bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Manipulation of Images to Handle Indeterminacy in Spatial Reasoning
Authors: Ioerger Thomas R. 
Published: August 2005

In this article, we propose a novel method for using images to do spatial reasoning. The task we consider is to answer questions about descriptions involving spatial prepositional phrases. Psychological experiments suggest that imagery is an appropriate cognitive model of how people solve such problems when descriptions are determinate. However, natural language discourse often contains indeterminate descriptions, and imagery has been criticized for its apparent inability to represent incomplete information necessary for making inferences in such situations.We propose a new image‐based method of reasoning, called ISR for indeterminacy in spatial reasoning, which dynamically constructs and inspects multiple images to reason about spatial prepositional phrases. The consideration of more than one consistent image, as a model of the description, increases the accuracy of reasoning. However, because it is intractable to consider every possible consistent image, ISR uses several heuristics to generate only the most relevant images, admitting some inaccuracy. Thus, ISR exploits the computational trade‐off between efficiency and accuracy, and we show empirically in a representative domain that this trade‐off is effective.The ISR method demonstrates that, with the help of specialized procedures, imagery can be more accurate for reasoning about spatially indeterminate descriptions. However, as we observe in attempting to extend ISR to a scaled‐up domain, the procedural encoding of knowledge hinders the maintenance of an effective computational trade‐off. We conclude that imagery is distinct from axiomatic/deductive approaches only in having heuristic knowledge about space for making approximations.
Program Structure and Design
Authors: Rist Robert S. 
Published: August 2005

Most models of computer programming explain the programmer's behaviour by a single design strategy. This article presents a cognitive architecture that uses cue‐based search to model multiple design strategies including procedural, functional, means‐end or focal, and opportunistic design. The model has been implemented in an artificial intelligence (AI) system that generates Pascal programs from English specifications.Knowledge is represented as nodes that reside in internal or external memory, where a node encodes an action that may range from a line of code to a routine in size. A program is built by linking nodes through a search cue of the form <role, goal, object>. The cue is broadcast to memory, and any matching node is returned; the cue provides a question to ask, and the return provides the answer. A cue on the newly linked node is then selected as a new focus, and the search process repeated. Each design strategy defines a specific node visiting order that traverses the program structure through its links.
Social Context in HCl: A New Framework for Mental Models, Cooperation, and Communication
Authors: Mantovani Giuseppe 
Published: August 2005

This article considers current research in computer‐supported cooperative work (CSCW), computer‐mediated communication (CMC), and distributed artificial intelligence (DAl). These areas need an articulated model of social contexts to bridge the persisting gap between social and technological dimensions in computer system design and use.A conceptual model of context is presented to account for both cooperation‐conflict and communication‐negotiation processes. The model conceives of contexts as including not only physical objects and other people but also social norms which influence both individuals and organizations. It assumes that computer system use occurs in social scenarios in which the features cannot be reduced to any type of input or data in the world that designers and users can process along with other information coming from the current task. The model is built on three levels: from social contexts as normative order (Level 1), to specific and intrinsically complex situations (Level 2), to person‐computer interactions for the performance of particular tasks (Level 3).The model has three main implications. First, Human‐Computer Interaction (HCl) studies—especially scenario‐based design—may profit from a fresh topdown approach to designers' and users' mental models taking into account normative social processes which have been neglected in previous research. Second, CSCW may realize how deeply discrepant perspectives affect multi‐agent environments and why in real working life negotiation is intertwined with cooperation. Designers may use this insight to design systems allowing more place for negotiation among actors. Third, we should dismiss the view that CMC lacks adequate social cues and fosters impulsive behavior. Cognitive processes such as categorization, stereotype construction, and social identification can make electronic environments even more strongly sensible to social norms than face‐to‐face communication. Context, according to our model, is not restricted to the physical copresence of other people but consists mainly of processes providing situations with socially recognizable meaning.
Primate Social Intelligence
Authors: Worden Robert P. 
Published: August 2005

A computational theory of primate social intelligence is proposed in which primates represent social situations internally by discrete symbol structures, called scripts. Three well‐defined computational operations on scripts are sufficient to support social learning, planning, and prediction. This gives a formal, predictive model with which to analyse how primate social knowledge is acquired, as well as how it is used.The theory is compared with primate data, such as Cheney and Seyfarth's observations of vervet monkeys. It gives simple, understandable script‐based analyses of many observed phenomena—such as the recognition and use of kin relations, learning of alarm calls, habituation to calls, knowledge of rank, tactical deception, and attachment behaviour.I argue that a tight, concise theory of social cognition, such as script theory, is needed to explain the rapid learning and social guile seen in primates. It also has the benefits of simplicity and testability. The extension of scripts to incorporate a primate theory of mind is described in a subsequent paper.
The Texture Lexicon: Understanding the Categorization of Visual Texture Terms and Their Relationship to Texture Images
Authors: Bhushan Nalini , Rao A. Ravishankar , Lohse Gerald L. 
Published: August 2005

