bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Successful use of stainless steels in nitrogen‐based fertilizer plants
Authors: Tersmeden Knut 
Published: June 2004

AbstractIn ammonia plants duplex stainless steels have been successfully used in many heat exchangers operating up to 600°C in cooling water polluted by chlorides. The duplex stainless steels offer a safe and cost‐effiecient alternative to carbon steel and stainless steels in the 300 series. In urea plants operating with stripper technology the material for the stripper, condenser, H.P. piping and reactor is reviewed. The good performance of 2RE69 has lead to a wider usage especially when 316L Urea Grade has been replaced for the Snamprogetti stripper. The new bimetallic tubing using a 2RE69 tubing with an inner lining of zirconium is now an accepted solution. Welding consumables are also presented.
A quantitative approach to determination of NFPA reactivity hazard rating parameters
Authors: Hofelich T. C. , Prine B. A. , Scheffler N. E. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractThe National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has developed a system for labeling short‐term acute hazards of materials in fire, or emergency situations [1]. The procedures for obtaining the hazard rating for health and flammability are based upon measured quantities [2], but the basis for assigning reactivity ratings are largely qualitative [1]. This paper proposes a quantitative approach for assigning reactivity hazard ratings.
No good deed goes unpunished: Case studies of incidents and potential incidents caused by protective systems
Authors: Dowell A. M. , Hendershot D. C. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractIn the course of chemical process and plant design, engineers identify potential hazardous incidents. These potential incidents may be identified through special hazard analysis reviews and procedures, or by the design team in the course of design activities. To manage and control those hazards, the team will modify the initial design, often by adding on additional protective devices and systems—alarms, interlocks or active protective systems. However, any change in a system, even a change intended to prevent or mitigate a potential hazardous incident, also has the potential to introduce new hazards, or new mechanisms by which existing hazards can result in an incident. A number of case studies illustrating this point are reviewed. The examples illustrate the importance of a management of change program, which must consider all changes including the addition of safety devices and systems, and which must throughly consider all potential effects on the system.
Utilize plant data from emergency relief events to test design methods: A proposal to the AIChE DIERS users group
Authors: Edwards Victor H. , Howard Walter B. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractAdvanced methods for the design of emergency relief systems were developed under the auspices of the AIChE Design Institute for Emergency Relief Systems (DIERS). Rapid progress has continued, but most testing has been done at laboratory or small pilot plant scale. Full scale tests of design methods for emergency relief systems are much needed, but would be prohibitively expensive.Proposed here is a practical alternative: Use existing production data from operating plants to test design methods for emergency relief systems. Fortunately, although most emergency pressure relief events represent plant upsets and lost production, the relief system prevents a catastrophe in most process upsets. However, the qualitatively successful operation of an emergency relief system in a given upset does not represent proof of the design method employed. More importantly, it does not guarantee that the existing relief system will perform successfully in every credible upset that the process might experience in the future.Advocated here is an industry‐wide program to use data from selected process upsets to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of current emergency relief system design methods to quantitatively predict the performance of existing emergency relief systems. Products of this effort would include confirmation of a significant number of existing design methods, identification of deficiencies in current methods, and a published compendium of documented and evaluated case histories of full‐scale relief system performance. In addition to its instructive value to workers in emergency relief, the compendium could be used to test new design methods.This proposal is offered to the AIChE DIERS Users' Group. The DIERS Users' Group, which is comprised of over one hundred member companies, has representatives qualified to define, organize, sponsor, and execute a multi‐company research program of this type. (NOTE: At the semiannual meeting of the AIChE DIERS Users' Group in Calgary, Alberta, Canada on September 9, 1996, this proposal was presented to and adopted by the DIERS Users' Group and assigned to the Case Histories Committee.)
Carbon disulfide incidents during viscose rayon processing
Authors: Hall Danal S. , Losee Lyman A. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractTwo incidents occurred in a viscose rayon manufacturing process about a month apart during the same step of a semi‐monthly cleaning operation in a carbon disulfide recovery box. The operation removes sulfides that accumulate on equipment surfaces during the week. In both incidents, carbon disulfide was released from the recovery box into the vapor exhaust system and the area surounding the recovery box. Ignition occurred and the resulting vapor flash propagated throughout the vapor exhaust system and the operating bay. Both incidents caused extensive equipment and building damage and minor injuries to personnel.Investigation and recommendations after the first incident, although appropriate, did not eliminate the root cause of the problem. Additional information obtained during the investigation of the second incident showed that a combination of several modifications and subtle changes in that particular process line, in conjunction with the colder temperatures of fall and winter, resulted in the incidents. The changing of the critical balance of temperature, pressure in the closed system, and sudden volatilization of accumulated carbon disulfide in an unlikely location were triggered by startup of the cleaning operation. Once the carbon disulfide vapor pressure vented from the closed system numerous ignition sources were available.The discussion will focus on the importance of management of change for seemingly small, logical changes, and on the importance of attention to small details in an accident investigation.
