bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues that the core of the concept of knowledge is true belief plus some property indicative of true belief and that there is no detailed answer to the query ‘and what property is that?’ The Nozick–Dretske counterfactual analysis, Alvin Goldman's causal theory, reliabilism, and the justified true belief account are all good approximations to the concept of knowledge, for, in each case, there is justification for the addition(s) made to the minimal concept. This justification arises not so much from the concept of knowledge itself as from certain very general beliefs we hold about the world. Thus, when the conditions laid down in the minimal concept are satisfied, it will almost always be believed that the conditions of the above theories are satisfied too.
Other locutions: Knowing how to. The Inquirer and the Apprentice. ‘Knows how to’ compared with ‘can’—and with ‘knows that’
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
‘Knows how to’ (‘knows’ in the capacity sense) appears synonymous with ‘can’, and yet ‘can’ does not primarily tell us about someone's capacity as an informant, suggesting that the practical explication cannot provide an account of ‘knows how to’. Three responses are considered: (1) the capacity sense exists only in some languages and therefore poses no problem; (2) there is no irreducible capacity sense; (3) the capacity sense is connected to the informational sense by the natural connection between agency and information. (3) is favoured, on the grounds that the needs of the inquirer and the apprentice, one who seeks an instructor from whom he may learn how, overlap in central cases. Craig concludes that the practical explication successfully explains both senses of ‘know’ in a unitary fashion.
Introduction
Authors: Ameriks Karl 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter notes the paradox of the widespread admiration for Kant's criticism of dogmatic arguments about the mind and the scarcity of close analyses of Kant's procedure in his criticism. It also comments on the fact that many readers of the Critique have been put off by the fact that Kant's general doctrine of transcendental idealism immediately seems to bring with it absurd consequences—in particular, the striking implication that we cannot, theoretically, know our own self at all. I argue that Kant's general doctrine has some admirable ‘modest’ and critical dimensions, and that whatever worries one has about his idealism, these can, for the most part, be separated from the main innovations of his theory of the mind, which concern a perceptive unmasking of the so‐called ‘Cartesian’ claims about an immediate mental access to ourselves. In addition, the Introduction summarizes the pattern of the development of Kant's theory throughout his other works, and it gives an overview of Kant's main conclusions about the mind.
Immateriality
Authors: Ameriks Karl 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter begins the detailed analysis of specific Kantian doctrines of the mind by pointing out that, despite its sharp critique of many rationalist arguments, Kant's Critical philosophy remains committed to the core rationalist claim that the mind ultimately cannot be material. This claim follows from transcendental idealism's general doctrine that nothing is material in itself. I explain in detail how this view is compatible with Kant's critical observations, in the first and second paralogisms, concerning traditional arguments for the self's substantiality and simplicity. Here, as elsewhere, it is useful to contrast Kant's views at four different levels (noumenal, phenomenal, scientific, and appearance), and to distinguish his thoughts about what is true, or even practically demonstrable, from what may be established a priori by theoretical reason.
Immortality
Authors: Ameriks Karl 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is a relatively brief chapter, giving a concise review of Kant's position on this issue throughout his writings. On the one hand, Kant treats the topic as the defining ‘Idea’ and goal of rational psychology as such; on the other, he is highly critical of all traditional theoretical arguments for it. His harsh criticism of these arguments has been a major factor in misleading readers into thinking that he has equally incisive or negative views about other, much more qualified rationalist claims. The unique a priori argument for our immortality (as a ‘postulate’ of pure practical reason) that Kant endorses in his Critiques can be understood as a weakened variation of a series of arguments that he had presented in early works, and that came to have an ever more peripheral significance.
Independence
Authors: Ameriks Karl 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter concerns human freedom, a topic that Kant remarkably struck from the list of main topics in rational psychology, although right before the Critique, he had given it pride of place. Hence, it is crucial to see why the Critique neither presents nor directly criticizes the rationalist arguments for our freedom with which Kant was extremely familiar. Kant's views here must be understood in terms of clues from his lectures, and especially in the light of the different kinds of arguments to freedom, which he presents in his Groundwork (a ‘deduction’) and second Critique (a ‘fact of reason’). I connect the changes in his presentation there with the clearer expression, in the second ed. of the first Critique, of his anti‐rationalist doctrine of self‐knowledge (as dependent on knowing spatial things). In this way, I show how—to appreciate the full interconnection and development of Kant's theoretical and practical views on freedom—we need to go beyond readings by Beck, Paton, Henrich, and others.
