bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Motive of Duty
Authors: Cummiskey David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter starts with Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to justification, and then considers its connection to his famous principle of universalizability, his account of the absolute value of the goodwill, and his analysis of the motive duty as the determining ground of goodwill. Kant's argument, if it succeeds, rules out externalist theories of justification and also mere natural inclination, even mere sympathy, as a determining ground of goodwill. It does not, however, rule out a consequentialist account of the normative content of morality.
Formal Principles and Objective Ends
Authors: Cummiskey David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kant argued at length against the idea that moral principles could be “material” principles, but consequentialist principles presuppose a theory of the good and thus seem to be material principles. After a careful explication of Kant's distinction between formal principles and material principles, especially as it is developed in The Critique of Practical Reason, we see that a consequentialist principle can indeed be a formal principle, and that they can even pass the universalizability test for moral principles. The formula of universal law is compatible with consequentialism.
The (Not So) Imperfect Duty of Beneficence
Authors: Cummiskey David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kant's own application of the categorical imperative reflects his strong deontological intuitions. Unfortunately, Kant's own interpretation of the limits on the duty of beneficence, and his various distinctions – between perfect and imperfect duties, narrow and wide duties, duties of virtue and duties of justice, maxims of actions and maxims of ends – simply reflect but do not support his intuitions. Contemporary Kantians follow Kant in this regard but replace their own intuitions about what is right with Kant's more extreme and unpalatable views. Yet, they too assume what needs to be shown. This chapter focuses on Thomas Hill, Jr.'s influential account of Kant's account of imperfect duties and supererogation, and argues that Kant's theory supports a robust principle of beneficence but that Kant (or Hill) does not, in fact, provide any deontological constraints on the principle of beneficence.
Respect, Dignity, and the Kingdom of Ends
Authors: Cummiskey David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There are many versions of Kantian ethics and even more supposedly Kantian objections to Consequentialism. By considering three of the more sweeping and influential objections, we shall see that there are general conceptual difficulties with Kantian responses to consequentialism, and Kantian consequentialism in particular. We consider, first, the significance of the Kantian deontologist emphasis on the principle of respect for persons. Second, we explore the relevance of Kant's distinction between price and dignity, his conception of the dignity of humanity, and Hill's interpretation of the dignity principle. Third, and last, we focus on Kant's related formula of the kingdom of ends, and consider Rawls’ development of Kant's idea in his hypothetical social contract theory and more general Kantian constructivist conception of moral reasoning.
The Sacrifices of the Innocent
Authors: Cummiskey David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is a basic structural feature of consequentialism that (at least in principle) it may sometimes require the sacrifice of the innocent. Chs. 5 and 6 argued that respect for persons involves both positive and negative duties. The problem at issue is thus the competing demands of the conflicting duties, or grounds of obligation, that confront us when the only way to save some involves sacrificing others. In these types of tragic cases, a commitment to the equal unconditional value of all persons should lead moral agents to recognize the legitimacy of their own sacrifice to save others. If a sacrifice is rationally defensible to the sacrificed, then it also respects human dignity and treats rational nature as an end‐in‐itself. This chapter also discusses the limits of beneficence, self‐sacrifice, and the nature of justified coercion.
The Morality of Happiness
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe book examines the major traditions of ancient ethical theory, showing that they share a common theoretical structure. They are examples of eudaimonism, a type of ethical theory in which the basic concepts are those of happiness and virtue. The book looks at the way this type of theory is articulated in Aristotle, and then at the differing versions of it to be found in Epicurus, the Stoics, and Academic and Pyrrhonian Sceptics. We find a common structure: we all implicitly seek a final end in all our actions, but different theories offer rival accounts of what this consists in. To gain a proper understanding of the ancient debates, we have to examine the basic concepts of happiness and virtue, which in modern ethical theories are often subject to misunderstanding. The book first aims to recover the ancient understanding of these basic notions, then examines the role of nature in ancient ethical justification, the role in eudaimonism of other‐concern, and finally the extent to which the ancient theories demand revision and transformation of everyday ethical thought.
Aristotle: Nature and Mere Nature
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAristotle argues that the virtues develop from nature as matter (mere nature) to nature as form, an ideal. Nature is also, however, what is ‘always or for the most part’. These points are linked to Aristotle's controversial uses of nature in discussing the city‐state, slavery, and moneymaking; on this issue, his arguments are inconsistent.
