bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Dirty Hands and Conflicts of Values and of Desires in Aristotle's Ethics
Authors: Stocker Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Takes up particular issues of conflict and plurality in Aristotle's ethics and moral psychology. Argues that Aristotle explicitly allows for dirty hands as well as conflicts of values and of desires. This involves discussing issues in Aristotle's treatment of voluntariness, mixed acts, eudaimonia, and pleasure. It is argued that for Aristotle, being a good person does not mean that choices among values can be executed lightly, nor does it ensure that the good never experience lack of eudaimonia, since even they have to deal with dirty hands and conflict of values.
Moral Conflicts: What They Are and What They Show
Authors: Stocker Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPhilosophers commonly argue that conflicts of values are deeply problematic for ethical theories in so far as they force the theories into impracticality, incompleteness, or irrealism. To be complete, a theory must tell us in every case what must be done. To be practical, it must never tell us to do what is impossible. As conflict seems to involve just these features, some philosophers argue from the fact that avoiding conflict (and correlatively regret) is impossible to the conclusion that ethical theories must either be silent in some cases or that it requires us to do both of the jointly impossible acts. Others seek to explain the conflict away as merely apparent. Against these views, it is argued that mere incompossibility does not make for a conflict. All choice involves incompossibility, but not all choice involves conflict. Conflict must be understood in terms of what is conflicting. Understanding this requires seeing that many act evaluations are not action‐guiding.
Courage, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the Possibility of Evaluative and Emotional Coherence
Authors: Stocker Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAccording to Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean, virtue and a good life involve a mean of feeling and action. This chapter focuses on David Pear's claim that the Doctrine is conceptually incoherent. It argues that there are serious difficulties in understanding what it could be for courage and its feelings to be in a mean. Courage involves plural and incommensurable values, victory and danger, and the respective emotions, confidence and fear––it is difficult to see how these can be resolved into a mean. It is argued that this problem can be solved by seeing how incommensurable value and emotions can fuse into complex wholes of disparate and incommensurable values and emotions, and can thus be assessed as lying or not lying in a mean.
Monism, Pluralism, and Conflict
Authors: Stocker Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines the proposal that value conflict generally requires plural values, and finds that it is correct, but only about a kind of rational conflict, which is rational conflict restricted to practicable options. The focus is on kinds of conflict and whether monism is apt to handle them. The discussion lays out the intricacies of conflict, and its relation to time, agency, and differential care. It is concluded that only pluralism can allow for the lack and loss involved in rational conflict over practicable options.
Maximization: Some Conceptual Problems
Authors: Stocker Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines arguments that maximization holds for conceptual reasons. Looks at maximizing theory and raises conceptual problems for evaluative maximization––difficulties in ranking mixes, problems with organic wholes, and mathematical versus internal evaluative judgments. As regards the evaluative decisions maximization is concerned with, it is argued that we are guided in our understanding of what is good by what is better. To the extent that the better is prior to the good, maximizations are parasitic on other evaluations. Concludes with a look at the discussion of false pleasures in Plato's Philebus.
The Nature of Necessity
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book is a study of the concept of necessity. In the first three chapters, I clarify and defend the distinction between modality de re and modality de dicto. Also, I show how to explain de re modality in terms of de dicto modality. In Ch. 4, I explicate the concept of a possible world and define what it is for an object x to have a property P essentially. I then use the concept of an essential property to give an account of essences and their relationship to proper names. In Ch. 6, I argue that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals—even when fortified with Counterpart Theory—is false. Chapters 7 and 8 address the subject of possible but non‐existent objects; I argue here for the conclusion that there is no good reason to think that there are any such objects. In Ch. 9, I apply my theory of modality to the Problem of Evil in an effort to show that the Free Will Defense defeats this particular objection to theism. In Ch. 10, I present a sound modal version of the ontological argument for the existence of God. Finally, in the appendix, I address Quinean objections to quantified modal logic.
Modality De Re: Objections
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I discuss three objections to essentialism. The first objection is from Gilbert Harman, who claims that because numbers can be identified or reduced to sets it follows that numbers cannot have essential properties. In the second objection, William Kneale argues for the conclusion that objects have essential properties only relative to a certain way of specifying or selecting the object. Kneale's argument suffers from a de re/de dicto confusion and the disambiguated reading of his argument is unsound. The third objection, Quine's mathematical cyclist, contains a similar confusion.
