bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Fourth Kondratiev Wave: The Great Depression and the Age of Oil, Automobiles, Motorization, and Mass Production
Authors: Freeman Chris , Louçã Francisco 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe key inventions that led to the internal combustion engine, to the automobile, the truck, the tractor, and the tank, were made in Europe, but the innovations that led to the assembly line, to mass production and consumption, were made at the Ford plant in Detroit in the early years of the twentieth century.These technical and organizational innovations gave such an impetus to productivity, profitability, output, and exports of the US automobile industry that the plant became a Mecca for visitors from all over the world and ‘Fordism’ became a dominant management philosophy as well as an economic and cultural ideology, believed to herald the dawn of a ‘new economy’.The chapter devotes considerable attention to possible explanations for the collapse of this boom and the advent of the ‘Great Depression’ of the 1930s, concluding that, as with previous clusters of innovations, the assimilation of a major new technology into the social system gave rise to enormous political and social tensions and to structural crises of adjustment, both at national and international levels.These tensions and conflicts led ultimately to a Second World War, a motorized war in which tanks and aircraft proved decisive weapons and oil was the essential fuel for the motorized armed forces.The world economy after the war was no less dependent on abundant cheap oil, and became a system dominated by the mass production of cars and consumer durables, as well as motor highways, the mass media, mass tourism, mass education, mass culture, and the political and military supremacy of the US.
Introduction
Authors: Pollack Mark A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal‐agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration.
Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the European Union
Authors: Pollack Mark A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPrincipal‐agent theories of delegation generate specific, testable hypotheses about delegation to supranational organizations in the European Union, including: the specific functions delegated to such agents; the conditions under which member‐state principals delegate greater or lesser discretion to their agents; and the conditions under which supranational organizations such as the Commission are able to pursue their distinct preferences, within the limits of their statutory discretion. Such principal‐agent analyses, drawn from rational choice theory and transaction‐costs approaches, represent a parsimonious and internally consistent approach to the study of delegation; however, a competing approach, derived from sociological institutionalism, generates strikingly different predictions. This book examines both the delegation stage (at which member‐state principals create supranational organizations, delegate powers to them and establish control mechanisms to limit their discretion) and the subsequent behaviour of supranational agents in the day‐to‐day conduct of their executive, judicial and legislative powers. Although causally related, these two stages raise very different methodological challenges, and thus the two parts of the book utilize distinct research designs and methods to answer the questions posed in each.
The European Parliament as an Outlier: Delegation of Legislative Power in the European Union
Authors: Pollack Mark A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractEuropean Union governments have delegated an ever‐expanding set of supervisory, budgetary and legislative powers to the European Parliament over the past five decades of European integration. Such delegation to the Parliament appears to be motivated not by the functional demands emphasized in principal‐agent approaches, but primarily by an ideological concern on the part of member governments, and their constituents, to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the European Union. A close examination of the patterns and process of delegation to the EP, however, suggests that member governments calculate the likely consequences of delegation to the EP, and refrain from delegating powers in areas where they perceive that the EP would move political outcomes away from their collective preferences.
Conclusions: A Europe of Agents, a World of Agents
Authors: Pollack Mark A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe member states of the European Union have delegated functions to the Commission and the Court of Justice, which correspond closely to the functions predicted by principal‐agent models; delegation to the European Parliament, however, fits poorly with such models, and appears to be driven primarily by concerns about democratic legitimacy. Turning from delegation to the subsequent activities of supranational agents, the evidence suggests that the EU's supranational agents generally act as unitary actors with a preference for further integration, and that the discretion of these actors to realize their preferences varies systematically with the institutional control mechanisms established by member governments. Looking beyond the European Union, the increasing delegation of executive and judicial powers to international organisations, secretariats and tribunals calls for further study using the tools of principal‐agent analysis. Such international delegation promises significant benefits to participating states, but also raises normative concerns about democratic accountability.
Order and Justice in International Relations: What Is at Stake?
Authors: Hurrell Andrew 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter takes issue with a traditional approach that has tried, unsuccessfully, to separate order from justice. It argues that a solidarist consciousness has been developed, arising from a wide range of social, political, economic, and technological forces. These developments make a retreat to pluralist state‐based conceptions of international order and justice impossible. Yet the chapter acknowledges, too, that attempts to move towards promoting some conception of global justice are still constrained because these attempts have to be made in the context of a global political order that remains heavily structured around inherited pluralist mechanisms that reflect various types of inequality.
