bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Mind and Nature
Authors: O'Hear Anthony 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDespite being material beings, humans are unlike most material objects—we are conscious and able to express our thoughts in language. This book examines the possibility of giving a naturalistic explanation of these latter aspects of human activity. The last discourse of Socrates in Plato's Phaedo suggests that it is possible that some of our motivations are non‐Darwinian, i.e. not directly concerned with survival and reproduction and that our nature as conscious agents can make our goals and projects puzzling or inexplicable in physical or biological terms. If we are programmed for survival and reproduction, why, e.g. did Socrates choose that fate that he did? Kant and Wittgenstein represent modern philosophers who also circumscribe the role of naturalistic explanation and leave room for a philosophical account of our behaviour as rational, moral agents concerned with thinking and acting for the best.
Self‐Conscious Belief
Authors: O'Hear Anthony 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
What does it mean to be self‐conscious? Mere consciousness involves no conception of the self. Self‐consciousness requires a conceptual scheme or symbolic system and this in itself—drawing on Wittgensteinian points about the essentially public and social nature of language—presupposes that, contrary to sceptical doubts, we are already part of a language using community. Pierce made the point that self‐consciousness only arises if one sees oneself as a fallible member of a community of speakers—that self‐consciousness requires the possibility of error. While this role for fallibility in the arising of self‐consciousness carries with it some sceptical risks, it casts doubt on any extreme form of scepticism.
Morality and Politics
Authors: O'Hear Anthony 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In morality, self‐consciousness and evolution can pull in different ways. While, as Humphrey has shown, evolution can explain the existence of self‐consciousness and empathy and socio‐biologists have shown how self‐interest can lead to the existence of reciprocal altruism and kin selection, this falls short of genuine morality, which seems to require the possibility of true altruism and self‐sacrifice. Following Sartre we must understand the importance of the reciprocal ’gaze’ of other members of our linguistic community in forming our identity as selves. Hayek has argued that a social evolutionary account, in which those traditional societal practices that are successful persist and flourish, ought to motivate us to favour a form of irrationalism over immediate individual rational reflection. Similarly, Orwell has argued for the powerful motivational effects of traditional and less transparently rational virtues such as patriotism and fidelity. Despite this, however, we ought not to adopt an unquestioning obedience to tradition or to the demands of immediate rationality, but rather, following Edmund Burke, remain both wary of extreme rationalism and aware of the benefits of tradition and of powerful allegiances to our particular countries and communities while continuing to employ rational reflection on our moral standards and practices where appropriate.
Conclusion
Authors: O'Hear Anthony 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
While humans are the embodied products of our evolutionary origins, we can transcend such origins in myriad ways including our approach to the true, the good, and the beautiful. We may stem from our particular histories, cultures, and traditions but we are not fully determined by them. We possess rationality and self‐consciousness which are neither reducible to Darwinian analyses nor explicable via Darwinian drives. Our capacities may have evolved in Darwinian ways but once acquired take off in un‐Darwinian ways.
Passion and Action
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Passion and Action explores the place of the affects or passions in seventeenth‐century understandings of the body and mind, and examines the role they were held to play in thought and action. Interest in the passions pervaded all areas of philosophical enquiry and was central to the theories of such major figures as Hobbes, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Pascal, and Locke, as well as to the work of authors who are nowadays less familiar. Yet, little attention has been paid to this topic in studies of early modern philosophy. This book surveys the inheritance of ancient and medieval doctrines about the passions, and shows how these were incorporated into new philosophical approaches in the course of the seventeenth century. It examines the place of the passions in body and mind, their role in the acquisition of knowledge and their relation to volition and action, offering fresh interpretations of a broad range of texts by well‐known writers, as well as by less canonical figures. It establishes that a full understanding of the philosophy of this period must take account of its discussions of our affective life.
Passion and Action also addresses current debates, particularly those concerned with the embodied character of thinking and the relation between emotion and knowledge, which have played a central part in feminist philosophy. It throws new light on the shaping of our ideas about the mind, and provides a historical context for burgeoning contemporary investigations of the emotions.
Passion and Action in Aristotle
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Early modern discussions oppose passions in action, and in doing so draw on and adapt a distinction elaborated by Aristotle. This chapter considers the senses in which Aristotle viewed the passions as passive. It maps the relations between passion and action, matter and form, and potentiality and actuality, and shows how these metaphysical categories are used to analyse the powers of the Aristotelian soul.
