bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Some Metaphysical Presuppositions of Science
Authors: Khatchadourian Haig 
Published: November 2002

In order to determine what are the metaphysical presuppositions of science (if any), we have to first define the terms ‘presupposition’ and ‘metaphysics’ or ‘metaphysical’. We shall begin with the former.Arthur Pap in his article Does Science Have Metaphysical Presuppositions? discusses two senses of the term. A presupposition may be (a) a necessary condition: p presupposes q, dt = p implies q, i.e. not-g implies not-p. (b) a premise or a rule (or a set of rules) of inference used in deriving a belief. Thus in this sense, p presupposes q means that if q were false, then the belief in p would cease to be grounded.
The Short Run
Authors: Salmon Wesley C. 
Published: November 2002

1. The Problem. In spite of the vast discussion which has been devoted to the theory of probability, the problem of the short run has received surprisingly little attention. Yet, the whole significance of the theory depends upon a solution of this problem, for without an answer to it we cannot say why it is useful to have knowledge of probabilities or why we should take account of this knowledge in making practical decisions. As far as I know, Charles Peirce was the first to appreciate the importance and difficulty of the question, and his characteristically vivid formulation serves as an excellent starting point for its consideration. He says:According to what has been said, the idea of probability essentially belongs to a kind of inference which is repeated indefinitely. An individual inference must be either true or false and can show no effect of probability; and therefore, in reference to a single case considered in itself, probability can have no meaning. Yet if a man had to choose between drawing a card from a pack containing twenty-five red cards and a black one, or from a pack containing twenty-five black cards and a red one, and that of a red one were destined to transport him to eternal felicity, and that of a black one to consign him to everlasting woe, it would be folly to deny that he ought to prefer the pack containing the larger proportion of red cards, although from the nature of the risk, it cannot be repeated. [Collected Papers, 2.652]
An Essay on the Relativity of Categories
Authors: von Bertalanffy L. 
Published: November 2002

Among recent developments in the anthropological sciences, hardly any have found so much attention and led to so much controversy as have the views advanced by the late Benjamin Whorf.The hypothesis offered by Whorf is,“that the commonly held belief that the cognitive processes of all human beings possess a common logical structure which operates prior to and independently of communication through language, is erroneous. It is Whorf's view that the linguistic patterns themselves determine what the individual perceives in this world and how he thinks about it. Since these patterns vary widely, the modes of thinking and perceiving in groups utilizing different linguistic systems will result in basically different world views” (Fearing, 1954).“We are thus introduced to a new principle of relativity which holds that all observers are not led by the same physical evidence to the same picture of the universe, unless their linguistic backgrounds are similar. … We cut up and organize the spread and flow of events as we do largely because, through our mother tongue, we are parties to an agreement to do so, not because nature itself is segmented in exactly that way for all to see” (Whorf, 1952, p. 21)
War Games and Operations Research
Authors: Cushen Walter E. 
Published: November 2002

SummaryThe problems of operations research, optimized at the tactical and strategic level, have a domain of interest much broader than many of its earlier suboptimization problems. Its appeal to scientific method requires the construction of a model from which predictions can be made. This model must have the comprehensive character of those proposed by philosophy and the sciences. Such a model is available in the form of war gaming, a traditional military training vehicle transformed in such a way as to make it a research tool of great power and flexibility and which can assume a multitude of forms. The war game as a new research tool, when applied to the important problems at a high level of optimization, carries with it the excitement of a pioneering venture and the promise of contributions of greatly increased importance to the development of military science.
Vectorial Composition of Velocities in Relativity
Authors: Leaf Boris 
Published: November 2002

The Einstein law of velocity addition is well-known. Consider three inertial reference frames S, K, and M, with X axes parallel in the same sense. Let K have velocity v1 along the X axis of S, and M have velocity v2 along the X axis of K. Then, according to the Einstein formula, the velocity v3 of M along the X axis of S is
If v2 is the velocity of an object at rest in M as measured by an observer in K, then v3 is the velocity of the same object as measured by an observer in S. The formula is valid for a change in reference frame of the observer.
The Perspective for Fundamental Research in Anthropology
Authors: Weltfish Gene 
Published: November 2002

I propose to treat this broad topic in terms of three main questions:
1.The shift in emphasis in anthropological research from culture-history-culture philosophy to “social engineering”,2.The question of whether these two types of emphasis are related or not, and if so in what manner, and3.The implications of anthropology for other fields of knowledge.
On the Establishment of a Universal Time
Authors: Moon Parry , Spencer Domina Eberle 
Published: November 2002

