bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Eudaimonia As An Activity In Nicomachean Ethics 1. 8 – 12
Authors: Heinaman Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Given the attention it has received, students of Aristotle may well be weary of the debate over inclusivist and non-inclusivist interpretations of the Nicomachean Ethics’ account of eudaimonia. But I believe the issue is worth revisiting because evidence favouring the non-inclusivist view has yet to be appreciated. While attention has focused on Nicomachean Ethics 1. 7, there is strong support for the non-inclusivist view in the immediately following chapters of book 1.
The Early Stoic Doctrine Of The Change To Wisdom
Authors: Brouwer Reneé 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The early Stoics presented the sage as the crowning glory of their system of thought. Although they acknowledged the difficulty of achieving the ideal, this did not restrain them from describing how it could be attained. Here I wish to concentrate upon one small, but important aspect of the Stoics’ theory of the long and strenuous process of achieving wisdom: the moment of becoming wise.
Russell s Logical Form, LF, and Truth-Conditions
Authors: Linsky Bernard 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions is generally credited as the source of the idea that the logical form of a sentence will be very different from its grammatical or syntactic form. Russell’s view was that just as ‘I met a man’ and ‘No one met Jones’ are only superficially atomic relational statements of the form aRb and must be represented very differently when symbolized in a formal language, so sentences with definite descriptions such as ‘The present king of France is bald’ must also be given symbolizations very different from their superficial grammatical form as simple subject predicate sentences.
Ordinary Proper Names
Authors: Reimer Marga 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
If one asserts ‘Scott is Sir Walter’, the way one would mean it would be that one was using the names as descriptions. One would mean that the person called ‘Scott’ is the person called ‘Sir Walter’, and ‘the person called ‘‘Scott’’ ‘ is a description and so is ‘the person called ‘‘Sir Walter’’ ‘. So that would not be a tautology. It would mean that the person called ‘Scott’ is identical with the person called ‘Sir Walter’. But if you are using both as names, the matter is quite different. You must observe that the name does not occur in that which you assert when you use the name. The name is merely that which is a means of expressing what it is you are trying to assert, and when I say, ‘Scott wrote Waverley ‘, the name ‘Scott’ does not occur in the thing I am asserting. The thing I am asserting is about the person, not about the name. So if I say ‘Scott is Sir Walter’, using these two names as names, neither ‘Scott’ nor ‘Sir Walter’ occurs in what I am asserting, but only the person who has these names, and thus what I am asserting is a pure tautology (Russell, 1918).
Forms as Causes: Plato and Aristotle
Authors: Fine Gail 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
‘One might be especially puzzled’, Aristotle muses in Metaph. A 9 (991a8–10 = M 5, 1079b12–14), ‘about what forms contribute either to everlasting sensibles or to those that come and cease to be.’ If forms are to ‘contribute’ to sensibles, they must be some sort of aitia—explanatory factor—of them.1 There are, Aristotle believes, just four sorts of explanatory factors—material, formal, efficient, and final. Platonic forms, he argues, are explanatory of sensibles in none of these ways; hence they contribute nothing to sensibles. Since we have reason to believe something exists only if it serves some explanatory purpose, we have no reason to believe forms exist.
The Holistic Presuppositions of Aristotle’s Cosmology
Authors: Matthen Mohan 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the De caelo Aristotle posits an unchanging intelligent being that exists beyond the heavens, enjoying there ‘the best and most selfsufficient life’ (1. 9, 279”21-2). In Physics 8 and Metaphysics A this entity becomes the Primc Unmoved moreover, ultimately responsible for all movement, change, and generation in the universe. what exactly is the relationship between the Prime Mover and the corporeal universe? It is perhaps natural to think of it as a cause of change that is distinct from and stands outside the various corporeal substances in which change occurs.
Philosophy and History in the History of Modern Philosophy
Authors: Garrett Don 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Philosophical questions are cognitively orienting. That is, how one answers them whether explicitly or implicitly—determines in fundamental ways how one thinks about a whole range of important but more specific or consequent questions. Answers to philosophical questions can provide cognitive orientation through their implications about what the answers to those more specific or consequent questions must be, through their implications about how those more specific or consequent questions should be approached, or through their implications about the significance or value of the answers to those more specific or consequent questions. Of course, it does not follow from this characterization of philosophical questions that every question is either entirely philosophical or entirely unphilosophical; nor that philosophical questions can be well addressed without knowledge of the answers to less philosophical questions; nor that there is any single method or training that is suitable for addressing all philosophical questions; nor that different cultures and eras will not find themselves confronting quite different philosophical questions or employing quite different methods.
