bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Aspects of the Relationship Between Aristotle's Psychology and His Zoology
Authors: Lloyd G. E. R. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay explores the extent to which Aristotle’s zoological researches were influenced by his general psychological theory and specific psychological doctrines, and the match or mismatch between the results of his zoological investigations and his general position on questions such as definition, essence, form, and matter. It argues that psychology provides the major articulating framework for Aristotle’s zoology. Certain key points in his zoology and specific psychological doctrines influence his interpretation of the biological phenomena.
Dialectic, Motion, and Perception: De Anima Book
Authors: Witt Charlotte 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Book 1 of Aristotle’s De Anima extensively discusses two characteristics of the soul: the soul as the source of motion of the living being, and the soul as the seat of perception and cognition. The following conclusions are drawn on the nature and function of the soul. The soul is not a magnitude and not material; it is a substance and not an attribute; it is a unity, and the principle of unity is not material continuity. The soul is the origin of perception and motion, and of psychological processes such as emotions and desires. An adequate account of how the soul causes perception, motion, and the like must not attribute motion to the soul.
Aristotle on the Sense of Touch
Authors: Freeland Cynthia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay explores the central place of Aristotle’s views of the sense of touch within his empiricist epistemology and general physical theory. It argues that Aristotle was not committed to a ‘literalist’ view of the nature of sensory representation, according to which an organ literally becomes ‘like’ the said object. It suggests an interpretation of Aristotle’s defence of the objectivity of tactile representation, which shows a deep and complex link between his theory of sense-knowledge and his project of scientific explanation.
Aristotle on the Imagination
Authors: Schofield Malcolm 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay explores Aristotle’s treatment of imagination. It argues that Aristotle need not be charged with the radical inconsistency in his treatment of phantasia diagnosed by Hamlyn. Although a conceptual link can be made between imagination and a use of ‘appears’, the link is not as close as the connection between phantasia and phainesthai, nor does ‘appears’ provide the natural entree to the study of imagination which phainetai provides to that of phantasia. A little lexicography will show that the syntactic behaviour and semantic range of phantasia are different from those of imagination.
The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle
Authors: Frede Dorothea 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Phantasia is viewed as a unified concept in Aristotle. When the metaphoric meaning of ‘phantisizing’ is excluded, the causal account for all imagination is the same: all phantasiai are motions in the soul caused by sense-perceptions. These are sensory images or imprints that can exist independently from their original source. Their history may be different, and their character and value may vary. Aristotle’s insistence on their sensory nature indicates that he saw them as a unitary phenomenon in the soul, as sensory appearances.
Aristotle on Memory and the Self
Authors: Annas Julia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay argues that Aristotle’s view of memory is more like that of the modern psychologist than that of a modern philosopher; he is more interested in accurately delineating different kinds of memory than in discussing philosophical problems of memory. The short treatise On Memory and Recollection is considered a treatise on memory and loosely associated phenomenon and recollection. It is suggested that this work is better regarded as a treatise on two kinds of memory.
Desire and the Good in De Anima
Authors: Richardson Henry S. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay presents an interpretation of the theory of animal movement that emphasizes the place Aristotle accords the good as the object of desire and the coordinate importance he assigns to desire and discernment. This interpretation is based on two competing models: the desire-based model, where the shape of the account of any action is based on some one occurrent desire; and the good-based model, where the account starts from some object aimed at as good. It is argued that the texts of De Anima 3. 9-11 better fit the good-based model of animal motion than the desire-based model.
The Seas of Language
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The book contains articles in metaphysics and philosophy of language written between 1975 and 1992. Dummett defends the verificationist theory of meaning, according to which in order to know the meaning of a statement one must be in possession of a procedure to verify it. He also argues for the link between bivalence and the metaphysical doctrine of realism. Other topics discussed include refutation of instrumentalism, mathematical applicability, backward causation, and the analysis of the concept of existence.
Language and Truth
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
According to one view, it is as absurd to explain the notion of truth in general as it is to explain the notion of winning the game for an arbitrary game. Knowing what it takes to win the game is inseparable from knowing what the game consists in. Far from showing the absence of a philosophical problem about truth, this argument establishes the link between the concept of truth and the concept of meaning. The meaning of a sentence should be given in terms of the procedure in which this sentence may be verified. Hence, the notion of verification may play a part of the theoretical rôle usually ascribed to the notion of truth, even if the latter might not be wholly explainable in terms of the former.
