bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Co‐expression of neuregulins 1, 2, 3 and 4 in human breast cancer
Authors: Dunn Mariana , Sinha Prakash , Campbell Rebecca , Blackburn Edith , Levinson Neil , Rampaul Raj , Bates Tom , Humphreys Stephen , Gullick William J 
Published: April 2004

AbstractWe have produced antibodies to the NRG2‐alpha, NRG2‐beta, NRG3 and NRG4 proteins and used these, and previously described antibodies to NRG1‐alpha and NRG1‐beta, to detect expression of each ligand by immunocytochemical staining in a series of 45 breast cancers. Each protein was expressed in a proportion of cases. Statistical analysis suggested that expression of one factor was associated with a high probability that other members of the family were co‐expressed. NRG2‐alpha expression was associated with node positivity (p‐value = 0.005). The mRNAs for NRG1, 2, 3 and 4 were found in established breast cancer cell lines and NRG1, 2 and 3 mRNAs were detected in primary breast cancers. Expression of NRG4 mRNA was shown by in situ hybridization in sections from primary breast cancers. This data demonstrates that each member of the NRG family of ligands is expressed in breast cancer and suggests that they may be involved in regulating cell behaviour. Copyright © 2004 Pathological Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Molecular modeling of protein function regions
Authors: DeWeese‐Scott Carol , Moult John 
Published: April 2004

AbstractExperimental protein structures often provide extensive insight into the mode and specificity of small molecule binding, and this information is useful for understanding protein function and for the design of drugs. We have performed an analysis of the reliability with which ligand‐binding information can be deduced from computer model structures, as opposed to experimentally derived ones. Models produced as part of the CASP experiments are used. The accuracy of contacts between protein model atoms and experimentally determined ligand atom positions is the main criterion. Only comparative models are included (i.e., models based on a sequence relationship between the protein of interest and a known structure). We find that, as expected, contact errors increase with decreasing sequence identity used as a basis for modeling. Analysis of the causes of errors shows that sequence alignment errors between model and experimental template have the most deleterious effect. In general, good, but not perfect, insight into ligand binding can be obtained from models based on a sequence relationship, providing there are no alignment errors in the model. The results support a structural genomics strategy based on experimental sampling of structure space so that all protein domains can be modeled on the basis of 30% or higher sequence identity. Proteins 2004. © 2004 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.
Structural features of the inactive and active states of the melanin‐concentrating hormone receptors: Insights from molecular simulations
Authors: Vitale Rosa Maria , Pedone Carlo , De Benedetti Pier G. , Fanelli Francesca 
Published: April 2004

