bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Socrates’ Dialectic in Xenophon’s Memorabilia
Authors: Natali Carlo 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In recent years there has been a tendency to revise the harsh judgement given on Xenophon by philologists of the nineteenth century and the First part of the twentieth century. Some contemporary scholars maintain that it is interesting to study Xenophon’s Socratic writings, even if it is not possible to Find in them a historically accurate image of Socrates. Also the tendency to Find in Xenophon the remains of all the literature written by the Minor Socratics is not as strong as it was previously.
Types of DeWnition in the Meno
Authors: Charles David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It has become a commonplace to say that Socrates in the Meno and elsewhere did not have one clear idea of the type of answer he was seeking as an answer to his famous definitional question: ‘what is F?’ Recent critics have distinguished three different types of account which (in their view) Socrates overs in answer to this question. They have separated In their view, Socrates failed to determine which of these three types of definition of F is to be preferred.
Definition in Plato’s Meno
Authors: Karasmanis Vassilis 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The Meno is considered to be a transitional dialogue between Plato’s early and middle period. Plato, in the Meno, goes beyond the ‘Socratic’ elenchus and proposes new theories and positive ways to arrive at knowledge. In the Meno, we find for the first time the distinction between knowledge and belief (together with a definition of knowledge), the theory of recollection and the hypothetical method, themes that we meet in other middle dialogues.
How do Linguists Classify Languages?
Authors: McMahon April , McMahon Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this book we shall be considering a range of methods which can be used in the comparison of languages (and indeed dialects or other varieties). However, classification is not just comparison, but comparison with a particular goal in view—the goal being the discernment of meaningful resemblances in the data, which in turn may allow us to identify those languages which descend from a single common ancestor, and to recover the history which has produced that divergence. Resemblances do, in some cases, have other causes; and although in the chapters that follow we shall concentrate on grouping languages into families, in Chapter 8 we return to the issue of comparison more broadly.
Lexicostatistics
Authors: McMahon April , McMahon Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The essential first step in the development of any quantitative method is identifying something to measure. If we want to use a quantitative technique to establish whether languages are likely to be related, or whether they fall into the same subgroup, or how similar two languages are relative to a third language, we need to decide what we are going to count; and to ensure that we are comparing like with like, the something we are counting has to be the same across all the languages we are comparing. Indeed, to make the method as flexible as possible we need that something to be the same in all the languages we might ever want to compare. In comparative linguistics this is a tall order. Our first thought might be to turn to sociolinguistics, where quantitative methods have enjoyed such success, and adopt the strategies developed there. However, sociolinguistic studies tend to operate within a single speech community (Patrick 2002), where speakers share the same norms of behaviour and attitude, and the same variable elements of linguistic structure. It is possible, therefore, to isolate a set of variables and to study the circumstances, both linguistic and non-linguistic, under which the different variants emerge. For example, we might consider a phonological variable (t), with variants [t], used mainly by women, and glottal stop [?], mainly used by men. We might find a syntactic variable (negation), with multiple negation (I didn’t do nothing ) favoured by lower-class speakers, and single negative markers (I didn’t do anything) the dominant variant for middle-class speakers; or a lexical variable, where the meaning (be sick) might be expressed by vomit for older speakers and throw up for younger ones.
Climbing Down from the Trees: Network Models
Authors: McMahon April , McMahon Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The fundamental problems with family trees are the degree of idealization they necessitate and their essential incompatibility with the forces of contact-induced change which, as we have been arguing throughout this book, are as important for at least some languages as descent with differentiation from a common ancestor. Some languages will have an essentially tree-like history, while others are primarily contact languages. Historical linguists, with their propensity for designing opposing methods, might suggest the tree model for one extreme and the wave model for the other: but this does not get around the problem that most languages will occupy some position on the cline between these two end points. We can foresee long and unproductive struggles over deciding when each model is to be used, missing crucial bits of data for each system in the process, whereas in a perfect world what we need is a single model which could sort out for us how much of a language is tree-like and how much non-tree-like, and display the two driving forces, and resulting language features, differently.
Dating
Authors: McMahon April , McMahon Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Embleton (2000: 143) provides an admirably concise summary of the goals of mathematical approaches to classification, and it is certainly worth quoting the relevant paragraph in full here:Since at least the 1930s, linguists have been seriously and practically interested in the development of mathematical techniques for assessing the closeness of the relationship between a pair of languages, using only information from the contemporary languages themselves. Applied pairwise, this leads to the reconstruction of a family tree for a group of genetically related languages, without the use of any actual historical information about the languages or language family. If one can either determine a rate of linguistic change, or calibrate one of the branch lengths of the putative tree against some external information, one can then assign dates to the splits in the family tree.
