bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Symmetries of Probability Kinematics
Authors: Fraassen Bas C. van 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
While it was argued earlier in the book that no rule‐governed notion of rational opinion change could be adequate, there are certainly patterns of normal opinion change (updating in response to new data or new constraints accepted in response to experience), which have a rule‐following form. The basic example is Simple Conditionalization (often characterized as the application of Bayes's rule or Bayes's theorem, sometimes called Bayesian Conditionalization, and sometimes accepted as the sole admissible form of opinion change), but more advanced patterns (beginning with Jeffrey Conditionalization) have been described in the literature, as well as challenged there, e.g. by Isaac Levi. The question of what can justify such rules is addressed using symmetry arguments, and the (hidden or explicit) premises of such arguments analysed. Probability kinematics, as formulated initially by Richard Jeffrey, is the general theory of rules for changing a (‘prior’) probability function, subject to given or imposed constraints, into a new (‘updated’, ‘posterior’) function. Such constraints can take various forms, and the rules offered for them can be limited by symmetry considerations but may not be uniquely determined.
Sidgwick's Ethics and Victorian Moral Philosophy
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book presents an analysis of Henry Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics. It is divided into three parts. The first begins with a study of the development of Sidgwick’s thought up to the time when the main positions of the Methods were formulated, including a review of British moral philosophy in the 19th century. It then discusses why Sidgwick made his philosophy a synthesis of the work of his predecessors. The second part involves a commentary on the main topics of Methods, emphasizing the underlying argument connecting the different parts of the book. The third part examines Sidgwick’s critique of the two main ethical theories that developed following the publication of his work.
The Aims and Scope of The Methods of Ethics
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics was a technical work aimed at treating ‘ethical science’ with ‘the same disinterest curiosity to which we owe the great discoveries of physics’. He also meant the book to be systematic — a direct opposition to Grote’s rejection of system in moral philosophy. To understand the way in which the Methods is systematic, it is important to clarify what it is and is not intended to cover and to establish.
The Examination of Common‐Sense Morality
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Two discussions on common sense morality in Book III of Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics are examined. These chapters are among the most valuable of Sidgwick’s contributions to ethics given their attention to detail, nicety of discrimination, and breadth of perspective on ordinary moral concepts and maxims. Attention is given to Sidgwick’s specific analysis of moral rules, since his conclusions about them establish the main features of common-sense morality which any ethical theory must be able to explain.
Sidgwick and the Later Victorians
Authors: Schneewind J. B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the latter part of his life, Sidgwick critiqued two schools of thought: the evolutional and the idealistic. He viewed these as two types of ethical thought moving away from his own. Bradley’s attack on Sidgwick, which had many objectives in which T. H. Green agreed, is examined. Sidgwick’s analysis of Green’s positive views is then discussed. Although Green agreed with Bradley on a Hegelian conception of nature and limits of moral philosophy, he had a more Kantian moral outlook. Sidgwick saw in Green the one serious effort to spell out a real alternative to his own.
Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Centres on Schopenhauer's conception of the self and how it relates to the world, primarily dealing with his book The World as Will and Representation. It locates Schopenhauer in relation to Kant, of whom he was both a follower and a critic. While accepting Kant's transcendental idealism and the associated notion of the ‘I’ as a pure subject of knowledge distinct from the world of objects, Schopenhauer undercuts this notion with a conception of the self as will. The self as will is primarily active, embodied, organic, and manifests pre‐rational ends and drives. The book shows how Schopenhauer arrives at a position in which idealism and materialism are correlative positions, but where a metaphysical account of the thing in itself as will takes primacy. It explores Schopenhauer's arguments that willing is identical with acting, and that at the level of individual willing there is no freedom. The book assesses the relevance of Schopenhauer's conception of the self to recent philosophical debates, and explores its influence on Wittgenstein and on Nietzsche.
The Development of Schopenhauer's Philosophy
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Schopenhauer's philosophy was formed during the years 1810–18. This chapter looks at the influences that shaped it, principally Kant, but also Plato, and the Upanishads. Schopenhauer aimed at a synthesis of these influences. Although indebted to Kant for the framework of his thought, he developed a conception of metaphysics and a ‘better consciousness’ of objective reality that would be free from the limitations imposed by Kant. Schopenhauer's antagonistic relationship with Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel is also mentioned.
