bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Reduction vs. Elevation
Authors: Slote Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There are five basic classes of ethical notions: the notions surrounding the idea of welfare; moral notions; virtue notions; rationality notions; and notions involving the evaluation of states of affairs. Epicureanism and utilitarianism try to reduce all the other notions (notion‐clusters) to that of well‐being or welfare, but Stoicism moves in the opposite direction, seeing well‐being as a function of virtue. Since virtue seems higher or more ideal as a value than sheer or mere well‐being, we can say that Epicureanism and utilitarianism monistically reduce virtue to well‐being, whereas Stoicism monistically elevates well‐being to the status or level of virtue. But commonsense virtue ethics treats well‐being and virtue in dualistic fashion as mutually ineliminable.
The Main Issue Between Utilitarianism and Virtue Ethics
Authors: Slote Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The main issue between utilitarianism and commonsense virtue ethics is whether what is admirable is a function of the overall benefit a trait brings to sentient beings generally or whether there can be sources of admirability and virtue status somewhat independent of such overall consequences. It is argued by example that many kinds of admirability seem possible and that some of these do not grow out of overall likely benefits to sentient beings. This favors commonsense virtue ethics over utilitarianism.
Kantian Consequentialism
Authors: Cummiskey David 
Published: October 2003

AbstractKantians and Consequentialists alike have presumed that Kantian ethics is incompatible with all forms of consequentialism, and that it instead justifies a system of agent‐centered restrictions, or deontological constraints, on the maximization of the good. Unlike all forms of utilitarian theories, Kant's ethical theory is supposed to justify basic human rights, respect for which constrains the maximization of the good. Kantian Consequentialism argues that Kant's basic rationalist, internalist approach to the justification of normative principles, his conception of morality as a system of categorical imperatives, his account of the nature of the goodwill and the motive of duty, and his principle of universalizability are all compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, the core moral ideal of the dignity of humanity, and the related conception of respect for persons, which is based on the intrinsic value of rational nature as an end‐in‐itself, support the widespread intuition that our rational nature is the basis of values that are higher than mere happiness. The result is a novel and compelling form of consequentialism that is based on, and that gives priority to, the unique and special value of rational nature itself.
Introduction
Authors: Cummiskey David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kant's moral theory is focused primarily on the justification of normative principles and the nature of moral motivation, reasons, and principles. Kant's own normative ethics, of course, is not consequentialist, and indeed Kant argues at length against empiricist, utilitarian approaches to ethics. The question, however, is whether he actually provides a nonconsequentialist justification of deontological intuitions or individual rights. I argue that, contrary to widespread philosophical opinion, Kant simply does not consider, and thus does not reject, a consequentialist interpretation of the moral law or categorical imperative. Furthermore, once we distinguish the justification of normative principle from the principle itself, Kant's rationalist, internalist approach to justification seems to be compatible with normative consequentialism. In addition, we see that the key to the rejection of consequentialism is the justification of basic agent‐centered constraints. The introductory chapter also provides a comment on rational reconstruction as a form of textual interpretation and an overview and summary of the book's argument.
Rational Nature as an End‐In‐Itself
Authors: Cummiskey David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kant maintains that “rational nature exists as end‐in‐itself” and thus you must “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.” As Korsgaard has emphasized, Kant presents a transcendental argument for the unconditional value of rational nature. According to Kant, happiness is indeed also valued as an end, but its value is nonetheless conditioned by the value‐conferring power of rational nature. In this chapter, Kant's conceptions of intrinsic value, the goodness of ends and means, and the idea of an end‐in‐itself are explained. Problems for the argument for the priority of rationality are also explored.
Conclusion
Authors: Cummiskey David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kantian consequentialism combines a Kantian conception of the justification of moral principles with a consequentialist principle of right action. Although the focus of this book is on defending the Kantian foundations of this new type of consequentialism, it is noteworthy that the resulting Kantian theory of value also leads to a more intuitively plausible form of consequentialism. The Kantian foundation of this new form of consequentialism does indeed entail significant constraints on the kinds of sacrifices that are morally permissible. Most centrally, the maximization of happiness cannot override the basic interests related to our rational nature. For similar reasons, on issues of social justice, this type of consequentialism is more distribution‐sensitive than classical utilitarianism. Kantian consequentialism thus supports many of the deontological intuitions and basic rights concerns that have led Kantians like Rawls to reject utilitarianism.
