bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Skepticism and the Future
Authors: Will Frederick L. 
Published: November 2002

The contention of the above comment, as I understand it, is that there is, analogously to the problem of trisecting an arbitrary angle in mathematics, a sound demonstration, along the lines employed by Hume and Russell, of skeptical conclusions concerning our inductive knowledge of the future, and that hence one is mistaken in imputing to that argument, as I have done, a logical slip arising from a confusion in the use of ‘future’ and other similar words. I am indebted to Mr. Wang for the stimulation, and to the Editor of Philosophy of Science for the opportunity, to try to make my points clearer.The proponents of these skeptical arguments maintain that, apart from some supporting postulates which we must make in inductions about the future, we have no evidence concerning the future of any given moment. If we restrict ourselves to the evidence we have from the present and the past, and do not bolster this evidence with some Principle of Induction, like that of Hume to the effect that the future will be like the past, “we have no theoretical assurance,” as Mr. Wang puts it, “that the practice of guiding our activities by what we learn from ... [the past] will lead to success on the whole and in the long run.”
Whitehead and Relativity
Authors: Seaman Francis 
Published: November 2002

When Whitehead's views of relativity are mentioned, everyone thinks of the views Whitehead published between 1919 and 1924. Concerning these views, C. D. Broad is “depressed”1 (1: pp. 143–4) that physicists paid so little attention. And Victor Lowe has written:There is a bare possibility that Whitehead's theory of relativity may yet affect the history of science. (4: p. 69)
Note about Whitehead's Definitions of Co-presence
Authors: Capek Milic 
Published: November 2002

In his Concept of Nature Whitehead gives the following definition of the term “co-presence”:
I call two event-particles which on some or other system of measurement are in the same instantaneous space ‘co-present’ event-particles. Then it is possible that A and B may be co-present, and that A and C may be co-present, but that B and C may not be co-present. For example, at some inconceivable distance from us there are events co-present with us now and also co-present with the birth of Queen Victoria. If A and B are co-present there will be some systems in which A precedes B and some in which B precedes A. Also there can be no velocity quick enough to carry a material particle from A to B or from B to A.
Reflections on Philipp Frank's Philosophy of Science
Authors: Kegley Charles W. 
Published: November 2002

Recent writings of Professor Frank raise basic questions concerning the nature of science and its relations to social, political, theological and metaphysical issues.This paper concentrates on several of these questions. What determines the acceptance of an hypothesis in the sciences? Is it explanation of the facts and confirmation by experimentation or is it the capacity of a theory to guide human conduct? Professor Frank's espousal of the latter criterion raises the question of whether this criterion can clearly be applied. Equally important: it places on the scientist the responsibility of (a) reliably predicting the effects of a theory on human conduct and (b), deciding which effects ought to be achieved, assuming we could reliably achieve them. Another set of problems arises concerning the relation between scientific views and metaphysical, political and religious beliefs. Are the former relevant to the latter? If so, how? Does not scientific method at least involve the rejection of certain political and religious philosophies? We conclude that each and all of these difficulties could be relieved if not resolved by accepting a thoroughgoing empiricism.
Two Approaches to Mathematical and Physical Systems
Authors: Schlesinger G. 
Published: November 2002

It is commonly the case that a problem concerning a mathematical or physical system can be solved in two quite different ways—by an internal or an external approach. For example, the area of a triangle can be found by integration or by showing it to be half that of a certain rectangle. In general, the first approach is, to analyse the given system into component parts, and the second approach is to deal with the system as a whole.It seems that even in cases where solutions to physical problems obtained according to these two approaches are equally valid, and are equally good as explanations, scientists prefer the solution obtained by the internal approach.The reasons for this preference are examined. And it is suggested that whatever the reasons, this preference may have been partly responsible for the 19th century preference for the Kinetic Theory rather than Thermodynamics.
Theories, Frameworks, and Ontology
Authors: Maxwell Grover 
Published: November 2002

