bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Transformation of the Welfare State
Authors: Gilbert Neil 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This book is the outgrowth of a large‐scale comparative project on the changing landscape of the welfare state initiated by the author in 1997. In it, it is argued that the changes in welfare policy being witnessed in Europe and the USA are not marginal adjustments to the borders of the welfare state, but represent a fundamental shift or transformation in the design and philosophy of social protection. The author argues that there has been a turn away from the conventional welfare‐state emphasis on broad‐based entitlements, passive income supports, and publicly delivered benefits, towards a new ‘enabling’ approach under which welfare allocations are more selective on the bases of income and behaviour, and are activity related, and privately delivered. The shift to this ‘enabling state’ is traced, and evidence provided of how the new system promotes work and economic inclusion over protection, and how it changes the nature of social cohesion, diluting the role of government and thickening the glue of civil society. The likely readership is sociologists, political scientists, economists, historians, and social workers.
New Course or Marginal Adjustment?
Authors: Gilbert Neil 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
In the first part of the chapter, views are discussed on the changing arrangements for social protection that have occurred in the last decade of the twentieth century in many, if not all, of the industrialized nations. Some see these changes as a marginal adjustment in the borders of the welfare state, while others perceive the changing landscape of industrialized welfare states as the embodiment of major revisions in the principles and philosophy of social protection. Most welfare state analysts acknowledge that the reforms are spurred by the need for greater labour force adaptability and productivity in a global economy, by concerns on the erosion of individual responsibility, and by new institutional arrangements for social protection involving market competition. The last part of the chapter addresses the two main theories on how welfare states evolve – convergence under the pressures of broad impersonal structural forces, or divergence into distinct regimes responding to human interventions shaped by socio‐political factors.
Toward the Enabling State
Authors: Gilbert Neil 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
The four main factors influencing the change from a welfare to an enabling state are discussed. Two of these influences are large‐scale structural changes involving demographic trends and globalization of the economy that generate the kind of impersonal forces that drive the development of the welfare state according to the convergence theory. The other two influences stem from changing ideas and normative views on the consequences of social policies and the appropriate role of the state; these changes animate socio‐political processes that give rise to divergent types of welfare states according to the theory of distinct regimes. The rest of the chapter discusses the changes that accompany the shift from a welfare to an enabling state, and the emergence of new social accounting to accompany the emergence of the alternative framework for social protection.
Protection to Inclusion
Authors: Gilbert Neil 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
Over the last decade of the twentieth century, policies for social protection of the unemployed in the advanced industrial world have been reformulated from the provision of income maintenance (income support), to schemes for getting people back to work. This change has three connected rhetorical themes (a shift from passive to active policies; an emphasis on responsibilities over rights ; and a redefinition of objectives from income maintenance to social inclusion), which are discussed. An account is then given of experiences in the USA on the reform of public assistance. Next, the four most significant dimensions of policy change involved (restricting entrance and accelerating exit; the segmentation of participants; the introduction of contractual obligations; and the formulation of work‐oriented incentives and services) are discussed. The last part of the chapter discusses the legal aspects of implementation of work‐oriented policies, and the accompanying recommodification of labour.
Universal to Selective
Authors: Gilbert Neil 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
The principle of universalism in the allocation of social benefits, that is the availability of social benefits to everyone as of right, is contrasted with allocation on a selective basis in which benefits are allocated on the basis of need as determined by means testing of income. The increasing drift towards income‐tested benefits is described, and the possible stigma of means testing discussed. The implications of methods of targeting social welfare benefits other than by means testing are discussed; these include age, behaviour (e.g. searching for work, training, and voluntary work), and functional impairment (disability). The lack of transparency of restrictive targeting is noted.
The Triumph of Capitalism—and Its Discontents
Authors: Gilbert Neil 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
On the basis of the analysis of the changes in the welfare state over the last decade of the twentieth century described in the book, the occurrence of a paradigm shift is identified. The relative stances of the Left and Right on the changes in the welfare state, and the role of the free market in shaping the future course of welfare are discussed. The dangers of the enabling state as a handmaiden to the market are noted, and approaches to creating a healthier balance between the enabling state and market forces, and reviving the public sphere to some extent, are outlined.
