bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Regulatory Legitimacy in the United States and the European Union
Authors: Majone Giandomenico 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Returns to themes sounded in the previous two chapters, elaborating them in the context of regulatory federalism: Majone discusses how regulatory independence may be reconciled with accountability, in a context where important policy‐making powers are delegated to non‐majoritarian institutions, an issue the American polity has grappled with for more than a century. Joint regulatory action, or regulatory cooperation, is a crucial feature of multi‐level governance, where powers are not clearly allocated hierarchically, and in Europe, the emergence of transnational regulatory networks is the key development that will help Europe find coordinated rather than vertically distinct solutions to regulatory problems. However, this also entails important dilemmas of legitimacy: on the one hand, in the context of multi‐level governance, values of technical competence and political independence argue in favour of governments delegating these joint regulatory activities to bodies of regulators from the various jurisdictions; on the other hand, this poses a very serious challenge to democratic legitimacy since there is no comprehensive democratic body or polity that can apparently effectively control the exercise of these delegated powers. Here, Majone dismisses various philosophies that have been tried in the USA and found echoes in the EU—from the traditional ‘transmission belt’ approach leaving no discretion to regulatory agencies, to the expertise model of the New Deal period or the pluralist proposal to politicize the regulatory process. Instead, he argues that, if one looks imaginatively at some of the control mechanisms that exist in the USA system today with respect to delegated federal regulatory powers, the problem may not at all be insuperable. In the EU, these procedural safeguards, designed to strengthen democratic legitimacy in general rather than simply state rights, are all the more necessary since delegation to the Commission and to a lesser extent to outside bodies involves wide discretionary powers: in short, the EU should continue to strengthen its multi‐level networks as well as to adopt the equivalent of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and emulate the far‐reaching judicialization of regulatory decision‐making that has occurred since then in the USA.
Democratic Legitimacy Under Conditions of Regulatory Competition: Why Europe Differs from the United States
Authors: Scharpf Fritz W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAddresses concern over the so‐called ‘democratic deficit’ in the EU in comparison with the USA. The author deduces that there are two reasons for the political salience of this alleged deficit: the pragmatic reason that the EU's institutions are inadequate for a union with fifteen members and an expanded range of competencies (and will become unworkable when it is enlarged by the joining of the Eastern European countries); and the trilemma of the democratic welfare state. This is that EU member states cannot want to shed their welfare‐state obligations without jeopardizing the bases of their democratic legitimacy, they cannot want to reverse the process of economic integration, which exposes national welfare states to regulatory competition, and they cannot want to avoid regulatory competition by shifting welfare‐state responsibilities upward to the European level. The chapter focuses primarily on the third part of this European trilemma. It begins with a brief theoretical discussion of the preconditions of democratic legitimacy, then it explores how these are affected by European integration; it concludes with an examination of European policies that could strengthen national efforts to cope with the constraints of regulatory competition.
Citizenship and Federations: Some Preliminary Reflections
Authors: Choudhry Sujit 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Some preliminary reflections are offered on the place of citizenship in a theory of federalism. Citizenship is one of the central concepts in political theory, and an account of citizenship, at the very least, defines the criteria for, and the method for the acquisition of, membership in a political community; more importantly, it also lays down the rights and responsibilities that attach to membership. The first section in this chapter makes the point that the three chapters following in this last section of the book further the debate on citizenship and federalism by invoking three different conceptions of citizenship, ethnocultural (Ch. 17), civic (Ch. 15), and economic (Ch. 16), which in turn express different underlying conceptions of political community; these different conceptions are discussed. The second section argues that the three chapters do not fully address the complication that federalism poses for citizenship, which is termed here the problem of divided, multiple or conflicting allegiances/loyalties; this is done by discussing conceptions of citizenship in the EU, and contrasting them with the situation in the USA.