AbstractComparative molecular dynamics simulations of both subtypes 1 and 2 of the melanin‐concentrating hormone receptor (MCHR1 and MCHR2, respectively) in their free and hormone‐bound forms have been carried out. The hormone has been used in its full‐length and truncated forms, as well as in 16 mutated forms. Moreover, MCHR1 has been simulated in complex with T‐226296, a novel orally active and selective antagonist. The comparative analysis of an extended number of receptor configurations suggests that the differences between inactive (i.e., free and antagonist‐bound) and active (i.e., agonist‐bound) states of MCHRs involve the receptor portions close to the E/DRY and NPxxY motifs, with prominence to the cytosolic extensions of helices 2, 3, 6, and 7. In fact, the active forms of these receptors share the release of selected intramolecular interactions found in the inactive forms, such as that between R3.50 of the E/DRY motif and D2.40, and that between Y7.53 of the NPxxY motif and F7.60. Another feature of the active forms of both MCHRs is the approach of “helix 8” to the cytosolic extension of helix 3. These features of the active forms are concurrent with the opening of a cleft at the cytosolic end of the helix bundle. For both MCHRs, the agonist‐induced chemical information transfer from the extracellular to the cytosolic domains is mediated by a cluster of aromatic amino acids in helix 6, following the ligand interaction with selected amino acids in the extracellular half of the receptor. Proteins 2004. © 2004 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.
PROFAT: A user friendly system for probabilistic fault tree analysis
Authors: Khan Faisal I. , Abbasi S. A. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractA methodology has been developed to conduct probabilistic fault tree analysis during risk assessment in chemical process industries. The methodology is based on a system involving (a) development of fault tree, (b) determination of minimum cutsets or shortest pathways leading from initiating events (malfunctioning) to the top event (the major accident), (c) probability analysis, and (d) working out improvement index values. To this end techniques of Boolean algebra, structure moduling, analytical method of cutsets finding (top‐to‐bottom algorithm), Monte‐Carlo simulation, optimization technique and fuzzy probability set have been used.We named the methodology Analytical ‐Simulation Methodology (ASM) and we developed a software package PROFAT (PRObabilistic fault tree analysis) to facilitate the use of the methodology in a rapid and eflective, yet user‐friendly manner. PROFAT enables the user to find out, in an industry, (i) initiating events which may eventually lead to a major accideizt, (ii) shortest routes (minimum cutsets) a series of initiating events may take place while aiding each other in causing the accideizt. (iii) the probabilities of occurrence of such initintirig events, (iv) relative contributiom of each of the initiating events and, finally, (v) identfiing initiating events with the greatest potential to cause the top event (major accident) so that accident prevention strategies aud emergency preparedness plans can be focused on them.The noteworthy attributes of the system are: resilience towards lack of precision in the basic data, swift processing with moderate requirements of computation cupacity (sophistication of computers needed), ease of use, and direct1y utiliz‐able output. The applicability of PROFAT has been denionstrated with a case study of a sulfolane manufacturing unit.
Safety performance in ammonia plants: Survey VI
Authors: Williams Gerald P. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe worldwide safety performance is shown of 89 ammonia plants operating in 25 countries around the world. A three‐year period from 1994–1996 is covered, and safety incidences including fires and explosions are reviewed. This recent safety performance is compared with the performance history from past surveys. A list of noteworthy safety practices recommended by the plants is also presented.
The world's worst industrial accident of the 1990s what happened and what might have been: A quantitative study
Authors: Khan Faisal I. , Abbasi S. A. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe world's most destructive industrial accident of the current decade, in terms of human lives lost (over 60) and damage to property (over $15 million), occurred at the petroleum refinery of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) at Vishakhapatnam, India, on September 14, 1997. In this paper we have used two computer automated tools recently developed by us, MAXCRED [7], and DOMIFFECT [8], to determine their ability to forecast the details of the incident. When the situation at Vishakhapatnam, prior to the accident, was studied with MAXCRED for potential accidents and their likely consequences, the tool was able to generate a scenario which forecast the incident quite closey. We then used MAXCRED and DOMIFFECT to tell us what else might have occurred.The prognosis is quite scary. The computer tools reveal a few lucky breaks: had the situation and the events conspired a little more treacherously, the HPCL disaster would have been much larger in magnitude. Indeed the incident could have resulted in a death toll of the magnitude of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy with additional massive damage to propert.This paper show‐cases the usefulness of MAXCRED and DOMIFFECT and also brings forth lessons which all industries would benefit from learning.
Oychem Y2K contingency planning
Authors: Scheier Ephraim 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe Year 2OOO problem has been widely publicized. Significant efforts are underway to identify and remedy problems with equipment that may malfunction. Recognizing that despite these efforts there may still be Y2K failures, attention need to be focused on potential process equipment malfunctiom and contingency planning for Ear 2000 related incident.Y2K incidents may arise from problems within the plant or from external sources. Ongoing efforts to prioritize and remedy Y2K systems and equipment have reduced the probability and impact of problems. Contingency planning addresses the residual Y2K risk.This paper describes an OxyChem approach to managing the potential Y2K problems and steps being taken to develop contingency plans. The paper includes examples of Y2K related failures and emphasizes contingency planning, procedures and preparedness.
Inspection, testing and maintenance of fire protection systems at industrial plants
Authors: Dieken Dominique 
Published: April 2004

