bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens
Authors: Romilly Jacqueline De 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The arrival of the Sophists in Athens in the middle of the fifth century BC was an intellectual event of great importance. They brought a new method of teaching founded on rhetoric, and offered bold new doctrines which broke away from tradition. They have often been misunderstood - only fragments of their own work survive, and we have to rely on the testimony of Plato, who was an opponent. Athenians used their teaching to defend an amoralism which they did not themselves advocate. Through an original interpretation of the works of their disciples such as Thucydides, Euripides, and Isocrates, Professor de Romilly investigates the reasons for the initial success of the Sophists and the reaction against them, in the context of the culture and civilization of classical Athens.
The Dangers of the Tabula Rasa:Immoralism
Authors: Romilly Jacqueline De 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
IN the last quarter of the fifth century BC, a grave cns1s developed, in the course of which all kinds of people exploited the Sophistic critique to justify resolutely immoralist points of view. So much is established beyond doubt by the testimony of the various contemporary writers: Euripides, Thucydides, Aristophanes, and, a little later, Plato. The crisis was clearly not solely due to the influence of the Sophists. Many other circumstances contributed towards it, in the first place the war. Every year Attica was invaded. It was a pattern which continued until 421. Then, after a few years’ respite, it found itself under partial occupation by enemy forces. Each year the death-toll rose. People’s faith in the justice of the gods began to waver as they noticed that, in human society, it was the strong who triumphed. Such long, widespread wars are never conducive to the maintenance of moral values. As Thucydides remarked, ‘war ... is a rough schoolmaster and creates in most people a temper that matches their condition’ (3. 82. 2).
Experience
Authors: Schulte Joachim 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the course of his early attempt at a classification of psychological phenomena Wittgenstein wonders if he ought to call the whole field of the psychological the field of experience (seep. 28, above; cf. RPP i. § 836). But even independently of a discussion of the problem of whether or not this terminology can be justified, it is necessary to see how the concept ‘experience’, which is central to Wittgenstein’s entire philosophy of psychology, is to be understood.
Introduction
Authors: Robinson Howard 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In recent philosophy the term ‘physicalism’ has been used both in broader and in more restricted senses. According to the broadest current sense it designates any form of materialism: the upshot of this is that it is the name for any form of materialism that is nowadays fashionable. In its restricted sense it is a particular species of materialism, and does not include all the current theories. The restricted sense can be approached in the following way. Materialism is the theory that all the substances that exist are physical substances. Materialism allows for the possibility that physical substances may possess, at a basic level, certain odd, non-physical properties, in addition to their physical properties. The ‘dual aspect’ or ‘attribute’ theory of mind is a theory of this sort. It might also allow that there can be immaterial abstract objects, because these are not substances in the relevant sense, and are not part of, and do not interact with, the spatio-temporal system. On this view, numbers, universals, or propositions might be held to exist and to be non-physical, consistently with materialism. Physicalism, in the restricted sense, is narrower and more ambitious and says that, at the basic level of characterization, all things and all properties are physical. Even here, there are weaker and stronger versions of the theory.
Thinking1
Authors: Myra George 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The phenomenon of thinking has given rise to a great amount of philosophical puzzlement and controversy. Yet this itself seems paradoxical, since a classical philosophical view, extremely plausible to some and supported, I think, by certain of our ordinary, unreflective convictions, would seem to imply that thinking is among those matters which are clearest of all to us and least subject to puzzlement and serious controversy. So that, from a certain point of view, one may feel that the real philosophical puzzle about thinking is how there can be philosophical puzzles about it. How can a matter which is so clear to us be so unclear? Or does the fact of puzzlement and controversy all by itself refute one of the parties in the controversy: the one which maintains that thinking is among the matters which are clearest of all to us and least subject to puzzlement and serious controversy? It seems to me that even this is not clear! A vague and one-sided diagonsis of the situation at this point might be along the following lines.
Physics, Biology, and Common-Sense Psychology
Authors: Hornsby Jennifer 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The attitude of philosophers to the physical sciences no doubt partly explains why the 'physical' has featured so prominently in their discussions of mind. If a subject-matter is shown to be reducible to physics, its metaphysical status is revealed, and, presumably (supposing that the reduction carries conviction), rendered unproblematic. A reduction of mentality to physics would, then, be satisfying if it were available. But suppose that we cannot be satisfied by such a reduction, because we are persuaded of its impossibility.