Pythagoras Revived
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Pythagorean idea that number is the key to understanding reality inspired Neoplatonist philosophers in Late Antiquity to develop theories in physics and metaphysics based on mathematical models. This book examines this theme, describing first the Pythagorean interests of Platonists in the second and third centuries and then Iamblichus's programme to Pythagoreanize Platonism in the fourth century in his work On Pythagoreanism (whose unity of conception is shown and parts of which are reconstructed for the first time). The impact of Iamblichus's programme is examined as regards Hierocles of Alexandria and Syrianus and Proclus in Athens: their conceptions of the figure of Pythagoras and of mathematics and its relation to physics and metaphysics are examined and compared with those of Iamblichus. This provides insight into Iamblichus's contribution to the evolution of Neoplatonism, to the revival of interest in mathematics, and to the development of a philosophy of mathematics and a mathematizing physics and metaphysics.
Varieties of Pythagoreanism in the Second and Third Centuries ad
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter compares the Pythagorean interests and tendencies of four Platonist philosophers, Numenius, Nicomachus of Gerasa, Anatolius, and Porphyry, in particular, as regards their views on the relation between Pythagoras and Plato and the place of number in their philosophy.
On Pythagoreanism V–VII: The Excerpts in Michael Psellus
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is shown that extracts from books V, VI, and VII of Iamblichus's work On Pythagoreanism are to be found in the work of the Byzantine philosopher Michael Psellos. The contents of these lost books are reconstructed from Psellos's extracts: they concern number as applied in physics, in ethics, and in metaphysics.
Iamblichus' Work on Pythagoreanism: General Conclusions
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of Iamblichus's work On Pythagoreanism and shows how its programme to Pythagoreanize Platonism can be found in what remains of Iamblichus's other philosophical works. Iamblichus's Pythagoreanism is compared with that of his Platonist predecessors.
Hierocles
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The connections between Iamblichus's school in Syria and the beginnings of the Neoplatonist school in Athens are indicated, and, as a first case of the influence of Iamblichus's Pythagoreanizing programme, the works of Hierocles of Alexandria (a pupil of Plutarch of Athens) discussed, with reference, in particular, to Hierocles's views on the history of philosophy and his use of Pythagoreanism in his commentary on the Golden Verses.
Mathematics and Physics in Proclus
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Proclus's mathematizing approach to physics is discussed in relation to his adaptation of Aristotle's Physics and his interpretation of the physics of Plato's Timaeus, in which physics is geometricized in its method, and its claim to scientific status circumscribed. The transposition of mathematical truths to physics is also discussed.
Existential Epistemology
Authors: Richardson John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I develop a Heideggerian response to the central traditional problem in epistemology—whether we can have (objective) knowledge of the external world. I introduce the main philosophical terms and claims of Being and Time, and try to use this system to amplify the book's brief and elusive treatments of that problem. Because Heidegger's early system is crucially ‘existential’, it gives a critique of epistemology from an existential stance—or an existential epistemology. This critique claims to ‘dissolve’ or ‘undermine’ that traditional problem, by showing how it is misguided or misformed. Heidegger's ultimate argument is that the problem rests on a mistake about time, or about the temporal character of reality, and of humans—Dasein—in particular. Heidegger thinks this mistake infects not just epistemology, but our whole theoretical stance, how we try to go beyond our ‘everyday’, pre‐theoretical understanding. But his point is not to return us to that ‘everydayness’, but to improve our thinking by turning it into a ‘phenomenology’, which—by Heidegger's existential twist—amounts to the same thing as authenticity. My three chapters focus respectively on these three basic stances—everydayness, epistemology, and phenomenology.
Epistemology
Authors: Richardson John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The second chapter examines the special theoretical attitude by which Heidegger thinks philosophy and science have traditionally tried to advance beyond that everyday understanding. This attitude involves ‘suspending’ those pragmatic projects and grasping ourselves and things ‘objectively’, which is to treat them not as ready‐to‐hand equipment, but as present‐at‐hand objects. But, Heidegger argues, our (Dasein's) own condition cannot be grasped as present‐at‐hand, because of the way it is crucially projecting ahead towards its ends— i.e. because of its temporal character. This limitation in the attitude is most exposed by the traditional effort of epistemology, best represented in Descartes. Its inability ever to ground its knowledge claims reflects its temporal limit in the present.
