bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Schopenhauer's Influence on Wittgenstein
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Schopenhauer was the first and greatest philosophical influence on Wittgenstein, a fact attested to by those closest to him. He began by accepting Schopenhauer's division of total reality into phenomenal and noumenal, and offered a new analysis of the phenomenal in his first book, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus. The Logical Positivists, who believed that only the phenomenal existed, took this as the paradigm for their philosophy. Wittgenstein, however, moved away from it and proposed a new and different analysis in his book Philosophical Investigations, and this became the most influential text in linguistic philosophy. Thus, Wittgenstein produced two different philosophies, each of which influenced a whole generation that remained largely oblivious of its Schopenhauerian origins.
Schopenhauer's Influence on Creative Writers
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Schopenhauer has influenced the work of more, and more distinguished, creative writers than any philosopher since his day, more even than Marx. This is especially true among novelists: Tolstoy, Turgenev, Zola, Maupassant, Proust, Hardy, Conrad, and Thomas Mann must be included. He also influenced short‐story writers such as Maugham and Borges, poets such as Rilke and Eliot, and dramatists such as Pirandello and Beckett. They were attracted, variously, by his psychological insight, his understanding of unconscious motivation, his disenchanted view of human beings, and his non‐religious view of the cosmos, as well as by his teachings about the arts and the fact that he was himself a great prose writer.
Schopenhauer's Reputation in Its Changing Historical Context
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
For some 35 years after the publication of his masterpiece, The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer was virtually ignored. Then the mood of pessimism brought about across Europe by the failure of the revolutions of 1848 created a climate of opinion favourable to him. After the 1850s, he enjoyed a reputation as one of the ‘great’ philosophers. But in the twentieth century, his work fell into neglect once again. Now a revival of interest is taking place.
Misunderstanding Schopenhauer
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The commonest misunderstanding of Schopenhauer is that he taught, contradicting Kant, that we can have direct knowledge of the noumenon. Then there is the mistake that this noumenon is the will understood in a conative sense, the will as we experience it in agency, or the will to live, or the will to power. A careful reading of Schopenhauer's work is able to show that these are misinterpretations. He does not believe we can know the noumenon; and by ‘will’ he means a blind force that is as present in inorganic nature as elsewhere. It was an error on Schopenhauer's part to use the term ‘will’ in a way that invites these misunderstandings; but the damage has been done.
‘A Learned and Eloquent Piety’
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Extracts from Descartes's correspondence with Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia explaining his ideas on the passions lead to a psychological analysis of Descartes and a discussion of melancholia. Childhood is described, with reference to the social milieu to which he belonged. Sets the religious scene by reviewing the state of Christian religion in early seventeenth‐century France. Erasmus’ educational reforms are discussed, and the rise of the municipal collèges organized by the gentry.
An Education in Propriety 1606–1618
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Charts the history of the Jesuits in France, their organization, teaching methods and aims, with particular reference to La Flèche and the relationship between Christianity and Classical philosophy in the philosophical curriculum followed there by Descartes. This was the Jesuit version of the liberal arts, based mainly on works by Aristotle, including dialectic, natural philosophy, mathematics, metaphysics, and ethics. Speculation as to Descartes's activities in the period 1614–1618, in between finishing his studies at La Flèche, his law studies, and joining Prince Maurice of Nassau's army.
The Apprenticeship with Beeckman 1618–1619
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Details Descartes's relationship with Beeckman, and their collaboration on three projects in mathematics, dealing with music, falling bodies, and hydrostatics. Presents Beeckman's version of corpuscularianism, its differences from traditional atomism, and its relevance to their collaboration. Letters to Beeckman give details of Descartes's mathematical discoveries on the subject of longitude, compasses, and his attempt to revive a traditional mathematical art, mathesis universalis.
A New System of the World 1630–1633
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses the structure and content of Le Monde, which deals with corpuscularianism, a theory of matter based on fluid mechanics containing the contentious theories of conservation of motion and the non‐existence of vacua. The work also presents a definition of the nature of colour, uses a hypothetical ‘new world’ (which when compared with the real world will be found to be indistinguishable from it) to define his cosmology, and sets out a theory of light that explains the behaviour of light rays with particular reference to rainbows. By analogy with Le Monde, L’Homme presents the mechanistic physiology of imaginary beings. Discusses psycho‐physiological functions, by means of reference to the actions of automata, and the implications these have for the difference between human and animal cognition, and whether animals have souls.
