bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Investigation of an explosion and flash fire in a fixed bed reactor
Authors: Ogle Russell A. , Schumacher John L. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractAn explosion and flash fire in a fixed bed reactor occurred at a municipal wastewater treatment plant (WWTP). Two employees were injured in the accident. The accident occurred in an ozone treatment building where ozone was used to treat odors from the offgas of the sludge concentration units. Excess ozone manually was routed to the fixed bed reactor (ozone destruct unit) where the ozone is catalytically transformed into oxygen before being discharged to the atmosphere.An investigation of the accident was conducted to determine the root cause of the explosion and flash fire and identify corrective actions which the WWTP management could undertake to prevent a recurrence. This investigation included site inspections, interview with the injured employees, sampling and analysis of various materials, an explosion dynamics analysis, and a root cause analysis.It was concluded that cooling oil from one of the ozone generation units entered the main ozone gas line due to a crack in one of the reactor's dielectric tubes. The cooling oil was vented into the ozone destruct unit when an employee opened a ball valve on the main ozone gas line. The cooling oil, essentially a saturated hydrocarbon mixture, reacted exothermically when it contacted the manganese dioxide catalyst. The exothermic reaction resulted in an explosion which propelled the access panel outwards and dispersed the catalyst pellets. A flash fire followed the explosion. The flash fire burned two employees and caused thermal damage to a nearby control panel.Although this accident was the first of its kind at this facility, this was not the first time that the ozone generator had experienced a failure of a dielectric tube. Thus, there was a significant probability that a dielectric tube failure could leak cooling oil into the main ozone gas line. This failure event could, in turn, result in another explosion and flash fire. The WWTP staff neither designed nor fabricated the ozone generator‐destructor system. Therefore, it did not seem appropriate for the WWTP staff to modify the ozone system. Instead, it was recommended that the ozone destruct unit be taken out of service. The WWTP management acted on this recommendation.
Investigation of a steam explosion in a petroleum product storage tank
Authors: Ogle Russell A. , Schumacher John L. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractAn explosion occurred in a petroleum product storage tank at a refinery. The liquid petroleum product was a heavy oil used as an asphalt extender. There were no injuries, but the cleanup was costly. The storage tank was one of several which received the product stream from a dehydration unit. The accident occurred shortly after the refinery was brought back on‐line following a shutdown for schduled maintenance.This was the first incident of this kind to occur at this facility. Analysis of the process data and eyewitness observations indicated that the dehydration tower, which was supposed to be maintained at a minimum of 100°C during the shutdown, was allowed to drift below 100°C for an unknown period of time. This deviation enabled liquid water to enter the storage tank. Three operational factors contributed to the accident. Corrective actions were recommended to prevent a recurrence of a similar incident.
Suppression of class a fires with HFC‐227ea
Authors: Robin Mark L. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractHFC‐227ea (CF3CHFCF3;1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 3, 3‐heptafluoropropane) is an effective replacement for Halon 1301 in fire suppression systems, providing rapid extinguishment of flames through a combination of physical and chemical mechanisms. The vast majority of applications for HFC‐227ea involve the protection of Class A hazards, which are characterized by low fuel loadings and low energy output, with fire sizes often in the range of 5–10 kW. Mid‐ and large‐scale testing has demonstrated that HFC‐227ea, at its minimum design concentration of 7.0% v/v, is effective at extinguishing fires typical of those expected to occur in electronic data processing (EDP) facilities, telecommunication facilities and anechoic chambers. The levels of HF produced following extinguishment of typical Class a fires with HFC–227ea were well below the estimated mammalian LC50 and the human Dangerous Toxic Load (DTL), and do not appear to present a threat to electronic equipment.
A thematic approach to system safety
Authors: Ekman Mark E. , Werner Paul W. , Covan John M. , D'Antonio Perry E. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractSandia National Laboratories (Sandia) has refined a process for developing inherently safer system designs based on methods used by Sandia to design detonation safety into nuclear weapons. The process was created when Sandia realized that standard engineering practices did not provide the level of safety assurance necessary for nuclear weapon operations, with their potential for catastrophic accidents. A systematic approach, which relies on mutually supportive design principles integrated through fundamental physical principles, was developed to ensure a predictably safe system response under a variety of operational and accident‐based stesses. Robust, safe system designs result from this thematic approach to safety, minimizing the number of safety critical features. This safety assurance process has two profound benefits: the process avoids the need to understand or limit the ultimate intensity of off‐normal environments and it avoids the requirement to analyze and test a large array of accident environment scenarios (e.g., directional threats, sequencing of environments, time races, etc) to demonstrate conformance to all safety requirements.