The Need for Social Epistemology
Authors: Goldman Alvin 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Epistemology is one of the oldest fields of philosophy. Plato, for example, devoted several dialogues, or portions thereof, to epistemology, including Meno, Phaedo, Republic, and Theaetetus. Epistemology is as lively a subject today as in many periods, though its intricacies are not widely known outside academic philosophy. Much of today’s epistemology, like the epistemology of yesteryear, is focused on skepticism. But there is also a novel development in epistemology, the emergence of social epistemology. This paper’s aim is to sketch the contours of social epistemology and to show why its rapid and extensive growth is to be encouraged.
The Expression of the Inexpressible in Eugenio Montale’s Poetry
Authors: Brook Clodagh J 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is impossible to say just what I mean!' Prufrock's frustration in Eliot's celebrated poem underlines the pessimistic view of language at the heart of much Modernist poetry. Locating the greatest Italian poet of the twentieth century, Eugenio Montale, firmly within European Modernism, this book examines the struggle with language that is central to his work. What can a poet do when words fail him? Does he put down his pen, retreat into silence? Does he seek instead to push language towards its limits, and, if so, what tools can he employ? What part does metaphor, the via negativa, allusive or understated writing have in this process? These are just some of the issues that Clodagh J. Brook seeks to address. In its unravelling of the inexpressibility paradox, her book offers a new reading of Montale's early verse, and reveals how in articles and metapoetic comments Montale gives us insights into both his poetics and the whole process of expression.
Athens, Democracy and Freedom
Authors: Schofield Malcolm 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In Karl Popper’s famous book The Open Society and its Enemies, Plato ﬁgures not as the earliest architect of an anti-democratic ideology (that accolade went to Heraclitus), but as the most influential of all anti-democratic thinkers in the Western tradition. Hence the title of Popper’s first volume: The Spell of Plato. His interpretation of the Republic was highly controversial, and in some respects demonstrably mistaken. But although there are lines of thought worked out in the Republic that need not in themselves be regarded as incompatible with democracy, few readers would deny that its main political argument is profoundly undemocratic in basic direction.
Utopia
Authors: Schofield Malcolm 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One thing everybody knows about the Republic is that it is the first great work of political utopianism ever written—although it was not for another 2,000 years that the word ‘utopia’ was invented (by Sir Thomas More, early in the sixteenth century). In some minds that description will at once ring warning bells. Wasn’ t the construction of utopias a blind alley for political thought and (still more) for the pursuit of happiness? And isn’ t it an activity—whether literary or political—we are now thankfully rid of? Not for nothing, it might be said, was the second half of the twentieth century punctuated by inquests on the entire enterprise: After Utopia, The End of Ideology, Das Ende der Utopie, The End of Utopia, and (ambiguously, but perhaps most notoriously of all) The End of History, even if the note they were striking was seldom uncomplicatedly triumphalist.
Ideology
Authors: Schofield Malcolm 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The nightmare of society tearing itself apart in mutual hatred and the pursuit of self-interest is a spectre omnipresent in Plato’s thinking about politics: a nightmare for our own times. Plato’s recipe in the Republic and the Laws alike for dispelling it has various components: tightly controlled institutional structures; a common education—at least for the ruling classes—designed to develop or control (as needed) every element in the human psyche for the promotion of virtue; government conducted with wisdom and an overriding concern for the public interest. Another ingredient is the subject of this final chapter: ideology. Not Plato’s word, of course (a late eighteenth-century French coinage). and a word with a range of meanings, although its use as a critical tool by Marx, Marxists and other theorists of false consciousness is per-haps the most celebrated.
The Present State of the Scientific Realism Debate
Authors: Psillos Stathis 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this survey article I try to appraise the present state of the scientific realism debate with an eye to important but hitherto unexplored suggestions and open issues that need further work. In Section 2, I mostly focus on the relationship between scientific realism and truth. In Section 3, I discuss the grounds for realists’ epistemic optimism.
There was at one time a feeling in the philosophy of science community that the scientific realism debate had run out of steam. Fine went so far as to declare that ‘realism is well and truly dead’ ([1986a], p. 112) and to write the obituary of the debate, aka the Natural Ontological Attitude. Fortunately, this line of argument has failed to persuade many philosophers, who still think that the scientific realism debate has a glorious past and a very promising future
Getting to Goodness
Authors: Inwood Brad 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is a fundamental tenet of Stoicism that the entire repertoire of human concepts comes directly or indirectly from our sensory experience, interpreted broadly. Here (for convenience) is a familiar set of texts which tells us most of what we know about Stoic theories on the acquisition of concepts. Diogenes Laertius 7.52–3 52. According to the Stoics, ‘sense-perception’ refers to [a] the pneumawhich extends from the leading part [of the soul] to the senses and [b] the ‘grasp’ which comes through the senses and [c] the equipment of the sense organs (in which some people are impaired).
