bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Using quantitative risk assessment to develop a cost effective spill prevention program
Authors: Davis Lloyd , Ness Albert 
Published: April 2004

AbstractA manufacturing plant needed to ensure that allowable peak styrene loadings to a Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) were not exceeded. To reduce the potential for spills of styrene monomer, hazdrd analysis techniques were used to identify release scenarios that could impact the POTW Recommendations were then made to reduce or eliminate the likelihood of spills. Cost estimates were done for all recommendations requiring capital outlays. A Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) was conducted to rank the spill scenarios by frequency. The recommendations were then asessed for their effectiveness in reducing spill frequencies using the LOPA. The analysis showed that of the 34 recommendations requiring capital outlays, 10 reduced the spill frequency by a factor of 40. The rest had a small impact on the spill frequencies. Thus, the LOPA evaluation of the recommendations saved about a half million dollars in capital outlays that would have brought little risk reduction.
Layer of protection analysis and inherently safer processes
Authors: Dowell Arthur M. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractLayer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is an effective way to determine the required Safty Integrity Level (SIL) for Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) based on the risk of the undesired event. This paper extends the LOPA concepts presented in previous papers to show the effect of inherently safer features. Inherently safer fatures in a process design can reduce the required SIL of the SIS, or can eliminate the need for the SIS, thus reducing cost of installation and maintenance. The discussion includes how to estimate the risk reduction for some inherently safer features. Maintenance requirements and management of change issues for some inherently safer features will be included.
Application of ISA S84.01 to SIS in the chemical and petrochemical industries
Authors: Cohen Wayne 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe kellogg Brown & Root Company (KBR) has created a Safety Guide for Safity Instrumented Systems (SIS). This gulde defines what must be addressed in designing a safety system, and incolporates the application of ISA S84.01. It provides a way to perform a quantitative analysis for verification of the SIL values. The life cycle process is presented. The documentation is defined and some forms are provided.This presentation reviews each step in design of the SIS starting with management commitment. The actions that must be undertaken to apply ISA S84.01 are discussed. The components of the Safety Gulde, specific forms, safety reviews, and SIL calculations are identified.
Survey of fire hazard classification systems for liquids
Authors: Britton Laurence G. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThis article discusses classification systems for describing fire hazards of flammable and combustible liquids that might need to be applied by U.S. companies in order to comply with domestic or international regulations and standards. Despite international efforts to obtain uniform terms and definitions there continues to be a number of obstacles in the way of harmonized classifcation criteria, including the signifcant dffirences that currently exist between fire hazard classification systems developed and used in the U.S.
When you cut down a tree, keep an eye on the forest
Authors: Anderson Stanley E. , Ness Albert I. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractSince the EPA began mandating controls on atmospheric discharges of organic materials, there have been a number of fires, explosions and other types of incidents of varying significance involving the emissions control devices. While these kinds of repetitive incidents are common throughout the industry, this paper discusses a number of incidents in one corporation, including thermal oxidizers, flares, and charcoal beds. We then discuss the common causes that seem to rise up to catch the operators of such devices unaware in spite of the history. Reasons why these avoidable incidents keep repeating are also explored.
Process improvements from incident data
Authors: Leggett David , Singh Jasbir 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThis paper discusses four different chemical processing accidents that resulted from plant mal‐operations. Each incident was relatively minor yet provided valuable information about the stability and/or vulnerability of the process to upset conditions. The reaction classes involved were:

Polyester polymerization
Secondary amine formation followed by decomposition
Oxidation of poly‐alkylated aromatic hydrocarbon
Base catalyzed oligomerization
The paper describes the ‘after‐the‐fact’ data that was obtained by calorimetric hazards testing. We will discuss how the information was used, in each case to improve the process safety of the particular operation.We also describe an incident database that may be used by chemical companies to provide an on‐going ranked and categorized record of accidents and incidents that have occurred. The value of the database information lies in the fact that the actual and potential severity of each accident is estimated from the data of the incident events. This information can be used to distinguish processes that may be responsible for the majority of the minor incidents from those processes where more severe, but infrequent, accidents occur. The information is also valuable in providing a focus with which to drive process safety improvement efforts.
Safety integrity level analysis for processes: Issues and methodologies
Authors: Bhimavarapu Kumar , Stavrianidis Paris 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe performance based ANSI/ISA S84.01 and IEC 61508 standards provide overall risk based safety life cycle models for industrial processes. Among other guidance, they provide the basic methodology and guidelines for the identification of safety instrumented systems necessary for a process to meet the established target risk levels. In order to arrive at risk based solutions, many practical issues need to be addressed. Such issues include identification of target risk levels, identification of hazardous events associated with the process under consideration, establishing the existing risk associated with the process, and selection of appropriate non‐instrumented and instrumented safety systems to meet the target risk. This paper outlines the basic methodology, and discusses some of the related issues mentioned above. Further, it provides a few methodologies to establish the requirements of the safety instrumented systems and their safety integrity levels.
Evaluation of two‐phase flow models for flashing flow in nozzles
Authors: Darby Ron 
Published: April 2004

