bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Galen’ S Teleology And Functional Explanation
Authors: Schiefsky Mark 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The importance of functional analysis in contemporary biology and social science is widely recognized. By functional analysis I mean an approach in which the parts of a complex system are studied in order to determine their contribution to the continued existence or operation of the system as a whole. Thus we may say that the function of the heart in an organism is to circulate the blood, and in doing so we identify the contribution of the heart to the organism’s continued existence. When we cite the function of an organ such as the heart to explain its presence or its distinctive structure we are giving a functional explanation, and such an explanation will involve teleological language.
Truth Conditions: The Event Theory
Authors: Lycan William G 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter I shall propose a new semantic theory of conditionals, concentrating on the expressions ‘if ‘, ‘unless ‘, ‘only if ‘, and ‘even if ‘, and guided by the syntactic and semantic evidence assembled in Chapter I. I intend a ‘semantic theory of ‘ these expressions in the sense of a systematic assignment of truth conditions to sentences containing them. Such an assignment is to do at least three things:
account for such sentences ‘ felt implications and other intuitive semantical properties, (l1) explain some of the ways in which their truth values depend upon context, and (c) accord with noteworthy aspects of their surface-syntactic behavior as sketched in Chapter l.
An Unbeautiful but Less Easily Refutable Theory of‘ Even If‘
Authors: Lycan William G 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A first counterexample is discussed at some length by Bennett: the use of‘ even‘ as an intensifier of comparatives, as in (1) Bill is even taller than John. (1) of course has several readings on which it fits our analysis and Bennett‘ s alike (those in which it means that even John is shorter than Bill, that among Bill‘ s accomplishments is even managing to be taller than John, etc.). But (I) can and would often mean that although John is tall, Bill is taller. Bennett argues convincingly that this ambiguity is not a focus ambiguity like the others-notice that on the comparative-intensifying reading,‘ even‘ cannot be made a tag, as in
LF and Natural Logic
Authors: Ludlow Peter 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
During the twentieth century, the focus of work in logic was principally on the developmentoflogicalcalculithatbearlittleapparentrelationtothestructureof natural language. That is, the syntactic forms postulated for purposes of logical reasoning (for example, the logical forms of the propositional and predicate calculi) do not obviously resemble the forms postulated within current grammatical theory. This apparent mismatch between logical form and grammatical form is ordinarily taken as an unsurprising consequence of the fact that, since Frege and Russell, one of the central goals of logic has been to help clarify (if not establish) the foundations of mathematics. Mathematics aside, however, it has also been held that natural language is a rather poor medium in which to couch logical reasoning, since natural language is ambiguous, vague, etc.
Logical Form and the Relational Conception of Belief
Authors: Matthews Robert J 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Many, if not most, philosophers embrace a relational conception of the attitudes. On that conception, propositional attitude ascriptions of the form x believes (desires, etc.} that S assert that the referent of x stands in a particular relation, namely, the relation of belief (desire, etc.), to an entity that is the referent of the that-clause that S, and that entity is the object of the attitude, i.e., what the possessor believes (desires, etc.).
Protagorean Relativisms
Authors: Fine Gail 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the first part of the Theaetetus (151 e–186 e), Plato considers three theses: Theaetetus’ claim that knowledge is perception (T) (151 e 1–3); Protagoras’ measure doctrine (P), according to which ‘man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, and of those that are not that they are not’ (Tht. 152 a 2–4);1 and Heracleitus’ claim (H) that ‘all things change, like streams’ (160 d 7–8).2 These theses are not considered in isolation; on the contrary, Plato takes them to be intimately connected. There is considerable dispute, however, both about the precise content of each of the theses and about how they are connected (both in fact and in Plato’s view). These two disputes are related. For we can know how the three theses are connected only if we know what each of them says.
Separation
Authors: Fine Gail 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
At Metaphysics M 4, 1078b30–1, and M 9, 1086b32–b5, Aristotle says that Plato, but not Socrates, separated (echōrise, 1086b4) forms2 or universals; at 1086b6–7 he says that separation is responsible for the difficulties in Plato’s theory of forms. What exactly is separation? Did Plato, but not Socrates, separate forms? And if so, is this for the reasons Aristotle suggests? Is Aristotle right to find separation so objectionable?
Psychic Pregnancy and Platonic Epistemology
Authors: Sheffield Frisbee C C 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It requires much care and knowledge to carry and nurture a child in the womb and to bring it to birth. A pig and a dog were arguing about successful delivery, when the dog said that she alone among the four-footed creatures delivers quickly. The pig answered, ‘But know when you say this that you give birth to blind offspring.’ The story shows that matters are judged not in terms of their spe&lt;‘d, but in terms of their perfection.