The Years of Consolidation 1634–1640
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses various works of Descartes's and their reception, including objections to them and his response to those objections. Météors deals with meteorology, which includes a corpuscular model of light, an account of refraction, and vision, and its links with optical instruments; the Dioptrique is a practical treatise on the construction of these optical instruments; and Géométrie compares arithmetic with geometry and extends Descartes's treatment of the Pappus problem and the classification of curves. The organization of material in the Discours appears arbitrary unless interpreted autobiographically. The Meditationes contains a fuller treatment of scepticism, in comparison with Pyrrhonism, and hyperbolic doubt, a defence of mechanism (which Descartes also saw as a defence of Copernicanism), discussions of the cogito and the transcendence of God, the classification of ideas, a new version of the doctrine of clarity and distinctness, and the nature of the thinking self, the identification of the self with the mind and mind/body dualism.
Rights
Authors: Miller Fred D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAlthough past commentators saw Aristotle as recognizing the rights of individuals, recent interpreters have objected that no single Greek word corresponds to the modern word ‘rights’. In reply, it is shown with evidence from Aristotle and other writers that the ancient Greek discourse of law and politics included distinct locutions corresponding to the different senses of ‘rights’ distinguished by the jurist W. N. Hohfeld: to dikaion corresponds to Hohfeld's claim right, exousia to a liberty or privilege, kurios to authority or power, and adeia and ateleia to immunity (compare also akuron). A right for Aristotle is essentially a just claim that a person has against other members of the same community, and a natural right is a just claim based in nature. Recent arguments that rights have theoretical implications inimical to Aristotle's principles are also found to be unpersuasive, because they rely on tendentious assumptions that would rule out many modern theories of rights as well. The chapter also indicates how a respect for the rights of others might be justified on the basis of Aristotelian practical wisdom.
The Best Constitution
Authors: Miller Fred D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAristotle states that ‘there is only one constitution which is everywhere according to nature the best.’ This constitution (Aristotle's version of utopia) is unqualifiedly just and ‘according to nature’ because it promotes the common advantage (or public interest). The interpretation of ‘common advantage’ is problematic: does it consist in the advantage of the citizens considered as distinct individuals (individualism) or the advantage of the polis (city‐state) considered as a whole (holism or collectivism)? Only on the former, individualistic interpretation would the best constitution be deeply committed to individual rights, and it is argued that a moderate version of individualism is the correct interpretation of Aristotle's best constitution. The chapter goes on to consider difficulties in Aristotle's account of the best constitution, including his views on education and the question of which is better: virtuous kingship or the rule of law.
The Second‐Best Constitution
Authors: Miller Fred D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractRecognizing that the best or ideal constitution is generally unattainable, Aristotle employs a principle of proximity: although the highest end is best, if it is unattainable, legislation should aim at the result that is closest to the end and thus the best attainable outcome. In politics, this is called the ‘second sailing’, and Aristotle discusses such a constitution under the headings of polity, mixed constitution, and middle constitution. Although this constitution is correct and just, the standard is lowered in the face of necessity. Still, the second‐best constitution serves as a norm for evaluating the various deviant constitutions that are forms of democracy and oligarchy. The second‐best constitution emulates the ideal constitution and it satisfies the maxim of unanimity, which in its strongest form requires that if a constitution is to be preserved, all the citizens should wish that it exist and continue unchanged.
Property Rights
Authors: Miller Fred D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSupports Ernest Barker's interpretation that Aristotle offers a ‘vindication of the right of private property.’ Although Aristotle emphasizes the common interests of the citizens, he also provides a place for private property in all of his constitutions, including the best constitution. The chapter argues that Aristotle gives a basic account of property ownership that is similar to modern concepts of property rights. He offers justifications of private property, states conditions under which property may be justly acquired, defends private property against Plato's communism, and argues that property is indispensable for the exercise of citizenship.
Aristotle's Politics Reconsidered
Authors: Miller Fred D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAssesses the presuppositions underlying Aristotle's political theory. The principle of teleology holds that human beings strive to fulfil certain natural ends such as rationality and social cooperation; the principle of perfectionism holds that the good for human beings consists in the attainment of these ends; the principle of community holds that individuals can attain the good only if they are subject to the authority of the community, including the state (political community); and the principle of rulership holds that the community (including the state) can function successfully only if order is imposed on it by rational agents. This chapter considers the extent to which these principles may be defended against powerful objections that have been raised by modern philosophers and scientists. Finally, it is pointed out that the modern theory of rights, which assumes a version of extreme individualism, faces serious difficulties, so that Aristotle's theory of rights, based on a moderately individualistic theory of justice, is an alternative still worthy of serious consideration.
