bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Causal Loops
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
What is our conception of the temporal priority of cause over effect? It is that a causal chain runs always in the earlier‐to‐later direction. Each link in the chain is a process, whose initiation is the immediate, and thus simultaneous, effect of the arrival at a particular stage of the process that constitutes the preceding link. It is the fact that it is the subsequent continuation of the process, once initiated, that calls for no explanation, which gives a temporal direction to the causal chain. If there are causal chains running in the reverse as well as in the usual direction, there is a possibility of causal loops.
Common Sense and Physics
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The distinction between `how things are in themselves’ and `how they appear to us’ bifurcates into two different distinctions: that between what is true of the world and what only appears to be, but is not in fact true of it; and that between what may be called an absolute and what may be called a relative form of description. An absolute description characterizes things independently of the situation of human beings, located on the surface of a certain planet at a particular stage in its history, and having a particular range of sensory faculties. One of the things that a scientific theory aims to do is to attain an accurate absolute description. However, such a description need not invalidate the form of description in relative terms that we employ in everyday life. Thus, there is no ground for an instrumentalist view of science, according to which science is useful as a means of encapsulating patterns and regularities detectable among the genuine facts supplied by common sense.
Wittgenstein on Necessity: Some Reflections
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Radical conventionalism treats every necessary truth as a linguistic convention, akin to the statement ’There are seven days in a week’. Wittgenstein's endorsement of this view was a result of his belief that nothing can explain the fact of the acceptance of necessary truths. There could not be necessary truths being a consequence of human nature, which have not yet been recognized, or those which would never be recognized as such. This view stands in contrast to moderate conventionalism, which is powerless to explain the necessity of logical consequence.
Postmodernism in the Visual Arts
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Commences with Arthur Danto's claim that art has exhausted its creative possibilities, and that we have, in effect, witnessed the end of art. On the basis of a comparison between modernism and postmodernism in the visual arts, it is argued that Danto is wrong. The argument is then contextualized in relation to the theory of art and the aesthetic broached earlier in this book.
Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind
Authors: Child William 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExplores the relation between interpretationism and causal theories in the philosophy of mind. Interpretationism is the view that we can understand the nature of the propositional attitudes by reflecting on the process of interpretation—the process of ascribing attitudes to a subject on the basis of what she says and does. Causal theories say that the concepts of common‐sense psychology—concepts such as action, perception, and memory—are essentially causal. Interpretationism and causal theories are sometimes combined, notably in the work of Donald Davidson. But it is often thought that they are incompatible—that interpretationism makes it impossible for mental phenomena to play genuinely causal roles. The book defends interpretationism as an approach to the propositional attitudes; it defends causal theories of action‐explanation and vision; and it explains how these two approaches are compatible. Different versions of interpretationism are distinguished and assessed. The relations between the mental and the physical are discussed; the anomalism of the mental is traced to the uncodifiability of rationality and its implications are explored. A disjunctive conception of visual experience is supported and combined with a causal theory of vision. And the explanatory relevance of mental properties is defended against those who hold that non‐reductive monism in general, and anomalous monism in particular, cannot satisfactorily accommodate the causal role of the mental.
Anomalism, Rationality, and Psychophysical Relations
Authors: Child William 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines the arguments for the anomalism of the mental (the Davidsonian view, central to anomalous monism, that there are no laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained). It is argued that the basis for the anomalism of the mental is the principle that rationality is uncodifiable, and that principle is defended. It is shown that the anomalism of the mental, and the uncodifiability of rationality that underlies it, is compatible with the supervenience of the mental on the physical, but that it rules out most varieties of functionalism. It is argued that the uncodifiability of rationality rules out token identity or token correlation between particular mental states or events and particular physical states or events.
Causalism and Interpretationism: The Problem of Compatibility
Authors: Child William 
Published: October 2003

AbstractInterpretationism in the philosophy of mind is often thought to conflict with the idea that beliefs and desires play a genuinely causal role. It is argued that there is in fact no such conflict and that a causal understanding of the mental is essential for realism about mental phenomena and about the relations between thought and reality. First, the chapter considers and responds to various reasons for thinking that the metaphysics of interpretationism is incompatible with a causal view of the mental. Then it examines the view of philosophers (like Richard Rorty) who accept that rationalizing, interpretative stories and causal stories are both legitimate, but argue that no single account of anything can be simultaneously rationalizing and causal. Against that view, it is argued that, unless we see interpretative, psychological stories as themselves being causal stories, we cannot understand psychological explanation and we cannot understand how thought and experience can have the objective content they do.
