bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Prehistory and Origins of the Dormition and Assumption Traditions
Authors: Shoemaker Stephen J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Many previous interpreters have sought to locate the origins of the Dormition traditions within ancient “Jewish‐Christianity.” Although they are quite correct in identifying a number of heterodox features present in some of the narratives, Jewish‐Christianity is a highly problematic construct that does not offer the best explanation for these features. Contact with some sort of gnostic Christianity can better explain these elements. Most importantly, these traces of contact with early Christian heterodoxy very strongly suggest that the narratives in question most likely were composed by the third century at the latest. This early date, along with several other features, makes very unlikely the frequently suggested hypothesis that the origin of the Dormition traditions is somehow linked with resistance to the council of Chalcedon.
The Second Kondratiev Wave: The Age of Iron Railways, Steam Power, and Mechanization
Authors: Freeman Chris , Louçã Francisco 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMajor inventions and improvements in the design of high‐pressure steam engines made it possible to use them for steam‐powered locomotives as well as for steamships and a widening range of industrial machines, based on cheap coal and iron.The highly successful demonstration trials of locomotives on the Liverpool to Manchester railway in 1831 triggered waves of railway investment in Britain in the 1830s and 1840s, amounting to ‘mania’ but leading ultimately to the creation of an efficient new transport infrastructure, first in Britain but later in many other countries.Contrary to the views of some cliometric historians, we argue that the railroads and the telegraph were immensely important in bringing huge competitive advantages in speed and reliability of transport and communication to many American industries.No less important were the institutional changes associated with the management of an efficient railway network and affecting many other industries in their capacity for managing stocks, forward planning, finance, personnel, industrial relations and government regulation.The construction of a railway network in North America in the 1850s and 60s with the huge scale economies and efficiency improvements it brought to many other industries and services, enabled the US economy to overtake Britain, the erstwhile leader of the Industrial Revolution, in the second half of the nineteenth century.
Order, Justice, and Global Islam
Authors: Piscatori James 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter examines some of the conceptions of order and justice that are present in the Islamic world. It argues that many Islamic states have been willing to accommodate themselves to an international society based on the idea of sovereign equality. However, one of the impacts of globalization has been to shift the allegiances of some members of these states from territorially based political communities to those based on religious or cultural identity. Some of the radical Islamist groupings that have emerged in recent years and have voiced a range of grievances are seeking nothing less than the overturning of prevailing international and domestic orders. Although the outcome of this complex challenge is impossible to predict, one consequence is that it has created space for the emergence of a new and possibly transformational Islamic civil society, which directs its attention principally to the reform of Muslim societies themselves.
Virtue, Goods, and Happiness in the Laws
Authors: Bobonich Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Laws endorses a Dependency Thesis about goods: every good, other than virtue, is good for its possessor only on the condition that its possessor is virtuous. I argue that the Dependency Thesis is supported by the Philebus’ claim that wisdom is the cause of the good life. I show that the Dependency Thesis explains why the Laws holds that the proper ultimate end of the laws is to foster virtue in as many citizens as possible, and holds that the citizens should receive a true ethical account of the basis of the laws that govern them. I show how these goals are advanced by the Laws’ practice of attaching preludes to legislation.
Knowledge and Reality
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Knowledge and Reality brings together a selection of Colin McGinn's philosophical essays from the mid 1970s to the late 1990s, whose unifying theme is the relation between mind and reality. The essays are divided into three groups (‘Knowledge and Necessity’, ‘Thought and World’, and ‘Reality and Appearance’) and range over several topics of recent interest, including the analysis of knowledge, the a priori, necessity, possible worlds, externalism, essentialism, realism, mental representation, intentionality, and colour. While all but one essay has been previously published elsewhere, McGinn has provided a new postscript to each essay, placing it in its philosophical context by sketching the background against which it was written, explaining its relations to other notable work, and offering his current reflections on the topic. The volume thus traces the development of McGinn's ideas and their role in some central philosophical debates. Seen together McGinn's essays bear out his commitment to ‘not making the world depend upon our means of knowing about it’, offering a many‐sided defence of realism, while emphasizing the epistemological price that realism exacts.
Realist Semantics and Content‐Ascription
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
McGinn's target is again Dummettian anti‐realism; this time he argues that Dummett's criticism of realist semantics rests on a questionable theory of content‐ascription. McGinn develops four Twin Earth cases (one of which prefigures Putnam's ‘brain in a vat’) designed to show that, contra Dummett, content is not determined by use (where ‘use’ is understood as ‘the exercise of recognitional capacities in respect of assertability conditions’). But if use does not exhaust content, McGinn argues, then from the fact that verification‐transcendent truth conditions are not present in linguistic use, it does not follow that reality cannot be represented in our sentences.
