bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Some Specs on Specs in L2 Acquisition
Authors: Schwartz Bonnie D 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There are two goals to this chapter: first, to familiarize those outside the field of non-native language (L2) acquisition with some of the conceptual and theoretical concerns of L2 acquisition research; secondly, to discuss some empirical findings, related to the area of specifiers, that bear on these issues. In regard to the latter, data from two studies on child L2 acquisition-one involving clitics (White I 996), the other the order between verb and object (Haznedar 1995, 1997)-will be reexamined. Before turning to these data (Sections 3 and 4, respectively), a brief introduction to the principal issues guiding L2 acquisition research in the generative framework is in order.
Attempts to Solve the Problems
Authors: Carstairs-McCarthy Andrew 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter we will look at explanations that have been proposed for the three aspects of human language that this book is concerned with—namely, vocabulary size, duality of patterning, and the sentence/NP distinction. I will argue that no previous explanation accounts satisfactorily for any of these aspects of language individually. A fortiori, no previous explanation accounts satisfactorily for them all in a unified fashion. Some of the proposals discussed here shed light on the relationship between the syntactic sentence/NP distinction and the lexical-cum-semantic noun/verb distinction, but none of them explains why the sentence/NP distinction arose in the first place, and certainly no other proposal relates it to vocabulary size and duality of patterning in the way that the scenario to be presented in Chapter 5 does.
The Vowel System
Authors: Siptdr Peter , Torkenczy Miklos 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A surface phonetic classification of the Hungarian vowel system is shown in (1):1
This classification involves five heights, three points of articulation along the sagittal axis, plus the rounded/unrounded distinction. Obviously, a number of phonetic details can be filtered out of this representation on grounds of pre-dictability. The difference between upper mid and lower mid might be taken to be a matter of tense/lax (or else, [+/-ATR]); but even that is predictable (redundant) on the basis of long vs. short (i.e. XX vs. X in terms of skeletal positions/timing slots). On the other hand, the two lows may be simply taken to be the same height phonologically: the exact height of [a:], as well as its centrality, is a matter of phonetic implementation since in the phonological pattern of Hungarian (e.g. with respect to vowel harmony, long/short alternations, etc., see below) [a:] behaves as a low back vowel. Hence, the simplified pattern in (2) emerges.
Summa Theologiae II
Authors: Kenny Anthony 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The first part of the Summa Theologiae, unlike the first part of the Summa contra Gentiles, treats not only of natural theology but also of specifically Christian doctrines. The dogma of the Trinity, in which there are three divine persons but only a single divine nature, presented Aquinas with a remarkable challenge. The cornerstone of his theory of divine being was that God was essentially simple, that any form of complexity or composition was utterly foreign to the divine nature. How is the simplicity of the divinity to be reconciled with the trinity of divine persons? Question thirty-nine of the First Part addresses this question. God, Aquinas has so often insisted, is the very same thing as his essence. In the first article he explains how this applies once we have been told that there are three persons in one God. The solution he offers to the problem is that each person is really distinct from each other person, but none of the three are really distinct from the essence. This response is insufficiently soothing, since from all we have read hitherto we have been led to believe that essences were individuated by their possessors: N.s essence was distinct from B’s, because one was N.s essence and the other was B’s essence. We need, but do not receive, an explanation why this principle no longer applies when we are considering the divine essence.
The Languages of Jerusalem
Authors: Spolsky Bernard , Cooper Robert L 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The Old City of Jerusalem, small and densely populated, is a complex microcosm of Israeli society. It is a multilingual community characterized by unequal power relations between the speakers of the two official languages of Israel - Arabs and Jews. The authors begin with a sociolinguistic sketch of the Old City in the present day. They then provide a historical background to their field study, discussing Jewish multilingualism from the period of the Second Temple until modern times, the sociolinguistics of Jerusalem one hundred years ago, and the recent revival and spread of Hebrew. They go on to develop a model of the rules of language choice which arises from their analysis of language use in street signs, and which they then apply to language use in the market place. In the final chapters they examine language learning and language spread in their social context. The authors demonstrate that, because of the close association between language use and social structure, the study of language use in a multilingual society is at the same time both a powerful and a delicate method of studying the dynamics of group interactions.
The Language of Signs
Authors: Spolsky Bernard , Cooper Robert L 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
THE aim of this chapter and the next is to explore the form and nature of a theory of language choice, looking in particular at the suitability of a preference model for this purpose. In developing a tentative model, this chapter will present a set of rules accounting for the choice of language on public signs in the Old City; the next chapter will consider the rules of language choice as demonstrated by the speech of passers-by and shopkeepers in the streets of the market.
