bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Hypospadias in Washington State: Maternal Risk Factors and Prevalence Trends
Authors: Porter Michael P. , Faizan M. Khurram , Grady Richard W. , Mueller Beth A. 
Published: March 2005

Objective. Maternal risk factors for hypospadias are poorly defined, and there is debate about temporal trends in hypospadias prevalence. We examined select maternal characteristics as possible risk factors for hypospadias among male offspring and evaluated yearly prevalence rates in Washington State.
Methods. We performed a population-based, case-control study using linked birth-hospital discharge data from Washington State for 1987–1997 and prevalence data for 1987–2002. All cases of hypospadias were identified on the basis of International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, codes from the birth hospitalization (N = 2155). Five control subjects were randomly selected for each case subject from the remaining singleton births, frequency matched according to year of birth (N = 10775). Maternal and infant characteristics were ascertained from the birth certificate. Logistic regression was used to calculate odds ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence intervals (CIs). Yearly prevalence was determined by dividing the total number of hypospadias cases by the number of male singleton live births for each year.
Results. The risk of delivering an affected male infant increased with advancing maternal age; relative to women &lt;20 years of age, those &gt;40 years of age were at greatest risk (OR: 1.70; 95% CI: 1.17–2.48). Infants of nonwhite women were generally at decreased risk. Infants born to women with preexisting diabetes mellitus were at greater risk than those born to women without diabetes (OR: 2.18; 95% CI: 1.03–4.60); however, this was not observed for infants born to women with gestational diabetes. The birth prevalence of hypospadias in 2002 was 5.0 cases per 1000 male births, not significantly different from that in 1987.
Conclusion. Older maternal age, white race, and preexisting diabetes were associated with increased risk of hypospadias among male offspring. The prevalence of hypospadias in Washington State did not increase significantly between 1987 and 2002.
Homeostasis Model Assessment Is More Reliable Than the Fasting Glucose/Insulin Ratio and Quantitative Insulin Sensitivity Check Index for Assessing Insulin Resistance Among Obese Children and Adolescents
Authors: Keskin Mehmet , Kurtoglu Selim , Kendirci Mustafa , Atabek M. Emre , Yazici Cevat 
Published: March 2005

Objective. Simple fasting methods to measure insulin resistance, such as the homeostasis model assessment (HOMA), fasting glucose/insulin ratio (FGIR), and quantitative insulin sensitivity check index (QUICKI) methods, have been widely promoted for adult studies but have not been evaluated formally among children and adolescents. The aim of this study was to compare the HOMA, FGIR, and QUICKI methods for measuring insulin resistance, expressed by oral glucose tolerance test (OGTT) results, among obese children and adolescents.
Methods. Fifty-seven pubertal obese children and adolescents (30 girls and 27 boys; mean age, 12.04 ± 2.90 years; mean BMI: 29.57 ± 5.53) participated in the study. All participants underwent an OGTT. Blood samples were obtained 0, 30, 60, 90, and 120 minutes after oral glucose administration for glucose and insulin measurements, and 2 separate groups were studied, according to the presence or absence of insulin resistance. HOMA, FGIR, and QUICKI methods were studied for validation of insulin resistance determined with the OGTT for these groups.
Results. The groups consisted of 25 obese children and adolescents with insulin resistance (14 girls and 11 boys; mean age: 12.88 ± 2.88 years; mean BMI: 31.29 ± 5.86) and 32 subjects without insulin resistance (16 girls and 16 boys; mean age: 11.38 ± 2.79 years; mean BMI: 28.23 ± 4.94). There were significant differences in the mean HOMA (6.06 ± 4.98 and 3.42 ± 3.14, respectively) and QUICKI (0.313 ± 0.004 and 0.339 ± 0.004, respectively) values between the 2 groups. Sensitivity and specificity calculations based on insulin resistance with receiver operating characteristic curve analysis indicated that HOMA had high sensitivity and specificity for measuring insulin resistance.
Conclusions. As a measure of insulin resistance among children and adolescents, HOMA is more reliable than FGIR and QUICKI. The present HOMA cutoff point for diagnosis of insulin resistance is 3.16. The HOMA cutoff point of &gt;2.5 is valid for adults but not for adolescents.
Gödel, Tarski, Church, and The Liar
Authors: Serény György 
Published: March 2005