Batch runaway reaction relief: Re‐evaluation of “Credible” scenario
Authors: Singh Jasbir 
Published: June 2004

AbstractMany chemical reactions in the fine chemical and related industries are performed in a semi‐batch manner under isothermal conditions. Relief system design evaluation for runaway reactions, using DIERS methodology for example, is frequently studied adiabatically using data derived from batch mode testing. In many cases, however, evaluation of the process isothermally under the realistic semi‐batch mode can be extremely useful, often helping to greatly reduce the vent size as a result of a better understanding of the process. In some cases, it is even possible to eliminate runaway reaction as a viable case for relief sizing. Such evaluations of venting are fully consistent with DIERS methodology.This paper presents the arguments for sizing vents for scenarios other than the very worst case, by objective evaluation of trips and interlocks, so that the level of risk is reduced to an acceptable level without the need for extremely large vents.
Fully quantitative predictive maintenance/inspection planning optimization for chemical process plant components
Authors: Mauney David A. , Schmidt Michael E. G. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractPredictive maintenance/inspection planning and fitness‐for‐service analyses are being applied more frequently to address the effect of component aging affecting plant reliabibility. Component aging is one of the critical issues in an increasingly competitive environment, especially in plant components built and installed during the 50s and 60s. Maintenance optimization is also a critical issue for components, such as those that operate in the creep regime, and therefore age quickly. Maximizing the value received for each predictive maintenance/inspection dollar is the key. This article introduces the use of decision analysis to unite engineering analysis and economic evaluation for decision making. To illustrate this idea, examples of this approach applied to chemical facility components will be presented. In addition, the concept of priority‐ranking multiple component maintenance/inspectio projects having maintenance budget and safety constraints in a way that maximizes Net Present Value, will be presented.
KG: New data and analysis
Authors: Senecal Joseph A. , Beaulieu Patricia A. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractThe design and deflagration pressure relief vents is based on correlations developed for various types of combustible materials and for enclosures of different strengths. The primary guideline for deflagration vent design in the US is NFPA 68 Guide for Venting of Deflagrations [5]. That document gives guidance for the design of vents for enclosures containing flammable gases, specifically hydrogen, coke oven gas, propane, and methane. Application of the guide to other gases is achieved using the KG value. Values of KG are published for a relatively small number of gases, as seen in Table D‐1 of NFPA 68. This work present KG data on several additional gases obtained in a laboratory scale test vessel along with analysis of the results with respect to published values of fundamental burning velocity.
Risk based prioritization of maintenance repair work
Authors: Harnly John A. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractThis paper describes the development of a risk ranked Inspection Recommendation procedure that is used by one of Exxon's chemical plants to prioritize repairs that have been identified during equipment inspection.As part of the Company's Safety Management Practices initiative in the late 1980's a procedure was put into place to ensure that an Inspector's repair recommendations were properly addressed by the organization. The initial procedures were successful at “systematizing” the documentation and stewardship‐to‐completion of the Inspector's recommendation, however, there were complications with the original process:

The Inspector made a simple High, Medium or Low assessment of the priority/criticality of the recommendation. Frequently, this resulted in disagreements with Operations about the true priority of the recommendation.
If there was agreement on the priority of the recommendation, there was still disagreement on the relative rank within the priority‐which high priority was the highest priority?
With limited funds to spend on repairs, it was (and is) important to make sure that the money was being spent on the highest risk items that had the greatest risk reduction/cost benefit ratio.
To address these concerns, the procedure was modified to incorporate a risk assessment of the recommendation by both the Inspector and Operations. In the new procedure, the Inspector describes the deficiency that he/she finds and assesses the probability of failure within a certain time‐frame. Operations must assess the consequences, from an environmental, safety and economics standpoint, were the failure to occur. These assessments are combined in the typical risk equation (risk = probability × consequences) to arrive at a severity index which serves to rank the recommendation relative to the other recommendations. Because Operations participates in the assessment there is very little disagreement about the priority of the recommendation. The severity index puts the recommendations in order so it is quite clear which are the highest priority recommendations. This process has helped to focus the entire organization on those deficiencies that represent the greatest risk with the result that less time and money is spent correcting items that have a low risk/cost benefit ratio, allowing these savings to be used to reduce the higher risks in the plant.
