bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
What Is Structuralism? and Other Questions
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractI explore the relation between structuralism and other theses that I have presented in the rest of the book, in particular, my holism, realism about mathematical objects, and the disquotational account of truth. In developing my theory, I have claimed that there is no fact of the matter as to whether the patterns that the various mathematical theories describe are themselves mathematical objects, so I first try to explain what the locution ‘there is no fact of the matter’ means. Next, I discuss the relativity of key structuralist concepts like sub‐pattern and pattern equivalence, and then explore the possibility of formulating structuralist versions of mathematical theories. Even if my holism precludes me from drawing a sharp distinction between philosophy and science I do not regard my structuralism as a mathematical theory but rather as a philosophical account of mathematics that tries to achieve a deeper understanding of the epistemology and ontology of mathematics. My structuralism is epistemic rather than ontic because it is not an ontological reduction or a foundation for mathematics but a philosophical view about the nature of its objects. So when it is combined with realism concerning mathematical objects, it need not commit one to the existence of structures.
Entity and Identity
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
‘No entity without identity’. If interpreted liberally as ‘No entity that is not in principle identifiable’, the slogan is acceptable. If interpreted strictly as ‘No entity that does not belong to a sort such that there exist clearly stateable general criteria of identity for all entities of that sort’, then it is unacceptably exclusive; for it excludes not only the general properties exemplified by individual particulars but even most of the general kinds or sorts, the concepts of which constitute individuating principles of identity for the particulars that fall under them, and hence threatens the status of those particulars themselves.
Logical Form and Logical Constants
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A general characterization of the constants of standard logic is achieved by following the suggestion, inspired by Wittgenstein's Tractatus, that the meanings of these constants can be fully explained by reference to no more than two essential features of empirical statements; all such statements must possess excluding power and at least some must exhibit a certain duality. The sufficiency of these terms is demonstrated and the results are related to some earlier insufficient attempts at such a characterization.
May Bes and Might Have Beens
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Epistemic possibilities, the ‘might have been's of the past and ‘may be's of the future, are examined and analysed. The former relate to points in the past regarding which presently available knowledge does not show the then prevailing situation to be such as to exclude the particulars concerned acting or suffering differently from the ways in which they actually did; the latter relate to what present knowledge makes likely or does not wholly exclude. Various extensions, refinements, and objections are considered.
Austin and ‘Locutionary Meaning’
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Progressively richer senses of the expression ‘the meaning of what was said’ as applied to an utterance made on some occasion are distinguished. An unsuccessful attempt at elucidating Austin's notion of the content (meaning) of a ‘locutionary act’ in the light of these distinctions is followed by a proposed (imposed) solution that depends on the notion of statements or propositions as candidates for truth‐evaluation. Austin's general reasons for reservations about ‘true’ are questioned, and their extension to reservations about distinguishing truth‐evaluation from other dimensions of assessment is shown to be unsound.
Meaning and Context
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A distinction is drawn between the ‘linguistic meaning’ (A), ‘linguistic‐cum‐referential meaning’ (B), and ‘complete meaning’ (C) of what is said by a serious utterance of a sentence. The questions considered are: What are the determining effects that context of utterance may have on the content and relations of A, B, and C? When are these effects governed by rule or convention and when not? The complex answers to these questions are set out and explained. The general moral drawn is that a satisfactory theory of meaning must take account of the aim of communication.
Kant's New Foundations of Metaphysics
Authors: Strawson P. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Some muted echoes of Kantian idealism are to be found in the work of many twentieth century philosophers (e.g. Putnam, Davidson, Quine, Dummett, Wittgenstein) who would readily describe themselves, like Kant, as ‘empirical realists’ but dismiss the notion of a reality in principle inaccessible to human cognitive capacities; only muted echoes, therefore, since Kant holds to a belief in precisely such a reality. The crucial distinction lies in the Kantian doctrine of the ideality of space and time.
Sorting Out Ethics
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book is divided into three parts: in Part I, R. M. Hare offers a justification for the use of philosophy of language in the treatment of moral questions, together with an overview of his moral philosophy of ‘universal prescriptivism’. The second part, and the core of the book, consists of five chapters originally presented as a lecture series under the title ‘A Taxonomy of Ethical Theories’. Hare identifies descriptivism and non‐descriptivism as the two main positions in modern moral philosophy. The former he divides into Naturalism and Intuitionism, and the latter into Emotivism and Rationalism. Hare argues that all forms of descriptivism tend to lead to Relativism because the truth conditions of moral statements are culturally variant. Of the positions discussed, only Hare's own position, a form of Rationalism, which he calls Universal Prescriptivism, meets all of the requirements that an adequate ethical theory should meet. Part III consists of Hare's previously published essay ‘Could Kant have been a Utilitarian?’ (Utilitas 5, 1993). Here, Hare puts forward the controversial thesis that Kant's moral philosophy is, in its basic principles, compatible with utilitarianism.