AbstractA variety of methods and models have been proposed in the literature for sizing relief valves for two‐phase flow applications. A typical application involves liquids which flash during discharge as the pressure drops. The predictions from these various methods can vary greatly under such circumstances, and can also deviate as much as 300% from measured values. This paper compares predictions from several versions of the homogeneous equilibrium and non‐equilibrium models with data from the literature for flashing of initially subcooled and low quality steam‐water mixtures through nozzles of various lengths. The results indicate that the homogeneous equilibrium model gives reasonable results for nozzle lengths greater than about six inches, but non‐equilibrium effects must be taken into account for shorter nozzles. Both the Fauske model with no adjustable parameters and the TPHEM model with appropriate values of the non‐equilibrium parameter (kne) are shown to give good results for short nozzles and subcooled or low quality inlet conditions.
A natural gas feed preheater fire
Authors: Singh Jagmohan , Joshi M. D. , Desai U. R. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThis paper examines an incident in an ammonia plant which began when a leakage in the radiant section tube of a natural gas preheater ignited a small fire. The small fire ultimately developed into a major blaze which caused the leaky tube to burst resulting in the plant shutdown.A subsequent investigation revealed inadequate equipment safety procedures. These faulty measures included the bypassing of an instrument interlock system provided for the gas feed preheater. The bypass caused operational problems because two plants were operating from a single natural gas supply header. In the aftermath of the incident, the instrument interlock system of equipment was modified to handle an emergency shutdown in the affected plant safely and, in the process, avoid hampering other ammonia plants.
Was Murphy wrong? Murphy's law in operation and design of chemical plants
Authors: Hendershot Dennis C. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractWe've all heard of Murphy's Law. It has been stated in various forms, generally something like “If something can go wrong, it will go wrong, and at the worst possible time.” We often quote Murphy's Law often in a light‐hearted or joking context. But, do we really believe it? What effect does our belief in Murphy's Law have on how we actually operate and design chemical plants? Is our application of Murphy's Law appropriate? How should we be using Murphy's Law?
An air and refrigeration machine oil console fire
Authors: Singh P. P. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractAn incident due to the ignition of a fire at the top of an oil console of air and refrigeration compressors caused the shut down of an ammonia plant for five days. The cause: failure of refrigeration compressor seals resulted in the lowering of the oil level in the console. This caused cavitation in the oil pump suction resulting in high vibration in the pump discharge piping which led to the snapping of a 3/4'' diameter interconnection line weld joint. Oil splashing from the snapped joint to the nearby steam header with improper insulation caused a serious fire above the oil console.
The impact of toxicity dose‐response relationships on quantitative risk analysis results
Authors: Ferguson Jeffrey S. , Hendershot Dennis C. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe toxicity dose‐response relationship is a critical data requirement for a quantitative risk analysis of a chemical processing facility. This paper will review:

The use of toxicity dose‐response relationships in a quantitative risk analysis
The development of dose‐response relationships for use in a quantitative risk analysis from toxicity data
Examples of variation in published dose‐response relationships for some common chemicals
The impact of differences in dose‐response relationships on the results of a quantitative risk analysis
Finally, we propose the development of a standard protocol for development of toxicity dose‐response relationships for use in quantitative risk analysis, with emphasis on the benefits to the chemical industry of a standardized methodology.
A study on detonation safety of some hydrocarbon‐air mixtures
Authors: Lizhong Yang , Weicheng Fan , Xiaodong Zhou , Qingan Wang 
Published: April 2004

AbstractHazards caused by detonation of hydrocarbon‐air mixtures have been a matter of concern for a long time. In this paper, critical initiation energy of detonation of some hydrocarbon air mixtures have been measured in confined (rectangle shock tube tests) and unconfined (plastic bag tests) condition. Based on the concept of explosion length, a formula for estimating the critical initiation energy of detonation under unconfined condition is presented. Detonation safety analysis of the studied hydrocarbons is carried out using the experimental results.
Derivation of Le Chatelier's mixing rule for flammable limits
Authors: Mashuga Chad V. , Crowl Daniel A. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractIn 1891 Le Chatelier [6] first proposed an empirical mixing rule for predicting the flammable limit of lean fuel air mixtures ‐this method is still widely used today. This paper presents a proof to Le Chatelier's mixing rule based on thermodynamics. A number of assumptions are required to produce the proof. These assumptions are