The fact that Gödel's famous incompleteness theorem and the archetype of all logical paradoxes, that of the Liar, are related closely is, of course, not only well known, but is a part of the common knowledge of the community of logicians. Indeed, almost every more or less formal treatment of the theorem makes a reference to this connection. Gödel himself remarked in the paper announcing his celebrated result (cf. [7]):The analogy between this result and Richard's antinomy leaps to the eye;there is also a close relationship with the ‘liar’ antinomy, since … we are… confronted with a proposition which asserts its own unprovability.In the light of the fact that the existence of this connection is commonplace it is all the more surprising that very little can be learnt about its exact nature except perhaps that it is some kind of similarity or analogy. There is, however, a lot more to it than that. Indeed, as we shall try to show below, the general ideas underlying the three central theorems concerning internal limitations of formal deductive systems can be taken as different ways to resolve the Liar paradox. More precisely, it will turn out that an abstract formal variant of the Liar paradox, which can almost straightforwardly inferred from its original ordinary language version, is a possible common generalization of (both the syntactic and semantic versions of) Gödel's incompleteness theorem, the theorem of Tarski on the undefinability of truth, and that of Church concerning the undecidability of provability.
From Foundations to Ludics
Authors: Girard Jean-Yves 
Published: March 2005

Ludics [1] is a novel approach to logic—especially proof-theory. The present introduction emphasises foundational issues.For ages, not a single disturbing idea in the area of “foundations”: the discussion is sort of ossified—as if everything had been said, as if all notions had taken their definite place, in a big cemetery of ideas. One can still refresh the flowers or regild the stone, e.g., prove technicalities, sometimes non-trivial; but the real debate is still: this paper begins with an autopsy, the autopsy of the foundational project.Up to say 1900, the realist/dualist approach to science was dominant; during the last century some domains like physics evolved so as to become completely anti-realist; but this evolution hardly concerned logic.By the turn of the XXth century mathematics was jeopardised by paradoxes, the most famous of them being due to Russell. Hilbert's reaction was to focus on consistency. But the reduction of paradoxes—and therefore of foundations—to solely the antinomies is highly questionable: indeed, the typical paradoxical artifacts are secret sharers, objects satisfying the formal definitions but far astray from the intended meaning, typically the Peano “curve” which contradicts our perception of dimension. Fortunately, topology has been able to show that dimension m is not the same as dimension n … but just for a second, forget this and imagine consistent mathematics in which balls in any dimension are homeomorphic: what a disaster! This exclusive focus on consistency—not to speak of the strategic failure of the Programme—should explain why logic, especially foundations lost contact with other sciences during last century.
Two Spaces Looking for a Geometer
Authors: Parisi Giorgio 
Published: March 2005

AbstractIn this talk I will introduce two spaces: the first space is the usual n-dimensional vector space with the unusual feature that n is a non-integer; the second space is composed of the linear matrices acting on the previous space (physicists are particularly interested in studying the limit as n goes to zero). These two spaces are not known to most mathematicians, but they are widely used by physicists. It is possible that, by extending the notion of space, they can become well defined mathematical objects.
Model Theory: Geometrical and Set-Theoretic Aspects and Prospects
Authors: Macintyre Angus 
Published: March 2005

