bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Introduction
Authors: Penrose Edith 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This introductory chapter discusses the development of a theory on the growth of the firm. The theory is first developed as a theory of internal growth, i.e. growth without merger and acquisition. The focus then shifts from the internal resources of the firm to the impact of particular types of external conditions as firms grow larger, and to the situation of small compared to large firms. This permits an analysis of changes in the rate of growth for firms as they grow. And finally leads to a discussion on the process of industrial concentration.
The Firm in Theory
Authors: Penrose Edith 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter discusses the nature of the ‘firm’ in the ‘theory of the firm’, to indicate why it provides an unsuitable framework for a theory of the growth of firms. It explores the firm as an administrative organisation, the firm as a collection of productive resources, and the motivations of the firm. The ‘firm’ in the theory of price and production is also considered.
‘Inherited’ Resources and the Direction of Expansion
Authors: Penrose Edith 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines the internal factors affecting the direction of expansion of firms. Internal obstacles arise when specialised services required for expansion in a particular direction are insufficient within the firm. Internal inducements arise from the existence of a pool of unused productive services, resources, and special knowledge. The reasons why there will always be unused productive services within a firm, and the significance of the existence of such services for ‘external’ opportunities for expansion are discussed.
The Rate of Growth of a Firm through Time
Authors: Penrose Edith 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines the factors causing changes in the rate of growth of firms as they become larger. The firm reaches a point at which its rate of growth tends to decline, its absolute size continuous to increase, and there is no reason to believe that some increase in size will ever become impossible. The limit to size is set by the administrative criteria used to decide whether or not a given collection of economic activities constitutes a business firm instead of an investment holding company or financial ‘community of interest’.
Growing Firms in a Growing Economy: The Process of Industrial Concentration and The Pattern of Dominance
Authors: Penrose Edith 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter examines the relationship between the growth of firms of different sizes and the process of industrial concentration. It discusses restrictions on the ability of small firms to take advantage of the opportunities for profitable investment left open by larger firms. It presents a number of conclusions for the place of large and growing firms in the modern world.
North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality
Authors: Wood Adrian 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExpansion of trade in manufactures between developed and developing countries has had a far greater effect on labour markets than earlier research suggested. In developing countries (the South), unskilled workers have benefited most from this trade, but in developed countries (the North) the gains have been concentrated on those with skills, while unskilled workers have suffered falling wages and rising unemployment, which has worsened income distribution and aggravated other social problems. The failure of Northern governments to recognize what is happening has fuelled the rise of protection—the worst possible response, which slows development in both regions. The best solution for the North in the longer term is more investment in education, but in the near term, other measures are needed to boost the demand for, and incomes of, unskilled workers.
Summary and Conclusions
Authors: Wood Adrian 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExpansion of trade in manufactures between developed and developing countries has had a far greater effect on labour markets than earlier research suggested. In developing countries (the South),unskilled workers have benefited most from this trade, but in developed countries (the North) the gains have been concentrated on those with skills, while unskilled workers have suffered falling wages and rising unemployment, which has worsened income distribution and aggravated other social problems. The failure of Northern governments to recognize what is happening has fuelled the rise of protection—the worst possible response, which slows development in both regions. The best solution for the North in the longer term is more investment in education, but in the near term, other measures are needed to boost the demand for, and incomes of, unskilled workers.
Evidence from Previous Studies
Authors: Wood Adrian 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter reviews the findings of previous studies of North–South trade and labour market interactions, which use various methods. It looks at evidence in developing countries, developed countries, and both types of countries together. Most previous studies show that the main effect of North–South trade in manufactures on labour markets is to alter the relative demand for skilled and less‐skilled workers (and that this trade is not based on differences in the scarcity of physical capital). Previous studies also suggest that this impact on the relative demand for skill in the North is small. However, the methods used in these studies are biased towards understatement.
Factor Content of Noncompeting Trade
Authors: Wood Adrian 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter applies a modified version of the factor content method of estimating the impact of North–South trade in manufactures on the skill composition of the demand for labour in both country groups. Its objective is to obtain a more accurate measure of the size of this impact, which is understated by standard calculations because they do not allow for the fact that much North–South trade in manufactures is noncompeting. Allowing for noncompeting imports, for defensive labour‐saving innovation induced by trade, and for indirect effects in non‐manufacturing sectors, the impact of this trade on the composition of demand is estimated to be roughly 40 times as large as suggested by standard factor content of trade calculations.