Phenomenology
Authors: Richardson John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The third chapter turns to the new theoretical stance Heidegger advocates to us, phenomenology, and the existential condition to which it is tied, authenticity. This requires examining, rather more selectively, the terms and claims in Being and Time's second Division. We find that both everydayness and epistemology are responses to existential deficiencies in Dasein's condition, which Heidegger calls ‘nullities’, and links with guilt and anxiety. Both our everyday absorption in equipment, and our theoretical relation to objects, are ‘falling’ avoidances of these nullities, which is reflected above all in their temporal character. Heidegger promotes to us instead the method of phenomenology, which faces those nullities, in the authentic stance in which Dasein's temporality is transparent to it.
The Existence of God
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book assesses the worth of arguments for and against the existence of God. Evidence confirms (makes more probable) a hypothesis that explains that (1) given the hypothesis, the evidence is to be expected, i.e. the hypothesis makes the evidence probable, (2) the evidence is not otherwise to be expected, (3) the hypothesis is simple, and (4) it fits with background knowledge (i.e. knowledge about how things behave in neighbouring fields of enquiry.) When we are assessing hypotheses (such as theism, the hypothesis that there is a God) purporting to explain everything, there will be no background knowledge. Theism is a very simple hypothesis. If there is a God, there is some reason to expect that he will create a universe, with laws of nature, leading to the evolution of humans (bodies connected to souls), who often have experiences which seem to them experiences of God. It is most impossible that all this evidence exists if there were no God. Taken together, therefore, all this evidence makes it probable that there is a God. The occurrence of evil, whether produced by humans or natural processes, does not diminish that probability.
The Explanatory Power of Theism: General Considerations
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Evidence e renders a hypothesis be more probable insofar as both the prior probability of b is high and its explanatory power (that is the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis divided by the prior probability of the evidence) is high. Different e increases the probability of the hypothesis of theism beyond its prior probability because it is quite probable that there would be that evidence if there is a God, and quite improbable if there is no God. There cannot be a best of all possible worlds.
The Problem of Evil
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is a good thing that humans should have the opportunity to choose freely between good and evil; and hence the “free will” defence to “moral evil”, that God has reason to allow such evil. There are two substantial reasons why God should bring about natural evil – to give us the knowledge of how to bring about good and evil consequence ourselves; and to give us the opportunity to react to it with courage, sympathy etc. and to do virtuous acts of a kind, which we would not otherwise have such opportunity to do.
Arguments from History and Miracles
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
God has reason to bring about occasional miracles in the sense of violations of laws of nature. (e.g., as answers to prayer or to show his approval of some particular teaching). He has reason to become incarnate in order to provide atonement for human sin, to reveal truth and to identify with our sufferers; and to show that he has done this by a super‐miracle such as the Resurrection. But for God such violations are not to be expected. Hence, violations in the right sort of circumstances is further evidence of the existence of God.
The Argument from Religious Experience
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Large numbers of people have religious experiences in the sense of experiences that seem to them to be experiences of God. It is a basic epistemological principle. The principle of credulity, that – in absence of counter‐evidence – we should believe that things are as they seem to be, the only kind of counter‐evidence which would tend to show a religious experience not to be veridical would be any evidence tending to show that there is no God. In the absence of any such evidence, any religious experience is evidence of the existence of God.
Constructibility and Mathematical Existence
Authors: Chihara Charles S. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA continuation of the study of mathematical existence begun in Ontology and the Vicious‐Circle Principle (published in 1973); in the present work, Quine's indispensability argument is rebutted by the development of a new nominalistic version of mathematics (the Constructibility Theory) that is specified as an axiomatized theory formalized in a many‐sorted first‐order language. What is new in the present work is its abandonment of the predicative restrictions of the earlier work and its much greater attention to the applications of mathematics in science and everyday life. The book also contains detailed discussions of rival views (Mathematical Structuralism, Field's Instrumentalism, Burgess's Moderate Realism, Maddy's Set Theoretical Realism, and Kitcher's Ideal Agent account of mathematics), in which many comparisons with the Constructibility Theory are made.
Mathematical Structuralism
Authors: Chihara Charles S. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe first of six chapters in which rival views are critically evaluated and compared with the Constructibility view described in earlier chapters. The views considered here (forms of ‘Structuralism’) are those of Stewart Shapiro and Michael Resnik. A number of difficulties with these two views are detailed and it is explained how the Constructibility Theory is not troubled by the problems that Structuralism was explicitly developed to resolve.
Deflationism and Mathematical Truth
Authors: Chihara Charles S. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractTakes up Field's version of Logicism—a position that he calls ‘deflationism’. Unlike traditional Logicists, Field does not analyse mathematical propositions into purely logical ones, but he does analyse mathematical knowledge into logical knowledge. Several objections are raised to deflationism, revolving around Field's contention that mathematics consists mostly of falsehoods. Contends that, although mathematics, literally and platonically construed, is not true, it does convey genuine (true) information.