The Functions of the Concept of Physis in Aristotle’S Metaphysics
Authors: Buchheim Thomas 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There are obvious, and prima facie convincing, objections to the claim that the concept of ,j,Vai, plays a central rok in Aristotle’s Metaphysics; and they are surely the reason that no study of this concept in the Metaphysic,exists: first, ,f,Ua,, is a cause of movement, whereas the Metaphysics asks about the ‘unmoved’ aspect of reality. Second, everything which exists in the context of and due to ,j,Uoi, is material, while the central analyses of the metaphysics are devoted to the form of things, which is without matter, and is, according to Aristotle, their ‘primary substance’.
The Context Principle
Authors: Fine Kit 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It was once a common part of mathematical practice to introduce terms for new entities by means of contextual definition. Thus negative numbers might have been introduced by means of the equation, -m + m O; and the point at infinity might have been introduced by the condition that r &lt; ∝ for any real number r. Such definitions seem to hold out the hope that one might be justified in taking there to be certain entities simply upon the basis of a stipulation.
Is ‘Natural Kind’ a Natural Kind Term?
Authors: Dupré John 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The traditional home for the concept of a natural kind in biology is of course taxonomy, the sorting of organisms into a nested hierarchy of kinds. Many taxonomists and most philosophers of biology now deny that it is possible to sort organisms into natural kinds. Many do not think that biological taxonomy sorts them into kinds at all, but rather identifies them as parts of historical individuals. But at any rate if the species, genera, and so on of biological taxonomy are kinds at all, there are various respects in which they fall short of the traditional requirements of naturalness. The members of biological taxa lack essential properties that make them members of a particular kind: any properties specific enough to belong only to members of the kind cannot be assumed to belong to all members of the kind. And if there are laws applying to members of biological taxa, they are laws of very minor and local importance and, in view of the preceding point, at best probabilistic.
The Ends of the Sciences
Authors: Kitcher Philip 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The agenda for twentieth-century philosophy of science was set in the 1920s in Vienna and Berlin, as a group of thinkers who were to transform the character of English-language philosophy responded to the contrast they perceived between the grand achievements of physical inquiry and the inconclusive meanderings of many discussions in philosophy and in the human sciences. Their original ambition was to fashion a scalpel that could be used in intellectual surgery, to slice away statements that transcended the bounds of meaningful discourse or that could not be accepted with intellectual integrity.
Money and the Soul
Authors: Schofield Malcolm 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
When the accumulation of wealth is no longer of high social importance, there will be great changes in the code of morals. We shall be able to rid ourselves of many of the pseudo-moral principles that have hag-ridden us for two hundred years, by which we have exalted some of the most distasteful human qualities into the position of the highest virtues. We shall be able to afford to dare to assess the money-motive at its true value. The love of money as a possession—as distinguished from the love of money as a means to the enjoyments and realities of life—will be recognized for what it is ... one of those ... semi-pathological propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease.
On Aims and Methods of Cognitive Ethology (with Marc Bekoff)
Authors: Jamieson Dale 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In 1963 Niko Tinbergen published a paper, “On Aims and Methods of Ethology”, dedicated to his friend Konrad Lorenz. This essay is a landmark in the development of ethology. Here Tinbergen defines ethology as “the biological study of behavior” and seeks to demonstrate the “close affinity between Ethology and the rest of Biology” (p. 411). Building on Huxley (1942), Tinbergen identifies four major problems of ethology: causation, survival value, evolution, and ontogeny. Concern with these problems, under different names (mechanism, adaptation, phylogeny, and development), has dominated the study of animal behaviour during the last half century.
On the Ethics of the Use of Animals in Science (with Tom Regan)
Authors: Jamieson Dale 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
As you read this, animals are being killed, burned, radiated, blinded, immobilized, and shocked. They are being locked and strapped into the Noble Collip drum, tossed about at the rate of 40 revolutions per minute and thrust against the iron projections that line the drum. This procedure crushes bones, destroys tissues, smashes teeth, and ruptures internal organs. Right now, somewhere, animals are in isolation, deprived of all social contact, while others are in alien environments, manipulated into cannibalizing members of their own species. It is not just a few animals at issue. In the year 1978 alone, about 200 million animals were used for scientific purposes, about 64 million of these in the United States. This number includes 400,000 dogs, 200,000 cats, and 30,000 apes and monkeys. From anyone’s point of view, these are disagreeable facts, but some will say they are the concern of scientists only. We who are not scientists cannot get off the hook so easily, however.
Experimenting on Animals: A Reconsideration
Authors: Jamieson Dale 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
We live in a world that is morally horrific by almost anyone’s standards. In the Third World millions of people suffer from malnutrition, and due to inefficiency, stupidity, or venality many of them will literally starve to death. Even those of us fortunate enough to live in affluent countries are threatened daily with annihilation. Through madness or miscalculation, Reagan or Gorbachev could turn the entire planet into a fiery oven. The survivors would have nothing to look forward to but slow death in a nuclear winter.
