bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Fear of Relativism
Authors: Scanlon T M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Relativism is a hot topic. By this I do not mean merely that it is now much discussed but, rather, that its discussion always arouses certain passions. From some, relativism provokes passionate denial, the passion and haste of these denials suggesting a kind of fear. Others are eager to affirm it, and often do so with a particular exhilaration and sense of satisfaction, perhaps even of superiority. The question that I will begin with here is, what gives the topic this heat? Since my own reaction to relativism has generally been one of opposition, I will approach the question mainly from that side, by asking why we should want our judgements of value in general, or our moral judgements in particular, to have some property that relativism would deny them. As will become clear, my thoughts about this topic have been in large part shaped by Philippa Foot’s writings.
Plato’s Cratylus: The Naming of Nature and the Nature of Naming
Authors: Silverman Allan 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The Cratylus is Plato’s only dialogue-length treatment of an issue which today we would consider to be part of the philosophy of language. While his way of putting the question under consideration – ‘What is [the cause of] the correctness of names?’–and the proposed answers–convention or nature–are slightly unusual, the nexus of elements which dominate his discussion is quite familiar. The Cratylus is an investigation into the problem of how names hook on to the world. and the familiar triad of the world, language, and speakers properly serve as the three points from which we are to triangulate an answer.
The Cyrenaic Theory of Knowledge
Authors: Tsouna Mckirahan Voula 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the analytical literature on epistemology of the 1960s and 1970s versions of foundationalism such as sense-data theories and adverbial theories are to be found at the core of the then current debates. But their glory was rather short-lived. Thanks to the fervour and industriousness of its critics, sensory foundationalism withdrew from the limelight of contemporary philosophical discussions.
Substantial Holism
Authors: Scaltsas Theodore 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Substances are the most unified wholes in Aristotle’s metaphysics, being paradigmatically single but complex entities. My concern in this paper is to understand the nature of their unity, and through it, explicate an important aspect of the relation of the potential to the actual, which is fundamental in Aristotle’s system. Although the nature of this relation is illuminated by examples offered by Aristotle, this is not sufficient, in view of the enormous explanatory weight that is placed by Aristotle on this relation. An attempt must be made to understand why it is that this relation can deliver such fundamental and rather spectacular—denigrated as ‘magical’ by its critics —metaphysical results.
Essences, Powers, and Generic Propositions
Authors: Moravcsik Julius 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
What are essences? Aristotle and the student of the modern natural sciences are both concerned with this question. Some recent analytic philosophy assumes that the essence of a natural kind K will be a collection of truths that are necessarily and uniquely of it and its members. If so, essences should be expressed by sentences of the form: ‘All and only As are Bs’ in which ‘A’ names the natural kind under scrutiny. This essay shows that such a conception of essence is inadequate. It neither captures Aristotle’s notion of the essential, nor that of the modern biologist. For the essence of a natural kind includes constituency, structure, and function. Thus an adequate analysis has to account for all three of these ingredients. Functioning is, however, not an all-or-nothing affair. Things can function better or worse. Thus an entity can more fully embody its essence, or less so.
Rhetoric, Dialectic, and the Passions
Authors: Cooper John M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
That Aristotle devotes the major part of the second book of his Rhetoricto a discussion of a fairly wide range of emotions or passions is I suppose fairly widely known among philosophers. And I know that philosophers interested in the emotions either from the point of view of philosophy of mind in general or moral psychology and the philosophy of action in particular do read these chapters for the light they may throw on the phenomena that interest them. However, the fact is that very close, philosophically informed work has not been done on this (or in fact any) part of the Rhetoric by Aristotelian scholars nothing to compare with what has been done on the Ethics, or the Physics, or Aristotle’s various writings on metaphysics and logic. The result is that, despite its recognized interest and presumed philosophical value, Aristotle’s treatment of the emotions in the Rhetoric, which is the only extended treatment of them anywhere in his writings, is still very little understood. This is not terra incognita, but it is territory very little explored. It still needs to be mapped and marked so that what it has to offer for philosophical history, as well as for the rest of philosophy, can be made available to us. It is to such a preliminary mapping and marking that I devote this paper.
Problems with Graham’S Two-Systems Hypothesis
Authors: Goldin Owen 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
in Aristotle's Two Systems 1 Daniel Graham has put forward a bold new hypothesis concerning the development of Aristotle’s thought, which he labels ‘the Two Systems Hypothesis’. Graham recognizes that the interpreter of Aristotle faced with conflicting doctrines sometimes has no recourse but to posit a development in Aristotle’s thought. But, with the notable exception of the speculations of Owen,2 Graham finds previous developmental accounts of Aristotle’s thought philosophically unsatisfactory. This is because genetic accounts (like those of Jaeger)3 have typically explained changes in Aristotelian doctrine on the basis of a shift in general outlook, not on Aristotle’s attempts as a philosopher to resolve tensions arising in his earlier views. Graham’s book is an attempt to give a developmental account of Aristotle’s thought in metaphysics and philosophy of science without this shortcoming.