Intuitionism
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Intuitionism, the second type of descriptivism, is the theory that the truth conditions of moral statements depend on irreducible moral properties, which must be defined in moral terms. The intuitionist claims that we have knowledge of moral truths derived from moral intuition. However, because it is a subjective experience, one person's intuition may differ from another's, and the theory offers no way to decide between them. Intuitionism, Hare argues, is really a kind of Subjectivist Naturalism, or Subjectivism; and, as with Naturalism, it also leads to relativism. Therefore, because it is exhausted by these two theories, descriptivism in general must be abandoned if we are to attain the sort of objectivity that will allow us to avoid relativism.
Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Hare questions the claim made by modern intuitionists and deontologists that Kant is their ally against utilitarianism. The core of the chapter is a discussion of Kant's Categorial Imperative, which is shown to be compatible, in its various formulations, with utilitarianism. Conspicuously anti‐utilitarian elements of Kantian ethics, Hare argues, are based on principles extrinsic to, and sometimes incompatible with, Kant's moral theory. In answering possible objections to his interpretation, Hare firstly distinguishes pure from applied ethics, which includes an important distinction between Kant's notions of Wille and Willkür; and, secondly, he argues that Kant can be understood as a consequentialist.
Hume's Problem
Authors: Howson Colin 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book is an extended discussion of Hume's famous sceptical argument that we have no reason to believe that the future will resemble the past. In the context of scientific methodology, this implies that however stringent the process of experimentation, the data supplied does not in itself support any one general hypothesis over another. There have been many attempts since Hume published this argument to show that it is mistaken, or that it itself begs the question. These attempts, which fall under the various headings of probabilism, reliabilism, deductivism, the No‐Miracles argument, and naturalism, are examined and are all found to be wanting. It is then argued that Hume's argument is sound, but that conceding this does not show that there are no valid inductive inferences. The final sections of the book are devoted to showing that there are such arguments, namely probabilistically valid arguments, whose premises are assignments of prior probability. Such arguments are clearly conditional, like those of deductive logic, their conclusions depending on the premises. Indeed, this book argues that the laws of probability are as authentically logical principles as those of deductive logic, mediating like them non‐ampliative inferences from premises to conclusion. Hume's position, that all inductive arguments depend on assumptions about the likely course of nature, is endorsed, since these assumptions can be identified with the prior probability assignments. Thus, though Hume was correct, there is nevertheless room for a genuine logic of inductive inference, supplied by the laws of probability.
Hume's Argument
Authors: Howson Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Hume's argument for inductive scepticism is presented, and some ‘quick’ rejoinders to it are considered. Two of the most popular are (1) that it begs the question that only deductive arguments are valid, and omits consideration of probabilistic arguments, and (2) that inductive reasoning is partly constitutive of what we mean by valid inference, and so needs no independent justification. Both these rejoinders are rejected (1) because an examination of Hume's text clearly shows that he was talking about any sort of putatively sound argumentation, including probabilistic arguments; and (2) because it misses the point, which is to show why we can reliably expect the course of nature to continue in the way predicted on the basis of past evidence.
Reliabilism
Authors: Howson Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers the popular doctrine of reliabilism, the thesis that distinguishing between internal and external guarantees of reliability dissolves Hume's problem, since there may well be an external guarantee, in the way the world actually is, of the reliability of standard inductive practice. Indeed, we have good evidence that the world is so constituted to favour these practices. Furthermore, regarding the past predictive success of inductive inferences as good evidence of the reliability of the procedure of inductive inference itself is no less circular than using deductive arguments to justify deductive inference. These claims are examined and rejected.
Probabilism
Authors: Howson Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers whether probability theory offers a way round Hume's argument, as has sometimes been contended. There are theorems of formal probability theory that appear to show that suitable evidence must increase the probability of the predicting theory, though when these theorems are examined they are all seen to have substantive assumptions, usually that some putative law has non‐zero prior probability. As such, they merely corroborate Hume's thesis that any inductive argument will contain explicitly or implicitly at least one inductive premise.
