bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Shareholding Cascades: the Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium
Authors: Becht Marco , Chapelle Ariane , Renneboog Luc 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This paper analyses the control of Belgian listed companies. The analysis reveals that control of listed companies in Belgium is highly concentrated. Business groups, holding companies, and voting pacts play an important role in bringing about this concentration. The main characteristics of the Belgian corporate ownership and equity market can be summarized as follows: (1) few, merely 140, Belgian companies are listed on the Brussels stock exchange, (2) there is a high degree of ownership concentration with an average largest direct shareholding of 45%, (3) holding companies, families, and to a lesser extent industrial companies are the main investor categories whose share stakes are concentrated into powerful control blocks through business group structures and voting pacts, (4) control is levered by pyramidal and complex ownership structures, and (5) there is a market for share stakes.
Ownership and Voting Power in France
Authors: Bloch Laurence , Kremp Elizabeth 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis paper provides an overview of ownership structure and voting power in France, both in terms of institutional and legal framework, and of quantitative analysis. If cross share holdings in large groups were a characteristic of the French model called ‘financial core’, and had been extended in 1986 with the first wave of privatizations, the foundations of this model seem to be weakened. This organization has not been able to really prevent the increase of foreign presence in French capitalization. Looking at listed firms and CAC40 firms, and at a large dataset of unlisted firms, this paper shows that concentration of direct ownership and voting power is very high in France even for listed and CAC40 firms. The second direct owner lags far behind the first one and the category ‘families’ plays a major role in the detention of non‐listed firms. The average ownership stakes of banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions are relatively low, except for CAC40 firms.
Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy
Authors: Bianchi Marcello , Bianco Magda , Enriques Luca 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Italian corporate governance system features a high concentration of direct ownership, for both listed and unlisted companies. The analysis of direct ownership and of the identity of owners reveals that a major role is played by families, coalitions, the State, and above all by other companies. The largest stake in listed and unlisted companies is held by other non‐financial or holding companies. The amount held by financial institutions is limited. More than 50% of all Italian industrial companies belong to pyramidal groups. The main reason for this structure, especially among listed companies, is the possibility of controlling vast resources with a limited amount of capital.
Ownership and Control in The Netherlands
Authors: de Jong Abe , Kabir Rezaul , Marra Teye , Röell Ailsa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This paper analyses ownership and control structures of Dutch listed companies. Legislation, effective since 1992, mandates all shareholders with holdings of 5% or more in Dutch companies to disclose their holdings. Our analysis shows that the average ownership stakes of the largest and the three largest shareholders are 27% and 41%, respectively. The average ownership stakes of banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions are relatively low. We observe that voting rights are more concentrated than ownership rights; the use of a supervisory board representing interests of different stakeholders is ubiquitous; and listed companies use different forms of anti‐takeover defence measures.
Ownership and Control of Spanish Listed Firms
Authors: Crespí‐Cladera Rafel , García‐Cestona Miguel A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The paper analyses the ownership structure of a large sample of Spanish listed companies. The results show a picture of concentrated ownership where stock markets are relatively less important. Direct ownership and voting blocks, which account for indirect ownership through third companies, are larger for non‐financial firms followed by families or individuals and financial firms other than banks. Nevertheless, the use of intermediate companies (pyramiding) is not frequent according to our data. Banks do not seem to play the important role they did in the past and the recent privatization reduced to a minimum level, state shareholdings on listed companies.
The Liberal Archipelago
Authors: Kukathas Chandran 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter discusses a model of the free society. This model is one in which there may be many associations, none of which are ‘privileged’ or regarded as having special moral significance. In such a society, there may be many authorities, but all authority rests on the acquiescence of subjects rather than on justice. Thus, the theory of the free society is an account of the terms by which different ways coexist rather than an account of the terms by which they cohere.
The Cultural Construction of Society
Authors: Kukathas Chandran 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter argues that the purpose of the state is not to promote or foster liberal equality nor serve as the cultural architect or guardian of society. Its role is to serve as an umpire who attends to questions that arise in a society. It examines the idea that the state should pursue equality, and the view that ‘benign neglect’ is an implausible idea, embarrassed by the fact that the state cannot help but shape society.