Utilizing Carnap's notions of “questions [or assertions] within a framework” and “questions [or assertions] about a framework” and his account of A-truth (analyticity in the broad sense), a theory of the ontological status of entities—in particular, that of theoretical entities—is adumbrated.In addition to the usual L-rules, each conceptual framework considered embodies a set of sentences whose truth value is quickly decidable on other than purely linguistic grounds, a set of A-true formulae, and a set of rules for the confirmation and disconfirmation of non-L-true, non-A-true formulae which are not quickly decidable. Criteria which acceptable sets of A-true formulae must fulfill are given.Using this apparatus, a schema for a realistic interpretation of scientific theories is outlined.
Points of View, Scientific Theories and Econometric Models
Authors: Wolfson Robert J. 
Published: November 2002

The relationship between a class of structural forms and a single reduced form econometric model is discussed. These are shown to be empirically equivalent. It is made clear that choice of a particular structural form for estimation, rather than another of the same class, rests on a priori heuristic and computational considerations, not on empirical or logical grounds.Alternative scientific strategies are discussed briefly.
Science and Idealism
Authors: Almeder Robert F. 
Published: November 2002

In this essay it is argued that (1) if the process of scientific inquiry were to continue forever, then science would ultimately terminate in the acceptance of a single theoretical framework better than all conceivable others, and (2) there is some evidence in favor of the view that science will continue unto eternity but no evidence in favor of the contrary view.In arguing for claim (1) it is claimed that if we are to understand the sense in which science is progressive we must mean either that science progresses by approximating a final goal which, given an infinite process, will be attained, or that science progresses simply in the sense of expanding a body of funded knowledge such that, given an infinite process, the body of funded knowledge expands ad infinitum. That the second member of this disjunct is false and that the first cannot be shown to be false follows largely from a discussion and rejection of all available arguments (five) against the hypothesis proposed in (1). Further, an argument provided by Peirce (and suitably supplemented) provides additional positive evidence for the truth of the first member. No such argument exists for the truth of the second member.In arguing for claim (2) it is held that evidence in favor of a belief can be purchased by the positive moral value likely to occur as a result of accepting the beliefs, and that there is at least one moral value which accrues to the belief that inquiry will continue forever but which does not accrue to the belief that inquiry will not continue forever. In short, while there is no systematic evidence for or against the view that inquiry will continue forever, we have the right (and duty) to believe that inquiry will continue forever but we do not have the right (and duty) to believe the contrary.
Polanyi on the Meno Paradox
Authors: Bradie Michael 
Published: November 2002

In [1] Michael Polanyi argues that in order to understand how scientists come to recognize problems as problems, we must invoke a concept of “tacit knowing.” Tacit knowledge is a kind of knowledge of which we are aware but which cannot be made explicit. Polanyi argues that a paradox discussed in the Meno cannot be solved without appeal to this notion of tacit knowledge. Here I want to argue, quite simply, that Polanyi's formulation of the “paradox” can be easily subverted without an appeal to tacit knowing. Polanyi puts the paradox thus:... to search for the solution of a problem is an absurdity; for either you know what you are looking for, and then there is no problem; or you do not know what you are looking for, and then you cannot expect to find anything. ([1], p. 22)
On a Problem in Conditional Probability
Authors: Dale A. I. 
Published: November 2002

In an article “Countering a Counter-intuitive Probability” [4], Lynn E. Rose discusses a question in conditional probability, claiming that the following problem posed by Copi [1] is usually incorrectly solved:Remove all cards except aces and kings from a deck, so that only eight cards remain, of which four are aces and four are kings. From this abbreviated deck, deal two cards to a friend. If he looks at his cards and announces (truthfully) that his hand contains an ace, what is the probability that both his cards are aces? If he announces instead that one of his cards is the ace of spades, what is the probability then that both his cards are aces? (These two probabilities are not the same!) ([1], p. 433)
Five Duhemian Theses
Authors: Yoshida R. M. 
Published: November 2002