The Naturalistic Fallacy
Authors: Howson Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers another popular way of evading the force of Hume's argument, Naturalism. According to this doctrine, Hume merely shows why we must give up trying to find top–down justifications for our scientific procedures. Instead, we should use scientific procedures to investigate ways of acquiring knowledge. Naturalism is closely related to Reliabilism, like it claiming that the ordinary canons of evidence are all we need to underwrite the reliability of ordinary inductive procedures. These claims are investigated and shown to rest on a version of the Naturalistic Fallacy.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
Authors: Howson Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Applies the results of Ch. 7 to scientific methodology and shows that they give a logical interpretation of the subjective Bayesian theory of inductive inference. This theory is therefore no more necessarily subjective than deductive logic, consisting as both do of objective logical rules for proceeding from premises to conclusion. In the Bayesian case, the premises are prior probability assignments. It is shown that familiar rules of scientific method are endorsed, and, in particular, the rule that unless there is prior support for a hypothesis, its overall probability will be very small however good the fit with current evidence.
The Idea of Hellenic Harmony
Authors: White Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The historiography of Greek ethics has, since the days of Winckelmann, Schiller, and Hegel, been shaped by an effort to use it in modern debates. Kantians believed that the Greeks ignored the notion of morality. Hegelians by contrast thought that they understood how to show that one's own happiness is compatible with the happiness of others and conformity to ethical norms—either through inclusivism (the view that the first includes the other two) or fusionism (the view that the former is identical with their combination).
Imperatives in Greek Ethics
Authors: White Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A common theme in the historiography of Greek ethics says that modern ethics is characterized by imperative notions such as ‘duty’—and with a Judeo‐Christian notion of imperatives or commands issued by god—whereas ancient ethics supposedly deals mainly with ‘attractive notions such as ‘good’ and ‘virtue’. This thought is often juxtaposed with the idea that imperative notions betoken a conflict between one's duty and one's good, because an imperative seems to be required only to command people to do what they do not wish to do, which is felt to be inappropriate to the supposed eudaimonism of Greek ethics. In fact Greek ethics makes substantial use of imperative notions, and does not attempt to show that attractive notions are more basic or preferable in ethics.
The City‐State in Greek Ethics
Authors: White Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
One of the main vehicles for the reconciliation of individual and social happiness that has supposedly been characteristic of Greek ethics is the concept of the polis. In the Hegelian tradition it has been thought that the Greeks reduced all norms and values to standards laid down by and for the city‐state, and that this fact made it possible for them to hold that the well‐being of an individual is entirely compatible with the well‐being of his fellow‐citizens and of the city‐state as a whole. However, the Greeks were familiar with and attached substantial weight to non‐polis‐based norms and values, even universalist ones like the Golden Rule, and made ample conceptual room for conflict between the happiness of a citizen and that of his community. Moreover, Greek attitudes on this issue were variegated, not uniform.
Time, Tense, and Causation
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDefends a dynamic, or tensed, conception of time, according to which the past and the present are real while the future is not. This conception differs from traditional tensed views, according to which tensed facts are more basic than tenseless ones; on the contrary, tensed facts reduce to tenseless ones.The conception of time defended is supported by arguments from causation: there can be causation only in a world where the past and the present are real, while the future is not.Further, the direction of time can be defined by the direction of causation, and causation can be used to analyse temporal relations such as the relations of simultaneity and temporal priority.The dynamic conception of time developed is contrasted with alternative views and defended against numerous philosophical objections.It is also defended against implications of the Special Theory of Relativity: A modified version of the Special Theory of Relativity that allows for absolute simultaneity is suggested.
The Nature of Time: Alternative Accounts and Basic Issues
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFormulates the central claim to be defended in the book, which is a conjunction of two theses. First, tenseless concepts and facts are more basic than tensed concepts and facts. Second, the world is dynamic: while the past and the present are real, the future is not. The chapter also outlines the role of causation on this account: the direction of time is defined in terms of the direction of causation, and causation can exist only in a dynamic world.
Temporally Relative Facts and the Argument from Preventability
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses an argument from preventability to the effect that the past and the present are real, while the future is not. The argument draws on an analysis of ‘It is a fact that p at time t’ as ‘p, and it is logically impossible for there to exist anyone who would have been able, at t, to prevent it from being the case that p’. However, there are two strong objections to the argument from preventability, one relating to backward causation and causal loops, and one relating to the truth conditions for subjunctive conditionals.
