bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Ground of Logic
Authors: McCarthy Timothy , McCarthy Timothy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Applies the Conformal Framework to the philosophy of logic, and, in particular, to what McCarthy calls the Interpretation Problem for Logic, i.e. the problem of characterizing the logical devices of a language, as opposed to its descriptive expressions, paradigm examples of which include observational predicates and natural kind terms, on the basis of the data provided by an interpretation of its speakers. An extension of the Conformal Framework is given that facilitates a general solution to the interpretation problem: a logical constant, on McCarthy's account, is an operator whose semantic role is invariant under structure‐preserving transformations defined across situations, which are epistemically possible for the idealized intentional system interpreted. Such a characterization results in a relative determinacy: the interpretations of the logical terms in the intentional system's language are fixed by the role they play in stories describing worlds that are epistemically possible for the system, which in turn is fixed by the system's inductive method.
The Atrocity Paradigm
Authors: Card Claudia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Taking atrocities as paradigms of evil, this book develops the theory that evils (plural) are foreseeable, intolerable harms produced by culpable wrongdoing. It places this theory in relation to others put forward by historically influential philosophers (Jeremy Bentham, Friedrich Nietzsche, Immanuel Kant, the ancient Stoics), places the concept of evil in relation to other ethically important concepts (such as justice and equality), and considers case studies: rape in war, domestic violence, child abuse, and “gray zones” understood as certain predicaments of people who are at once victims and perpetrators.
Contesting Nietzsche's rejection of the concept “evil,” this book holds it important to distinguish as evils the very worst wrongs and show how they differ from ordinary wrongs (which are bad but do not make lives intolerable); it finds the concept “evil” rooted not in the envy of the impotent (as Nietzsche thought) but in the belief in entitlement to decent treatment. On the atrocity theory, the nature and severity of harm, rather than degrees of perpetrator culpability, distinguish evils from ordinary wrongs. Intermediate between stoicism and utilitarianism, the atrocity theory treats both wrongful willing and harm as essential components of evils but finds neither all wrongful willing (but only what produces intolerable harm) nor all intolerable harm (but only what issues from wrongful willing) to be evil. Like Kant (in the Stoic tradition), it treats evil as an ethical concept, but it extends Kant's moral psychology in reexamining the possibility (which he rejected) of what he called “diabolical evil,” namely, doing evil for evil's sake.
Unjust inequalities need not be evils, although they are wrong; to be an evil, an injustice must be intolerably harmful, not merely exhibit arbitrary inequality. Hence, political activists, including feminists, should prioritize addressing genuine evils (such as war rape) over eliminating such inequities as the arbitrary exclusion of women from certain occupations. Two chapters examine legacies of past evils, considering forgiveness, mercy, gratitude (for mercy or forgiveness), guilt, and punishment in reflecting on how best to live with evils we have not escaped suffering or avoided perpetrating. The final chapter uses Primo Levi's concept of “gray zones” to construct an all‐too‐human account of diabolical evil, namely, the deliberate and successful pursuit of moral corruption of others as an alternative to the conception Kant rejected.
Introduction: The Atrocity Paradigm
Authors: Card Claudia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book takes atrocities – such as genocide, slavery, torture, rape as a weapon of war, and the saturation bombing of cities – as paradigm evils. As atrocities are both perpetrated and suffered, the atrocity paradigm yields two basic dimensions of evils: culpable wrongdoing (by perpetrators) and foreseeable intolerable harm (to victims). Evils tend to ruin lives, depriving victims of basics necessary to make life possible, tolerable, and decent. Still, evils have degrees; some are worse than others, although comparisons can be difficult, complex, and sometimes impossible, given the multidimensionality of evils. Institutions, laws, and practices are evil when it is reasonably foreseeable that intolerable harm will result from their normal or correct operation and people with power to rectify them culpably fail to do so.
Prioritizing Evils Over Unjust Inequalities
Authors: Card Claudia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Noting that unjust inequalities need not be evils, this chapter argues that political activists (including feminists) should take evil, rather than inequality, as their guiding concept and prioritize addressing evils over simply eliminating wrongful inequalities. The atrocity theory supports the kinds of feminism that target severe oppression or those that target such evils as domestic violence, rape, severely hazardous working conditions, and involuntary homelessness as more urgent than, for example, workplace inequities or inequities addressed by affirmative action. Prioritizing evils need not mean ignoring lesser injustices or even spending most of our incomes to alleviate the plight of victims of evil. Rather, it means that over time and in the design of social institutions, we devote significant attention to the prevention or alleviation of evils, whatever else we may also do toward other ends.