Ethics and the Study of Animal Cognition (with Marc Bekoff)
Authors: Jamieson Dale 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the heyday of logical empiricism (c.1930-60 ), science was seen as the purest of human activities. There was a single thing that was “the scientific method”; observations were distinct from and unaffected by theoretical commitments; theories were “sets of sentences” that made no essential reference to knowers; explanation and prediction were regarded as formal relations between sentences that in principle could be made mechanical; and all of this theorizing, explaining, and predicting was thought to be uncontaminated by values.
Afterward: Child of the Sixties
Authors: Jamieson Dale 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is presumptuous for a philosopher to write an autobiography. What a philosopher has to offer is coherent claims and cogent arguments, and these have little to do with personal circumstances. For claims and arguments, except perhaps those involving words such as ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, are neutral with respect to person, place, and time. Sometimes that is what I believe. But despite this, I often find myself turning first to the “notes on contributors” sections of books and journals. However, when I do this a certain ambivalence sometimes bubbles to the surface. On the one hand I often feel frustrated when I can find nothing about Jane Doe’s background, education, and professional position.
Introduction
Authors: Jackson Frank , Pettit Philip , Smith Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
‘In Defence of Folk Psychology’ (Jackson and Pettit) makes a case in support of the claim that our ordinary way of thinking about human beings, crediting them with beliefs and desires, is fundamentally sound. Folk psychology will prove defensible so long as we can provide convincing support for two claims: first, that it is sufficient for people to have folk-psychological beliefs and desires that they are sometimes in states that satisfy certain conditions; and second, that people are sometimes in states that do satisfy those conditions. We argue that the functional conception of intentional states like belief and desire gives us a persuasive version of the first claim00ADit gives us an attractive account of what it takes for there to be beliefs and desires00ADand that it provides reason for thinking both that the second claim is compelling and that it would be likely to prove compelling even if we were in possession of a completed neuroscience.
Some Content is Narrow
Authors: Jackson Frank , Pettit Philip 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One way to defend narrow content is to produce a sentence of the form ‘S believes that P’, and show that this sentence is true of S if and only if it is true of any duplicate from the skin in, any doppelganger, of S. Notoriously, this is hard to do. Twin Earth examples are pervasive.’ Another way to defend narrow content is to show that only a narrow notion can play the causal explanatory role we require of content in a properly scientific psychology or cognitive science. Notoriously, this is hard to do. The considerations00ADmethodological solipsism, the principle of autonomy, or whatever00ADinvoked to show that a broad notion of content cannot play the required causal explanatory role are open to serious objection.2 More-over, this approach is not an argument for the existence of narrow content as such. It is an argument that content had better be narrow.
Ethical Particularism and Patterns
Authors: Jackson Frank , Pettit Philip , Smith Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Information couched in descriptive terms plays a major role in determining our moral judgements. Perhaps we learn that an action involves breaking a promise and respond by forming the view that it is wrong. Later we learn that it was necessary to break the promise in order to save a life, and retract our earlier judgement and decide that the action was right. Later still we learn that, although a life was saved, many more were lost as result of the promise00ADbreaking and we return to our original judgement. Here we have a simple example of the role of descriptive information in leading us to a moral judgement, and of how our judgement may change as more descriptive information comes to hand.
Practical Unreason
Authors: Pettit Philip , Smith Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The philosophical literature on failures of practical reason generally takes categories of failure recognized in common-sense morality and in the philosophical tradition-weakness of will, compulsion, wantonness, and the like-and offers a reconstruction of what is involved in such failures. The approach is deferential; it casts philosophy in the role of underlabourer to received wisdom. In this essay we explore a methodologically bolder approach to practical irrationality. We start with a distinction between intentional and deliberative perspectives on the explanation of action and we try to show how it can be used to generate a systematic taxonomy of the different types of failure that we may expect to find in practical reason.
Freedom in Belief and Desire
Authors: Pettit Philip , Smith Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
People ordinarily suppose that there are certain things they ought to believe and certain things they ought not to believe. In supposing this to be so, they make corresponding assumptions about their belief-forming capacities. They assume that they are generally responsive to what they think they ought to believe in the things they actually come to believe. In much the same sense, people ordinarily suppose that there are certain things they ought to desire and do and they make corresponding assumptions about their capacities to form desires and act on them. We chart these assumptions and argue that they entail that people are responsible and free on two fronts: they are free and responsible believers, and free and responsible desirers.