The Sceptics: Accepting What Is Natural
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAncient sceptics, both Pyrrhonian and Academic, cannot appeal to nature as other philosophers do without falling into the commitment to beliefs that they seek to avoid. Nonetheless, they rely on nature in an undogmatic way as support for life and action, when argument on both sides of a case has produced suspension of judgement. Tensions arise when this undogmatic reliance takes the form of a structured theory, as in Sextus Empiricus.
Finding Room for Other‐Concern
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe Cyrenaics are hedonists who have difficulty finding a stable place in their theory either for one's life as a whole or for other‐concern. Epicurus tries to avoid their problems by his theories of friendship and of justice, with incomplete success. The Sceptics face problems in trying to claim that the Sceptic will be benevolent to others despite achieving tranquility as his final end.
Justice
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractJustice is a virtue of both character and institutions. Epicurus treats these separately but, it is argued, consistently. The Stoic theory of natural law arguably depoliticizes institutional questions, treating politics as merely one concern of an individual among others. Aristotle deals with both issues of justice separately; later Aristotelians, influenced by the Stoics, have little to say about institutions.
Aristotle: An Unstable View
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAristotle, in making virtuous activity necessary but not sufficient for happiness, tries to do justice to the intuitive requirement that the content of happiness not be revised so as to shock our intuitions that happiness involves worldly success and enjoyment. But he also tries to do justice to the theoretical pull: happiness must involve virtuous activity over one's life as a whole. Aristotle runs into difficulties over the level of external goods required for the virtuous life to be happy, as well as the results when the virtuous happy person loses external goods.
Happiness and the Demands of Virtue
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAncient ethical theories produce differing accounts of happiness, depending on their position on the nature and importance of virtue. These are important debates, recognizably on the same topic as modern debates about the nature and importance of morality. In the ancient debates Aristotelian and Stoic views can both draw on compelling arguments, and no simple resolution is obvious.
The Advancement of Science
Authors: Kitcher Philip 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe Advancement of Science attempts to understand the notions of scientific progress, scientific objectivity, and the growth of knowledge by taking up the challenges that have been issued by scholars in the history and sociology of science. Begins from an outline of classical views in philosophy of science and explains how those views were confronted with apparently problematic examples from scientific practice past and present. Then builds an account of science that emphasizes the ways in which socially situated scientists can gain objective understanding of the world.
Varieties of Progress
Authors: Kitcher Philip 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe notion of a scientific practice allows for an approach to the concept of progress. Progress can occur with respect to any of the components of a practice. The root notion concerns the development of language and the acceptance of statements in that language that permit the answering of significant questions. The account tries to make sense of the intuitive idea that we make progress by coming to understand the structure of the natural world.
Dissolving Rationality
Authors: Kitcher Philip 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The approach to progress allows an apparently simple analysis of scientific rationality: a transition in practice is rational just in case it is generated by some procedure that would be expected to yield progressive modifications of practice. It is shown how this standard can be articulated in a number of different ways. The issue of the rationality of scientific revolutions is then posed, and addressed by developing a compromise model that draws both from the logical empiricist tradition and from the historical objections to it.
The Organization of Cognitive Labor
Authors: Kitcher Philip 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Ends with an attempt to construct a formal model of knowledge for scientists working together in a community of inquiry. It is shown how the questions of social epistemology can be conceived in terms of optimal strategies for the attainment of the goals of science, and how particular social schemes for organizing research approximate the optimal results. Specific problems considered include those of the division of cognitive labour and of the role of authority in scientific research.
Modalities and Intensional Languages
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this paper, quantified modal logic is defended against criticisms concerning identity and substitution, the interpretation of the existential quantifier, and the commitment to essentialism. The paper includes two appendices: the first is a record of the discussion that followed the presentation of the paper in 1962, and includes Quine and Kripke among the discussants; the second is a review of A. Smullyan's “Modality and Description.”
Essential Attribution
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This paper contributes to an account of modes of essentialism within the framework of quantified modal logic. It distinguishes between “Aristotelian” and “individuating” essentialism, and argues that Aristotelian essentialism may be best understood on a “natural” or “causal” interpretation of the modal operators. The paper includes an appendix entitled “Strict Implication, Deducibility and the Deduction Theorem.”
