bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Objectivity Argument
Authors: Cassam Quassim 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines two versions of the Objectivity Argument. The concept version asserts that in order to think of one's perceptions as perceptions of objects in the weighty sense, one must conceive of oneself as a physical object. The intuition version maintains that in order to think of one's perceptions as perceptions of objects in the weighty sense, one must be intuitively aware of oneself as a physical object. The concept version is rejected, but the intuition version is claimed to be more successful.
The Identity Argument
Authors: Cassam Quassim 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines two versions of the Identity Argument. The concept version states that consciousness of one's own identity as the subject of different experiences requires the conception of oneself as a physical object. The intuition version states that consciousness of one's own identity as the subject of different experiences requires intuitive awareness of oneself as a physical object. The intuition version is shown to be plausible. Kant's defence of consciousness of the identity of the self is shown to be unsatisfactory.
Reductionism
Authors: Cassam Quassim 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDerek Parfit's Reductionist view of persons is a combination of reductionism about personal identity and the impersonal description thesis. This chapter argues against the impersonal description thesis, the thesis that it is possible to give a complete description of reality without claiming that persons exist. It considers whether reductionism can accommodate the epistemological primacy of memory and the fact that it is not possible to give a full specification of the content of an I‐thought without ascribing it to a particular person.
Aesthetic Concepts
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Here, Frank Sibley illuminates what it is for a term or an expression to be an aesthetic term or expression, i.e. in his view, a term that is such that taste or perceptiveness is required in order to apply it. He emphasises the natural basis of responses of various kinds without which aesthetic terms could not be learned, such as similarities of various sorts, notable colours, shapes, scents, size, and intricacy. Such natural responses enable us not only to learn aesthetic terms often by a metaphorical shift, but are also used subsequently to evaluate and illuminate works of art. It is in this sense that critics reinforce the relation between aesthetic terms and their natural bases.
Aesthetics and the Looks of Things
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
‘Aesthetics and the Looks of Things’ examines the view that aesthetic vision is justifiably juxtaposed to ordinary vision and that a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the former is that it is concerned always, if not only, with an object’s ‘appearing so-and-so’ rather than ‘being so-and-so’. Sibley first clarifies how such a view can be understood. He then broadens the debate beyond looks to include sounds, tastes, feels, smells, and so forth. Sibley finally argues that only a certain family of such appearances can be admired for themselves or serve as ultimate goods for aesthetic admiration. The tentative characterisation of the latter is that they are vitally involved in human experience.
Aesthetic and Non‐Aesthetic
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Sibley distinguishes aesthetic judgements, non-aesthetic judgements, and verdicts. Verdicts are purely evaluative, while the (initially intuitive) distinction between aesthetic and non-aesthetic judgements demarcates, barring expected borderline cases, the subject matter of aesthetics. Chapter 3 is concerned with illuminating this distinction, by outlining how aesthetic judgements are made, justified, and explained. Sibley further disentangles the various, conceptual and contingent, relations and dependences of aesthetic and non-aesthetic judgements, concluding that the truth of aesthetic judgements cannot be verified, confirmed, or supported mechanically or by appeal to rules.
Colours
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Attempts to illuminate the question of what is involved in our being able to say that things have colours. Sibley argues that imaginable contingent changes could give rise to extensive disagreements, difficulties, and complexities in stating and applying decision procedures, and, consequently, apparent grounds for scepticism, even with matters as objective as colours or tastes. In non-aesthetic realms, however, this possibility does not rule out truth and falsity of attribution, and thereby does not exclude objectivity. This may give some weight to the belief that aesthetic objectivity can be defended along parallel lines.
Objectivity and Aesthetics
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Concerned with the objectivity of aesthetic descriptions. The approach is schematic: starting from certain paradigms of properties and retaining certain similarities, Sibley adds differences of kind and degree which results in concepts less rigid than those paradigms and closely akin to aesthetic properties. He then poses the question of why these concepts should not be said to concern objective matters. Sibley argues that if we are justified in believing that in actual practice we do manage to give aesthetic terms a partial but not unsuccessful run as property terms, we will not need to abandon all claims to objectivity.
Particularity, Art, and Evaluation
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Poses the question of whether there are criteria of aesthetic merit. Sibley argues that there are such criteria, in the sense that, if merit-terms are applicable to a thing, it has thereby some aesthetic merit. However, there are at best few criteria of merit in aesthetics, if that means that there are determinable descriptions of properties responsible for a merit-term being applicable, which can serve as criteria or justifications for the application of a merit-term. Sibley further argues that if there is a certain particularity about aesthetic assessment, it concerns the nature of and relation between the neutrally descriptive properties of a thing and its possession of aesthetic merit-qualities.