The product heat capacities are constant.
The number of moles of gas is constant.
The combustion kinetics of the pure species are independent and unchanged by the presence of other combustible species.
The adiabatic temperature rise at the flammability limit is the same for all species.
These assumptions we re found to be reasonably valid at the lower flammability limit and less so at the upper flammability limit.This paper also considers experimental data that support some of the assumptions made to arrive at the Le Chatelier mixing equation.
Fire protection risk assessment: A proposed methodology for oil and chemical facilities
Authors: Roe Donald L. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractFire protection is considered only part of a facility's safety and loss prevention program. Fire protection systems are designed to respond to events after they have occurred, and do not take into consideration other systems in place that prevent the event from occurring in the first place. In many instances, and especially after events have occurred, lawsuits have been filed, regulatory consent orders have been issued, and recommendations from outside experts and insurance companies have been issued, directly pressuring the company to take action. Other companies with similar risks have also felt indirect pressure to install additional protection systems. Good engineering judgment has not always been applied to assure that the money was well spent.This paper will present a fire protection risk assessment methodology for oil and chemical facilities. In this methodology, not only are fire protection issues considered, but also select management, process safety and engineering systems are reviewed. The systematic review of these factors will assist a facility in establishing its own risk assessment criteria.ECRC has applied and proven the benefits of this methodology at a Gulf Coast refining and petrochemical complex. I will summarize the results of this work during this presentation.
Analysis identifies deficiencies in existing pressure relief systems
Authors: Berwanger Patrick C. , Kreder Robert A. , Lee Wai‐Shan 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThis article presents a statistical analysis showing that the pressure relief systems on nearly half of the equipment in the oil, gas, and chemical industries lack adequate overpressure protection as defined by recognized and generally accepted good engineering practice. This analysis was based on data collected from a large number of government mandated (per OSHA 1910.119) pressure relief system design audits per‐formed by an independent contractor. The vast majority of these deviations from good practice were not identified during conventional process hazard analyses (PHA) performed on these same facilities. Most of the units had also been designed by reputable design firms.The authors conclude that, as a practical matter, conventional PHA methods are ineffective tools for evaluating pressure relief systems. They also conclude that the pressure relief system design process could be improved. Specifically, the authors recommend that, in order to reduce this deficiency rate in the future, that the industry adopt an equipment based approach to pressure relief system design and maintenance.
Mitigation of gas explosions using water deluge
Authors: Van Wingerden Kees 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe degree of congestion in petro‐chemical installations has a strong impact on the strength of possible gas explosions. Model predictions and recent full‐scale explosion tests showed that there are situations where the consequences of such gas explosions are unacceptably high. These consequences make it necessary to consider several measures including very expensive ones such as control room relocation or strengthening of control rooms. When the costs are too high other mitigation methods may also have to be assessed. One of these methods is mitigation of gas explosions using water spray systems. Such systems are already in use for this purpose offshore, water curtain systems may be applicable onshore.An overview of recent research into the effects of water spray on the course of gas explosions in congested environments is presented in this paper. How water spray affects the course of gas explosions, under which conditions water spray will be effective as a means for explosion effects reduction is also reported. In addition, the author illustrateg how one can design a water spray system to limit the consequences of possible accidental gas explosions. Finally the potential of increase of ignition probability due to the use of water spray is discussed.
Accidental releases of two‐phase multicomponent critical flow from horizontal pipes
Authors: Verlicchi Paola , Leonelli Paolo , Spadoni Gigliola 
Published: April 2004

