bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Philadelphia
Authors: Harrington Watt David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
During the early 1990s, when the fieldwork upon which this book is based was conducted, economic conditions in Philadelphia were not good. Jobs were relatively scarce and the city's cultural and educational institutions usually seemed short of cash. Life in the city was characterized by relatively high rates of violence and crime. At that time, there was a great deal of segregation – racial, ethnic, and economic ℃ in Philadelphia.
Social Power
Authors: Harrington Watt David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book uses data drawn from fieldwork to check the accuracy of one of the stories that scholars often tell about Bible‐carrying Christian churches. According to that story, such churches naturalize asymmetrical power relations. They teach people that it is natural for Christians to defer to the desires of corporations and nation‐states; for lay people to defer to ministers; for homosexuals to defer to heterosexuals; and for women to defer to men.
The Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship
Authors: Harrington Watt David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship, a congregation that deeply valued the traditions of the Anabaptists, was located in a section of West Philadelphia that was not at all prosperous. Many of the people associated with the fellowship were devoted to “traditional family values” and many of them believed that homosexuality was a sin. The congregation was not, by any means, made up exclusively of people who were thoroughgoing feminists. Nevertheless, the Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship was a place where patriarchal norms were sometimes interrogated. It was also a place where people were taught that Christians sometimes ought to resist the power of nation‐states and of corporations. At the Philadelphia Mennonite Fellowship, forms of hierarchy associated with ministerial authority were viewed with suspicion.
The Philadelphia Church of Christ
Authors: Harrington Watt David 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe Philadelphia Church of Christ, a congregation associated with a movement called the International Churches of Christ, put a great deal of emphasis on the importance of rapid church growth. The congregation was a place where people were taught that it is a mistake for Christians to pour too much energy into resisting the power of nation‐states or corporations. At the Philadelphia Church of Christ, people were taught that it is natural for women to defer to men and for homosexuals to defer to heterosexuals. People were taught, too, that it is imperative for Christians to unhesitatingly follow directions given to them by ministers and by other church authorities.
The Romanization of Catholicism
Authors: Dolan Jay P. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Focuses on the turning away from a Catholicism grounded in the American democratic tradition in the years 1820–1880. This was a key transition period in American Catholic history. What took place was a thorough Romanization of Catholicism in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. During these years, such aspects of American culture as the rise of the public school and anti‐Catholic nativism had an impact on Catholicism by reinforcing its sectarian quality.
Competing Visions
Authors: Dolan Jay P. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The five themes presented in Ch. 3 (American national identity, Americanization of Catholic doctrine, democracy, devotional Catholicism, and gender equality) are further examined here in the context of seeking to show how American culture shaped Catholicism in the era 1920–60 . It is shown that during these years, Catholics were beginning to think in a less parochial manner, and emerge from the neighbourhood/parish ghettos that had formed their life previously, and had been subject to attack by nativist revivals of Anglo‐Saxonism and anti‐Catholicism (in the shape of a revived Ku Klux Klan). Such a reorientation gave rise to the emergence of a public Catholicism that sought to influence the shape and values of American society.
An American Religion and a Roman Church, 1960–2001
Authors: Dolan Jay P. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The five themes presented in Ch. 3 (democracy, American national identity, gender equality, devotional Catholicism, and the Americanization of Catholic doctrine) are further examined here in the context of seeking to show how American culture shaped Catholicism in the period 1960–2001. The chapter starts by examining the role of President Kennedy in enabling Catholics to stand taller, and the changes initiated by Pope John XXIII's election in 1958, which led to the Second Vatican Council reforms (1962–65). It then examines the further emergence of a public Catholicism that sought to influence the shape and values of American society. The chapter also touches on some issues that have generated considerable controversy among Catholics in recent years – the ethical issues of abortion and birth control, the desire for more democracy in the management of parish life, the role of women in the church, the increased ethnic diversity of Catholicism, and the new rituals of prayer and worship that have emerged in the past 40 years.
Three Platonic Analogies
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Attempts to provide a coherent understanding of three analogies that appear at the center of Plato's Republic: The Sun and the Good, The Divided Line, and the Allegory of the Cave. The main innovation is to treat The Divided Line as an image‐object metaphor illustrating the nature of mathematical reasoning. On this reading, the middle two portions of the four‐part Divided Line both contain diagrams. In the lower middle portion, the diagram is treated as a physical object that can have reflected images. In the upper middle portion, the diagram is treated as a physical object, which is itself an image of a form.