Facts, Causation, and Time
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractTakes the objections that were discussed in the previous chapter as a starting‐point for arguing in favour of the dynamic view of the world that is defended in the book.It argues that satisfactory truth conditions for counterfactuals can only be given if the world is a dynamic one. Further, an argument from causation can be put forward in favour of the dynamic view:
Truth and Truth at a Time
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDefends both the concepts of truth at a time and of truth simpliciter.It rejects arguments against truth at a time, according to which this concept involves a confusion between propositions and propositional functions. It argues that tensed views of time should employ three valued logics, and that alleged problems with the latter can be overcome by distinguishing between factual truth and logical truth. Finally, the chapter defends the concept of truth simpliciter: Tensed views of time still require this concept so as to apply it to propositions involving atemporal entities.
Summary and Conclusions
Authors: Tooley Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Gives a brief summary of the results reached in the book and their advantages. It recapitulates the differences between the dynamic view of the world defended in the book and traditional tensed conceptions of time. While the latter hold that tensed facts are fundamental, the former holds that tensed facts reduce to tenseless facts even in a dynamic world, where what tenseless facts there are depends on what time it is. The different roles of causation for the present approach are summed up: Causation defines the direction of time, and can be used to analyse temporal relations; There can be causation only in a world where the past and the present are real, while the future is not.
Descartes on Causation
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractGives the source of Descartes's view that a cause must in some way resemble its effect. The concept of a trope, or property‐instance, and the theory that causation is trope‐transfer and Descartes's rejection of this is discussed. His theory that substances endure only with help from God and his differing treatments of causal action of body on body, body on mind (including sense perception), mind on body, and mind on mind are explained. Reveals his lack of any robust concept of, or analytic theory of, causation.
Desire in Descartes and Spinoza
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDescartes tries to keep teleology out of his account of desire. Spinoza often seems to do likewise: he equates desire with ‘appetite’, which he firmly defines in non‐teleological terms. His extraordinarily ingenious and equally fallacious attempt to prove the ‘conatus’ doctrine—that everything strives to preserve its own being—is analysed and criticized. If enough allowances are made, the argument takes him to a kind of pseudo‐egoism, which he invalidly equates with egoism.
Leibniz Arrives at Monads
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractLeibniz held that there are no material substances (because of divisibility), and that there are immaterial substances, which he called ‘monads’. They are absolutely real; bodies are appearances of monads, and are phenomenal; space and time are ideal. Leibniz is not an idealist. His reasons for holding that all minds are monads and his further reason (his gradualism) for holding that all monads are mindlike are also given.
Leibniz's Contained‐Predicate Doctrine
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
What the contained‐predicate doctrine (CPD) is, and its source in Leibniz's problem about individual reference—one he could have solved better if he had allowed inter‐substance causation and indexicals is covered. Gives his attempt to reconcile the CPD with there being contingent subject–predicate propositions; and infinite analysis. Leibniz's great mistake of construing the CPD as though it were causal rather than logical, and his attempt to reconcile it with human freedom are also dealt with.
Descartes's Search for Security
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines the search for security, for immovable foundations, that is conducted in Descartes's Meditations, centring on the Cogito. Topics discussed include the role of the omnipotent Deceiver, the truth rule, God's role in all this, the supposed Cartesian circle, and Bréhier's failed attempt to remove it.
Descartes's Stability Project
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Presents and defends the thesis that in his Cogito‐related pursuit of security in the Meditations, Descartes is searching not only for (1) certainty, understood normatively but also, and perhaps dominantly, for (2) stability of beliefs, understood psychologically. Much of what is most problematic in the work makes better sense related to 2 than related to 1.
Learning from Six Philosophers Volume 2
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book presents and analyses the most important parts of the philosophical works of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Volume 1: the shift from Aristotelian to Cartesian physics; Descartes on matter and space, on causation, and on certainty; Descartes and Spinoza on matter and mind, and on desire; Leibniz's metaphysics (monads) and physics, his theory of animals. Volume 2: Locke on ideas, on necessity, on essences, on substance, on secondary qualities, on personal identity; Descartes on modality; Berkeley's epistemology and metaphysics; Hume on ideas, on belief, on causation, on bodies, on reason; Hume and Leibniz on personal identity.
Lockean Ideas, Overview and Foundations
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Locke had no clear metaphysic of ideas. Ideas ought not to be reified, but Locke sometimes did this. In this chapter, ideas are presented as tropes. Locke put ideas to work in perceiving and imagining, thinking, meaning, a priori knowledge, and classifying. Different ways in which an idea might represent something is discussed.