bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Interpersonal Comparison
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Provides a defence against the objection to utilitarianism that it requires individuals to make comparisons between utilities to different people. It is argued that an adequate response to the problem concerning our knowledge about other people's experiences can be achieved if we focus on interpersonal comparisons of degrees or strengths of preferences, and not pleasures or any other kind of utilities. We need to be impartial between our own and other people's preferences, not altruistic in its correct sense of giving more weight to the preference of others. We have to treat everyone as one, including ourselves: to do to others as we wish they should do to us.
Philosophical Scepticism and Everyday Life
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 2 focuses on the challenge to the sceptical reasoning that what Descartes says is a requirement for everyday knowledge of the world – and would destroy all everyday knowledge of the world if it were a genuine requirement because it cannot be fulfilled – is in fact no such requirement at all.
A particularly persuasive and influential version of that line of criticism is found in the work of J. L. Austin, who in his paper ‘Other Minds’ tries to show how the traditional philosophical investigation of knowledge significantly deviates from our normal practices. Austin observes that in our ordinary assessments of claims to knowledge we always presuppose a specific doubt about some specific knowledge claim, and he insists that a specific doubt about a specific knowledge claim can only be raised if there is some reason to think that a specific possibility that would undermine that knowledge claim actually obtains; if so, it would seem that there is no room for doubts about knowledge claims that rest on purely abstract considerations about possiblities that might obtain, or cannot be excluded, and therefore no room for a completely general scepticism of the kind Descartes envisions.
Drawing a distinction between conditions of assertion and conditions of truth, Stroud argues that even if we grant the point Austin makes about our ordinary assessments of knowledge it still does not follow that Descartes deviates in his reasoning from our everyday standards and procedures and changes or distorts the meaning of the word ‘know’. The requirement that there must be some ‘special reason’ for thinking a certain possibility might obtain should be seen as a requirement on the appropriate or reasonable assertion of knowledge, but not necessarily as a requirement on knowledge itself; and if the possibility that one is dreaming is a possibility that one must know not to obtain if one is to know something about the world, as the sceptic can plausibly insist it is, then one will simply not know that thing about the world if one has not been able to eliminate that possibility – even though it might be completely inappropriate or unreasonable on particular occasions in everyday life to insist on ruling out that possibility before saying that one knows.
Logical Atomism
Authors: Pears David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Pears examines and evaluates the metaphysics of the Tractatus and scrutinizes the relevant differences between Russell's and Wittgenstein's versions of logical atomism. Pears criticizes Wittgenstein's logical atomism for its separatist nature, but argues that the decisive step towards holism is foreshadowed in the early work.
The Basic Realism of the Tractatus
Authors: Pears David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Is concerned with the relation between names and objects in Wittgenstein's earlier thought. Pears deduces from the conclusions of the previous chapter his prominent ‘basic realism’ interpretation of the Tractatus, which is based on the idea that once a name has been attached to an object, the nature of the object takes over and controls the logical behaviour of the name, and defends it against rival interpretations.
Authority and Reason
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter addresses the question: what is authority? Authority cannot simply be regarded as a right to rule, as Robert Ladenson has claimed. The recognitional conception of authority, which regards authoritative utterances as reasons to believe that one has a reason to act as instructed, fails to explain why authoritative utterances are also reasons for action. The inspirational conception of authority describes authority in terms of love, but this conception cannot account for authorities that are not ‘loved’ by those whom it rules, nor can it account for the conceptual distinctness of love and authority. Authoritative utterances provide content independent reasons for action, as do promises, threats, offers, and requests, in the sense that there is no direct connection between the reason and the action for which it is a reason.
Right‐Based Moralities
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is argued that rights alone cannot provide a complete account of morality. Personal autonomy is incompatible with moral individualism and strong rights against coercion, since autonomy requires not just options but acceptable options, requiring the provision of collective goods. Collective goods are public goods that are intrinsically valuable, public goods being goods that are valuable for many people in society. There are, then, fundamental moral duties that do not derive from rights. We should not seek to draw a fundamental distinction between moral principles concerned with one's personal goals and those independently concerned with others.