Kantian Objects
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Kant's central contribution to theoretical philosophy was the position he called ‘transcendental idealism’. Schopenhauer also adopted transcendental idealism, though he wanted to modify Kant's position considerably, as evidenced in his long ‘Critique of the Kantian Philosophy’ appended to The World as Will and Representation. This chapter outlines Kant's idealism, comparing it with the idealism of Berkeley, examining the limitation of knowledge to appearances as opposed to the thing in itself, and the a priori principles that govern the world of empirical objects. Schopenhauer's often critical reception of these notions is emphasized, against the background of problems with transcendental idealism that had been raised by Kant's immediate successors.
Idealism
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses Schopenhauer's claim that his idealism unites insights of Kant and Berkeley, and contrasts his position on the subject–object relation with that of Fichte. The question whether his idealism is solipsistic is raised. Schopenhauer's arguments that idealism is the only viable alternative to scepticism, and that the existence of a world of objects except for a representing subject is inconceivable are also critically analysed.
Materialism
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Schopenhauer argues that the world of objects must be material, and that the only use for the concept of substance is that of matter. He argues that materialism is correlative with idealism. Even the brain functions of the subject are material processes. However, materialism is one‐sided because it does not account for the point of view of the consciousness of the subject of knowledge, from which idealism indispensably starts.
Freedom from Will
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Outlines the ways in which Schopenhauer alleges that value is to be attained by an escape from or denial of the will that is our essence. Schopenhauer's pessimism involves a negative assessment of the life of insatiable striving and egoism to which the will condemns the individual. Aesthetic experience provides an escape into a will‐less state of consciousness. Ethics is founded on the recognition that individuation is basically illusory and egoism an erroneous impulse to action. Finally, Schopenhauer speaks of a mystical vision in which one does not distinguish oneself as an individual from the whole, a state in which one reaches denial of the will.
Self and World
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Addresses the question of the relevance of Schopenhauer's philosophy to a present‐day audience. Schopenhauer raises questions concerning I‐thoughts, in which one makes ascriptions to oneself without needing to identify oneself as an object in the world. He also provides a prototype of the thought that the ‘I’ cannot be conceived wholly as a disembodied or transcendental pure subject, but must be an active and embodied agent. Schopenhauer's dichotomy of subjective and objective viewpoints is argued to be parallel to the conceptions developed by Thomas Nagel.
Conclusions
Authors: Janaway Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Resumes the salient features of Schopenhauer's philosophy dealt with in the book. These include his dichotomy of subject and object, the correlativity of subjective and objective viewpoints, and the primacy of the will in accounting for the self. It concludes that Schopenhauer is helpful in uncovering two mysteries: that a ‘blind’ nature should produce a being with self‐consciousness, and that this being should be capable of understanding itself as a product of nature.
Beyond Evolution
Authors: O'Hear Anthony 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The theory of evolution may be successful in explaining natural history, but it is of limited value when applied to the human world. Because of our reflectiveness and rationality, as embodied in language, we give ourselves ideals that cannot be justified in terms of survival‐promotion or reproductive advantage. Evolutionary theory is unable to give satisfactory accounts of such distinctive features of human life as the quest for knowledge, our moral sense, and the appreciation of beauty. At most, it can account for their prefiguration at some earlier stage of development than the human. In all these areas we transcend our biological origins, and such mechanisms as genetic survival, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and sexual selection. But because of our rationality we can also transcend our cultural inheritance explanation of which in terms of memes is both hollow and misleading. We are rooted both in our biology and in our cultural inheritance; but, sociobiology and sociology notwithstanding, we are prisoners neither of our genes nor of the ideas we encounter as we each make our personal journey through life.
Immanent and Transcendent Dimensions of Reason
Authors: O'Hear Anthony 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There is a tension between considering humans as creatures of reason and as creatures of nature subject to Nature's categorical imperatives. While reason may raise sceptical doubts about our beliefs and practices, we cannot live as if these doubts were true. It is plausible that some of these deeply held beliefs and practices are so embedded because they promote survival and this might give rise to a Humean view that Nature is too strong for Reason. However, our nature as transcendently self‐conscious rational agents means that we should not abandon all thought of justifying our most basic beliefs in favour of a purely instrumental account of reason. Reason, for self‐conscious agents, has a vertical aspect enabling us to step outside our beliefs and practices and question their validity.
