bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Truth and Meaning
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Develops the criterion of learnability proposed in Essay 1 into a constraint for a satisfactory theory of meaning: such a theory must show how, on the basis of a finite stock of semantic primitives, speakers come to understand a potentially infinite number of sentences; more precisely, how the meaning of each and every sentence in the language is owed to the sentence's structural composition. Davidson notes that introducing distinct entities as meanings for each expression (‘intensions’, ‘senses’) does not illuminate these structural workings of the language (this complaint, he says, operates quite independently of ontological reservations about intensions being ‘abstract’ or lacking clear individuation conditions). If, on the other hand, we dispense with intensions, we must define ‘meaning’ by mere appeal to reference; but this clearly won’t work since, if we concede that sentences ‘refer’ to their truth‐values, all sentences alike in truth value would be alike in meaning. Davidson therefore individuates a sentence's meaning by its ‘logical place’ in the language to which it belongs, i.e. by its entailment relations to other sentences in the language; the meaning of a subsentential expression is likewise individuated holistically, namely in terms of the systematic effect the expression has on the entailment relations of the sentence in which it occurs. Since a Tarskian truth theory captures these entailment relations for each sentence (in a specified language) by associating it with its ‘truth‐condition’, the truth theory can be said to give the ‘meaning’ thus construed for each sentence (a fortiori for their subsentential expressions), while meeting both the constraint for finiteness and the restriction to purely referential means. Davidson discusses various objections to this proposal (since called ‘Davidson's programme’), e.g. that it cannot accomodate sentences containing indexicals or contexts in which extensionality breaks down; and he shows its merit in its varied applicability to questions of logical form, the success of which is evaluated by whether the aforementioned entailments are preserved and explained for a variety of sentences (see Essays 6–8, and Essays 6–10 of the companion volume Essays on Actions and Events).
True to the Facts
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Davidson explores whether the semantic concept of truth utilized in Essay 2 (i.e. a theory of truth recursively defined on satisfaction) can be developed into a ‘correspondence’ theory of truth, i.e. into a theory that explains the property of being true ‘by a relation between a statement and something else.’ He shows how reducing truth to either its disquotational function (the redundancy theory of truth associated with Ramsey) or to a notion of correspondence insensitive to more advanced semantic considerations both fail. In the former case, idioms such as ‘everything he said was true’ cannot be analysed without universally quantifying over propositions and defining truth for them recursively on satisfaction; in the latter case, the position of q in the sentential predicate ‘corresponds to the fact that q’ allows coextensive redescriptions to the effect of collapsing all q into one fact (the ‘One Great Fact’, as Davidson calls it). Davidson adds that traditional correspondence theories of the latter sort invariably suffer from assigning distinct entities, such as facts, to sentences as a whole (entities with which to compare sentences); whereas on his preferred theory, such assignments take place at the subsentential level via the apparatus of satisfaction and denotation ( Essay 15).
Semantics for Natural Languages
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Davidson rehearses the demands for an acceptable theory of meaning for a natural language—that it give the meaning for each (actual and potential) utterance in the language, that it do so by finite means and shed light on the structural workings of the language (see Essay 2)—and argues that a theory of truth for that language provides ‘a precise, profound and testable answer’ to these demands. In addition, he demands that the stock of concepts used by metalanguage in which the truth theory is stated (its ‘ideology’) extends minimally beyond, and ideally includes, that of the object language (cf Essay 14); he looks at how alternative semantic programs fare under this constraint (cf Essay 5). He then addresses the more general question of how truth‐theoretic semantics copes with recalcitrant, i.e. non‐extensional, locutions current in natural languages, and addresses Tarski's pessimism of formal frameworks to ‘tame’ them. He concludes by stressing, as he did in Essay 2, that recognizing the role played by logical form (as analysed in truth theories) for the analysis of sentential meaning is all‐important; and questions whether this form or ‘deep structure’ of the sentence can be identified, as Chomsky suggested, with an underlying psychological mechanism in the speaker.
Quotation
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDavidson applies the truth‐theoretic apparatus of Essay 2 to give a systematic analysis of quotation. He demands that our analysis uses and not merely mentions quoted words, and that we individuate quotations by finite means. Writers who model quotations on names of expressions (Tarski, Quine) and hence treat them as semantically unstructured fail on both scores, says Davidson (see also Essay 1). More generally, the reference of quoted expressions and truth conditions of quotational attributions (‘He said “. . .” ’) are explored.