Unemployment in the North
Authors: Wood Adrian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Unemployment rates in the North rose between the 1960s and the late 1980s. The hypothesis of this book is that the rise in unemployment was caused by expansion of trade with the South, in conjunction with rigidity of wage differentials. Alternative explanations such as oil shocks and hysteresis seem less convincing. The estimated size of the impact of trade on the relative demand for skilled and unskilled labour is consistent with the actual size of the increase in unemployment. The trade hypothesis is also able to explain variation in the size of this increase across Northern countries. Other forces, however, were also acting on unemployment rates during this period.
Past and Future
Authors: Wood Adrian 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Whether past trends in North–South trade, and their effects on skilled and unskilled workers, continue in the future, or cease or change, depends on the future course of reductions in barriers to trade and the relative supply of skilled and unskilled labour in the North and in different parts of the South. Barriers to trade, both natural and artificial, will probably continue to decline, bringing an ever‐widening range of goods and services within the scope of the skill‐based North–South division of labour. More exports of labour‐intensive manufactures from low‐income countries will lower their world prices and widen wage differentials in middle‐income countries. Rising skill supplies in middle‐income countries will intensify competition in the least skill‐intensive traded sectors in the North and further widen skill differentials there.
India's Economic Reforms, 1991-2001
Authors: Joshi Vijay , Little I. M. D 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book is a follow‐up study to an earlier work tracing India's economy up to 1991. Here the focus is on the economic reforms introduced after the financial crisis of 1991. The authors examine the different areas of the economy and outline the successes and effects of reform measures. They utilize economic theory and knowledge to suggest ways to liberalize the economy and open up the market to revitalize the Indian economy alongside those reforms already implemented. They end with predictions of the future of economic reforms and what sectors should be seen as priorities for prospective development.
Financial Sector Reform
Authors: Joshi Vijay , Little I. M. D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines the financial sector, with the major focus being on India's banking institution. It provides a brief overview of the poor state of the banks in 1991, with the financial system on the brink of collapse. This is followed by an analysis of how the sector was renewed by banks being recapitalized and by interest rate deregulation. It also analyses problems, such as non‐performing assets. It concludes with a brief analysis of other areas such as the capital market and insurance sectors.
The Social Sectors, Poverty, and Reform
Authors: Joshi Vijay , Little I. M. D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe effect of industrial reform on the social sector is the main aspect of this chapter. It examines the different effects of reform on the level of poverty in India. The authors propose ways to reform the industrial sector and comment on the likely effects of these changes on poverty levels in the short and long terms. There is also a brief discussion on the education and health sector.
Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy
Authors: Hardin Russell 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe central argument of this book is that liberalism, constitutionalism, and democracy, as well as, specifically, liberal constitutional democracy all work, when they do, because they serve the mutual advantage of the politically effective groups in the society through coordination of those groups on a political and, perhaps, economic order. These arguments are applied both to the early history of constitutional developments in the United States and to contemporary transitions from autocratic regimes to market democracies. A subsidiary claim is that constitutional political institutions and democratic procedures generally require not so much active support as merely acquiescence in order to survive and work. These are explanatory theses, not normative claims, but they have relevance for normative claims if one takes seriously some relative of Kant's dictum that ought implies can. If we are to insist that some form of government is normatively right for a particular society, we must be able to say that it would or could work for that society.It is commonly argued that what makes democracy right is that it works by consent. If so, it is such a distressingly minimal form of consent—acquiescence—as to be normatively disqualified. If we rule out mere acquiescence as adequate for consent, it seems likely that no credible argument can be adduced to defend liberal constitutional democracy in any detail on grounds of consent or contractarianism. Hence, concern for workability, which should be central to any moral assessment of principles of social order, undercuts the entire consent school of political theory.
