bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Varieties of Homonymy
Authors: Shields Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe aims of this chapter are, firstly, to understand homonymy, or multivocity; secondly, to reveal the theoretical foundations of homonymy; and thirdly, to reflect on the cogency of the general framework of Aristotle's approach to homonymy. Shields discusses Aristotle's introduction of homonymy in the Categories and how it contrasts with synonymy; this distinction is exhaustive, in that every definable term is either homonymous or synonymous. Shields argues that Aristotle implicitly relies upon different conceptions of homonymy in different contexts. Aristotle recognizes discrete homonyms and associated homonyms, and, of the latter, he reserves a special philosophical role for core‐dependent homonymy among the latter. Shields argues that Aristotle appeals to functional determination to establish homonymy or non‐univocity; however, functional determination cannot show that distinct homonyms are associated.
The Promises and Problems of Homonymy
Authors: Shields Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Shields reviews Aristotle's methods for establishing homonymy, association, and core dependence, without yet evaluating their success or failure. Shields begins by considering Aristotle's critical and constructive uses of homonymy, before turning to the sorts of tests upon which Aristotle relies for establishing non‐univocity; after that, he considers the sorts of tests needed to establish association and core dependence. Shields distinguishes focal meaning from focal connection, on linguistic or semantic grounds, before raising some of the problems or objections that homonymy faces. At the end of the chapter, Shields considers the promise of homonymy to be methodological; core‐dependent homonymy is something that allows Aristotle to offer a way of philosophizing that is sensitive to metaphysical multiplicity, and yet alive to the prospects of multiplicity's order. Aristotle's reliance on homonymy can be compelling, however, only if he offers a plausible method of establishing non‐univocity and clarifies the notion of association.
Homonymy and Signification
Authors: Shields Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConsiders Aristotle's suggestion that difference in signification is sufficient for establishing homonymy. Shields examines Aristotle's notion of signification, and argues that difference in signification is not just sufficient, but necessary, for homonymy. He first explains Aristotle's account of signification in the context of Aristotle's general semantic theory; then considers questions about signification and word meaning, arguing that signification is a meaning relation. While Shields thus believes that Aristotle is justified in assuming that difference in signification is sufficient for homonymy, difference in signification alone cannot establish association or core dependence. Shields also defends Aristotle from the possible objection that he conflates concepts and properties, by arguing that an identification of properties and concepts is possible as the properties are essences specified by signification.
Core‐Dependent Homonymy
Authors: Shields Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe last chapter of Part I is an examination of the general framework of core‐dependent homonymy, Aristotle's most striking use of homonymy for philosophical purposes. If Aristotle can establish both non‐univocity and core dependence for some central philosophical concepts, then he can justifiably claim to have introduced a powerful methodology for rejecting Platonism, while retaining a constructive approach to philosophical analysis. But this is possible only if Aristotle can show that some homonyms associate. In this chapter, Shields articulates and defends Aristotle's method of core dependence for finding unity and multiplicity. Shields develops a general framework for core‐dependent homonymy such that these homonyms are determinate, yet open ended, being related by one of the four causes to each other.
The Body
Authors: Shields Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractShields begins the investigation of the practical application of homonymy by considering the principle use of discrete, seductive homonymy; the body, for Aristotle, is a discreet homonym. Aristotle's appeals to homonymy in serious philosophical contexts are appeals to discrete homonymy, because these are patently non‐univocal. Shields argues that homonymy in this context is a defensible application of homonymy, and furthermore it arms Aristotle against serious objections of the hylomorphic analysis of soul–body relations. The homonymy principle is also compatible with a functionalist interpretation of Aristotle's philosophy of mind.
Oneness, Sameness, and Referential Opacity
Authors: Shields Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractShields examines oneness and sameness within the framework of homonymy developed in Part I. One of Shields's main aims here is to reject the reading according to which Aristotle introduces multiple entities when discussing accidental sameness. Shields argues that Aristotle does not countenance such entities, because the homonymy of oneness permits him to say that, e.g. Socrates and Socrates seated, are and are not one and the same. Oneness and sameness are core–dependent homonyms that gives Aristotle a means of recognizing how things can be one without being identical.
