bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Notes of a Jewish Episcopalian: Gender as a Language of Class; Religion as a Dialect of Liberalism
Authors: Williams Joan C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The charge of socialism is a conversation-stopper; republicanism offers a native American alternative. To justify his radical widening of the concept of property, Charles Reich, in “The New Property,” mixed the liberal language of privacy with language from the republican egalitarian strain. The mystique of homeownership carries on republican themes, such as the notion that property offers a stable stake in society, and the notion that owners make good citizens. The grip of domesticity is so profound that the only realistic strategy is to transform it from within, to turn arguments for why women should remain in the home into demands to employers and the government to spread the costs of childrearing instead of privatizing them onto the women and children who represent 77 percent of those in poverty. In a culture with few viable redistributive rhetorics, religion has tremendous potential for building cross-class and cross-race coalitions.
A Defense of Minimalist Liberalism
Authors: Rorty Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Most people nowadays believe both that a free society is one in which citizens participate in government, and that it is one in which people are, within the limits Mill defined, left alone to choose their own values and ends. Liberals should not allow themselves to be encumbered with the idea of a self which is prior to its ends: existentialist, Californian, self which can somehow sit back and choose ends, values, and affiliations without reference to anything except its own momentary pleasure. The pragmatist, minimalist liberal, position is: try to educate the citizenry in the civic virtue of having as few compelling interests, beliefs, and desires as possible, to get them to be as flexible and wishy-washy as possible, and to value democratic consensus more than they value almost anything else. When Sandel says that liberals who have a merely “cooperative” vision of a community cannot meet Nozickian objections to redistributivist policies, the minimalist liberal should reply that they are met sentimentally, by telling sob stories about what happens to the poor in nonredistributivist societies. What emerges from Rawlsian attempts to put the search for consensual compromise above moral and religious conviction is not an absence of morality and religion, but new moralities and new religions.
Liberal Egalitarianism and Civic Republicanism: Friends or Enemies?
Authors: Kymlicka Will 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Civic republicanism and procedural liberalism are–or should be–allies; exaggerating their differences is philosophically suspect and politically counterproductive. Liberals insist that whatever the object of public policy–whether it is legal rights, economic resources, political institutions, civic virtues, or communal identities–the aim of state policy should be to promote principles of right, not to promote particular conceptions of the good. However much Sandel describes republican freedom as an alternative to liberal justice, one may guess that he would not promote the former at the expense of the latter, and that he (tacitly) views principles of justice as setting constraints on the promotion of republican freedom. While right-wing liberalism has been influential, its influence has often been to rationalize nonliberal opposition to progressive policies, which it is able to do because it is right-wing (i.e. because it opposes redistribution), not because it is liberal (i.e. not because of its commitment to revisability and its rejection of perfectionism). If the traditional liberal commitment to national institutions as the site of collective self-government and distributive justice is no longer viable, then liberals will need to create new forums of self-government, new institutions of redistribution, and corresponding new forms of identity and virtues.
Moral Status and the Status of Morality in Political Liberalism
Authors: Siegel Andrew W. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Political liberalism asserts that, in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism, the principles of justice which govern the basic social structure cannot be founded on a set of doctrines that some reasonable persons would not accept. For the political liberal, Sandel’s critique of the pervasiveness of the unencumbered self in legal discourse shows that we need to raise neutrality to a higher level, not that we need to relinquish it. One can oppose slavery and defend abortion rights while remaining neutral on moral and theological questions. Slavery is impermissible on the political conception of justice because it fails to recognize the political status of individuals who possess the properties of citizens and because it violates the principles which govern the fair terms of social cooperation among citizens. Although it appears that the political liberal must, in order to ward off metaphysics, denounce a constitutional right to abortion, she can preserve legal neutrality by leaving the issue of abortion rights to the states to decide.
Sandel's Liberal Politics
Authors: Frohnen Bruce 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Sandel retains the primal liberal attachment to individual flourishing as the proper end of life. On Sandel’s view, Rawls’s largely Kantian theory of justice rests on an emptying out of human nature. Attachments, for Locke and for Sandel, are necessary because they are the natural means by which we become capable of meaningful choice. Precisely because he refuses to question the self’s centrality, Sandel remains safely within liberal confines, unwilling or unable to question the validity of liberal suppositions. Sandel’s vision of the individual and of political life does not seem conducive to the institutions, beliefs, and practices on which any substantive community must rely.