Classes, Collections, Assortments, and Individuals
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Set theory obscures ordinary distinctions between assortments, collections, and classes. This paper argues that the puzzles generated by assimilating ordinary collections to classes reflect the same difficulties as the puzzles that result from equating proper names with definite descriptions. It is then shown how these ordinary distinctions can be articulated within an alternative logical framework, namely, the intensional modal system S42.
Does the Principle of Substitutivity Rest on a Mistake?
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This paper upholds Fitch's suggestion that it is reasonable to suppose that names of identified objects should be everywhere intersubstitutable when they are being used as names (the principle of substitutivity). Counterexamples provided by R. Cartwright are diagnosed as trading on the inevitable ambiguities of natural languages, and it is argued that the principle of substitutivity should therefore be tested with respect to statements in logical form.
Spinoza and the Ontological Proof
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This paper attempts to characterize the “ontological proof” for the existence of God. It discusses Wolfson's analysis of the proof and argues that his characterization is not mistaken but insufficient. It is then argued that the characterization here proposed provides a good account of Anselm's and Descartes’ proof, but shows that there is no “ontological proof” in Spinoza. The paper concludes by identifying a confusion between metaphysical and epistemological notions, which conflates very different arguments under the heading “ontological proof.”
The Moral Division of Labor
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe general form of solution to the problem of reconciling the standpoint of the collectivity with the standpoint of the individual is through the design of institutions, which penetrate and in part reconstruct their individual members, by producing differentiation within the self between public and private roles, and further differentiation subordinate to these roles. In a sense, the aim is to externalize through social institutions the most impartial requirements of the impersonal standpoint, but our support of those institutions depends on an internal differentiation, which exploits the natural complexity of the self.
Nietzsche's System
Authors: Richardson John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
My overall project is to show that Nietzsche's ideas do cohere into a philosophical system comparable to his predecessors’ – despite his own strong attacks on the system, and on these predecessors. This system centers around his view of the world as will to power. I work to make this notion conceptually precise, and to show how it extends into his wealth of other thoughts, including his analysis of the basic types of persons and societies, his insistence that the world is “not being but becoming,” his values of individuality and self‐creating, his attacks on morality, and his critique and affirmation of truth. The claim that Nietzsche promotes such a systematic view seems inconsistent with his well‐known “perspectivism”; I argue that the latter issues from his conception of these wills to power as perspectives, and that this source shows us both the forces and limits of that doctrine.
Being
Authors: Richardson John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter develops the core idea that “the world is will to power” – what I call Nietzsche's “power ontology.” I give careful analyses of “will” and “power,” and clarify how he thinks these are things’ essence or being. I distinguish between two basic forms that will to power can take – the active and the reactive – which will lie at the root of his values. The chapter then shows how this notion of will to power grounds Nietzsche's conception of persons as systems or syntheses of such wills (or drives), as well as his distinction of three basic types of persons – master, slave, and overman – each clarified as a specific way such a system of drives can be organized.
Becoming
Authors: Richardson John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines how this power ontology could be compatible with Nietzsche's frequent assertion that the world is “not being but becoming.” That appears to rule out any ontology – understood as a “theory of being” – but I argue that it instead expresses a surprising new ontology, which insists on process (what's real are processes not states) and contextuality (what's real are relations not individuals). I develop this theory of becoming in relation to Plato's formative discussion of being/becoming, arguing that Nietzsche retains far more than we expect or he implies. The chapter then returns to other parts of his system to show their temporal content. For example, the types master–slave–overman each involves a specific temporal stance – in particular the overman's stance involves willing or embracing eternal return.
Golden Fetters
Authors: Eichengreen Barry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe gold standard and the Great Depression might appear to be two very different topics requiring two entirely separate books, and the attempt to combine them here reflects Barry Eichengreen's conviction that the gold standard is the key to understanding the Depression. The gold standard of the 1920s set the stage for the Depression of the 1930s by heightening the fragility of the international financial system, and was the mechanism that transmitted the destabilizing impulse from the USA to the rest of the world and magnified that initial destabilizing shock; it was the principal obstacle to offsetting action, and the binding constraint preventing policymakers from averting the failure of banks and containing the spread of financial panic. For all these reasons, the international gold standard was a central factor in the worldwide Depression; recovery proved possible, for these same reasons, only after abandoning the gold standard. The gold standard also existed in the nineteenth century, of course, without exercising such debilitating effects – the explanation for the contrast lies in the disintegration during and after World War I of the political and economic foundations of the prewar gold standard system. The dual bases for the prewar system were the credibility of the official commitment to gold and international cooperation: the credibility induced financial capital to flow in stabilizing directions, buttressing economic stability; the cooperation signaled that support for the gold standard in times of crisis transcended the resources any one country could bring to bear. Both were eroded by the economic and political consequences of the Great War, and the decline in credibility rendered cooperation all the more vital – when it was not forthcoming, economic crisis was inevitable. The decline in both credibility and cooperation during and after World War I reflected a complex confluence of domestic and international political changes, and economic and intellectual changes. This book attempts to fit all these elements together into a coherent portrait of economic policy and performance between the wars. The goal is to show how the policies pursued, in conjunction with economic imbalances created by World War I, gave rise to the catastrophe that was the Great Depression. The argument is that the gold standard fundamentally constrained economic policies, and that it was largely responsible for creating the unstable economic environment on which the policies acted.