Realism in Semantics
Authors: Niiniluoto Ilkka 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSemantical realism claims that truth is a semantical relation between language and reality. The view that representation is one of the functions of language can be combined with the thesis that languages as systems of symbolic signs (in the sense of Peirce's semiotics) are human‐made social conventions. This chapter defends, against Quine, the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Tarski's model‐theoretic approach is argued to be the best explication of the correspondence theory of factual truth. By combining the notions of truth and similarity, a comparative and quantitative concept of truthlikeness is defined for a large variety of statements.
Realism in Methodology
Authors: Niiniluoto Ilkka 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMethodological realism accepts the axiological view that truth is one of the essential aims of science. Following Popper and Levi, truthlikeness as the aim of science, combines the goals of truth and information. This chapter discusses the relations between truthlikeness and other epistemic utilities like explanatory power (Hempel), problem‐solving capacity (Laudan), and simplicity (Reichenbach). While rationality in science can be defined relative to the goals accepted within scientific communities at different times, a critical realist defines scientific progress in terms of increasing truthlikeness. It is argued that progress in this sense can be assessed, relative to empirical evidence, by the notion of expected verisimilitude. An abductive argument is formulated to defend realism as the best (and even the only) explanation of the empirical and practical success of science.
Realism, Science, and Society
Authors: Niiniluoto Ilkka 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBesides systematic philosophical arguments, there are various extra‐scientific reasons that have been presented for or against realism. This discussion about the relations of knowledge and happiness (good human life) started already among the ancient philosophers (Aristotle, sceptics), and has continued ever since. Such religious, moral, and political considerations do not directly speak in favour or against the truth of scientific realism, but they raise important issues about science policy that have recently been topical in the so‐called Science Wars. Against Rorty's postmodern pragmatism and Feyerabend's epistemological anarchism, it is argued that critical scientific realism, with its commitment to the ethos of science as described by Merton's ethical norms, is in many ways a desirable philosophical outlook in a free, democratic, liberal society.
Europeanization as Convergence: The Regulation of Media Markets in the European Union
Authors: Harcourt Alison J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
One of the challenges of Europeanization as an innovative research agenda is the identification of mechanisms through which domestic public policy is Europeanized. In Chapter 2, Radaelli identified two types of mechanisms, vertical (these include European Commission (EC) directives, European Court of Justice (ECJ) decisions, and EC competition decisions) and horizontal (suggestion of best practice through European level policy forums). This chapter elaborates on these mechanisms by considering the case of media market regulation in the European Union (EU), arguing that Europeanization of this policy area can be understood by looking at the interplay between the two mechanisms. An examination is made of vertical mechanisms in the section ‘The Impact of ECJ Decisions on National Regulation’, and of horizontal mechanisms in the section ‘Vertical Europeanization via EC Merger Policy’; together these sections provide an overview of ECJ and competition decisions. The section on ‘The Commission and New Modes of Governance’ overviews how policy ideas travel through European-level forums; last, the ‘Conclusion’ looks at how Europeanization has driven the convergence of national media policies.
Radical Interpretation and Philosophical Scepticism
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An exploration of the possibility of drawing anti‐sceptical conclusions from Donald Davidson's discussions of radical interpretation and his accounts of belief and belief‐ascription. Stroud argues, against Davidson, that the truth of most of our beliefs cannot be derived solely from the fulfilment of the conditions of our attributing them to ourselves and others, at least not without a doubtful transcendental argument that would appear to depend on some form of idealism. However, Stroud sketches a Davidsonian anti‐sceptical strategy that demonstrates not the truth but what Stroud calls the ‘invulnerability’ of the beliefs in question.
StJohn Damascene and Tradition
Authors: Louth Andrew 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discussion of the late Life of St John and what it tells us about John's reputation around the turn of the millennium, when it was written. Survey of John's works, including the spurious Balaam and Josaphat, which again reveals something of John's later reputation in Byzantium. How John was both shaped by tradition and he himself came to shape it.
Probable Reasoning: The Negative Argument
Authors: Owen David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Hume's negative argument about probable reasoning is sometimes called the problem of induction. The modern version of that argument is centrally concerned with the warrant of probable reasoning and the justification of the beliefs that result from such reasoning. It is argued here that Hume is more concerned with the mechanism that produces such beliefs, and that his problem is more one of explanation than justification. What does Hume mean by raising the question whether we are determined by reason in making the inference from a present impression to an unobserved idea? If we were determined by reason, something, such as the idea of necessary connection or the principle of uniformity, would have to serve as the intermediary via which we get from the impression to the idea. But no such idea or principle is available to us prior to our engaging in probable reasoning. So inferences or reasonings from the observed to the unobserved are not explained by an appeal to the faculty of reason. The point about not being determined by reason does not show that such inferences, or the beliefs we thus come to hold, are unreasonable. It shows that our coming to have such beliefs is not explained by an appeal to the proper functioning of the faculty of reason.