Analysis of Headwords
Authors: Wright Laura 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
As the documents studied vary in formality from the carefully written and illuminated Custumals to the many Journals and Letter-Books which pay scant attention to presentation, so the script varies from careful non-cursive bookhand to cursive anglicana. The script of many of the documents studied here has already been discussed by previous scholars; see 2.1. An attempt is made below to sum up some of the orthographical characteristics of the documents taken as a whole, in order to indicate whether or not there were any orthographical conventions operative in the London area over the period. Since more documents were studied from the latter portion of the period there is more evidence for the fifteenth century.
Explanatory projects in physics, 2. 3 and 7
Authors: Schofield Malcolm 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In one way, then, that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called a cause, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species. In another way, the form of the archetype, i.e. the definition of the essence, and its genera, are called causes (e.g. of the octave the relation of 2: 1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition. Again, the primary source of the change or rest; e.g. the man who deliberated is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what changes of what is changed.
Universals And Particular Forms In Aristotle’S Metaphysics
Authors: Woods Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In Form and Universal in Aristotle1 Antony Lloyd wrote: ‘to attribute particular forms to Aristotle has only recently been a familiar notion for most British and American scholars’. Since then, the number of those who have taken the same view as Lloyd has grown.2 This tendency among recent writers on Aristotle has encouraged me to look again at Metaph. Z 13, which has been thought to require the attribution of a belief in particular forms to Aristotle.
Aristotle In Plotinus: The Continuity And Discontinuity Of Psyche And Nous
Authors: Armstrong Hilary 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is of course a very commonplace observation that one of the main differences between the thought of Plato and that of Aristotle concerns the relationship of Psyche and Nous. In Plato nous is (or is ‘in’ and characterizes) psyche at its highest, at the level at which it can contemplate the Forms. All the levels of psychic activity, including the noetic or contemplative, which is not clearly distinguished from the dianoetic or reasoning, are continuous, and there is no break, still less any sense of tension and opposition, between contemplative-rational activity and the external activities which should be directed by it. This applies both to divine and human psyche. The intelligent formation and ruling of the cosmos by divine psyche and the intelligent ethical and political activity proper to well-ordered human psyche are in no way discontinuous with or disjoined from their higher Contemplative rational activity.
Phantasia and Mental images: Neoplatonist interpretations of de an/ma, 3. 3
Authors: Sheppard Anne 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Aristotle’s treatment of phantasia in De anima, 3. 3, is both suggestive and tantalizing: suggestive because Aristotle there seems to be trying to describe a capacity of the mind which cannot be identified either with sense-perception or with rational thought, a capacity which, if it is not the same as what we call ‘imagination’, at least has a good deal in common with it; but tantalizing because the chapter flits from one point to another and is hard to interpret as a consistent whole. There have been a number of recent attempts to make sense of the chapter and relate it to Aristotle’s other remarks about phantasia elsewhere.1 I shall briefly discuss three of these, which all make some use of modern discussions of imagination; in all three cases the way they see Aristotle’s position is affected by the account of imagination which they themselves favour.
From Aristotle to Brentano: the development of the concept Of intentionality
Authors: Sorabji Richard 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A1ustotle ‘s On the Soul or De anima is probably the most variously interpreted of his works. Modern interpretations have disagreed chiefly on how Aristotle’s psychology stands in relation to Descartes.1 The ancient Neoplatonist commentators, in order to harmonize him with Plato, insisted on his belief in the immortality of the rational soul, and thereby unwittingly made Aristotle safe for Christianity. In this paper I want to take Aristotle’s theory of sense-perception and show how there too the ancient commentators started the process of reinterpretation, and handed it on to the Middle Ages. I hope that Tony Lloyd will consider this a suitable theme with which to honour him, since he has led the way in showing that professional philosophers need not and should not leave all the work to others in studying the philosophy of late antiquity.
Selfsame
Authors: Williams C J F 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In each of these triads of propositions the first implies both the second and the third. The second and third imply each other (indeed I am prepared to say that they mean the same thing), but neither implies the first. The point is that in each case there is a word or a phrase in the first member of the triad which could be replaced by something else without spoiling the implication of the second and third by the first.
