bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Intending Harm
Authors: Kagan Shelly 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe second way to characterize a constraint against harm is as a constraint against intending harm. This presupposes a distinction between harm that is intended as a means or an end, and harm that is merely foreseen as an unintended side effect. We can again provide some intuitive support for this distinction – in terms of either the idea of using someone or the idea of aiming at evil – but here too the distinction ends up sorting cases in ways that are intuitively unattractive. And once again, attempts to defend the relevance of the distinction are ultimately unsuccessful, as are attempts to show that the distinction would support a constraint.
Without Constraints
Authors: Kagan Shelly 
Published: October 2003

AbstractGiven the difficulties surrounding the attempt to defend constraints, we need to reconsider the possibility of defending options without assuming the existence of constraints. A view that incorporated options but not constraints would be a departure from ordinary morality, but might be attractive nonetheless. This chapter first explores the structure of such a theory, and then argues that it cannot avoid unacceptable implications unless it presupposes the moral relevance of one of the distinctions discussed in the two previous chapters, such as the distinction between doing and allowing harm. But that distinction remains problematic and inadequately supported, even given the more limited use being made of it here.
The Appeal to Cost
Authors: Kagan Shelly 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter begins to examine the defence of options in terms of an appeal to the potential cost to the agent of promoting the good. It suggests, first, that cost here should be understood in terms of the loss involved to the agent's ability to promote his various interests, and it examines how well such an account fits with ordinary views about the range of options. It then asks how, exactly, the appeal to cost is supposed to justify options. The most promising answer takes off from a general account of the nature of the personal point of view, combined with the thought that morality must adequately reflect the nature of people.
The Fabric of Character
Authors: Sherman Nancy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Fabric of Character explores Aristotle's account of virtuous character and its development. I argue that traditional conceptions of Aristotelian habituation have ignored the critical role of practical reason in both the development of virtue and the emotions constitutive of virtue. Virtue is, thus, neither the product of mindless drill nor of well‐behaved, but ultimately stupid emotions. If the virtuous person is, as Aristotle insists, also practically wise, then the path to a knowing kind of virtue must itself be critical and reflective. Character development is also a social project, on Aristotle's view, and the book explores the role of friendship (philia) in both the early and more mature stages of character growth. Key to a shared life is the possibility of coordinated ends and choices as well as empathetic attunement. I suggest an Aristotelian account of this kind of coordination and its role in the construction of happiness or eudaimonia. Finally, I explore the role of moral perception within virtue, and the epistemic role of emotions in discerning moral salience.
The Choices of a Character
Authors: Sherman Nancy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I frame the chapter by taking up two related objections—that Aristotle lacks an adequate account of moral reasoning about the ends of good living and that he lacks an account of future intention. I try to meet both objections, arguing that Aristotle has a systematic account of deliberation about how best to live over the course of a life and that this is a form of deliberating about future plans and intentions. Central to the account is the notion of prohairesis or reasoned choice and its relationship to stable character.
Axioms
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPursues the theoretical level of the two‐tiered epistemology of set theoretic realism, the level at which more abstract axioms can be justified by their consequences at more intuitive levels. I outline the pre‐axiomatic development of set theory out of Cantor's researches, describe how axiomatization arose in the course of Zermelo's efforts to prove Cantor's Well‐ordering Theorem, and review the controversy over the Axiom of Choice. Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis and various questions of descriptive set theory were eventually shown to be independent of the standard axioms, and new axiom candidates—Gödel's Axiom of Constructibility, on the one hand, determinacy and large cardinal axioms, on the other—offer dramatically different solutions. This situation presents a new epistemic challenge to the set theoretic realist: on what grounds can we adjudicate between new axiom candidates?
Reason and Reasons
Authors: Grice Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Grice begins this chapter by discussing to what extent the notion of variable rationality can be derived from that of flat rationality, and thus from the concept of a rational being alone. He then draws a distinction between ‘explanatory’ (motivating) and ‘justificatory’ (normative) reasons, as well as ‘personal’ reasons that combine the two by being reasons acted upon and regarded as justifying by the agent. Finally, he introduces a structural representation for practical and alethic justificatory reasons that shows that ‘common modals’ (ought, must, necessary, etc.) are used univocally on both sides of the practical/alethic divide. This representation consists of a single modal operator ‘Acc’ (‘it is acceptable that’), two mood‐operators ‘!’ (practical ) and ‘⊥’ (alethic), and a phrastic ‘r’ that these operators apply to.
