bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Assessing risks from threats to process plants: Threat and vulnerability analysis
Authors: Baybutt Paul 
Published: April 2004

AbstractProcess security management addresses threats from terrorist and criminal acts against plants that may result in the release of hazardous materials. The risk of such threats must be assessed to determine if existing security measures and safeguards are adequate or need improvement. Risk assessment is the heart of a process security program. Process plants need straight forward and easily applied methods to assess security risks using techniques that can be employed in a variety of situations and at varying levels of detail. This paper describes an approach that accomplishes these objectives.Threat analysis is the first step. It is used to identify the sources and types of threats and their likelihood. The approach described in this paper involves the consideration of motivations and capabilities of adversaries and the rating of facility security factors to develop a threat profile. Once specific threats have been identified, process vulnerability analysis is used to identify threat scenarios, i.e., how threats could be realized. Plants and processes are divided into sectors, and each credible threat within each sector is considered. Vulnerabilities are identified by brainstorming the ways barriers can be penetrated and process containment breached. Checklists are used to guide the brainstorming, and scenario consequences are recorded. Existing security measures and safeguards are listed, and any recommendations for improvements to reduce the likelihood and severity of terrorist and criminal acts are made for consideration by management based on the nature of the threat, process vulnerabilities, possible consequences, and existing security measures and safeguards. Risk rankings are performed as part of the analyses.
Legionella pneumophila in an ammonia plant cooling tower
Authors: Verduijn Wim D. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractIn 1999, 30 people died from infection by Legionella pneumophila bacteria after visiting a flower exhibition in Bovenkarspel, The Netherlands. This event prompted Kemira Agro Rozenburg to sample its cooling tower water at regular intervals for the presence of the Legionella bacteria.The results were consistently negative until the spring of 2000 when a sudden outbreak of the bacteria was detected. Safety measures were implemented immediately, the cause of the outbreak was discovered, and measures were subsequently taken to prevent a reoccurrence.
Natural gas line failure: Agrium Fort Saskatchewan Nitrogen Operations
Authors: McConnell Mark , Timbres Donald H. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractWhile restarting an ammonia plant after a shutdown, the pipe line supplying natural gas to the sulfur removal section preheat coil in the primary reformer convection section ruptured. High‐pressure natural gas from the rupture ignited causing significant fire damage. The gas line rupture was determined to have been caused by corrosion. This paper examines the cause of the gas line failure and the corrective actions taken to prevent a reoccurrence.
Explosion protection with metal dust fuels
Authors: Going John E. , Snoeys Jef 
Published: April 2004

AbstractMetal dust explosions have unique deflagration characteristics in comparison to organic fuels, and that can make them more difficult to control. The flame temperature of some metals dusts can exceed 3,500° K, more than 1,000° K higher than an organic flame. This can result in high explosion pressures, Pmax. Also, the pressure rate of rise, Kmax, as well as the flame speed, can greatly exceed that found with organic fuels. All of these contribute to making explosion protection more difficult.Successful explosion protection lies in the speed of the system as well as its effectiveness. Detection and activation processes, as well as the mechanical response of the components, determine the overall speed. The effectiveness, for example, of suppression lies in the ability of the agent to stop the flame from propagating.This paper reviews the potential effectiveness of explosion protection techniques (containment, suppression, venting and isolation) in metal dust explosions, and the limits associated with each technique. Experimental results will show that metal dust explosions can be controlled when the explosion protection techniques are properly applied.
Evaluation of reaction hazards for a wiped‐film evaporator
Authors: Johnstone Harold 
Published: April 2004

AbstractTo increase its capacity, a production plant investigated raising the operating temperature of a wiped‐film evaporator (WFE) unit. The WFE separates a high‐boiling product (taken overhead) from a heavy tar stream (taken out the bottom). Both product and tars begin to decompose at temperatures near the operating temperature of the WFE. The plant's Management of Change procedure required that all potential reactivity hazards be considered before making the proposed change. This paper describes the experimental work done on plant samples with ARC and Setaram C‐80 instruments, and how decomposition kinetic parameters were estimated using thermal safety software from Cheminform St. Petersburg, Ltd. The results of this hazard evaluation allowed the plant personnel to make an informed decision about the proposed operating change.
