bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Process automation can advance loss prevention goals
Authors: Brandes David J. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractProcess automation can advance loss prevention goals even in today's pressure‐filled business environment of smaller workforces and subsequent needs to maximize production efficiency. The Dow Chemical Company has been totally automated for 30 years, and has seen substantial gains in process safety and reliability. Increased process control automation can benefit other areas as well. We have consistently seen a reduction of operating costs, faster startups and shutdowns, and improved product quality through the reduction of variability. You get your best operator 24‐hours per day.As the level of automation increases and operator supervision decreases, more is demanded of the process control system. Significantly higher control system reliability in both hardware and software is needed. The control system must provide a platform that is fault tolerant in real‐time, and provide a graceful degradation of operations. This, in turn, leads to a need for process state‐based control, active redundancy, and deterministic operation.
Hazard identification using new logic diagrams and descriptors
Authors: Duarte Dayse , Pires Thiago 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe motivation behind this work was the need to develop new logic diagrams for implementating risk management programs, taking into account the impact of the information revolution, and the globalization of business. These changes were not visualized some years ago. It is not logical to assume that the risk management strategies for a new millennium can be based on the assumptions of the past.The new logic diagrams—continuous and single value network—presented in this article go beyond those recommended by the American Institute of Chemical Engineers' Center for Chemical Safety (CCPS), which are currently the most commonly used in the process industries. The new diagrams enable an engineer to evaluate the system mode of failures. One of the advantages of using these value networks is that they are flexible and provide a road map for logical thought. These logic diagrams and descriptors were used during the hazard identification analysis of the thermal dry area of Petroflex–Cabo Unit, the only synthetic rubber plant in Latin America.
Critical safe operating parameters: “Never exceed” limit and “never deviate” action
Authors: Dowell A. M. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractWhere does the human being fit in the normal operating system and where does he/she fit in the safety shutdown system? Planning ahead can make human interaction inherently safer. This paper offers the following suggestions for managing that interaction: (1) Use inherently safer principles in the design of the process and its layers of protection. (2) Define “Never Exceed” limits for critical safe operating parameters. (3) Define a mandatory action point and a “Never Deviate” action with enough response time to prevent exceeding the Never Exceed limit. (4) Train and drill.
Hazard investigation of reactive chemicals
Authors: Murphy John , Joseph Giby , Long Lisa , Mitchell Kevin , Poje Gerald V. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) began operation as a new independent Federal agency in 1998. Its primary mission is to aid in the prevention of chemical related incidents (e.g., fires, explosions, or toxic releases) in fixed commercial or industrial facilities.This paper discusses the organization and status of CSB's reactive chemical hazard investigation, which was initiated by a serious process incident at Morton International. The objectives of the reactive chemical hazard investigation are to: (1) determine the impact of reactive chemical incidents; (2) examine how industry, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) address reactive chemical hazards; and (3) analyze the appropriateness of, and consider alternatives to, industry and OSHA use of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) reactivity rating system [1] for process safety management. The hazard investigation will make recommendations to promote the safe handling of reactive chemicals.
Getting from policy to practices: The pyramid model (or what is this standard really trying to do?)
Authors: Dowell A. M. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractA major challenge in any organization is successfully getting from policies to practices. It is important that the acceptable risks envisioned by a company's safety and health policies be achieved in the actual practices of every worker. Frequently, standards and procedures are written to direct worker practices, but, over time, these standards may not be effective in meeting the organization's policies and values. When someone requests a variance from a standard, the organization may realize that no one knows exactly what it is trying to accomplish, making it almost impossible to rationally grant a variance. The criteria upon which the standard is based are rarely stated explicitly.This paper presents a pyramid model showing the flow from values to policies to criteria/guidelines to standards/procedures to practices/behaviors. Actual examples from operating chemical plants and engineering groups illustrate the type of problems encountered when we leave out one or more steps. Cases in which all steps function are also presented.
Characteristics of fire and explosion in semiconductor fabrication processes
Authors: Chen Jenq Renn 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe characteristics of fire and explosion in semiconductor fabrication processes differ from those in the chemical process industries. Case studies are given to illustrate the common, as well as peculiar features of fire and explosion in the fabrication processes. In particular, the process exhaust systems, usually involving flammable, pyrophoric and corrosive gases and vapors, were shown to be a major fire and explosion source. With some preliminary understanding of the semiconductor process, standard chemical process safety knowledge can be readily applied to semiconductor processes.