Evolutionary Epistemology
Authors: O'Hear Anthony 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There is a distinction between the true—what we ought to believe—and the useful—what would be useful to believe. Our cognitive powers are the product of evolutionary development and natural selection is responsive to what is useful rather than to what is true. This can lead us, for good evolutionary reasons, to err on the side of caution with respect to toxicity of possible foods, e.g.—there can be beneficial false beliefs. Furthermore, Peter Munz has pointed out that idiosyncratic community‐wide false beliefs can have high utility from the point of view of social bonding and integration. Plato, Hayek, and Roger Scruton have also questioned the social value of rationality. As self‐conscious beings, we do seem to be concerned with truth as well as the merely useful. However, it remains open whether the search for truth is long‐term beneficial.
Evolution and Epistemological Pessimism
Authors: O'Hear Anthony 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Science can show how our beliefs are produced by our interactions with the material world. Explaining how, e.g. we might have experiences of secondary qualities and why such experiences might be useful from an evolutionary standpoint even if, strictly speaking, they have no existence independent of us. Selection, as described in the previous chapter, only ensures that our cognitive abilities will be survival‐promoting rather than truth‐delivering. Science, however, must be responsive to observation and be intelligible to us and observability and intelligibility look like they are also relative to our natures. Science, as van Fraassen, Hacking, and Cartwright point out, also involves the production of artificial phenomena through experiment and involves a degree of idealization. Science, on this account, is a process by which embodied beings explore their world and, in being susceptible to a naturalistic explanation, is no different from our other methods of belief formation. Secondary qualities, given this, are no less real and science no more objective. A naturalistic evolutionary perspective on knowledge while not justifying our basic non‐sceptical epistemic standpoint also does not lead inevitably to scepticism.
Beauty and the Theory of Evolution
Authors: O'Hear Anthony 
Published: October 2003

AbstractGiven the remarkable transition over human history from the caveman to the painter of icons, what is the source of our aesthetic sensibility? Biologists can disagree about whether non‐human animals display a genuine aesthetic sense, as Darwin claimed, or whether, as Wallace argued, apparently aesthetic choices may simply reflect underlying pragmatic considerations. Even allowing for this, humans display the sort of features—reflectiveness, universality, disinterestedness, etc.—that Kant singles out as hallmarks of the aesthetic whereas non‐human animals do not. Contrary to Hume and Kant, however, we ought not to see aesthetic judgements as based on purely emotional responses to objects but rather as reflections of underlying objective facts about the world which, nevertheless, require a specific human sensibility to pick out. This explains, e.g., why aesthetic judgements can appear to converge across cultures and across time and why aesthetic judgements can appear to have a normative dimension.
Introduction: The Passions and Philosophy
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This introductory chapter surveys some of the central themes that shaped seventeenth‐century discussions of the role of the passions in body and mind, and in reasoning and action, with which the book as a whole is concerned. It stresses that although the passions were regarded as turbulent and dangerous, the therapeutic benefits of understanding them were widely appreciated. The study of the passions in this period challenges a number of entrenched historical claims about the development of philosophy in this period, and also informs our contemporary understanding of the emotions.
Passion and Action in Aquinas
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Aristotelian analysis discussed in Ch. 2 is taken up by Aquinas, who adapts it to fit a Christian framework. Aquinas modifies and elaborates Aristotle's account of the active and passive aspects of the soul, and produces a novel analysis of its passions. This continued to exert an enormous influence on seventeenth‐century theorists, who did not altogether reject the assumptions of their Scholastic predecessors.
Negotiating the Divide: Descartes and Malebranche
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Among seventeenth‐century philosophers who produced novel and systematic theories of the passions, two of the most important are Descartes and Malebranche, who attribute the physical and psychological aspects of the passions to the dual substances of body and soul. The first part of this chapter examines Descartes’ attempt to deal with the Aristotelian heritage; it concentrates on his reconfiguration of the soul, his account of the function of the passions, and his analysis of their physical and psychological aspects. The second part shows how these themes are developed by Malebranche, for whom the passions are social phenomena designed by God to realize our collective good.
Mental and Bodily Passions Identified: Hobbes and Spinoza
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The dualist framework used by Descartes and Malebranche to explain the passions is challenged in different ways by Hobbes and Spinoza. Hobbes develops a materialist account of our passions as manifestations of an underlying striving for power. Spinoza develops this view into a monist analysis that breaks with strands of Aristotelianism, which are still to be found in Cartesianism, and makes space for a new conception of the distinction between active and passive thoughts.
Passion and Error
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Alongside their frequent invocations of the distinction between reason and passion, seventeenth‐century philosophers have a sophisticated grasp of the role of the passions in the acquisition of knowledge. This chapter opens the discussion of Part III by examining the ways in which our passions are thought to give rise to error. As Hobbes and Spinoza explain, they encourage projection. They also make us inconstant. Above all, they distort our sense of time and scale, thus giving rise to a corrupting esteem for grandeur and contempt for petitesse, a phenomenon treated at length by Malebranche.