In this paper we present the results of two experiments. The first is on the categorization of texture words in the English language. The goal was to determine whether there is a common basis for subjects' groupings of words related to visual texture, and if so, to identify the underlying dimensions used to categorize those words.Eleven major clusters were identified through hierarchical cluster analysis, ranging from “random” to “repetitive”. These clusters remained intact in a multidimensional scaling solution. The stress for a three‐dimensional solution obtained through multidimensional scaling was 0.18, meaning that 82% of the variance in the data is explained through the use of three dimensions. It appears that the major dimensions of texture descriptors are repetitive versus nonrepetitive; linearly oriented versus circularly oriented; and simple versus complex.In the second experiment we measured the strength of association between texture words and texture images. The goal was to determine whether there is any systematic correspondence between the domains of texture words and texture images. Pearson's coefficient of contingency, a measure of the strength of association, was found to be 0.63 for words corresponding to given images and 0.56 for images corresponding to given words. Thus the texture categories in the verbal space and those in the visual space are strongly tied.In sum, our two experiments show (a) that despite the tremendous variety in the words we have to describe textures, there is an underlying structure to the lexical space which can be derived from the experimental data; and (b) that the association between a category of words and a category of images was strongest when both categories represent the same underlying property. This suggests that subjects' organizations of texture terms are systematically tied to their organization of texture images.
Comparative visual search: a difference that makes a difference
Authors: Pomplun Marc , Sichelschmidt Lorenz , Wagner Karin , Clermont Thomas , Rickheit Gert , Ritter Helge 
Published: August 2005

AbstractIn this article we present a new experimental paradigm: comparative visual search. Each half of a display contains simple geometrical objects of three different colors and forms. The two display halves are identical except for one object mismatched in either color or form. The subject's task is to find this mismatch. We illustrate the potential of this paradigm for investigating the underlying complex processes of perception and cognition by means of an eye‐tracking study. Three possible search strategies are outlined, discussed, and reexamined on the basis of experimental results. Each strategy is characterized by the way it partitions the field of objects into “chunks.” These strategies are: (i) Stimulus‐wise scanning with minimization of total scan path length (a “traveling salesman” strategy), (ii) scanning of the objects in fixed‐size areas (a “searchlight” strategy), and (iii) scanning of object sets based on variably sized clusters defined by object density and heterogeneity (a “clustering” strategy). To elucidate the processes underlying comparative visual search, we introduce besides object density a new entropy‐based measure for object heterogeneity. The effects of local density and entropy on several basic and derived eye‐movement variables clearly rule out the traveling salesman strategy, but are most compatible with the clustering strategy.
Interactionally situated cognition: a classroom example
Authors: Wortham Stanton 
Published: August 2005

AbstractAccording to situated cognition theory, cognitive accomplishments rely in part on structures and processes outside the individual. This article argues that interactional structures—particularly those created through language use—can make essential contributions to situated cognition in rational academic discourse. Most cognitive accomplishments rely in part on language, and language in use always has both representational and interactional functions. The article analyzes one classroom conversation, in order to illustrate how the interactional functions of speech can facilitate the cognitive accomplishments speakers make through that speech. By showing how closely cognition and interaction can interrelate, the article both supports theories of situated cognition and shows how cognition in at least some educational contexts cannot be extricated from enduring social structures and the construction of social identity.
Integrating analogical mapping and general problem solving: the path‐mapping theory
Authors: Salvucci Dario D. , Anderson John R. 
Published: August 2005