The Cambridge Moralists
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The views of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, who was neither a teacher at Cambridge nor primarily a philosopher, influenced the thought of the university’s moral philosophers. Coleridge’s thoughts were first represented strongly at Cambridge by Julius Hare, a classical scholar who taught as a Fellow of Trinity from 1822 to 1832. Hare was a close friend of Whewell, and a teacher of F.D. Maurice, the most important exponent of Coleridgean religious thinking in Victorian Britain. Whewell was followed as Knight-bridge Professor by John Grote, who in turn was succeeded by Maurice. All these men were known by Sidgwick.
Willing and Acting
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Presents Schopenhauer's claims about the relation between willing and action. Willing is for him fundamentally a moving of the body, not a mental volition that causes bodily movement. His theory here is clearly opposed to dualism. Human action is distinguished from other bodily events by its having motives as its causes. The chapter suggests that this discussion of will and action had some influence on Wittgenstein and thereby perhaps on more recent action theory.
Remarks on Wittgenstein and Nietzsche
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Gives some of the background to the reception of Schopenhauer's philosophy by both Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, and then examines the influence on each of them of Schopenhauer's conceptions of self and will. In Wittgenstein's early notebooks and Tractatus, the notion of the subject's not being a part of the world and of happiness lying in not willing are distinctly Schopenhauerian notions. Wittgenstein's later pre‐occupation with the relation of willing and acting show a lasting influence from Schopenhauer. In Nietzsche's case, The Birth of Tragedy is transparently influenced by Schopenhauer's views on the thing in itself and individuation, while the later doctrine of will to power is designed as an alternative to Schopenhauer's will to life. Nietzsche's later philosophy makes continual reference to Schopenhauer even in its determination to oppose metaphysics and the unitary ‘I’.
Universals
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The existence of universals (general properties or kinds) is disputed because of fears of myth‐making, and argued against on the grounds that they are dispensable as objects of reference and that they lack general principles of identity. Ripostes: they are unavoidable as objects of thought, and each, as essence, is its own individual principle of identity. The fundamental ground of the continuing dispute is the strong human disposition to believe that to exist at all is to exist as an object in time in the natural world; whereas universals are abstract objects of thought, exemplified in the natural world and related inter se by conceptual necessities.
Direct Singular Reference: Intended Reference Andactual Reference
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the ideal (and normal) case of successful direct reference to an individual particular (1) there exists a particular individual that the speaker means (i.e. intends to refer to), (2) the singular term (name or description) the speaker uses applies to that individual, (3) there is an individual the audience would, in the circumstances, naturally take to be the object of reference, and (4) the latter is identical with the intended object of reference. There can occur cases of failure of one or more of these conditions. Various possibilities of description of such cases are listed. What is important is not to choose between them but to understand both the normal case and these possibilities.
Taxonomy
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Hare explains what he means by ‘Ethical Theory’, and what he means by ‘Taxonomy’. Ethical theory, which Hare contrasts to ‘moral theory’, is a purely formal discipline that is concerned with the meaning and logical properties of moral words. Hare offers a ‘Taxonomy’ of ethical theories in the sense of a classification into genera and differentia, beginning with what he sees as the basic dichotomy in ethical theory between descriptivism and non‐descriptivism. The difference between descriptivist and non‐descriptivist ethical theories is that, according to the former, the meaning of moral statements is determined entirely by their truth conditions; the latter deny that this is so. Hare divides descriptivism into ‘Naturalism’ (Ch. 4) and ‘Intuitionism’ (Ch. 5), and non‐descriptivism into ‘Emotivism’ (Ch. 6) and ‘Rationalism’ (Ch. 7).
Naturalism
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Naturalism is a species of descriptivism, and is described as the proposal to specify the truth conditions of moral statements without reference to moral words, i.e. without reference to the attitudes of the speakers. Hence, the truth conditions of moral statements are non‐moral properties. Hare subdivides Naturalism into ‘objectivist’ and ‘subjectivist’ varieties. The variety of Naturalism that interests Hare in this chapter is objectivist naturalism, according to which the non‐moral properties are objective. Naturalism, Hare argues, results inevitably in relativism, and any ethical theory that implies relativism must be rejected.
Realism and the No‐Miracles Argument
Authors: Howson Colin 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConsiders the increasingly popular, so‐called ‘No‐Miracles’ argument that we do have a valid inductive argument for supposing that our current theories, at any rate in physics, are substantially, if not wholly, true: it would be incredibly improbable that theories very far from the truth could make such extremely precise predictions, verified experimentally up to one part in a billion. Such ‘miracles’ of chance agreement can clearly be ruled out as themselves too improbable to be true. This apparently plausible argument is examined carefully and shown to consist in a number of separate steps, all of which are fallacious.