In concluding section 2, chapter VI of part II of [6], Duhem claimed:
(I)... the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only a whole group of hypotheses ... ([6], p. 187)(II)... when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions, what he learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be changed'. ([6], p. 187)
Rejoinder to Tuana
Authors: Quinn Philip L. 
Published: November 2002

Consider the two Duhemian theses S, according to which no single or individual theoretical hypothesis by itself has any observational consequences, and F, which states that no single theoretical hypothesis can be conclusively falsified by any observations.Does the truth of F follow from the truth of S? I had conjectured that Duhem may have thought so, but I argued that it does not [1]. Nancy Tuana contends that my argument misses the mark, and she goes on to argue that it does [2]. It seems to me that her arguments are decisive on this point, and so I welcome the correction.
Some Doubts About “Turing Machine Arguments”
Authors: Heffernan James D. 
Published: November 2002

In his article “On Mechanical Recognition” ([6]) R. J. Nelson brings to bear a branch of mathematical logic called automata theory on problems of artificial intelligence. Specifically he attacks the anti-mechanist claim that “[i]nasmuch as human recognition to a very great extent relies on context and on the ability to grasp wholes with some independence of the quality of the parts, even to fill in the missing parts on the basis of expectations, it follows that computers cannot in principle be programmed to recognize or learn to recognize all patterns” ([6]), p. 24). Nelson proposes, contrary to this claim, that “gestalt recognition is not beyond digital automata” ([6], p. 24). in particular, he claims, he will establish by what he calls “Turing machine arguments” ([6], p. 25) that the following four theses are true:
(1)automata can recognize different pattern types in one and the same set of instances;(2)automata can recognize the “same” pattern in different (even completely disjoint) sets of instances;(3)automata can recognize incomplete, degraded patterns having missing or indeterminate parts;(4)automata can recognize family resemblances. ([6], pp. 24–25)
An Interpretation of Macroscopic Irreversibility within the Newtonian Framework
Authors: Hollinger Henry B. , Zenzen Michael J. 
Published: November 2002

Some of the most imaginative analyses in contemporary science have been fostered by the paradox of irreversibility. Rendered as a question the paradox reads: How can the anisotropic macrophysical behavior of a system of molecules be reconciled with the underlying reversible molecular model? Attempts to resolve and dissolve the paradox have appealed to large numbers of particles, jammed correlations, unseen perturbations, hidden variables or constraints, uncertainty principles, averaging procedures (e.g., coarse graining and time smoothing), stochastic flaws, cosmological origins, etc.While acknowledging these efforts as important articulations of basic ideas of statistical mechanics, we question their relevance to irreversibility as it occurs in nature. It seems to us that once the emergence of the phenomenon of equilibrium is understood in terms of molecular dynamics, the macroscopic appearance of irreversibility can also be understood in terms of the frequency of forced withdrawals from young equilibria. We believe that the paradox of irreversibility can be resolved in a simple, logically clear, and aesthetically pleasing manner.
Space-Time and Synonymy
Authors: Spirtes Peter , Glymour Clark 
Published: November 2002

In “The Epistemology of Geometry” Glymour proposed a necessary structural condition for the synonymy of two space-time theories. David Zaret has recently challenged this proposal, by arguing that Newtonian gravitational theory with a flat, non-dynamic connection (FNGT) is intuitively synonymous with versions of the theory using a curved dynamical connection (CNGT), even though these two theories fail to satisfy Glymour's proposed necessary condition for synonymy.Zaret allowed that if FNGT and CNGT were not equally well (bootstrap) tested by the relevant phenomena, the two theories would in fact not be synonymous. He argued, however, that when electrodynamic phenomena are considered, the two theories are equally well tested.We show that it is not FNGT and CNGT which are equally well tested when the electrodynamic phenomena are considered, but only suitable extensions of FNGT and CNGT. Thus, there is good reason to consider FNGT and CNGT to be non-synonymous. We further show that the two extensions of FNGT and CNGT which are equally well tested when electrodynamic phenomena are considered (and which could be considered intuitively synonymous) not only satisfy Glymour's original proposed necessary condition for the synonymy of spacetime theories, they satisfy a plausible stronger condition as well.
Relational Theories of Euclidean Space and Minkowski Spacetime
Authors: Mundy Brent 
Published: November 2002