Hazard analysis and safety considerations in refrigerated ammonia storage tanks
Authors: Al‐Abdulally Falah , Al‐Shuwaib Saad , Gupta B. L. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractA systematic approach to find out the probability of Ammonia tank failure was adopted and a consequence analysis in case of accidental Ammonia release from refrigerated ammonia storage tanks was made. The study revealed that construction of a concrete bund wall around the tanks is not justified. Instead, it would be adequate to upgrade the safety in the common dyke around the tanks by adopting additional conventional methods.
Effect of fireproofing design on thermal performance of horizontal members with top flange exposed
Authors: Castle G. K. , Castle G. G. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractIt is common practice in the industrial sector to leave the top flanges of fireproofed beams bare. The main reason for this is to permit placement of pipes and grating on the beams without interference from fireproofing materials. To the authors' knowledge, tests of such configurations have not been conducted to determine actual resistance to fire. However, structures fireproofed in this manner have survived actual fire exposures. The purpose of this paper is to examine theoretically the effect of various fireproofing designs on the performance of these members and point out which practices can lead to premature failure of fireproofed beams where top surfaces are left bare. An approximate but practical analytical model is used to evaluate bare steel, encased (concrete/contour) and box (hollow) constructions. The need for reinforcements is demonstrated by examining the effect of bond loss in decomposable systems. Thermal performance is related to load carrying capability of the member.
Review of literature related to human spark scenarios
Authors: Berkey Brian D. , Pratt Thomas H. , Williams George M. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractThis paper presents a summary of articles from the literature concerning human spark ignition scenarios. Two basic subject areas are covered. These are (1) articles related to charge generation, particularly those associated with clothing and textiles, (2) articles related to energy storage and discharge. The papers have been organized according to their primary subject. However, it should be recognized that many of the papers relate to both subject areas. The key conclusions and recommendations from each of the cited articles are included, as well as a summary of conclusions drawn from the overall literature review.
Systems for electrostatic evaluation in industrial silos
Authors: Britton Laurence G. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractWhile a primary strategy for avoiding ignition during silos filling lies in control of the ignition energy of the suspension, it may also be possible to control the energy of on‐bed brush discharges created during filling. Two instrument systems are described for investigations in operational, full‐scale process equipment. A discussion is made of the effective energies of brush discharges, the effects of process variables on static, and types of charge neutralizer that have been used or proposed. The instrument systems allow pragmatic, in‐plant evaluation of the effects of process variables and the benefits of any charge neutralizer system that is used.
Vaporization and dispersion modeling of contained refrigerated liquid spills
Authors: Studer D. W. , Cooper B. A. , Doelp L. C. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractThe modeling of evaporation and dispersion from chemical spills has been an active area. The available models span the range of very simple calculational methods, for quick response at the time of accidents, to more complex transient models that predict the results of hypothesized events. Conservative assumptions are often used in all of these models in place of more accurate and more complicated computational techniques.
Safety in multistream ammonia plants utilizing common utility services
Authors: Mall Ram Ditta 
Published: June 2004

AbstractA multistream plant has a definite advantage of achieving an overall lesser downtime as compared to a single‐stream plant based on Partial Oxidation because the outage of individual stream does not necessarily put the plant out of operation. But the safety considerations in the design, operation and maintenance of a multistream plant should be all the more elaborate and well defined. Usually the multistreams have common utility sources and a number of interconnections provided for the side streams. The present paper is a case study of an incident that occurred in the Ammonia Plant when the maintenance work was in progress in one stream and the other two were under operation.
Formation of diacrylic acid during acrylic acid storage
Authors: Wampler Francis M. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractDiacrylic acid (β‐acryloxypropionic acid) forms spontaneously in bulk acrylic acid by a Michael‐addition reaction. Fresh samples of acrylic acid containing 0.08–2.9% (m/m) levels of water were stored at constant temperatures of 15, 25, 35, and 45°C up to 65 days. An empirical equation to predict diacrylic acid formation was generated from the data.
Effect of operating conditions on pressure drop in a pulse‐jet cleaned fabric filter
Authors: Templin B. R. , Leith David 
Published: June 2004

AbstractTests were conducted to determine the effect of operating conditions on pressure drop in a pulse‐jet cleaned fabric filter. A three‐bag, pilot‐scale filter was used. Polyester bags with ptfe‐laminated surface and untreated surface collected fly ash and limestone dust at 30, 120, and 480 seconds between cleaning pulses to each bag. Tests were conducted using off‐line and on‐line cleaning. Results were compared to predictions of theoretical models. The models should be used only when sufficient dust is on the fabric to cause model parameters to remain constant.