Fixing God's Torah
Authors: Levy B. Barry 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
Many scholars and learned readers believe that rabbinic Judaism assumes a dogmatic commitment to the notion that the Bible text, particularly the Torah text, is letter perfect; orthodox Jews often accept this notion as fact, others, as normative rabbinic doctrine. This position developed over the centuries as an internal theological and interpretative posture and as a response to external pressures. These factors include rabbinic indifference to alternative forms of the Bible text recovered from pre‐rabbinic times or non‐rabbinic sources, attacks from Christians and Muslims who accused the Jews of falsifying the text or failing to transmit it accurately, and mystical Jewish teachings that saw in the Torah a divinely revealed and perfectly transmitted document whose letters were, in their entirety, a divine name. The assumption of letter‐perfect accuracy sustains much of the midrashic literature and has become a cornerstone of the postmodern fad of decoding the text to reveal alleged references to phenomena that occurred long after its books were written. This study, based on careful examination of hundreds of authoritative rabbinic writings, offers a very different picture of the Bible's textual reality and the rabbinic beliefs about it. Beginning with late antiquity and progressing throughout the subsequent ages, this book explores Talmudic, midrashic, medieval, Renaissance, and modern rabbinic texts that address the question of the letter‐perfect accuracy of the Bible text; it is particularly attentive to the writings of Rabbis Solomon ben Adret, Jacob ben Ibn Adoniyah, and David Ibn Zimra, as well as others who lived between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries. The documents analysed have been chosen from Bible commentaries, responsa, halakhic codes, guidebooks for scribes, studies of Bible manuscripts and the printed Bible, and many other rabbinic works. In presenting these sources, many translated here for the first time, the author explores the various rabbinic attempts to fix the Bible text—to correct it and to establish its authoritative spelling. He demonstrates conclusively that many of the same rabbinic figures whose teachings inform other contemporary Orthodox doctrines were quite open about the fact that their Bible texts, even their Torah scrolls, were not completely accurate. Moreover, though many of the variations are of little exegetical significance, these rabbis often acknowledged that, textually speaking, the situation was beyond repair.
Ibn Zimra's Responsum C: The Talmud, the Torah Scrolls, and Fixing the Torah Text
Authors: Levy B. Barry 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter, and Chapters 2–3 and 5 explore the principles that underlie medieval rankings of various types of halakhic evidence for deciding on a number of questionable spellings of the Torah text, including an important shift in ranking that received much support in the sixteenth century; they centre on a closely related group of four responsa (responses to questions) about the accuracy of the Bible text and closely related matters, by Rabbi David ben Solomon ibn Abi Zimra (popularly known in English as Ibn Zimra, and in Hebrew as HaRaDBaZ). A careful look at Ibn Zimra's responses offers an important glimpse into how a leading sixteenth century rabbinic authority evaluated his predecessors’ treatments of textual questions and ranked the conflicting witnesses to the spellings or orthographic irregularities of certain biblical words; it also clarifies the halakhic literature's overall approach to fixing the Bible text and reveals what appears to be a major inconsistency in Ibn Zimra's attitude towards the Masorah (the collective textual notes and other additions to the text of the Torah itself). Translations of each responsum are given, and an analysis made of the sources and nuances of their author's arguments, with observations on the relationships between these documents and other issues and compositions of masoretic and halakhic importance. The third responsum, which is covered in this chapter, deals with the unusual shape of the letter waw in the word šlwm, ‘peace’, in Num. 25: 12, and whether it was necessary to follow a talmudic teaching that required it to be cut.
The Literary Background of Ibn Zimra's Responsa: Rabbi Solomon Ben Adret and the Medieval Sefardi Halakhic Literature
Authors: Levy B. Barry 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter builds on the previous four, which analysed the closely related group of four responsa (responses to questions) about the accuracy of the Torah text and closely related matters, by Rabbi David ben Solomon ibn Abi Zimra (popularly known in English as Ibn Zimra, and in Hebrew as HaRaDBaZ). Ibn Zimra's approach was primarily halakhic, not masoretic, and to appreciate it an examination needs to be made of passages from both the halakhic and masoretic literature (the Masorah is the collective textual notes and other additions to the text of the Torah itself), especially the writings of Solomon ben Abraham Ben Adret, a prolific author and unchallenged rabbinic leader of Spanish Jewry until his death in 1310. Ibn Zimra cited Ben Adret several times, and the analysis presented begins with an anonymous question posed to Ben Adret on matters of spelling in the Torah, and goes on to give his response. Ibn Zimra's use of it is considered in the next chapter.
France: Old and New Civic and Social Ties in France
Authors: Worms Jean‐Pierre 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
This chapter examines social capital changes in France. The simultaneous growth of inner-oriented, self-centred primary group social capital and reduction of other-oriented bridging and institutionally linked social capital are observed. Received social capital is becoming irrelevant to citizens’ emerging demands, attitudes, mores, and capabilities. Civil society is undergoing a process of emancipation from the state.