Feminism, the Family, and the Politics of the Closet
Authors: Calhoun Cheshire 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book is about placing sexual orientation politics within feminist theorizing. It is also about defining the central political issues confronting lesbian and gay men. It brings the study of lesbians from the margins of feminist theory to the centre by critiquing the analytic frameworks employed within feminist theory that render invisible the difference of lesbians from heterosexual women. The basic features of lesbian and gay subordination are also addressed by exploring the differences between heterosexual dominance and gender and race relations. Throughout the book, the aim is to re‐centre lesbian and gay politics away from concern with sexual regulations and towards concern with the displacement of gays and lesbians from the public sphere of visible citizenship and from the private sphere of romance, marriage, and family.
“Extreme” Electoral Systems and the Appeal of the Mixed‐Member Alternative
Authors: Shugart Matthew Soberg 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis develops an argument applicable primarily to reform in established democracies, but potentially offering insight into choices in new democracies as well: that there are certain electoral systems that may be seen as extreme on one (or both) of two dimensions—interparty and intraparty. The interparty dimension refers to the degree to which, on the one hand, a single party forms a majority government on well under a majority of votes, or, on the other hand, coalitions are formed among several parties; the intraparty dimension refers to a continuum of electoral systems from those in which legislators depend exclusively on their own personal votes to those in which votes are given exclusively to parties such that legislators have no direct ties to voters. Suggests that electoral systems that are extreme on one or both of these dimensions are inherently prone to reformist pressures, and also shows that much of the appeal of mixed‐member systems derives from how they appear to balance the extremes on each of these dimensions: the trade‐off on the interparty dimension, which is between majoritarian and proportional forms of representation; and the trade‐off on the intraparty dimension, which is between ‘strong candidates’ and ‘strong parties’. Brief studies are presented of five cases of reform from extreme electoral systems to mixed‐member systems: New Zealand (formerly a pluralitarian system); Italy and Israel (formerly hyper‐representative systems); Japan (formerly a hyper‐personalistic system); and Venezuela (formerly a hyper‐centralized system). The ideas presented in the chapter form the basis for the set of key questions presented to the authors of the country chapters in Part II of the book.
Choosing MMP in New Zealand: Explaining the 1993 Electoral Reform
Authors: Denemark David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explores several of the factors that significantly affected the transition of New Zealand's political system from a pluralitarian (extreme majoritarian) system famous for its tranquil efficacy to an MMP (mixed‐member proportional) system renowned for its vengeful reformism. These factors include: (1) dealignment; (2) minor party under‐representation; (3) the under‐representation of minority groups in an era of increasing multiculturalism; (4) radical, unpopular economic reform by successive Labour and National party governments; and (5) the parliamentary ‘other side’ of the calculus—the provision of both a Royal Commission, which highlighted representational failings of the Westminster system while legitimating MMP specifically as an alternative electoral system, and indicative and binding referendums, which gave New Zealand's voters the final say in determining the fate of the country's electoral system. The extent to which these issues were important in vote choices of electors in the 1993 referendum is also considered. A last section considers the overall explanations for New Zealand's turn to MMP, and the chapter includes a table that shows a timeline of electoral change in New Zealand since 1985 (the period immediately preceding the reform of 1993) and an appendix giving a sketch of the MMP system in New Zealand.
The Sources of Electoral Reform in Venezuela
Authors: Crisp Brian F. , Rey Juan Carlos 
Published: October 2003

AbstractRecent electoral reform in Venezuela, including the adoption of a mixed‐member proportional (MMP) system, has occurred in the context of crisis. Recounts the history leading from the situation of an extreme electoral system with a very dominant party leadership (a hyper‐centralized system) to the adoption of the MMP system in 1993—in which it was hoped that legislators would be more accountable to voters in the newly created single‐seat geographic constituencies; the system adopted is described as the result of compromise. The first section describes the electoral system and how it has evolved, emphasizing issues of ‘electoral efficiency’. The next section analyzes the reform process and the role/motivations of various actors in the move to an MMP system. With these historical data in hand, the chapter concludes by putting the system for electing congress in the context of wider systemic, institutional issues.
Electoral Reform in Bolivia: Origins of the Mixed‐Member Proportional System
Authors: Mayorga René Antonio 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn 1994, Bolivia undertook a major constitutional and electoral reform, in which a closed‐list proportional representation (PR) system for the Lower House of the Congress was replaced by a mixed‐member proportional (MMP) system. Article 60 of the reformed constitution establishes that 68 deputies out of a constitutionally fixed number of 130 will be chosen by plurality rule in single‐seat districts, while the remaining 62 will be chosen by party‐list voting according to proportional representation in nine regional multi‐seat districts. This new electoral system establishes seats linkage between the two tiers such that the overall allocation of seats is determined proportionally according to list votes at the level of each multi‐seat district. In analyzing the underlying causes of the electoral reform in 1994, Mayorga first deals with the widely perceived fundamental problems and flaws of the traditional PR system and, second, addresses the main causes leading to the adoption of an MMP system, focusing on the context in which the politics of electoral reform was carried out.