Reliable detection of runaway reaction precursors in liquid phase reactions
Authors: Spence John P. , Noronha John A. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractA theoretical approach for early on‐line detection of runaway reactions based on temperature derivative estimates is described and shown to be feasible in the laboratory. On‐line process measurements were processed to yield smoothed derivative estimates and confidence intervals. These estimates were then compared to characteristics of potentially hazardous situations. If a match was sensed, preventive or emergency measures could be initiated. The problem lies in the tradeoff between earliest possible detection and false alarm avoidance.
Failure mode management: A loss prevention philosophy for programmable logic controllers
Authors: Wilson Dean K. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractProgrammable logic controllers are microprocessor‐based solid state switches that can be programmed to operate in a particular sequence in response to such external inputs as pressure or temperature indication. These units are now being installed to control primary and peripheral processes, including the burner management/safety environment, in place of the more traditional electromechanical controls. Specific design guidelines that will successfully manage the several identified failure modes of programmable logic controllers are discussed. Suggestions as to how this philosophy may be applied to actual installations are provided.
Lessons learned from a hydrogen explosion in a process unit
Authors: MacDiarmid J. A. , North G. J. T. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractPolysar Limited operates a large petrochemical complex in Sarnia, Canada with several plants that produce monomers and synthetic rubber. On Good Friday, April 20th, 1984, there was a hydrogen explosion and fire in the Litol benzene unit of Polysar's Styrene I plant. Two men were killed and two more were injured. Injury and loss of life would likely have been greater had the explosion not happened on a plant holiday.The explosion occurred when the unit was being restarted following a scheduled shutdown for maintenance. The explosion followed the release of about 30 kilograms of hydrogen gas into a compressor shed from a burst flange operating at 4800 kPa (700 psig). The findings of the investigation into the explosion and the actions taken to prevent a re‐occurrence are discussed.
The anatomy of an acrylic acid runaway polymerization
Authors: Levy Leon B. , Penrod James D. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractThe details of an unscheduled polymerization of acrylic acid initiated by indirect heating have been characterized by in‐depth analysis of the polymer, kinetic and thermodynamic calculations, and heat and material balances on the system. The data fit together to give a consistent picture of the polymerization scenario. The fact that the acrylic acid polymerization was not violent was primarily due to the presence of about 10 ppm phenothiazine, which delayed the onset of free radical polymerization until about 2 to 3 hours after the monomer had reached its boiling point. Since much of the acrylic acid was converted to dimer during this induction period, the ultimate energy release was greatly limited. Other moderating factors were a relatively slow heatup of the tank contents in the external heat exchange recycle loop, free vapor venting, and the incursion of fire monitor water into the tank.
Preventing fires and explosions in pilot plants
Authors: Capraro M. A. , Strickland J. H. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractWhile the magnitude of potential consequences might vary, most hazards encountered in pilot plant operations are the same as those experienced in full scale commercial facilities. For example, safeguarding hazardous chemicals storage and transfer, protecting reaction vessels against catastrophic failure or runaways, all require careful consideration regardless of scale. We, however, want to address some aspects of pilot plants which can introduce hazards unique or more common to their operation. To illustrate, we present some case histories from our own pilot plant experience in BASF's Chemical Engineering Department, and include a brief discussion of some corresponding safeguards to mitigate these situations.
Case histories of dust explosions
Authors: Skinner S. J. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractThree dust explosion incidents that occurred within Monsanto Europe are discussed. The company carries out a wide range of operations involving powdered solids, and the incidents illustrate the range of situations that can cause dust explosions. The design approaches used now, covered by guides such as the NFPA 68 and 69 usually prevent major losses, but there are some lessons to be learned from the three incidents described. The most basic one is that there are so many different ways of igniting flammable dusts that we should never use elimination of ignition sources as the sole method of protection. The other lesson is a very old one: the need to maintain all our equipment and safety systems in operational condition at all times. This is particularly difficult in practice because these systems are not required for day‐to‐day production, but still must operate effectively when they are needed.
Foam‐water sprinkler protection for flammable liquids
Authors: Tabar David C. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractCompanies involved in the handling, processing, and storage of flammable liquids all share a common denominator: the hazards of the business. Loss experience within chemical and related industries, and their respective distribution chains, continues to reaffirm the need to maintain active and aggressive internal loss‐prevention programs. Losses, fire research, technological advances, the code‐making process, and the individual efforts of loss prevention professionals have produced design concepts and standards for sprinkler protection of flammable liquids. Industrial fire losses have been widely publicized. These losses have heightened to invoke concern with respect to “real‐world” ignition scenarios, sprinkler system design criteria, and hazardous material runoff. While thorough investigations have not been made public in all cases, industry knowledge of causal and other loss‐related factors is vital for the prevention of future losses. At the same time, industry is facing reaction—in the form of high building construction costs—called for by model fire and building codes when hazardous materials are involved.