The Scientific Image
Authors: Fraassen Bas. C. van 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book presents an empiricist alternative (‘constructive empiricism’) to both logical positivism and scientific realism. Against the former, it insists on a literal understanding of the language of science and on an irreducibly pragmatic dimension of theory acceptance. Against scientific realism, it insists that the central aim of science is empirical adequacy (‘saving the phenomena’) and that even unqualified acceptance of a theory involves no more belief than that this goal is met. Beginning with a critique of the metaphysical arguments that typically accompany scientific realism, a new characterization of empirical adequacy is presented, together with an interpretation of probability in both modern and contemporary physics and a pragmatic theory of explanation.
The Structure of the Private Language Argument
Authors: Pears David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Having clarified the private language argument, Pears relates it to the earlier discussion of phenomenalism, which by itself constitutes a basis of objection against Wittgenstein's argument. Pears then works out the relation between the private language argument and the thesis that sensation language grafted on to a complex pre‐linguistic structure. These two discussions constitute the basis on which the deep structure of the private language argument is to be revealed.
Do the Laws of Physics State the Facts?
Authors: Cartwright Nancy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The facticity view of fundamental laws of physics takes them to state facts about reality. To preserve the facticity of laws in the face of complex phenomena with multiple intervening factors, composition of causes, often by vector addition, is invoked. However, this addition should be read only as a metaphor, for only the resultant force is real. The truth and the explanatory power of laws can both be preserved by viewing laws as describing causal powers (or capacities) that objects possess, but this view would require a new account of explanation.
The Simulacrum Account of Explanation
Authors: Cartwright Nancy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The very paucity of bridge principles in physics is important for increasing the explanatory power of fundamental theories, given that physics usually employs a few well‐understood principles to model many different aspects of physical processes. However, this also implies that the fundamental laws of physics do not govern objects in the real world, but rather only objects in models. Consequently, the proper account of explanation in science is the ‘simulacrum’ view. On this account, to explain is to construct a model that fits the phenomenon into the basic framework of the theory, and then to derive analogues for its phenomenological laws.
Rational Belief
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Distinguishes five different kinds of rationality that a belief may possess. It may be rational in being probable, given the believer's evidence and his inductive standards; or probable, given the believer's evidence and correct inductive standards. Or it may be rational in being the result of what the believer regards as adequate investigation, or the result of adequate investigation by the believer's own standards, or the result of adequate investigation by correct standards. Correct standards require a subject to investigate the truth of a proposition; insofar as its initial probability is not very close to l or 0, there is an initial probability that investigation will change the probability, and having a true belief on the issue is important relative to other demands on the subject's time.
Utilitarian Accounts: The Desire Account Developed
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter, the second of two on utilitarian accounts of well‐being, seeks to identify the best development of the desire account. It argues that the ancient question, valuable because desired, or desired because valuable, should be answered, and there is no priority. The best form of the desire account is an informed‐desire account, in which the person is well informed about the desire. An informed desire is one formed in proper appreciation of the nature of the object of the desire. This high standard raises the question whether the desire account, fully developed, is still in accord with the utilitarian tradition.
Fairness
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: October 2003

AbstractLooks at problems of fairness arising from cooperation problems (the prisoner's dilemma, free‐riding, etc.). It proposes a ‘minimal solution’ to free‐rider problems, by considering the least that has to be done to ensure fairness in these situations: viz. the introduction of a principle of equal chances (and the establishment of its relation to other moral principles). It ends by considering the objection that the proposed solution to the free‐rider problem is too weak. It then assesses tougher Kantian and various other de‐ontological solutions, which it finds too strict.
Desert
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMany moral views give no deep place to desert: utilitarianism, Kant, Rawls’ contractualism. Is desert a moral reason for action? Is merit? The chapter argues that, although merit can be a reason to praise or thank or honour a person, and to fail to one or other of these things may be wrong, it is not a moral reason or a moral wrong. Demerit is different: though both reward and punishment are responses with standards of appropriateness, punishment is a response to something moral and gets its own moral status from that. It concurs with an account of the forms of punishment that are morally justified.
Redemption
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Each human owes atonement to God for his own sins, and owes it to his fellow humans to help them to make atonement to God for their sins. Only an individual sinner can repent and make apology, but others can provide him with the means to make reparation (and penance) (the two other parts of atonement). Jesus Christ, who, being God, owed nothing to God, provided his life and death as something that we can offer to God as our reparation (and penance) for our own sins and those of our fellows. This model of atonement, tantamount to the ‘satisfaction’ model of Anselm (as qualified by Aquinas) and the to the biblical model of ‘sacrifice’, is the most satisfactory of the traditional theological models of the Atonement.