Deductivism
Authors: Howson Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses the view, often called Deductivism, put forward independently by the philosopher Karl Popper and the statistician and geneticist R. A. Fisher, that deductive logic suffices to tell us which is the best theory in the light of observational data. In Fisher's case, this view supported his theory of significance tests. Deductivism purports to be a radical solution of Hume's problem because, according to it, there are no specifically inductive inferences. This, and the related views of the statisticians Neyman and Pearson, are shown to be untenable.
Chance and Probability
Authors: Howson Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers the nature of chance and its role in statistical hypotheses. It is argued that the best way to understand chance is as tendency, naturally measured by the frequency in repeated trials of the occurrence of the event in question. The relationship with von Mises's theory is briefly examined. It is shown how, via Bayes's Theorem, statistical data can support or undermine chance hypotheses even though there is no deductive relation between the hypotheses and the data.
Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics
Authors: White Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Even before Hegel, philosophers opposed to Kant's dualism of reason and inclination, and to other similar dualistic oppositions of morality and self‐interest, have looked to the ancient Greeks for an alternative conception of ethics and the human personality that is to be guided by it. For this purpose these philosophers fixed on Greek ethics, stressing its harmonizing eudaimonist elements and its use of the notion of virtue.
This book argues to the contrary that if we picture Greek ethics as simply a form of harmonizing eudaimonism we seriously distort its true character. First, Greek ethics is far too variegated to fit under a single such label. Second, the Classical ideas of Plato and Aristotle contain important elements that are characteristic neither of harmonizing eudaimonism nor of an ethics of virtue. Greek thinkers did not as a group believe in a consistency of one's happiness with one's conformity to ethical norms or with a full regard for the happiness of others. Rather they took seriously the idea that ethical standards can possess a rational force that does not derive from any contribution that they might make to one's own well‐being.
Even Plato and Aristotle believed that under certain circumstances there can be a genuine clash between obeying ethical standards and achieving one's greatest good. The project of ruling out any such clash was developed not in the Classical period but rather in the Stoic ethics of the Third Century. Thus Greek ethics does not eliminate ethical dualisms, and many Greek views exhibit many of the same contours, and the same deep philosophical problem of the conflict of individual and social good, as modern ethics does.
Individual Good and Deliberative Conflict in Aristotle
Authors: White Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Although Aristotle's ethics is rightly characterized as eudaimonist, in making the happiness of an individual his preeminent aim, it does not adopt the harmonizing eudaimonist position that all constituents of human happiness are consistent with each other. For one thing, he holds that there can be conflicts between friends. In addition, he maintains that conflicts within happiness can break out, between the value of acting in a morally virtuous way and that of pursuing intellectual virtue or contemplation (theoria). Aristotle thus admits the possibility of conflict within virtue, and therefore within happiness, which is defined as activity in accordance with virtue. He accordingly does not use the notion of virtue, let alone an ethics of virtue, to construct a harmonizing view of happiness.
Conflict and Individual Good in Hellenistic Ethics
Authors: White Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Contrary to the hegelian thought that harmonizing eudaimonism was manifested most fully in the Classical period of Greek ethics, it is in fact the Hellenistic period after Aristotle that shows the most forthright attempts to produce ethical views that do not generate conflicts between rational aims. This is partly the result of the Hellenistic attempts to generate positions that, unlike the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, possess a high degree of systematic coherence. Epicurean hedonism is a case in point, as is Stoic ethics, which goes a considerable way toward eliminating the very idea of a distinction between what is good for oneself and what is good in a global, non‐self‐referential way.
Actuality and Actuality as of a Time
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Characterizes certain notions that are needed for stating the central claim of the book.Facts are to be identified with states of affairs, which are the truth‐makers for true propositions. The concept of a state of affair's existence or actuality should be taken as basic and unanalysable.
The dynamic view of time to be defended requires that not only the concept of actuality simpliciter but also the concept of actuality as of a given time is treated as basic.