Serial Verbs in Olutec (Mixean)
Authors: Zavala Roberto 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Olutec is a Mixe-Zoquean language of the Mixean branch. It is spoken in the town of Oluta, in the state of Veracruz, Mexico by approximately fourteen elderly people. Some of the prominent typological features of this language are: (1) it is highly polysynthetic with a very complex verbal template; (2) it shows complex verb compounds; (3) the pronominal proclitics on the verb follow an ergative/ absolutive pattern; (4) it shows the direct vs. inverse alternation; and (5) it includes most of the traits of an OV language, although synchronically the constituent order of the core arguments is quite flexible.
Verbal Compounding in Wolaitta
Authors: Arnha Azeb , Dimmendaal Gerrit J 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Wolaitta, an Omotic (Afroasiatic) language spoken by approximately 12 million people in southwestern Ethiopia, has a restricted class of compound verbs with just two components, Vj + V2, where Vj is a (same-subject) converb, while V2 is a fully inflected verb. Vj can be any verb in the language, but V2 belongs to a closed class of (about fourteen) verbs. Such compound verbs are distinct from regular converb + main verb or clause-chaining constructions. With the latter, the converb is clearly a subordinate clause describing an anterior, sequential, or simultaneous event to that described by the main clause. With compound verbs, however, the converb plus main verb describe a single event, including, in some cases, the manner in which some action takes place, or the duration of the action expressed.
Preface
Authors: Hampshire Stuart 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The standard edition of the works of Spinoza in Latin is that of Dr Carl Gebhardt (Heidelberg, :1925); a more widely available edition is that of Van Vloten and Land in two volumes (The Hague, :1882). The first volumes of a complete and scholarly English version of Spinoza’s works have appeared, edited by E. M. Curley for Princeton University Press. There is an earlier and respectable translation of the Ethics and On the Correction of the Understanding by W. Hale White (better known as ‘Mark Rutherford’) and Amelia S. Stirling.
Politics and Religion
Authors: Hampshire Stuart 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Spinoza, in spite of his debt to Thomas Hobbes, was scarcely less original as a political philosopher than as a metaphysician; and his approach to politics is today entirely intelligible and appears as an anticipation of methods which have become familiar in contemporary thought. His conception of political science, which was directly derived from his metaphysics, naturally shocked his contemporaries and successors for the same reasons which made his metaphysics repugnant.
Empiricism and Ramsey’s Account of Theories
Authors: Cruse Pierre 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Suppose we propose a new scientific theory. Presumably we will do this because we want to explain some facts we already know about, and we will have a language to describe these facts that doesn’t get its meaning from our theory. This language we can call the ‘primary system’. However, typical theories also introduce new, or ‘secondary’, terms that are not in the primary system. These secondary, theoretical, terms tend to refer to things that are abstract and distant from observation. A plausible claim is that their meanings in some way derive from their connection with primary terms. The question arises how are we to understand this dependence.
A Nose By Any Other Name: Sameness, Substitution, And Essence In Aristotle, Metaphysics Z 5
Authors: Lewis Frank a. 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There is yet another puzzle about them. For (i) if snub nose and hollow nose are the same, the snub and the hollow will be the same; but if not [El OE /L , rn3oh30], because it is impossible to speak of the snub without the thing of which it is the attribute per se (for the snub is hollowness in nose), [1’32] (ii) either to speak of snub nose is not possible, or the same thing will have been said twice, hollow nose nose (for the snub nose will be hollow nose nose), for which reason it is absurd that essence should belong to such things; but (iii) if not [El OE /L , h35], it will go to infinity: for in snub nose nose yet another (nose) will be present. It is clear, therefore, that definition is of substance alone. For if it is also of the other things predicated [rnT17yopuvv, I031"2], then it must be by addition [77p6a0w,,] ... That definition is the account of the essence, and that essence is either of substances alone, or above all and primarily and without qualification (of these), is clear. (Metaph. Z 5, rn3oh28-rn31"2, "11-14)
Aristotle On Being-As-Truth
Authors: Pearson Giles 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this paper I provide an account of Aristotle’s notions of being as-truth in E 4 and 0 10 of the Metaphysics.1 I divide my discussion into two parts. First, I consider Aristotle’s account of being-as truth as that applies to statements or beliefs concerning compound or composite entities (E 4 and first half of 0 10), and second, I consider how Aristotle then applies this notion of being-as-truth to the grasping of simple or incomposite entities (second half of 0 10 ). On my account, by ‘being-as-truth’ in E 4 Aristotle means the attaching of beings or entities in thought such that one thinks of things-that-are that they are or of things-that-are-not that they are not. He is thus not, I argue, intending to point to a signification of ‘is’ in statements in which it signifies truth. My view is supported by precise observation of the reasons why Aristotle wishes to exclude being-as-truth from his general enquiry into being qua being.