The Stoics: Human Nature and the Point of View of the Universe
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe Stoics appeal to human nature in their theory of virtue and ‘preferred indifferents’, showing in a developmental account how grasping virtue is the culmination of a natural progression. They also appeal to the nature of the cosmos to support ethics as a whole, but this does not, as issometimes claimed, provide premises from which specific ethical conclusions are inferred.
The Epicureans: Rethinking What Is Natural
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Epicurus’ appeal to nature to show that our final end is pleasure is less crude than often thought. Instead of formulating a hedonic calculus, he distinguishes between desires in terms of what is natural and what is necessary. He produces a revisionary, ideal account of nature, illustrated by Philodemus’ work on anger.
Self‐Concern and the Sources and Limits of Other‐Concern
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThere is a developed debate from Aristotle through the Stoics to Aristotelian hybrid theories found in Antiochus and Arius Didymus: should other‐concern be seen as a developed form of self‐concern (Aristotle), thus giving us a single source for both, or should self‐concern and other‐concern be seen as having distinct sources and development (the Stoics)? The Stoic tradition also gives other‐concern wider scope, extending it to all rational humans rather than privileging groups like the city‐state.
The Sceptics: Untroubledness Without Belief
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSextus Empiricus represents the only school of ancient scepticism to have developed views on happiness as our final end. He gives arguments to dislodge our commitment to all positive theories of happiness, aiming to produce suspension of judgement, which is alleged to result in tranquility. But what replaces it is not substantial enough to be plausibly articulated as a theory of happiness, and is too dependent on actual agreement to ground scepticism's alleged therapeutic value.
Theophrastus and the Stoics: Forcing the Issue
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAristotle's pupil Theophrastus sharpened the claim that happiness requires external goods as well as virtue, a claim prominently denied by the Stoics. Their position that virtue is sufficient for happiness requires revision of the content of happiness and adjustment of our attitudes to premature death and many other matters. The strain put on our concept of happiness is, however, greatly alleviated by the Stoic theory of preferred indifferents, which allows things other than virtue to have value of a different kind, as the material on which virtuous activity is exercised.
The Microstructure of Scientific Change
Authors: Kitcher Philip 
Published: October 2003

AbstractUsing the details of the case study as an illustration, offers a picture of the scientist as a cognitive subject, and introduces the key notion of a scientific practice. Instead of thinking of a corpus of beliefs, it is suggested that the state of science at a time can best be represented by a multidimensional entity, among whose components are the language used, the questions hailed as significant, the answers accepted, the methodological and experimental lore, and so forth. Both individual practices and the consensus practice (the practice that represents the view of the community) are considered.
The Experimental Philosophy
Authors: Kitcher Philip 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses the major questions that arise about the knowledge of the individual scientist. First, the problems of the theory‐ladenness of observation are distinguished and discussed. Second, the traditional issues in the theory of confirmation are addressed by articulating an eliminativist view of scientific inference. This view faces obvious difficulties stemming from the alleged underdetermination of theory by evidence. It is suggested that some forms of this problem are less intractable than is usually supposed, but that related questions are at the heart of worries about the rational resolution of scientific revolutions. To tackle these worries, some historical episodes—one focused on the chemical revolution of the eighteenth century, the other on Darwin's arguments from biogeography—are discussed in some detail.
Modalities
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book is a collection of papers by Ruth Barcan Marcus, covering much ground in the development of her thought, and spanning from 1961 to 1990. Many of the papers deal with logical, semantic, metaphysical, and epistemological issues in intensional logic, and in particular, modalities. Some important themes that run through these papers are extensionality, the necessity of identity, the directly referential conception of proper names as “tags,” essentialism, substitutional quantification, and possibilia and possible worlds. What emerges from them is a robust defense of quantified modal logic in the light of a host of objections, particularly from Quine. Modalities also includes two papers on belief, which have consequences for epistemic logic and more widely for theories of rationality; two papers on ethical issues, which have consequences for deontic logic and practical reasoning; and finally, two papers on historical figures, Spinoza and Russell, dealing with the ontological proof of God's existence, and the nature of particularity, identity, and individuation, respectively.