Kant and Hume on Simultaneity of Causes and Effects
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the Treatise of Human Nature Hume argued – actually quite badly – that a cause must be prior to its effect. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant cites what seems to be a clear example of a cause being simultaneous with its effect: a ball impressing a hollow on a cushion. This raises a problem for Hume's account of causality, for, if we grant, agreeing with Kant, that causes are sometimes simultaneous with their effect, how, on Hume's “regularity” account of causality, can we distinguish causes from effects. The solution suggested here is that the direction of causality is not fixed by physical facts but, in part at least, by what we are doing or how we view things. Whether this is right or not, it seems to be a solution that conforms to a Humean account of causality.
Wittgenstein and Intuitionism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay explores one important strain that runs through Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics: his commitment to themes characteristic of the intuitionist movement in logic and mathematics. Chief among them are his attacks on the unrestricted use of the Law of Excluded Middle, his distrust of nonconstructive proofs, and his impatience with the idea that mathematics stands in need of a foundation. The central idea of the essay is that these aspects of Wittgenstein's position can be explained by attributing to him the view that mathematical and logical propositions are tacitly governed by the modal operator “it is a rule that.”
Industrializing through Learning
Authors: Amsden Alice H. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is a book not only about South Korea and how it came to be a major factor in the world economy, but also about the industrialization process that South Korea followed. This process, which will be referred to as late industrialization, has profound implications for a range of other countries that are also struggling to compete in the world of international business. South Korea's success in this struggle can thus be seen both as a fascinating story in itself, and as an example from which others may learn. It is also an example of a new way of industrializing that challenges long‐held assumptions of generations of economic thinkers. This is discussed in the different sections of this chapter which cover: learning as a new mode of industrialization; the relative speeds of industrialization in different eras; South Korea as a special case of late industrialization; the role of the state (government) in late industrialization; the process of catching up; and overcoming technological ignorance.
Getting Relative Prices “Wrong”: A Summary
Authors: Amsden Alice H. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
According to accepted economic theory, industrial expansion can be explained by one of two grand approaches, market oriented or institutional, and success is usually interpreted as a validation of market principles and of the institutions financially supporting them. In South Korea, in contrast, the government made most of the pivotal investment decisions, the firms involved operated with an extraordinary degree of market control, protected from foreign competition, and relative prices were not got right, they were deliberately got wrong. This chapter offers a new paradigm to explain the behavior of the growing economies of late industrializing countries, based on the historical record of deliberately getting prices wrong, and the disciplinary mechanism involved.
The Rise of Salaried Engineers: Automobile Manufacturing
Authors: Amsden Alice H. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter looks at the salaried automobile engineer in South Korea's late industrialization with respect to two extreme typologies – the small‐ and medium‐sized firm, and the huge diversified business group. These two groups are addressed in the first two main sections of the chapter, and includes some general discussion of across‐country situations in various manufacturing industries as well as specific discussion of the Korean automobile industry. Three further sections discuss the following: Learning at the Hyundai Motor Company, Japan's influence on Korea's small‐ and medium‐sized firms, and the subcontracting network of the Hyundai Motor Company.
The Switch in Industrial Leadership
Authors: Amsden Alice H. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Korea has diversified from less to more complex diversified industries in a nonlinear fashion. This chapter suggests that cotton spinning and weaving, South Korea's leading sector in terms of production volume, did not serve as the springboard for further (late) industrialization in any organizational sense. Insofar as the diversified business (industrial) group acted as the agent of expansion, it had its origins in the government's more management‐intensive, early import‐substitution projects, not in a labor‐intensive industry like cotton textiles. The first part of the chapter discusses the Korean textile industry in detail. The last part discusses the textile industry versus the cement‐making industry, with a section devoted specifically to the Hyundai Cement Company.
The Triumph of Steel
Authors: Amsden Alice H. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines the hypothesis that climbing the ladder of comparative advantage is a matter of creating competitiveness, usually with government assistance, rather than stepping into it. The evidence comes from South Korea's integrated iron‐ and steel‐maker (the Pohang Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., POSCO), which is the centerpiece of basic industry and a public enterprise. The chapter discusses POSCO's founding in 1968; its profitability and subsidization; international competition; foreign technical assistance and the nature of steel‐making technology; POSCO's initial prioritization of increasing volume production, and the later shift to improving product quality and introducing new products; shop‐floor focus; and cross‐subsidization.