Radical Interpretation
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDavidson asks what knowledge suffices for redescribing an uninterpreted utterance as an interpreted one, a process he terms ‘radical interpretation’. He explores how best to construe the evidential base on which this process operates, wavering between too thick or too thin a base, i.e. intensions and purely physical characterizations, respectively, the latter leaving it mysterious how the evidence is ‘related to what it is surely evidence for’. The inverse difficulty, of too thick a base, is not to pre‐suppose what we set out to verify; i.e. we must not individuate the evidential base by reference to facts we have no access to prior to radical interpretation. Davidson argues that most speakers’ propositional attitudes or intentions fall into this category, and this precludes an intention‐based approach to semantics (made famous by Grice and Strawson). After discarding Quine's approach of ‘radical translation’ as inapt for the task at hand because of its neglect of the semantic structure of interpreted utterances, Davidson proceeds to outline his own truth‐theoretic approach on which the interpretation of speech and attribution of propositional attitudes must proceed simultaneously (see Essay 10); he answers three queries about truth theories on which his approach is based: (1) whether such theories can be given for a natural language as a whole (cf Essay 4), (2) whether the evidence on which their verification proceeds, and the technical machinery of satisfaction and related notions they introduce, meet the above constraints, and (3) whether they can really serve the task of radical interpretation.
Thought and Talk
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractStarting from the evident dependence of speech on thought, Davidson wonders whether the inverse dependence holds too,i.e. whether we can explain thought and its attribution independently of that of speech. Treating belief as central to all kinds of thought, Davidson develops the thesis that to have one belief is to have several, all of which are interlocked to form a ‘web of belief’ which also determines the content of each individual belief. Further, the attribution of such beliefs to others interlocks with a theory of action, since interpreting others as having beliefs relies on rationalizing their actions (Davidson refers us here to his Essays 10 and 12 of Essays on Actions and Events); both actions and beliefs are answerable to the interpretative principles outlined in Essays 9 and 10, among them the constitutive ideal of rationality. By adding that only a creature who has the concept of belief (i.e. the distinction between being right and being wrong) can have beliefs at all, Davidson concludes that being interpretable as having thoughts, and being able to interpret the speech of others, is constitutive of having thoughts.
The Method of Truth in Metaphysics
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn this essay, Davidson sets out to demonstrate that successful communication or mutual interpretability indicates the presence of a shared, and largely true, view of the world. Beliefs must be shared for the attribution of error or disagreement can only occur against a widely shared background: error and disagreement can only be local and never massive or total (Essay 13). Truth is no longer relative to conceptual schemes but only to languages that can be shown to be largely correct about the world. Consequently, by studying one's language one can derive ontological conclusions: a truth theory (such as that developed in Essay 2) will reveal the overall ontology required by a particular language, and while quotations and intensions can be dispensed with as distinct entities (on a proper analysis of them, given in Essays 1, 6, and 7), an ontology of events cannot, provided the language contains causal statements (Essays 6 and 8 of Essays on Actions and Events). By eliminating the concepts of satisfaction and denotation from our truth theories (cf Essay 15), Davidson can eliminate their concomitant ontology (cf Essay 3) as well as avoid extending the ideology of the interpreter's language too much beyond that of the language to be interpreted (Essay 4).
What Metaphors Mean
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDavidson argues that there are no strict rules determining which expressions in a language must count as metaphorical; and that metaphorical meaning is to be expressed in terms of, even though it cannot be fully paraphrased by, literal meaning. He argues against theories (such as Max Black's and Paul Henle's) that posit distinct ‘metaphorical meanings’, claiming that such posits are explanatorily inert. Instead, the meaning of metaphors has to proceed via a literal understanding of what is said and then progress to a special use of the words thus understood. Metaphors have to be defined, claims Davidson, by their characteristic ‘effect’ on the hearer (by what they make him ‘notice’) rather than as distinct cognitive contents; this also accounts, he says, for our frequent difficulty in paraphrasing metaphorical meaning into literal talk.