Understanding the role of process chemistry in fires and explosions
Authors: Mannan M. Sam , Aldeeb Abdulrehman A. , Rogers William J. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractChemical incidents involving fires and explosions cannot be prevented just through command and control regulatory requirements. Prevention requires understanding the fundamental root causes of safety incidents. When heat generated by an exothermic reaction exceeds the heat removal capability of the system, the exothermic reaction will accelerate and may lead to a thermal runaway reaction, explosion, and fire.Understanding the role of process chemistry as a root cause of fires and explosions in the chemical process industry requires knowledge of the maximum quantities of both energy and gas generated by the primary and secondary exothermic reactions. Also, rates of energy and gas production are of utmost importance. This data is usually gathered by experimental methods. Experimental thermal analyses can provide an overall reactivity evaluation, but are often unable to explain the reaction mechanisms needed for safe process chemistry. Moreover, experimental analyses of all reaction pathways are expensive and sometimes impractical.This paper provides a structured approach to chemical reactivity hazard evaluation using computational methods coupled with experimental techniques. This systematic approach helps to minimize experimental work, identifies the most important parameters in evaluating process fire and explosion hazards, and provides a more comprehensive understanding of process chemistry.A reactive system involved in selected industrial fires and explosions is analyzed to test the validity of this systematic approach. Providing a better understanding of the reactive system chemistry, and reducing the experimental work were among the main objectives of this study.
Managing risk of electrostatic hazards in coating and printing on moving webs
Authors: Blitshteyn Mark 
Published: April 2004

AbstractWhen static charges accumulate in flammable or explosive atmospheres, it can lead to an electrostatic discharge (ESD) known to cause fires. This paper will identify hazards attributed to electrostatic charges on moving webs in a flammable‐vapor environment, such as in coating and printing processes. Among the reviewed ignition sources are discharges of isolated conductors and insulating webs, as well as human operators as ignition sources. Grounding of conductors and operators, and air ionization for prevention of static buildup on insulators will be examined. This paper also reviews the safety and performance of various static neutralizers, including the importance of computer‐generated data to provide information on static conditions and neutralizing equipment status. It will be shown that diagnostic and performance data from static neutralizing equipment can provide valuable input to internal safety evaluations and post‐fire investigations. The paper will outline the key elements of a thorough electrostatic hazard risk management program in coating and printing.
Risk‐based assessment of a 25,000 ton ammonia storage tank
Authors: Daly D. , Deis Gregory J. , Frishmuth Ronald E. , McIntyre D. , Paneitz Doug , Smallwood Robert E. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractCytec's ammonia storage tank was last inspected in 1989, and based on internal requirements, would have been due for an internal inspection in 1999. Cytec has only one atmospheric ammonia storage tank. Inspecting this single tank would require solving significant logistical problems to avoid major business disruptions to the downstream operating units. Additionally, we wished to avoid the cost to decommission and clean, dispose of the wastes generated, inspect, and re‐commission the tank.Based on prior inspection reports and a risk‐based inspection documented by Capstone Engineering, the tank has been approved for at least five more years of service without an internal inspection. Within five years, an acoustic emission study will be conducted to insure that no audible defects can be found.
Ammonia venting study to reduce environmental risks
Authors: McConnell Rod , McGrath Peter 
Published: April 2004

AbstractFollowing closure of a substantial part of the BHP Steelworks at Newcastle, New South Wales, the smell of ammonia from occasional accidental emissions had become more apparent to people living and working around the plant. Incitec, therefore, conducted a review of all potential emission points where accidental releases of ammonia could occur. A detailed study was then carried out to quantify the frequency of each emission, the amount released, and the downwind concentration in populated areas. A risk grid was devised to help decision‐making for the various releases, and, for those emissions that did not meet the required frequency‐consequence standards, improvements were devised to reduce either the frequency or the consequences, or both. For the ammonia plant, this has led to several significant modifications. This paper describes the study and some of the resulting environmental improvements implemented on the ammonia plant, the ammonia storage area, and downstream nitrates plants.
Major hazards analysis: An improved method for process hazard analysis
Authors: Baybutt Paul 
Published: April 2004

AbstractProcess hazard analyses (PHAs) usually focus on major hazards—fires, explosions, and toxic releases. Traditional PHA methods, such as the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study and What‐If analysis, often include scenarios for other hazard types, such as operability problems. Sometimes, this may be desired, but not always. There is a need for a PHA technique that directly and exclusively addresses major process hazards. Such hazards are realized when process containment is lost. Therefore, the method proposed here uses a categorization scheme to guide brainstorming of initiating events that can result in fires, explosions, or toxic releases. It provides a more efficient and, likely, more complete, identification of major hazard scenarios than current PHA methods.