AbstractEvery year, fire supprersion system fail to operate satisfactorily in fire situations. In about one‐third of these cases, the cause is inadequate inspection, testing and maintenance. An Edison Electrical Institute (EEI) study found that 49 percent of gaseous suppression systems in combustion turbine units failed to operate satisfactorily in a 2O‐year period, with a total property damage of $15.9 million. An example of a fire with a tragic consequence involved lube oil at a cogeneration plant on Christmas Day in 1992, which resulted in the death af three plant operators. Automatic sprinkler protection was provided for most of the plant, including lube oil hazard, but the systems had been turned off. Had the system been operational, the fire may have been controlled.
SACHE case histories and training modules
Authors: Willey Ronald J. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractTraining can be simplified. Vivid slides of case histories of accidents, supplemented with easy‐to‐use lecture notes for the universities and industry, are now available through AIChE's Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS). Since 1991, a committee composed of approximately seven academics, seven industrial representatives, and three government representatives have worked together to produce teaching modules for use in the undergraduate educational experiences at colleges and universities. This committee, called the Undergraduate Education Committee (UEC), was established by CCPS to enhance chemical engineering undergraduate education in the area of chemical rocess safely. To date, the committee has produced 6 problem sets, and 15 case histories/training modules that consist of slides and lecture notes. These products are made available to universities who join a group called SACHE (Safity and Chemical Engineering Education) and can be used by instructors in classroom and seminar formats. The focus for this paper is a summary of case histories available (Tank Failures, Nitroaniline Reactor Rupture, Seveso, Bhopal, and Pasadena). Industry can also benefit by usin these informative modules in training their tecffnical employees.
Electrostatic ignitions in everyday chemical operations: Three case histories
Authors: Pratt Thomas H. , Atherton John G. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractIn operations where there are flammable or combustible materials it is axiomatic that all conductive equipment be firmly bonded and grounded. Even though vigilance to such matters may be exercised in a given operation there may be times where detail are overlooked or deemed to be of no consequence; and, in some cases, these detail can have dire conesquences. This paper sets forth three such case histories where proper grounding was not done and an electrostatic ignition resulted.The first example is the drawin of a sample of toluene into a metal pail ‐ a common, everyday operation which had been done many times before. The second example is pumping toluene into a reactor through a chemical hose where the stiffening wires were not bonded to the couplings, an “everyday” operation. The third examle is the offloading of an aluminum powder from a bulk truck ‐ a one‐time, makeshift operation. These examples are discussed to give operators an appreciation for the vigilance required to keep all conductive objects grounded in chemical operations where flammabel or combustible material are present.
A new approach to explosion suppression
Authors: Theré Frank , Harmanny A. , Van Gelder P. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractOne of the most widely applied protective systems, to reduce the effects of an explosion, is explosion pressure release (venting). There is a disadvantage to venting in that, with an explosion, there is considerable (fire) damage which can result in major repair costs and production losses. In addition there is a growing resistance against the venting of large flame jets and combustion products, because of environmental and safety issues.A good alternative to explosion venting is explosion suppression. If designed, installed and maintained properly, explosion venting is a reliable protective technique. The main obstacle to the widespread acceptance of suppression technology, apart from the initial investments, is the intensive maintenance, which can have considerable impact both on production costs and efficiency.
A “worst case” methodology for risk assessment of major accident installations
Authors: Hirst I. L. , Carter D. A. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThis paper considers the application of one of the weighted risk indicators used by the Major Hazards Assessment Unit (MHAU) of the United Kingdom's Health & Safety Executive (HSE) in formulating advice to local planning authorities on the siting of new major accident hazard installations. In such cases the initial consideration is to be assured that the proposed installation would not be incompatible with existing land uses in the vicinity, as determined by the categorization of the existing populations and the estimated levels of individual risk which the proposed installation would impose upon them.An analysis of the consequences and likelihood of a single “worst case” event, coupled with MHAU's “Risk Integral,” is then undertaken. This enables the societal risk aspects of the proposal to be considered at an early stage and, in many cases, allows a prompt response. The paper describes the methodology and includes several case studies based on MHAU's day to day work which illustrate its use.
The development of acute exposure guideline levels for hazardous substances
Authors: Rusch George M. , Garrett Roger , Tobin Paul , Falke Ernest , Lu Po‐Yung 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThe primary purpose of the National Advisory Committee for Acute Exposure Guideline Levels for Hazardous Substances (NAC/AEGL) is to develop guideline levels for short‐term exposures to airborne concentrations for approximately 400 to 500 high priority, acutely hazardous substances within the next ten years. These Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) are needed for a wide range of planning, response, and prevention applications.The NAC/AEGL Committee seeks to develop the most scientifically credible, acute (short‐term) exposure guideline levels possible within the constraints of data availability, resources and time. This includes a comprehensive effort in data gathering, data evaluation and data summarization; fostering the participation of a large cross‐section of the relevant scientific community; and the adoption of procedures and methods that facilitate consensus‐building for AEGL values within the Committee. The NAC/AEGL Committee is currently comprised of representatives of federal, state and local agencies, private industry and other organizations in the private sector that will derive programmatic or operational benefits from the existence of the AEGL values.AEGL values are determined for three different health effect end‐points. These values are intended for the general public where they are applicable to emergency (accidental) situations. Threshold exposure values are developed for a minimum of 4 exposure periods (30 minutes, 1 hour, 4 hours, 8 hours). In certain instances, AEGL values for a 10‐minute exposure period also will be developed. Each threshold value is distinguished by varying degrees of severity of toxic effects, as initially conceived by the AIHA ERP Committee, subsequently defined in the NAS' National Research Council Report, Guidelines for Developing Community Emergency Exposure Levels for Hazardous Substances, published by the National Academy of Sciences in 1993, and further refined by the NAC/AEGL Committee. To date, the committee has reviewed over 80 chemicals.
Using maximum experimental safe gap to select flame arresters
Authors: Britton Laurence G. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractThis article discusses the use and possible misuse of Maximum Experimental Safe Gap (MESG) in selecting deflagration and detonation flame arresters (DDAs). Gas mixtures having low autoignition temperatures or unusually wide flammable ranges might not behave as predicted on the basis of MESG, especially under restricted‐end deflagration conditions. When applied to DDA selection the Westerberg apparatus might prove to give a more reliable ranking of gas sensitivity than the IEC apparatus. If credit is taken for inert gases using the new MESG combination formula in NFPA 497 an incorrect DDA could be selected. An outline is given for a possible test program to elucidate the effect of gas mixture MESG on DDA performance.
Case history: A steam line rupture at Tennessee Eastman division
Authors: Lodal Peter N. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractAt approximately 1:07 PM on November 3, 1998, a 12'' branch 600 psig steam line on a pipe bridge near the center of the Tennessee Eastman Division (TED) plant ruptured catastrophically. A 36'' long section of the line upstream of a decommissioned venturi flow meter failed, resulting in a major steam leak. The leak led to the loss of 600 psig header pressure throughout the plant, resulting in the shutdown of all steam generation equipment, and the loss of production throughout most of the TED facility for a period of 5‐7 days.Because this incident occurred in a section of steam piping over 30 years old, immediate concerns focused around the vulnerability of the entire network to similar failures. This paper discusses the resulting root cause analysis (RCA), and the surprising results obtained from the analysis of the ruptured pipeline, which uncovered a root cause completely different from that assumed by the team at the start of the investigation.
A model of indoor releases with recirculating ventilation
Authors: Woodward John L. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractModeling indoor dispersion is an important problem for risk analysis used to justify design improvements that increase safety. Of particular interest is a method to estimate what fraction of the volume of a room could have flammable concentrations when the source rate is too weak to fill the entire room. An analytic model is described here that allows a time‐varying source rate such as typically occurs with an evaporating liquid pool. The model allows automatic increases and decreases in the ventilation rate and/or fresh air makeup ratio such as could be activated by a gas sensor system. This provides a design tool for such gas sensor systems. An approximate approach is developed to estimate the effects of imperfect mixing, such as can occur with density stratification or dead zones. Two options are described, a dead zone model and a “bypass” model.
The pros and cons of shelter‐in‐place
Authors: Mannan M. S. , Kilpatrick D. L. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractRecently shelter‐in‐place has received a lot of attention regarding its effectiveness as an emergency response measure. While proponents feel that it is an effective measure, opponents are equally confident that shelter‐in‐place itself could represent a threat and be the cause of injuries, fatalities, and general loss of comfort. This paper provides an overview of the current knowledge on shelter‐in‐place, procedures for effective shelter‐in‐place, and factors that should be taken into account in recommending shelter‐in‐place. The authors argue that shelter‐in‐place should not be the only alternative considered by emergency response planners. However, at the minimum, shelter‐in‐place should be considered as a high‐level element in the hierarchy of emergency response options available to emergency response planners, emergency responders, and incident commanders.Within this paper are summaries cataloging the effectiveness of shelter‐in‐place. It demonstrates the circumstances in which shelter‐in‐place can be a viable response measure. Also included are the initial steps towards development of a decision tree that can be used to evaluate the many options that safety managers are faced with. While all of these protective methods are viable, one method may be preferred over another in certain circumstances.
Zero period process—a description of a process to zero injuries
Authors: Squire Richard H. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractAt the Dupont plant, located in Belle, West Virginia, we have marked three years without an OSHA recordable injury. While earlier speculation suggested that a process might exist to accomplish this sustainable level of performance, the road to actually developing the needed processes was not at all straightforward. We have summarized this work in the paper.
Ammonia plant NII: Explosion of hydrogen in a pipeline for CO2
Authors: Pande John Oscar , Tonheim Jan 
Published: April 2004