Mindreading
Authors: Nichols Shaun , Stich Stephen P. 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThis volume defends an integrated account of the psychological mechanisms underlying “mindreading,” the commonplace capacity to understand the mind. The authors maintain that it is, as commonsense would suggest, vital to distinguish between reading others’ minds and reading one’s own. In reading other minds, the imagination plays a central role. As a result, the authors begin with an explicit and systematic account of pretense and imagination which proposes that pretense representations are contained in a separate mental workspace, the “Possible World Box,” which is part of the basic architecture of the human mind. The mechanisms subserving pretense get recruited in reading other minds, a capacity that implicates multifarious kinds of processes, including those favored by simulation approaches to mindreading, those favored by information-based approaches, and processes that don’t fit into either category. None of these mechanisms or processes, though, explains how we read our own minds, which, according to the authors, requires invoking an entirely independent set of mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Authors: Nichols Shaun , Stich Stephen P. 
Published: August 2004

AbstractMindreading has captured the attention of a wide variety of researchers for a wide variety of reasons. This chapter canvasses the many and varied reasons for the interest in mindreading, with particular focus on the philosophical motivations for determining the character of our mindreading capacities. The chapter also describes the approach to analyzing cognitive capacities that is adopted throughout the book, the familiar ‘computational’ level of analysis. Finally, two crucial background assumptions are set out: the representational account of cognition and an account of the basic cognitive architecture of the human mind.
3 Pieces of Mind: A Theory of Third‐Person Mindreading
Authors: Nichols Shaun , Stich Stephen P. 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThis chapter presents a detailed account of the mechanisms underlying third person mindreading: the attribution of mental states to others. A speculative Just So Story about the evolutionary origins of the capacity for third person mindreading is offered. This is followed by a list of basic facts about mindreading and some central empirical findings that plausibly need to be accommodated by any adequate theory. This leads to a detailed rendering of the theory of the cognitive mechanisms underlying mindreading, and a comparison with alternative theory-theory, modularity theory, simulation theory and rationality theory approaches. The view that emerges is a highly eclectic one that includes processes that fit with theory theory, modularity theory, and simulation theory as well as processes that do not have any clear parallel in any of the competing theories.
Reading One's Own Mind
Authors: Nichols Shaun , Stich Stephen P. 
Published: August 2004

AbstractThe most widely held account of self-awareness is the “theory theory”, according to which self-awareness is a theory-mediated process which depends on the same “theory of mind” that underlies the attribution of mental states to others. The chapter distinguishes several versions of the theory theory of self-awareness and presents an alternative account, according to which self-awareness is subserved by a monitoring mechanism that is independent of the theory of mind. The chapter also describes and disputes the prominent arguments for the theory theory, including a wellknown argument based on parallels between the development of first person and third person mindreading. Finally, it is argued that clinical findings on autism and schizophrenia seem to favor the view that the mechanism for self-awareness is independent of the theory of mind.
The Problem of Objectivity
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
‘The Problem of Objectivity’ challenges the Cartesian picture according to which there is a metaphysical distinction between the inner and the outer, knowledge of one's own mind is more fundamental and secure than knowledge of other minds, knowledge is based on data given to the individual mind, and acquisition of knowledge is based on a progression from the subjective to the objective. Proposes a complete revision of this picture, substituting the inner/outer framework with an epistemologically extensional framework with practical abilities and the concept of error, of one making a mistake by one's own lights, at its centre. The concepts of an objective reality and truth, and thereby of the ability to raise Cartesian‐style sceptical doubts, are presumptions of thought itself. All propositional thought, according to the author, requires the possession of the concept of objective truth, and this concept is accessible only to those creatures that are in communication with others. Concludes that general sceptical claims are plainly unintelligible and that knowledge, being interpersonal, emerges holistically.
The Interpersonal Comparison of Values
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
Considers the question of the extent to which objective interpersonal value judgements are possible, i.e. to which extent it is possible to objectively judge a state of affairs that involves the interests of two or more people. The author's answer is not straightforward: the previous chapters have established that beliefs and desires are inextricably linked to value judgements, so that if an interpreter is to understand the propositional attitudes of a subject, she must fit them to some degree into her own scheme, which includes her own value judgements. Consequently, the basis for an interpersonal comparison of value judgements is inherent in the very activity of interpretation, which does not decide the question of, but gives content to the idea, of an objective comparison of interpersonal value judgements.