The Normative Character of Belief
Authors: Baldwin Thomas 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Moore points to the absurdity of saying such things as ‘I don’t believe that it’s raining, though as a matter of fact it is’ and ‘I believe he has gone out, but he has not’ (Moore 1942: 543; 1959: 175; 1993: 207). He goes on to argue that this kind of absurdity is paradoxical because it disappears once these statements are conjugated into the past tense, as in ‘I did not then believe it was raining, though as a matter of fact it was’, or expressed in the third-person as ‘Moore does not believe that it’s raining, though as a matter of fact it is’ (Moore 1993: 208– 9).
Moore’s Paradox and the Transparency of Belief
Authors: Adler Jonathan E , Armour-Garb Bradley 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A number of philosophers have thought to extend Moore’s Paradox to concepts other than belief, e.g., I want Tina to go out with me, but I’m indifferent to whether she does. The scope of Moore’s Paradox is the problem of what concepts besides belief will generate a Moore’s (or Moorean) Paradox from the following schema: (MP@) I @ that ( p, but it’s not the case that I @ that p), where @ is a schematic variable ranging over elements of a delimited class of propositional attitude verbs (e.g., desire, belief).
Masque Costumes
Authors: Ravelhofer Barbara 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the late 1620s, a popular engraving, The Funeral Obsequies of Sir All-in-New-Fashions , circulated in the English, French, and German satirical press (see Fig. 8). Its unknown artist portrayed the rites administered to a defunct city fop: his mortal remains are paraded in a theatrical pageant while insignia inform bystanders about his lifetime achievements. In best heraldic tradition, the engraving harks back to funerary processions as they were orchestrated for persons of consequence. Sir All-in-New-Fashions’s last outing resembles a macabre catwalk more than an attempt at heroic immortality: his coat of arms consists of his wardrobe.
Colours and Lights: The Costume in Motion
Authors: Ravelhofer Barbara 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
If we tried to restage a court masque based on literary scholarship we would end up with a black-and-white performance. The subject of colour has eluded even groundbreaking studies of Jonesian festival iconography. It was not so in the seventeenth century, when eyewitnesses loved to dwell on colours and fabrics far more than on the literary contents of a performance. For Bulstrode Whitelocke, the colours of his masquers in The Triumph of Peace (1634) embodied the event itself. Twenty years later, he still kept their silver and blue for his own embassy to Sweden.
Animadversions on Burnyeat’ S Theaetetus: on the Logic of The Exquisite Argument
Authors: Wedin Michael V 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In book Gamma of the Metaphysics Aristotle criticizes Protagoras’ doctrine that man is the measure of all things. This he understands as the thesis that what appears to be the case is the case. I shall refer to this as Protagoras’ Thesis.
Explanation, Deliberation, and Reasons
Authors: Wallace R Jay 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Jonathan Dancy’s Practical Reality defends a strikingly nonpsychologistic account of motivating reasons for action. When we explain what people do by citing their reasons, we are trying to isolate the considerations that were actually effective in moving them to act. But it is crucial, Dancy contends, that these considerations be understood in a way that preserves their connection to the normative contexts in which the concept of a reason also has a place. The considerations that move agents to act are considerations that agents take to cast a favorable light on the actions they perform, and it is at least sometimes the case that peoples’ motivating reasons are also good reasons for action, considerations that really do recommend or speak in favor of the action that was undertaken.
The Logical Form of Action Sentences
Authors: Lepore Ernie , Ludwig Kirk 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Strange goings on Jones did it slowly, deliberately, in the bathroom, with a knife, at midnight. What he did was butter a piece of toast. We are too familiar with the language of action to notice at first an anomaly: the ‘it’ of ‘Jones did it slowly, deliberately, ... ‘ seems to refer to some entity, presumably an action, that is then characterized in a number of ways. Asked for the logical form of this sentence, we might volunteer something like, There is an action x such that Jones did x slowly and Jones did x deliberately and Jones did x in the bathroom, ... ‘ and so on. But then we need an appropriate singular term to substitute for ‘x’. In fact we know Jones buttered a piece of toast.
Intending
Authors: Lepore Ernie , Ludwig Kirk 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Someone may intend to build a squirrel house without having decided to do it, deliberated about it, formed an intention to do it, or reasoned about it. And despite his intention, he may never build a squirrel house, try to build a squirrel house, or do anything whatever with the intention of getting a squirrel house built. Pure intending of this kind, intending that may occur without practical reasoning, action, or consequence, poses a problem if we want to give an account of the concept of intention that does not invoke unanalysed episodes or attitudes like willing, mysterious acts of the will, or kinds of causation foreign to science. When action is added to intention, for example when someone nails two boards together with the intention of building a squirrel house, then it may at first seem that the same problem does not necessarily arise.