Goodness
Authors: Shields Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractShields argues that Aristotle is correct to argue for application of the homonymy to goodness, although it is only a partial success, as certain of Aristotle's arguments to this end are not good. Shields places Aristotle's discussion of the homonymy of goodness into its proper context, which is as an anti‐Platonic manoeuvre.Shields examines Aristotle's argument for the homonymy of goodness in Nicomachean Ethics 6, and also some interpretations of it, and he denies that it can be successfully defended, since it fails to establish non‐univocity. Other arguments are more successful while only establishing non‐univocity; in fact, Aristotle fails to offer a compelling argument for the thesis that goodness is a core‐dependent homonym. However, Shields draws on Aquinas's argument for the homonymy of goodness, and since Aristotle holds premises analogous to those of Aquinas's argument, we may attribute to Aristotle the homonymy of goodness, but in a more limited sense than is usually thought to be the case.
The Homonymy of Being
Authors: Shields Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractOne argument for the homonymy of goodness fails, because Aristotle attempts to show that it is derived from the homonymy of being; but being, as Shields argues in the final chapter, is not homonymous. Aristotle's most celebrated treatment of homonymy is his conception of the homonymy of being. The bulk of this chapter is a critique of five approaches to the homonymy of being. Shields considers and criticizes interpretations of Aristotle's attempts to establish the homonymy of being, including that of G.E.L. Owen, and of Michael Frede. The problem with the doctrine that being is homonymous, Shields argues, is that being as such is univocal; hence, it cannot be a core‐dependent homonym because it is not a homonym at all.
Saving Strangers
Authors: Wheeler Nicholas J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that there has been a change of norm in relation to the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s. It shows how humanitarian justifications for the use of force lacked legitimacy in Cold War international society, focusing on the cases of India, Vietnam, and Tanzania's interventions in the 1970s. This reflected the dominance of pluralist international society thinking in shaping the legal rules and institutions of international society. By focusing on cases of intervention in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo, the second part of the book shows how a new solidarist conception of international society shaped Western interventions in the 1990s. In arguing that a new norm has developed that has facilitated new state actions; the book identifies two key limits to this norm: first, military intervention justified on humanitarian grounds requires UN Security Council authorization; second, whilst new norms enable new actions, they do not determine that intervention will take place when it is urgently needed as in Rwanda.
Humanitarian Intervention and International Society
Authors: Wheeler Nicholas J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExplores traditional realist and pluralist objections to the practice of humanitarian intervention in international society. It then develops a solidarist theory of humanitarian intervention that rebuts these criticisms. A key part of the chapter lies in drawing on English School theory, constructivism, and Quentin Skinner's work to develop the claim that legitimacy is constitutive of state actions.
Vietnam's Intervention in Cambodia: The Triumph of Realism Over Common Humanity?
Authors: Wheeler Nicholas J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractInvestigates why Vietnam was so heavily sanctioned for its use of force against the murderous regime of Pol Pot. The reactions of other states reflected the domination of a pluralist conception of international society. However, I argue that Vietnam's use of force should have been legitimated on solidarist grounds as humanitarian.
Good or Bad Precedent? Tanzania's Intervention in Uganda
Authors: Wheeler Nicholas J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines why Tanzania's overthrow of the Ugandan Government of Idi Amin was greeted with almost tacit approval compared to Vietnam's reception in overthrowing Pol Pot. International society did not endorse the principle of humanitarian intervention in this case, but it did show by its reaction that it understood the moral context in which Tanzania had acted.
From Famine Relief to ‘Humanitarian War’: The US and UN Intervention in Somalia
Authors: Wheeler Nicholas J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAnalyses how the USA and UN came to intervene militarily in Somalia in 1992–94. It shows how the Security Council in Resolution 794 crossed the threshold on authorizing the use of force to end a humanitarian crisis, albeit in a case where the government of the state had collapsed. It also explores why the Somali mission failed, and what lessons can be learnt from it for future humanitarian interventions.
Setting the Scene
Authors: Atkinson Tony , Cantillon Bea , Marlier Eric , Nolan Brian 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe purpose of this book is to make a scientific contribution to the development of social indicators as part of the social agenda in the EU. It assesses the strengths and weaknesses of different indicators relevant to social inclusion in Europe, and their usefulness in promoting good practice by member state governments and allowing comparable assessment of social outcomes. The aim is that the book will play a role in widening public debate about the social dimension of Europe, will be of value to the social partners, to non‐governmental and grass‐roots organizations, and to the socially disadvantaged. It seeks to provide both a constructive background document at a crucial stage in the evolution of the social dimension of the EU and a reference work of continuing value. This first chapter sets the scene, providing background information about social indicators and about the development of the social agenda in the EU; in particular, it seeks to make clear both what the book tries to achieve and what it is not intended to provide. The four sections of the chapter (1) introduce social indicators, (2) look at social policy in Europe, (3) discuss the development of the European social agenda since the agreement reached by the Lisbon European Council in March 2000 that the EU should adopt for the next decade the strategic goal of becoming ‘the most competitive and dynamic knowledge‐based economy . . . with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’, and (4) provide an outline of the structure of the book.