Philosophical Objections
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses several philosophical objections against the view of time defended in the book. Objections against the unreality of the future that relate to bivalence are rejected by denying that disjunction is truth‐functional. The charge that a vicious regress of meta‐times is entailed is shown not to apply to the dynamic view defended here. Mellor's and Dummett's variants of McTaggart's argument against the reality of time are rejected, as are independent arguments of Mellor's against the reality of tensed facts.
Animals That Think
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explains why Leibniz held that matter cannot think (the grounding principle). His ‘mill’ thought‐experiment and his account of animals; the role of the dominant monad in an animal; the scope of animality in the material world; and corporeal substances are also dealt with in this chapter. An aside: Locke's argument for the existence of a god. A coda: Leibniz's need for, and difficulty in having, a sound concept of confused perception.
Knowledge of Necessity
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDeals with Locke's attack on, and Leibniz's defence of, the belief in innately possessed knowledge. The debate is made more complex when Leibniz introduces the idea of innate dispositions to have knowledge. While Locke attempts to explain modal knowledge without help from innatism Leibniz attempts to explain it with that help. The debate over innately possessed ideas is hard to get into focus because ‘ideas’ is a blurry term.
The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith
Authors: Evans C. Stephen 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe story of Jesus of Nazareth, as recounted in the New Testament (incarnational narrative), has always been understood by the Church to be historically true. It is an account of the life, death, and resurrection of a real person, whose links with history are firmly signalled in the creeds of the early Church, which affirm that Jesus ‘suffered under Pontius Pilate’. Contemporary historical scholarship has, however, called into question the reliability of the Church’s version of this story, and thereby raised the question of whether ordinary people can know its historical truth. This book argues that the historicity of the story still matters, and that its religious significance cannot be captured by the category of ‘non-historical myth’. The commonly drawn distinction between the Jesus of faith and the Jesus of history cannot be maintained. The Christ who is the object of faith must be seen as historical; the Jesus who is reconstructed by historical scholarship is always shaped by commitments of faith. A reconsideration of the Enlightenment epistemologies that underlie much historical scholarship shows that historical knowledge of this story is still possible. Such knowledge can be inferential, based on historical evidence. Newer accounts suggest that this knowledge can also be epistemologically basic, although never groundless. A careful look at contemporary New Testament studies, and the philosophical and literary assumptions upon which they rest, shows that this scholarship should not undermine the confidence of lay people who believe that they can know that the Church’s story about Jesus is true.
Critical History and the Supernatural
Authors: Evans C. Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A variation on the epistemological objection to special acts of God (miracles) investigated in the previous chapter is the claim that such acts cannot be recognized by anyone who is committed to critical, historical investigation. This kind of argument, which rests on the nature of historical knowledge and critical historical method, is considered in this chapter. If the incarnational narrative necessarily includes such divine actions, then the argument claims that we cannot have historical knowledge of it. The different sections of the chapter are: rationalism about religious knowledge; can the rationalist conception of religious knowledge be defended?; Hans Frei and the character of the biblical narrative; the assumptions of the ‘critical historian’; Troeltsch’s principles of correlation and analogy; and the sociology of knowledge and appeals to authority.
The Incarnational Narrative as Historical: Evidence for Belief
Authors: Evans C. Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter is the first of three asking how knowledge of the incarnational narrative might be acquired. To do this an examination is made of two distinct theological traditions that give rather different answers to the question of how Christians gain this historical knowledge: the first, which is examined in the next chapter, gives great emphasis to the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit; the second, which is the subject of this chapter, puts the central focus on objective evidence, and regards the knowledge of the incarnational story as based on other things that we know or believe. It is commonly claimed that all historical beliefs must be based on evidence, and so it is not surprising that there is a long tradition of Christian apologetics that attempts to show that there is indeed good evidence for Christian beliefs about the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. This is the evidentialist approach, which, philosophically, has often been characterized by at least an implicit acceptance of epistemological internalism, although it is possible for an evidentialist apologetic to be developed that is not committed to internalism. The different sections of the chapter are: Classical examples of the two-stage approach (the first phase is mainly natural theology and attempts to show the reasonableness of believing in a God with at least some characteristics of the Christian faith, the second attempts to show that the events recorded in the Bible are a true revelation of God and his activities); Swinburne’s contemporary evidentialist apologetic; problems with evidentialist accounts; and, conclusions: values and limits of an evidentialist case.