General Criteria and Reasons in Aesthetics
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses Beardsley’s ‘generalist’ view that in criticism there can be and are general reasons for aesthetic judgement, a view that Sibley shares. Sibley defends this generalist position by exposing the ‘extreme and heroic’ nature of Beardsley’s view, which he subsequently demonstrates to be unnecessary to defeat the particularist. Sibley further argues that the nature of Beardsley’s position makes it inadequate to establish the deeper claim that the ultimate criteria of aesthetic merit can be isolated from ultimately negative aesthetic criteria, an assumption that some objections against the generalist position are based on.
Arts or the Aesthetic—Which Comes First?
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Deals with the question of the genesis of the concept of the aesthetic: where does it originate? In partial response to this question, Sibley attempts to show just how widespread the aesthetic interests of ordinary people are, especially if juxtaposed to the fairly restricted, minority interest in the highly developed arts, and emphasises the natural basis of our primitive aesthetic responses. Sibley concludes that, while the project of determining the logical priority of either the artistic or the aesthetic may be confused, investigations in aesthetics should focus at least as much on the nature and origins of primitive aesthetic satisfactions as on the more recherché questions about arts.
Making Music Our Own
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 11 is about descriptions, particularly figurative ones, and their relevance to, the understanding and interpretation of music. Drawing on certain common descriptions by musicians and critics, Sibley questions the coherence of certain purist positions and of the notion of understanding or experiencing ‘in purely musical terms’. He further explores the possibility that an important element in the proper interpretation of music is covertly extra-musical, and argues that extra-musical phenomena are not merely peripheral except to programme music.
Adjectives, Predicative and Attributive
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses Geach’s contrast between ‘logically predicative’ and ‘logically attributive’ adjectives. Sibley argues that Geach conflates two distinctions, one of which, between those predicates that can be split up and those that cannot, are of high relevance to the nature of aesthetic terms. Thus ‘x is a red car’ splits into a pair of predications ‘x is red’ and ‘x is a car’, whereas ‘x is a big flea’ does not split up into ‘x is big’ and ‘x is a flea’. While Sibley rejects Geach’s own umbrella test for essentially attributive adjectives, he proposes, rather tentatively, that in the proposition ‘x is A’, when ‘A’ is an essentially attributive adjective, one must understand some class of things, without necessarily knowing the noun by which they are called.
Some Notes on Ugliness
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses the notion of ugliness, a notion that Sibley believes to be of considerable interest to aestheticians, even if seldom discussed. Sibley attempts to clarify the concept and argues, with the general argument of Ch. 12 and the background view that ‘beautiful’ is not always attributive, established in Ch. 13, that ‘ugly’ is indeed attributive and not merely a tacit comparison.
Tastes, Smells, and Aesthetics
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Tackles the neglected question of whether tastes and smells can be objects of aesthetic interest, appreciation, satisfaction, and value. Bypassing the question of whether the objects of tasting and smelling are works of art, Sibley states that it is not the case that tastes and smells are wholly excluded from the realm of the aesthetic, that is to say, that they do not necessarily lack those features that would make them eligible in such a way that aesthetic judgements or descriptions of them are possible. Sibley offers a variety of considerations in favour of the view that tastes and smells meet some of the demands we typically impose on objects if viewed in the context of aesthetic evaluation. Since, furthermore, no suitable candidate presents itself to serve as a criterion of demarcating the aesthetic and the sensuous, and since, consequently, these domains have to be understood as merging along a continuum, the diverse intersections between the two permit of some aesthetic evaluation of the sensuous.
Why the Mona Lisa May not Be a Painting
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Challenges the assumption that paintings and sculptures are identical with physical objects and that, as a consequence, they are not subject to the type-token distinction. Since our knowledge and appreciation of vast ranges of art depends upon copies, on prints, on illustrated art books that most lovers of painting own, on colour slides and television programmes, it seems that there is no strong case for denying that reproductions of the Mona Lisa are tokens of a type. This claim goes beyond the view that with increasing accuracy in reproduction of art objects, the closer we get to what is valuable – Sibley thinks we are already there. He concludes that either the concept we have of a painting may be internally inconsistent or that there may be two concepts of painting, one in which the work of art is identical with a physical object and the other in which it admits the type-token distinction.