AbstractThis article describes the path‐mapping theory of how humans integrate analogical mapping and general problem solving. The theory posits that humans represent analogs with declarative roles, map analogs by lower‐level retrieval of analogous role paths, and coordinate mappings with higher‐level organizational knowledge. Implemented in the ACT‐R cognitive architecture, the path‐mapping theory enables models of analogical mapping behavior to incorporate and interface with other problem‐solving knowledge. Path‐mapping models thus can include task‐specific skills such as encoding analogs or generating responses, and can make behavioral predictions at the level of real‐world metrics such as latency or correctness. We show that the path‐mapping theory can successfully account for the major phenomena addressed by previous theories of analogy. We also describe a path‐mapping model that can account for subjects' incremental eye‐movement and typing behavior in a story‐mapping task. We discuss extensions and implications of this work to other areas of analogy and problem‐solving research.
What do double dissociations prove?
Authors: Van Orden Guy C. , Pennington Bruce F. , Stone Gregory O. 
Published: August 2005

AbstractBrain damage may doubly dissociate cognitive modules, but the practice of revealing dissociations is predicated on modularity being true (T. Shallice, 1988). This article questions the utility of assuming modularity, as it examines a paradigmatic double dissociation of reading modules. Reading modules illustrate two general problems. First, modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of exclusionary criteria that define pure cases. As a consequence, competing modular theories force perennial quests for purer cases, which simply perpetuates growth in the list of exclusionary criteria. The first problem leads, in part, to the second problem. Modularity fails to converge on a fixed set of pure cases. The second failure perpetuates unending fractionation into more modules.
Predication
Authors: Kintsch Walter 
Published: August 2005

AbstractIn Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) the meaning of a word is represented as a vector in a high‐dimensional semantic space. Different meanings of a word or different senses of a word are not distinguished. Instead, word senses are appropriately modified as the word is used in different contexts. In N‐VP sentences, the precise meaning of the verb phrase depends on the noun it is combined with. An algorithm is described to adjust the meaning of a predicate as it is applied to different arguments. In forming a sentence meaning, not all features of a predicate are combined with the features of the argument, but only those that are appropriate to the argument. Hence, a different “sense” of a predicate emerges every time it is used in a different context. This predication algorithm is explored in the context of four different semantic problems: metaphor interpretation, causal inferences, similarity judgments, and homonym disambiguation.
From implicit skills to explicit knowledge: a bottom‐up model of skill learning
Authors: Sun Ron , Merrill Edward , Peterson Todd 
Published: August 2005

AbstractThis paper presents a skill learning model CLARION. Different from existing models of mostly high‐level skill learning that use a top‐down approach (that is, turning declarative knowledge into procedural knowledge through practice), we adopt a bottom‐up approach toward low‐level skill learning, where procedural knowledge develops first and declarative knowledge develops later. Our model is formed by integrating connectionist, reinforcement, and symbolic learning methods to perform on‐line reactive learning. It adopts a two‐level dual‐representation framework (Sun, 1995), with a combination of localist and distributed representation. We compare the model with human data in a minefield navigation task, demonstrating some match between the model and human data in several respects.
Integrating structure and meaning: a distributed model of analogical mapping
Authors: Eliasmith Chris , Thagard Paul 
Published: August 2005

AbstractIn this paper we present Drama, a distributed model of analogical mapping that integrates semantic and structural constraints on constructing analogies. Specifically, Drama uses holographic reduced representations (Plate, 1994), a distributed representation scheme, to model the effects of structure and meaning on human performance of analogical mapping. Drama is compared to three symbolic models of analogy (SME, Copycat, and ACME) and one partially distributed model (LISA). We describe Drama's performance on a number of example analogies and assess the model in terms of neurological and psychological plausibility. We argue that Drama's successes are due largely to integrating structural and semantic constraints throughout the mapping process. We also claim that Drama is an existence proof of using distributed representations to model high‐level cognitive phenomena.
A computational model of frontal lobe dysfunction: working memory and the Tower of Hanoi task
Authors: Goela Vinod , Pullara David , Grafman Jordan 
Published: August 2005

AbstractA symbolic computer model, employing the perceptual strategy, is presented for solving Tower of Hanoi problems. The model is calibrated—in terms of the number of problems solved, time taken, and number of moves made—to the performance of 20 normal subjects. It is then “lesioned” by increasing the decay rate of elements in working memory to model the performance of 20 patients with lesions to the prefrontal cortex. The model captures both the main effects of subject groups (patients and normal controls) performance, and the subject groups (patients and normal controls) by problem difficulty interactions. This leads us to support the working memory hypothesis of frontal lobe functions, but for a narrow range of problems.
Modeling individual differences in working memory performance: a source activation account
Authors: Daily Larry Z. , Lovett Marsha C. , Reder Lynne M. 
Published: August 2005