We here present explicit relational theories of a class of geometrical systems (namely, inner product spaces) which includes Euclidean space and Minkowski spacetime. Using an embedding approach suggested by the theory of measurement, we prove formally that our theories express the entire empirical content of the corresponding geometric theory in terms of empirical relations among a finite set of elements (idealized point-particles or events) thought of as embedded in the space. This result is of interest within the general phenomenalist tradition as well as the theory of space and time, since it seems to be the first example of an explicit phenomenalist reconstruction of a realist theory which is provably equivalent to it in observational consequences.The interesting paper “On the Space-Time Ontology of Physical Theories” by Ken Manders, Philosophy of Science, vol. 49, number 4, December 1982, p. 575–590, has significant affinities to this one. We both, in a sense, try to formally vindicate Leibniz's notion of a relational theory of space, by constructing theories of spatial relations among physical objects which are provably equivalent to the standard absolutist theories. The essential difference between our approaches is that Manders retains Leibniz's explicitly modal framework, whereas I do not. Manders constructs a spacetime theory which explicitly characterizes the totality of possible configurations of physical objects, using a modal language in which the notion of a possible configuration occurs as a primitive. There is no doubt that this is a more accurate realization of Leibniz's own conception of space than the embedding-based approach developed here. However, it also remains open to objections (such as those cited here from Sklar) on account of the special appeal to modal notions.Our approach here, by contrast, aims to avoid the special appeal to modal notions by giving directly a set of laws which are satisfied by a configuration individually, if and only if it is one of the allowable ones. One thus avoids the need for reference to possible but not actual configurations or objects, in the statement of the spacetime laws. We may then take this alternative set of laws as the actual geometric theory, and do away with the hypothetical entity called ‘space'. Yet at the same time there is no invocation of modality, except in the ordinary sense in which every physical theory constrains what is possible. So that a relationalist is not forced to utilize a modal language (though Leibniz certainly does.)
Robert Stalnaker, Inquiry
Authors: Field Hartry 
Published: November 2002

This is an interesting, well argued, and highly readable book; anyone interested in the central philosophical problems with which it deals will benefit from studying it.Stalnaker defines inquiry as the process of forming, testing, and revising beliefs. His goal is to lay the groundwork for a theory of inquiry, by elaborating and defending a certain apparatus in terms of which the process of inquiry should be described.
Forces
Authors: Bigelow John , Ellis Brian , Pargetter Robert 
Published: November 2002

Traditionally, forces are causes of a special sort. Forces have been conceived to be the direct or immediate causes of things. Other sorts of causes act indirectly by producing forces which are transmitted in various ways to produce various effects. However, forces are supposed to act directly without the mediation of anything else.But forces, so conceived, appear to be occult. They are mysterious, because we have no clear conception of what they are, as opposed to what they are postulated to do; and they seem to be hidden from direct observations. There is, therefore, strong initial motivation for trying to eliminate forces from physics. Furthermore, as we shall explain, powerful arguments can be mounted to show that theories with forces can always be recast as theories without them. Hence it seems that forces should be eliminated, in the interests of simplicity.We argue, however, that forces should not be eliminated—just differently construed. For the effect of elimination is to leave us without any adequate account of the causal relationships forces were postulated to explain. And this would remain the case, even if forces could be identified with some merely dispositional properties of physical systems. In our view, forces are species of the causal relation itself, and as such have a different ontological status from the sorts of entities normally considered to be related as causes to effects.
Cork Taint of Wines: Role of the Filamentous Fungi Isolated from Cork in the Formation of 2,4,6-Trichloroanisole by O Methylation of 2,4,6-Trichlorophenol
Authors: Álvarez-Rodríguez María Luisa , López-Ocaña Laura , López-Coronado José Miguel , Rodríguez Enrique , Martínez María Jesús , Larriba Germán , Coque Juan-José R. 
Published: November 2002