Post‐Aristotelian Passion and Action
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The rejection of certain Scholastic doctrines nevertheless enabled seventeenth‐century writers to reconsider the interpretations of activity and passivity that they had inherited, and to generate new conceptions of the passions. This chapter introduces the kinds of innovations they introduced, and the arguments they offered for them. It focuses on general claims about the causal role of the passions, their relation to the soul's other powers, and their connection with the body.
The Value of Persuasion
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There nevertheless remains a worry that the capacity of the passions to thwart our attempts to acquire knowledge is not so easily disposed of. A third solution to the problem challenges the idea that passion and reason are opposed by arguing that we rely on our passions to motivate us to reason, and thus to pursue scientia. One version of this view, exemplified by Hobbes, suggests that we need to appeal to various passions, such as fear, to excite our desire to reason. Another version holds that we need to use the imagination, and more generally rhetoric or the art of persuasion, to mitigate the aridity of reasoning and excite our interest in it.
Conflicting Forces: The Cartesian Theory of Action
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter and the next examine the view, taken for granted in the seventeenth century, that our passions move us to act. How exactly do they do this, and what forces can change or modify them? Addressing this question, Descartes modifies an established Scholastic account of the relations between volition, passion, and action. His discussion is part of a broader attempt to provide a unified analysis of the mind, and to reconfigure the relation between mind and body.
Deliberating With the Passions
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The same problem is addressed by philosophers whose account of the antecedents of action focus on the notion of desire, and who move away from the old view that actions result from a struggle between reason and passion. Foremost among these authors are Hobbes and Spinoza, who offer novel interpretations of deliberation and psychological conflict. Their controversial view that a volition is not a distinct kind of thought is contested, e.g. by Bramhall, and in a different way by Locke. However, they mark a transition to a new understanding of the passive and active aspects of the mind and a new interpretation of desire and its relation to action.
Introduction
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMathematics has often been described as the ‘Queen of Sciences’, yet philosophical problems arise as soon as one tries to define its subject matter. Anti‐realism concerning mathematical objects has proven to be problematic, but, on the other hand, realism gives rise to well‐known epistemological problems. In this book, I offer a type of mathematical realism according to which mathematical objects exist independently of our constructions, and mathematical truths are obtained independently of our beliefs. Central to my account of mathematical objects is a sort of structuralism, according to which mathematical objects are featureless, abstract positions in structures. On the epistemological level, I reject the apriority of mathematical knowledge, and claim that our justification for believing in the truth of mathematics is derived from pragmatic and holistic considerations concerning science.
Recent Attempts at Blunting the Indispensability Thesis
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe indispensability thesis maintains both that using mathematical terms and assertions is an indispensable part of scientific practice and that this practice commits science to mathematical objects and truths. Anti‐realists have used several methods for attacking this thesis: Hartry Field has tried to show how science can do without mathematics by showing that it is possible to replace analytic mathematical scientific theories with synthetic versions that make no reference to mathematical objects. Phillip Kitcher and Charles Chichara have tried, instead, to maintain the mathematical formalism in science without being committed to mathematical realism, by giving a non‐realist account of mathematical objects. Finally, Geoffrey Hellman devised a modal structuralism that uses modal operators to translate standard mathematical language into a ‘structuralist’ language. In this chapter I discuss these positions and claim that, on the one hand, they have failed to show that science can do without mathematical objects, and on the other, that these approaches to mathematics do not represent an ontic and epistemic gain over standard realism.
Doubts About Realism
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractOne of the strongest motivations for being an anti‐realist with regard to mathematics is the difficulty in formulating a plausible realist epistemology, given that there seems to be a lack of ties between the mathematical apparatus and observation. In this chapter, I discuss a few puzzles that the mathematical realist has to solve in order to formulate an acceptable epistemology, and I hint at the direction in which one might hope to find the solution to these puzzles. One of the puzzles, that was first clearly formulated by Paul Benacerraf, is that since mathematical objects are supposed to be causally inert entities existing outside of space and time, it is hard to see how we can ever get in contact with them, i.e. how we can ever gain knowledge of them or refer to them. A second puzzle concerns the incompleteness of mathematical entities that has it, that we have no conceivable evidence and so no answers to questions of whether the objects that one mathematical theory discusses are identical to those that another theory treats. Realists can reject the presuppositions of both these puzzles. The first presupposes that there must be some sort of direct or indirect interaction between us and the objects of our knowledge. The second assumes that there is always a fact of the matter as to whether the objects of one theory are the same or distinct, as those of another. In later chapters, I will try to undermine both of these presuppositions.
