love; he now attacks Butler’s views on conscience. Butler regards conscience as the expression of reason, as a source of moral requirements, and as a superior principle carrying authority. Hume rejects these claims.
Voluntarism, Egoism, And Utilitarianism
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
We noticed earlier that theological voluntarism is a persistent feature of English moral philosophy in the 17th and 18th centuries. We might have expected to find it in Scottish philosophy too, given its affinity to some trends in Calvinism, but we do not find it. Probably this is not because it was unpopular in Scotland, but because the major Scottish philosophers belonged to the theological moderates who reacted to Calvinism. Complaints against Hutcheson suggest that some of his opponents may have been voluntarists. No English moralist sets out a voluntarist position as fully as Pufendorf does. But the English voluntarists are worth examining as critics of rationalism and sentimentalism. John Clarke sets out the main points of criticism. In his view, both Samuel Clarke the rationalist and Hutcheson the sentimentalist leave obscurities and unanswered questions that a voluntarist account removes.