Myself
Authors: Williams C J F 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
If self is the selfsame concept as same, what do we make of all the things that have been said by philosophers, psychiatrists, preachers, theologians, and others about ‘the self? Is ‘samishness’ to be regarded as a synonym of ‘selfishness’? If an understanding of identity is all that is required to make sense of talk about self, where does that leave myself, or what philosophers are wont to refer to as ‘the Ego’? Before attacking ‘myself head on, it is a good plan to examine the way in which other ‘-self words work. Let us start with ‘herself. When Rosie hits her thumb with a hammer, we ask whether she has really hurt herself. For practical purposes this is probably a mere variant on asking whether she is hurt, tout court; but we can make the reflexive pronoun more significant by supposing that she has already done damage to other people. She recently dropped a heavy plank on Bernard’s toe. The hammer incident prompts us to say ‘Look, she’s hurt herself now!’ This time Rosie has hurt Rosie.
Kooky Objects
Authors: Williams C J F 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
What I have been trying in the preceding chapters to persuade the reader of is this: that ‘--- exist’ and ‘--- is true’ are not genuine one-place predicables, and that’--- is the same as ‘is not a genuine two-place predicable. I am now hoping to persuade her of the complementary thesis-that certain expressions which look like logical subjects are not genuine subjects. They seem to stand for things, but if we take this seriously and try to explain what it is that they stand for, we find ourselves committed to some strange objects.
The Philosophical Basis of Psychiatric Ethics
Authors: Hare R M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
2.1 I have already in the preceding paper outlined the way in which, as I think, the moral philosopher can help with the problems of medical ethics, and I shall not repeat all that I said there. There are some problems, however, which afflict the psychiatrist in particular, and not only illustrate the method well, but deserve a more extended treatment.
Health
Authors: Hare R M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
3.1 The concept of health is one the understanding of which would help with both theoretical problems in philosophy and practical problems in medicine. The theoretical problems arise because philosophers, at least since Plato and Aristotle, have used what may be called the medical analogy when discussing morality; they have claimed that expressions such as ‘good man’ behave in some ways like the expression ‘healthy man’, and that if we have no difficulty in applying the latter, we should have no more difficulty in applying the former. Thus advocates of descriptivist ethical theories often claim that since ‘healthy’ is a descriptive concept, so may ‘good’ be. The obvious reply, for those who reject descriptivism, is to ask whether ‘healthy’ is purely descriptive either; and that is what I shall be doing in this paper.
In Vitro Fertilization and the Warnock Report
Authors: Hare R M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
7.1 The philosophical contribution to discussions like that about in vitro fertilization (IVF) and related problems should be to help sort out the good from the bad arguments that are used. One has only to read the many pronouncements on this subject in the newspapers to realize that what is needed above all is a sound and generally accepted method of argumentation, armed with which those who start with different views can discuss them with one another in the light of the medical facts and possibilities, and in the end, we hope, reach agreement. It is adherence to a sound method of argument that will bring this about; in default of it the discussions can go on inconclusively for ever. Since nearly all the questions involved are moral or ethical, it is the moral philosopher, the specialist in ethics in the narrow philosophical sense, who should, if he is good at his trade, be able to help here. The help consists not in handing down conclusions but in enabling others to reach them by sound arguments.
Palatalization: Derived-Environment Rules
Authors: Rubach Jerzy 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter we look at derived-environment rules. Characteristically, these rules apply at morpheme boundaries but not morpheme-internally, a fact that assigns them to the class of cyclic rules. From the descriptive point of view this chapter deals with palatalization and the associated problems. Theoretical interest lies not only in the cyclist of the rules but also in the statement of palatalization, particularly because in most cases palatalization is not phonetic. That is, rules do not produce segments that are [— back] phonetically. Yet, we uphold Clements’s (1988) claim that palatalization is conceived of as spreading. We begin with an overview of the problems that are analysed in detail in subsequent sections of this chapter.
Germanness: Language and Nation
Authors: Coulmas Florian 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
‘It distinguishes the Germans’, Nietzsche (1978: 131) once sighed, ‘that they never get tired of asking who they are.’ Although the Germans are hardly alone in indulging in the pastime of searching for an identity, Nietzsche pinpointed a noteworthy aspect of the spiritual make-up of one of Europe’s belated nations. Before the Napoleonic wars Germany, as well as Italy, had not existed as a nation-state in even rudimentary form. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, Germany had not only joined the ranks of the more traditional nation-states, but become a nation-state superpower. A great deal of intellectual energy during that century was spent accompanying and digesting this process of nation-building. As a result, nation and state, which are usually identified in the Anglo-Saxon world as well as in France, are conceptually very distinct in Germany.