Social Indicators from a Member State Perspective
Authors: Atkinson Tony , Cantillon Bea , Marlier Eric , Nolan Brian 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn designing indicators for use in the EU monitoring process, a great deal can be learnt from the experience of member states in their national policies to combat social exclusion. Ch. 3 reviews, country by country, social indicators from a member state perspective, with the aim of illustrating the range of current practice in the use of social indicators in the field of social inclusion, rather than providing a comprehensive assessment. Member states differ in the degree to which they have embarked on strategies aimed at promoting social inclusion that already include explicit targets and indicators against which to measure the effectiveness of policy, and for this reason, the amount of space allocated to each country varies. In each case, however, the National Action Plan on Social Inclusion (NAPincl) submitted to the European Commission in June 2001 is discussed from the viewpoint of the method by which the plans were produced, their relation with previous policy formation, the use made of the seven indicators proposed by the Commission, and other indicators employed by member states that seem of wider interest, particularly where they relate to fields not covered by the Commission's indicators. The countries included in the review are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and the UK.
Portfolio of Indicators as a Whole
Authors: Atkinson Tony , Cantillon Bea , Marlier Eric , Nolan Brian 
Published: October 2003

AbstractCommences the analysis of social indicators for use in the EU monitoring process, starting with the portfolio as a whole, where a three‐tier structure of indicators is envisaged. There would be a small set of lead ‘headline’ indicators (Level l), supported by a wider range of indicators at Level 2, where both levels would be common across member states; to these, member states would be encouraged to add their choice of Level 3 indicators, to highlight specificities in particular areas, and to help interpret the Level l and 2 indicators. The Level l and 2 indicators would be presented in the form of a level of performance, rather than a ranking, so that improvements in country performance can be clearly seen. The difficulties of aggregate performance measures are discussed, and two different types of aggregation outlined—the aggregation of aggregate indicators, and the aggregation of different elements of deprivation at the individual level (which are then summed over individuals to form an aggregate index for the country). The Level l and 2 indicators would also be disaggregated in a number of ways, and the importance is highlighted of giving separate indicators for women and men, and of examining the regional dimension wherever possible.
Depth of Poverty and Income Inequality
Authors: Atkinson Tony , Cantillon Bea , Marlier Eric , Nolan Brian 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConsiders the persistence of financial poverty, measures of the poverty gap, and the extent to which those with low financial resources are suffering enforced deprivation. This latter section of the chapter discusses deprivation indicators, looking at their application in the context of the EU. The final section of the chapter turns to the broader issue of the overall distribution of income—measures of income inequality.
Coordination at the European Union Level
Authors: Atkinson Tony , Cantillon Bea , Marlier Eric , Nolan Brian 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe end result of the investigations carried out over the last 8 chapters is a list of 33 recommendations, which are printed in bold type, scattered throughout the book, and summarized at the end of the book, preceding a list of the proposed social indicators. The recommendations and proposed indicators are intended as a contribution to the debate about EU policy‐making, and in this chapter, the future policy process is considered. Topics discussed include the use of indicators in National Action Plans on Social Inclusion and by the European Commission, policy and national targets, and the development of indicators and mobilizing actors.
Introduction
Authors: Hooker Brad 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSets out five criteria for assessing normative moral theories. Then discusses the aspiration to find coherence between theory and our moral intuitions. Also argues that, other things being roughly equal, we rightly prefer a moral theory that offers a unified foundation for morality to one that does not. What is more, the chapter argues that, other things being roughly equal, we rightly prefer a moral theory that offers an impartial foundation for morality to one that does not.
What Are the Rules to Promote?
Authors: Hooker Brad 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that rules should not be evaluated in terms of the numbers of acts of this or that kind that they allow. Then asks whether rules should be assessed in terms of whether they promote equality, fairness, and justice, or whether they give priority to the worst off. Finally, two sections discuss how rule‐consequentialism and contractualism differ as to whether morality contains prohibitions on how humans treat animals and the natural environment.
Is Rule‐Consequentialism Guilty of Collapse or Incoherence?
Authors: Hooker Brad 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAccording to this chapter's arguments, rule‐consequentialism need not be guilty of either collapse into extensional equivalence with act‐consequentialism or incoherence. The chapter also explains how rule‐consequentialism and contractualism differ over what is the best account of impartially justified rules. The final two sections consider rule‐consequentialism's relation to intuitionism and Ross‐style pluralism and whether rule‐consequentialism fails to be a form of consequentialism.