AbstractAn accident involving a two‐phase release can result in serious consequences for people as well as the environment. Consequently, tools are needed to give accurate predictions of the discharge rate, physical state, composition of released material, and chocked pressure in order to improve process safety efficiency.This paper discusses possible approaches to the examination of two‐phase critical releases and presents a slip equilibrium model which provides critical flow rate, critical pressure, and phase fraction of the two phases emerging from an accidentally broken pipe containing a liquefied gas mixture under pressure.Comparisons between experimental critical flow rates and model predictions are favorable in both monocomponent and multicomponent mixtures.
Design of cyclone separators for emergency relief systems
Authors: Schmidt Jürgen , Giesbrecht Hartmut 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe main dimensions of cyclone separators for emergency relief systems have been optimized by measuring the gas loading capacity of geometrically similar cyclones having diameters of 290 and 1,000 mm. Experiments have been carried out with mixtures of air and water, aqueous Luviskol® (poly[vinylpyrrolidone]), having viscosities of 180 to 1,100 mPas, as well as two aqueous foams, the surfactant K8 and methylcellulose. Overall, the measurements have shown that the optimized devices are equally suitable for the separation of aqueous, viscous, and foaming media. The fluids vented during emergency reactor discharges can thus be reliably separated. Compared with design recommendations given in the literature, significantly smaller equipment is required for the same separating performance.
Cable and cabling systems in hazardous locations
Authors: Buschart Richard J. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractCabling and wiring are critical to the safety, reliability, and operability of chemical process facilities, especially in Hazardous (Classified) Locations.The National Electrical Code (NEC), Article 500, provides the basic rules for electrical installations in locations where flammable gases or vapors may be present. There have been revolutionary changes in Article 500 in recent NEC Code Cycles. The European (or zone system) offers the option of meeting international standards, and offers significant advantages in chemical plants.Some chemical (and petroleum) companies have been using open wiring, drip loops, cabling systems instead of conduit. Cable systems are also very flexible and offer significant maintenance advantages.
Lessons learned from fires, flash fires, and explosions involving hot work
Authors: Ogle Russell A. , Carpenter Andrew R. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractEight case studies of fires, flash fires and explosions involving hot work are reviewed. Each of these accidents occurred in the course of performing hot work on, or in the vicinity of, a vessel, container, or pipe. In most cases, the fuel's presence was not identified prior to the accident. Another feature of these case studies is that the accident occurred despite the fact that the hot work operators were familiar with the tools, procedures, and the equipment on which they were working.The causal factors of these accidents are identified and compared with the applicable safety standards to show how safe work practices could have prevented the accidents. The fundamental conclusion to be drawn from these eight case studies is this: if you fail to recognize a hazard, you cannot control it.
Protecting semiconductor facilities, 2000 and beyond
Authors: Pearce Robert J. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe semiconductor industry remains one of the most rapidly changing industries, and its fate of always being on technology's cutting edge has not always been enviable. In the 1970s, the industry was concentrated in municipalities using the Uniform Building Code (UBC) [1]. None of the code's occupancy classifications were really appropriate, so semiconductor fabrication facilities (FABs) were designated as an “H” or hazardous occupancy. This vagueness reflected uneducated, arbitrary, and inconsistent interpretations of the codes that made it difficult to construct and manage facilities. To address this, many of the leading‐edge semiconductor companies dedicated staff to work with code officials to assure that any codes governing the industry could be applied uniformly, and would contain reasonable protection requirements. Continuing that practice will ensure the industry's ability to operate safe facilities despite an atmosphere of constant change.
Thermo‐kinetic analysis of reactions involved in the manufacture of o‐nitroaniline
Authors: Willey Ronald J. , Rodrigues Fausto , Chippett Simon , Melhem Georges , Singh Surendra K. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractExothermic reaction processing must be concerned with potential consequences when heat released by the reaction exceeds that removed by the reactor coolant system, a situation known commonly as a runaway reaction. We have investigated a complicated reaction process in which two exotherms can occur—the process of making the desired product, o‐nitroaniline (o‐NA), from ammonia and o‐chloronitrobenzene (T Onset around 140°C), and the decomposition of the product, o‐NA (T Onset around 225°C). A severe industrial loss occurred in 1971 at a plant producing o‐nitroaniline, an incident that has been the subject of several AIChE loss prevention presentations and papers. In this article, we take a closer look at the chemistry involved, and the ability to use thermo‐kinetic analyses to understand the reactions involved, and how these influenced the accident that occurred. Further, we present the progress we've made towards predictive models for the kinetics and the pressure‐time data. Several useful generalizations have evolved. First, is the need to include experiments that use stoichiometric mixtures when assessing exothermic reactions. Second, is the need to understand the role of reaction intermediates, and how they may influence the operation of the plant.
Computer‐aided planning for lockout/tagout program
Authors: Matsuoka Shinobu , Muraki Masaaki 
Published: April 2004

AbstractLockout/Tagout is an effective program to protect plant workers from exposure to hazardous energy sources. Because of the complexity of a process plant, it is a time‐consuming job for maintenance managers to achieve certain Lockout/Tagout plans for Turnaround Maintenance. Process flow and layout information are essential to this planning, so Computer‐Aided Design (CAD) systems are becoming very useful resources. In this study, we propose a computer‐aided method for planning Lockout/Tagout programs in process plants. To isolate certain equipment, minimum required operations are explored and reported automatically. Algorithms that investigate CAD data are shown in order to determine isolated areas. Data structures which mitigate limitation of calculation time are applied for large‐scale plants. We also consider the integration of isolated areas and the elimination of overlapping operations.