Mary and Max and Jack and Ned
Authors: Perry John 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There is more in Ned Block’s rich chapter than I can discuss with the allotments of time, space, and, especially, wit and acumen, that various higher authorities have allotted me. I confine myself to replying to some of his criticisms of my treatment of the knowledge argument in Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness (Perry 2001), mainly by restating my view in ways that connect with at least some of his reservations.
Goodbye Growing Block
Authors: Merricks Trenton 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Eternalism says that all times are equally real. Objects existing at past times and objects existing at future times are just as real as objects existing at the present. Properties had at past times and properties had at future times are had just as much as properties had at the present. Indeed, there is no metaphysical difference at all between past, present, and future. They differ only as a result of one’s perspective, akin to the way ‘‘right here’’ differs from ‘‘over there’’. And so the eternalist takes ‘the present’ to be an indexical, like ‘here’ or ‘this place’. With all this in mind, let’s say that the eternalist believes in a subjective present.
Aristotle’s Constituent Ontology
Authors: Loux Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In both Aristotle and Nicholas Wolterstorff we meet with a distinction between two styles of metaphysical explanation. They use different language in setting out the distinction. Wolterstorff speaks of relational and constituent ontologies; whereas Aristotle tells us that we can make the substance of sensible particulars either something that exists ‘‘apart from the sensible objects’’ or something that is ‘‘immanent in them’’ (994a15–16); but the contrast they want to mark is, I believe, the same contrast. The context for the distinction is a certain philosophical project, the project Aristotle calls identifying the substance of familiar sensible particulars. Put in general terms, this project is that of explaining why familiar particulars have the character they do, why, that is, they fall under the kinds and exhibit the properties we, in our prephilosophical thinking, associate with them.
Richard dawkins: intellectual plumber—and more
Authors: krebs John 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The other week I was enduring one of those dinner parties at which the strength with which opinions are held is matched only by the weakness of their foundation. When the conversation turned, as it all too often does, to the possible health benefits of Organic Food, I was asked for a view in my capacity as the recently demitted Chairman of the UK Food Standards Agency. As I embarked on a brief, but pithy, exegesis of the scientific evidence, I was cut short in the middle of my first paragraph by the braying voice of the woman seated opposite me who interjected: ‘But we don’t believe in science in our family’. Suppressing my immediate inclination towards some form of physical response, I diverted my thoughts, as I often have before in similar situations, to the idea that there really should be an ‘Emergency Dawkins Service’.
Deep Commonalities Between Life and Mind
Authors: Pinker Steven 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
US television talk-show host Jay Leno, interviewing a passerby: How do you think Mount Rushmore was formed? Passerby: Erosion? Leno: Well, how do you think the rain knew to not only pick four presidents—but four of our greatest presidents? How did the rain know to put the beard on Lincoln and not on Jefferson? Passerby: Oh, just luck, I guess. I am a cognitive scientist, someone who studies the nature of intelligence and the workings of the mind. Yet one of my most profound scientific influences has been Richard Dawkins, an evolutionary biologist. The influence runs deeper than the fact that the mind is a product of the brain and the brain a product of evolution; such an influence could apply to someone who studies any organ of any organism.
The Perverse Primate
Authors: Sterelny Kim 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Richard Dawkins has had an enormous influence on my professional life. I had always been interested in the interface between philosophy and science, but until the 1980s, the sciences in question had been psychology and linguistics. (Physics was too damned hard.) But in 1983, at the urging of the philosopher Peter Godfrey-Smith, I read The Extended Phenotype—a truly great book—and was hooked on evolutionary biology. My copy disappeared under successive waves of marginal annotations as my career irrevocably changed course. In this essay I shall explore Darwinian visions of a somewhat neglected aspect of human nature: our paradoxical mix of astute intelligence and blindness to the obvious. I shall suggest that Richard’s Darwinism, with its emphasis on conflict, helps us understand this paradox rather better than do alternative evolutionary approaches to our cognitive foibles.
Dawkins and the Virus of Faith
Authors: Grayling A C 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Richard Dawkins is surely the most frequently-cited champion or demon, depending upon point of view, in the science versus religion wars. His detractors portray him as a humourless, soulless reductionist, a threat not just to faith but to all beauty and brightness. His admirers applaud the devastating blows he lands on the votaries of superstition and unreason. I am with the applauders; and the lucidity, clarity, and force of his contributions are a major part of what makes me so. Having encountered a Dawkins in his writings who is eloquently and indeed poetically alert to the astonishing and beautiful world revealed by science—so much more wonderful than anything the limited imaginings of religion offer—it always used to surprise me when Dawkins’ detractors charged him with sourness.