The Constitution of Institutions
Authors: Meehan Elizabeth 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Begins with a brief reference to the constitutional and institutional frameworks of allegiances, identification, and citizenship rights, and goes on to argue that there are grounds for questioning the customary conceptual and political overlap between nationality and citizenship. Some decoupling has taken place in the EU, opening, according to some commentators, the possibility of a new paradigm in citizenship praxis. Thus, the chapter explores Carlos Closa's idea that supranational citizenship has more potential than national citizenship to be democratic, and draws on Joseph Weiler's ideas, which in some respects are similar to those of Closa but differ in respect of the significance of nationality and national identity; Weiler's acknowledgement of national forces is, however, consistent with Closa's suggestion that civil society in the EU is too weak to take advantage of the more democratic potential of supranational citizenship. Both ideas can be used to infer that difficulties in European citizenship may be reinforced by enlargement, not because of the introduction of a further set of nationalities per se into a supranational citizenship system, but because of a new complexity in the principled norms that Closa says have to be present in a site of democratic citizenship. In view of this, there are lessons to be learned from American theories of republican federalism, which, as expounded by S. H. Beer (1993), have much in common with a modern interest among radical democrats in deliberative or dialogic democracy; in this respect, Weiler's ideas about a European public space must be taken seriously
European Citizenship: The Relevance of the American Model
Authors: Lacorne Denis 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Draws an analogy between the threats posed by social heterogeneity in the USA and the threats posed by differing national allegiances in the EU. The author reminds USA that core political identities can vary over time and that early conceptions of citizenship in the USA focussed almost exclusively on state, not federal, citizenship; in his view, within unitary states communities of identity are fine so long as individuals do not conflate these with their core political identity. In a federal system, the problem or challenge is exactly that of belonging to several political communities. Lacorne argues that pure constitutional patriotism will not suffice, since individuals require a substantial citizenship; what is needed instead are ‘common and concrete political experiences’ that would give rise to ‘a new European ethics of responsibility’. The two sections of the chapter are: The Irrelevance of the American Model of Federal Citizenship; and The Relevance of the American Multicultural Model.
Objects and Persons
Authors: Merricks Trenton 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There are no statues or rocks or chairs. But there are microscopic objects arranged statuewise and rockwise and chairwise. Moreover, there are—in addition to microscopic objects arranged humanwise—composite human organisms.
The ontology of Objects and Persons is motivated, in large part, by causal considerations. One of the central conclusions is that physical objects are causally non‐redundant: physical objects cause things that are not wholly overdetermined by their parts. I ‘eliminate’ statues and other inanimate composite macrophysical objects on the grounds that they would—if they existed—be at best completely causally redundant.
I defend our existence by arguing, from certain facts about mental causation, that we human beings cause things that are not already caused by our parts.
A second strand of argument for the book's overall ontology involves a variety of philosophical puzzles, puzzles that are dealt with in illuminating and often novel ways. These puzzles support eliminativism regarding statues and rocks and chairs, but—I argue—do not support eliminating us human organisms.
Many other issues are addressed along the way, including free will, the ‘reduction’ of a composite object to its parts, and the ways in which identity over time can ‘for practical purposes’ be a matter of convention.
Epiphenomenalism and Eliminativism
Authors: Merricks Trenton 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I argue that anything a baseball causes—if baseballs exist—is also caused by the baseball's atoms working in concert. Moreover, a baseball is ‘causally irrelevant’ to what its atoms cause. These two claims imply that baseballs, if they existed, would be at best mere overdeterminers of whatever they cause. From this we can draw two conclusions. First, our perceptual reasons for believing in baseballs are no good and whether baseballs exist, just like whether arbitrary sums exist, can be decided only by philosophical argument.Second, there aren’t any baseballs. For, we should resist causal overdetermination and assume, unless forced to do otherwise, that effects are not systematically causally overdetermined. Baseballs would systematically causally overdetermine the effects of their constituent atoms. And so, the bias against systematic causal overdetermination gives a positive reason—in addition to those of Ch. 2—to deny that baseballs exist.
Considerations in Favour of Eliminating Us?
Authors: Merricks Trenton 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I show that the arguments of Ch. 2, while giving good reasons to eliminate statues and other inanimate composita, do not provide equally good reasons to eliminate us human organisms. As with Ch. 2, the arguments discussed touch on a variety of topics, including vagueness and the ‘Sorites Game,’ worries about co‐location and constitution, and the way a thinker (such as a person) is related to her brain.
Belief and Practice
Authors: Merricks Trenton 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues that—because eliminativism is true—folk beliefs about statues and chairs are indeed false. But I make the case that, insofar as practical matters and justification are concerned, such beliefs are ‘nearly as good as true.’ And I argue that whether a claim of (e.g.) statue identity over time is ‘nearly as good as true’ can be, to some extent, a matter of convention. But, I argue, nothing similar can be said about claims of personal identity over time. Thus, my ontology yields a principled defence of the intuitively plausible claim that personal identity over time can never be a matter of convention, whereas the ‘identity of artifacts’ can be.
