bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
How to Get Causes from Probabilities
Authors: Cartwright Nancy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the context of linear causal systems, ‘How to Get Causes from Probabilities’ shows that given correct background information about other causal facts, certain probabilistic relations (like correlations and partial correlations) are both necessary and sufficient for the truth of new causal facts. This is done by showing how simple structural models from econometrics can be read causally if the conditions for identification of the model are met, and a generalized version of Reichenbach's principle of the common cause is assumed.
Singular Causes First
Authors: Cartwright Nancy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
‘Singular Causes First’ rejects Hume's thesis that singular causal facts are reducible to generic ones, adopting a reverse position, taking singular causes as basic. Using idealized examples, Cartwright shows that strategies to establish causal claims without using singular causal facts as inputs all fail, including probabilistic theories of causality. Not only is singular causal input necessary if probabilities are to imply causal connections, the resulting causal output is also at base singular.
Abstract and Concrete
Authors: Cartwright Nancy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Modern science relies heavily on Galilean idealization, which establishes ceteris paribus laws—laws about what happens when a factor operates unimpeded. But these laws are of little direct use since factors seldom do operate unimpeded. The follow‐up to Galilean idealization is abstraction—we talk simply of what the factor does. The best way to understand this abstraction is as an ascription of a capacity, not in terms of any kind of laws. Even the process of ‘de‐idealization’ or of ‘concretization’ that results in a concrete phenomenological law inevitably involves further concepts in the capacity family.
A Nominalist Theory of Musical Works
Authors: Goehr Lydia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractLays the foundation for an investigation into the concept of a musical work according to the terms of analytic philosophy. It considers a range of analytic positions, but focuses ultimately on Nelson Goodman's influential nominalist and extensionalist account of musical works and performance compliance. Goodman's view that the musical score is a uniquely specified character in a notational system generates strict theoretical criteria to distinguish between constitutive and contingent features of works and compliant and non‐compliant performances. The critical examination of Goodman's theory is used to prepare the ground for a more general argument against the possibility of reaching a satisfactory account of the complex relation between philosophical theory and musical practice while working within the parameters of analytic philosophy.
A Platonist Theory of Musical Works
Authors: Goehr Lydia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe limitations of the analytic approach are further explored through a consideration of Jerrold Levinson's modified Platonist view of musical works and performances. Levinson's account of musical works as initiated types seems to be more sensitive to our pre‐ontological and aesthetic understanding of works. The debate between Goodman and Levinson largely turns on which pre‐ontological and/or aesthetic conditions they are willing either to accommodate or dispense with in their theories. Several disputes are considered: Do notationally identical pieces that are produced nonetheless by different composers count as ‘the same’ work? Are works created or discovered? Is the specification of instrumentation essential to the identity of a work? The cases are used to demonstrate that no satisfactory decision between pre‐ontological and ontological claims can be reached within the theoretical limits provided by current strategies of analysis.
The Limits of Analysis and the Need for History
Authors: Goehr Lydia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Presents an argument against the analytic approach. In each case, its inadequacies are argued to stem from either unsatisfactory or indecisive stands on the relation between the theory and the phenomena. In an attempt to be scientific or naturalistic, these theories seek ahistorical definitions of cultural concepts. Such definitions result in what Adorno calls a ‘false clarity’ and create an unbridgeable rift between theory and musical practice. The argument does not assume that harmony between theory and practice can be reached. It is an argument rather for the indispensability of history in the philosophical treatment of concepts.
The Central Claim
Authors: Goehr Lydia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Identifies the philosophical content of the claim that the work concept began to regulate musical practice at a particular point in history. The ontological picture presupposed by the historical investigation of the musical work is made explicit: rather than treating the work as an object, the investigation asks what sort of a concept the work concept is. Five claims are made about the concept of a musical work. (1) It is an open concept with original and derivative employment. (2) It is correlated to the ideals of a practice. (3) It is a regulative concept. (4) It is projective. (5) It is an emergent concept. It is argued that the work concept came to regulate musical practice around 1800, that music came at this time centrally or predominantly to be packaged in terms of works. The claim entails neither that the work concept is inappropriately applied to productions of music prior to 1800 nor that the concept has remained fixed since 1800.