Action: Causal Theories and Explanatory Relevance
Authors: Child William 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIf mental causal explanations are grounded in facts about physical causes and effects, and if there are no psychophysical laws, how can we avoid the conclusion that the mental is causally, and causally explanatorily, irrelevant? The chapter analyses the ways in which this objection has been raised against non‐reductive monism in general, and Davidson's anomalous monism in particular. Then a conception of explanatory relevance for non‐basic physical properties is set out: properties are candidates for explanatory relevance if they play a role in a simple model of causal action; it is intelligible how a property can be causally explanatorily relevant only if it supervenes on low‐level physical properties; but such supervenience does not provide a self‐standing condition of explanatory relevance. A parallel model is developed for the mental case, exploiting the intuitive model of rational action and appealing to supervenience. Anomalous monism is thereby defended against one objection; but, it is argued, this defence challenges the original motivation for thinking that mental events must be physical events.
Composition as Identity in the Parmenides and Sophist
Authors: Harte Verity 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe focus of this chapter is Plato's examination of the rejected model of composition, particularly in the Parmenides, in which the same pattern of puzzle recurs four times in an escalating series, ending in the first and second deductions, to further develop the model's paradoxical implications. The unity of the whole is shown to be problematic in all those puzzles that depend on the rejected model of composition as the identity and share the central premise that parts pluralize, i.e. that a whole is many rather than (or, as well as) one. This same premise and model of composition is then to be found in the Sophist (244b6–245e2) in the dilemma presented to the monists by the Eleatic Stranger. Here, Plato once again associates the rejected model with his Eleatic predecessors, who are lead to it by their desire for ontological innocence.
One Way to Read Ourselves
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines central philosophical themes and doctrines of twentieth century philosophy in the light of the Agency Theory. Craig argues that despite the unpopularity of philosophical visions of high generality in contemporary philosophy, the Agency Theory is the one vision, or Weltbild, on which much twentieth century philosophy explicitly or implicitly relies. It is evident in the philosophical doctrines of the Vienna Circle, with its radically emotivist accounts of value and radically conventionalist accounts of the a priori. It is evident in the numerous attacks on moral realism, which invite us, instead of thinking about morality not in terms of an independent realm of moral facts that obtain independently of our thinking about them, to see ourselves as the creators of ethical value. It is evident in existentialism, with its belief in absolute human freedom and its demand for absolute moral independence, manifested in the existentialist ethics of authenticity. It is evident in the prevalence of ‘opacity’, our willing acceptance of brute facts without further explanation as long as our beliefs about those facts are reliable. Finally, the dominance of the Agency Theory is evident in epistemology, where the community has taken over many responsibilities that the individual used to have, as well as in the theory of meaning, where accounts of meaning are given in terms of the use of words in a linguistic community, as by Wittgenstein and Austin, or in terms of the speaker’s environment, as in the externalist account of meaning advocated by Putnam. But, as Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World and George Orwell’s Nineteen-Eighty-Four illustrate, too much enthusiasm for human activity has its dangers.
Introduction
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Technical terms to be used in this book are introduced – substance, property, event, material object, mental property, physical property. Three views on the mind/body problem are distinguished – hard materialism, soft materialism (or property dualism), and substance dualism. Inductive principles to be used in the book are introduced – the principles of credulity, of testimony, and of simplicity (entailing the principle of charity).
Body and Soul
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Personal identity cannot be analysed either in terms of a continuity of mental life, or in terms of continuity of bodily matter. Continuing personal identity in the short term is a datum of experience, not merely known by inference from other experiences. To express this fact within an integrated system of thought, we must think of human persons as substances that consist of two parts – soul (the essential part) and body (non‐essential). Part 2 of this book (Chs. 8–10) develops this view more fully. The argument of this chapter is put in precise logical form in New Appendix C. New Appendix D claims that souls have thisness; that is, the indiscernibility of identicals does not apply to souls.