Doing Harm
Authors: Kagan Shelly 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Defenders of ordinary morality must establish the existence of constraints, including a constraint against harming. This chapter distinguishes between two basic ways that this particular constraint can be characterized – either as a constraint against doing harm, or as a constraint against intending harm – and then focuses on the first. A constraint against doing harm presupposes a distinction between doing harm and allowing harm. But although we can provide some intuitive motivation – in terms of the idea of interfering – for viewing this distinction as morally significant, when we try to carefully articulate this distinction we end up sorting cases in a way that is intuitively unattractive. In any event, attempts to defend the relevance of the distinction are ultimately unsuccessful, as are attempts to show that the distinction would truly support a constraint against doing harm.
Avoiding the Appeal
Authors: Kagan Shelly 
Published: October 2003

AbstractEven if the existence of constraints is granted, if only for the sake of argument, the need to defend options still remains. This chapter turns to that defence. It considers three arguments that attempt to establish options – given the existence of constraints – without appealing to the cost to the agent of promoting the good. The first argument holds that unless there are options, agents unavoidably violate constraints when they impose sacrifices upon themselves. The other two arguments hold that the existence of constraints entails the existence of rights, which in turn entails the existence of options. But none of these arguments succeeds.
The Negative Argument
Authors: Kagan Shelly 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThere are two distinct ways of elaborating the thought that only moral systems with options adequately reflect the nature of the personal point of view. This chapter evaluates the first of these – the negative argument – which holds that a general requirement to promote the overall good will inevitably lack the motivational underpinning necessary for genuine moral requirements; options are thus a concession to the nature of persons. Examination of an analogous argument with regard to the requirements of prudence reveals the potential significance of vivid belief in providing motivation. Reason is then given for thinking that despite the bias in favour of one's own interests, people are, in principle, capable of being moved to promote the overall good.
The Positive Argument
Authors: Kagan Shelly 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAccording to the positive argument, the personal point of view is not a mere hindrance to moral action, but a source of genuine and distinct values. There are thus reasons for the agent to act in keeping with the subjective point of view, and if morality is to provide space to do this, it must include options. If successful, this argument might provide a justification not only for options but for constraints as well (given the appropriateness of reflecting the patient's point of view, and not only the agent's point of view). But it is far from clear that there are any genuine values that cannot be adequately accommodated within the objective standpoint; and even if there were subjective reasons of this sort, they would simply ground new moral requirements, rather than options.
Extraordinary Morality
Authors: Kagan Shelly 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
If options cannot be defended, then there is a general requirement to promote the good. Appropriate political and social structures have an important place in seeing to it that this requirement is met, and in somewhat reducing the nature of the sacrifices that may be required in meeting it; but there is no getting around the fact that morality can demand a significant overall sacrifice of one's interests. However, moral agents are free, and we are required to use this freedom to change ourselves so as to better meet the demands of morality.
Discerning the Particulars
Authors: Sherman Nancy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Here I consider the way in which practical reason involves a discrimination of salience. My concern is thus with practical reason as a kind of perception and sensitivity to changing particulars. I first introduce the issue in the context of Aristotle's discussion of equity (epieikeia) and flexible and fair judgement of cases in the law. I then extend the discussion by considering what Aristotle might regard as lacking in a Kantian account of moral choice that emphasizes universalizability. From here I turn to Aristotle's substantive account, and his view of perception as both an affective and cognitive capacity.
The Shared Life
Authors: Sherman Nancy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In Aristotle's view, the good life is a life lived amongst friends, and in particular, amongst friends of virtue or good character. I contrast this emphasis on attachment and intimacy with the themes of a more impartialist ethics, such as Kant presents. I then discuss friendship as a relational form of external good and discuss issues relating to both chosen friendships and natural philia.
The Habituation of Character
Authors: Sherman Nancy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
According to traditional interpretations, the habituation of character is a mechanical process that chronologically precedes more reflective and cognitive moral development. I challenge this view, arguing that habituation is primarily a form of critical practice dependent on cognitive capacities of choice, perception, and deliberation. We are not children and then, at once, at the age of majority, reflective adults. Rather, as children we are gradually and incrementally, in the process of becoming reflective adults. A developmental account of this sort is requisite if we are to understand Aristotle's claim that the person of good character is at once the person of practical wisdom.