Introduction
Authors: Comrie Bernard , Stone Gerald , Polinsky Maria 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Our objective in this book is to trace and illustrate the main changes that have taken place in the Russian language since the beginning of the twentieth century, and particularly those between 1917 and the late 1980s, a time which can be identified as the Soviet period, by now a reasonably complete stage in the history of Russia and the former Soviet Union.
Changes and Ends
Authors: Pivčević Edo 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The collapse of the ‘causal’ model, as we saw, seemed to indicate that there was no possibility of explaining why any two events, or states, should be mutually connected other than in the context of our experience, and this in turn raised the problem of accounting for change as an objective phenomenon. But surely, it might be said, such difficulties were due entirely to the exaggerated emphasis being placed upon efficient or mechanistic causation, exemplified by the proverbial billiard balls bouncing randomly off each other. Small wonder that under such circumstances the task of explaining the structure of the transition from A to B became an insurmountable problem. Any attempt to account for change in terms of mechanistic causation is a forlorn effort, destined to end in failure. Once this became obvious, the tendency, not unnaturally, was to retreat into the ‘ontologically uncommitted’ language of sufficient conditions. Now, within limits this may hc1ve been a. sound practical policy, but from a philosophical point of view it was unsatisfactory, inasmuch as it meant in effect turning one’s back on the problem of change rather than solving it.
What Makes Reality Intelligible? Reflections on Aristotle’s Theory of Aitia
Authors: Moravcsik Julius M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
To say that some parts of reality are intelligible is to say that we can understand these and can offer explanations for them. Understanding and explaining are what we do; reality provides the objects for these states or activities. This suggests that theories of reality are one thing, while accounts of explanations and understanding constitute something else. The former embraces science and metaphysics, the latter a part of epistemology and the philosophy of mind. From the point of view of a conception adopting this bifurcation Aristotle’s theory of aitia seems puzzling. For on the one hand it is a theory about various configurations of elements of reality, and on the other hand it seems to be a theory about explanations. We can, however, remove the puzzlement if instead of asking, ‘How do we explain various parts of reality?’ we ask, What features of parts of reality make these intelligible?’ In this essay Aristotle’s theory of aitia will be interpreted as an answer to this question. The answer is, roughly, that just as certain configurations of elements of reality make corresponding statements true, so certain configurations of elements of reality make some explanations adequate, true, and insightful. Aristotle’s theory of aitia is a correspondence theory of explanations, thus dealing at once both with the world and with the ways in which we explain the world. Furthermore, for Aristotle the intelligibility of the world depends partly on fundamental changes and processes in the world being the manifestations of powers and potentialities that have an intelligible nature of their own.
Chance and ’Always or For the Most Part’ in Aristotle
Authors: Judson Lindsay 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This paper has two aims. One is to examine Aristotle’s analysis of chance in Phys. 11. 4-6; the other is to try to elucidate a concept which has been very much neglected by commentators despite its central importance to a number of Aristotle’s doctrines and theories–his concept of happening always or for the most part’. These two aims go hand in hand, because the analysis of chance invokes the concept of happening always or for the most part, and also provides important evidence as to what this concept is. I shall begin with the analysis of chance (sections I-II), then turn to ‘happening always or for the most part’ (sections III-VI), considering along the way what light the former sheds on the latter. In pursuit of these broad questions a number of points of detail raised by the analysis in 11. 4-6 will have to be ignored.
Aristotle on the Reality of Time
Authors: Inwood Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
At Phys. 1v. 21b632 ff. Aristotle asks whether time is ‘among the things that are or among the things that are not’ (21b631). He presents three ‘exoteric’ arguments which suggest that time either ‘is not at all or scarcely and dimly’ (21b632-3):
Aristotle on Continuity in Physics VI
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Aristotle’s favourite model of the continuum is the same as ours, namely a geometrical line, or line-segment. He does not also have, as we do, the numerical model of the real numbers, but that is scarcely a handicap. After all, one of our main ways of understanding the structure of the real numbers (namely via the notion of a ‘Dedekind cut’) is very naturally viewed as drawing upon our prior grasp of the structure of a geometrical line, with the real numbers understood as corresponding to the points on that line. There are some features of this structure which Aristotle grasps very clearly, notably that no two points on a line are ever next to one another, for between any two points there is always a whole line-segment, which in turn will always contain further points within it. Undoubtedly, this is a major achievement on his part, but its importance should not be over-exaggerated, as it appears to be (for example) in Ross’s classic edition of the Physics. (Looking at the issue from our contemporary point of view, we may observe that the fact that between any two points there are always others does not yet distinguish the structure of the real numbers from that of the rational numbers.)