Possible But Unactual Objects: The Classical Argument
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 7 explores the question: Are there or could there be, possible but non‐existent objects? In the first half of the chapter, I critically assess the claim that an applied semantics for modal logic commits us to the claim that there are non‐existent possible objects. I conclude that it does commit us to there being some possible world distinct from the actual world that contains some object distinct from anything that exists in the actual world; but it does not, however, commit us to the claim that there really are some things that do not exist. In the second half of the chapter, I develop a historically based argument for the conclusion that there are non‐existent possible objects, which I call the Classical Argument. Importantly, the Classical Argument presupposes that singular negative existentials are possible. I end the chapter by showing that certain objections to the possibility of singular negative existentials fail, and that such existentials are indeed possible.
God and Necessity
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In Ch.10, I apply the previous chapters’ account of modality to the Ontological Argument for the existence of God. I begin the chapter by attempting to develop a sound version of the Ontological Argument based on the work of St. Anselm. I conclude that this argument fails, as does a more recent attempt by Charles Hartshorne and Norman Malcolm. I then give a modal version of the Ontological Argument that is sound and is based on the claim that the property of unsurpassable greatness is possibly exemplified. I grant that this premise is not likely to be accepted by those who do not already hold that the property is actually exemplified, but I argue that it is still rational to accept the premise.
Ignorance
Authors: Unger Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues for the thesis of universal ignorance, i.e., for the claim that nobody can ever know anything. To this effect, puts forward versions of the classical Cartesian argument for skepticism as well as novel arguments involving normative premises and the concept of certainty. Universal ignorance gives rise to further skeptical results: in order to be justified or reasonable in believing something, the subject must know something to be so. Likewise, many attitudes (e.g., being happy about or regretting something) and “illocutionary acts” (e.g., commanding, apologizing) require that the subject knows something. Since nobody can ever know anything, it follows that nobody can ever be justified or reasonable in believing anything, that nobody can ever be happy about or regret anything, and that nobody can ever command or apologize for anything. Finally, the book argues that not only is knowledge impossible, but so is truth. The remedy it suggests is a radical change in our language.
A Language With Absolute Terms
Authors: Unger Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The notion of an absolute term (such as “flat”) is defined as one that denotes a limit, and contrasted with the notion of a relative term (such as “bumpy”). Since absolute terms denote limits – if something is flat, then there could be nothing that is flatter – they are hardly ever, if at all, instantiated. The existence of absolute terms is defended against objections to the effect that owing to their sparse or missing instantiation, we could not learn their meaning. “Certain” is identified as an absolute term, on the grounds that certainty entails the complete absence of doubt; it follows that there is at best very little of which we are certain. Arguing that knowledge requires certainty, the chapter concludes that there it at best very little that we know.
Where Ignorance Enjoins Silence
Authors: Unger Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Argues that if someone asserts that something is so, this entails that he or she represents himself or herself as knowing that it is so. This hypothesis is supported by consideration of a modified version of Moore's Paradox, and by observation of conversational situations. A prima facie case is made for the claim that the hypothesis can be generalized for what J. L. Austin has called “illocutionary acts” (for instance, apologizing, commanding, questioning, etc.): whenever a subject performs such an act, it represents itself as knowing something.
The Impossibility of Truth
Authors: Unger Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In an analysis of truth, this chapter identifies the central entity as the whole truth about the world: this entity is, or parts of it are, the object of knowledge, and the adjective ‘true’ means agreement with this entity. However, there cannot be such a thing as the whole truth about the world. This result gives rise to paradoxes, and implies, among other things, that nothing can ever be true and that we can never believe or think anything. The moral to be drawn is that our language needs to be changed since it embodies a radically false theory.
The Concept of Causation—Conditional Analyses
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter discusses conditional analyses of causal statements, focusing on singular causal statements, which Mackie argues are conceptually and epistemologically prior to generalizations. He also attempts to elucidate the notion of a causal field, the background context within which singular causal statements are made. After an examination of the various ways in which necessity and sufficiency can be related to an account of causation, Mackie proposes an analysis that involves the employment of counterfactual conditionals. He also claims that a notion of causal priority is required for an analysis of causation. Mackie concludes that both necessity and sufficiency are required for his counterfactual analysis, though the requirement of sufficiency is less firm than that of necessity.