Order and Justice in the International Trade System
Authors: Toye John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Toye focuses on issues relating to substantive justice as mediated through the international trade regime. He argues that the transition from the GATT to the WTO is leading to the continuation, possibly even the worsening, of inequality amongst countries. Toye concludes that formal justice is at odds with substantive justice since the inequalities of political and economic power between developed and developing countries have not been compensated for in the enactment of supposedly improved trade procedural rules.
Russian Perspectives on Order and Justice
Authors: MacFarlane S. Neil 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMacFarlane argues that Russian perspectives on order and justice are deeply rooted and are basically inconsistent with liberal thinking. These perspectives strongly reflect the country's geographical and historical experiences. The leaders of the country have generally ignored solidarist ends and have remained wedded to the promotion of a state‐based order in which multipolarity prevails, multilateralism is to be avoided, and the Russian loss of status is recovered along with its material power. Russian leaders remain concerned with interstate justice in the context of a re‐established domestic and Russian‐led regional order.
An Uneasy Engagement: Chinese Ideas of Global Order and Justice in Historical Perspective
Authors: Mitter Rana 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Mitter's study argues that until the late Qing, concepts of international order and justice were alien to China's imperial rulers. Subsequently, however, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, China perceived itself to be the victim in an unjust world of aggressive, powerful, Western states. Contemporary Chinese perceptions of a just international order have been shaped by such past experiences and encompass a strong element of restitution. Its justice claims start with the Chinese state itself rather than with the needs of a broader global community.
Indian Conceptions of Order and Justice: Nehruvian, Gandhian, Hindutva, and Neo‐Liberal
Authors: Bajpai Kanti 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBajpai begins by examining these four dominant traditions of thought and compares the attitudes of the four traditions towards state sovereignty, the use of force, the utility of rules and institutions, and inequality. The author shows the degree of compatibility between these four perspectives and the Westphalian concept of order and justice as well as with more solidarist approaches. He concludes by outlining what a just world order would look like from the four perspectives, and notes that a three‐way conversation on this topic is taking place between the Nehruvians, the increasingly influential Hindutvas, and the nascent neo‐liberals.
Plato's Utopia Recast
Authors: Bobonich Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that Plato in his middle period (roughly at the time of the Phaedo and the Republic) had a radically pessimistic view of non‐philosophers: they could not be genuinely virtuous or happy, and their lives were inevitably deeply undesirable ones to live. This pessimistic conclusion, I argue, rests on Plato's middle‐period epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics. But in the later dialogues (e.g. the Laws and the Statesman), Plato comes to a strikingly different conclusion. At least some non‐philosophers can be virtuous and lead lives that are well worth living. This book traces and explores the backward and forward connections to Plato's new estimate of non‐philosophers’ ethical capacities. On the backward side, these changes rest on significant developments in Plato's psychology and epistemology. In particular, in Plato's late period, he develops a more unified view of the soul's capacities and a richer understanding of how reason structures and influences the rest of the soul's capacities. On the forward side, these differences in non‐philosophers’ ethical capacities have significant implications for Plato's political philosophy. Since non‐philosophers are capable of more, the political and social institutions appropriate for them must also be differ ent.This book thus reads the Laws in the context provided by Plato's other post‐Republic dialogues—especially the Phaedrus, the Philebus, the Statesman, the Theaetetus, and the Timaeus—and tries to show how the Laws’ novel ethical and political conclusions depend on the epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics of these later dialogues.
Philosophers and Non‐Philosophers in the Phaedo and the Republic
Authors: Bobonich Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explores Plato's two most important earlier discussions of non‐philosophers: that in the Phaedo, in which Plato for the first time takes as a central theme the differences between philosophers and non‐philosophers, and that of the Republic, which is the most extensive and philosophically rich account of non‐philosophers in the middle period. It examines the psychology and the epistemology of the Phaedo and the Republic and shows that they have pessimistic implications for the ethical capacities of non‐philosophers and for Plato's political theory.
Parts of the Soul and Non‐Rational Motivations
Authors: Bobonich Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues that the Phaedrus, the Theaetetus, and the Timaeus develop Plato's rationale for the abandonment of the Republic's psychological theory. In these dialogues, Plato comes to deny to the lower parts of the soul the sort of epistemic independence that they had in the Republic. The perceptual resources they drew upon in the Republic are no longer sufficient to allow them to be goal‐setting agents or the possessors of beliefs and desires. This chapter then examines the implications of Plato's later psychology for the place of the emotions and pleasure in the virtuous life.