Terrorism in the Home
Authors: Card Claudia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Against activists who advocate extending marriage to same‐sex couples, this chapter supports skepticism regarding the very institutions of marriage and motherhood by arguing that these institutions facilitate the evils of terrorism in the home, just as the institution of slavery facilitates the evil of torture. Insofar as marriage and motherhood shelter and enable domestic violence and child abuse, granting abusers enforceable intimate access to victims and extensive control over information about victims, thereby making abuse difficult to prove (or even detect) and placing obstacles in the way of holding perpetrators accountable, these institutions are themselves evils. More flexible intimate partnerships and more communal or distributed forms of childrearing, such as the distributed care envisioned by Bell Hooks and Eva Feder Kittay, might be improvements over current mainstream institutions of marriage and motherhood.
The Moral Powers of Victims
Authors: Card Claudia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The moral powers of victims include the negative power of blame, which can sometimes evoke guilt and a sense of obligation in wrongdoers, and the positive power of forgiveness, which can relieve burdens for both victims and wrongdoers that may be otherwise unrelievable, even by punishment. Punishment is an attempt at rectification and restoration of the balance disrupted by wrongdoing. But not all wrongs are rectifiable or completely rectifiable; moral remainders are what is left after all has been rectified that can be. This chapter extends the concept of remainders to include not only unexpiated wrongs but also emotional and attitudinal responses to them, such as forgiveness. But is forgiveness always good or even always possible? This chapter explores issues in the nature and ethics of forgiveness, with an extended look at Simon Wiesenthal's dilemma in his narrative, The Sunflower.
The Unfinished Semantic Agenda of Naming and Necessity
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter sets out the unfinished semantic agenda of Kripke's Naming and Necessity, the first item of which is a positive theory of the meaning of proper names, and the propositions semantically expressed by sentences containing them. Although much of Kripke's discussion supports the Millian view that the meaning of a name is its referent and that the proposition expressed by a sentence containing the name is a singular Russellian proposition, these conclusions conflict with his contention that the propositions expressed by true identity sentences like Hesperus is Phosphorus or Cicero is Tully are knowable only a posteriori. It is shown that Kripke's argument for this contention is flawed, and that, because of this, the Millian conception of meaning remains a viable option – provided that the Millian can explain how speakers are able to use sentences that differ only in the substitution of one coreferential name for another to assert different things, to convey different information, and to express different beliefs. The second item on the unfinished semantic agenda of Naming and Necessity is showing how to extend the nondescriptive, Millian account of proper names to simple predicates involving natural kind terms. It is shown that many of Kripke's examples of true theoretical identity sentences contain such predicates, and that his explanation of the necessity of these sentences faces a serious challenge.
The Meaning of Names
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A conception of language use is developed according to which an unambiguous, noncontext‐sensitive sentence may be used to assert and convey more than one proposition in a single context, and different propositions in different contexts, depending on the presuppositions of conversational participants. The meaning of such a sentence in the language of which it is a part – the proposition it semantically expresses – is information that is included in what would be asserted and conveyed by an assertive utterance of it in virtually any normal context in which competent language users speak literally, nonmetaphorically, and without canceling conversational implicatures. On this conception, the meaning of a linguistically simple proper name – that which it contributes to propositions semantically expressed by sentences containing it – is simply its referent. Hence, two sentences that differ only in the substitution of coreferential names mean the same thing, and semantically express the same proposition. Nevertheless, these (synonymous) sentences may frequently be used to assert different things and convey different information.
Ambiguity and Indexicality
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, the account of meaning and assertion developed in Ch. 3 is extended and refined in order to handle the ambiguity of many proper names, and the context sensitivity of indexicals. The notion of semantic content is explained, and distinguished (in the case of indexicals) from that of meaning. It is argued that the semantic content of an indexical in a context – that which it contributes to the proposition semantically expressed in the context by a sentence containing it – is its referent, and the principles relating semantic content to information asserted and conveyed in different contexts are modified to account for indexicality. On this picture, the semantic content of a sentence relative to a context is information that a competent speaker/hearer can confidently take to be asserted and conveyed by an utterance of the sentence in the context, no matter what else may be asserted, conveyed, or imparted. It is a sort of minimal common denominator determined by the linguistic knowledge shared by all competent conversational participants, around which they can structure the totality of information the sentence is used to communicate in the given situation.