Elimination versus Non-reductive Physicalism
Authors: Loar Brian 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There is reason to be pessimistic about the physicalist reduction of the mental, especially as regards propositional attitudes. But the straightforward alternatives are unappealing, namely, dualism and the eliminativist proposition that mental ascriptions are never strictly true. The question is whether some form of non-reductive physicalism is a more promising alternative, that is, commitment both to the comprehensively physical nature of things and despite non-reduction to the reality of mental facts. I am going to argue that current versions do not stand up. But the point is not that reduction or elimination must then hold (putting aside dualism as incredible). It is quite consistent with my argument here that we reach an impasse, that standard presuppositions permit no viable position. At least there is no easy non-reductive way out, despite the claims of two distinctive theses: Stephen Schifter's to the effect that nominalism about mental properties permits physicalism without reduction; and the widely prevalent doctrine of non-reductive supervenience. Non-reductive physicalisl views reject an atomist picture of how physical facts make mental ascriptions true, namely by correspondence: the mental ascription must correspond to a physical fact in such a way that the ascribed mental predicate stands for a physical-property constituent of the truth-making fact. Schiffer rejects this by rejecting properties, and supervenience views reject it by making the relation between ascription and the physical facts more oblique. The argument of this paper is in effect that the correspondence picture is not so easy to get rid of.
Values: Reduction, Supervenience, and Explanation by Ascent
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I doubt that there is one metaphysical status for values. To take just ethics, the status of prudential values is different, I suspect, from that of most moral values, and moral values are not uniform among themselves. For that reason, we should, at the start, choose one sort of value to concentrate on. I shall choose prudential values. I use ‘prudence’ in the philosopher's broad sense, in which it has to do with everything that makes an individual life, seen on its own, good. I concentrate on the prudential case for two reasons. First, it seems to me a bit easier than the moral one, while raising all the central meta-ethical questions. It is easier, I think, even though it is impossible to make a sharp cut between prudence and morals. And secondly, human interests hold a particularly basic place among values generally. They get us into the subject not only more easily but also at a deeper point. Also, I do not myself find it fruitful to separate meta-ethics and normative ethics for long. I think that their best hope for advance is to advance together. It is hard to decide on the reducibility, or supervenience, or reality of values without a fairly full idea of what is valuable and what arguments are actually available to us in deciding this. So my way into this meta-ethical subject is through some normative ethics.
Bohr
Authors: Krips Henry 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Bohr took it as the key fact of QT that neither of the models for describing the behaviour of systems offered by classical physics— neither the ‘particle picture’ nor the ‘wave picture’—fitted q-systems in all aspects of their behaviour. More particularly he took these two pictures to be ‘complementary’—when one fitted the other one did not. This failure of fit was seen by Bohr as usually only partial however, as a degree of’imprecision of fit’ rather than a total failure of fit; and it is in terms of this notion that Bohr was then able to give expression to his principle of complementarity, viz. that the degrees of imprecision of fit of the wave and particle pictures are reciprocally related: to the extent that one of the pictures fits well, the other fits badly. In this chapter I shall discuss these notions in the context of a more general discussion of Bohr’s philosophy of Quantum Theory.
Measurement
Authors: Krips Henry 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter I shall consider particular models for the process of measurement of q-quantities, models which are constructed within QT itself. It is not of course necessary that QT by itself generates such models, any more than we require a description of the functioning of devices for measuring charge, say, to be given entirely from within electromagnetism (although arguably if QT is to be ‘complete’ then it must provide such models). Indeed Bohr for one seems to have denied precisely this requirement. For him the description of the measurement process for q-quantities ultimately had to be made in classical terms and he seems to have denied that these classical descriptions must in turn be reducible to quantum theoretic descriptions.
Introduction
Authors: Saunders Simon 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The Ancient World knew many concepts of substance; some of them appeared to preclude the concept of 'the empty'. As for space, Aristotle used the word topos, 'place' or 'container'-a continuous, finite receptacle which persists through change and which is 'separable' from matter. What then is this distinction between matter and the 'container' of matter? It is only with the atomists that the concept of emptiness acquires an absolute character; the distinction is made out in terms of the existence or non-existence of atoms.