An example of a test method for vent sizing—OPPSD/SPI methodology
Authors: Poteet Charles S. , Banks Marvin L. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractAn alternative methodology to that of United Nations, Appendix 5, Sample Method, has been developed by the Organic Peroxides Producers Safety Division of the Society of the Plastics Industry (OPPSD/SPI) to assure the safe emergency venting of organic peroxides in an approved container. The methodology is applicable for designing a new container for an existing or new organic peroxide. Bench‐scale testing with a 10 liter vessel determined the maximum pressure pulse (spike) generated during a thermal decomposition/overpressurization vs. the ultimate, structural strength of the container measured and/or calculated. The methodology has been tested full scale with a United Nations 6(c) fuel fire. Container deformation, so long as there is no fragmentation, is permitted with the proviso that the container be retired from service following an incident. The methodology, as developed, reflects advances in technology while “harmonizing” to a maximum extent with the United Nations, Appendix 5, Sample Method.
Artificial intelligence advancements applied in off‐the‐shelf controllers
Authors: Marszal Edward M. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractSince the earliest process units were built, CPI engineers have employed artificial intelligence to prevent losses. The expanding use of computer‐based systems for process control has allowed the amount of intelligence applied in these expert systems to drastically increase. Standard methods for performing Expert System tasks are being formalized by numerous researchers in industry and academia. Work products from these groups include designs that present process hazards knowledge in a structured, hierarchical, and modular manner.Advancements in programmable logic controller (PLC) technology have created systems with substantial computing power that are robust and fault tolerant enough to be used in safety critical applications. In addition, IEC 1131‐3 standardized the programming languages available in virtually every new controller. The function block language defined in IEC 1131‐3 is particularly well suited to performing modular tasks, which makes it an ideal platform for representing knowledge.This paper begins by describing some of the advancements in knowledge‐based systems for loss prevention applications. It then explores how standard IEC 1131‐3 programming techniques can be used to build function blocks that represent knowledge of the hazards posed by equipment items. The paper goes on to develop a sample function block that represents the hazards of a pressure vessel, using knowledge developed in the API 14‐C standard.
Benchmarking MOC practices in the process industries
Authors: Keren Nir , West Harry H. , Mannan M. Sam 
Published: April 2004

AbstractChemical, oil, and gas plants process many potentially hazardous chemicals. Historically, a variety of measures have been used for hazard reduction and risk management. However, a number of catastrophic chemical incidents can be attributed to incorrect handling of process changes. During the last decade, federal regulations have been promulgated in the United States mandating a well‐defined administrative procedure for “management of change” as a key element of a process safety management system. OSHA's Process Safety Management Program and EPA's Risk Management Program provide the baselines and framework for the development of Management of Change programs. Due to the performance‐based nature of these regulatory requirements, there is wide variation in management of change programs and practices. This paper summarizes the results of a benchmarking exercise aimed at identifying the diversity of implementation practices in industry.
Using operating and safety limits to create safety procedures
Authors: De La Cruz‐Guerra Cornelio , Cruz‐Gómez M. Javier 
Published: April 2004

AbstractIn this paper, the criteria for the development, implementation, and control of operating and safety limits of parameters like pressure, temperature, level, composition, etc., are described. Operating and safety limits are required by Elements 2 “process safety information” and 4 “operating procedures” of the information package for OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM). A brief description is also given of how these limits should be established and the information, with respect to consequences, safeguards, and corrective actions, that should be obtained during a detailed analysis of deviation from an operation or process parameter. This paper looks for an easier method of developing operating and safety limits within chemical and petrochemical plants to prevent and control undesirable events (human losses, material losses, economic losses, or environmental pollution) through adequate emergency plans and response programs.
Picture this! Incidents that could happen in your plant
Authors: Sanders Roy E. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractHere is an opportunity to see misfortunes resulting from flaws in judgment on minor decisions. Observe these chemical plant case histories that involve relatively minor errors in design, operation, or maintenance. These incidents occurred within ordinary equipment found in most plants and refineries. Each minor error resulted in an unforgettable incident for the involved designers, operators, and maintenance crews, as well as their supervisors. You may have experienced similar memorable moments.Note the fundamentals covered. Each can be shared in a technical review meeting or within control rooms. As our knowledgeable supervisors and veteran operators continue to move to other areas or retire, we are working with less people. We must share our past experiences with our leaner crews to avoid repeated incidents. Short, focused narratives with high‐impact, vivid illustrations can help us “Picture This!” It behooves us to share our costly information within our organizations and within technical meetings to help make us a better industry.