Requirements for a minimum ignition energy standard
Authors: Dahn C. James , Dastidar Ashok G. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractFires and explosions are serious hazards in the process industries. Mitigation methods, such as suppression and venting, can be expensive. Ideally, the best option would be to avoid fire or explosion, which may be accomplished by either removing the explosible fuel/oxidant mixture, or the ignition source.One of the most overlooked and preventable ignition sources is electrostatic discharge (ESD). To evaluate the potential for ignition of a fuel/oxidant mixture, one must determine its minimum ESD ignition energy. Once the initiation thresholds have been identified, one can evaluate the likelihood of electrostatic charging and storage, which could result in an electrostatic discharge.Identifying this threshold level can be problematic. An ASTM standard has been developed but, for this test standard to be effective, it must reflect the true hazard potentials observed in industry. Some important questions that need to be addressed to increase the utility of any minimum ignition energy standard are: (1) discharge geometry, (2) duration of the discharge and (3) calculation of the energy of the discharge. This paper will discuss the importance of these factors when evaluating the least amount of energy required to initiate an explosion.
Toxic gas release caused by the thermal decomposition of a bulk powder blend containing sodium dichloroisocyanurate
Authors: Carpenter Andrew R. , Ogle Russell A. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractA thermal runaway reaction occurred during the mixing of a batch of a bulk powder that resulted in the production and release of toxic gases. The mixture consisted of an oxidizer (sodium dichloroisocyanurate), some organic compounds, and inert compounds. This toxic release led to the evacuation of the building and resulted in extensive damage to the facility. This was only the fourth time an 1,100‐pound batch of this material had been mixed in this equipment. Prior to this production run, the material had been prepared in small batches of 2 to 50 kilograms. Accelerated Rate Calorimetry (ARC) testing had been performed prior to the scale‐up to production batches.This paper looks into the root causes of this particular accident and demonstrates how proper analysis of the testing data and other warning signs observed during the bench testing could have revealed the likelihood of this accident. Further, this paper will consider how simple design changes to the manufacturing process resulted in an inherently safer design.
Detection of hazardous reaction products during a thermal runaway
Authors: Kersten Ronald J. A. , Boers Marco N. , Opschoor Gerard , Cortes M. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe control of major accident hazards linked with the storage and processing of dangerous substances in chemical and petrochemical installations is regulated in the European Union by the so‐called “Seveso II Directive.” One of the requirements in this Directive is the declaration of not only the hazardous substances as present onsite, but also any hazardous products that could form during a loss of control situation.This study focused on the development of an experimental technique to determine the substances that might be formed during an uncontrolled chemical reaction or runaway reaction. The decomposition reaction of a diazo compound was studied with the technique to assess its applicability.The results show that, apart from its applicability in relation to the Seveso II Directive, the same technique can be used to obtain data for the design of gas treatment systems or to study the mechanism behind runway reactions. Understanding this mechanism, in turn, helps to identify conditions that might favor the occurrence of, or might temper the course of, the runaway reaction.
Using neural networks to monitor piping systems
Authors: Caputo Antonio C. , Pelagagge Pacifico M. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe paper proposes a state estimation technique, which uses Artificial Neural Networks (ANN) to monitor the status of piping networks carrying hazardous fluids, in order to identify and locate spills and leakages. A Multilayer Perceptron ANN is used to process pressure and flow rate information coming from a limited number of sensors distributed across the network. The ANN is trained on different sets of input data, which characterize several states of the fluid network under normal and abnormal operating conditions. During the running phase, it acts as a classifier in order to estimate the actual system status and pinpoint leaks, based on available information, thereby solving the stated inverse problem. A two‐level architecture is selected, composed of a main ANN at the first level, to identify the branch in which the leakage occurs, and several branch‐specific ANNs at the second‐level to accurately estimate the magnitude and location of the leaks. After describing the proposed methodology and the system architecture, we present a realistic application example in order to show the technique's potential.