Musical Meaning: From Antiquity to the Enlightenment
Authors: Goehr Lydia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe central claim is supported by tracing the concept of so‐called ‘serious’ music. Since 1800, so‐called serious or classical music has been packaged in terms of works. Several general transitions are described to demonstrate the emergence of an effectively imaginary museum of musical works: (1) The move from extra‐musical to purely musical criteria of value and classification; (2) The emancipation of the music language from its dependence on poetic and religious texts; (3) The rise of so‐called purely instrumental music or absolute music; (4) The articulation of the concepts of fine art and the autonomous work of art and the inclusion of music under these categories.
Musical Meaning: Romantic Transcendence and the Separability Principle
Authors: Goehr Lydia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Investigates how the emancipation of music from the extra‐musical involved first an inclusion of music under the recently emerged concept of ‘the fine arts’ (the Kristeller thesis). The emancipation of instrumental music and fine art both depended on the separability principle. The romanticization of fine art re‐evaluated the conditions previously associated with productive art, imbuing them with aesthetic value: creativity, product, artefactuality, and perseverance. As music began to be understood as one of the fine arts, it began to articulate its need for artefacts comparable to the other works of fine art. In music, the romantic aesthetic, broadly conceived, involved both a transcendent move and a formalist one. Both moves served more thoroughly to separate musical meaning from seemingly worldly affairs by merging form and content and eliminating mimesis as a goal of music.
Musical Production Without the Work‐Concept
Authors: Goehr Lydia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Demonstrates that most moments, aspects, or beliefs associated with the work concept was either absent or understood differently prior to the late eighteenth century. It argues that the moments of the work concept did not function together in such a way as to give the concept institutional centrality. It shows, further, how the extra‐musical and functional understanding of music pervaded every level of practice. Issues such as reception, occasional music, composers’ involvement in performances, ownership of musical material, musical publication, and notation are explored in their pre‐1800 settings.
After 1800: The Beethoven Paradigm
Authors: Goehr Lydia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Investigates the transition to a musical practice in which the focus was on the production of complete, discrete, original, and fixed products. It explores the development and consequences of the emerging Beethoven myth and with this the Beethoven paradigm, according to which Beethoven comes to be the standard for what it means to compose musical works. The paradigm is described according to several historical shifts in musical practice: the composers’ rising authority and social standing; the composer's increasing independence from worldly affairs; reconceived relations to publishers and performers as well as reconceived norms of ownership, copyright, and plagiarism; new discussions of fidelity, werktreue, and texttreue. The emerging cult of virtuosity and extemporization are also considered. The idea is simply to describe the work concept as thickly as possible, which means at every level of practice and theory.
Werktreue: Confirmation and Challenge in Contemporary Movements
Authors: Goehr Lydia 
Published: October 2003

AbstractInvestigates the force of the Werktreue ideal in various parts of musical practice––in the practices of jazz and the avant‐garde, and in early performance practice; it offers a reading specifically of John Cage's 4’ 33’. It looks too at the use of the Werktreue ideal as shown in the rise of the conductor. If further investigates the ideal of Werktreue in relation now to the historical or authentic performance movement. It returns critically to the analysts’ use of the counter example method. It looks at the possibility of distinguishing original from derivative uses of the work concept as a development of the idea of the open concept. It looks at what it means to speak of conceptual challenge, conceptual change, neutralization, and the generic use of concepts; it looks also at the idea of conceptual imperialism. Though the argument of the book as a whole follows a strong conceptual argument all the way through, it is dependent also on the so‐called 1800 thesis, namely that this was the time of the emergence or culmination of the concept of a musical work as a regulative concept of musical practice.
Testimony
Authors: Coady C. A. J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book is about a topic in epistemology that had been much neglected until its publication, but has subsequently become much more discussed. That topic is testimony, or, less technically, the conveying of information by telling. Coady argues that reliance upon the word of others plays a crucial role in the economy of knowledge, though the extent and depth of this reliance have gone largely unrecognized in the philosophical tradition. He discusses those efforts that have been made to explain and justify the role of testimony in the getting and sustaining of knowledge or reliable belief, and concludes that, with the partial exception of Thomas Reid's discussion in the eighteenth century, they have been unsuccessful. This widespread failure, he argues, stems from a reductive approach with an individualist bias that fails to appreciate just how fundamental are our cognitive debts to one another. Indeed, he argues, the very possibility of linguistic communication rests upon some basic reliability of testimony. He spells out an alternative to the reductive way of understanding the links between testimony, perception, memory, and inference. In the latter part of the book, Coady explores several puzzles generated by our reliance on testimony, including those created by the tension between prior probabilities and testimony to astonishing events, the supposed increase in unreliability of testimonial chains of transmission as they expand, and a puzzle about competence and transmission of knowledge. He also discusses certain implications of his view of testimony for important issues in history, psychology, mathematics, and the law.