Common causes and corrections for explosions and fires in improperly inerted vessels
Authors: Morrison Delmar R. , Carpenter Andrew R. , Ogle Russell A. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractIn this article, causal factors and corrective actions surrounding improperly inerted vessel incidents are developed and compared based on several case studies of flash fires or explosions involving these process vessels. In industry, vessels that contain or have contained flammable vapors are commonly inerted for many reasons, but one of the most common is explosion prevention. Common inerting gases are carbon dioxide, nitrogen, steam, and air, depending upon the specific application. Incident causes ranged from procedures to design issues, but a general set has been produced for application to the problem of explosion prevention in process vessels. Each case study is compared to safety standards to show how safe work practices could have prevented the accidents. However, rigid adherence to safety standards may not be sufficient to prevent an accident. The application of a safety standard should be tempered by situation‐specific circumstances. Some specific recommendations for preventing explosions include methods for improved mixing of the inert gas, the use of blinds, filling the vessel with water, improved work procedures and improved monitoring procedures. A suggested design strategy for engineering an inerted system is presented.
Induced water atomization devices for gas explosion suppression
Authors: Ewan Bruce C. R. , Moatamedi M. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe work investigates the use of a new passive system for the mitigation of gas explosion overpressures in which a field of water droplets is generated continuously within the overpressure area. The system relies on the induced liquid flow from an aerodynamically shaped water container and the subsequent atomization in the convective cross flow.A wind tunnel has been used to study the transient characteristics of the emerging liquid flow and atomization, by means of flash photography and laser diffraction sizing, for a range of generic devices. The sizes and spray concentrations produced are consistent with published values required for explosion mitigation. A 5.1m long explosion duct has been used to examine the effectiveness of one of the devices, and has demonstrated the possibilities for good explosion suppression. The practical areas of application of the system are for onshore and offshore process plant.
Establishing ignition conditions for the tank manifold fire at the Powell Duffryn tank terminal
Authors: Woodward John L. , Lygate James 
Published: April 2004

AbstractA fire destroyed three tanks containing crude sulfate turpentine (CST) at a storage facility in Savannah, Georgia, on April 10, 1995, prompting an evacuation, and resulting in some environmental damage. The events of this fire have been documented an a U.S. EPA report [1]. The investigators determined the most likely cause of ignition was overheating in a newly‐installed activated‐carbon drum as air was drawn in during evening cooling. One aspect not entirely explained in the EPA report is that the tanks were connected by a vapor manifold and were not protected by detonation arresters, yet the flames initially propagated to only one tank.This paper discusses the development of a model to quantify the likely sequence of events that is consistent with observations. Tank inflows and outflows forced by the diurnal temperature cycle were modeled to calculate hydrocarbon concentrations in the vapor space. This establishes that the combination of vapor concentrations above the lower flammable limit, and oxygen concentrations above the lower limit to support combustion, occur for only a few hours during the day. Further estimates of the ignition, flame acceleration, and run‐up distance indicate that an explosion probably occurred inside the polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipe. The forces from such an explosion would be sufficient to open the PVC pipe, thereby slowing the flame front propagation and contributing to the failure to initially ignite more than one tank.This paper illustrates how modeling strengthens an accident investigation and helps distinguish between alternative postulated ignition sequences.
Charge generation during filling of insulated tanks
Authors: Vidal Migvia , Wagner John P. , Rogers William J. , Mannan M. Sam 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThis research involves charge generation measurements for various flammable fluids during filling of insulated tanks and relating static charging with flow rate and physicochemical parameters, especially changes in electrical conductivity. The objective is to correlate static charge measured inside baffled metal and polyethylene tanks as a function of impeller, Reynolds number, and the electrical conductivity of both the hydrocarbon and the dispersed water phase for a variety of flammable liquids.A product of the research is a correlation for polyethylene and other plastic insulated tanks for transfers of low conductivity liquid fuels. Also, a universal (dimensionless) correlation that relates the charging data to the colloidal nature of the mixture will be developed for static charge generation during impeller mixing of light hydrocarbons containing various concentrations of water in cylindrical tanks. The correlation of electrostatic data from this research will help make it possible to control electrostatic charges, and, as a result, greatly improve safety of operations involving flammable fluids in industry.