ABSTRACT

Cork taint is a musty or moldy off-odor in wine mainly caused by 2,4,6-trichloroanisole (2,4,6-TCA). We examined the role of 14 fungal strains isolated from cork samples in the production of 2,4,6-TCA by O methylation of 2,4,6-trichlorophenol (2,4,6-TCP). The fungal strains isolated belong to the genera
Penicillium
(four isolates);
Trichoderma
(two isolates); and
Acremonium
,
Chrysonilia
,
Cladosporium
,
Fusarium
,
Mortierella
,
Mucor
,
Paecilomyces
, and
Verticillium
(one isolate each). Eleven of these strains could produce 2,4,6-TCA when they were grown directly on cork in the presence of 2,4,6-TCP. The highest levels of bioconversion were carried out by the
Trichoderma
and
Fusarium
strains. One strain of
Trichoderma longibrachiatum
could also efficiently produce 2,4,6-TCA in liquid medium. However, no detectable levels of 2,4,6-TCA production by this strain could be detected on cork when putative precursors other than 2,4,6-TCP, including several anisoles, dichlorophenols, trichlorophenols, or other highly chlorinated compounds, were tested. Time course expression studies with liquid cultures showed that the formation of 2,4,6-TCA was not affected by a high concentration of glucose (2% or 111 mM) or by ammonium salts at concentrations up to 60 mM. In
T. longibrachiatum
the O methylation of 2,4,6-TCP was catalyzed by a mycelium-associated
S
-adenosyl-
l
-methionine (SAM)-dependent methyltransferase that was strongly induced by 2,4,6-TCP. The reaction was inhibited by
S
-adenosyl-
l
-homocysteine, an inhibitor of SAM-dependent methylation, suggesting that SAM is the natural methyl donor. These findings increase our understanding of the mechanism underlying the origin of 2,4,6-TCA on cork, which is poorly understood despite its great economic importance for the wine industry, and they could also help us improve our knowledge about the biodegradation and detoxification processes associated with chlorinated phenols.
Role of Membrane Fluidity in Pressure Resistance of
Escherichia coli
NCTC 8164
Authors: Casadei M. A. , Mañas P. , Niven G. , Needs E. , Mackey B. M. 
Published: November 2002

ABSTRACT

The relationship among growth temperature, membrane fatty acid composition, and pressure resistance was examined in
Escherichia coli
NCTC 8164. The pressure resistance of exponential-phase cells was maximal in cells grown at 10°C and decreased with increasing growth temperatures up to 45°C. By contrast, the pressure resistance of stationary-phase cells was lowest in cells grown at 10°C and increased with increasing growth temperature, reaching a maximum at 30 to 37°C before decreasing at 45°C. The proportion of unsaturated fatty acids in the membrane lipids decreased with increasing growth temperature in both exponential- and stationary-phase cells and correlated closely with the melting point of the phospholipids extracted from whole cells examined by differential scanning calorimetry. Therefore, in exponential-phase cells, pressure resistance increased with greater membrane fluidity, whereas in stationary-phase cells, there was apparently no simple relationship between membrane fluidity and pressure resistance. When exponential-phase or stationary-phase cells were pressure treated at different temperatures, resistance in both cell types increased with increasing temperatures of pressurization (between 10 and 30°C). Based on the above observations, we propose that membrane fluidity affects the pressure resistance of exponential- and stationary-phase cells in a similar way, but it is the dominant factor in exponential-phase cells whereas in stationary-phase cells, its effects are superimposed on a separate but larger effect of the physiological stationary-phase response that is itself temperature dependent.