The Domain of Testimony
Authors: Coady C. A. J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Sets the stage by exhibiting the extent and depth of our normal dependence upon the word of others. It explores the often‐unnoticed ways that this reliance is present in both everyday knowledge and rigorous scientific thought. It then examines the history of philosophical belittling of testimony and relates this to social and intellectual movements such as the dominance of an ideal of knowledge inherited from Platonic sources, the rise of individualism, the increased post‐Renaissance hostility to authority, and the development of probability theory.
Deciding for Testimony
Authors: Coady C. A. J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Continues the critique of important discussions of testimony in the philosophical tradition by discussing H. H. Price's complex defence of our reliance upon the word of others. Price rejects the attempt at an inductive justification for the reliance, since he thinks that this treats the reliability of testimony as a factual claim, and, moreover, one that is impossible to establish. He thinks that it is really a policy justification that is required, but Coady argues that the reasons Price provides, and some others that could be developed from his comments, fail to vindicate the reliability of testimony in the way required.
The Status of Testimony
Authors: Coady C. A. J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBegins with an investigation of certain central cognitive verbs to do with perceiving and remembering in order to compare the status of perception and memory with that of testimony. The verb learn is contrived to allow comparison of receiving testimony with other sources of knowledge, and objections to the idea that testimonial knowledge can be direct are considered and rejected. It then argues that, even allowing a certain centrality to perception, testimony should be treated non‐reductively as on the same epistemic level as perception, memory, and inference.
Astonishing Reports
Authors: Coady C. A. J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Deals with puzzles raised by reports of deeply surprising events. There is a tendency to judge testimony harshly when it fails strikingly to conform to past experience (especially one's own), but this dismissive tendency is argued to be problematic. Discussions by Locke, Hume, Paley, Laplace, Mill, Bradley, and Peirce, amongst others, are examined and the relevance of Bayesian considerations is explored.
The Disappearance of History
Authors: Coady C. A. J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The puzzle addressed in this chapter is most explicitly raised by Laplace, though foreshadowed by Locke, and is concerned with the supposed diminution in probative force of testimony that has passed through too many hands (or tongues). Laplace suggests that lengthy transmission chains must ‘enfeeble’ the probability of historical facts, but this disappearance of history thesis (DOHT) has some very counter‐intuitive consequences. It argues against various forms of the DOHT by exploring the diverse types of testimony chains available in written and oral traditions.
Experts and the Law
Authors: Coady C. A. J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The role of expert evidence in the law has been much debated in the legal literature though less so in philosophy. This chapter attempts to bring the insights of the earlier chapters of this book to bear on the problem of the admissibility and value of expert evidence, especially in criminal trials. It examines various proposals for restricting or enlarging the role of experts, and the implications of these proposals are discussed.
Hylomorphism and Functionalism
Authors: Cohen S. Marc 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Myles Burnyeat, Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Cambridge University, disputes functionalist interpretations of Aristotle. Moreover, he contends that a correct understanding of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind leads to the realization that the only thing to do with it is to reject it. This essay argues that Burnyeat has failed to refute either Aristotle or his functionalist interpreters.
On Aristotle's Conception of the Soul
Authors: Frede Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay explores Aristotle’s conception of the soul. Aristotle believes that natural objects and their behaviour cannot be fully understood in terms of their material constituents and their properties, but have to be explained in terms of their essence or nature. Souls are simply a particular kind of essence or nature, namely the essence or nature of animal bodies. Doing justice to physical or natural phenomena requires the notion of a form or nature. Once this notion is allowed, it is strong enough to account for all that one would want a soul to account for – life, the things living objects do, and even the so-called affections of the soul.
Explaining Various Forms of Living
Authors: Code Alan , Moravcsik Julius 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Aristotle did not see a sharp contrast between the psychological and the physical. He viewed the physical as just the natural, and treats the psychological as part of the physical. This essay attempts to explain why this is so, and presents observations about Aristotle’s framework. It explores the relation of hylomorphism to functionalism, and argues against funtionalist interpretations of Aristotle due to the belief that Aristotle was confronting a different set of concerns and issues.