The Citizens of Magnesia
Authors: Bobonich Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Since in the Laws Plato comes to think that non‐philosophers are capable of genuine virtue, new conceptions of what a good city is and of what a good citizen is are both possible and required. This chapter explores these conceptions and in doing so examines Plato's understanding of proper political rule, the goodness of ethical activity, and the city's theology. I also discuss some of the details of the political and social structure of the city of the Laws (Magnesia) and the ways in which such a city is ‘second best’.
Theory and Truth
Authors: Sklar Lawrence 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSceptics have often cast doubt on the legitimacy of claims to the effect that our best scientific theories are true. One ground for such scepticism is the fact that our theories advert to the existence and nature of unobservable entities and features of the world. Another ground for such scepticism is the fact that our theories rest upon our idealization of the world in their descriptions and explanations. A third ground for scepticism is the claim that all of our theories are but transient. If we expect even our best theories to ultimately be replaced, how can we think of them as truly describing the world? Each kind of sceptical argument plays a role within the scientific project of theory construction and evaluation itself. But there are clear and important differences between the kinds of internal role such arguments play within science and the way that they function in the more abstract philosophical context.
The Concept of Knowledge
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this essay, McGinn argues for a version of reliabilism, contending that a belief counts as knowledge just in case ‘it is produced by a method capable of yielding true beliefs in a range of relevant cases’. This view diverges from other versions of reliabilism, notably Robert Nozick's counter‐factionalist tracking theory, which, McGinn argues, ‘localizes the conditions for knowledge into a relation between the knower and a unique proposition’. Against this local analysis of propositional knowledge, McGinn presents a global reliabilism in which the notion of discrimination is basic. On McGinn's view, global reliability consists in a subject's capacity to distinguish the true from the false within a relevant class of propositions. McGinn concludes by considering the implications of his view for sceptical arguments—in particular, the claim that knowledge is not closed under known logical implication.
A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
McGinn defends a causal criterion for distinguishing a priori from a posteriori knowledge. In the case of a posteriori knowledge, the subject matter of a knower's ground for believing a proposition is the cause of that knower's coming to believe that proposition. In the case of a priori knowledge, it is not the case that the subject matter of the knower's ground for believing a proposition is the cause of that knower's coming to believe that proposition. In this essay's first section, McGinn argues that a causal condition for knowledge is no part of an analysis of knowledge tout court, but merely part of a naturalized account of a posteriori knowledge. McGinn then argues for the extensional adequacy of his account of a priori knowledge for the cases of mathematical, logical, and analytic knowledge. He concludes by considering the connections between the a priori and the a posteriori, on the one hand, and the modal notions of necessity and contingency, on the other.
A Note on the Essence of Natural Kinds
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this, his first philosophical publication, McGinn introduces a distinction between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility, in order to diagnose the reason for Mackie's misinterpretation of Kripke's essentialism about natural kinds. McGinn then argues—on behalf of Kripke and pace Mackie—that the secondary qualities of natural kind substances (e.g. gold, water) are rigidly identical to the underlying primary qualities.
Modal Reality
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this essay, McGinn argues for a version of ‘modal realism’ that denies the reality of possible worlds. Central to this discussion is a distinction between objectual and non‐objectual interpretations of modal expressions. Objectual interpretations affirm the reality of possible worlds, the existence of which McGinn flatly denies; whereas on the non‐objectual alternative, the semantic role of modal expressions is non‐referential. According to McGinn, the modal truth is to be grounded not in a realist ontology of possible worlds but in the manner in which real objects have the properties they do. In this way, McGinn remains a modal realist by locating modality in the modes of objects.
The Structure of Content
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this precursor to his Mental Content (1989), McGinn defends and explores the implications of his dual‐component theory of mental and linguistic content. According to McGinn, our concept of belief combines two components: the first (apropos of belief's causal‐explanatory role) consists in a mode of representation of things in the world, the second (apropos of belief's truth‐bearing role) involves the semantic relations between such representations and the things represented. The case is analogous for linguistic content, which is also structurally duplex; meaning, for McGinn, consists in both reference and mode of presentation. Having situated his dual‐component theory relative to several standard accounts of meaning, McGinn concludes the essay by considering its implications, notably for the conditions under which mental and linguistic content can be ascribed, and for the nature of radical interpretation.