Communication and Convention
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Davidson discusses the use the concept of convention has for illuminating linguistic behaviour and related semantic concepts. In particular, he discusses theories on which conventions connect (1) sentence types with particular (‘illocutionary’) uses of them (Dummett), (2) individual sentences with single uses (Chomsky), or (3) individual words to extensions or intensions (Lewis). In response to (1), Davidson denies that conventions govern the practice of assertion and the linkage of assertion to what is believed to be true. He claims that (2) offers at best a partial analysis of the connection of speakers’ intentions to their utterances; and that the conditions Lewis proposes for convention in (3) are partly unnecessary and jointly insufficient for the mutual interpretability between speakers. He concludes that convention is not a condition for language but vice versa.
Introduction: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy
Authors: Belmont Katharine , Mainwaring Scott , Reynolds Andrew 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAddresses three key questions. First, how far have political institutions acted as levers of conflict management in divided societies during the twentieth century. Second, how far can the constitutions of divided or plural societies be engineered to promote inter‐communal harmony and strengthened democracy. Third, the manner in which political institutions affect the trajectory of democratization in divided societies.
Institutions and Coalition Building in Post‐Communist Transitions
Authors: Shvetsova Olga 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn the ten years of post‐communist transition, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe have passed through several election cycles, providing new evidence of the influence of formal political institutions on transition dynamics. This chapter examines the transitional development of their party systems as a function of institutional choices. Focusing on party systems, it identifies the process of coalition formation as the transmission mechanism by which institutions influence political consolidation at this stage. It addresses the transitional influence of combinations of majoritarian and power‐sharing institutions, suggesting that their interactive effect may undermine or weaken the incentives for party‐building that each of them can separately provide. The article provides supporting evidence from Poland and Romania.
Presidentialism and Democratic Performance
Authors: Cheibub José Antonio 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues that the historical pattern of democratization in Latin America requires a reconsideration of the prevailing thesis that presidentialism has caused regime instability in Latin America, and of the mechanisms allegedly responsible for presidentialism's poor performance. The purpose of the chapter is to do so by means of an empirical examination of the factors that, according to the thesis, should account for variations in the political and economic performance of presidential regimes.
Federalism and State‐Building: Post‐Communist and Post‐Colonial Perspectives
Authors: Solnick Steven L. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines the process of bargaining over the creation of new rules and institutions after radical regime transitions. The analysis addresses the limited but important class of cases where a weakened central authority—whether constituted by the provinces or established as a legacy of imperial administration—must win the support or acquiescence of a minimal coalition of territorial actors in order to remain in power. It focuses on the relationship between cohesiveness achieved and impartiality of administration, with particular regard to the mode of the bargaining between central and provincial elites during the state‐building process. It then tests this theoretical account against the experiences of post‐communist Russia and Ukraine, of the consolidating Indian states in and around 1947, and of other post‐colonial cases.
Constitutional Engineering in Post‐Coup Fiji
Authors: Lal Brij V. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAnalyses the historical background to the constitutional crisis that flared up in Fiji in 1987, when a military coup, led by native Fijians, overthrew a government democratically elected by a majority immigrant population. It then discusses the issues that led to the Fiji Constitution of 1990, and that continue to engage the attention of the Fiji Constitution Review Commission, regarding protection of the legitimate rights and interests of all ethnic groups in the island. It focuses on two major sets of issues: first, the elections to and composition of the parliament; second, the functioning of the institutions of government and questions of governance and accountability regarding social justice and human rights.
The Belfast Agreement and the British‐Irish Agreement: Consociation, Confederal Institutions, a Federacy, and a Peace Process
Authors: O'Leary Brendan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractReviews the political processes that led to the multi‐party and intergovernmental agreement reached in Belfast on 10 April 1998 (the ‘Good Friday Agreement’), and to the subsequent British–Irish Agreement of 1999. It then examines the details of the understandings arrived at. The story raises some interesting political science questions for formal theorists and comparative analysts regarding the nature of coalition government, the bargaining processes for allocating ministerial portfolios, and variations in consociational executive practice around the world.
Ethnic Diversities, Constitutional Designs, and Public Policies in India
Authors: Stuligross David , Ashutosh Varshney 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines how India's constitutional provisions and public policies have dealt with the nation's four main sources of ethnic diversity—religion, language, caste, and tribe. It addresses three questions. First, how did India's constitution makers and founding fathers propose to deal with the problems of each category, as they went about building the nation? Second, what has been the impact of the constitutional provisions, institutional frameworks, and public policies that they devised? Third, could constitutional and public policy engineering have achieved the objectives set, or have some other factors intervened to produce the actual outcomes? It concludes that while India's constitutional design has been a great success in respect of linguistic diversity, the record has been mixed in respect of the other categories.