The Origin and Life of the Soul
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
We have no grounds for supposing that a foetus has a soul until it is conscious, and no grounds for supposing that it is conscious until there occur in it brain processes similar to those that accompany consciousness in more developed human brains. The higher animals have souls. While scientists may discover vast numbers of correlations between mental events and brain events, it is most improbable that they will be able to explain why there are the correlations that they are, or any correlations at all – that is, why neural systems of a certain complexity give rise to souls. The very success of science in achieving vast integrations of theories in physics and chemistry was achieved by separating off from the physical world colours, tastes etc; but this cannot be done when we are looking for a theory with psychophysical laws.
The Freedom of the Will
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A substantial balance of evidence favours the view that human souls have (limited) libertarian free will, that is the freedom to choose between alternative actions, despite all causal influences acting on them. Free will thus entails soul indeterminism, which entails brain indeterminism. There is no reason to suppose that the same laws govern the behaviour of the brain as govern any other physical system, since the brain is different from any other physical system in being in causal interaction with a soul. In any case, its indeterminism may be ensured by Quantum indeterminism. The main evidence for soul indeterminism is, however, the fact that human counter‐suggestibility would be compatible with determinism only on the assumption of an a priori very unlikely mechanism for the production of beliefs. New Appendices E, F, and G discuss the relevance to this topic of different interpretations of Quantum Theory, of Gödel's Theorem and of Libet's experiments.
The Structure of the Soul
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The belief‐desire set of every soul is necessarily an integrated one in the sense that each belief and desire requires many other beliefs and desires to give it meaning and justification. Some beliefs and desires are much more central than others, and these include those that form a person's character. There are normal rational processes of change of belief and desire, often ones caused by other beliefs and desires; and abnormal irrational processes of change by means of brainwashing, brain disease, and surgery. The continuing existence of beliefs and desires when the subject is unaware of them consists in a continuing state of the soul, not merely in a continuing state of the brain linked to the soul. Some beliefs and desires belong to the Unconscious.
The Future of the Soul
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Evidence of ‘near‐death’ experiences, parapsychology, and claims of reincarnation do not constitute very good evidence that human souls survive the death of their bodies. Nor are there good philosophical arguments for the natural immortality of souls. Yet there are no natural laws connecting the existence or functioning of a soul with the existence or functioning of a body. Only an argument via some very general metaphysical theory could show what happens to a soul after death – e.g. an argument to a God who has revealed what happens.
Context and Content
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA collection about the intentionality of speech acts and propositional attitudes. The chapters in the first section develop a framework for pragmatics—the study of the interaction of speech acts and the contexts in which they are performed. The framework is used to defend and apply a pragmatic conception of presupposition, to account for the role of indicative conditional statements in reasoning, and to solve some puzzles about statements of identity and existence. The chapters in the second section concern the semantics of the attribution of belief and other propositional attitudes. They attempt to reconcile the possible‐worlds analysis of propositional content with the phenomena, including de re belief attribution and the attribution of indexical or self‐locating belief. The chapters in the third section defend an externalist account of the contents of thought. It is argued that there is no reason to think a viable account of narrow content can be developed, and that none is needed to provide an adequate account of the role of intentional content in the explanation of behaviour and experience. The chapters in the fourth section discuss the relation between the content of thoughts and the forms in which content is represented and expressed. It is argued that the temptation to build linguistic structure into the content of thought should be resisted since it does not provide the material for an adequate solution to the problems that plague the possible‐worlds conception of proposition, such as the problem of logical omniscience.
The Philosophy of Schopenhauer
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There are unusual reasons why Schopenhauer's philosophy is important. Retaining from Kant the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal, he embraces the relevance of Eastern philosophy to the former and that of empiricism to the latter. His ethics—unlike Kant's, which are based on reason—are based on compassion. So he alone among major Western philosophers takes genuine account of Buddhism, yet at the same time gives full weight to science. Areas outside philosophy in which his thought has been important include psychology and the arts. As well as being the first and greatest philosophical influence on both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, he had comparable influence on Freud and Jung and affected the work of creative artists from Wagner to Tolstoy. The intellectual fashions of the twentieth century underestimated his work, and neglected his influence, but a reappraisal of both is now due. This book takes a fresh look at his work, and contains especially long discussions of his influence on Wittgenstein and Wagner.