On the Ether
Authors: Einstein Albert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
If we are here going to talk about the ether, we are not, of course, talking about the physical or material ether of the mechanical theory of undulations, which is subject to the laws of Newtonian mechanics, to the points of which are attributed a certain velocity. This theoretical edifice has, I am convinced, finally played out its role since the setting up of the special theory of relativity. It is rather more generally a question of those kinds of things that are considered as physically real, which play a role in the causal nexus of physics, apart from the ponderable matter that consists of electrical elementary particles. Therefore, instead of speaking of an ether, one could equally well speak of physical qualities of space.
Game Theory and Rational Choice
Authors: Blackburn Simon 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The third interpretation of the principle of maximizing expected utility that I distinguished in the last chapter said that it was definitional: a grid imposed upon the process of interpreting others. It is this that we now turn to explore.2 What I shall do is to introduce the bones of the classical analysis due to F. P. Ramsey.3 We have just learned from Bishop Butler that it is not at all true that people act so as to maximize the intensity or duration of some state of themselves. They do not even always act with their own interests in mind, where these interests are construed as states of themselves. Nor would we want them to do so. So we could conclude that the principle of acting to maximize expected utility has been exploded as empirically and normatively bogus.
Deductive Reasoning in Human Information Processing
Authors: Evans Jonathan ST B T 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Information processing is the central concern of cognitive science and deductive reasoning is one of the most significant methods by which it is achieved. The programming language PROLOG, for example, designed for research into artificial intelligence, uses deductive reasoning based upon predicate logic as its basic method of operation. A deductive inference occurs whenever two or more pieces of information are taken together and some new information is derived as a consequence. Such reasoning has been central to the development of ‘expert systems’ (see Hayes-Roth et al. 1983)-one of the major fields of research into artificial intelligence in recent years. In attempting to simulate the function of a human expert such systems have generally been provided with huge databases of ‘facts’ and ‘rules’ together with an inference engine which permits deductions to be made.
Conclusion
Authors: Smilansky Saul 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The importance of free will for morality in the wide sense and for our view of ourselves is great: it is so great that illusion is required. Illusion keeps, and ought largely to continue keeping, our moral and personal worlds intact. There is partial non-illusory grounding for many of our central free will-related beliefs, reactions, and practices, even in a world without libertarian free will. But in various complex ways, we require illusion in order to bring forth and maintain them. The two central aspects of this discussion—the ethical and personal dimensions of the free will problem and the role of illusion in this problem—are closely interwoven. Illusion is seen to flow from the basic structure of the free will issue, and its recognition is identified as an important key to our understanding. Revealing the large and mostly positive role of illusion concerning free will not only teaches us a great deal about the free will issue itself, but posits illusion as a pivotal factor in human life.
Minds, Brains, and Tools
Authors: Clark Andy 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The selected texts for this discussion were two recent pieces by Dennett (‘Things about Things’ (forthcoming), and ‘Making Tools for Thinking’ (2000), henceforth TAT and MTT respectively) and one oldie-but-goodie (‘Styles of Mental Representation’ (I983), henceforth SMR). What was most striking, to me, was the way these three small texts seemed to fit together and, collectively, help to illuminate the shape of Dennett’s whole corpus, from the work on stances all the way to the work on consciousness and personhood. I found this exhilarating, and I hope my enthusiasm-tempered though it is by a few doubts and worries-shows through.
Haugeland on Representation and Intentionality
Authors: Cummins Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Haugeland doesn’t have what I would call a theory of mental representation. Indeed, it isn’t clear that he believes there is such a thing. But he does have a theory of intentionality and a correlative theory of objectivity, and it is this material that I will be discussing in what follows.
It will facilitate the discussion that follows to have at hand some distinctions and accompanying terminology I introduced in Representations, Targets and Attitudes (Cummins 1996a; RTA hereafter). Couching the discussion in these terms will, I hope, help to identify points of agreement and disagreement between Haugeland and myself, and perhaps help to build a bit of a bridge.
Discussion
Authors: Clapin Hugh 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Clark If something has content but it’s not representational content, that’s because there isn’t something there worth calling the representation on all our accounts, right? Smith Well, I thought you were disagreeing with Hugh when he was saying that the architecture can have content. [See Discussion point 6. -ed.] Clark I’m happy with the architecture having content, I’m just not happy with it having representational content.
Discussion
Authors: Clapin Hugh 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Cummins This is what anti-realists do on purpose. Dennett Commit this inscription error? Cummins Just, lots of them. Smith Here’s a simple case to see what’s going on. Suppose you want to know if your cat recognizes you as an individual as opposed to as just more ‘Hughness’. And suppose people say,’Yeah,look,because here’s its neurophysiology and this cell lights up every time-same cell, so it must be the same person.’ But how do you know it’s the same cell? Maybe it’s just rein stantiating some type in there.