AbstractOn Sunday, April 13, 1997, the transfer pipe for CO2 gas from Ammonia Plant NII exploded. There were no injuries, but 850 meters of the line was totally destroyed and a large number of glass windows were broken.The line was temporarily out of service, and the investigation team concluded that:

the trip system had been disabled prior to the explosion,
hydrogen enriched gas had entered the pipe line,
nitrogen purge had not been effective,
air had leaked into the line and formed an explosive mixture, and
the mixture had ignited.
Using quantitative methods to evaluate process risks and verify the effectiveness of PHA recommendations
Authors: Wallace Stephen J. 
Published: April 2004

AbstractFederal regulations and internal factors mandate that managers of chemical processes ensure that the process is operating in a safe manner. Traditionally, some form of a qualitative Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) has been used to evaluate the condition of the process, comply with federal regulations (specifically OSHA 1910.119 and EPA 40 CFR 68), and develop recommendations to ensure safe operation in the future. However, by extending what is required, actual process risks can be quantified, recommendations can be better prioritized, and money spent on safety can be allocated appropriately.One approach that has successfully been used to satisfy all these objectives is outlined in this paper. It requires a combination of qualitative analysis extended by quantitative analysis. Information is initially gathered by a team familiar with the process and safety analysis techniques, actual risks are determined, recommendations are developed as necessary, and the expected success of implementing a particular recommendation is evaluated.