Michael Sandel's America
Authors: Walzer Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The members of greedy communities do not make good citizens because they are only marginally interested in the political community; their sense of the common good is determined mostly by their religious beliefs and not by their membership in or allegiance to the state: some of them refuse, on principle, to declare their allegiance to anything as secular as a state. Immigration is an individual (or familial) decision, a free choice, which represents a break with those Old World communities whose members were, in Sandel’s exact sense, encumbered selves, that is, men and women whose obligations were given; the immigrants, once they have arrived in their new country, do not have obligations in quite the same sense. The more active members of groups (though not of the greediest groups) are also the more active citizens of the republic, the people who come closest to the civic commitment that Sandel wants to encourage–but a substantial part of what they are doing, and they probably understand it this way, is representing particular interests, bargaining for a place on “balanced” tickets, negotiating compromise arrangements, getting as much as they can from the state. Justice is a kind of recognition, and individual men and women who are recognized in their communities and empowered by them may be the most likely citizens of the community of communities.
Moral Dialogues: A Communitarian Core Element1
Authors: Etzioni Amitai 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The literature that explores the ways collectives formulate public policies is deeply influenced by the liberal way of thinking that argues that the way a democratic people ought to proceed (or/and does proceed) is for them to dispassionately discuss the facts of the situation, explore their logical implications, examine the alternatives that are available, and choose the one that is the most appropriate as determined on the basis of empirical evidence and logical conclusions. Deliberations have been contrasted with culture wars, a term used to suggest that the public is profoundly divided in its commitments to basic values, and that segments of the public confront each other in a highly charged way, often demonizing one another and turning differences into total opposition to the other’s fundamental commitments. Moral dialogues occur when a group of people engage in a process of sorting the values that will guide their formulations of the social good; they occur often in societies that fit the communitarian paradigm of balancing autonomy and order. A major characteristic of moral dialogues is that they abide by rules of engagement that reflect the basic tenet that a participant’s words and actions should be based on the recognition that the conflicting parties are members of one and the same community. Further development of these rules can serve both as an entry point into the dialogues themselves and as a pillar for sustaining them when social breakdowns are looming or the current normative course leaves certain groups feeling disassociated or disaffected from social processes.
Can This Republic Be Saved?
Authors: Elshtain Jean Bethke , Beem Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
For most Americans, intense sectarian commitments embodied in congregations were central and helped to fuel the penchant for political liberty. The replacement of citizenship with a state-sanctioned, consumerist-driven, perpetual childhood also explains our willingness, even eagerness, to orient our politics according to the dictates of pity–that is, the uncritical embrace of the victim. What we are seeing in this child-mindedness, this domestication of political imagery, is the reversal of the old standard in loco parentis: in the arenas of mental health, sexuality, values, we are all at sea, it seems, until others have clarified matters for us. As the epistemological status of civic claims has declined, it has become ever more difficult to counter the ethos of the “neutral” state; unless we can say that we understand that the good we seek reflects a truth, and that the grounds for that belief are universally accessible to all persons of good will, then there are no grounds for avoiding the counter-charge of coercion. Even the most ardent defenders of the procedural republic accept that democratic government requires a modicum of what is usually labeled civic virtue, but can one celebrate the idea of freedom as self-government without claiming that self-government and its exercise is good for its own sake?
Living With Difference
Authors: Taylor Charles 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There is a way of going about arbitrating a difference, not by finding a procedural principle, which will adjudicate it once and for all, but by confronting the identity needs and the demands of faith and principle that are here in confrontation, and trying to come to some defensible accommodation. One can say that, if the proponents of school prayer had had the sense to stop being Christians, and to redefine themselves as agnostic Kantians, they would have seen that they were being equally respected, qua rational agents, or life-plan choosers–but to take that as a modality of respect in a plural society sounds more like a bad joke than like good political philosophy. There are deep reasons in epistemology, and a theory of human agency and freedom, to go for a procedural ethics and politics, but the nature of the debate, in which the second Rawls is a key figure, was meant to bypass metaphysics and to bracket the deep theories of epistemology and anthropology. A subgroup which is not listened to, is in some respects excluded from the “nation,” but by this same token, it is no longer bound by the will of that nation. What Foucault defined as the only really healthy mode of identity formation, the definition of self in the aesthetic dimension, was a completely solo operation, the achievement of lone virtuosi, who could learn from each other, but did not need to associate with each other; one could not be farther removed from the Herder–Humboldt perspective, which may be the only perspective from which one can distinguish destructive from creative modes of multiculturalism.