Charity, Interpretation, and Belief
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
McGinn argues that, pace Davidson, relational belief attributions do not require a principle of charity. According to McGinn, the requirement of Davidsonian charity turns on the false presumption that ‘most of what others say and believe is going to be true’. But, in this early statement of externalism about the mind, McGinn argues that a subject ‘may be intentionally related to an object … without being able to conceive it aright’; this is because a subject may see an object (which is sufficient for relational attribution) without having preponderantly true beliefs about the object she sees. Thus, because ‘intentionality is prior to veridicality’, we cannot discount the possibility of ‘widespread and deep‐going disagreement between interpreter and interpreted’. McGinn concludes by considering how his externalism about propositional attitudes mirrors Putnam's externalism about meaning, and how rejecting the principle of charity impacts Davidson's method of radical interpretation.
Radical Interpretation and Epistemology
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this companion to ‘Charity, Interpretation, and Belief’, McGinn broadens his attack on Davidson's principle of charity, arguing that charity is no more required for the ascription of notional beliefs (i.e. shared concepts) than it is for the ascription of relational beliefs. His argument takes the form of a reductio: if Davidson were right that about the inherently charitable nature of interpretation, then, McGinn argues, traditional sceptical worries (e.g. concerning the external world, other minds) would not even arise. But that is absurd. In the concluding section, McGinn presents his preferred (Quinean) method of interpretation, according to which the ascription of beliefs and meanings proceeds only after the attribution of perceptual experiences.
The Mechanism of Reference
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
McGinn's aim is two‐fold: to undermine both descriptive and causal theories of reference, and to argue for his preferred, ‘contextual’ theory of reference. McGinn is moved to this position by emphasizing indexicals—which he takes to be the primary referential devices—rather than proper names. Linguistic reference, for McGinn, is a conventional activity governed by rules that prescribe the spatio‐temporal conditions of correct use; the semantic referent of a speaker's term is given by combining its linguistic meaning with the spatio‐temporal context in which the speaker is located. McGinn concludes his defence of this theory by demonstrating the plausibility of its implications for such topics as abstract objects, self‐reference, attribution, the language of thought hypothesis, truth, and the reducibility of reference.
Truth and Use
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this response to the work of Michael Dummett, McGinn aims to vindicate the plausibility of a realist outlook. Realism claims that a sentence's truth is ‘epistemically unconstrained’ or ‘knowledge‐transcendent’, in the sense that the world is as it is independently of our knowing truths about it. Contra Dummett's arguments against the tenability of this realist conviction, McGinn's counter‐argument proceeds by showing, first, ‘that it is an empiricist dogma to suppose that we cannot acquire conceptions that transcend our experience (“recognitional capacities”),’ and second, ‘that we can connect experience‐transcendent conceptions with linguistic use by making the (deflationary) observation that such conceptions are fit subjects for communicative speech acts’.
Two Notions of Realism?
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
McGinn's narrow aim in this essay is to complicate Dummett's simplistic, logico‐linguistic formulation of the debate between realism and anti‐realism, by undermining the presumption that the law of bivalence captures the intuitive notion of realism. Drawing on a wide variety of illustrations (e.g. statements of personal identity, ethical statements, Quinean theories of radical interpretation, mathematical statements), McGinn counters that realism is better characterized as the claim of evidence independence, arguing that this claim is independent of the truth or falsity of bivalence. Thus, McGinn's wider aim is to formulate the dispute between realism and anti‐realism as a metaphysical, rather than logico‐linguistic, debate.
Another Look at Colour
Authors: McGinn Colin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this essay—the first of two essays on colour included in this collection—McGinn abandons the dispositional theory that he first defended in The Subjective View (1983). In its standard formulation, the dispositional theory of colour claims that an object's being red consists in its possession of some physical property which, in turn, has the causal role of generating experiences of red in perceivers; this property is what disposes the object to cause red experiences. Following a demonstration of how this dispositional analysis fails to account for the phenomenology of colour perception, McGinn defends a revised position that combines ‘a form of naïve realism about colour perception’ with a ‘natural descendent’ of the dispositional theory, according to which primitive colour properties are not identical to, but rather supervene on, complex dispositional properties.