Animals in the Poetics
Authors: Gallop David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
According to Aristotle, art (techne) imitates nature. This celebrated doctrine is not limited to what we call the ‘fine arts’, or to works of’art’ in any narrow modern sense; and it does not mean that such art-works copy things in the natural order. It means, more generally, that craftsmen adopt means to produce ends; and that in doing so, they follow a pattern found throughout organic nature.
A Philosopher’s Coming of Age: A Study in Erotetic Intellectual History
Authors: Fisch Menachem 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Whewell’s intellectual undertakings were enormous. He wrote widely on almost every topic on the early Victorian agenda. He was indeed a polymath, but, as noted in the introduction to this volume, the term polymath fails to do full justice to the nature of his universal scholarship. Whewell’s works both literary and scientific, historical and philosophical, moral and theological were written with an explicit view not merely to embrace the world of learning but to synthesize it and render it a unified intellectual whole. As is evident from various of the contributions to this collective effort to assess Whewell’s achievement, there exists a measure of disagreement as to the extent to which he succeeded in his ambitious interdisciplinary project. Contributors also differ in their location of the underlying unifying components of Whewell’s multi-faceted enterprise. Yet there is no doubt that Whewell himself regarded his History and Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences as both the hallmark of his career and the unifying ‘hard core’ of his entire system of thought.
William Whewell’s Philosophy of Knowledge and its Reception
Authors: Yeo Richard R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
During Whewell’s lifetime references to his polymathic aspirations coloured most assessments of his achievements. Like Sydney Smith’s well-known aphorism, these characterizations often carried negative judgements concerning Whewell’s metascientific deliberations. Even before embarking on his vast history and philosophy of the inductive sciences Whewell himself anticipated the opinions of ‘people [who] bid us beware of the Demon of universal knowledge’, although he freely confessed to George Morland in 1815 about ‘certain yearnings after the whole circle of the sciences, certain ecstatic aspirations after universal knowledge, certain indefinite desires to approximate to something like omniscience’. Thirty years later he referred to the Greek philosopher Erastosthenes whose activites embraced philosophy, geometry, astronomy, and poetry and, clearly with his own case in mind, observed that: ‘It is seldom that one person attempts to master so many subjects without incurring the charge, and perhaps the danger of being superficial. ‘
Structural Questions
Authors: Gibbard Allan 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Throughout the book I have read morality narrowly. We can mark it off, I proposed, through its connection to narrowly moral sentiments, guilt and resentment. Morality on this narrow reading looks to the kinds of acts for which a person can be to blame. A person is to blame for an act if it makes sense for others to be angry at him-from a stand point of full, impartial engagement, I added-and if it makes sense for the person himself to feel guilty for what he has done. Morally wrong acts are not always acts a person is to blame for; there can be excuses. Still, the connection is tight. Wrong acts, roughly, are acts a person would be to blame for if he chose them in a normal state of mind.
Socratic piety:In Response to Scott Calef
Authors: Mcpherran Mark 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I am happy to see the arguments and views of my paper ‘Socratic Piety in the Euthyphro’ serve as a springboard for Scott Calef’s investigation of the Euthyphro. By focusing on my ‘constructivist’ reading of the dialogue’s latter half, he hopes to show that although the Euthyphro encapsulates positive Socratic teaching on the nature of piety, that teaching does not-as I argued-identify piety as a part of justice. Instead, he maintains that the dialogue is best read as being compatible with the view that piety is identical to the whole of justice, and thus that it presents no prima-facie conflict with the Socratic doctrine of the unity of the virtues (as found, for example, at Prot. 329 C-D). In what follows I want to show that while Calef’s challenge helps to clarify the search for piety in the Euthyphro, he has neither undermined my own position nor made plausible his own constructivist account.
Further Reflections on Socratic Piety: A Reply to Mark Mcpherran
Authors: Warren Calef Scott 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I have great respect for Mark McPherran as a thinker and scholar. Unfortunately, I cannot reply to all of his criticisms of my paper here, nor give to those I do discuss the attention they no doubt deserve. Many involve subtle misreadings and cannot be individually addressed. In the following I hope to further the discussion in a positive way by focusing on McPherran’s most substantive points. These include his discussion of the clarification passage and Socrates’ use of the fear/shame and number/odd analogies, his objection that my account supposes that there is something correct in Euthyphro’s ‘long-winded’ answer at I4A II-B 7,andhisclaim that my account of the gods’ chief ργov is ‘unlikely to be found an acceptable candidate by Socrates.