The God of the Self‐Movers
Authors: Kretzmann Norman 
Published: October 2003

AbstractUnlike anti‐evidentialism, rational theism requires one to provide philosophically good evidence, on the basis of which one can rationally believe that God exists. Aquinas leads us to expect a posteriori demonstration of God's existence in which he argues that sense‐perceptible things, events, or states of affairs cannot be satisfactorily explained otherwise than on the basis of the existence of a being that is plausibly identifiable as God. Aquinas's five arguments for the existence of God are examined, two of them in detail, (ascribed to Aristotle's Physics and Metaphysics) in which Aristotle undertakes to prove God's existence on the basis of motion. The analysis develops the hypothesis that motion is to be explained in terms of self‐movers, and that all motion is ultimately to be explained in terms of a cosmic first self‐mover and a separated, altogether immovable first mover.
From Independence to Perfection
Authors: Kretzmann Norman 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Identifying an acknowledged first cause as God requires further argumentation to show that this extraordinary entity must have characteristics that pick out the supreme being of the monotheistic tradition and to show that it must be the transcendent, personal, omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good creator, and governor of the universe. By means of the exclusive application of the eliminative method to an immutable first cause, Aquinas's account leads to eliminating the distinction between its nature and being, to its essential nature being identical with its own unique, necessary, and ultimately explanatory being. Through Aquinas's perfection argument, the ultimately explanatory being is also shown to be universally perfect.
Creation's Modalities
Authors: Kretzmann Norman 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFocuses on the investigation of the question—why would an absolutely perfect being create anything at all? Aquinas's account of a non‐necessitated choice in the act of creating involves a return to the topic of God's power and omnipotence, opposing the single‐effect account of creation, and considering the modalities of intellection and volition. Aquinas denies any necessitation of creation stemming out of an obligation of justice or from God's perfect goodness. He then undertakes to show how not merely conditional but even absolute necessity characterizes certain aspects of the created world, despite his conviction that its original production is entirely free. Aquinas concludes his full survey of creation's modalities by showing how each kind of cause—material, formal, efficient, and final—gives rise to absolute necessity in nature.
Could the Created World Have Existed for Ever?
Authors: Kretzmann Norman 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe grounds available in the debate over the propositions whether the world has existed for ever (Aristotle), or the world began to exist, became divided for the medievals into those holding the audacious assessment: the view that it can be, and indeed has been, demonstratively proved that the world could not have existed for ever and those holding the judicious assessment (including Aquinas): who deny that such purported demonstrations really do disprove that the world could not have existed for ever. Aquinas does not see a beginningless existence of created things as impossible. Arguments and objections are given to beginninglessness based on considerations of God, on considerations of created things, and on considerations of the making of things, about which Aquinas denies that creating is to be construed as a kind of making at all. He ends by positing an argument in support of the created world's having begun to exist, which he thinks has more probability than all those he rejected.
The Origin of Species
Authors: Kretzmann Norman 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAquinas now moves from arguments about creation to distinguishing things, which is, broadly speaking, to be described as his understanding of the origin of species. Like Augustine, Aquinas adopts a non‐literal reading of Genesis 1, a view, which would have equipped him to appreciate scientific accounts of evolution. He differentiates determinate distinguishing from general distinguishing, providing the fundamental metaphysical framework to explain the development of the world's species. Aquinas's theory of the distinguishing of things is preceded by, and based on, his theory of the origin of the stuff that gets distinguished: not by chance nor by the diversity of matter alone but by God's producing something out of nothing, a mind behind the scenes. An examination follows of God's choice of this world rather than another.
Intellects
Authors: Kretzmann Norman 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAquinas devotes the entire third (last part) of Book II to considering only one kind of created things: intellects, or more precisely, only such kinds of created things as are essentially intellective in themselves. In only one of his arguments for why created things include intellective substances, does he make the point that created intellect is a necessary condition of God's manifesting his goodness. Aquinas's conception of freedom is based on the intimate relationship between will and intellect: the presence of intellect may be recognized as a sufficient condition for the presence of will. Created intellective substances cannot be material at all, but unlike God, there is a difference between their existence and essence, which leads Aquinas to a detailed analysis of the interrelations of matter, form, substance, being, potentiality, and actuality.