Pressure relief system documentation: Equipment based relational database is key to OSHA 1910.119 compliance
Authors: Berwanger P. C. (Pat) , Kreder R. A. (Rob) 
Published: June 2004

AbstractUnder OSHA 1910.119, all Process Safety Management (PSM) facilities are required to keep their pressure relief system design information current. This article demonstrates why a pressure relief system design verification effort must be based on an equipment list, rather than a relief device list, in order to ensure that every piece of equipment is adequately protected. The formerly common practice of simply checking the design bases of all existing relief devices is deficient is deficient since this technique does not systematically ensure that every piece of equipment is protected.The “Berwanger Method” is a step by step process for designing or analyzing a pressure relief system to meet OSHA 1910.119 Process Safety Information (PSI) and Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) mandates. The method uses a relational database which tracks the relationships between protected equipment, potential overpressure scenarios, and protective devices.The challenge facing an operating company does not end once the design basis has been “verified”—the design basis information must also be maintained and be readily accessible to avoid costly reinvention of the wheel down the road. The “Berwanger Method” also addresses these maintenance issues.
Team situation awareness for process control safety and performance
Authors: Kaber David B. , Endsley Mica R. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractThis paper defines situation awareness (SA) and discusses its importance to operator‐machine system safety and functioning in the context of process control activities. Specifically, identified are relationships of human detection of critical process cues converying the status of automated control systems and operator interpretation of the meaning and relevance of such information to the potential for negative incidents in chemical processing. Beyond individual operator SA in interacting with control systems, intra‐ and inter‐ work team SA are discussed for supporting individual attainment of process control responsibilities. Factors critical to team SA are discussed. “Road blocks” to team SA are also analytically examined. Lastly, methods for assessing individual and team SA are reviewed and vehicles for relating outcomes of these methods to changes in process control operator and team behavior to improve human‐machine system safety and performance are relayed.
A detailed reaction study of phosphorus trichloride and water
Authors: Melhem G. A. , Reid D. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractThis paper reports on a comprehensive literature search and small scale experimental work on the reaction characteristics of phosphorous trichloride and water. More than 30 tests were conducted, including both closed and open test cells. The water to phosphorus trichloride molar ratio was varied from 1 to 25. When in contact, water and phosphorus trichloride will form two liquid layers with a reaction starting at the interface. The impact of variables on reaction rates including the interface surface area, layer depth, and stirring were investigated experimentally. A reaction rate model that fits all the measured data is presented. Case studies illustrating the use of this data for emergency relief systems and vent containment design are presented in reference. [1].
Dust explosion mitigation using Q‐Rohr and exkop
Authors: Stevenson William J. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractDust explosions have been with us for a long time. The first record of a dust explosion occurred in Turin, Italy, on December 14, 1785 [1]. The detailed record of this event is left to us by Count Morozzo. The event took place in Mr. Giacomelli's bakery. We know from his account that the weather was unseasonably dry, that a boy who worked in the bakery was using a shovel to stir and transfer the flour to a chute from a store room to the bakery and he had a lighted lamp to work by. The rest, as the saying goes, is history. No one was killed, and the building was saved by the sagacious fact of having plenty of windows. Since that first record, of course, there have been many explosions with much loss of life and significant economic consequences.
Making safety second nature
Authors: Kletz Trevor A. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractFrom the 1960s onwards, the chemical and oil industries developed and used a number of new safety techniques which, in time, became second nature to those who applied them. They included the use of QRA for deciding priorities, Hazop and audits for identifying problems, inherently safer design for avoiding hazards, and more thorough investigation of incidents for identifying underlying causes. However, it has not yet become second nature to remember the accidents of the past and the actions needed to prevent them happening again.I joined industry in 1944 and moved to production in 1952. Then, and for at least 15 years afterwards, safety was a non‐technical subject that could be left to arts graduates and elderly foremen. There was concern that people should not be hurt—great attention was paid to the lost‐time accident rate—but there was no realization, that it was a subject worthy of systematic study by experienced technologists.This view changed at the end of the 1960s. A new generation of plants had been built, operating at higher temperatures and pressures and containing larger inventories of hazardous chemicals; the result was a series of fires and explosions and a worsening fatal accident rate. Figure 1 shows the situation in ICI, at the time the UK, s largest chemical company. Other companies experienced a similar state of affairs.As a result in 1968, I was appointed one of the company's first technical safety advisers, an unusual appointment at the time for someone with my experience, and if the reason for my appointment had not been so obvious I would have wondered what I had done wrong. I and my colleagues tried to apply the same sort of systematic thinking to safety that we applied in our other professional work. We developed some new concepts and techniques and adopted others. A common feature of our ides, realized only in restrospect, was that they consisted of more than mere problem‐solving techniques. Once people had got used to these new concepts and used them a few times, they began to look at a whole range of problems in a different way.