Common Sense and the Law
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter concerns the employment of causal notions within a legal context, especially focusing on the account given by Hart and Honore. The examination is made in the light of Mackie's conclusions regarding causal regularities and conditional analyses offered in the previous chapters. Mackie argues that despite the variety of employment of causal notions put forward by Hart and Honore, there may be one broad account of causation that can account for all of those cases. Mackie also critically examines Ducasse's account of causation. Having made several criticisms of this account, Mackie concludes that a counterfactual component is still required for any successful account of causation.
Extensionality—Two Kinds of Cause
Authors: Mackie J. L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Mackie here considers the nature of the entities that are thought to stand in causal relations. The discussion focuses on the notion of the extensionality of these terms. Mackie distinguishes two types of cause—producing causes, which are related to events, and explanatory causes, which are related to facts. He then examines the question of the conditions under which it can be thought that equivalent descriptions of causal terms can be substituted, salva veritate. Mackie concludes that there is a difference regarding the extensionality of explanatory cause statements in that they are not interchangeable in the way that they might be in a regularity theory of causation.
Moral Thinking
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
By distinguishing between two different levels of moral thinking, we see how utilitarian reasoning at the critical level—enlisting the impartial sympathy for others’ predicaments, which we must have if we fully understand them and universalize our preferences as morality requires—generates moral principles for use at the intuitive level, which square with common intuitions, e.g. about justice and rights. The reasoning itself depends on the logic of concepts, which all who ask moral questions are already using.
Introduction
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The task of moral philosophy is to help us think better about what we ought to do. This can be primarily accomplished by improvements in rationality and our capability to understand the proper structure of moral reasoning. Hare's project is shaped by three methodological points. Firstly, the best prospect for dealing with moral questions is to study the meaning and logical properties of moral terms. Secondly, the prescriptivist utilitarian account advanced in this book deals with both normative‐ethical and metaethical considerations. Thirdly, Hare attempts to show why intuitionism as a moral theory ought to be rejected.
Moral Conflicts
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Hare introduces a distinction between two levels of moral thinking; the first being the intuitive and the second being the critical. These levels of moral thinking are concerned with moral questions of substance, but they handled them differently, each appropriate to the different circumstances in which, and purposes for which, the thinking is done. The intuitive level of thinking is concerned with the ordinary, day‐to‐day evaluation of the moral status of different acts. The critical level of thinking consists of making a choice under the constraints imposed by the logical properties of the moral concept under question. The explanation of these two moral levels is done by discussing the problem of moral conflicts. It is argued that moral conflicts are possible at the intuitive level, but not at the critical level.
The Archangel and the Prole
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The relation between the two levels of moral thinking, and how we know when to think at one level and when to think at the other is best explained in terms of our use of critical thinking to select the best set of prima facie principles for use in intuitive thinking. Critical thinking has epistemological priority over, and governs, the intuitive level. In moral reasoning, we need to select moral principles before we can establish substantial criteria of relevance for the principles—it is the principle that determines what is relevant. Hare argues that in addition to the properties of universalizability and prescriptivity for moral judgements, an additional distinguishing property of overridingness is required to differentiate evaluative judgements from moral judgements.
Another's Sorrow
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Details how the logical properties of moral concepts help us to construct moral arguments. In ordinary moral thinking, we have our intuitive or prima facie principles to start from, and shall normally treat as prima facie relevant the features that figure in them; but because we cannot take our prima facie principles for granted in critical thinking, we must be prepared to consider other features besides these as candidates for relevancy. In discussing a way of thinking about moral questions critically and rationally, the question of our knowledge of what it is like to be somebody else who is suffering is examined. When we come to universalize our prescriptions, we have to consider only those prescriptions and preferences of others, which they would retain if they were always prudent.