Reforming Electoral Systems in Mexico
Authors: Horcasitas Juan Molinar , Weldon Jeffrey A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMexico has a long experience with highly majoritarian variants of mixed‐member systems, but has recently been made more proportional in a process of democratization. Electoral reform has developed along two major axes: the degree of proportionality, and the composition of the electoral authority, with the parties often trading openness on one axis for closure on the other. Sometimes trade‐offs in reform negotiations followed a third dimension—the registration requirements for new parties. This chapter first describes the evolution of the Mexican electoral formulae from 1963 to today, explaining the rationale of each phase of reform either as a majority party decision or as a trade‐off between government and opposition; the phases described are the plurality party deputy system (1963–1976), the mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) minority representation system (1979–1985), the governability clause of the 1988 law, the governability clause with ‘moving escalator’ of the 1991 law, and the abandonment of the governability clause in the 1994 law. The last part of the chapter focuses on the last round of electoral reforms (the 1997 law), in which the mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) system reintroduced in 1994 (after the earlier brief interludes of systems that combined MMM with mixed‐member proportional (MMP) arrangements under the 1988 and 1991 laws), was further reformed to result in a more proportional allocation of seats, with the dominant principle depending on the vote distribution.
Hedging Against Uncertainty: Regime Change and the Origins of Hungary's Mixed‐Member System
Authors: Schiemann John W. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis examines why Hungary adopted a mixed‐member (MM) electoral system by analyzing the bargaining process that produced it. The discussion of Hungary's negotiated transition to democracy from communism in 1989 shows that the country's MM system emerged as the result of a patchwork grafting of different components rather than a systematically conceived and coherently designed grand plan to meet broad societal needs. The coalition of opposition parties and the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party that negotiated the electoral law in National Roundtable talks attempted to design a system that would both maximize the seat shares of their individual parties and allocate those seats to top‐party elites. They pursued these objectives, however, under a thickening veil of ex ante uncertainty about ex post electoral outcomes, and indeed, the thickening of the veil during the Roundtable talks caused the ruling Socialists to hedge their bets on the global features of the system, combining different sets of rules in order to allocate seats in multiple ways. The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section provides some necessary historical background, discussing previous electoral systems in Hungary's fleeting periods of democratic rule and under communism, as well as the struggles over the reform of the law leading up to the National Trilateral (Roundtable) talks that produced the system in use today; the second section briefly describes the electoral system resulting from the electoral law of 1989, identifying the significant elements of the law and disaggregating the institution into its individual components; the third section discusses the background to the National Roundtable talks, and the fourth turns to the negotiated design of the 1989 law in order to explain the origin of the significant components of the Hungarian electoral system; the last section summarizes the discussion.
Compromise Amidst Political Conflict: The Origins of Russia's Mixed‐Member System
Authors: Moser Robert G. , Thames Frank C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe introduction of a mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) electoral system in Russia came in the midst of a violent struggle between President Boris Yeltsin and a communist and nationalist opposition, after which Yeltsin was left to construct a new electoral system and a new constitutional order unopposed. Explains the development and maintenance of the MMM system in Russia as a compromise between competing intraparty and interparty goals, first within the small circle drafting the executive decree in 1993, and then between competing institutions in the struggle over the electoral law in 1995. The designers of the presidential decree that implemented the system saw a mixed‐member system as being able to promote the formation of national parties while maintaining regional representation, and despite the preponderance of power that Yeltsin held throughout this process, the system was not crafted exclusively for the interests of a particular party or ideological camp. It is argued that the system that eventually emerged was a product of competing goals, uncertainty over future electoral outcomes, and compromise between competing institutions. The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section briefly examines the historical background of elections in Russia and provides an overview of the MMM system adopted in 1993; the second describes the process surrounding Yeltsin's executive decree establishing the electoral system for the 1993 election; the third looks at the adoption of the electoral law in 1995; the final section draws some conclusions.