Partially Descriptive Names
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Ch. 5 discusses a rich and varied class of linguistically complex phrases, called partially descriptive names. These expressions display many of the most important features of simple proper names, and they are standardly recognized as names in their own right. However, they are not, strictly speaking, rigid designators – though they are nearly so, in that they always designate the same object, when they designate anything at all. It is argued that partially descriptive names are equivalent to special definite descriptions that combine direct reference to their referents with partial descriptions of them.
The Problem Posed by Propositional Attitude Ascriptions
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is argued that propositional attitude ascriptions of the form a believes / asserts that S semantically express propositions that report that an agent bears the relevant attitude – belief or assertion – to the proposition semantically expressed by S in the context in which the report is made. Apparent instances of substitution failure – in which substitution of coreferential names or indexicals in S appears to change the truth value of the original attitude ascription – are then used to formulate a challenge to the views about the semantic contents drawn in earlier chapters. According to those views, the proposition semantically expressed by S is simply its Russellian semantic content, and attitude ascriptions differing only in the substitution of coreferential names or indexicals semantically express the very same proposition (and so have the same semantically determined truth conditions), even though assertive utterances of the two ascriptions in certain contexts may result in the assertion of propositions with different truth value. According to an alternative conception, such substitution really does change the semantically determined truth values of the attitude ascriptions, and the proposition semantically expressed by a sentence S is an amalgam of its Russellian semantic content plus the very sentence S itself (i.e., it is a linguistically enhanced proposition).
The Case Against Linguistically Enhanced Propositions
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines and criticizes two leading semantic theories of attitude ascriptions of the form x believes / asserts that S. According to these theories, ascriptions of this sort report that an agent bears the relevant attitude to a linguistically enhanced proposition that contains words or mental representations among its constituents. One of these theories – the theory of interpreted logical forms developed by Richard Larson and Peter Ludlow, is a version of the semantic program of Donald Davidson, while the other – defended by Mark Richard – is a metalinguistic variant of Russellianism. It is argued that both theories, despite their virtues, face intractable problems that, in the end, defeat the idea that attitude ascriptions report relations to partially linguistic objects. In light of this, the best option is to return to the analysis of such ascriptions as reporting relations to ordinary, Russellian propositions.
What Is It for a General Term to Be a Rigid Designator?
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Ch. 9 initiates an investigation of the similarities between proper names and natural kind terms by arguing that although most proper names are clearly rigid, application of the notion of rigid designation to natural kind terms is highly problematic. Because natural kind terms come in a variety of syntactic and semantic types, and often function as predicates rather than singular terms, it is doubtful than any interesting notion of rigidity applies to them all. It is argued in particular that there is no notion of rigid designation for predicates that (1) is a natural extension of the notion of rigidity for singular terms, (2) is such that simple natural kind predicates are standardly rigid whereas many other predicates are not, and (3) plays the role imagined by Kripke in explaining the necessary a posteriori status of theoretical identities like Water is H2O and An object x is hotter than an object y iff x has a higher mean molecular kinetic energy than y. Because of this, a new explanation of the status of these sentences is needed.
What Do Natural Kind Predicates Have in Common With Proper Names?
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In Ch.10, it is argued that the crucial similarities between proper names and natural kind terms, including simple natural kind predicates, are the result of the nondescriptionality of such terms, and the way in which their reference is standardly established. These in turn provide the basis needed to explain the necessary a posteriori status of many theoretical identification sentences with logical forms ∀x (Px ⊃ Qx) and ∀x (Px ≡ Qx)– which, it is argued, includes many of Kripke's most well‐known examples.
Natural Kind Predicates, Mass Nouns, and Abstract Singular Terms
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Building on work begun in Ch. 10, I attempt to find another way of characterizing the semantic similarities between natural kind predicates and proper names. In this chapter, I provide a different, more limited, vindication of the claim that the semantics of natural kind terms guarantee that certain theoretical identification sentences involving them are necessary, if true.
Identifying the Image of God
Authors: McKanan Dan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book traces the development of a theology of nonviolence in the popular literature of antebellum social reform movements. Between 1820 and 1860, American social reformers pioneered a “politics of identification” that was deeply rooted in liberal Christian theology. Activists like William Lloyd Garrison and Frederick Douglass, along with sentimental authors like Catharine Sedgwick and Harriet Beecher Stowe, drew on the doctrine of the imago dei, or image of God, to argue that God is present both in the victims of violence and in those who use nonviolent means to overcome oppression. This posed a sharp alternative to the providential theology of Reformed orthodoxy, which was more inclined to see God's hand in wars and other violent events. Proponents of the new theology can be characterized as “radical Christian liberals.” They linked their liberal faith in human nature to the Christian doctrine of the imago dei, yet were willing to contemplate the overthrow of all social institutions, even ostensibly liberal or Christian ones, that blocked the free expression of the imago dei.