Representation and Interpretation
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
Works out the implications of the claims of Ch. 5. Concepts used to explain actions of thinking creatures are irreducibly causal: the explanatory causal vocabulary that we call upon to interpret the semantics of a thinking object or creature is normative, relying on the interpreter's own standards of rationality. Sciences like physics, on the other hand, seek explanations and laws in which causal concepts no longer figure. Neither knowledge of the syntactical program of a computer nor knowledge of the neurophysiology of an organism warrant our attributing to the object or creature a holistic normative network of concepts, acquired through its interactions with the surrounding world. Consequently, information, ends, or strategies can be represented in such a (syntactical or neurophysiological) system, but the system cannot be interpreted as having the information, ends, or strategies. Generally, then, the difference between mind and body is not an ontological difference between types of entities, but a difference between schemes of classificatory concepts.
Incoherence and Irrationality
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
Continues the theme of the preceding chapter, inquiring further into the possibility of irrational thought and action, judged against a background that stipulates large‐scale rationality as a necessary condition for both interpretability and possession of a mind. Argues that, in order to remove the paradoxes of irrationality, it is not necessary to regard judgements of irrationality as subjective; rather, a more holistic approach, which holds that irrationality is made possible by the fact that agents cannot fail to comport most of the time with the basic norms of rationality, is required. Furthermore, the view of the mind that makes synchronic inconsistency seem paradoxical, namely, one that implies that all beliefs, desires, intentions, and principles of the agent that creates the inconsistency are present and in operation at once, does not seem to be tenable.
Deception and Division
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
Continues the theme of the preceding chapters, examining further the possibility of irrational thought and action, judged against a background that stipulates large‐scale rationality as a necessary condition for both interpretability and possession of a mind. Concentrates on the phenomenon of self‐deception, which the author holds to include ‘weakness of the warrant’, a phenomenon that violates what Hempel and Carnap have called ‘the requirement of total evidence for inductive reasoning’. The main tool to remove the paradox of self‐deception, according to the author, is the recognition of the idea that there can be boundaries between parts of the mind. Such boundaries, however, are not discovered by introspection, but are conceptual aids to the coherent description of genuine irrationalities.
Who is Fooled?
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
Applies and extends the conclusions of the preceding chapters by examining cases of self‐deception of a puzzling sort emerging from cases of fantasizing and imagining, found in Joyce's Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and Flaubert's Madame Bovary. The author is particularly interested in what can be described as the ‘divided mind of self‐deception’, the mind that produces an imagination due to its realising the state of the world that motivates the fantasy construct and the possessor's eventual acquisition of the belief that the fantasy construct represents reality accurately. In the process of deceiving oneself, he holds, no clear line can be drawn between imaginative activities that are not yet self‐deceptive and those that are.
An Interview with Donald Davidson
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
The last chapter is an interview Ernest Lepore, Director of the Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science and a friend of the Davidson family, has conducted with the author in 1988. In this interview, the author speaks of his childhood, his student years at Harvard, and his service in the navy in the Second World War. He describes his academic career, which took him from Queens College to Stanford, Princeton, and Rockefeller University, and illuminates his personal and philosophical relationships with contemporary philosophers and logicians such as Quine, Dummett, Carnap, and Tarski. He finally clarifies Lepore's questions regarding the development of and relations between his philosophical programmes in the philosophy of action and the philosophy of language.
A Jerusalem School Inspected
Authors: Heaton E. W. 
Published: August 2004

Abstract
The first part of this chapter introduces the possibility that the writers of the Old Testament came from an Israeli school tradition – as opposed to being a group of ‘wise men’ with a ‘wisdom tradition’, or even from a ‘Wisdom Movement’. The idea is often doubted on the grounds that there is no unambiguous reference to a school in Israel until Ben Sira’s ‘house of instruction’, which flourished in Jerusalem in the early years of the second century bc, and is mentioned in Ecclesiastes. The working hypothesis of this book is that it ought not to be difficult to identify a core of Old Testament writings, which, by their subject matter, literary form and delight in language, reveal what their authors encountered at school, and can be reviewed in the expectation that features in them that are often overlooked will become apparent, and give an awareness of the impressive continuity of Israel’s school tradition. The school tradition will be found to have distinctive features: it is distinct from popular religion and the view of divine–human relations embodied in the cult; it is engaged in the teaching of a moral and reasonable faith; it provides a clue to the activity in Israel of a less parochial type of theologian; it also helps to explain the obscure transmission of Israel’s literature through the centuries, and illuminates the way in which received tradition was reshaped and reinterpreted by a succession of scholarly editors. The last part of the chapter starts the exploration of the school tradition with an examination of Ben Sira’s school in Jerusalem.