Facts About Behaviour
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A case is made for focusing less on acts than on facts about behaviour. This fits with the use of fact‐causation, which is conceptually superior to event causation; it fits with the ‘by’‐locution, on the only viable analysis of that given so far (the one in this chapter), and it avoids needless difficulties that arise when one tries to make the act concept do work for which it is not fitted.
Moral Judgement
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book is mainly concerned with first‐order morality (right and wrong) as distinct from second‐order morality (blameworthiness etc.). It is argued here that the agent's state of mind has nothing to do with the rightness/wrongness of his conduct, though the latter is affected by what the agent could know at the time of acting. At a deeper level, it depends on what consequences the behaviour in question makes probable. When some horrible consequence ensues through bad luck, we may have emotions that feel like blame, but they are really something different.
Moral Significance
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe making/allowing distinction tends to be accompanied by three other considerations that do have moral significance: ease of avoidance, motive, and knowability of consequences. Much discussion of making/allowing is based on intuitions about contrasted pairs of cases—a procedure that has dangers against which this chapter warns. Any thesis to the effect that making/allowing sometimes makes a moral difference is a sign of uncompleted work; the result is not interesting until we know the differentia.
Positive/Negative
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter analyses making/allowing in terms of positive/negative: you allow something to happen if an explanation of its happening requires only a negative fact about your behaviour. A negative fact about your behaviour is a highly general or uninformative one; it corresponds to almost the whole of the logical space of your possible ways of moving. An objection to this analysis, based on giving a very special status to immobility, is described and countered. The possibility space might have a different metric, i.e. be structured in terms of something other than possible ways of moving. One such alternative metric is discussed.
Active/Passive
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAlan Donagan offered an account of making/allowing in terms of so conducting yourself that what ensues is not (making) or is (allowing) what would have happened in the course of nature. On a reasonable understanding of ‘the course of nature’, this analysis nearly coincides in its output with the analysis in terms of positive/negative, including relating in the same way to the ‘immobility’ objection to the latter (Ch. 6). Differences are discussed, and found to be too recherché to yield decisive intuitions.
Other Attempts
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter discusses attempts by Dinello, Kamm, Kagan, Bentham, Warren Quinn, and others to explain the making/allowing distinction. In each case, it is shown that if the proposed account can be tightened up into something significant and defensible, that always turns it into something equivalent to the analysis of Bennett (Ch. 6) or, more often, that of Donagan (Ch. 7). It is argued that on either of the latter analyses, making/allowing certainly has no basic moral significance, though it may often be accompanied by factors that do have such significance.
Atrocities
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A ‘crisis’ is defined as a situation in which if a person does not do something atrocious there will ensue a state of affairs that is even worse. This chapter discusses Anscombe's absolutism about atrocities, and the near‐absolutism of Fried and Williams, and, more sympathetically, Hampshire's view that absolutism ought to be adopted as a policy though not defended as a theory. Issues about atrocity and moral character, about the relevance of an atrocity's involving other agents as well, and about Williams's concept of ‘projects’, are discussed. An account is given of the real conceptual structure that is at work in moralities known as ‘deontological’.
Intentions
Authors: Bennett Jonathan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter analyses and criticizes the view, contained in the ‘doctrine of double effect’, that it is worse to act intending to produce a bad result than to act merely foreseeing that your action will produce a bad result. The analysis makes use of the decision in Ch. 2 to proceed in terms of facts about behaviour rather than acts, and gains strength from that chapter's analysis of the ‘by’‐locution.
The Anatomy of Neoplatonism
Authors: Lloyd A. C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractNeoplatonism is traditionally considered a mystical philosophy; on the contrary the aim of this book is to show the importance of a logical and epistemological approach for the understanding of Neoplatonic basic ontological problems. In doing that, Lloyd considers a very wide range of philosophers from Plotinus up to Byzantine Neoplatonists. After a preliminary discussion of how the Neoplatonic semantics and logical concepts are a result of their understanding of previous philosophers (in particular Aristotle), Lloyd introduces the key point of the book, i.e. his theory of the P‐series. A P‐series is a group of terms ordered according to priority a posteriority in which the first term is universal and common to all the others. This logical theory is applied to explain how the reality is structured (procession and emanation from the One) and how knowledge is constituted. The book ends with an analysis of how mystical apprehension differs from the union with the One.