The concept of simultaneity, and the associated problems of synchronization of moving clocks and establishment of a universal time scale, were given little or no attention prior to the twentieth century. In 1905, however, Einstein analyzed the concept of simultaneity on the basis of two principal postulates:
(1)Absolute velocity is meaningless (relativity postulate),(2)The velocity of light in a vacuum is the same for all unaccelerated observers.
Gestalt and Relativity: An Analogy
Authors: Sellars Roy Wood 
Published: November 2002

This is in no sense an attack on the theory of relativity but, instead, an attempt to clarify some points about its epistemology and ontology. It is quite probable that the queries I have had in mind are products of the past. But I observe enough uncertainty in writings here and there to justify a brief discussion.Discarding both ether and Newtonian Space either as entities or as frames for light, we have left the problem of relating the behavior of light to physical bodies, such as the proverbial rods.
Aristotle's Treatment of Probability and Signs
Authors: Madden Edward H. 
Published: November 2002

Probability and Frequency. Aristotle frequently used the concept of probability, but apparently he did not make any persistent effort to clarify or analyze it. His description of a fortiori argument in The Topics (115a, 6–14), e.g., depends upon “the more or less likely or probable,” but he does not explore this notion. In The Rhetoric, where he applies himself to a puzzle about probability which the Sophists had advanced (1402a, 5–30), he comes closer to an analysis of probability. Aristotle quotes Agathon,
One might perchance say this was probable—That things improbable oft will hap to men,
and elaborates thusly: “For what is improbable does happen [often], and therefore it is probable that improbable things will happen. Granted this, one might argue that ‘what is improbable is probable.’ “(1402a, 10–15.) Aristotle believes that one can avoid this imposture by distinguishing between “general” and “specific” probability, and apparently intends by the former the statistical sense of frequent occurrence; but he does not establish what he might mean by the probability of an individual event and so leaves the notion of “specific probability” unclear.
Ideal Language and Kinship Structure
Authors: Gellner Ernest 
Published: November 2002

This paper is inter-disciplinary. Its disadvantage is that the author is not sufficiently conversant with the disciplines it is inter. He may however, like Lord Wavell, claim that at least the thread that binds them is his own.The paper is of philosophic interest in that it is inspired by, and hopes to shed some light on, the notion of an ideal language. It is of interest to social anthropology in that its main subject is kinship structure. It may be of interest to mathematicians in setting a task.
Pragmatism, Intuitionism, and Formalism
Authors: Patin Henry A. 
Published: November 2002

“… there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.”“… Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”One example which Peirce chose to illustrate his pragmatic maxim as thus stated was the familiar theological distinction between transubstantiation and consubstantiation. Now (Peirce says) since these two doctrines agree in all of the effects which they conceive the sacrament to possess and which may have practical bearings, here and hereafter, it is absurd to say that there is any real distinction between the two doctrines. Peirce declares in the same passage that, having used the question as a logical example only, he does not care to pause to anticipate the theologian's reply.
Non-Quantal Foundations of Quantum Theory
Authors: Landé Alfred 
Published: November 2002

Bertrand Russell in “New Hopes for a Changing World” (1) writes the following passage:
“The science of economics has been wrapped around by the theorists in a series of many veils, which have caused the plain man to suppose that there must be something indecent about its naked form. I think that the only thing to do in view of this situation is to begin at the beginning with matters of such simplicity that the reader may be indignant at finding them mentioned …”.
Biologische Erkenntnis und Moderne Physik
Authors: Itō Schuntaro 
Published: November 2002

Die neuere Naturwissenschaft trat im 17. Jahrhundert zuerst als “Physik” auf. Man soll sich an die Gründung der modernen Dynamik von Galileo und Newton erinnern.Die methodisch-allgemeine Grundlegung dieser neuen Wissenschaft wird in der Cartesischen Philosophie am klarsten ausgedrückt.
Rejoinder on the Principle of Simplicity
Authors: Feuer Lewis S. 
Published: November 2002

There are three points which Professor Schlesinger makes in his criticism of my discussion of the principle of simplicity.
(1)He holds that the principles of simplicity and verifiability may in actual use contradict each other. The simpler hypothesis will be rejected, he maintains, if it leads to unverified consequences.(2)He holds that it is legitimate to add auxiliary hypotheses to one's theory, if it is desired to allow, let us say, for the creation of the universe by a deity, or to exclude the possibility for all time of such events as a pail of water freezing on fire.(3)He maintains with Bridgman that the cosmogonists' use of the simple notion that the same laws of nature hold throughout space-time leads to “perfectly hair-raising extrapolations” which a verificationist will reject.
The Resolution of the Clock Paradox
Authors: Builder Geoffrey 
Published: November 2002