Unencumbered Individuals and Embedded Selves: Reasons to Resist Dichotomous Thinking in Family Law
Authors: Shanley Mary Lyndon 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
US law concerning families has not tipped as unequivocally in the direction of unbridled individualism as Sandel believes, and, in any event, individualism and moral values are not diametrically opposed to one another. Because law shapes the way we conceptualize human relationships, we should make sure that “the tale told by law” reflects an understanding of the importance of communal interdependence to both individuals and society, rather than simply reflecting justice understood as the protection of individual rights. In promising wives long-term support in the event of divorce, the old marriage law provided some compensation to wives for their economic vulnerability, but it promoted an inequality in both the family and the larger society; the challenge for family law and family policy is to design measures that will allow deep affection ties to flourish while not locking some people–primarily women–into dependency. In Sandel’s eyes, the dissenters in Bowers v. Hardwick missed an opportunity to articulate the possible goods to be realized by homosexual intimacy, and in doing so impoverished political discourse, but throughout his opinion, Blackmun attempts to relate the importance to an individual of being a member of a family or an intimate association and the ability to choose to establish or enter such a relationship. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 regards neither Indian infants nor their biological parents as unencumbered individuals, but rather suggests that they are embedded in a web of relationships they have not chosen, yet which in part constitute who they are and which justify particular legal stipulations regarding jurisdiction and placement in foster care and adoption cases; it also recognizes individual rights through provisions that allow for consideration of the wishes of the biological parents and of the best interests of a particular child.
Gay Marriage and Liberal Constitutionalism: Two Mistakes
Authors: West Robin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This argument for gay marriage based on its seamless sameness with straight marriage and the “equality” and equal treatment that sameness demands, deprives us of the opportunity to not only argue for gay marriage “on the moral merits,” so to speak, but to make such an argument which stresses, rather than pointedly denies, the morally salutary differences between what gay marriage might be and what straight marriage here and now is. We might want to consider the possibility that the nonreproductive sex act, tamed, disciplined, and sanctified by a legal, religious, and socially recognized same-sex marriage, between two individuals committed to the care of each other and no less committed than their heterosexual counterparts to the possibility of raising children, presents a physical model of caring for the other that, precisely because it does not embed the giving of physical care in genetic replication, is less constrained by egoism. Sandel is right that liberalism misses the moral point of family life, but Mary Shanley is right that Sandel should be faulted for not seeing that communitarianism (his proffered alternative) misses the profound damage that a particular community can wreak on the lives of its members. Will Kymlicka asks whether liberalism can be charged with any aspect of our apparent inability to transcend the paralyzing grip of the mythology of social Darwinism; it can: the logic of liberalism–even in its left wing variant–drives us away from a direct and meaningful attack on the moral merits, so to speak, of this myth as myth. To dislodge the myth of the “self-made man,” we have to not only expose it as myth, but we also have to challenge it in kind; we have to replace it with a better one.
Corporate Speech and Civic Virtue
Authors: Regan Milton C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Supreme Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce upheld the application to the Michigan Chamber of Commerce, a nonprofit corporation funded by dues from members, three-quarters of whom are business corporations, of a Michigan law that forbids non-media corporations from using corporate treasury funds to make independent expenditures in connection with state elections for public office. The decision in Austin can be seen as resting on the view that business corporations are constrained in ways that systematically preclude them from cultivating civic virtue. Ironically, despite its often enormous wealth, the corporation is a paradigm of the materially dependent actor that has no choice but to look relentlessly to its self-interest. The modern corporation is operated for the sake of fictional shareholders, who are assumed to care only about maximizing the financial value of their shares, but, given the increasingly broad ownership of shares, shareholders also may well be employees of the company in which they hold stock or members of a community in which the corporation is an important economic presence. Union activity represents an effort at self-governance in the workplace, which requires consideration of and trade-offs among a variety of both material and nonmaterial goods.
The Reciprocity Principle
Authors: White Stuart 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter discusses a substantive economic reciprocity principle, referred to as the fair-dues conception of reciprocity. It argues that the satisfaction of this principle should be a requirement of justice. The basic idea of the fair-dues concept is that when the institutions that govern economic life are sufficiently fair in terms of the opportunities and awards they afford for productive contribution, citizens who claim the large share of the social product available to them under these institutions should make a decent productive contribution to the community in return.