Attitudes to Logic
Authors: Lloyd A. C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines the role played by the Aristotelian logic in Neoplatonic philosophers. To start with, it is remarked that Aristotelian Organon was regarded not only as a corpus of logical texts but also as an introduction to philosophy. Focuses on several Neoplatonic Aristotelian commentators, from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Byzantine thinkers, presenting both the characteristics of their works and their lack of interest in discussing their own philosophical view. Finally, it is observed that, although not original, these commentaries provide a rather reliable and correct investigation of Aristotle.
Procession and Decline
Authors: Lloyd A. C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDevoted to the key Neoplatonic concepts of procession and emanation. The two terms are taken to express the same idea, although procession is preferred as more neutral. Points out how procession can be explained in Aristotelian terms. More specifically, it is demonstrated how Plotinus’ notion of procession uses the Aristotelian theory of the actualization of an activity by a potency in order to explain how a higher activity can actualize a lower one. Finally, considers the doctrine of Proclus who expresses the procession, involving the theory of causal relation, in a way opposite to Plotinus.
Descartes
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Taking our cue from Descartes, we can see that his break with scholasticism can be aptly characterized by saying that in his philosophy the mind has become godlike. We shall use this hint that Descartes provides us to define some of the main features of his opposition to scholasticism in the philosophy of mind. But, first, we must explore the more familiar features of the Cartesian revolution to which Kenny draws our attention. For, to say that ideas, for Descartes, are not divine archetypes but mental or psychological entities leaves a number of questions unanswered. We shall see that in his mature writings Descartes advances theories of ideas as events, as objects, and (less explicitly) as dispositions.
Descartes
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It is well known that Descartes revived the ancient doctrine of innate ideas. However, it is doubtful whether Descartes advanced a single doctrine that employs the same concept of innateness throughout. We shall see that Descartes appeals to innate ideas in response to a number of different philosophical questions; he invokes them not just in his account of a priori knowledge but also in connection with his anti‐Scholastic theory of perception and his strange doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths. We shall see further that Descartes's position on innate ideas was accepted as it stands by none of his rationalist successors, and that at the centre of subsequent debate was the nature of ideas themselves.
Leibniz
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe dispositional theory may be Leibniz's most prominent account of innateness, but it is not the only one, even in the New Essays; as is well known, Leibniz attempts to construct a theory of innateness on the basis of Locke's admission of ideas of reflection. Traditionally, Leibniz's claim that ideas of reflection are really innate ideas has been seen as something of an embarrassment because, for one thing, it is doubtful whether what we may call the reflection account can really perform the role that Leibniz seems to require of a theory of innateness. Moreover, there are obvious difficulties concerning the relationship of the two accounts that Leibniz seems not to have noticed, so it would be foolish to pretend that all these problems can be solved, and no attempt will be made to minimize them in the present chapter. But we can throw light on the reflection account of innateness if we place it in the wider context of Leibniz's concern with the issue of self‐knowledge; as we have seen, this issue became central in philosophy after Descartes. In the first half of this chapter, we will explore Leibniz's response to the pessimistic claims about self‐knowledge advanced by both Locke and Malebranche; in the second half, we will seek to tie in Leibniz's reflection account of innateness with the whole issue of self‐knowledge.
Pseudo‐Constraints on an Adequate Account of Meaning
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA good theory must explain (1) the possibility of knowing what words mean; (2) the nature of the relation, ‘x means y’; (3) the fact that language can be used to represent reality; (4) the epistemological import of understanding; (5) compositionality—i.e. the dependence of the meanings of sentences on the meanings of their component words; (6) the normative character of meaning; and (7) the explanatory and evidential relations between the meaning of a word and its deployment. It is argued that these constraints have often been imposed in unreasonably inflated forms but that they can be satisfied, when properly understood, by a neo‐Wittgensteinian use theory of meaning.
Meaning as Use
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIt is proposed here that the meaning of each word, w, is constituted by its ‘basic acceptance property’—a property roughly of the form, ‘Our acceptance of such‐and‐such sentences containing w explains our overall use of it’. Seven arguments in favour of this idea are developed—the principal one (in light of constitution issues elsewhere in science) being that what engenders the meaning of a word will be the property that explains the symptoms of that meaning, which are the word's various uses. Objections to this position are then considered, on the basis of considerations of indeterminacy, determination of reference, holism, pragmatics, propositions, ambiguity, synonymy, definition, individualism, externalism, and the relation between language and thought.