The Elusive Distinction Between Mathematics and Natural Science
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIt is commonly believed that the epistemology of mathematics must be different from the epistemology of science because their objects are different in kind, i.e. metaphysically different. In this chapter, I want to suggest that some careful work must be done before we can take the distinction between physical and mathematical objects for granted. This distinction has traditionally been drawn by making reference to location, causal powers, detectability in principle, and change in properties. By analysing the ontology of theoretical physics, I wish to show that some physical objects, like quantum particles as they are described by D. Bohm, are as much mathematical as physical, for they do not seem to be located in space and time, and they are as incomplete as mathematical objects. The upshot of this discussion is to address those who are realists about physical objects and anti‐realists about mathematical objects, and, more importantly, to suggest that mathematical realists should not assume that a realist epistemology should be radically different from ordinary scientific epistemology.
The Local Conception of Mathematical Evidence: Proof, Computation, and Logic
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe fact that mathematics is ordinarily practised as an autonomous science with its own, peculiar type of evidence constituted mainly by deductive reasoning (proofs and computations) is often taken as evidence that mathematics and science have specifically different evidential supports and specifically different subject matters. I argue against this conclusion by first analysing deductive proofs, and the type of evidence that is usually required for axioms, and claiming that most of the evidence for the most elementary and fundamental parts of mathematics is empirical. I then appeal to the role of computation to argue that non‐deductive inference from empirical premises is part of the contemporary methodology of mathematics, and so some of our proofs turn out not to be purely logical deductions. Finally, I discuss the relation between mathematics and logic and argue against logical realism by denying that statements attributing logical properties or relations are true independently of our holding them to be true, our psychology, our linguistic and inferential conventions, or other facts about human beings. In the end, both mathematics and logic turn out to be a priori only in the sense that some mathematical and logical truths are obtained through deductive proofs, and for pragmatic reasons, are insulated from experience; but neither mathematics nor logic are a priori in the sense of being immune to empirical revision.
Mathematical Objects as Positions in Patterns
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIt is usual to regard mathematical objects as entities that can be identified, characterized, and known in isolation. In this chapter, I propose a contrasting view according to which mathematical entities are structureless points or positions in structures (patterns) that are not distinguishable or identifiable outside the structure. By analysing the various relations that can hold between patterns, like congruence, equivalence, mutual occurrence, I also account for the incompleteness of mathematical objects, for mathematics turns out to be a conglomeration of theories, each dealing with its own structure and each forgoing identities leading outside its structure. My suggestion that mathematical objects are positions in structures or patterns is not intended as an ontological reduction, but rather as a way of viewing mathematical objects and theories that put the phenomena of multiple reductions and ontological and referential relativity in a clearer light.
Patterns and Mathematical Knowledge
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractI present a hypothetical account of how the ancients might have come to introduce mathematical objects in order to describe patterns, and I explain how working with patterns can generate information about the mathematical realm. The ancients might have started using what I call templates, i.e. concrete devices, like blueprints or drawings, to represent how things are shaped or structured, and this could have evolved into representing the abstract patterns that concrete things might fit. In this way, they might have come to believe that written constructions and computations could provide information about the mathematical realm, for by their very nature, patterns should be structurally analogous to their templates and in positing that they are, one simply projects onto structures and features already attributed to templates. By reflecting on systems of dots representing cardinalities, the ancients could generate a body of results that then evolved into a systematic theory of numbers, but the approach fails when there is no direct connection between the computations and the patterns they are supposed to concern, e.g. those concerning trigonometric functions or transfinite ordinal numbers. In these cases, we forge a connection between proofs and patterns by positing that the premises of the proofs state uncontroversial features of the patterns, i.e. the premises constitute implicit definitions of the patterns. I explain how this position does not entail that mathematics is analytic or a priori.