Mutual Advantage
Authors: Hardin Russell 
Published: October 2003

AbstractTheories of liberalism, constitutionalism, and democracy are mutual advantage theories. Liberalism is about arranging institutions to allow all of us to prosper in our own individual ways. Political liberalism was partly invented in response to religious claims that some ways of believing should be suppressed, and economic liberalism grew and was eventually more or less institutionalized in government policy because it caused all to prosper through the prosperity of each. Constitutionalism works when and only when it serves to coordinate a population on some matters, such as social order, commerce, and national defense that are more important than the issues on which they might differ. Similarly, democracy works only when there are no deeply divisive issues that override the value of order and other very generally advantageous values. The pre‐eminent theorists of mutual advantage are Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, and Adam Smith, although there are many strands of mutual advantage arguments in virtually all of political theory and in the predominant school of economic theory of the past several centuries in Scotland and England, Western Europe, North America, and, recently, most of the world.
Liberalism: Political and Economic
Authors: Hardin Russell 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDespite the singular term liberalism, there are two relatively distinct historical branches—political and economic liberalisms—and a collection of variously titled modern branches. Political liberalism arose in the seventeenth century to counter universalistic religious views whose proponents were so ardent as to wish to impose those views by force, and in a sense therefore it was an invention to resolve a then current, awful problem. There have been many comparable social inventions, many of which have failed, as communism, egalitarianism, and perhaps socialism have all failed to date. In contrast, by the time Bernard Mandeville, Adam Smith, and others came to analyse economic liberalism, they were analysing characteristics of their own society, some of which had been developing over many centuries. Insofar as the early economic liberals had programmes, these were for reforms of political practice to end elements of state‐sponsored monopoly and protection and of political theory to give a moral (welfarist) justification for the supposedly immoral greed that drives markets to greater production; as he put it, public virtue comes from private vice.
Liberalization and Its Discontents
Authors: Hardin Russell 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAs there are two liberalisms, so also there are two major liberalizing transitions that non‐liberal polities may make. They may become politically liberal and they may become economically liberal. It is possible that eventually a society must be both politically and economically liberal if it is to be either, although, despite many arguments in defence of this supposition, evidence suggests that, at least, politically illiberal societies can be relatively liberal in their economic management for decades and maybe longer and politically liberal societies can have very strong central control of their economies. Initial liberalization is a matter of essentially spontaneous recoordination from one form of government order to another. The main discontents in the liberalizations of the societies of the eastern nations are the difficulties involved in economic reform, the dispiriting rise of group conflict, including violent ethnic conflict, and the loss of the program and hope of egalitarianism.
Afterword: Whether Agreed to or not
Authors: Hardin Russell 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSociologically, as explanatory theories, liberalism, constitutionalism, and democracy may yield compelling accounts of the political order of many societies. This follows if they serve the mutual advantage of the politically most important groups in modern societies. But they typically do not serve the mutual advantage of everyone in any particular society. This fact raises the normative question of how we could morally justify a liberal, democratic, constitutional regime and its actions. Workability is a necessary part of the morally right order for society; it is merely not sufficient for moral justification.
Coase Revisited: Business Groups in the Modern Economy
Authors: Granovetter Mark 
Published: October 2003

AbstractRonald Coase's celebrated query as to why economic actors typically aggregate into entities called ‘firms’ rather than transacting as individuals in a market has engendered a vigorous stream of research. This paper asks a parallel question: why is it that in all modern economies, firms themselves aggregate into larger entities, often more stable than any literature predicts, which are here referred to as ‘business groups’? After establishing some working definitions, and discussing the curious conjunction of empirical importance and analytical invisibility of business groups, an attempt is made to establish the most significant dimensions along which such groups vary. The chapter ends with some speculations on the role of these groups in economic development. The six sections of the chapter are: Coase Encounters of the Second Kind; A Working Definition of Business Groups; The Invisible Problem of Business Groups; Background and Critique of the Existing Literature; Business Groups: the Empirical Patterns (axes of solidarity; ownership relations; authority structure; moral economy; finance, capital, and the role of banks; and relations with the state); and Discussion.
Technological Discontinuities, Organizational Capabilities, and Strategic Commitments
Authors: Rosenbloom Richard S. , Christensen Clayton M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Innovations based on radically new technologies are believed to create advantages for entrants over incumbents in the relevant markets. This essay asks under what circumstances this is true, and to what extent do the disadvantages of incumbent firms stem from their failure to make timely commitments to new capabilities and new strategies as opposed to their inability to implement those commitments effectively. These questions are explored in relation to recent literature in economics and organization theory, and the concept of the ‘value network’ is introduced. Historical evidence suggests that entrants find greatest advantage when innovations disrupt established trajectories of technological progress, a circumstance that is associated with moves to new value networks. The incumbent's disadvantage, hence, seems to be associated with an inability to change strategies rather than technologies.