Practical Dilemmas
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExplains why C cannot be directly self‐defeating. Theories are agent‐relative if they give different agents different aims. Two such theories are S and Common Sense Morality, or M. It is often true that, if each of several people does what would be best for themselves, that would be worse for all these people. In such cases, S is directly collectively self‐defeating. In moral analogues of such cases, M is similarly self‐defeating. The chapter describes how these problems can have political, psychological, or moral solutions.
Theories That Are Directly Self‐Defeating
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines whether it is an objection to S that, in some cases, S is directly collectively self‐defeating; some bad defences of S and M ‐ why it is an objection to M that this theory is directly collectively self‐defeating; how and why we ought to solve this problem by revising M. The different parts of moral theories are also explored.
The Best Objection to the Self‐Interest Theory
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines the Present‐aim Theory of rationality, or P; The Instrumental and Deliberative Theories, how desires can be intrinsically irrational, or rationally required; the Critical Present‐aim Theory, or CP; the relations between P, S, CP and morality; and Psychological egoism; offers the best objection to S; and how temporal neutrality is not what distinguishes S from P, or CP.
Different Attitudes to Time
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses whether it is irrational to give no weight to past desires – desires that depend on value judgements or ideals; three attitudes to time: caring more about, or being biased towards, what is near, what is in the future and what is present – whether these attitudes are rational; the direction of causation; how it would be better for us if we were temporally neutral; Time's passage; and the asymmetry in our attitudes to our own lives and the lives of others.
The Non‐Identity Problem
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines how our identity depends on when we were conceived. It discusses cases that involve all and only the same people, same numbers but different people, and different numbers of people; what weight we should give to the interests of future people. It examines the case of a young girl's child; how lowering the quality of life might be worse for no one; and whether this fact makes any moral difference.
The Archimedean Point
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Archimedean point is one from which a rational individual may exert the force needed to govern the moral realm, and hence one in which she must choose and act aware that she is a person with preferences but unaware of the content of those preferences, and so impartially. We contrast this person, the ideal actor, with other idealizing conceptions in moral theory, the noumenal self, the ideal observer, the ideal sympathizer, and the ideal proprietor. We then characterize choice from the Archimedean point, rejecting the views of John Harsanyi and John Rawls, and arguing instead that the ideal actor would choose the proviso, the market in conditions of perfect competition, and the principle of minimax relative concession. Thus, analysis from the Archimedean point confirms the conclusions about rational choice reached in previous chapters.
Existence and Goodness
Authors: Rice Hugh 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues that objective value is capable of explaining, not just our believing this or that, but also the very existence of order. The natural order exists because it is good that it should do so. This idea, I claim, is a natural extension of ordinary thinking. I also argue that the explanation of the existence of the world directly in terms of goodness is to be preferred to an account that introduces a mediating God, who creates the world because he perceives that it would be good that such a world should exist; and further, that it is reasonable to prefer it to an account according to which the existence of the world has no explanation.
Goodness and God
Authors: Rice Hugh 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses the relationship between God and morality. I argue that the most satisfying view identifies the will of God with the basic facts about goodness. This, I claim, yields an abstract conception of God, according to which to say that the world exists because it is good is to say that it was created by God. I argue further that God, so conceived, can be thought of, not only as the creator of the world, but as reacting to the world, as possessing knowledge, and as loving. I reject, however, the identification of duty with the content on divine commands.
The Problem of Evil
Authors: Rice Hugh 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses the problem of evil, and, in particular, the question whether the world could have been created by God, when he is conceived in the way I have proposed. I consider the way in which the existence of free will might make the existence of evil in a good world inevitable, and whether the existence of free will is essential to any solution. I also consider the problem posed by unintended evil and the existence of terrible lives.
Conceptual Analysis and Metaphysical Necessity
Authors: Jackson Frank 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWork by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke has made us sensitive to the distinction between metaphysical necessity and conceptual necessity, and between being necessary and being a priori. This chapter relates these matters to the discussion of conceptual analysis given in Ch. 2 and uses the apparatus of two‐dimensional modal logic and the associated distinction between A‐intensions and C‐intensions (or primary and secondary intensions, respectively, in David Chalmers’ terms) to argue that physicalism is committed to the thesis that the mental is in principle a priori derivable from the physical.