Entity and Identity
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Gathered in this volume are selected essays by P. F. Strawson from the 1970s to the 1990s in two areas of philosophy to which he has most notably contributed. The first 12 pieces concern the philosophy of language, a broad heading under which many controversial philosophical issues can be fruitfully approached. Questions such as the following are discussed: Do general properties exist as well as the particular things that have them? What is involved in reference to particular things? What exactly is formal logic as we now understand it? What do we mean when we say that something may happen or might have happened? What do we mean when we speak of the meaning of what we say? The volume is completed by four studies of Kantian metaphysics: these develop and strengthen Strawson's influential view of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and bring out the implications of this view for current metaphysical debates.
Positions for Quantifiers
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Quantification into predicate‐position is defended. While it is denied that such quantification is either substitutional or disguised referential‐ objectual, it is admitted that the predicates non‐referentially introduce (abstract) objects. Quantification into sentence‐position is rejected in favour of quantification over propositions; but non‐objectual quantification into adverbial position is defended.
Belief, Reference, and Quantification
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Many propositions ascribing a belief to a person can simply be understood as expressing a two‐termed relation between person and proposition. This simple account becomes untenable when the ascription contains a direct reference to one or more individuals the belief is about and thus allows for quantification into the belief‐context from outside it. Some suggestions are rejected, a tentative solution proposed, and the solution of resulting complications provided.
‘If’ and ‘⊃ ’
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The view that the ordinary conditional ‘if p then q’ has the same meaning as the material conditional of standard truth‐functional logic confronts the more intuitive view that it imports, as part of its meaning, some ground‐consequent relation between antecedent and consequent clauses. Grice's powerful defence of the former position demonstrates that the operation of certain effective general principles of assertive discourse would normally ensure that the truth‐functional conditional carried a non‐conventional consequentialist implication. A defence of the contrary view rests on the fact that ‘p, so q’, which incontestably carries a consequentialist implication as part of its meaning, differs from ‘if p then q’ only in that the former conjoins asserted, the latter unasserted, propositions. There is plenty of occasion for the use of both ‘so’ and ‘if’. The balance of argument favours the consequentialist position.
The Problem of Realism and the A Priori
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kant's ‘empirical realism’ about the objects of science and commonsense is quite consistent with the recognition of the special (a priori) status of the categories and the forms of sensible intuition (space and time) as necessary conditions of human experience; but it is questionably compatible with the doctrine of the unknowable real nature of things as they are in themselves, conceived as non‐spatial and non‐temporal. One or the other realism has to go.
Kant's Paralogisms: Self‐Consciousness and the ‘Outside Observer’
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kant distinguishes between himself as object of outer sense (man), himself as object of inner sense alone (empirical consciousness), and himself as he is in himself (the transcendental subject that underlies all thoughts). He also speaks of the ‘transcendental unity of apperception’ or ‘unity of consciousness’ (the ‘I’ of ‘I think’, which belongs to all thought or experience). Each of us, aiming to study the self in abstraction from empirical consciousness, is liable systematically to confuse the unity and simplicity of his or her consciousness with a consciousness of unity and simplicity and mistakenly conclude that his or her ‘I’ denotes a simple, identical, immaterial substance, the self as it is in itself; but no outside observer is liable to make that mistake about anyone else.
Kant on Substance
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kant holds that matter alone, by being permanent, satisfies, in the field of appearance, the formal criterion of substance (being thinkable only as subject, never as predicate) and manifests itself empirically as substance through action. While it is shown that none of Kant's major arguments or contentions is defensible as it stands, it is conceded that it is plausible to hold, if not for Kant's reasons, that everything in nature depends ultimately on some modification of matter.
Philosophy of Language in Ethics
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Philosophy of language, according to Hare, contributes significantly to ethics, because it provides a logical structure for moral thinking. Referring to J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts, Hare distinguishes two kinds or genera of speech acts, the descriptive and the prescriptive; and he also discusses Austin's distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts. Moral judgements, e.g. those judgements expressed by ‘ought’, are prescriptive speech acts, but they also have a descriptive meaning. This is because moral judgements share with normative judgements the logical feature Hare calls universalizability. Alongside prescriptivity and universalizability, a third element of Hare's account of moral judgement is the identification of one's will with that of another moral agent's will in hypothetical situations.