I see model theory as becoming increasingly detached from set theory, and the Tarskian notion of set-theoretic model being no longer central to model theory. In much of modern mathematics, the set-theoretic component is of minor interest, and basic notions are geometric or category-theoretic. In algebraic geometry, schemes or algebraic spaces are the basic notions, with the older “sets of points in affine or projective space” no more than restrictive special cases. The basic notions may be given sheaf-theoretically, or functorially. To understand in depth the historically important affine cases, one does best to work with more general schemes. The resulting relativization and “transfer of structure” is incomparably more flexible and powerful than anything yet known in “set-theoretic model theory”.It seems to me now uncontroversial to see the fine structure of definitions as becoming the central concern of model theory, to the extent that one can easily imagine the subject being called “Definability Theory” in the near future.Tarski's set-theoretic foundational formulations are still favoured by the majority of model-theorists, and evolution towards a more suggestive language has been perplexingly slow. None of the main texts uses in any nontrivial way the language of category theory, far less sheaf theory or topos theory. Given that the most notable interactions of model theory with geometry are in areas of geometry where the language of sheaves is almost indispensable (to the geometers), this is a curious situation, and I find it hard to imagine that it will not change soon, and rapidly.
Foundations and Applications: Axiomatization and Education
Authors: Lawvere F. William 
Published: March 2005

AbstractFoundations and Applications depend ultimately for their existence on each other. The main links between them are education and the axiomatic method. Those links can be strengthened with the help of a categorical method which was concentrated forty years ago by Cartier, Grothendieck, Isbell, Kan, and Yoneda. I extended that method to extract some essential features of the category of categories in 1965, and I apply it here in section 3 to sketch a similar foundation within the smooth categories which provide the setting for the mathematics of change. The possibility that other methods may be needed to clarify a contradiction introduced by Cantor, now embedded in mathematical practice, is discussed in section 5.
Differential Calculus and Nilpotent Real Numbers
Authors: Kock Anders 
Published: March 2005

Do there exist real numbers d with d2 = 0 (besides d = 0, of course)? The question is formulated provocatively, to stress a formalist view about existence: existence is consistency, or better, coherence.Also, the provocation is meant to challenge the monopoly which the number system, invented by Dedekind et al., is claiming for itself as THE model of the geometric line. The Dedekind approach may be termed “arithmetization of geometry”.We know that one may construct a number system out of synthetic geometry, as Euclid and followers did (completed in Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie, [2, Chapter 3]): “geometrization of arithmetic”. (Picking two distinct points on the geometric line, geometric constructions in an ambient Euclidean plane provide structure of a commutative ring on the line, with the two chosen points as 0 and 1).Starting from the geometric side, nilpotent elements are somewhat reasonable, although Euclid excluded them. The sophist Protagoras presented a picture of a circle and a tangent line; the apparent little line segment D which tangent and circle have in common, are, by Pythagoras' Theorem, precisely the points, whose abscissae d (measured along the tangent) have d2 = 0. Protagoras wanted to use this argument for destructive reasons: to refute the science of geometry.A couple of millenia later, the Danish geometer Hjelmslev revived the Protagoras picture. His aim was more positive: he wanted to describe Nature as it was. According to him (or extrapolating his position), the Real Line, the Line of Sensual Reality, had many nilpotent infinitesimals, which we can see with our naked eyes.
Computable and Continuous Partial Homomorphisms on Metric Partial Algebras
Authors: Stoltenberg-Hansen Viggo , Tucker John V. 
Published: March 2005

AbstractWe analyse the connection between the computability and continuity of functions in the case of homomorphisms between topological algebraic structures. Inspired by the Pour-El and Richards equivalence theorem between computability and boundedness for closed linear operators on Banach spaces, we study the rather general situation of partial homomorphisms between metric partial universal algebras. First, we develop a set of basic notions and results that reveal some of the delicate algebraic, topological and effective properties of partial algebras. Our main computability concepts are based on numerations and include those of effective metric partial algebras and effective partial homomorphisms. We prove a general equivalence theorem that includes a version of the Pour-El and Richards Theorem, and has other applications. Finally, the Pour-El and Richards axioms for computable sequence structures on Banach spaces are generalised to computable partial sequence structures on metric algebras, and we prove their equivalence with our computability model based on numerations.
A Universal Approach to Self-Referential Paradoxes, Incompleteness and Fixed Points
Authors: Yanofsky Noson S. 
Published: March 2005