The Co‐Evolution of Technology, Industrial Structure, and Supporting Institutions
Authors: Nelson Richard R. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThere is a large intellectual discrepancy between most formal growth models described by economists and descriptions of growth in economic history. This paper draws on an evolutionary theory of economic growth that brings together appreciative theorizing regarding growth and formal theorizing. It aims to piece together a relatively coherent appreciative theoretical account of economic development at a sectoral level by laying out a story of the growth, and development, of a manufacturing sector, from birth to maturity, and perhaps until death, that seems to fit many cases and which can serve as a target for formalization. The paper first describes and tries to link two broad bodies of appreciative evolutionary theoretic writing: one proposes that a new technology develops along a relatively standard track from the time it is born, to its maturity, and that firm and industry structure ‘co‐evolve’ with the technology; the other is concerned with the development of institutions in response to changing economic conditions, incentives, and pressures. The matter of ‘punctuated equilibrium’ is then considered, before concluding with a consideration of two economic developmental implications that appear to flow from the analysis: the first concerns the pattern of change of productivity, of capital intensity, and relative variables associated with economic growth, as a technology and industry structure develop; the second is concerned with implicitly cross‐country comparisons, and is focused on how ‘comparative advantage’ develops in a new industry.
Economics and Business
Authors: Kay John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter explains why economics has had such a limited impact on business, and what should be done about it. The economics relevant to business is principally that which deals with markets and the interactions of firms, not the economics that deals with macroeconomic forecasting. Advances in the former have not been well documented, and most people are not aware of their existence. This chapter outlines their scope.
Can There Be a Science of Business?
Authors: Kay John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter is concerned with whether there can be such a thing as a science of management. It explains some of the issues involved in turning management from a subject based on the assertions of gurus to one that reproduces the structure of concepts, hypothesis, and empirical tests, which is characteristic of natural sciences. The second part of the chapter provides evidence of how management theories that do not follow this structure are misleading.
Competitive Advantage
Authors: Kay John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Using the example of six British supermarket chains, competitive advantage is explained and quantified. When there is no explicit comparator, competitive advantage can be measured in relation to the marginal firm in the industry. In other words, the weakest firm that still finds it worthwhile to serve the market provides the baseline against which the competitive advantage of all other firms can be set. Architecture, innovation, and reputation are reviewed as the main sources of competitive advantage.
The Competitive Advantage of Nations
Authors: Kay John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter explores how the resource‐base theory of strategy can be extended from the competitive advantage of firms to the competitive advantage of countries. A country's competitiveness will ultimately depend on three factors. The first is the strength of the competitive advantage of its individual firms. The second is the access to scarce resources that are available within a country. Most importantly, it will rely on the existence of supportive networks of firms and activities, which facilitate: speed, flexibility of response, and the construction of a base of tacit knowledge.
Contracts or Relationships
Authors: Kay John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
“Architecture” is introduced as the basis of competitive advantage for many companies. It refers to a network of relationship contracts within, or around, the firm. It can be sub‐divided into internal architecture (relationships with employees), external architecture (relationships with their suppliers and customers) and networks (relationships among a group of firms engaged in related activities). It adds value by helping to create organizational knowledge and routines that enable the company to respond flexibly to changing circumstances and allow easy exchanges of information. Such capabilities can only add value in the context of a long‐term relationship, which penalizes opportunistic behaviour.
The Customer Corporation
Authors: Kay John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The stake‐holding view of the nature and purposes of corporations applies most forcefully to monopoly public utilities. This chapter analyses some of the problems of utility regulation and proposes a stake‐holding alternative. In this context, the purpose of a privatized utility should be to serve its customers, and its obligations to shareholders exist only to the extent necessary to ensure that the company can meet its primary purpose.
Inclusive Economies
Authors: Kay John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter contrasts two alternative philosophies that can provide the context for capitalism to exist. On the one end, the New Right holds that the most important social institution is private property, self‐interest is the central human emotion and insecurity is the engine of progress. If there is room for nobler sentiments like altruism, sincerity, and confidence, it is in our family life and not in commerce. On the other end, inclusive economies believe that there is no incompatibility between the functioning of markets and the existence of shared values, collective activity, and broadly accepted concepts of fairness.