An Initial Assessment of the Consequences of MMP in New Zealand
Authors: Barker Fiona , Boston Jonathan , Levine Stephen , McLeay Elizabeth , Roberts Nigel S. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe purpose is to provide an initial assessment of the impact of the introduction of the mixed‐member proportional (MMP) electoral system on the New Zealand political system, especially with regard to the normative criteria established by the New Zealand Royal Commission on the Electoral System. However, since the normative nature of these criteria may limit the breadth of any analysis (they are not necessarily comprehensive and unambiguous, nor do they provide a watertight framework for evaluation), this particular discussion of the impact of MMP on the New Zealand political system is left until the last section. The bulk of the chapter instead employs the findings of political scientists on the relationships between electoral systems, political behavior, and political institutions. These are presented in 10 sections: Anticipating the New Electoral System; The Election and Government Formation; The Political Parties and the Party System; Political Recruitment and Careers; Voting Behavior; Parliament; Government Transition and Durability; Government and the Policy Process; The Future of the New Electoral System; and Winners and Losers. The authors make the point that (as in Germany) personalized geographic representation has continued even as the overall system has been made more proportional.
The Israeli Mixed Electoral System: Unexpected Reciprocal and Cumulative Consequences
Authors: Hazan Reuven Y. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis analyzes the consequences of the Israeli version of a mixed electoral system, in which a majoritarian method of electing the head of the executive branch was grafted onto an extremely proportional system of electing the legislature. Focuses on the first two elections in which this mixed system was implemented, 1996 and 1999, and in doing so, concentrates on two aspects of the elections: the election results, i.e., the decimation of the two main parties and the rise of sectarian parties (fragmentation of the parliamentary system); and the electoral dynamics, i.e., the convergence toward the center in both the executive and the legislative elections. The most significant ramifications of the implementation of the direct popular election of the prime minister have been a significant shift in the electoral strength of the parties and a dramatic change in the competitive electoral orientation of the Israeli party system. Neither result was expected by those who initiated and propelled the electoral reform, while many of the actual expectations of the reform were not met. Arranged in the following sections: The Israeli Version of a Mixed Electoral System and Resulting Hybrid Political System; and The Consequences of the Mixed Electoral System for (1) Electoral Competition, (2) Political Representation, and (3) Electoral Efficiency.
The Consequences of Electoral Reform in Japan
Authors: Reed Steven R. , Thies Michael F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In January 1994, the Japanese Diet (Parliament) passed two major political reform laws, the first changing the system used to elect its Lower House (the House of Representatives) and the second aimed at cleaning up campaign finance practices. After this, Japanese parties, candidates, and voters were faced with a completely new set of rules for Lower House elections, and the purpose of this chapter is to assess the effects of this electoral system revision. First describes the old electoral system, in which the members of the Lower House were elected by single, non‐transferable vote (SNTV) from multi‐member districts, and the new one, which is a mixed‐member majoritarian (MMM) system; key changes are pointed out. The following two sections describe the political changes that seem to have followed from the electoral reform, discussing first the interparty dimension (party‐system consequences) and second, the intraparty dimension (party organization and personalistic politics), with specific reference to whether or not the MMM system has solved the problems of the SNTV system (intraparty competition and its personalistic consequences) and thereby increased the efficiency of the electoral system. The last part briefly discusses the inadequacy of equilibrium‐based analyses for the study of dynamic processes.
The Legislative Consequences of MMP Electoral Rules in Venezuela
Authors: Kulisheck Michael R. , Crisp Brian F. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe inaugural mixed‐member proportional (MMP) elections were held in Venezuela in 1993. According to the MMP electoral rules in Venezuela, approximately half of the Chamber of Deputies is elected from single‐seat districts in the nominal tier of the system, and half is elected from closed party lists in the list tier. Analyzes how electoral incentives associated with the two tiers affect campaigns, elections, legislative entrepreneurship, and representation, and considers political behaviour and attitudes to be responses both to the institutional incentives associated with electoral rules and party structures, and to the actions of politically active citizens and interest organizations. The chapter has three sections: the first discusses the effects of MMP on the interparty dimension, examining proportionality and the effective number of parties, and analyzing party strategies for joining pre‐election coalitions in the nominal and list tier elections; the second and third sections look at the intraparty dimension, analyzing distinctions between the incentives and behaviour of members elected in each tier. The second section analyzes legislative entrepreneurship in the Chamber of Deputies before and after the adoption of the MMP system; the third section (Legislators, Parties and Representation) shows that legislators elected in the nominal and list tiers view campaigns and legislative representation differently, but that the adoption of MMP rules has not altered the strong relationships between established interest organizations and representatives in the Congress.