Belief and the Development of Hume's Account of Probable Reasoning
Authors: Owen David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
After rejecting traditional accounts in terms of reason, Hume presents his own explanation of how we are led from a present impression directly to an idea of something unobserved by the association of ideas set up by past experience. It is this that explains our most basic probable inferences. Hume also has to explain why and how the results of such inferences are believed. What distinguishes belief from mere conception is the very same thing as that which distinguishes impressions from ideas, and ideas of memory from ideas of the imagination: force and vivacity. Once he has an account of these basic inferences and beliefs, he is able to explain how we manage to engage in more complex, reflective reasonings. Such reasonings make use of the uniformity principle and the causal maxim, and Hume is even able to explain how we get the idea of necessary connection. At the end of the story, we have an account of how we manage to perform really difficult and complex feats of reasoning. But this account requires his explanation of the simplest cases of probable reasoning as merely associative, and his account of belief as belonging more to the sensitive than the cogitative part of our natures.
The Limits and Warrant of Reason
Authors: Owen David 
Published: October 2003

AbstractTwo large issues dealt with here are the scope of Hume's negative arguments and the warrant of probable reasoning. What Hume means when he says that we are not determined by reason when we make inferences from the observed to the unobserved is expanded and clarified. He is claiming that such inferences cannot be explained as the result of the faculty of reason considered as one that functions only by reasoning from one idea to another via an intermediate idea. Hume's own conception of reason explains reasoning in terms of a subset of properties of the imagination. Similarly, the arguments of scepticism with regard to reason are directed against reason considered as a faculty functioning independently of those properties; it is only because of these properties that beliefs survive in the face of sceptical arguments. Concerning the second issue, a suggestion is made regarding just where in fact Hume does face the issue of warrant and an explanation is given of how he deals with it. Although Hume was not primarily concerned with issues of warrant and justification, he does, in Part 4, begin to face the issue of just why we prefer the results of reason to those of other belief‐forming mechanisms, such as superstition. Although the beginnings of Hume's answer can be found in this part of the Treatise, the answer is much better formulated and more ably presented in the first Enquiry. Hume explains our preference for reason in the same way as he accounts for our preference for virtue: the reasonable person, like the virtuous person, is more useful and pleasing to herself and others.
Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues against two articles of Bernard Williams in which he attacks moral realism. In the first (Ethical Consistency), Williams finds a disanalogy between judgements of matters of fact and moral judgements in that when two beliefs are irreconcilable one must simply cede: whereas an obligation that overrides another obligation does so only with ‘remainder.’ Foot argues that although the notion of obligation when understood in one way does indeed allow coexisting irreconcilable obligations, this no more supports anti‐realism here than the possibility of clashing social engagements supports an anti‐realistic account of judgements about them. In the second article (Consistency and Realism) Williams argues from the special case of irresolvable moral conflict, where there are as good reasons for doing a as for doing not a, suggesting that there cannot similarly be as good reasons for believing and disbelieving a proposition. Foot denies that this implies anti‐realism for propositions about reasons, suggesting an analogy in the case of propositions that are equally assertable or deniable relative to different grounds.
Aristotle's Theory of Substance
Authors: Wedin Michael V. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe Categories and Metaphysics Zeta (Book VII) are often thought to be incompatible because each posits different candidates for the title of primary substance or ousia. In the Categories, primary substance is the concrete individual thing, while in Zeta, it is the form or essence of the individual thing, which is now understood as a composite of form and matter. In this book, Wedin rejects the thesis of incompatibilism, and in its stead argues that the two treatises are concerned with different projects. Wedin argues that the theory of Metaphysics Zeta is meant to explain certain features of the theory of the Categories, and that it therefore presupposes the Categories theory of substance. The ousia of the Categories, what Wedin calls ‘c‐substance’, remains a primary substance in the Metaphysics in the sense that its ontological priority is not called into question. Aristotle focuses on form in the Metaphysics because it explains the substantiality of c‐substances: in other words, it has ‘explanatory’ primacy. Wedin's overall view of Metaphysics Zeta is that it is concerned with investigating what sort of thing form must be, given that form is the primary cause of the nature or being of a c‐substance. The treatises, then, are not incompatible, because the explananda of Zeta are the primary substances of the Categories. Showing that this is so involves, firstly, setting out the theory of the Categories (Ch. 1–3), secondly, clarifying the sense in which ‘c‐substance’ is the explanandum of Metaphysics Zeta (Ch. 4–5), and finally, examining in detail the explanatory theory of Zeta (Ch. 6—10). In the Introduction, Wedin announces his intention to consider only what he calls the ‘canonical chapters’ of Zeta, i.e. Z.1–6, 10–11, 13–17: Ch. 7–9 and 12 are mostly neglected, as Wedin believes that these chapters are not part of the original project of Zeta.