Warrant: The Current Debate
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this book and in its sequels, Warrant and Proper Function and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity, enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. Contemporary epistemologists seldom focus attention on the nature of warrant; and when they do, they display deplorable diversity: some claim that what turns true belief into knowledge is a matter of epistemic dutifulness, others that it goes by coherence, and still others that it is conferred by reliability. I shall argue that none of these claims is correct, and (in Warrant and Proper Function) suggest a more satisfactory alternative. In the present book, I survey current contributions to the discussion of warrant and neighboring issues. I begin with internalism, looking first at the carefully crafted foundationalist internalism of Roderick Chisholm (Chs. 2 and 3). To better understand Chisholm and other internalists, however, I first make a preliminary excursus (Ch 1) into the classical internalism of Descartes, Locke, and others. After Chisholmian internalism, I turn to coherentism, which for classificatory purposes I take as a form of internalism. In the next three chapters, I consider coherentism taken generally (Ch. 4), the specific version of coherentism developed by Laurence BonJour (Ch. 5), and contemporary Bayesian versions of coherentism (Chs. 6 and 7). Next (Ch. 8), there is the more attenuated internalism of John Pollock, which I see as a transition from internalism to externalism. Finally, I examine the reliabilist and externalist views of William Alston, Fred Dretske, and Alvin Goldman (Ch. 9), and close with a preview of Warrant and Proper Function (Ch. 10).
Justification, Internalism, and Deontology
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, I introduce the notion of warrant (that quantity, enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief), and then turn to examine the connections between (epistemic) deontology, justification, and internalism. Central to deontology is the thought that being justified in holding a belief is a matter of having fulfilled one's epistemic duties in forming or continuing to hold that belief. The basic thrust of internalism is that the properties that confer warrant upon a belief are properties to which the believer has some sort of special epistemic access. After a brief survey of the great diversity in twentieth‐century views about justification, I argue that internalism flows from deontology, and that we can better understand twentieth century views about justification when we understand the relationships between deontology, justification, and internalism.
Coherentism
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, I consider coherentism taken generally (rather than this or that particular variety of coherentism), and argue that it does not afford the resources for a satisfactory account of warrant. We can better understand coherentism, I think, by contrasting it with foundationalism; I accordingly begin with an examination of ordinary foundationalism (and, in so doing, introduce the notion of proper basicality and the notion of a noetic structure). Turning next to coherentism, we find that the coherentist claims that coherence is both necessary and sufficient for warrant in that a proposition has warrant for me if and only if it is coherent with my noetic structure or appropriately follows from propositions that are coherent with my noetic structure. I argue that the coherentist is wrong on both counts – coherence is neither necessary nor sufficient for warrant. I then close with a short discussion of classical foundationalism.
BonJourian Coherentism
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, I explain and critically examine Laurence BonJour's version of coherentism, as presented in his The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Speaking roughly, BonJour holds that an empirical belief has warrant only if it is an element in a system of beliefs that is coherent in the long run. Somewhat less roughly, BonJour holds that an empirical belief B has warrant for a person S if and only if S has a reason for thinking B to be true; and that reason, on BonJour's view, can only be the conjunction of (1) B being a member of S's system of beliefs, and that system is coherent (in the long run) and (2) if B is a member of S's system of beliefs and S's system of beliefs has been coherent for a sufficiently long run, then B is likely to be true. After explaining BonJour's coherentism, I comment on two interesting facets of BonJour's thought: (1) his relationship to classical foundationalism and his trust in reason, and (2) the success of his argument for a coherentist justification of empirical belief. Finally, and most importantly for the larger purpose of my book, I consider his conception of warrant, concluding that BonJourian coherence is neither sufficient nor necessary for warrant.