The Commentaries of Origen and Jerome on St. Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians
Authors: Heine Ronald E. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It has long been known that Jerome depended on Origen to some extent in producing his own commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians. Several excerpts from Origen's commentary on Ephesians have been preserved in Greek. This book demonstrates the extent of Jerome's dependence on Origen by placing English translations of these excerpts from Origen's Commentary on Ephesians parallel to the English translation of Jerome's commentary on Ephesians. These parallels show that in every case where Jerome's commentary can be compared with Origen's, Jerome has followed Origen, either by translating his text or paraphrasing his thought. By this and other means, all the passages that can be attributed in some degree to Origen have been identified in Jerome's commentary in order to allow Origen's comments on Ephesians to be heard again, even if muffled at times, through the words of Jerome. This is important because Origen's commentary, in all probability, was the first complete commentary ever composed on the Epistle to the Ephesians. Origen's comments are sometimes philological, discussing the meaning of Greek words in the text and the syntax of the phrases in the Greek sentences of Paul. His comments deal also with theology, for Ephesians provided many texts that were key elements in some of his theological views, such as the pre‐existent church, the constitution of the foundation of the material world after the fall, God's foreknowledge, the unity of revelation based on the ancient prophets’ knowledge of God's future work in Christ, and the Christian struggle against hostile spiritual powers.
Book II
Authors: Heine Ronald E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractContains a translation of the second book of Jerome's Latin commentary on Ephesians along with a translation of all the parallel passages from Origen's commentary on Ephesians. The book has a brief prologue where Jerome describes the haste with which he is working, followed by a commentary on Ephesians 3: 1–4: 30. Origen makes numerous remarks about the peculiarities of Paul's grammar. Major subjects discussed in the commentary in this section of the epistle include the mystery of God's plan to save the Gentiles, the unity of revelation in the two testaments, the final restoration of all things, and the meaning of Paul's statement about ‘all paternity’ in heaven and Earth being named from God, and his references to maintaining ‘unity in the Spirit’ and attaining ‘unity of the faith’.
Epictetus
Authors: Long A. A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe Discourses of Epictetus, an emancipated Graeco‐Roman slave, are the most powerful surviving record of an ancient Stoic teacher at work. This book offers a comprehensive analysis of Epictetus’ philosophy as a guide to life, focusing on his dialectical methodology, principal ideas, and long‐term influence. It also shows, for the first time, how strongly he aligned his thought and educational goals with those of the Platonic Socrates. The first part of the book treats Epictetus’ intellectual and cultural context and the conversational style of the Discourses. In the second part, the core of his philosophy is found to consist in four fundamental themes: freedom, judgement, volition, and integrity. The book is also intended to serve as a guide to reading and sampling Epictetus, and it includes numerous excerpts from the Discourses in the author's original translations. Long finds Epictetus a thinker whose theism (though non‐Christian) is strikingly personalist, and whose acute psychological analysis scarcely needs updating.
The Socratic Paradigm
Authors: Long A. A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses the presence of Socrates in Epictetus’ Discourses. Plato's Gorgias was a principal source of inspiration for Epictetus, especially for his understanding and incorporation of the Socratic elenchus. On the basis of his concept of innate moral preconceptions, Epictetus arrived at an understanding of the Socratic elenchus strikingly similar to that proposed by Gregory Vlastos. He also shared with Plato's Socrates the belief that everyone has the motivation to pursue what they take to be good, with error due to failure of judgement and mental conflict. The chief aim of the Discourses is to undermine error by facilitating self‐examination and self‐discovery in terms of autonomous volition.
Reading Epictetus
Authors: Long A. A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractOffers detailed analysis of two of Epictetus’ Discourses: ’On rationality as self‐studying’, and ’On lapsing from integrity’. Epictetus explains the importance of making correct use of mental impressions, criticizes Epicurus, outlines the essentials of Stoic value theory, contrasts external power with self‐mastery, treats loss of integrity as supremely damaging to its former owner, and advocates internal dialogue as the essential resource for monitoring experience.
Epilogue: The Afterlife of Epictetus
Authors: Long A. A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConcludes with a survey of Epictetus’ influence on later authors, ranging from classical antiquity and early Christianity up to the present. Those discussed include Simplicius, Justus Lipsius, Pascal, Descartes, Joseph Butler, and The Earl of Shaftesbury. Also included are Epictetus’ presence in American literature, and a discussion of his prospects for the new millennium.