Retrofit experiences with a 32‐year‐old ammonia plant
Authors: Gupta Ved , Borserio Brennan 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe Incitec Kooragang Island ammonia plant, built in 1969 by Kellogg, needed to replace, refurbish, or redesign both equipment and process in order to stay competitive. After an extensive plant assessment in the areas of safety, EPA compliance, reliability, efficiency, and capacity, a number of changes were implemented that have resulted in higher ammonia production and improved efficiency.
Bimetallic and alloy welds in HP hydrogen and nitrogen service
Authors: Sievert James B. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractIn 1999 and 2000, three bimetallic welded joints failed in our Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., (KBR) ammonia processing plant designs. One was at an inlet and others were in the shells of Ammonia Converter Effluent Heat Exchangers (identified as 123Cs). These failures were in high‐pressure hydrogen services at two plant locations and occurred within about 5 and 10 years of operation. The exchanger operates with ammonia converter effluent on the shellside and boiler feed water on the tubeside. This paper presents a portion of the metallurgical failure investigation completed for one of the failures. In addition, failure avoidance of the dissimilar weldment (for repairs) and within current designs is noted. The particular failed weld joints were bimetallic, where nickel alloy filler metal “buttering” was applied to low chrome alloy base material. The “buttered” low alloy material had subsequently been postweld heat‐treated. The weld connecting the parts together was then completed using common nickel alloy filler materials without additional treatment in order to provide safe repairs for return to service. From these failures, the owners have learned what action steps are required. KBR also issued an “Advisory” to other operators in order to avoid failures of similar weld joints in other plants.
Fire tests to study the effect of pressure relief valve blowdown on the survivability of propane tanks in fires
Authors: Birk A. Michael , Vandersteen Jonathan D. J. , Cunningham M. H. , Davison C. R. , Mirzazadeh I. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThere is a significant variation in the blowdown behavior of the pressure relief valves (PRV) commonly supplied on certain commercial propane tanks. Determining how different pressure relief valve characteristics affect the survivability of a propane tank in a fire and the associated hazards, was the goal of these tests.To determine the effect of PRV blowdown, six 1890 L (500 gallon) propane tanks were exposed to an array of torch fires and thermally ruptured. A computer controlled valve was used to simulate the desired characteristics of a commercial PRV. In all cases the simulated PRV was set to open at 1.9 MPag, and blowdown was varied from 5% to 45%.The impact of the blowdown was determined by observing the nature of the failure, the time to failure, and the energy stored in the liquid and vapor phases at failure. Blast, radiation, and projectile hazards were also observed and recorded in order to determine the impact blowdown has on these pressure vessel failure hazards.An important finding of this testing is that the blowdown setting does impact the tank's survivability. It was consistently observed that large blowdown resulted in delayed failure. As a result, the PRV was open for a longer time, with a resulting reduction in hazards because of the lower fill at failure. This is believed to happen because of the lower average stress state in the tank with increased blowdown.
Study of major accidents and lessons learned
Authors: Balasubramanian S. G. , Louvar Joseph F. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractGovernment and private sector safety‐related databases and other published safety resources were studied to determine their relevance and to identify the major lessons learned from each product. Information sources studied include the National Response Center (NRC), the Accidental Release Information Program (ARIP), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI), Major Accident Reporting System (MARS), the Marsh & McLennan Annual Reviews (Marsh), and Safety and Loss Prevention Symposia (LPS). This paper appropriately references these sources of information to facilitate similar studies.We identified that: (a) there are some problems with the government databases, (b) even with these problems, some important information can be extracted, and (c) descriptions of accidents are especially useful and educational. Some surprising and useful conclusions have also been developed; e.g., (a) major accident performance is continuing to degrade, (b) although PSM may be making a mark, something else is needed to improve industry's accident performance, and (c) runaway reactions continue to be a significant cause of major accidents. Two case histories are summarized to support the conclusions and recommendations of this study.Recommendations concerning PSM and runaway reactions are included in this paper; that is: (a) add “administrative controls” to PSM, and (b) initiate more fundamental research in the area of short stopping runaway reactions.