The subjecthood of souls and some other forms:
Authors: Shields Christopher 
Published: November 2023

abstract
If he denies subjecthood to souls, Aristotle contradicts himself. For then he accepts the third member of an inconsistent set of propositions-whose first two members he also accepts: (1) souls are substances (Dean. 412 19-20, 412 10-11, 415 8-12); (2) substances are πoKϵµíμϵνa (substrates or subjects; M etaph. 1028 36-7, 1029 1-2, 1029 17-19, 1038 15); and (3) souls are not πoKϵµíμϵνa (evidently at De an. 412 18-19, and perhaps indirectly at De an.408b11-15). Wondering whether Aristotle had really contradicted himself on a point so near the surface of his mature writings, I undertook to explain how in the De anima he could suggest that souls fail to be subjects. For it seemed to me then, as it seems to me now, that Aristotle accepts both (1) and (2). Still, I maintain, there is no genuine contradiction: as I argued then, and shall argue more fully now, Aristotle does not accept (3) in any form inconsistent with (1) and (2). If I am correct, there is no problem of internal inconsistency.
Truth Definitions and Actual Languages
Authors: Peacocke Christopher 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
According to Davidson, his Tarski-style theory of truth for a natural language is an empirical theory, and ‘like any theory, it may be tested by comparing some of its consequences with the facts’.1 Of particular importance among the consequences of the truth theory for a particular language are the so-called T-sentences it yields as theorems, and Davidson holds that ‘the verification of instances of the T-sentences, or rather their surrogates in a theory relativized to speakers and times, remains respectably empirical’.2
On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language
Authors: Peacocke Christopher 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
ACTION-ASCRIBING sentences are susceptible of adverbial modification of such a kind that a proposition expressed by a sentence so modified entails any proposition obtained from it merely by shearing away some or all of the modifiers. Different theories are current which purport to explain our grasp of the structure of these entailments. In general there is a contrast between a theory, like Professor Davidson’s,1 which explains these relationships by reference to well-understood logical structures represented as underlying the surface forms of action-ascribing sentences, and any theory which finds an explanation closer to the surface of ordinary language by recognizing a more complicated basic syntax than a Davidsonian theorist is prepared to allow for.
Existence and Tense
Authors: Woods Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This paper is concerned with the problems involved in the semantics of existence in giving a truth theory for English. My particular concern is with the difficulties that are presented by the phenomenon of tense for those aiming to give a Tarski-style semantics for English in accordance with the programme envisaged by Donald Davidson and in other recent work. I shall therefore be presupposing a Davidsonian framework, though what I say is presumably capable of adaptation to alternative semantic approaches.
The De Re ‘Must’: a Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims*
Authors: Wiggins David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Quine mocks essentialism. But are his strictures levelled at unreflect ing acceptance of the ancient Aristotelian ontology of three-dimen sional changeable continuants in terms of which we are still doing our unthinking best to make sense of the everyday fabric of the world? Or does he maintain that, even while we remain within that provincial ontology, we have the choice to discriminate or not discriminate in favour of some of the concepts which the things we recognize fall
* This paper continues one of the themes of ‘Identity, Designation, Essentialism, and Physicalism’, forthcoming in Philosophia (1975) and in my contribution to the symposium ‘Identity, Necessity and Physicalism’ to appear in the Proceedings of the 1974 Bristol Philosophy of Logic Conference (ed. S. Komer and M. Welbourne, Blackwell, Oxford, 1975). It nowhere presupposes that paper. The stimulus to attempt the continuation came from trying to defend some of these contentions at the Corso Estivo di Filosofia 1974 in Montagnana, Italy. The appendix which Christopher Peacocke has very kindly agreed to write for the piece is some sign of the nature and extent of my great debt to him both as one of the discutants there and subsequently. I am also indebted to J. A. W. Kamp in the section on negation.
Is There a Problem about Substitutional Quantification ?
Authors: Kripke Saul 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Three Recent papers, two by John Wallace and one by Leslie Tharp,1 have attempted to prove that the distinctions usually made between ‘substitutional’ and ‘referential’ quantification are untenable. Now I have not only been puzzled that able authors should advance such a thesis; I have also been surprised to find that many able readers of their papers have believed that they have succeeded, or may possibly have succeeded. Sample statements of the thesis are:
(1) Advantages which were supposed to attach to substitutional quantification by virtue of its ‘lighter’, less predication committed, recursion are all lost. The range for quantified variables and the bias toward extensionality are present in the derived recursion on satisfaction (Wallace (2), p. 208).
Aristotle on the Truth of Utterances
Authors: Crivelli Paolo 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The first of this paper’s four parts ascribes to Aristotle the view that the linguistic items which are bearers of truth and falsehood are utterances (sentence-tokens). The second part defends the idea, at first sight implausible, that an utterance can have different truth values at different times. The third part endorses the ancient commentators’ claim that for Aristotle an utterance having different truth values at different times undergoes mere Cambridge change. The fourth part contains a definition of truth for utterances of categorical sentence-types.
