bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Full Circle
Authors: Holmes Frederic Lawrence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
On December 27 or 28, 1936, Hans Krebs made another trip to Cambridge, in order to meet with Francis Roughton so that they could finally finish their work on carbamino ornithine.1 There is no record of what Krebs and Roughton actually worked out together. By this time or shortly afterward Roughton himself wrote an outline and draft of their proposed paper, together with numerous calculations that he had carried out, all in his elegant, meticulous handwriting.
The Boundaries of Speech: What Actions and Restraints Are Significantly Reached by Justifications for Free Speech?
Authors: Greenawalt Kent 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This chapter focuses on what counts as “speech” for a principle of freedom of speech and is, thus, an introduction to all the chapters that follow. I proceed on the premise that the principle of special protection for speech covers mainly behavior to which its underlying justifications apply (though the principle may also come into play when the government has certain objectionable reasons for restricting behavior that itself might not qualify as speech). The chapter first explores the connection between the justifications for freedom of speech and the coverage of a principle of free speech. It then turns to claims of fact and value, communications that the justifications for free speech plainly cover, and examines whether such claims may nonetheless fall outside a principle of free speech if they are false, have narrow practical purposes, have no political content, are made in private, or remain uncommunicated to others. Next is a brief treatment of artistic expression and of actions that are not communicative in the ordinary sense; that discussion addresses the application of a principle of free speech when the government seeks to deter messages even if the acts prohibited do not otherwise qualify as speech. The rest of the chapter is devoted to “situation-altering” utterances and “weak” imperatives. I argue that communications whose dominant purpose is to accomplish something rather than to say something are not reached by a principle of free speech or are reached much less strongly than are ordinary claims of fact and value.
Agreements, Offers, Orders, and Criminal Implementation
Authors: Greenawalt Kent 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This and the next five chapters explore the relationship between a political principle of free speech and bases for criminal punishment. Though I do not systematically explore civil liability for expression, free speech considerations constrain the imposition of such liability as well as criminal penalties. Much that I say in relation to the law of crimes also applies to possible decisions by legislatures or courts’ to make people pay civil damages or subject them to injunctions. Occasionally, I comment specifically on civil liability, and for a few subjects that is the main practical relevance of my analysis.
Fraud and Falsehood
Authors: Greenawalt Kent 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Falsehood and insincerity are the subjects of this chapter, which briefly explores in various contexts the force of arguments to the effect that assertions that are false or insincere or both do not warrant protection under a principle of free speech. Much of this book concerns things people say which they believe and which are not evidently untrue. On the unusual occasions when such assertions may be suppressed, similar false assertions may also be suppressed. This chapter is about the special relevance of falsehood and insincerity: whether false or insincere assertions may be suppressed if similar true and sincere assertions are not suppressed. I begin with some reminders about falsehood and insincerity, before considering crimes whose elements include lying or inaccurate statement and ordinary crimes for which liability might ensue from one’s making assertions one thinks or knows are untrue. I close by considering defamation. Since criminal liability for common defamation is no longer a serious option in the United States, this discussion is one of those in the book whose only practical relevance concerns civil liability.
General Approaches to First Amendment Interpretation
Authors: Greenawalt Kent 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This chapter, a bridge between the two preceding chapters and those to follow, draws from my general observations about constitutional interpretation and the summary of First Amendment adjudication and discusses some general matters involving interpretation of the free speech and free press clauses. After some introductory words about a broadly libertarian approach toward the constitutional protection of speech and about the core of constitutional protection, I consider the edges of what counts as speech under the Constitution and the appropriate tests for determining whether suppression is permissible for communication that does count as speech. These questions are interrelated, because what is to be protected at all will depend on how strong the protection is, and vice versa. The chapters in Part II have already reflected this close nexus, as I have proceeded from the outer boundaries of what falls within a political principle of free speech to what communications should actually be unrestricted. The course of most of the chapters following this one is similar. Here I reverse the order, considering tests for suppression first. This reversal helps strongly to emphasize that what reasonably counts as speech rests in no small part on how absolute the protections of speech are. The chapter’s order also suggests another point: that some standards that are practically identical in import might be viewed either as tests for suppression of what counts as speech or as principles for what qualifies as speech in the first instance. A principle that communication causing immediate harm may be punished, for example, may be treated as a test for prohibiting otherwise protected speech or as a standard for what amounts to action rather than speech and falls outside the First Amendment for that reason.