De Anima 2. 2–4 and the Meaning of Life
Authors: Matthews Gareth B. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay constructs a picture of the meaning of life based on De Anima 2. 2-4. It shows that there are organisms that preserve their form through the exercise of identifiable functions. For an individual to be a short, living thing is for it to be one of these naturally species-preserving organisms. For an individual living thing to be actually living is for it to be able to perform one of the psychic or living functions appropriate to its species.
Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense‐Perception
Authors: Sorabji Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Aristotle did not view perception as a rudimentary reaction with little content as suggested by Plato, nor as the work of reason and thought as claimed by Strato. Perception is a half-way house between the two. This essay explores Aristotle’s redrawing of the map in which perception is located, and the formal and material causes of perception.
What Does the Maker Mind Make?
Authors: Kosman L. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay examines the question: what does the maker mind make, and what is it anyway? It argues that active thinking, thinking as theoria, which the maker mind makes, is a thinking most fully exemplified in the unremittingly active thinking of the divine mind. Thus, the maker mind is not simply an element in Aristotle’s psychological theory, but also an element in this theology.
Aristotle on Thinking
Authors: Ahn Charles H. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay discusses Aristotle’s theory of the intellect (nous), which is often neglected or misunderstood. It focuses on two doctrines in the theory of intellect: Doctrine One (D1) claims that nous is essentially incorporeal and has no bodily organ; and Doctrine Two (D2) is the thesis that the intellect in act is identical with its intelligible object. It is argued that D1 is incompatible with the general definition of psuchē, and that the appearance of conflict between D1 and the need for phantasms can be removed by distinguishing between noetic faculty and concrete acts of human thinking. D2 can shed light on the relationship of the nous and empirical consciousness in ordinary thinking, to sharpen the contrast between Aristotle’s view and post-Cartesian philosophy of mind.
What Is a Theory of Meaning? (I)
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The theory of meaning may either attempt to explain what it is to have the concepts expressible in a particular language (full‐blooded theory), or merely to associate concepts with words in that particular language (modest theory). A theory of meaning suggested by Davidson, according to which knowing the meaning of a sentence consists in the ability to produce a T‐schema for that sentence, is a modest theory. But such a theory will be either a translation manual (in which case it does not explain the knowledge of language), or will have to be construed holistically (in which case a systematic account of the mastery of language is impossible).
What Is a Theory of Meaning? (II)
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
To know the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth‐conditions. Yet, in what does the knowledge of truth‐conditions consist? In many cases, it consists in knowing the way in which the truth of the sentence is dependent upon the truth of some other sentences in the language; in some cases, paradigmatically those of the statements of observation. This knowledge consists in the ability to give a report of observation. Then one must know a way. Hence, the notion of truth‐conditions no longer occupies the central place, being replaced by verification and falsification.
What Do I Know When I Know a Language?
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Is the knowledge of language exhausted by a practical ability to employ the language on a certain occasion, or rather it should explain that practical ability? The knowledge of language is distinguished from other typical practical abilities by being a conscious process. It is, however, not a code concealing thoughts at some deeper level. The study of thoughts is conducted via the study of language. Any implicit knowledge of meaning is to be manifested in the actual use of the language.
The Source of the Concept of Truth
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
We should address not the issue of the nature of truth, but rather that of the way we come by the very concept of truth. As Hilbert's discussion of quantifiers shows, the concept of truth is borne out of a more basic concept of justifiability. Our mastery of the most primitive aspects of the use of language to transmit information does not require even an implicit grasp of the concept of truth, but can be fully described in terms of the antecedent notion of justifiability.
Existence
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Frege saw existence as a second‐level concept and ascribed it to first‐level concepts, rather than to individual objects. Frege's solution encounters difficulties with the statements involving either empty proper names or modal locutions. A modification of Frege's account is possible if Quine's proposal for transforming statements containing proper names into statements with quantifiers and predicates. It is further argued that Kripke's account of negative existentials is untenable, whilst Evans's insistence that all information‐linked terms can be understood just in case they have reference is misguided.
Does Quantification Involve Identity?
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Geach defended the thesis of relative identity according to which, for any theory there is an extension, in whose language the meaning of the identity sign does not coincide with the meaning of the identity sign in the original language. The argument fails for formalized languages, since the interpretation of a first‐order language demands that a domain be specified for the variables, and in doing this we specify the finest possible interpretation of the identity sign. Yet an analogous question for natural languages is whether for any expression of restricted generality (such as `every A’ or `some A’) there is a definite identity‐relation associated with the range of generality. Geach's thesis fails for natural languages, too, and furthermore, it is dependent upon the failure of the thesis for formalized languages.