AbstractFollowing F. William Lawvere, we show that many self-referential paradoxes, incompleteness theorems and fixed point theorems fall out of the same simple scheme. We demonstrate these similarities by showing how this simple scheme encompasses the semantic paradoxes, and how they arise as diagonal arguments and fixed point theorems in logic, computability theory, complexity theory and formal language theory.
Finite Conformal Hypergraph Covers and Gaifman Cliques in Finite Structures
Authors: Hodkinson Ian , Otto Martin 
Published: March 2005

AbstractWe provide a canonical construction of conformal covers for finite hypergraphs and present two immediate applications to the finite model theory of relational structures. In the setting of relational structures, conformal covers serve to construct guarded bisimilar companion structures that avoid all incidental Gaifman cliques—thus serving as a partial analogue in finite model theory for the usually infinite guarded unravellings. In hypergraph theoretic terms, we show that every finite hypergraph admits a bisimilar cover by a finite conformal hypergraph. In terms of relational structures, we show that every finite relational structure admits a guarded bisimilar cover by a finite structure whose Gaifman cliques are guarded. One of our applications answers an open question about a clique constrained strengthening of the extension property for partial automorphisms (EPPA) of Hrushovski, Herwig and Lascar. A second application provides an alternative proof of the finite model property (FMP) for the clique guarded fragment of first-order logic CGF, by reducing (finite) satisfiability in CGF to (finite) satisfiability in the guarded fragment, GF.
On the Philosophical Development of Kurt Gödel
Authors: Atten Mark van , Kennedy Juliette 
Published: March 2005

It is by now well known that Gödel first advocated the philosophy of Leibniz and then, since 1959, that of Husserl. This raises three questions:1.How is this turn to Husserl to be interpreted? Is it a dismissal of the Leibnizian philosophy, or a different way to achieve similar goals?2.Why did Gödel turn specifically to the later Husserl's transcendental idealism?3.Is there any detectable influence from Husserl on Gödel's writings?Regarding the first question, Wang [96, p.165] reports that Gödel ‘[saw] in Husserl's work a method of refining and consolidating Leibniz' monadology’. But what does this mean? In what for Gödel relevant sense is Husserl's work a refinement and consolidation of Leibniz' monadology?The second question is particularly pressing, given that Gödel was, by his own admission, a realist in mathematics since 1925. Wouldn't the uncompromising realism of the early Husserl's Logical investigations have been a more obvious choice for a Platonist like Gödel?The third question can only be approached when an answer to the second has been given, and we want to suggest that the answer to the first question follows from the answer to the second. We begin, therefore, with a closer look at the actual turn towards phenomenology.Some 30 years before his serious study of Husserl began, Gödel was well aware of the existence of phenomenology. Apart from its likely appearance in the philosophy courses that Gödel took, it reached him from various directions.
Identity of Proofs Based on Normalization and Generality
Authors: Došen Kosta 
Published: March 2005

AbstractSome thirty years ago, two proposals were made concerning criteria for identity of proofs. Prawitz proposed to analyze identity of proofs in terms of the equivalence relation based on reduction to normal formin natural deduction. Lambek worked on a normalization proposal analogous to Prawitz's, based on reduction to cut-free form in sequent systems, but he also suggested understanding identity of proofs in terms of an equivalence relation based on generality, two derivations having the same generality if after generalizing maximally the rules involved in them they yield the same premises and conclusions up to a renaming of variables. These two proposals proved to be extensionally equivalent only for limited fragments of logic.The normalization proposal stands behind very successful applications of the typed lambda calculus and of category theory in the proof theory of intuitionistic logic. In classical logic, however, it did not fare well.The generality proposal was rather neglected in logic, though related matters were much studied in pure category theory in connection with coherence problems, and there are also links to low-dimensional topology and linear algebra. This proposal seems more promising than the other one for the general proof theory of classical logic.
Barwise: Infinitary Logic and Admissible Sets
Authors: Keisler H. Jerome , Knight Julia F. 
Published: March 2005