Analysis of hydrogen fluoride release at Texas city
Authors: Woodward John L. , Woodward Hillary Z. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractOn October 31, 1987 a crane lifting a heat exchanger convection section failed and severed a 4″ loading line and a 2″ pressure relief line to an HF alkylation reactor settler drum at a petroleum refinery in Texas City, Texas. Vapors were emitted under pressure for about two hours and the vessel was plugged and drained aproximately 44 hours later. A plume from this accidental release passed through residential areas, damaging some vegetation (brown lawns), and spawning a class action law suit. An extensive analysis was conducted to determine the total inventory loss and to model the blowdown process and the concentrations of HF in the plume. Since the discharge rate was decreasing with time, a peak concentration of HF in the emitted vapors occurred just before the water spray mitigation system became fully operative. Consequently, the mitigation efforts were more effective late in the response when concentrations were already low. The predicted plume concentrations are consistent with observed vegetation damage effects, with concentrations below Emergency Response Planning Guideline Level 3 past 3/4 mile from the source. These results support a policy of sheltering in place during such an event.
RMP hazard assessment for compliance with EPA's risk management program regulation: OxyChem's experience
Authors: Riswadkar Raj , Mukhopadhyay Nik 
Published: June 2004

AbstractEPA's Risk Management Program regulation, promulgated in June 1996 as 40 CFR Part 68 requires subject industries to submit Risk Management Plans by June 1999. This plan requires hazard assessment of the operations of a facility using worst case scenarios and alternative releases. EPA has provided an Off‐site Consequence Analysis (OCA) guidance to help facilities in their hazard assessment.OxyChem will be significantly impacted by the RMP rule. This paper outlines OxyChem's general experience and its strategy in planning to comply with this rule. OxyChem's approach in the development of the scenarios required by the rule is described in this paper. Limitations involved in the use of EPA's look‐up tables or a single modeling solution for conducting all of the OCA are discussed. A three tiered OCA approach is presented as a possible alternative.
Property insurance considerations in loss prevention expenditures
Authors: Norstrom Gail P. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractCertain components comprise the Property Insurance premium. The sensitivity of those components to changes in the risk are analyzed considering the insurance market. The cyclic nature of the insurance market can also impact a Property Insurance program in other, less tangible, ways. Tangible premium charges and other intangible costs of risk which are dependent upon Loss Prevention expenditures are broadly quantified. Those factors which can be useful in determining the cost effectiveness of loss prevention expenditures are discussed in detail.
Early on‐line detection of exothermic reactions
Authors: Hub L. , Jones John D. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractOn‐line supervision exhibits in many respects properties complementary to those of established off‐line safety tests. Thus, on‐line methods are powerful tools for increasing the safety of chemical processes, especially in situations where unexpected hazards could occur. Known on‐line supervising methods are described and their advantage and disadvantages are briefly discussed. The abilities of various on‐line methods are demonstrated on a real case.
NOx in the cryogenic hydrogen recovery section of an olefins production unit
Authors: Henstock W. H. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractUnion Carbide has been investigating the fate and possible hazards of NOx compounds in cryogenic gas separation equipment. It has been learned that trace amounts of NOx in the process streams can accumulate in the equipment under certain conditions. Although mixtures of condensed NOx and condensed hydrocarbons can be ignited with a strong ignition source, the combination does not seem to present an imminent hazard. No explosive NOx‐hydrocarbon “gums” have been found yet, but the investigation is still continuing. We recommend that equipment which is exposed to NOx compounds be monitored to detect accumulations and prevent possibly hazardous situations.
Inspection of ammonia plants
Authors: Madhavan S. , Sathe S. Y. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractSafe operation of an ammonia plant and high on‐stream factor depend, to a large degree, on proper and timely inspection of the equipment to detect mechanical degradation. This paper addresses the inspection techniques, monitoring techniques, frequencies and interpretation of the results for all major pieces of equipment where problems have occurred in the past. This inspection can be a shutdown inspection or an on‐stream inspection.
Correlation of acid gas‐ethanolamine equilibrium using ionic concentrations
Authors: Maddox R. N. , Diers James , Bhairi A. M. , Thomas‐Cooper P. A. , Elizondo E. M. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractExperimental equilibrium measurements are modeled using a Davies‐like ionic strength correction term for the reaction equilibrium constants. Calculated and experimental results are in much better agreement when the ionic strength correction terms are used.