Essentialism in Modal Logic
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this paper, an example of the kind of essentialist argument that is supposed to generate difficulties for quantified modal logic is shown to be invalid on one interpretation, and valid but unable to generate categorical necessities without the ad hoc addition of essentialist premises, on another. The paper specifies how attributes figure in quantified modal logic, and also gives a formal characterization of essential properties.
Quantification and Ontology
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Interpretations of standard first‐order logic fail as vehicles for paraphrase of important segments of discourse involving tenses, modalities, and the like. This paper considers substitutional quantification, which severs the connection between quantifiers and ontological commitment, as a way of increasing the range of translatability into and out of an interpretation of standard first‐order logic.
Nominalism and the Substitutional Quantifier
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This paper explores the claim that a substitutional semantics for quantification theory lends itself to nominalistic aims. Without committing herself to nominalism, Marcus establishes some important points of contact between the two, such as the belief that proper names are not redundant or eliminable, and that substitutional semantics allows quantifiers with predicates as substituends without thereby forcing an ontology of universals.
Moral Dilemmas and Consistency
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this paper, it is argued that moral dilemmas need not indicate that the set of moral principles under which we define our obligations is inconsistent. It is also argued that the consistency of moral principles does not entail that moral dilemmas can be settled without residue. This points not only to an intractable fact about the human condition and the inevitability of guilt but also to a second‐order regulative principle: as rational agents we ought to conduct our lives and arrange our institutions so as to minimize predicaments of moral conflict.
On Some Post‐1920s Views of Russell on Particularity, Identity, and Individuation
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Expanding on scholarly work by M. Boudot, this paper indicates (1) what remains constant in the evolution of Russell's ontological views against which his later theories seem to be natural outcomes, (2) some criticisms of Russell's earlier views, which may have acted as catalyst for the change, and (3) some consequences the revised theory has for Russell's logic. It then comments on Russell's later views, which seem to prefigure contemporary theories of demonstratives and ordinary proper names.
Possibilia and Possible Worlds
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This paper examines claims that quantified modal logic trades on deep failures and confusions. In particular, it discusses the putative problem of failure of substitutivity of co‐referential terms in modal contexts, and the apparent commitment of modal semantics to possibilia. It concludes with a discussion of alternatives for a more adequate modal logic and its semantics, developing themes and proposals from earlier work.
Some Revisionary Proposals About Belief and Believing
Authors: Marcus Ruth Barcan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This paper proposes an “object‐centered” account of belief and believing that departs from the dominant, language‐oriented accounts, according to which the objects of believing are linguistic or quasi‐linguistic entities. The paper provides a critical examination of such language‐oriented views, and also includes discussions of the disquotation principle, a puzzle about belief in non‐existence, and whether one can believe an impossibility.
Introduction
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe central problem of political theory is to reconcile the standpoint of the collectivity with the standpoint of the individual. The problem is not approached as a question about the relation between the individual and society; in essence and origin it is a question about each individual's relation to himself. The impersonal standpoint in each of us produces a powerful demand for universal impartiality and equality, while the personal standpoint gives rise to individualistic motives and requirements, which present obstacles to the pursuit and realization of such ideals.
Two Standpoints
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Each of us begins with a set of concerns, desires, and interests of our own, and each of us can recognize that the same is true of others. We can then remove ourselves in thought from our particular position in the world and think simply of all those people, without singling out as I the one we happen to be. From this abstracted impersonal standpoint, the content and character of different individual standpoints remain unchanged. The impersonal standpoint plays an essential role in the evaluation of political institutions. Any political theory that aspires to moral decency must try to devise and justify a form of institutional life, which answers to the real strength of impersonal values while recognizing that they are not all we have to reckon with.
The Problem of Utopianism
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The duality of standpoints makes its appearance in political theory with particular prominence as the root of an old and persistent problem – the problem of utopianism. A political ideal, however attractive it may be to contemplate, is utopian if reasonable individuals cannot be motivated to live by it. But a political system that is completely tied down to individual motives may fail to embody any ideal at all. The danger of utopianism comes from the political tendency, in pursuit of the ideal of moral equality, to put too much pressure on individual motives or even to attempt to transcend them entirely through an impersonal transformation of social individuals. A nonutopian solution requires a proper balance between these two elements, and that requires knowing what they are and how they interact.