Points of View
Authors: Moore A. W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractI begin by raising the question whether there can be ‘absolute representations’. This is equivalent to the question whether the world can be represented from no point of view, absoluteness being an extreme form of objectivity. I probe the question, explain its significance and argue for an affirmative answer. I then consider arguments for a negative answer, and suggest that the most compelling of these depend on a kind of transcendental idealism that can be extracted from the work of Kant and Wittgenstein. The problem with such arguments is that the transcendental idealism in question is incoherent. But whence then its appeal? My diagnosis is that such transcendental idealism is the nonsense that results from attempting to express ineffable knowledge that we have. I then apply this idea to a range of further philosophical issues, including the nature of persons, the subject matter of mathematics, anti‐realism, value, and God.
Chapter Two
Authors: Moore A. W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractI next consider the significance of my question. I give various reasons for thinking that a negative answer would be disquieting. Such an answer would signal limits to how objective we can be; it would discredit the ambitions of science, or at any rate of physics; it would exacerbate certain problems associated with disagreement and relativism; it would pose a threat to our idea of reality; and it would curb a basic aspiration that we have to transcend our own finitude.
Chapter Five
Authors: Moore A. W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractHaving argued for an affirmative answer to my question, I consider arguments for a negative answer to it. With the important exception of those arguments in which the Basic Assumption is rejected, I think I can resist each of these. (This typically involves denying that what I call ‘outlooks’—ways of seeing the world—correspond to points of view.) But in the case of arguments in which the Basic Assumption is rejected, I seem to reach an impasse. There is, however, some prospect of reconciliation. This comes in a species of transcendental idealism whereby all our representations are from a ‘transcendent’ point of view and whereby the Basic Argument, though it has to be rejected at that ‘transcendent’ level, can be retained at a ‘non‐transcendent’ level.
The Life and Work of Christ
Authors: Davies Brian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
According to I Timothy I: 15, ‘Christ Jesus came into the world in order to save sinners’, and Thomas Aquinas, of course, accepts this. ‘The work of the Incarnation’, he says, ‘was directed chiefly to the restoration of the human race through the removal of sin.’ According to him, God became incarnate so that sinners might he brought back to God. But how can the Incarnation lead to this effect, and how can the fact that Christ was God do anything to bring us anything we might think of as salvation? This chapter chiefly looks at the ways in which Aquinas answers these questions. The different sections of the chapter look at: the general picture; sin and the Incarnation; satisfaction – the restoration of people subject to sin to a right relationship with God through Christ's suffering and death; the idea that something more (grace) is required for Christ's satisfaction to be effective in delivering from us sin; the receipt of justification by virtue of Christ's grace; and the resurrection and ascension of Christ.
Foundations of Liberalism
Authors: Moore Margaret 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFoundations of Liberalism is a critical examination of contemporary liberal theories of justice (Gewirth, Rawls, Gauthier, Raz, among others) focussing on the familiar problem of how to relate the personal point of view of the individual to the impartial perspective of justice. Two kinds of problems typically arise from the attempt to ground liberal justice in an individualist foundation. The ‘motivation problem’ refers to the difficulty in explaining why the individual would be motivated to act in accordance with liberal justice. The ‘integrity problem’ refers to the tendency to explain the above by presenting an incoherent or divided account of the person, with one part motivated by self‐interest, and the other part, by the impartial rules of justice. The book develops a more plausible account of the relation between self‐interest and morality, which avoids these two problems, and which is more similar to the revisionist liberal accounts of Rawls's Political Liberalism and Raz's The Morality of Freedom.
Gewirth and the Project of Entailment
Authors: Moore Margaret 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter examines the Kantian argument put forward by Alan Gewirth in Reason and Morality, that morality, which is identified with liberal principles of justice, is entailed in the standpoint of self‐interest, and can be discerned through the exercise of theoretical reason. This chapter argues that it fails to overcome the dualisms that bedevilled Kant's version of this argument.
Contextual Arguments for Liberalism
Authors: Moore Margaret 
Published: October 2003

AbstractContextual Arguments for Liberalism This chapter examines Rawls's essays published since A Theory of Justice and Charles Larmore's argument in Patterns of Moral Complexity, both of which reject the derivation of liberal principles from a neutral starting point and claim that their liberal principles are justified because they are the most appropriate response to the circumstances that obtain in modern society, and particularly the circumstance of moral pluralism.