Archetypal Heresy
Authors: Wiles Maurice 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Arianism is a fourth‐century heresy, which affirmed Christ to be divine, but not in the same full sense in which God the Father is divine. Traditional Trinitarianism, with its classical expression in the Nicene Creed, emerged out of controversy with Arianism and defined Christ as being of one substance with the Father. The overall aim of the book is to trace when and where beliefs of an Arian nature have recurred in the subsequent history of Christianity. It begins with an account of the main findings of recent scholarship on fourth‐century Arianism, which involve substantial revision of the traditional picture of the faithful orthodox defending sacred truth against the evil heretics. It goes on to provide survey accounts of Gothic Christianity, of references to Arianism in the Middle Ages, and of the resurgence of Arian‐type beliefs in the continental Reformation. There is a major concentration on eighteenth‐century Britain, where many leading intellectual figures favoured a view of the Trinity close to that of early Arianism. In particular, there are detailed studies of the theological beliefs of Isaac Newton, William Whiston, and Samuel Clarke. The collapse of these views (and the similar views of many leading heterodox dissenters) into Unitarianism is traced out, and reasons for that development offered. The final chapter looks at the development of the historical study of Arianism in Britain from John Henry Newman to Rowan Williams, with special regard for the relation between the scholars’ faith and scholarly judgement. Finally a brief epilogue asks about the implication of this historical study for contemporary Trinitarian faith.
The Rise and Fall of British Arianism
Authors: Wiles Maurice 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Looks briefly at anti‐Trinitarian tendencies in sixteenth‐ and seventeenth‐century Britain (with special attention to Ralph Cudworth and John Locke), but concentrates on the eighteenth century, when Arianism was a significant feature of the ecclesiastical scene, especially among leading intellectual figures both in the Church of England and among the Presbyterian churches. Detailed studies of the theologies of Isaac Newton, William Whiston, and Samuel Clarke. Traces the collapse of this Arian‐style anti‐Trinitarianism in the Church of England and the tendency of heterodox dissenters, such as Joseph Priestley, to adopt a Unitarian view. Suggests that the diminishing acceptance in the wider culture of belief in a transcendental spirit world was an important factor in that tendency, leading to a third death of Arianism.
Epilogue
Authors: Wiles Maurice 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Poses a question that the preceding historical survey raises for contemporary faith. Orthodox Trinitarianism, and the Nicene Creed in which it finds classical expression, were hammered out in the course of the fourth‐century debate with Arianism. How far does the revised understanding of that debate, to which modern historical study points, put in question the kind of authority that traditional faith has normally ascribed to its outcome? The eighteenth century was able to pursue the issues in terms close to that of the original debate, because its understanding of the world and of the nature of scripture was closer to that of the fourth century than to that of the twenty‐first. Is the historical survey outlined in the book one where historical study should be freeing us from being too closely bound by our historical past?
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis essay argues that giving the reason for which an action was done, thus ‘rationalizing’ it, is giving a causal explanation––a claim that ran counter to the then prevailing orthodoxy inspired by the later Wittgenstein. We rationalize an action, says Davidson, by specifying the agent's intention; i.e. we specify that the agent did something X because he desired such and such and believed that doing X would bring about what he desired. Because intentions (‘primary reasons’) are composed of beliefs and desires, they do not themselves refer to distinct entities such as acts of will; further, on the basis of those beliefs and desires we can form practical syllogisms from which the desirability of the action (or its execution) follows deductively. In asking why an agent did such and such, we want to be given a reason that not only justifies his action but tells us for which reason he actually did it; for he might have had the justificatory reason, and acted, but not because of it––this ‘because’ must be specified causally lest the explanatory connection between reason and action be left utterly mysterious. By distinguishing events from how we describe them, Davidson discharges several objections to the causal thesis, among them the apparent logical distinctness that pertains to causal but not rationalized relata; he salvages the identification of beliefs and desires with ‘mental’ events, and stresses that action and the reason re‐describing it (which , we saw, presented no distinct entity) are not two distinct entities but only one under different descriptions.
Eternal vs. Ephemeral Events
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay continues Davidson's exchange with Chisholm on the nature of events, started in Essay 9. Davidson emphasizes that his own ontological approach, as opposed to Chisholm's, grows out of a need to provide a semantic analysis for sentences stating that a (causal) change occurred; and that Chisholm is wrong to divorce matters of metaphysics from matters of entailment. Entailments matter because for Davidson a correct analysis yields the logical form of the sentence, which in turn captures the inferential relations of the sentence to those it entails (Essay 6 develops this at greater length). He stresses that sentences do not, as Chisholm claims, refer to particular events but are only existentially and generically committed to them (see Essay 8, Essay 9), and demotes additional evidence marshalled by Chisholm on behalf of the sentential theory, including sentences that apparently demand the existence of recurrent (‘eternal’) events on top of non‐recurrent (‘ephemeral’) ones. Replying to Chisholm's objection that he has not sufficiently clarified what he means by talking of an event or action ‘under a description’, Davidson classifies the locution as an intensional idiom for which we require a more general analysis––one he prefers to give in terms of utterance tokens rather than Chisholm's events.