Legitimacy and Unanimity
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The task of discovering the conditions of legitimacy is traditionally conceived as that of finding a way to justify a political system to everyone who is required to live under it. If the justification is successful, no one will have grounds for moral complaint about the way it takes into account and weighs his interests and point of view. Nagel uses Kant's unanimity criterion in relation to political institutions and to the individual lives of their members; he maintains that unanimity could be achieved by us in many respects as we are, provided that we are also reasonable and committed within reason to modifying our claims, requirements, and motives in a direction that makes a common framework of justification possible.
Kant's Test
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
What is reasonable for individuals cannot be determined at the level of individual practical reason alone, but depends also on some judgment about the collective result of everyone's following those principles. Nagel argues that a principle of universal acceptability is a genuine and nonvacuous alternative to the pure dominance of the impersonal standpoint. This alternative allows the personal standpoint an independent role in the justification of universal principles, and explains why some solutions are morally plausible and others are not.
Egalitarianism
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractModern political theories agree that a society must treat its members equally in some respects, but they disagree over the respects, and the priorities among them. Nagel advances a strong equalitarian social ideal and presents a case for extending the reach of equality in a legitimate political system beyond what is customary in modern welfare states, and then reflects on the great difficulties, practical and moral, of doing so. He also calls into question the motivational viability of an egalitarian position based on the conception of Kantian unanimity advanced by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.
Problems of Convergence
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
What sort of accommodation between egalitarian impartiality and personal motivation can pass the test of acceptability from all points of view at once? To consider this question, we must descend from the level of egalitarian impartiality and regard things instead from the mixed point of view of real members of a society. Nagel argues that an acceptable societal framework for apportioning negative interpersonal responsibilities is a condition of the moral acceptability of strict limitations on negative responsibility in the rules of individual conduct that govern personal relations within it.
Equality and Motivation
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
While institutions must play an important role in creating social and economic equality, they cannot sustain it unless they come to express what enough people feel. Nagel explores what transformations of motive might make possible the realization of a more egalitarian social ideal. There is no natural way to divide the creation of advantages by talent into the legitimate and the illegitimate, along lines that could correspond to a psychologically plausible division between personal and impersonal motivation. All that can be done is to reduce the magnitude of the inequalities in life chances within which the effort will determine the result.
Options
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThere is a personal dimension of life in which egalitarian impartiality has no place, but which interacts with the public domain to generate inequalities that raise serious issues of social justice. To avoid this, Nagel proposes that impartiality and egalitarianism would apply to the social structure, but not to private life, and individuals would be expected to devote their energies and their personal resources to the pursuit of happiness and for the benefits of their families.
Inequality
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIt is not always easy to prevent egalitarianism in political morality from infecting other values. If one is really uneasy about socio‐economic stratification, one can become uneasy about cultural, educational, and aesthetic stratification as well. Moral equality does not mean that people are equal in all respects. There are values, which are not just the values that things have for persons, and such values provide legitimate goals for a society. Nagel argues that some form of egalitarian impartiality should be the dominant value.
Toleration
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe most intellectually difficult problem regarding an acceptable partition of motives arises not from conflicts of interest but conflicts over what is truly valuable. Members of a society all motivated by an impartial regard for one another will be led into conflict by that very motive if they disagree about what the good life consists in, hence about what they should want impartially for everyone. Nagel argues that in the cases of toleration we require a different device to ensure legitimacy – the exclusion of certain values from the admissible grounds for the application of coercive state power. We must agree to refrain from limiting people's liberty by state action in the name of such values.
Truth
Authors: Richardson John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter turns to the most basic puzzle about Nietzsche's philosophy – the question about how his well‐known “perspectivism” can be consistent with his assertion of any ontological or valuative claims. Doesn’t that doctrine require that all his theories and values are “just his perspective,” and doesn’t this deprive them of the status he thinks they have? These doubts are reinforced by his attacks on the value and possibility of truth. I proceed by examining Nietzsche's genealogy of the “will to truth” and showing the complex set of senses for “truth” this genealogy reveals. I then argue that Nietzsche projects a new stage in the development of this will to truth, reached by his “new philosophers,” by which this will pursues a “perspectival truth.” With such a truth, his own perspectives can have the privileged status he claims for them.