Two ideal standard clocks, effectively isolated from interaction with other physical systems, and in a region of the universe free of gravitational fields, are assumed to move in any arbitrary manner so that they coincide on at least two occasions. In general, the reading of one of them will become retarded relative to the other in the interval between successive coincidences. This relative retardation is predicted by the restricted theory of relativity, taken together with the assumption that the ‘rate’ of a clock depends only on its velocity and not on its acceleration. The recognized procedure for calculating the retardation in terms of clock ‘rates’ is set out, and is illustrated by its application to a simple hypothetical experiment in which one clock remains at rest and the other travels away from and back to it with constant speed in a straight line.There is nothing paradoxical in the predicted retardation as such. The so-called 'clock paradox' arises because an alternative, and apparently valid, calculation procedure, also based on clock 'rates', leads to a contradictory result. The term ‘paradox’ is something of a euphemism since the two predictions are contradictories.It is shown that the paradox does not arise when direct use is made of the Lorentz transformation without introducing the additional, and non-essential, step in reasoning involved in utilizing the clock ‘rates’. It is then shown that the paradox arises only through using these clock ‘rates’ without due regard to the exact significance of the quantities so described; once this is recognized the paradox is resolved completely within the framework of the restricted theory, which then provides a unique and unambiguous prediction of the relative retardation.Once the paradox is thus resolved, the general theory of relativity can add nothing significant to the analysis. It is shown that the application of the principle of equivalence is essentially trivial; in effect, Einstein and Tolman evaded the real logical issue raised by the contradictory predictions by denying the applicability of the restricted theory and then utilizing, by means of the principle of equivalence, results obtained from it. This tortuous procedure succeeded in evading the paradox rather than in resolving it; it would obviously be quite invalid were the restricted theory indeed inapplicable to the problem.
Interrogatives, Imperatives, Truth, Falsity and Lies
Authors: Leonard Henry S. 
Published: November 2002

This paper aims to establish three major theses: (1) Not only declarative sentences, but also interrogatives and imperatives, may be classified as true or as false. (2) Declarative, imperative, and interrogative utterances may also be classified as honest or as dishonest. (3) Whether an utterance is honest or dishonest is logically independent of whether it is true or is false.The establishment of the above theses follows upon the adoption of a principle for identifying what is meant by any sentence, declarative, interrogative, or imperative. The analysis aims to show that meaning is to be attributed to the uttered or written sentence-token, rather to the thereby exhibited sentence-type. Further, the meaning of the sentential token is to be identified with a purpose of the speaker, that the speaker would reveal to the addressee by uttering the sentence.The to be revealed purpose is analysed into two components: an ultimate concern (that the addressee stand in such and such a relation—e.g., of believing, or informing the speaker about, or making it true that) and an ultimate topic of concern (the state of affairs, i.e., proposition, relative to which the speaker would have the addressee stand in the specified relation).Sentential utterances “signify” different purposes by “expressing” different ultimate concerns and “indicating ”different ultimate topics of concern. Variations in expressed concern are correlated with variations in sentential form, such as declarative, interrogative and imperative. Variations in indicated topic of concern are correlated with variations in the subject and predicate of the uttered sentence. Thus, for example, utterances of “Johnny will jump in the lake,” “Will Johnny jump in the lake?” and “Johnny, go jump in the lake! ” all indicate one and the same ultimate topic of concern but express different ultimate concerns with this topic.A sentential utterance is true or false according as its indicated topic of concern is true or false. Hence, declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives may all be classified as true or as false. But honesty or dishonesty is a function (explained in the paper) of the expressed concern, rather than of the topic of concern. Hence, although utterances of all sentential forms are honest or dishonest, their honesty or dishonesty is logically independent of their truth or falsity.
Is Indeterminism Supported by Quantum Theory?
Authors: Workman Rollin W. 
Published: November 2002

Two initially different arguments for indeterminism are often based either upon the Uncertainty Relations or the statistical interpretation of the wave equation of quantum mechanics. Both arguments ultimately involve three factors: (1) the assumption that elementary entities are enough like classical particles for it to make sense to say they are either determined or indetermined, (2) the fact that no exact measurements are possible of quantities supposed to characterize elementary entities, (3) the pragmatic supposition that determinism is false unless exact predictions are theoretically possible.If it is legitimate to use (3) to prove indeterminism, then an equally legitimate argument can be based upon (2) which denies (1). Thus, it is doubtful that quantum mechanics supports indeterminism, though it may show that the concepts of ‘determined’ and ‘indetermined’ are inapplicable to the world.
Authorship and Purpose
Authors: Leonard Henry S. 
Published: November 2002