Conditional Threats and Offered Inducements
Authors: Greenawalt Kent 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This chapter considers threats and offers that are designed to lead the listener to do what the person making the threat or offer wants. The threats considered are conditional; the constitutional status of “pure,” unconditional, threats is reserved for Chapter 19. The offers I am concerned with here are not offers to agree or to waive normative restraints, which are treated in the last chapter, but offers to reward someone for doing what is desired. If Tammy wants Victor to give a job or a kidney to her cousin, she might offer him $1000 for doing that or threaten to hurt him badly if he fails to do it. How the First Amendment relates to this sort of utterance is the topic of this chapter.
Offensiveness, Emotional Distress, and Diffuse Harms
Authors: Greenawalt Kent 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter I explore possible reasons for making communications criminal which do not have to do with improper coercion of the listener to perform actions the speaker wants or with the likelihood that the listener will commit a crime or be quickly influenced to perform another antisocial act. The discussion deals with disclosure of information, abusive words, and offensive pictorial representations and writings; the problem of false representation is reserved for the next chapter.
Agreement to Communicate
Authors: Greenawalt Kent 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Agreements to engage in communication raise special problems not presented by agreements to commit ordinary criminal acts like murder and burglary. Our review of Supreme Court cases has indicated how frequently those engaged in subversive advocacy have been punished as conspirators. The issue that has usually occupied the Court is whether the communications are punishable, it being assumed that if the answer to this question is “yes,” punishment for conspiracy is also appropriate. Yet Judge Coffin in the Spock case and some commentators have urged that, when the subject of agreement is communication, punishment for conspiracy may not be acceptable, even if punishment on another basis is. I shall address this troublesome issue shortly, but it can be clarified by analysis of two related questions.
Reading Mary Shelley’s Journals: Romantic Subjectivity and Feminist Criticism
Authors: Corbett Mary Jean 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
“For the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house”: Audre Lorde’s classic cautionary to white middle-class feminists should continue to have a particular resonance for all those working to “dismantle the master’s house.”1 Even as we have embarked on building new houses, the tools we have used, the paradigms we have taken over from masculinist discourse, are not them selves innocent. Critical analysis has exposed the racist, sexist, and hetero sexist logic of what once must have seemed the product of a process as “natural” as natural selection, yet some of the academy’s assumptions about literature have remained undisturbed. If we fail to attend to the persistence of some very basic dichotomies that still seem to structure our collective think ing, even our new centers could unwittingly reproduce some features of the older consensus about what counts as literature and what does not, what deserves attention and what can be ignored. I want to suggest here that what winds up at the center still depends, to an alarming extent, on the privileging of the “literary” over the nonliterary, the “extraordinary” over the everyday, the subject of writing over the subject of experience.
Subversive Surfaces: The Limits of Domestic Affection in Mary Shelley’s Later Fiction
Authors: Ellis Kate Ferguson 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I am by no means indifferent to the manner in which whatever moral tendencies exist in the sentiments or characters it contains shall affect the reader. Yet my chief concern in this respect has been limited to the avoid ing [of) the enervating effects of the novels of the present day and to the exhibition of the amiableness of domestic affection and the excellence of universal virtue. 1818 Preface to Frankenstein Shelley’s conviction that it was “unwomanly to print,” that it was “an offence against the conventionalities of society,” was a learned response, the result of a head-on collision between the aggressive desire epitomized by her mother and reinforced by Percy Shelley’s Romantic ideals and, on the other hand, the conservative, conventional wisdom that delimited the woman’s proper sphere For a woman writer in the early nineteenth entury, some version of this conflict was almost inevitable. While few writers allowed their monstrosity as resonant a voice as Mary Shelley did, many other women followed her into the side streets where propriety permitted women to express desire, resentment, and even rage.
A Simple View of Colour
Authors: Campbell John 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Physics tells us what is objectively there. It has no place for the colours of things. So colours are not objectively there. Hence, if there is such a thing at all, colour is mind-dependent. This argument forms the background to disputes over whether common sense makes a mistake about colours. It is assumed that the view of colour as mind-independent has been refuted by science. The issue, then, is whether the view of colour as mind-independent is somehow implicit in the phenomenology of colour vision. I want to look at the background argument which controls this dispute.
Colour, Transparency, Mind-Independence
Authors: Smith Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
John Campbell proposes a simple view of colour. He claims that colours are:
Campbell admits that (iii) would be inconsistent with (i) if we were to embrace the ordinary idea that a mind-independent feature of reality is one that would be mentioned in an ‘absolute’ or ‘objective’ description of the world, a description we could understand after abstracting away entirely from our own points of view. But his response is to deny that mind-independence requires any such thing. What, then, does Campbell say mind-independence does require?