From Sentimentality to Social Reform
Authors: McKanan Dan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Offers an overview of antebellum social reform movements, with particular emphasis on temperance, abolitionism, and nonresistance. These movements had diverse causes, including Jeffersonian liberalism, Protestant revivalism, liberal Protestant theology, and direct encounters between privileged reformers and members of oppressed groups. Some key leaders of social reform movements may be classified as “radical Christian liberals” because they linked their liberal faith in human nature to the Christian doctrine of the imago dei, yet were willing to contemplate the overthrow of all social institutions, even ostensibly liberal or Christian ones, that blocked the free expression of the imago dei. Radical Christian liberals may be subdivided into three groups: ultra reformers (William Lloyd Garrison, Lydia Maria Child) who embraced absolute nonviolence; sentimental reformers (T. S. Arthur, Harriet Beecher Stowe) who were implicitly nonviolent insofar as they stressed literary rather than political action; and revolutionary reformers (Gerrit Smith, Frederick Douglass) who were open to the use of coercion in the pursuit of radical social transformation.
Looking for Victims
Authors: McKanan Dan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Traces the development of nonviolent theology in the popular literature of the antebellum temperance movement. Though the temperance movement is often portrayed as socially conservative, it had radical implications both for battered women and for the “drunkards” who organized the popular “Washingtonian” movement. A new genre, the “temperance tale,” grew out of the testimonies of “drunkards” and their wives. Temperance tales used a variety of sentimental techniques to promote identification with the victims of the “alcohol system.” Novels like T. S. Arthur's Ten Nights in a Bar‐Room also elaborated a sentimental Christology in which Christ‐like children would usher in a millennium of nonviolence.
Through the Blood‐Stained Gate
Authors: McKanan Dan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Traces the development of nonviolent theology in the fugitive slave narratives published by the abolitionist movement. The new genre of the “fugitive slave narrative” grew out of the creative encounter between escaped slaves and white abolitionists between 1836 and 1860. These texts – most famously the autobiographies of Frederick Douglass – made the practice of sentimental identification increasingly complex, as readers were asked to identify with the full humanity of former slaves. They also expressed a radical theology by asserting that slaves possessed the imago dei even before they were enslaved by human violence.
Violent Messiahs
Authors: McKanan Dan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This concluding chapter traces the decline of nonviolent theology as social reformers invested messianic hopes in a series of individuals – Frederick Douglass, John Brown, and Abraham Lincoln – who were willing to use violence to bring about social change. Douglass was certainly a radical Christian liberal, though he advocated a limited use of violence to achieve radical liberal ends. Brown blended some radical liberal themes with a strong emphasis on apocalyptic violence and an orthodox understanding of God's overarching providence. But it was Lincoln who helped the entire nation to see God's presence in the violence of the Civil War rather than the nonviolent actions of individual reformers. The popular Christological interpretation of Lincoln's death pushed radical Christian liberalism to the sideline of the American consciousness.
Not Passion's Slave
Authors: Solomon Robert 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The idea that we are, in some significant sense (and to some significant degree), responsible for our emotions is an idea that Robert Solomon has developed for almost three decades, following the philosophy of Jean‐Paul Sartre. Here, in a single volume, he traces the development of this theory of emotions and develops it in detail. Two themes run through his work: the first presents a “cognitive” theory of emotions in which emotions are construed primarily as evaluative judgments. The second proposes an “existentialist” perspective in which he defends the idea that, as we are responsible for our emotions, it follows that – in a limited sense – we “choose” them. While the first premise has gained increasing currency in the literature, his thesis on responsibility has met with considerable resistance: the new emphasis on evolutionary biology and neurology has reinforced the popular prejudice that emotions “happen” to us and are entirely beyond our control.
This volume is also a kind of intellectual memoir of Solomon's own development as a thinker. The essays written in the 1980s develop the themes of the “intentionality” of emotion and further elaborate upon the notion of “judgment”; in this period, he is also increasingly preoccupied with how emotions are identified and “read” in a variety of cultures. In the 1990s, his interests revolve around the social and political role of emotion theories and the growing recognition of the social nature of emotions: here he suggests that emotions themselves involve social narratives that go beyond mere social context. The culmination of a 30‐year preoccupation with some of the French thinker's ideas, the final section presents his own (considerably more refined) philosophical position. Despite his own critical assessment of his earlier work, he continues to argue that, in the final analysis, we have control over – and remain essentially responsible for – the emotional and existential quality of our lives.