Justice as Fair Reciprocity
Authors: White Stuart 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter discusses the conception of justice as fair reciprocity. In its non-ideal form, fair reciprocity demands that institutions governing economic life satisfy a threshold level of absolute and relative economic opportunity. Specifying this threshold should address a long-standing aspiration of the modern egalitarian movement – the creation of a society that has abolished the bads classically associated with the proletarian condition: brute luck poverty, market insecurity and the risk of domination by others, lack of opportunity for self-realization in work, and class division based on unequal access to education and wealth.
Welfare Contractualism
Authors: White Stuart 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines the practice of welfare contractualism from the standpoint of fair reciprocity. At first sight, welfare contractualism appears to be a legitimate practice. The work-test can be viewed as necessary to protect citizens from the unfair resource claims of those unwilling to meet their contributive obligations to the community. However, the work-test is only just if certain conditions are met. These include conditions relating to background distribution of assets and opportunities, and the structure and design of the work enforcement regime.
Sustainable Development and the Crisis of Nature: On the Political Anatomy of an Oxymoron
Authors: Sachs Wolfgang 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe current environmental crisis is a long‐delayed ‘boomerang effect’ of the North's exploitation of the South, which began with Christopher Columbus. Economic development has started to bump up against the limits imposed by resource constraints, and the stopgap concept of sustainable development raises the central issue of economic distributive justice by proposing that the development that made the North rich should now be arrested or controlled so that it can stay that way. Development is a finite concept that no longer meets the global social requirement. There are three ways of looking at sustainable development, which clarify the cultural values involved in responding to it. First, the contest perspective, which simply acknowledges that the North has won the development race. Second, the astronaut's perspective, which regards the globe as an object to be managed and envisages various possibilities of global cooperation to that effect; unfortunately, it presupposes a non‐existent cultural and legislative framework that constrains the rich for the benefit of the poor. Third, the home perspective, which envisages a self‐restraint on the part of the North in pushing a concept of development that protects ‘moral economies’ and searches for decentralized rather than accumulation‐centred forms of society.
Eco‐Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation
Authors: Luke Timothy W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines the impact of the sustainable development discourse on the academic curriculum and the ways in which the ecological emphasis on technical rationality affects the training of professional ecologists. As with Keulartz in the preceding chapter, it recognizes that nature is an interpreted construct whose meaning is essentially contestable. This leads to the argument that ecological training, notably in the USA and in Britain, has incorporated a particular set of cultural assumptions about the purpose of ecology, by which managerial concepts of objectivity, rationality, and utility have been skewed towards endorsement of the performative norms embedded deep within capitalist theory and practice. This gives ecological management, or ‘eco‐managerialism’, the qualities of government, whereby nature loses its transcendental qualities and its locales, resources, and systems become objects of capitalist manipulation.
Images of Place in Green Politics: The Cultural Mirror of Indigenous Traditions
Authors: Torgerson Douglas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Green movements on the Western European model need to be more aware that their predilection for open public debate and transparency of government decision‐making can be insensitive to the interests of aboriginal peoples who do not share that predilection. While both environmentalists and aboriginals have a common cause in defending against encroachments by the forces of industrialism, there is an inherent paradox in the Green political concept of ‘defence of place’ arising from the fact that their cultural conceptions, of what is to be preserved and why, may conflict with those of the aboriginal peoples actually living there. An instructive case study of the protests over logging practices in Clayoquot Sound on the west coast of Vancouver Island in British Columbia is presented. The initial alignment between environmental activists and the Nuu‐chah‐nulth aboriginals gave way to estrangement when, after hundreds of the former had been arrested, fined, or jailed, the representatives of the latter arrived at a political understanding with the authorities in respect of land claims and forest management practices. The shock experienced by some environmentalists over the independent direction taken by the Nuu‐chah‐nulth may suggest that environmentalists and aboriginals were, in fact, operating with quite different images of the forest as property. A greater degree of cultural sensitivity is required to prevent such misunderstandings in future. It is also important to recognize how politicization can change culture—a deliberate political campaign to defend a traditional culture can itself change the culture being defended. It is entirely conceivable for a defence of place—through its own political and cultural dynamics—to undermine the very culture that has given the place its unique meaning and value.