Thermal stability and deflagration of ethylene oxide
Authors: Britton Laurence G. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractSome initiating causes of ethylene oxide decomposition are examined. Experimental data are presented for thermal decomposition limits, autoignition temperature and minimum ignition energy. It is shown that flame propagation through liquid filled lines may occur via decomposition of a vapor pocket. Insulation fires are discussed in terms of a series of exothermic reactions initiated by low tempertaure formation of polyethylene glycols. Some case histories are reviewed.
Dealing with the process safety “management gap”
Authors: Knowlton R. E. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractThe Process Industry has Corporate Safety Policies, codes of practice, skilled engineers and safety specialists and powerful techniques for Hazard Identification, Assessment and Control. Despite the above and a strong commitment to safety, accidents still occur. Many accidents appear to be due to “gaps” in the management systems rather than to failures of professional skills or to a lack of commitment. This paper will review the many stages in designing, constructing and operating a facility between the initial appraisal of a potential project and the final taking out of service of a facility. The “primary” and “secondary” safety checks will be described. The paper will give examples of gaps in management systems which have led to problems. Finally the paper will suggest ways in which these gaps can be minimized.
Continuing studies of hazardous material vapor mitigation using aqueous foams
Authors: DiMaio L. R. , Norman E. C. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractEarlier work [1, 2, 3] has shown that aqueous foams can be used successfully to suppress vapors and/or fumes and mitigate reactivity of many hazardous materials. Chubb National Foam, in concert with numerous major chemical manufacturers and users, is committed to a continuing hazardous materials control program which provides experimental data from actual field tests.Studies of this nature produce valuable information on techniques used to apply special foams, types of equipment required and the courses of action to avoid in a hazardous material incident.The tests covered in this report were conducted at the Department of Energy Nevada Test Site, Mercury, NV.
Management of process safety at Kerr‐McGee corporation
Authors: Emerson Steven D. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractIn 1986, the executive management of Kerr‐McGee Corporation directed that each operating unit examine its facilities for process hazards so that any deficiencies could be corrected.This paper reviews organization of the corporatewide process safety program and the deployment of review teams at particular facilities. It also focuses on how one operation in the chemical subsidiary was affected by events at a nearby competitor's facility. Lessons learned in managing the reviews have helped improve ongoing programs throughout the corporation.
Quantitative assessment of process safety programs
Authors: Pitblado R. M. , Williams J. C. , Slater D. H. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractIncreasingly it is being recognized that the quality and effectiveness of process safety programs have a direct quantitative bearing on a company's accident performance and show up most directly in equipment failure and incident frequency. A technique is currently under development, being partially funded by the Dutch and UK Governments, to address these factors. This paper reviews the underlying basis of the system, with its qualitative and simple quantitative outputs, describes a typical application and suggests the important areas for future development. It is anticipated that this system in its eventual configuration could prove useful for site management audits and compliance reviews as it is targeted specifically towards the chemical industry and derives its basis from CPI accident statistics and underlying management principles.
Rising American expectations for a larger public role to prevent chemical accidents
Authors: Poje Gerald V. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractLast year the President articulated an important national goal: People living near industrial facilities should not have to fear for their health.President George Bush. June 12, 1989Serious policy initiatives to guarantee freedom from fear must contain provisions to prevent chemical accidents through an open, cooperative dialogue involving community safety advocates, organized labor, and industry.
Facility risk review as an approach to prioritizing loss prevention efforts
Authors: Casada M. L. , Kirkman J. Q. , Paula H. M. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractIn large, complex facilities such as refineries and chemical facilities, it is difficult to identify and compare the risks from many different threats to personnel and production activities. Such a comparison, however, is worthwhile because managers can use this information in allocating limited loss prevention resources. A facility risk review (FRR), as described in this paper, is an effective means of identifying and ranking risks in a facility.
Semi‐quantitative risk assessment method for product management
Authors: Fraser W. J. , Bussey R. J. , Johnston J. C. 
Published: June 2004

AbstractThe workshop presented a semi‐quantitative risk assessment technique that can be used to judge the total risk on all undesired consequences/events for a product manufacturing operation. The technique requires an experienced team to judge risk utilizing a numerical rating system that, although arbitrarily chosen, is self consistent and provides a relative assessment of product manufacturing risk. Once calculated, the risk is compared to the product's net income for making risk management and product planning decisions. The workshop included an exercise where all participants could try the technique.