Objectivity and Insight
Authors: Sacks Mark 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Mark Sacks presents an innovative study of the nature and scope of objectivity. He argues for a conception of objectivity that draws on the central insight of transcendental idealism, while preserving a non-metaphysical orientation. The first two parts of Objectivity and Insight explore the prospects for objectivity on the standard ontological conception, and find that they are not good. In Part I, under the heading of subject-driven scepticism, Sacks addresses the problem of securing epistemic reach that extends beyond subjective content. In so doing, he considers models of mind proposed by Locke, Hume, Kant, James, and Bergson. Part II, under the heading of world-driven scepticism, discusses the scope for universality of normative structure-a problem which survives even after the assumption of an epistemologically significant breach between subject and object has been rejected. In the third part of the book Sacks introduces an alternative conception of objectivity, and shows that there is good reason to accept it. This conception turns on an insight which is taken to be implicit in transcendental idealism, and responsible for its abiding appeal; but Sacks's articulation of that insight is neither idealist nor metaphysical..
Introduction
Authors: Sacks Mark 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This book is concerned, primarily, with insight into the nature and scope of objectivity. This concern is addressed directly in Part III. The issue is set in relation to two forms of scepticism, in Parts I and II. While these serve to bring out the nature and costs of our standard conception of objectivity, to which the final part aims to be a corrective, the intention has been to present the discussion in such a way that all three parts can be read separately. Part I (Chapters 1-3) develops what can be called the subject-driven threat to the possibility of securing knowledge of such objective order as there might be. The concern is primarily with objectivity as that which is not merely subjective, which is not indexed to first-personal experience.
Empiricist Theories of the Mind: Locke and Hume
Authors: Sacks Mark 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The concern in this and the next two chapters is with the question of objectivity as it emerges in the traditional epistemological framework. This question is perhaps best seen as a form of subject-driven scepticism. The present chapter draws selectively on largely familiar material in order to set up the discussion of such scepticism here. As we will see, at issue is the relation between conceptions of the subject and epistemological yield: the guiding question is whether we can find an adequate model of the mind that is also adequate to the task of securing objectivity. It is difficult to avoid the impression that for a long time philosophical models of the mind were, to a significant extent, adopted with a certain amount of inattentiveness, certainly without sufficient argument. It is as if a sense of familiarity with the mind’s workings obscured the extent to which a description of those workings would nevertheless be theory-laden.
From the Egological Subject to the Domestication of Reason
Authors: Sacks Mark 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Much of philosophy in the past sixty years has been directed at, or has at least resulted in, questioning the traditional assumption of an epistemologically significant breach between subject and object. This raises the issue of the epistemic impact of this move. It might have been thought that in the absence of that assumption, with the subject regarded as perfectly at home in the world, epistemology would no longer be faced with sceptical worries, which might well have been the point of rejecting the traditional assumption. The three chapters comprising this part of the book make a case for thinking that no such simple deliverance ensues. It would be a mistake to think that rejecting the traditional assumption simply and incisively releases us from the related epistemological agenda. The orientation that brings about the blurring of that Cartesian dichotomy has been intimately bound up with other commitments, such as the withdrawal from metaphysics. And the combination of naturalism and the dissolution of the Cartesian chasm do not add up to an end to our epistemic troubles.
A Compulsion to Objectivity in Experience
Authors: Sacks Mark 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The first two parts of this book set the agenda for this final part. In this chapter I will take a look at some arguments designed to pick up on the insights of the philosophers canvassed in Part I, while allowing them to stand uncluttered by doubtful characteristics of one model of the mind or another. The essentially Strawsonian attempt will be to uphold the interdependence between subjectivity and objectivity, but without reliance on any transcendental psychology. This is intended to get round the various problems seen earlier, in particular the fact that the availability of a Jamesian alternative to the Kantian model of the mind threatens to derail the train of the Transcendental Deduction at the outset. These arguments, however, have the character of transcendental arguments, and the upshot of Part II has precisely been to cast doubt on the credentials of any such arguments. The possibility of such arguments will accordingly be taken up again in Chapter 8, where I will provide grounds for thinking that the arguments in the present chapter may not succumb to the relativist pressure on objectivity identified in Part II, and in fact provide a way of resisting it.