Bayesian Coherentism and Warrant
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, I outline the essentials of Bayesianism (also known as Bayesian Coherentism) and ask whether it contributes to a satisfying account of warrant. From the perspective of my overall project in Warrant: The Current Debate, Bayesianism can be seen as essentially suggesting conditions for a rational or reasonable set of partial beliefs, where a partial belief of an agent S is any belief that S accepts to some degree or another, no matter how small. Although Bayesians tend to speak not of warrant but of rationality, I consider in this chapter the relationship between Bayesianism and warrant. I conclude that the conditions for rationality proposed by Bayesians (e.g., coherence, strict coherence, changing belief by conditionalization or Jeffrey's “Probability Kinematics,” van Fraassen's Reflection) are neither severally necessary nor jointly sufficient conditions for warrant. Taken as a theory of warrant, Bayesianism is incomplete in that (1) it says nothing about the sort of relation between belief and experience required for warrant, and (2) it provides no account of evidence or evidential support.
Induction
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Broadly taken, the term “induction” denotes our whole nondeductive procedure of acquiring, maintaining, and discarding beliefs about what is so far unobserved or undetected or unknown. In this chapter, I examine induction from the perspective of my account of warrant. I first take up what is now referred to as “the old riddle of induction,” rejecting David Hume's claim that inductive reasoning is not rationally justified and defending the view that beliefs formed on the basis of inductive reasoning can have warrant. I then turn to Nelson Goodman's ruminations on grue and the “new riddle of induction,” which is the question: what makes a property projectible? I reject Goodman's own solution to this problem, examine other inadequate solutions, and then suggest that an answer can be found by making reference to the proper function of the human intellect; projectible properties are just those properties that a properly functioning adult human being in our circumstances will in fact project.
Naturalism Versus Proper Function?
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The account of warrant I propose, utilizing the notion of proper function as it does, is an example of naturalistic epistemology: it invokes no kind of normativity not to be found in the natural sciences; in this chapter and the next, I argue that naturalism in epistemology can flourish only in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. To do so, I argue that there is no satisfactory naturalistic explanation or account of the notion of proper function (or related notions like purpose, malfunction, design plan, etc.). I consider proposals for such an account that can be drawn from the work of John Pollock, Ruth Millikan, and John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter, but find in each case that the proposed account is inadequate. I then consider the possibility that the notion of proper function (and related notions) should be thought of as useful fictions. After some critical comments about this possibility, I proceed to point out that if one (1) is convinced that there really is such a thing as warrant and that there really is (for natural organisms) such a thing as proper function, and also (2) thinks that there is no naturalistic analysis of these notions, then one has a powerful argument against naturalism.
The Ethics of Killing
Authors: McMahan Jeff 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA comprehensive study of the ethics of killing in cases in which the metaphysical or moral status of the individual killed is uncertain or controversial. Among those beings whose status is questionable or marginal in this way are human embryos and fetuses, newborn infants, animals, anencephalic infants, human beings with severe congenital and cognitive impairments, and human beings who have become severely demented or irreversibly comatose. In an effort to understand the moral status of these beings, this book develops and defends distinctive accounts of the nature of personal identity, the evaluation of death, and the wrongness of killing. The central metaphysical claim of the book is that we are neither nonmaterial souls nor human organisms but are instead embodied minds. In ethical theory, one of the central claims is that the morality of killing is not unitary; rather, the principles that determine the morality of killing in marginal cases are different from those that govern the killing of persons who are self‐conscious and rational. Another important theme is that killing in marginal cases should be evaluated in terms of the impact it would have on the victim at the time rather than on the value of the victim's life as a whole. What primarily matters is how killing would affect that which would be rational for the victim to care about at the time of death. By appealing to various foundational claims about identity, death, and the morality of killing, this book yields novel conclusions about such issues as abortion, prenatal injury, infanticide, the killing of animals, the significance of brain death, the termination of life support in cases of persistent vegetative state, the use of anencephalic infants as sources of organs for transplantation, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and advance directives in cases of dementia. In particular, the book defends the moral permissibility of abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia in certain cases and argues that brain death is not the appropriate criterion of death either for a person or a human organism.
Identity
Authors: McMahan Jeff 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues against three widely held views of our identity: the view that we are souls or incorporeal substances, the view that we are human organisms, and the view that the criterion of our identity over time is entirely psychological. It argues that we are instead embodied minds and that the criterion of our identity over time is the continued existence and functioning, in nonbranching form, of enough of those regions of the brain in which consciousness occurs in order for the brain to retain the capacity, with relevant support systems, to support consciousness or mental activity. It also follows Derek Parfit in claiming that identity is not the basis of egoistic concern about the future.