F. H.Bradley
Authors: Hylton Peter 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBradley's views are the ones to which Russell and Moore are most directly reacting. The author approaches those views by considering a criticism of the views of Green. This leads to a consideration of Bradley's views about relations and (relatedly) experience and reality. Bradley's views about judgement and truth occupy the second half of the chapter and are considered in the context of Bradley's criticism of the empiricist's views on the same topic.
Russell's Idealist Period
Authors: Hylton Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Concerned with Russell's early work, written when he was still an adherent of the idealist tradition (1895‐1899). The author pays particular attention to Russell's 1897 book, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry. Russell argued that geometry was one stage in a ‘dialectic of the sciences’. Each stage would be shown, in Hegelian fashion, to be inadequate if taken by itself, and to lead naturally or inevitably to the next stage.
The Logic of Principia Mathematica
Authors: Hylton Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Here the concern is with the logic underlying Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica and with the relation of that logic to Russell's underlying metaphysics. The author emphasizes the fact that work is, strictly speaking, a theory of propositional functions, not of classes; sentences containing symbols for classes are defined by means of propositional functions. It is terms of the latter sort of entity that Russell's Paradox must be solved; the theory of types is, strictly speaking, a theory of the stratification of propositional functions.
The Natural Numbers and Analysis
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Motivation and details of a systematic translation of number‐theoretic sentences into a suitable modal‐logical language are provided, eliminating reference to numbers as objects and expressing the structuralist viewpoint. Modal existence postulates, although minimal, distinguish the present approach from ‘“if‐then”ism’ or ‘deductivism’. The translation scheme is then justified as accurate and adequate. Extension of the methods to more powerful systems, e.g. real analysis, is sketched. Finally, it is shown how the methods so far can be adapted to the concerns of nominalism, avoiding functions and relations as objects.
Set Theory
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The modal‐structural approach is extended to set theory, as an alternative to reifying sets as actual abstract objects, thinking instead of ‘possible results of selection’. Drawing inspiration from Zermelo's important paper of 1930 and suggestions of Putnam, it is shown how to incorporate modality into second‐order Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, avoiding proper classes and a fixed universe of sets, instead sustaining extendability principles (‘any set‐domain can be part of a larger one’, and strengthenings of this). It is then shown how this naturally leads to important kinds of ‘large cardinals’ (inaccessibles, Mahlo cardinals), motivated ‘from below’ rather than ‘from above’.
Plural and Conflicting Values
Authors: Stocker Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The central concern of this book is whether plural and incommensurable values necessarily result in unsolvable conflict and whether this conflict poses special problems for ethical theories. The view defended here is that plurality is no impediment to sound choice, and that a practicable ethics accounts for the fact that plurality and choice are ordinary and pervasive phenomena of moral life. Ethical theories, broadly divided into monistic and pluralistic, are pitted against each other in an attempt to show that the traditional understanding of the connection between value and conflict is flawed––a rationally grounded ethics does not require an evaluative monism purged of conflict, nor an algorithm to compare and choose between plural values. The book combines criticism of contemporary ethical theories with specific chapters on Aristotle's ethics. The first part focuses on the nature of moral conflict. Drawing on Aristotle's moral psychology, the author looks at dirty hands, moral immorality, and the nature of moral conflict in general. The second part focuses on whether plural values preclude sound moral judgement. The third part discusses whether conflict requires plural values, looking first at irrational conflict (akrasia or weakness of will) and next at rational conflict. The last part discusses maximization and plurality, and argues that maximization is mistaken, irrelevant, and parasitic. A central theme of the book is that ethics extends far beyond the guiding of action––‘our moral concern with acts goes beyond, primarily, what is to be done, and secondarily, what is better or best’.
Dirty Hands and Ordinary Life
Authors: Stocker Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA dirty hands case is (1) justified, (2) obligatory or permissible, and (3) morally wrong. It is argued that dirty hands are conceptually unproblematic and that they are instances of ordinary evaluative phenomena. Some ordinary cases of moral conflict are like dirty hands in that they are entirely justified, yet regrettable. The analysis shows that such cases involve double counting––the disvalue is counted once and overridden in the act‐guiding evaluation, and counted again later as the object of the moral emotions (guilt, shame, regret) and as being a disvalue. In addition, dirty hands are cases in which what is morally required is also immoral, and therefore regrettable. Shows that ethical theories can and should account for the existence of moral choices involving acts that are justified, even obligatory, yet nevertheless wrong, shameful, and regrettable.