Universalization
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
By referring to prescriptions that are expressions of motivational states or preferences in language, we are better able to display the logical relations between them. All prescriptions, universal and singular, have to be made in cognizance of the facts if they are to be rational. Moral judgements are universalizable only in the sense that they entail identical judgements about all cases identical in their universal properties. Universalizability can be demonstrated in the sense that it is possible to make the progression from prescriptions that I accept for my own experiences to prescriptions that I must accept for experiences I should have, were I to be in someone else's position with his preferences.
Loyalty and Evil Desires
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Deals with objections that are commonly levelled against utilitarianism concerning its potential counterintuitive conclusions. Hare provides instructions on how to manufacture objections of this sort and then on how to demolish them. This is done because such objections, and the answer to such objections, all take the same form. It is argued that this strategy can be used to dismount the objections that utilitarianism does not allow individuals to give any weight to personal duties or loyalties, and that utilitarianism cannot provide a principled distinction between good and evil desires.
Rights and Justice
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The chapter deals with two pressing objections to Hare's prescriptivist utilitarian moral theory: that it can give no room to the place of rights and that it can give substantial considerations to the place of justice. The objections are avoided when the employment of Hare's method at the critical level is used to select principles for general use that can be properly entrenched without too facile appeals to immediate utility. What we should be trying to find are moral principles that are acceptable for general use in the world as it actually is.
Fanaticism and Amoralism
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There are fanatics and amoralists whose inability or refusal to face facts, or think clearly, or for other reasons present a problem for moral theory. The amoralist refrains from making moral judgements at all or makes only judgements of moral indifference. The fanatic makes moral judgements, but clings to them in a peculiarly obdurate way, which resists critical thinking. Hare goes on to formulate the amoralist position and shows why only one version of the position is tenable. Amoralism is an option left open by our system of moral reasoning. All that can be done to prevent agents from choosing to be amoralists is to provide reasons of a non‐moral sort.
Objectivity and Rationality
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Moral philosophers have been largely concerned with the question of whether moral judgements are objective or subjective. In most senses, moral judgements are neither objective nor subjective, and the belief that they have to be one or the other is the result of a fundamental error (e.g. descriptivism), which both objectivists and subjectivists make. The rationality of moral thought rests on there being a system of reasoning for deciding which of the principles of rationality to adopt called critical thinking. In preferring what we prefer, morality compels us to accommodate ourselves to the preference of others, and this has the effect that when we are thinking morally and doing it rationally we shall all prefer the same moral prescriptions about matters that affect other people.
The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The thesis of scepticism is a thesis about the human condition: the view that we can know nothing, or that nothing is certain, or that everything is open to doubt. This book examines the sceptical thesis that we can know nothing about the physical world around us. The author argues that the sceptical thesis is motivated by a persistent philosophical problem that calls the very possibility of knowledge about the external world into question, and that the sceptical thesis is the only acceptable answer to this problem as traditionally posed.
On the basis of a detailed analysis of the sceptical argument advanced by Descartes, Stroud discusses and criticizes responses to scepticism by a wide range of writers, including J. L. Austin, G. E. Moore, Kant, R. Carnap, and W. V. Quine. In this discussion, Stroud is concerned with the significance of philosophical scepticism in three different respects.
Firstly, he shows philosophical scepticism to be significant as opposed to insignificant or unimportant: the philosophical study of knowledge is not an idle exercise, and the comforting popular belief that we already understand quite well how and why philosophical scepticism goes wrong is simply not true.
Secondly, Stroud argues for the significance of philosophical scepticism by defending it against the charge that it is meaningless or incoherent or unintelligible, and in doing so aims to articulate as clearly as possible what exactly it does mean.
Thirdly, and most importantly, Stroud argues that philosophical scepticism is significant in virtue of what it signifies, or indicates, or shows: even if the sceptical thesis turned out to be false, meant nothing, or not what it seemed to mean, the study of scepticism about the the world around us would still reveal something deep and important about human knowledge and human nature and the urge to understand them philosophically. One aim of the book is to investigate how and why this is so. Engaging in a philosophical reflection about our knowledge of the external world in this way, Stroud argues, can also reveal something about the nature of philosophical problems generally and about philosophy itself; studying the sources of the philosophical problem of scepticism can yield some degree of philosophical understanding or illumination even if we never arrive at something we can regard as a solution to that problem.