Predictability and Convention
Authors: Hooker Brad 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConsiders whether rule‐consequentialism is undermined by the unpredictability of the consequences of whole codes of rules. Argues that, where we can calculate that some alternative is better than the status quo, we press forward with reform, and that where we cannot calculate that some alternative code is better than the status quo, we should stick with the status quo. Concludes by considering how ideal codes have to compromise with extant conventions, and how rule‐consequentialism can support public goods.
Prohibitions and Special Obligations
Authors: Hooker Brad 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWe typically think that morality prohibits certain kinds of behaviour, such as killing the innocent, stealing, breaking promises, etc. This chapter explores rule‐consequentialism's ability to underwrite these prohibitions, and, in particular, to underwrite our views about when such prohibitions should be amended or overridden. Argues against absolute prohibitions and explores the role of judgement in rule‐consequentialism. The final section explains how rule‐consequentialism can endorse rules giving agents special obligations towards family and friends.
Act‐Consequentialism
Authors: Hooker Brad 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAct‐consequentialism is best construed as a criterion of rightness, not a decision procedure. Act‐consequentialism recommends that our procedure for making moral decisions employs rules very like the ones endorsed by rule‐consequentialism. However, the chapter highlights the remaining significant differences between act‐consequentialism and rule‐consequentialism over prohibitions, and discusses the extreme demandingness of act‐consequentialist duties to aid.
Introduction
Authors: Hookway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An introduction to the most important themes in Peirce's account of rational self‐control, which outlines his pragmatism and his theory of truth before explaining his account of the scientific method. There is also a discussion of his commitment to realism. After exploring the main ideas of his theory of signs (semiotic) and his theory of categories, this chapter addresses issues about how to make sense of the development of Peirce's thought.
Belief, Confidence, and the Method of Science
Authors: Hookway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A discussion of Peirce's claim that belief has no place in science and his views of the different roles of rational self‐control in dealing with scientific matters and with ‘vital questions’. This appears to be in conflict with Peirce's defence of the scientific method as the best method for the fixation of belief. There is also discussion of Peirce's claim that the laws of logic are regulative ideas, or hopes.
Truth and the Convergence of Opinion
Authors: Hookway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter is an extended discussion of Peirce's definition of truth as that on which inquiry is fated to converge. A detailed examination of how this thesis is to be formulated is followed by a discussion of the problem of ‘buried secrets’, of truths that are lost and will never be recovered. It is argued that pragmatist clarifications of concepts differ from other kinds of philosophical analyses, and that Peirce's account of truth is an account of the commitments we incur when we assert a proposition. It is also argued that the pragmatist clarification of truth is metaphysically neutral, leading neither to realism nor to anti‐realism.
Truth and Reference: Peirce Versus Royce
Authors: Hookway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA discussion of a dispute between Royce and Peirce about truth and the possibility of false belief. Royce argued that only an absolute idealist can make sense of how we can refer to objects about which we have false beliefs. Peirce responded that this argument rested upon a flawed theory of reference: once we recognize that our primary kind of reference uses indexical signs, we can reconcile realism with the possibility of false belief. The chapter explores Peirce's account of indexical reference and its relation to his realism.
Vagueness, Logic, and Interpretation
Authors: Hookway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This discussion of Peirce's account of vagueness begins with a comparison of the attitudes towards vagueness of Frege, Peirce, and Wittgenstein. It explores Peirce's account of vagueness through an exploration of his account of assertion and his semiotic account of quantification in natural languages. The place of bivalence in his philosophy is discussed, as are his claims about the importance of vagueness for science and other kinds of cognition.
Design and Chance: The Evolution of Peirce's Evolutionary Cosmology
Authors: Hookway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDuring the 1880s, Peirce began to develop a system of ‘scientific metaphysics’, an evolutionary cosmology that explains the evolution to a law‐governed external world from a state of pure possibility. This appeals to his ‘tychism’, the view that there is absolute chance, and provides a defence of his realism. The chapter explores the emergence of this theme in his work, asking why it is required by his beliefs about logic and how it is related to other themes in his writing.
Common Sense, Pragmatism, and Rationality
Authors: Hookway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Peirce defended ‘critical common‐sensism’, a modification of the common‐sense philosophy of Reid that reflected Peirce's Kantian affiliations. This chapter explores what is distinctive in Peirce's form of common‐sensism, discusses a range of examples of common‐sense beliefs, and discusses the role of the appeal to common‐sense in Pierce's account of rational self‐control. This appeal to common‐sense is an important plank in Peirce's rejection of Descartes's strategies in epistemology and in his defence of pragmatism.