Theories of Moral Justification
Authors: Copp David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The standard-based theory leaves us with two central questions: First, under what conditions would a moral standard qualify as justified? And second, what is common to the content of moral propositions in virtue of which any moral proposition entails that some moral standard is justified? A theory of the content and truth conditions of moral propositions should enable us to answer both questions. The philosophically interesting thing about moral propositions is that their truth depends on the existence of relevantly justified standards, and the central philosophical problem in explaining their truth conditions is to explain the conditions under which a moral standard would be justified.
What Is Mathematics About?
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The two most abstract of the intellectual disciplines, philosophy and mathematics, give rise to the same perplexity: what are they about? The perplexity does not arise solely out of ignorance: even the practitioners of these subjects may find it difficult to answer the question. Mathematics presents itself as a science in the general sense in which history is a science, namely as a sector in the quest for truth. Even those least instructed in other sciences, however, have some general idea what it is that those sciences strive to establish the truth about. Historians aim at establishing the truth about what was done by and what happened to human beings in the past; more exactly, to human beings after they had invented writing. Physicists try to discover the general properties of matter under the widest variety of conditions; more generally, of matter and of what it propagates, such as light and heat.
Random Grammars: Models of Functional Integration and Transformation
Authors: Kauffman Stuart A 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter I extend the basic model of autocatalytic polymer systems in an effort to develop a new class of models for functional integration, transformation, and coevolution in biological systems. The ideas appear far more general, however, and may well extend to social systems normally considered in fields such as economics, anthropology, and perhaps even history. The topics covered in this chapter are first efforts. Only further work will reveal whether the approaches I discuss will fulfill their apparent promise.
Responsibility in Nonideal Theory
Authors: Murphy Liam B 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The optimizing principle of beneficence appeared to be absurd for the simple reason that it is too demanding. But the problem of over-demandingness turned out to be far from simple, and our efforts to give it content led us to conclude that it is no problem at all. I do not sec how the problem can be rehabilitated, though of course I do not take myself to have shown that it cannot. My concern in the rest of this book is to explore a different diagnosis of the apparent absurdity of the optimizing principle of beneficence. This diagnosis. and the suggested principle of beneficence that it generates. are by no means free of their own difficulties: but they arc. I believe. more plausible than the alternatives.
Self-Control and The Self-Controlled Person
Authors: Mele Alfred R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Although akrasia has received a great deal of attention for a great many years, its opposite, enkrateia or self-control, has largely been ignored by philosophers. The reason for this, I think, is that whereas akratic behavior poses interesting difficulties for influential theories in ethics and the philosophy of mind, self-control and the behavior in which it manifests itself seem unproblematic. However, we cannot hope to understand akrasia in isolation from self-control. Indeed, the former is properly defined in terms of the latter.
Self-Control: A Paradox
Authors: Mele Alfred R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A certain paradox about self-control has gone largely unnoticed by philosophers.1 It revolves around a very plausible assumption about the relationship of motivation to intentional action-roughly, that whenever an agent acts intentionally he does what he is most motivated (occurrently) to do at the time.2 Of course, this formulation of the assumption cries out for qualification. Among other things, physical and psychological ability must be taken into account. Fortunately, refinements along these lines require little attention for present purposes.
Akratic Belief
Authors: Mele Alfred R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Although akrasia is typically treated as a strictly practical or ‘actional’ matter, its influence extends to belief as well. That it does should not be surprising. It has been recognized since antiquity that a person’s motivational condition can have a powerful bearing upon what he does or does not believe: Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex is a magnificent study of a species of this phenomenon. And some research on cognitive dissonance certainly seems to confirm this time-honored view.1 Moreover, motivated doxastic failures are often supposed to be centrally involved in self-deception; for example, the smoker who continues to believe, in the face of strong evidence to the contrary, that smoking has no causal bearing on lung cancer. In some such cases, a charge of akrasia may be in order: Perhaps a stronger person would have acknowledged the unpleasant truth of the matter.