Truth and Meaning
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
According to the code conception of language, we need language merely because we happen to lack the faculty to transmit thoughts directly from one mind to another. A fatal obstacle to the code conception is the complexity of thought: having a thought involves possession of its component concepts, and concepts cannot come before consciousness unless expressed in words. However, the explanatory priority of thought and language is not the most urgent: both the theory of meaning and the theory of thought have to explain what it is to have a thought. The principal trait of thoughts is their aptness for being true or false. In order to say anything illuminating about the concept of truth, we must link it with the notions of recognizing and of accepting a thought or statement as true.
Realism
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Realism has traditionally been understood as an epistemological doctrine about the direct awareness of the external objects. There is another sense of realism, in which one is said to be a realist about a particular subject matter. In the latter sense, it is a semantic thesis about the bivalence of the statements of the given subject matter. The anti‐realist semantical claim amounts to denying the possibility of knowing a statement to be true unless one has the means to arrive at such knowledge. Dummett argues that only the semantic thesis is coherent, exploring interactions between the semantic versions of realism and anti‐realism.
Testimony and Memory
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Testimony should not be regarded as a source, and still less as a ground, of knowledge: it is the transmission from one individual to another of knowledge acquired by whatever means. A sceptic cannot admit memory, but not testimony, as a channel for the transmission of knowledge, for the analogy between them is too close. The idea that it is unreasonable to believe something to be so on the sole basis of having been told that it is so is as myopic as the idea that it is unreasonable to believe something to have been so on the sole basis of remembering it as having been so. Lying should be treated as an abnormal phænomenon in linguistic practice, since otherwise words could not mean what they do mean.
What Is Mathematics About?
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
While it is relatively clear what the subject matter of empirical sciences is, puzzles persist about the proper subject matter of mathematics. The logicists took mathematics to be concerned solely with deductive arguments. Their programme attempted to combine three incompatible claims: that mathematics is a body of truths, that it is non‐empirical, and that it employs proofs obeying the rules of classical logic. By giving up the third contention, it becomes possible to salvage the logicist programme and to explain better mathematical practice, including the fact of its application in empirical disciplines.
Realism and Anti‐Realism
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Disputes about realism should be construed as disputes not about a class of entities, but about the truth‐value of the statements in a given class. For what reality consists in is not determined just by what objects there are, but by what propositions hold good: the world is the totality of facts, not of things. However, the rejection of bivalence is not a sufficient ground for rejecting realism. A genuine rejection of realism amounts to the view that logical constants classically understood do not make sense.
Critical Aesthetics and Postmodernism
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considerable controversy has raged around the question of postmodern culture and its products. This book attempts to overcome some of the antagonistic viewpoints involved by developing themes from the work of Kant, Benjamin, and Merleau–Ponty in the context of themes from contemporary culture. Attention is paid to such topics as the relation between art and politics, the problematics of poststructuralist and feminist approaches to art, the emergence and re‐emergence of theories of the sublime, and the continuing possibility of artistic creativity. The central theme is that there are experiential constants around which art and philosophy constellate. At the same time, however, due account must be given of the ways in which such constants are historically mediated. By articulating various aspects of this relation, it is shown how postmodern sensibility can be more than that of an alienated consumerism. Understood in the proper theoretical context, it is grounded on experiences and artefacts that humanize.
From Différance to Embodiment
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A critique of Derrida's approach to language using ideas from Merleau–Ponty. Focuses on an extended reappraisal of the notion of différance, and stresses the continuity that exists between perception and our reading of texts and other symbolic formations. This continuity stabilizes presence and meaning, and is grounded on our existence as embodied beings.
Violence in Painting
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Centres on a discussion of violence in painting. Recent discussions of the topic have tended to reduce it to gender issues—an approach so narrow as to warrant the term gendercentrism. The approach taken here, however, is one that builds on concepts broached in earlier chapters, and that emphasizes the possible interplay of imagination and aesthetic empathy even in the context of violent representation.
Moral Insight and Aesthetic Experience
Authors: Crowther Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Analyses and applies Kant's theory of the sublime. Offers the approach as an alternative to revisions of Kant (such as that by Thomas Weiskel) that are based on structural linguistics or psychoanalysis. Then defends the approach from criticisms raised against a version of it offeredearlier in this book The Kantian Sublime.