Biofunctions: Two Paradigms
Authors: Millikan Ruth Garrett 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Applications to biological systems of Robert Cummins’s notion of ‘function’ from his classic paper ‘Functional Analysis’ (Cummins 1975) and of my notion ‘proper function’ from Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories (LTOBC) (Millikan 1984) are discussed and compared. Neither notion is fully determinate in its application to life forms, always cutting decisively between ‘functions’ of the designated kind and ‘mere effects’. Nor do we need a notion of function in biology that is fully deter-minate in this way. The dimensions of indeterminacy for both concepts are explored.
The Rational and the Real: Some Doubts about the Programme of ‘Rational Analysis’*
Authors: LOWE E J 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This paper is a critique of Nick Chater and Mike Oaksford’s attempt to apply the programme of ‘rational analysis’ to human cognitive behaviour and, more particularly, challenges their claim that ‘everyday’ rationality is based on ‘formal’ rationality. I begin with some critical remarks about the way in which they distinguish between ‘everyday’ and ‘formal’ rationality and then explore a possible relationship between the two which they over- look but which is suggested by some remarks of John Locke’s. Next I raise some doubts about the programme of ‘rational analysis’ itself and about the parallels which Chater and Oaksford claim to see between their explanation of everyday rationality and the use of optimality models in evolutionary biology.
The Stag-God of the Countryside and Related Problems
Authors: Hawkins J D 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The Hittite Hieroglyphic signs registered by Laroche in LesHieéroglyphes hittites(1960), nos. 461–3, form an entangled nexus of problems. Fortunately the steady accumulation of new examples permits here as elsewhere gradual progress in our understanding. My attempt in this article to sort out these signs and their usages does lead to some revisions, alterations, and additions to Laroche’s HHnos. 461–3, which are presented at the end 6). This is a small oering to Anna Morpurgo Davies in gratitude for our many years of profitable collaboration on these inscriptions. Unlike most of my papers, this one will not have been scrutinized by her before publication, so I can only hope that she does not find too many points requiring revision.
The Improvability Of Eudaimonia In The Nicomachean Ethics
Authors: Heinaman Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Inclusist interpreters of Aristotle’s account of eudaimonia in the Nicomachean Ethics maintain that he regards it as a collection of intrinsic goods that contains more than virtuous activity. To support their view, they often appeal to Aristotle’s requirement(s) at NE 1. 7 that eudaimonia must be self-sufficient (1097b14-16) and most worthy of choice without being added to other goods (1097b16-20). The self-sufficiency requirement says that on its own happiness makes life worth choosing and lacking in (or needing) nothing. Many inclusivists take this to imply comprehensivismthe belief that eudaimonia consists of all goods-since if it lacked any good eudaimonia would be lacking in something. And, given that a greater collection of goods is always more worthy of choice than a smaller collection of goods (1097b19-20), the requirement that eudaimonia be most worthy of choice is also understood to imply that eudaimonia is a collection of all goods. For if any good were missing, then eudaimonia with that extra good would be, impossibly, more worthy of choice than eudaimonia. The ‘non-improvers’ conclude that eudaimonia is not improvable, and therefore it must include all goods. This paper deals with the ‘most choiceworthy’ requirement (ignoring the question of its relation to self-sufficiency).
Ethics And Politics In Aristotle: A Discussion of Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy
Authors: Taylor C C W 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This book is one in a series of new studies of major social and political thinkers, which aim to present accessible, historically based introductions to their thought, together with reassessments of their central ideas and arguments and assessments of their continuing relevance to current political debate. (I paraphrase the description on the back cover.) In its task of introduction and critical reassessment it seems to me to succeed admirably. It provides the newcomer with exactly the kind of accessible yet authoritative introduction to Aristotle’s political thought which the series aims at, and in its critical reassessments of his doctrines raises many issues of interest to the specialist (some of them touched on below). On the matter of relevance to contemporary political debate I am more sceptical; though Kraut states in his preface that one of his ambitions is to present Aristotle ‘in a way that shows how he speaks to the politics of our own time’ (viii), in fact the book has very little to say about relevance to contemporary issues. I do not regard that in itself as a defect, since I think that Aristotle’s political theory is so firmly entrenched in a historical situation radically different from that of the modern world that he has in fact very little relevance to modern political problems. Rather my criticism is that in paying lip-service to an unattainable ideal of contemporary relevance Kraut unintentionally plays down the extent of the distance between Aristotle’s socio-political world and ours.
Can Desires Provide Reasons for Action?
Authors: Chang Ruth 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
On a widely accepted story of human agency, all reasons for acting, intending, and desiring are provided by the fact that the agent wants something or would want it under certain conditions. My reason for going to the store, for example, is provided by the fact that I want to buy some ice cream, and my reason for wanting to buy some ice cream is provided by the fact that J want to eat some.1 According to these ‘desire00ADbased’ accounts, all practical reasons are grounded in the present desires of the agent; justification has its source in the fact that I do or would want it.