The Kantian Sublime
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kant's theory of the sublime has become one of the most keenly studied elements in both his own aesthetics and aesthetic theory in general. This book offers a sustained analysis of Kant's theory of the sublime as found throughout his critical philosophy but, of course, gives closest and most sustained attention to the Critique of Judgement's ‘Analytic of the Sublime’. More specifically, the book offers first an overview of Kant's general aesthetic theory and then a detailed analysis of the structure of argument in Kant's accounts of the mathematical and dynamical sublime, and the feeling of ‘respect’. Various difficulties are identified. The theory is then reconstructed in a more viable form, and extended into the sphere of art by means of the notions of ‘aesthetic idea’ and ‘genius’.
Kant's Critical Ethics and the Sublime
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Outlines Kant's basic epistemological position and also that of his moral philosophy. Attention is then paid to the way in which the sublime functions—via the notion of respect—in this philosophy. It is seen that, for Kant, the moral law is that which is most worthy of respect, and which is thence worthy of the epithet ‘sublime’.
Kant's Aesthetic Theory and Its Moral Significance
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Presents a detailed overview of Kant's aesthetic theory, focusing on the first four moments of the Analytic of the beautiful. The notions of nature, the judgement of taste, ‘disinterestedness’ and ‘finality’ are given close attention. There is an extended discussion of Kant's ‘Deduction’ of the pure aesthetic judgement's claim to universality. The argument is shown to be unviable.
Kant's Analytic of the Sublime: From the Preliminary Sections to the Mathematical Mode
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Offers a sustained and close reading of Kant's complex arguments concerning the mathematical sublime. This is based on our aesthetic response to overwhelming magnitude—in terms of vastness or size. Offers two different accounts of Kant's position. An ‘austere’ approach holds that it is when the imagination is overwhelmed by its attempts to comprehend the unity of vast phenomenal items or states of affairs that is the basis of the mathematical sublime. A more ‘baroque’ line of argument involving infinity as a ‘measure’ is also shown to be consistent with Kant's position. Argues that the former approach is the more viable.
From the Dynamical Mode of Sublimity to the Deduction, and an Overall Critical Review
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Pays detailed attention to Kant's understanding of the dynamical sublime. This is shown to involve a state of moral resistance to mighty phenomena that are perceived to be overwhelming in terms of power and destructiveness. Viewed from a position of safety, such phenomena invite us to become aware—through an aesthetic response to nature—of the superiority of our moral over our sensible being. This experience is shown to embody ‘respect’—a mode of feeling that involves a ‘mental movement’ from pain to pleasure, and that was earlier also shown to loom large in Kant's moral philosophy.
A Reconstruction of Kant's Theory of the Sublime
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Offers a critical appraisal of both major components in Kant's theory of the sublime, and identifies major difficulties with them. However, also offers a more viable reconstruction of his theory based on the ‘austere’ interpretation of the mathematical sublime—extended so as also to encompass the dynamical sublime. Broadly speaking, the theory now holds that phenomena that are overwhelming in size or power cannot be comprehended as unities in terms of imagination , but can be in rational terms. The scope of reason is thereby exemplified in aesthetic terms.
Sublimity, Art, and Beyond
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Applies the reconstructed version of Kant's theory in a context that he does not, officially, consider an appropriate place for the sublime—namely, in the experience of art. It is shown that, by modifying his notions of ‘genius’ and the ‘aesthetic idea’, it is possible to formulate a complex and distinctively artistic version of sublimity. This converges on a works capacity aesthetically to illuminate the overwhelming scope or universal significance of its subject matter.
Realism in Mathematics
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMany mathematicians understand their work as an effort to describe the denizens and features of an abstract mathematical world or worlds. Most philosophers of mathematics consider views of this sort highly problematic, largely due to two stark difficulties laid out by Benacerraf: first, if mathematical things are abstract, and thus not to be found in space and time, how can we come to know anything about them? Second, how can mathematics be the study of certain particular things, when all that seems to matter mathematically are various structural features and relations? The goal of this book is to develop a philosophically defensible version of the mathematician's pre‐theoretic realism (sometimes called ‘Platonism’) about mathematical things. Beginning from an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Quine's and Gödel's versions of mathematical realism, I propose an alternative called ‘set theoretic realism’ and argue that it avoids both of Benacerraf's problems. In their place, I raise a new problem: given that some open questions of mathematics (like Cantor's Continuum Hypothesis) cannot be settled on the basis of the standard axioms, how are we rationally to evaluate new candidates for axiomatic status (such as Gödel's Axiom of Constructibility or various large cardinal axioms)? Set theoretic realism and its realistic cousins are not the only positions that face this important new challenge—various popular versions of nominalism and structuralism do as well—which suggests that it taps into a fundamental issue.