Causal Theories
Authors: Child William 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIntroduces and explains the basic argument for a causal theory of action‐explanation, and defends it against various non‐causal views of action: explaining an action is explaining why something happened, and an explanation of why something happened is always a causal explanation. But what is involved in the claim that reason‐explanation is a form of causal explanation? The chapter begins to answer that question. First, it considers the relation between causal explanation, on the one hand, and the singular relation of causation, on the other. Second, it considers the relation between mental causation and physical causation, defending the idea that we cannot take a purely mentalist view of mental causation.
Frege's ‘Kernsätze Zur Logik’
Authors: Dummett Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A very early fragment contained in Frege's nachlaβ is here shown to have been a series of comments on the introduction to Herman Lotze's Logik (1874, 1880), and thus provides the only proof that Frege ever read Lotze. They demonstrate Frege's concern from early in his career with the question ‘what is a thought?’, and conviction from the same period that truth is indefinable.
Concepts
Authors: Fodor Jerry A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Jerry Fodor presents a strikingly original theory of the basic constituents of thought. He suggests that the heart of a cognitive science is its theory of concepts, and that cognitive scientists have gone badly wrong in many areas because their assumptions about concepts have been seriously mistaken. Fodor argues compellingly for an atomistic theory of concepts, and maintains that future work on human cognition should build upon new foundations. He starts by demolishing the rival theories that have prevailed in recent years—that concepts are definitions, that they are prototypes or stereotypes, that they are abstractions from belief systems, etc. He argues that all such theories are radically unsatisfactory for two closely related reasons: they hold that the content of a concept is determined, at least in part, by its inferential role; and they hold that typical concepts are structurally complex. Empirical and philosophical arguments against each of these claims are elaborated. Fodor then develops his alternative account, arguing that conceptual content is determined entirely by informational (mind—world) relations, and that typical concepts are atomic. The implications of this ‘informational atomism’ are considered in respect of issues in psychology, lexical semantics, and metaphysics, with particular attention to the relation between informational atomism and innateness.
Plato on Parts and Wholes
Authors: Harte Verity 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book is an examination of Plato's treatment of the relation between a whole and its parts in a group of Plato's later works: the Theaetetus, Parmenides, Sophist, Philebus, and Timaeus. Plato's discussions of part and whole in these texts fall into two distinct groups: a problematic one in which he explores, without endorsing, a model of composition as identity; and another in which he develops an alternative to this rejected model. Each model is concerned with the nature of composition of a whole from its parts, such that a whole is an individual, rather than a mere collection or heap. According to the problematic model of composition, a whole is identical to its many parts, that is, the relation of many parts to one whole is just the relation of identity. This model is shown to have the paradoxical consequence that the same thing(s) is (or are) both one thing and many things, and for this reason, amongst others, it cannot support an adequate account of composition. According to the alternative model of composition, wholes of parts are contentful structures (or, instances of such structures), whose parts get their identity only in the context of the whole they compose. Plato presents the structure of such wholes as the proper objects of Platonic science: essentially irreducible, intelligible, and normative in character.
The Problem of Composition
Authors: Harte Verity 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines several modern accounts of composition—especially David Lewis's, a version of classical extensional mereology—with the aim of framing a shared question about composition. The problem that Plato sets out to solve is of how to give an account of composition in such a way as to allow that a whole is an individual rather than merely a collection of parts. The relation between composition and identity, and the ontological innocence or otherwise of composition, are both matters right at the heart of Plato's discussions of composition, since on the view of composition that identifies a whole with its parts, a whole is both one and many. Consideration of a passage from the Theaetetus (203–206) gives content to the points of contact established between Platonic and modern discussions of composition and provides the first example of Plato's concern with this model of composition that he rejects.
A New Model of Composition
Authors: Harte Verity 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter, along with the next, focuses on the alternative model of composition that Plato develops to respond to the problems he has posed in his discussion of the rejected model. The focus here is first on the Parmenides, from which the outline of an alternative theory emerges, and then on the Theaetetus and the Sophist, from which some of the broader context of Plato's problem of composition is recovered within which his solution to the problem takes shape. Central to this solution is Plato's distinguishing of the part–whole relation from the relations of distinctness and, more importantly, of identity. On the alternative model, composition is restricted; it is ontologically committed or creative; and it centrally involves the existence of certain structural relations between the parts of a whole.