The Impact of Party Leaders in Britain: Strong Assumptions, Weak Evidence
Authors: Bartle John , Crewe Ivor 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There has been a widespread belief in Britain in recent years (which appears to be corroborated by survey evidence) that leaders’ personalities strongly influence the way that people vote and therefore the results of elections, although in a parliamentary system such as Britain’s, this is less obviously correct than in presidential systems such as the United States, France and Russia. However, British political science has usually reached negative conclusions on this belief, pointing out that popular leaders have often lost elections, and that only two of the eleven elections fought since 1964 (those of 1964 and 1997) stand out as elections in which leaders’ personalities may have been decisive. This chapter looks at the 1997 election, for which three separate studies belonging to the British Election Study are available: the cross–sectional study, XBES; the campaign study, BECS; and the British Election Panel Study, BEPS. It first discusses the effect of leaders’ personalities by constructing a series of vote models, and then looks at the relationship between leaders’ personalities and the vote. Each of the three British Election Studies are then analysed; only the BEPS study (which has the least comprehensive data set) indicates that leaders’ personalities had anything other than a marginal effect on the election outcome.
Prime Ministerial Contenders in Canada
Authors: Johnston Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
For the case of elections since 1988, this chapter looks at the suggestion made by Andre Siegfried in 1907 that Canadian elections are peculiarly vulnerable to leader effects. It begins by outlining the specifically Canadian arguments for taking leadership seriously and the evidence said to back them; the arguments are found to refer mainly to ‘indirect’ effects in the sense used by King in Chapter 1 (so that leaders are treated as embodied preferences), with the actual evidence largely silent on the content – personality or otherwise – of Canadian judgments on leaders, at least in so far as those judgments are linked to the vote. Likewise, most accounts control for competing explanations weakly, if at all, and none considers personality for its net, election–day effect. Working through each argument also reveals that each is highly contingent, generally applying more to certain parties or party sizes than others, and more to periods of flux and to new parties than to stable periods and old parties. Filling the gaps requires an account of the personality factors worth taking seriously (the analysis looks at competence and character), a basic estimation strategy setting these attributes into proper context (which is given), and based on this estimation strategy, an accounting for net aggregate effects (also given). The last two sections of the chapter discuss whether perceptions of personality can be modified over the course of a campaign, and give an account of a special sort of ‘indirect’ effect: the case where perceptions of a leader’s personality can be cashed in on perceptions of a policy option (here the proposal for a commercial union between Canada and the United States in 1988).
The Title
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The traditional title is an oddity. It has been explained as meaning ’On the Assertion’ (in accordance with the view that that is what the treatise is about) but the best translation is really ’On Language’. However, the title is never mentioned by Aristotle and is likely to be a later invention. ’On Contradiction’ or ’On the Contradictory Pair’ would be the most appropriate titles for the work's true preoccupations.
Chapter 5: Simple and Compound Assertions
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter offers two criteria for the unity of an assertion: the semantic claim that a single assertion is one which claims one thing about one thing, and the syntactic claim that an assertion may be ’one by conjunction’. After a discussion, the semantic criterion is preferred. There is also an argument that no single word can be an answer to a question, which accords with Aristotle's view of the dialectical question as the demand for the answerer to assent to one out of two assertions.
Chapter 7: The First Exception to RCP; Singular and Universal Assertions
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Aristotle now begins his investigation of contradictory pairs of assertions. ’Things’ are now divided into two types, universal and singular. Assertions may be divided likewise, and it is found that ’non‐universal assertions about universals’ (such as ’Man is pale’) do not necessarily obey the Rule of Contradictory Pairs (RCP) stating that one member of a contradictory pair is true and the other false (since the universal man is both pale and not pale, both ’Man is pale’ and ’Man is not pale’ are true). This chapter is closely allied to dialectic, in which the establishment of non‐universal statements about universals is of great importance, occupying books IV, V and VI of the Topics.