Perspectives on Time and Memory: An Introduction
Authors: Hoerl Christoph , McCormack Teresa 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
What is the connection between the way we represent time and things in time, on the one hand, and our capacity to remember particular past events, on the other? This is the substantive question that has stood behind the project of putting together this volume. The methodological assumption that has informed this project is that any progress with the difficult and fascinating set of issues that are raised by this question must draw on the resources of various areas both in philosophy and in psychology.
‘Lost in a Sea of Time’: Time-Parsing and Autism
Authors: Boucher Jill 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is well known that autism is defined in terms of a triad of impairments affecting social interaction, communication, and creativity. It is also widely known that other impairments, such as general learning difficulties (mental handicap) and motor incoordination often co-occur with autism, but that people with autism may also show peaks of relatively high ability typically in rote learning and memory, and sometimes on visuo-spatial tasks. What is much less widely recognized, except by those regularly in contact with people with autism, is that they have-probably universally-a very poor intuitive sense of time.
Scepticism and Epistemology
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter, I will explore the nature of the sceptical challenge in some detail, in order to see at what, points a transcendental argument might be used against it, and what form that argument might take. I hope to show that, in considering how to deploy transcendental arguments against scepticism, not all forms of scepticism should be treated alike, so that different ways of using transcendental arguments are available. In particular, my claim will be that we can distinguish between epistemic and justificatory scepticism, and then between reliabilist justificatory scepticism and normativist justificatory scepticism, and that each calls for a different conception of these arguments and the role they are required to fulfil.
Twenty-One Years in the Chinese Room
Authors: Searle John R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I want to use the occasion of this volume dedicated to the twenty-first anniversary of the Chinese Room Argument to reflect on some of the implications of this debate for cognitive science in general, and indeed, for the current state of our larger intellectual culture. I will not spend much time responding to the many detailed arguments that have been presented. I have already responded to more criticisms of the Chinese Room Argument than to all of the criticisms of all of the other controversial philosophical theses that I have advanced in my life. My reason for having so much confidence that the basic argument is sound is that in the past twenty-one years I have not seen anything to shake its fundamental thesis. The fundamental claim is that the purely formal or abstract or syntactical processes of the implemented computer program could not by themselves be sufficient to Buarantee the presence of mental content or semantic content of the sort that is essential to human cognition.
A Chinese Room that Understands
Authors: Simon Herbert A , Eisenstadt Stuart A 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The thesis of this chapter is that a computer can be programmed (and has been programmed) to understand natural language, in the sense of being able to translate natural language text, to answer in natural language questions put to it in language, and to perform similar tasks which, if performed by a human, would be taken as convincing evidence that the human understood the same language. We will call this thesis Empirical Strong AI (SAI-E) to distinguish it from Logical Strong AI (SAI-L), the thesis that Searle refutes, and which asserts that ‘an appropriately programmed digital computer with the right inputs and outputs, one that satisfies the Turing Test, would thereby necessarily have a mind’ (Searle 1999: 115).
Neural Depictions of ‘World’ and ‘Self’: Bringing Computational Understanding to the Chinese Room
Authors: Aleksander Igor 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Undoubtedly John Searle’s central contribution to the philosophy of both mind and language is his theory of intentionality. This suggests that cognition in all its forms is directed at objects. We attend to objects, we speak of objects, we understand object-laden stories, and we relate to objects both in perception and recall. When programmed computers only represent objects as symbols in relation to other symbols, this leads logically to the conclusion expressed in the ‘Chinese Room’ Argument (CRA (Searle 1980)): symbols are not objects that share properties with what it is that they represent.
Minds, Machines, and Searle 2: What’s Right and Wrong about the Chinese Room Argument
Authors: Harnad Stevan 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
When in 1979 Zenon Pylyshyn, associate editor of The Behavioral and Brain Sciences (BBS, a peer commentary journal which I edit) informed me that he had secured a paper by John Searle (with an unprepossessing title that Zenon, John, and I have all since forgotten!), I cannot say that I was especially impressed; nor did a quick reading of the brief manuscript-which seemed to be yet another tedious ‘Granny Objection’’ about why/how we are not computers do anything to upgrade that impression.
Business Performance in the Retail Sector
Authors: Bradley Keith , Taylor Simon 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This book investigates how John Lewis's unique ownership and organizational arrangements have enabled it to become one of the largest and longest-surviving employee-owned firms in the Western world. From its emergence in 1864, the John Lewis Partnership has placed its trust in an explicit set of business principles, emphasizing employee share-ownership, employee motivation, and profit-sharing. This study examines the success of these principles and the lessons to be learned from them for successful retailing strategy and competitiveness in the 1990s.