Composition and Structure
Authors: Harte Verity 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBegins with some general considerations about structure and the role it might be thought to play in the constitution of a whole and then turns to Plato's own account of both composition and structure. In the Sophist, structure is the proper object of science, as in mathematical structuralism for example, and it is so because structure is made a basic and irreducible item in its ontology. The same holds true in the Philebus, in which the class of limit captures the structure of things, abstractly conceived, and the unlimited captures the domain of content on which it is imposed, while together these are the two ingredients of the analysis of a mixture, normatively conceived, that is, of a whole. Then, in the Timaeus, structure is characterized mathematically, but, as in the Philebus, wholes may again be characterized as contentful structures.
The Mind of God and the Works of Man
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The overall aim of this book is to examine the relation between philosophy studied as a specialized academic discipline and ‘philosophies’, general visions of man and reality that provide guidance in thought and behaviour, and form the background for any specific philosophical enquiry. Philosophical thought has always had the function of articulating such very general pictures of the real. To forget this, Craig argues, leads to a serious distortion of the writings and concerns of great philosophers of the past, and also to trivial philosophy.
Two important consequences of looking at philosophy in this way are, first, an increased sympathy for the idea that philosophy can occur in a variety of media, for example literature, and second, a greater appreciation of the historically variable factors in philosophy, including our own.
The more specific aim of the book is to identify, by means of a broad survey of four centuries of philosophical thought, two visions of man and reality that have been dominant in the history of modern philosophy. In chapter 1, Craig is concerned with the dominant philosophy of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, arguing that the central metaphysical vision was the ‘Image of God’ doctrine, or ‘Similarity Thesis’: the view that man was made in God’s image.
In chapter 5, Craig portrays the very different ‘Agency Theory’, or ‘Practice Ideal’, that rose to prominence during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: the view that human beings are autonomous creators of their environment and values.
Chapter 3 discusses the metaphysic of the Romantic Era, revealing it to be a bridge period, in which the chief characteristics of the previous and following centuries were for a time closely united.
In chapters 2, 4, and 6 the attempt is made to show how selected philosophical texts are illuminated when read against the background of the dominant metaphysics of their time. Chapter 2 focusses on Hume, chapter 4 on Hegel, while chapter 6 turns to philosophical doctrines of the twentieth century.
The Mind of God
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The principal aim of this chapter is to document and describe the ‘dominant philosophy’ of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries: the doctrine that man was made in the image of God. Examining writings by thinkers such as Galileo, Descartes, Pascal, Spinoza, Leibniz, Malebranche, Newton, Clarke, and Berkeley, Craig finds that they were all committed to some version of the Similarity Thesis. Its cognitive branch, the ‘Insight Ideal’, manifests itself in the view that our logical and mathematical knowledge and our knowledge of our own mental states possesses a certainty that even God cannot surpass, as well as in the, then widespread, view that we live in a world that is, in principle, fully intelligible to us. The link between the human and the divine mind is usually thought to be provided by the faculty of reason, but the Similarity Thesis has also taken the form that the human mind is in fact a part of the divine intellect. It connects with the prevalence of a contemplative or scientific ethic in which the pursuit of knowledge appears as a good in itself. Moreover, there is a version of the Image of God doctrine focusing on agency and finding expression in the view of, for example, Descartes that, at its best, the human will is as free as a will could possibly be.
The Metaphysic of the Romantic Era
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter considers the philosophy of the years shortly before and shortly after the beginning of the nineteenth century, and in doing so illustrates the claim that the ‘dominant philosophy’ of an era can sometimes be found most clearly expressed in works of literature. The philosophy of the romantic era is characterised by one great metaphysical theme: unity, its loss and recovery. Schiller’s poem ‘Die Götter Griechenlands’, Goethe’s ballad ‘Der Fischer’, Kleist’s article ‘ Über das Marionettentheater’, and Hölderlin’s novel ‘Hyperion’, Craig suggests, all illustrate a fundamental striving towards unity that is lost through knowledge and consciousness, and although they differ both in their assessment of the situation and in their reaction to it, they express a singular awareness of the deep dichotomies that characterise the intellectual climate of their time. At the most general level, the romantic vision was of the oneness of man and nature, the immanence of God in nature, and an element of divinity in man. Deeply indebted to the Image of God doctrine, yet also on the way to abandoning it, these themes inform, and in part anticipate, the systematic philosophy of Hegel.