This paper approaches a theory relating authorship, meaning and purpose by semiformalized developments of two “presupposed theories”: of purposeful behavior and of sign-reading.The theory of purposeful behavior is made to rest upon two undefined predicates. 'Wt(a,p,q)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a works at bringing it about that p in order to bring it about that q. 'Bt(a,p)' abbreviates the claim that at time t, person a brings it about that p. A number of definitions and laws are based upon these two predicates. One practical utility of the symbolism is a constraint to symbolize differently a purpose, according as what is intended is a purposing or a thing purposed.The theory of sign-reading undertakes to assimilate sign-reading to inference. The theory proposes ‘Rt(a,p,q)‘ as a basic undefined predicate, abbreviating the claim that at time t, person a reads that p as a sign that q.The theory of deliberate sign-production, and more particularly of authorship, is approached by permitting the two above sets of symbols to supply arguments one for the other. Specifically, making a deliberate or a candid sign is defined as bringing about a state of affairs in order that an addressee will read the bringing about by the sign-maker of that state of affairs as a sign that such and so.The laws of the two first parts of the paper are then appealed to in order to show that when the sign-making is candid (defined in the paper), the such and so mentioned above must be a feigned or actual purpose of the author. The paper concludes with a brief consideration of what in this total signified purpose of the sign-making might be indentified by reference to the conventional sign-type (sentence) presented. Thus “meaning” of a sentence is thence viewed as an abstraction from the signified meaning (always a purpose) of the uttering.
On Ostensive Definitions
Authors: Kotarbinska Janina 
Published: November 2002

The first part deals with the problem of the external form of ostensive definition. It is concluded that the definition statement is not complete. The proper form of this statement is not a sentence, but a sentential function, namely a sentential function of the type: “IIx [N(x) = x is in the respect R and in the degree D such as A, B ... and not such as K, L ...]” where “N” stands for the term being defined.Thus the ostensive definition informs about the criteria of applicability of the defined term in a partial way only, and the rest must be supplied by the addressee for whom the given definition was destined.In the second part the conditions are analysed on which depends the possibility of solving that problem, and consequently the conditions on which depend the informational value and the efficacy of ostensive definition. The concluding remarks deal with the properties of the terms introduced by the ostensive method.
Some Problems of Causal Interpretation of Statistical Relationships
Authors: Nowak Stefan 
Published: November 2002

In following paper an attempt will be made to analyse the statistical relationships between variables as the functions of causal relations existing between them. Our basic assumption here is that statistical relationships between traits, events, or characteristics of objects, may be logically derived from the pattern of their mutual causal connections, if this pattern is described by appropriate concepts and with sufficient precision.The first part of the paper presents basic concepts, which according to author's view may serve for the description of different patterns of causal relations in such a way, that statistical relationships corresponding to each pattern may be derived. It gives also examples of such a derivation for some less complicated cases. The second part of the paper is an attempt of application of proposed method to the understanding and critical consideration of some standard techniques of statistical analysis, especially those mostly used in social sciences.
The Duhemian Argument
Authors: Grünbaum Adolf 
Published: November 2002

This paper offers a refutation of P. Duhem's thesis that thefalsifiabilityof an isolated empirical hypothesis H as anexplanansisunavoidably inconclusive.Its central contentions are the following:1.No general features of the logic of falsifiability can assure, for every isolated empirical hypothesis H and independently of the domain to which it pertains, that H can always be preserved as anexplanansof any empirical findings O whatever by some modification of the auxiliary assumptions A in conjunction with which H functions as anexplanans.For Duhemcannotguarantee on any general logical grounds the deducibility of O from anexplanansconstituted by the conjunction of H and some revised non-trivial version R of A: the existence of the required set R of collateral assumptions must be demonstrated for each particular case.2.The categorical form of the Duhemian thesis is not only anon-sequiturbut actually false. This is shown by adducing the testing of physical geometry as a counterexample to Duhem in the form of a rebuttal to A. Einstein's geometrical articulation of Duhem's thesis.3.The possibility of a quasia priorichoice of a physical geometry in the sense of Duhem must be clearlydistinguishedfrom the feasibility of a conventional adoption of such a geometry in the sense of H. Poincaré. And the legitimacy of the latter cannot be invoked to save the Duhemian thesis from refutation by the foregoing considerations.