Introduction
Authors: Eichengreen Barry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe gold standard is conventionally portrayed as synonymous with financial stability, and its downfall, starting in 1929, is implicated in the global financial crisis and the worldwide depression. A central message of this book is that precisely the opposite was true: far from being synonymous with stability, the gold standard itself was the principal threat to financial stability and economic prosperity between the World Wars I and II. To understand why, it is necessary first to appreciate why the interwar gold standard worked so poorly when its prewar predecessor had worked so well, next, to identify the connections between the gold standard and the Great Depression, and finally, to show that the removal of the gold standard in the 1930s established the preconditions for recovery from the Depression. These are the three tasks undertaken in the book (which is arranged chronologically), and they are summarized in the sections of this introductory chapter.
The Classical Gold Standard in Interwar Perspective
Authors: Eichengreen Barry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book is organized chronologically to convey a sense of how events appeared to those who made the critical decisions that led toward the Great Depression. Chapter 2 begins with the prewar gold standard. Besides documenting the role of credibility and international cooperation in the operation of the system, it highlights differences in the functioning of the gold standard at the center (in Britain, France and Germany) and the periphery (North and South America, Australia and New Zealand). It is shown that the smooth operation of the prewar system hinged on a particular conjuncture of economic and political forces – forces that were in decline even before the outbreak of World War I. The chapter finishes by explaining why interwar observers failed to appreciate the tenuous basis of the prewar system.
The Legacy of Hyperinflation
Authors: Eichengreen Barry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter and the next describe the fiscal war of attrition that fueled inflation in the 1920s. That war proved most intractable in Germany, where it was fought internationally as well as on the domestic front. The German hyperinflation that resulted from this deadlock is the subject of Ch. 5. The different sections of the chapter look at the background (the post World War I reparations tangle), the transition to hyperinflation, the impact of inflation on the German economy, the stabilization that followed the revaluation of government reserves and pegging of the exchange rate in November 1923, and the implications for international monetary relations.
Reconstructing the Facade
Authors: Eichengreen Barry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter (like the previous one) looks at the fiscal war of attrition that fueled inflation in the 1920s; here, inflationary chaos elsewhere in Europe is contrasted with the experience of countries that repelled the inflationary threat. The different sections of the chapter discuss the first (failed) attempts to restore the gold standard after World War I and the failure to provide a framework for international cooperation, deflationary paths (in Britain, Sweden and the Netherlands), inflation (in Belgium), the inflationary crisis in France, and the enduring effects of these. Recovery was more rapid in countries that experienced inflation and depreciation (notably France, Belgium, and Italy) than in those that had pursued deflation in order to stabilize their currencies and restore the prewar gold price. In countries where the fiscal war of attrition had been most destructive, political leaders and their constituencies insisted on going to exceptional lengths to prevent the ceasefire from breaking down. The gold standard was the white flag emblematic of the truce, and policy makers continued to wave it even after political economic circumstances had changed fundamentally and an entirely different policy response was required.
The Dollar and the World Economic Conference
Authors: Eichengreen Barry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter analyzes the critical period in the spring of 1933 when American policy was reversed and the dollar devalued. Roosevelt's abandonment of gold coincided with the World Economic Conference, which was held in London in June 1933, in a last attempt to respond cooperatively to the economic crisis. The connections are traced between the dollar's depreciation and the London Conference and an explanation given of why the latter failed. The different sections of the chapter discuss the background to the negotiations, the conference itself, the international monetary repercussions, and the impact of devaluation of the dollar.