AbstractWorking memory resources are needed for processing and maintenance of information during cognitive tasks. Many models have been developed to capture the effects of limited working memory resources on performance. However, most of these models do not account for the finding that different individuals show different sensitivities to working memory demands, and none of the models predicts individual subjects' patterns of performance. We propose a computational model that accounts for differences in working memory capacity in terms of a quantity called source activation, which is used to maintain goal‐relevant information in an available state. We apply this model to capture the working memory effects of individual subjects at a fine level of detail across two experiments. This, we argue, strengthens the interpretation of source activation as working memory capacity.
Detecting deception: adversarial problem solving in a low base‐rate world
Authors: Johnson Paul E. , Grazioli Stefano , Jamal Karim , Berryman R. Glen 
Published: August 2005

AbstractThe work presented here investigates the process by which one group of individuals solves the problem of detecting deceptions created by other agents. A field experiment was conducted in which twenty‐four auditors (partners in international public accounting firms) were asked to review four cases describing real companies that, unknown to the auditors, had perpetrated financial frauds. While many of the auditors failed to detect the manipulations in the cases, a small number of auditors were consistently successful. Since the detection of frauds occurs infrequently in the work of a given auditor, we explain success by the application of powerful heuristics gained from experience with deceptions in everyday life. These heuristics implement a variation of Dennett's intentional stance strategy, which is based on interpreting detected inconsistencies in the light of the Deceiver's (i.e., management's) goals and possible actions. We explain failure to detect deception by means of perturbations (bugs) in the domain knowledge of accounting needed to apply these heuristics to the specific context of financial statement fraud. We test our theory by showing that a computational model of fraud detection that employs the proposed heuristics successfully detects frauds in the cases given to the auditors. We then modify the model by introducing perturbations based on the errors made by each of the auditors in the four cases. The resulting models account for 84 of the 96 observations (i.e., 24 auditors × four cases) in our data.
Systematic error in the organization of physical action
Authors: Walter C.B. , Swinnen S.P. , Dounskaia N. , Van Langendonk H. 
Published: August 2005

AbstractCurrent views of the control of complex, purposeful movements acknowledge that organizational processes must reconcile multiple concerns. The central priority is of course accomplishing the actor's goal. But in specifying the manner in which this occurs, the action plan must accommodate such factors as the interaction of mechanical forces associated with the motion of a multilinked system (classical mechanics) and, in many cases, intrinsic bias toward preferred movement patterns, characterized by so‐called “coordination dynamics.” The most familiar example of the latter is the symmetry constraint, where spatial trajectories and/or temporal landmarks (e.g., reversal points) of concurrentlymoving body segments (limbs, digits, etc.) exhibit mutual attraction. The natural coordination tendencies that emerge through these constraints can facilitate or hinder motor control, depending on the degree of congruency with the desired movement pattern. Motor control theorists have long recognized the role of classical mechanics in theories of movement organization, but an appreciation of the importance of intrinsic interlimb bias has been gained only recently.Although detailed descriptions of temporal coordination dynamics have been provided, systematic attempts to identify additional salient dimensions of interlimb constraint have been lacking. We develop and implement here a novel method for examining this problem by exploiting two robust principles of psychomotor behavior, the symmetry constraint and the Two‐Thirds Power Law. Empirical evidence is provided that the relative spatial patterns of concurrently moving limbs are naturally constrained in much the same manner as previously identified temporal constraints and, further, that apparent velocity interference is an indirect, secondary consequence of primary spatial assimilation. The theoretical implications of spatial interference are elaborated with respect to movement organization and motor learning. The need to carefully consider the appropriate dimensions with which to characterize coordination dynamics is also discussed.
Is perception informationally encapsulated? The issue of the theory‐ladenness of perception
Authors: Raftopoulos Athanassios 
Published: August 2005

AbstractFodor has argued that observation is theory neutral, since the perceptual systems are modular, that is, they are domain‐specific, encapsulated, mandatory, fast, hard‐wired in the organism, and have a fixed neural architecture. Churchland attacks the theoretical neutrality of observation on the grounds that (a) the abundant top‐down pathways in the brain suggest the cognitive penetration of perception and (b) perceptual learning can change in the wiring of the perceptual systems. In this paper I introduce a distinction between sensation, perception, and observation and I argue that although Churchland is right that observation involves top‐down processes, there is also a substantial amount of information in perception which is theory‐neutral. I argue that perceptual learning does not threaten the cognitive impenetrability of perception, and that the neuropsychological research does not provide evidence in favor of the top‐down character of perception. Finally, I discuss the possibility of an off‐line cognitive penetrability of perception.