§0. Introduction. In [16], Barwise described his graduate study at Stanford. He told of his interactions with Kreisel and Scott, and said how he chose Feferman as his advisor. He began working on admissible fragments of infinitary logic after reading and giving seminar talks on two Ph.D. theses which had recently been completed: that of Lopez-Escobar, at Berkeley, on infinitary logic [46] (see also the papers [47], [48]), and that of Platek [58], at Stanford, on admissible sets.Barwise's work on infinitary logic and admissible sets is described in his thesis [4], the book [13], and papers [5]—[16]. We do not try to give a systematic review of these papers. Instead, our goal is to give a coherent introduction to infinitary logic and admissible sets. We describe results of Barwise, of course, because he did so much. In addition, we mention some more recent work, to indicate the current importance of Barwise's ideas. Many of the central results are stated without proof, but occasionally we sketch a proof, to indicate how the ideas fit together.Chapters 1 and 2 describe infinitary logic and admissible sets at the time Barwise began his work, circa 1965. From Chapter 3 on, we survey the developments that took place after Barwise appeared on the scene.§1. Background on infinitary logic. In this chapter, we describe the situation in infinitary logic at the time that Barwise began his work. We need some terminology. By a vocabulary, we mean a set L of constant symbols, and relation and operation symbols with finitely many argument places. As usual, by an L-structureM, we mean a universe set M with an interpretation for each symbol of L.
Barwise: Abstract Model Theory and Generalized Quantifiers
Authors: Väänänen Jouko 
Published: March 2005

§1. Introduction. After the pioneering work of Mostowski [29] and Lindström [23] it was Jon Barwise's papers [2] and [3] that brought abstract model theory and generalized quantifiers to the attention of logicians in the early seventies. These papers were greeted with enthusiasm at the prospect that model theory could be developed by introducing a multitude of extensions of first order logic, and by proving abstract results about relationships holding between properties of these logics. Examples of such properties areκ-compactness.Any set of sentences of cardinality ≤ κ, every finite subset of which has a model, has itself a model.Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down toκ.If a sentence of the logic has a model, it has a model of cardinality at most κ.Interpolation Property.If ϕ and ψ are sentences such that ⊨ ϕ → Ψ, then there is θ such that ⊨ ϕ → θ, ⊨ θ → Ψ and the vocabulary of θ is the intersection of the vocabularies of ϕ and Ψ.Lindstrom's famous theorem characterized first order logic as the maximal ℵ0-compact logic with Downward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem down to ℵ0. With his new concept of absolute logics Barwise was able to get similar characterizations of infinitary languagesLκω. But hopes were quickly frustrated by difficulties arising left and right, and other areas of model theory came into focus, mainly stability theory. No new characterizations of logics comparable to the early characterization of first order logic given by Lindström and of infinitary logic by Barwise emerged. What was first called soft model theory turned out to be as hard as hard model theory.
Jon Barwise's Papers on Natural Language Semantics
Authors: Devlin Keith 
Published: March 2005

For most of the 1980s, Jon Barwise focused much of his research in the area of natural language semantics. This article surveys his research publications in that area.Most, but not all, of those publications were in the area of situation semantics, a new approach to natural language semantics Barwise developed jointly with his colleague John Perry in the first half of the 1980s. That work was both blessed, and cursed, by becoming closely identified in academic circles with the award of a $23 million gift to Stanford from the System Development Foundation for the establishment in 1983 of its Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI). The development of situation semantics, and in due course its underlying mathematical foundation Situation Theory, carried out for the most part within the framework of CSLI's STASS research group (Situation Theory and Situation Semantics), was actually a relatively small part of the overall research program at CSLI. But because Barwise and Perry were leading figures at CSLI, were centrally involved in securing the SDF gift, and were respectively the first and second directors of CSLI, a general impression sprung up that the two of them had been awarded millions of dollars to develop situation semantics.A major consequence of this false impression was that from the theory's early days, a great deal of interest was shown in the project. With so many accomplished scholars pouring over the work while the ink was still wet on the manuscript pages, Barwise and Perry were able to take advantage of a broad range of helpful criticism (even if it was not always given with a view to being helpful). This meant that they were able to develop the new theory much more rapidly than would otherwise have been the case.