Dispassionate Scientia
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Because scientific knowledge must be free from error, those who seek it must somehow avoid the mistakes to which our passions expose us. Some seventeenth‐century philosophers taken an optimistic view of this problem. A number of them argue that we can escape from the passionate realm of the senses to a realm of the intellect in which reason holds sway. Others, including Descartes and Spinoza, argue that reasoning is sustained by emotions that are nevertheless not passions. This chapter examines these two strategies.
Knowledge as Emotion
Authors: James Susan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Alongside the view that we need passion to motivate us to acquire knowledge, we find in the seventeenth century the idea that knowledge itself—and especially practical knowledge—has an emotional dimension. Practical knowledge consists in an ability to act in certain ways, which in turn depends on certain motivating passions that are often conceived as forms of love. This conviction draws on Platonism and Augustianism, and is taken up by both Protestant philosophers such as the Cambridge Platonists, and Catholic ones such as Pascal. The emotional changes that knowledge is understood to produce are widely seen as giving us a form of protection against passions that can infiltrate our bodies and shape our characters, from the time we are in the womb.
What Is Mathematical Realism?
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractTalk of truth plays a major role in formulating realism, to the point that realist theories are often criticized by attacking the correspondence theory of truth that they are presumed to defend. In this chapter, I claim that there is an alternative theory of truth, which is both non‐epistemic and not based on correspondence relation that suffices to support mathematical realism. I describe the theory as a logical conception of truth because the truth predicate will turn out to be simply a logical operator. The theory has two main features: it is disquotational, and immanent, in that it specifies the extension of the term ‘true’ only for the language in which it applies.
The Case for Mathematical Realism
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The application of mathematics to science and the enormous success that derives from it is, perhaps, the strongest evidence in favour of mathematical realism. Quine and Putnam have taken the indispensability of mathematics in doing science as the main premise in an argument for both the truth of mathematics and the existence of mathematical objects. This argument has been criticized, among other things, for presupposing a realist position with regard to science. In this chapter, I propose a new argument, the pragmatic indispensability argument that avoids the problem by failing to presuppose that our best scientific theories are true. I argue that the justification for doing science also justifies our accepting as true, the mathematics that science uses.
Holism: Evidence in Science and Mathematics
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractI present a theory of justification for mathematical beliefs that is both non‐foundationalist, in that it claims that some mathematics must be justified indirectly in terms of its consequences, and holistic, in that it maintains that no claim of theoretical science can be confirmed or refuted in isolation but only as a part of a system of hypotheses. Our evidence for mathematics is ultimately empirical because the mathematics that is part of theoretical science, is, in principle, revisable in light of experience and confirmed by experience. Following Henry Kyburg, I develop this idea by claiming that in science we use combinations of mathematical and scientific principles to develop models (mini‐theories) that allow us to calculate values that we then compare with the data. ‘Separatists’ objections to holism revolve around the claim that holism fails to respect our intuitions about mathematics, e.g. that mathematics is clearly distinct from science and that mathematical evidence comes from proofs, rather than from experience. My response to these objections is that holism can accommodate these intuitions by appealing to pragmatic rationality that, on the one hand, underwrites the special role of mathematics and bids us to treat it as if it were a priori, and, on the other, justifies, on the grounds of simplicity and success, a local conception of evidence according to which data can confirm specific hypotheses.
Positing Mathematical Objects
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIf, as I grant, mathematical objects are abstract entities existing outside of space and time, and if the idea of supernaturally grasping abstract entities is scientifically unacceptable, then we need to explain how we can attain mathematical knowledge using our ordinary faculties. I try to meet this challenge through a postulational account of the genesis of our mathematical knowledge, according to which our ancestors introduced mathematical objects by first positing geometric ideals and then postulating abstract mathematical entities. Since positing involves simply introducing a discourse about objects and affirming their existence, positing mathematical objects involves nothing more serious than writing fiction. For this reason, postulational approaches seem better suited for conventionalists; so in the second part of this chapter, I explain how positing in mathematics is different from positing in fiction, and how we can gain knowledge from the former. Finally, I try to make sense of the idea that mathematical postulates are about an independent mathematical reality and that we can refer to that reality through them, by giving an immanent and disquotational account of reference and contrasting it with a transcendent/causal account.