Schopenhauer's Life as Background to His Work
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter is a brief biography of Schopenhauer that provides the background for the presentation of his work that is to follow. Schopenhauer grew up knowing many eminent people, including Goethe, and wrote his masterpiece, The World as Will and Representation, while still in his twenties, yet his work was neglected until he reached his mid‐sixties. He sank into pessimism, isolation, and misanthropy for most of his adult life. But in his last six years he became internationally famous.
The Ends of Explanation
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Investigates the contents of Schopenhauer's first book On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. This is devoted to the nature of explanation. It concludes that all events in the empirical world fall under one or more of four forms of explanation: scientific, mathematical, logical, and motivational. Since all meaningful empirical concepts are derived from experience, and no valid deductive argument can add to the content of its own premises, the only fully satisfactory empirical knowledge is provided by direct perception.
The Great Tradition
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Shows what Schopenhauer's view was of his own place in the history of philosophy, as revealed by an unusually long synopsis he wrote for such a history. He counted two philosophers, Plato and Kant, as supreme and regarded himself as correcting and completing the work of Kant. The foundations of Kant's critical philosophy had been laid, he believed, by Locke, and then strengthened by Hume. So he saw Locke, Hume, Kant, and himself as having developed a single line of thought over nearly 200 years. However, this was because they all stood baffled before the same fundamental problems: he disparaged any approach to philosophy that was primarily concerned with the writings of other philosophers and not directly with the problems presented to us by the world.
More Arguments for Transcendental Idealism
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
At the core of what Schopenhauer took from Kant is transcendental idealism. An understanding of this calls not only for intelligence but for what might be called ‘intellectual imagination’. The nature of whatever faculties we have must limit what they can do, and therefore, unless reality is itself a product of our minds, it is almost certain that there are aspects of an independent reality that we cannot apprehend. Schopenhauer follows Kant in using the word ‘noumenal’ for these and the word ‘phenomenal’ for those aspects of reality that are accessible to experience.
Objects and Subjects
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Empirical reality presents itself to us as experience, and this can take only such forms as can be mediated by whatever equipment we possess, including our own bodies. Thus there has to be a detailed correlation between our powers of apprehension and reality as we perceive it. So subject and object are interdependent: neither could exist as we apprehend them if the other did not also exist. Pure subject without an object and pure object without a subject are both metaphysical concepts, to which nothing could correspond in the empirical world.
Bodies and Wills
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
To the proposition that I can know objects only from outside, and through the forms of sense and intellect that my personal equipment makes available, there is a single exception and that is my own body. Each of us is a physical object that knows one physical object from inside, namely itself. But I experience the movements of this body primarily as an agent rather than through organs of sense or intellect. My willed movements are perceived by others as matter in motion, but by me they are apprehended first and foremost as acts of will: the two are the same phenomenon experienced in different ways.
The Flower of Existence
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The general forms through which the always‐hidden noumenal manifests itself in detailed phenomena were accurately identified by Plato, and we can retain the name ‘Platonic Forms of Platonic Ideas’. Cognition of these is made possible by works of art, which reveal to us the universal in the particular. Thus, the primary function of art is the expression not of emotion but of cognitive insight into the inner nature of things, expressible in art but unstatable in language. Music alone among the arts does not represent phenomena, and therefore does not unveil Platonic Forms, but is a direct experience of the noumenon. This makes it a super‐art, radically different in kind from the rest, and superior.
Metaphysics of the Person
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Schopenhauer believes that differentiation is possible only where there is time or space, and therefore only in the phenomenal world: the noumenon must be one and undifferentiable. This inner one‐less of all being explains our feeling for others, the compassion on which morality is based. Thus, Schopenhauer's ethics are a practical inference from his metaphysics. At our death in the empirical world, we cease to exist as individuals, but our noumenal nature remains unaltered. Being noumenal, it is outside time, and indestructible.
Schopenhauer and the Idealists
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The neglect of Schopenhauer's philosophy in the twentieth century led to his becoming associated in people's minds with his neat‐contemporaries, the Idealist philosophers Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, when in fact he was a radically different sort of philosopher from them. Unlike them, he absorbed the empiricist tradition into his work and saw the enterprise on which he was engaged as having been launched by Locke. He hated the Idealists and their writings, regarding them as a poisonous influence. In this he went too far, for their work had merits that he failed to appreciate and more in common with his own than he realized.