There’s No Such Thing As Free Speech and It’s A Good Thing, Too
Authors: Fish Stanley 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I appear before you, writes Stanley Fish, "by virtue of a mistake made by central casting which has tapped me for the role of ardent academic leftist, proponent of multiculturalism, and standard bearer of the politically correct." Indeed, as head of Duke University's English Department, Fish has drawn fire for supposedly championing campus speech codes (he does not, in fact); for his embrace of deconstruction (he would call himself a pragmatist), and for being a "professor who revels in his affluence" (as one journalist wrote)--despite his own status as a white male and a leading scholar in the traditional field of Renaissance literature. But as Adam Begley wrote in The New York Times Sunday Magazine, Fish is "the epitome of he academic as showman," a professor of both English and law who is "willfully provocative, politically conservative." In There's No Such Thing as Free Speech, Fish shows what all the fuss is about, with seventeen of his pivotal, provocative writings. Fish ranges across reverse discrimination, the First Amendment and hate speech codes, the nature of the law, and the state of the academy, lending his distinctive, insistent voice to the debate with sharply drawn and closely argued opinions. He goes straight to the core of America's orthodox platitudes, arguing that such liberal stand-bys as free speech, tolerance, equality, and nondiscrimination are meaningless in themselves; these concepts only exist in the context of the political views of those who invoke them (the assault on civil rights, he notes, has advanced under the David Duke banner "Equal Rights for All; Special Privileges for None"). Throughout, Fish applies techniques of literary criticism to the political debate, forcing us to examine the basis of our most sacrosanct principles. In the title essay, Fish writes that the First Amendment is "the first refuge of scoundrels." The concept of "free speech" always exists only in reference to speech which is banned in advance because it undermines the basis of a community; it takes a political struggle to decide where to draw the boundary of tolerance--and he finds good reason to put "hate speech beyond the pale. If left-leaning readers take comfort from such arguments, they will be discomforted in the second part of the book when Fish turns his searing critical attention to some of their cherished ideals and programs (including the expansion of tolerance and the politicization of humanistic studies). He concludes his critique of the academy by mocking the masochistic consumption of Volvos by affluent professors. Perhaps no other scholar in America has earned the notoriety achieved by Stanley Fish--notoriety he seems compelled to justify, relentlessly critiquing the values so many take for granted. This remarkable volume captures the essential Fish, with eloquent, witty, argumentative essays that are impossible to ignore.
Introduction: “That’s Not Fair”
Authors: Fish Stanley 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the movie version of How to Succeed in Business without Really Trying, Robert Morse, playing a Protestant version of Budd Schulberg’s Sammy Glick, insinuates himself into the firm of his heart’s desire and is assigned to the mailroom, where he finds one other co-worker who just happens to be the boss’s nephew. It turns out that one of the two will be elevated to the position of mailroom head, and the junior executive who is to make the decision announces solemnly, “I’ve been told to choose the new head of the mailroom on merit alone.” To this the boss’s nephew immediately responds, “That’s not fair.” The audience, of course, is supposed to laugh at the inappropriateness of invoking fairness as a protest against the introduction of a regime of merit, but the boss’s nephew is perfectly serious, and if we step back from the scene (as we are not encouraged to do) and look at it from his perspective, the point he wants to make comes into focus. He has been proceeding under the expectation that as the boss’s nephew he would have a leg up on any rewards that are to be distributed, and he is complaining that the rules of the game are suddenly being changed in the seventh inning. It is not so much that he is disputing the introduction of “merit” as a standard; rather, he is saying that according to the understanding that prevailed before this unhappy moment, it was a part of his merit that he was related to the head of the company.
Bad company
Authors: Fish Stanley 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One of the things that has been left out of the current debates about the canon and multiculturalism is history. Few have paused to inquire into the relationship between the present controversy and controversies that have erupted in the past. The only exception to this silence about history has been the oft-repeated assertion that the proponents of revised and enlarged curricula are leftover sixties revolutionaries who have traded in their beards and beads for tweed jackets and tenured positions in the universities. So we have this rather thin account of where the multiculturalists come from, but we have had no account at all of where the antimulticulturalists come from, and my intention here is to provide one. Let me begin by rehearsing some of the main tenets. of the antimulticulturalist argument, an argument that has been recently given a concise and forceful exposition by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in his book The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society. Schlesinger begins by sounding a call of alann, a kind of 1991 Paul Revere warning that not the British (or the Russians) but the multiculturalists are coming, and that they threaten the American way of life. He finds the threat in what he calls the “ethnic upsurge,” an “unprecedented . . . protest against the Anglocentric culture” that “today threatens to become a counterrevolution against the original theory of America as . . . a common culture, a single nation.”