Performance analysis of small size pilot plant and laboratory relief valves
Authors: Palluzi Richard P. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractSpring‐loaded relief valves are one of the most common safety devices installed in pilot plants and laboratory bench‐top units. They are typically used in sizes much smaller than those in process units, but their performance is assumed to be equivalent. Most organizations provide only limited preventive maintenance and re‐inspection for these valves under the assumption that they are very reliable devices and operation is fairly assured.Our experience and detailed test data with small size (1/2‐inch and less) spring‐loaded relief devices indicates that most will not perform as reliably as expected due to adhesion of the elastomer seal over time. This leads to initial relief pressures well over the 10% overpressure considered routine, with 30% overpressure being fairly common among certain sizes and conditions. Failing to recognize this problem can lead to otherwise preventable accidents, and even injuries.Data on more than 1,000 relief devices in actual research service for several years was analyzed and the performance measured over time. The data clearly indicate the problem is endemic across all manufacturers and not easily solved. Results are presented in summary form to allow evaluation of the risk inherent in the use of these devices. It indicates a lower level of confidence in actual valve performance, as well as a need for more detailed hazard analysis and risk assessment of the potential for significant relief valve overpressure.
Learning from concepts and ideas presented in Process Safety Progress
Authors: Clark David G. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractMagazine articles, such as those in Process Safety Progress (PSP), are a source of new ideas as well as old ideas restated and emphasized. While busy schedules increasingly interfere with getting the most out of these types of information sources, studying such published papers should not be given a low priority. Presented below are ideas and thoughts (some garbage, some gems) on a variety of subjects from just one such issue (September 2001 of PSP). They include:
comments on the probabilistic nature of electrostatic ignition,
the domino effect in explosion scenarios,
MY Tree analysis of accidents,
an argument from the viewpoint of the industrial ecosystem in support of a fault data bank,
the prescriptiveness of performance‐based standards,
the applicability of HAZOP to analogous systems different in scale and purpose,
keys to a good HAZOP and a good FMEA,
an argument in support of a universal effort to improve process safety by throwing cash at the hazards,
initiator/enabler concepts,
the use of a bar chart to effectively present the relative effectiveness of strategies used to control overall plant risk,
the flammability diagram: a living, pulsating thing, and
comments on the relationship between minimum ignition energy and turbulence.
Security risk analysis for chemical process facilities
Authors: Lemley J. R. , Fthenakis Vasilis M. , Moskowitz Paul D. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractIn response to the events of September 11, many companies stepped up security efforts in chemical process facilities and other installations. Since resources are limited, a system for ranking relative risk would be useful in establishing priorities for implementing physical‐security infrastructure and programs. This paper presents the elements of a relative risk assessment that can augment conventional process hazard analysis (PHA). This assessment is based on categorizing threat, vulnerability, and the consequences of deliberate actions by terrorists, disgruntled employees, and others.
Evaluation of safety instrumented systems using reliability analysis
Authors: Jin Sang Hwa , Yeo Yeong‐Koo , Moon Il , Chung Yonsoo , Kim In‐Won 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe authors have developed a new safety instrumented system (SIS) evaluation method based on reliability analysis. It evaluates the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). When the SIL falls short of the system's target level, this method can raise it through reliability analysis and system retrofit. A hazard evaluation was carried out on the 415V diesel bus to verify the SIL evaluation method. The availability of the original 415V diesel bus was 99.40%, which comes under the category of SIL 2. After exchanging the diesel generator and the isolator switch using the developed evaluation method, the availability rose to 99.94%, SIL 3.
Fires and explosions in vapor control systems: A lessons learned anthology
Authors: Myers Timothy J. , Kytömaa Harri K. , Martin Richard J. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractAs new environmental technologies have been introduced, and as older technologies have been applied in new ways to meet specific combinations of environmental and process needs, new failure modes have evolved, some of which can contribute to increased risks of explosion, fire, and chemical release. This paper presents anecdotal accounts of losses involving vapor control systems installed at processing plants specifically for environmental considerations. From this experience base, the authors discuss the importance of good process safety management practices as applied to environmental technologies, and offer guidance to plant management in selecting appropriate environmental technologies.
Cyber security vulnerability analysis: An asset‐based approach
Authors: Baybutt Paul 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThis paper describes a method for identifying and analyzing threats and vulnerabilities of process plants to cyber system attacks by terrorists, saboteurs, and other criminals, and provides an example of its use. The approach considers how cyber assets can be exploited by assailants to cause harm. It defines threat events by pairing threats with cyber assets, and considers vulnerabilities to attack, existing countermeasures, and the need for new or improved countermeasures.Previous security vulnerability analysis (SVA) methods have focused on physical and personnel security. Cyber security has not been explicitly addressed. Studies using the method described can be performed as adjuncts to existing SVAs, as part of future SVAs, or as stand‐alone cyber SVAs (CSVA). The method can also be used to consider all types of security issues in a single analysis, including physical, personnel, information and cyber security, or to study any of these areas individually.