Seneca and Self-assertion
Authors: Inwood Brad 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This essay is, in a sense, the continuation of a line of thought about moral psychology in Seneca first broached in Chapter 5. Between the composition of the two a little over seven years passed. The occasion of the first essay was a conference paper and the earliest version of it was entitled ‘The Will and the Self in Seneca’. But the longer I worked on that paper and the more critical feedback I received, the more self-less it became, until in the end it was entitled simply
The Pet Fish and the Red Herring: Why Concepts Still Can ’t Be Prototypes
Authors: Fodor Jerry , Lepore Ernest 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
THERE is a standard objection to the idea that concepts might be prototypes (or exemplars, or stereotypes; we ’ll use these terms inter changeably): Because they are productive, concepts must be compositional. Prototypes are n ’t compositional. So concepts can ‘t be prototypes. However, two recent papers (Osherson and Smith 1988 (OS2); Kamp and Partee 1995 (KP)) reconsider this consensus. They suggest that, although the standard objection is probably right in the long run, the cases where prototypes fail to exhibit compositionality are relatively exotic and involve phenomena that any account of compositionality is likely to find hard to deal with; for example, the effects of vagueness, quantifiers, indexicals, contextual constraints, etc.
Strawson and Analytic Kantianism
Authors: Glock Hans-Johann 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is a commonplace that the reputation of, and interest in, philosophers of the past waxes and wanes from decade to decade. But while even the greatest members of the philosophical pantheon can become unfashionable, some of them have never been neglected entirely. Plato and Aristotle belong to that select group, and so do the founder of modern philosophy, Descartes, and its most eminent representative, Kant. Still, there was a time when interest in Kant was mainly historical in nature, roughly between the 1920s and the 1960s. After the First World War the neo-Kantianism that had dominated academic philosophy on the Continent for fifty years finally ran out of steam. As a dynamic motor of philosophical development neo Kantianism was replaced by phenomenology and its hermeneutic offspring on the one hand, by analytic philosophy on the other.
Transcendental Arguments and Realism
Authors: Grundmann Thomas , Misselhorn Catrin 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It almost amounts to a platitude that realism and transcendental arguments do not go well together. To see why, let us briefly rehearse the characteristics of transcendental arguments. (i) Their premisses have to be justified independently of any experience about the external world, i.e. they must be justified introspectively or a priori. (ii) The premisses cannot be rejected by the sceptic. (iii) Transcendental arguments uncover necessary conditions of thought and experience. (iv) The conclusion of the argument entails truths about the external world. But, as Barry Stroud has emphasized since the late 196os, the premisses of transcendental arguments seem to have only psychological status. They, therefore, do not warrant any inferences about the external world.
On Strawson ‘s Naturalistic Turn
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is customary when considering Strawson ‘s philosophical outlook to categorize him as a Kantian, and understandably so: Strawson ‘s The Bounds of Sense is one of the most influential studies of Kant ‘s first Critique; his use of transcendental arguments in that work and in his earlier book Individuals is clearly inspired by Kant; and Strawson ‘s opposition to certain kinds of empiricism and anti-philosophical scientism (the former embodied for him by Ayer and the latter by Quine) appears to reflect Kant ‘s own hopes for his transcendental philosophy, as offering a ‘third way ‘ between these and a rationalistic traditional metaphysics. Above all, perhaps, it has been assumed that it is in relation to the problems posed by scepticism that Strawson is close to Kant, in attempting to undercut the sceptical position by showing that it rests on a questionable underlying assumption (for example, that inner sense is possible without outer sense, or that first-person experience is possible without experience of others), and that once the fallaciousness of this assumption is exposed, the sceptical position can be rebutted.
Program Explanation: A General Perspective
Authors: Jackson Frank , Pettit Philip 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The essay is in three sections. The first section introduces three plausible assumptions about the role of properties in causal explanations. We will not be questioning these assumptions here. The second section shows how these assumptions generate a problem when combined with a fourth assumption that looks equally difficult to resist. The third section offers a solution to the problem by showing how, nevertheless, we can and should resist this fourth assumption. The fourth assumption is that the only way in which a property can be causally relevant to an effect is by being causally efficacious in its production. In order to resist that assumption, the essay draws on an account of causal relevance under which a property can be causally relevant without being causally efficacious.
Structural Explanation 1n Social Theory
Authors: Jackson Frank , Pettit Philip 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Social facts are easier to illustrate than define. They include facts, if they are facts, like the following: that the rich enjoy higher social status than the poor; that there has been a world-wide fall in the number of smokers; that the Soviet Union withdrew its troops from Afghanistan; that the crime00ADrate in Australia is lower than in the US; that every successful entrepreneur maximizes expected net revenue; and that the birth00ADrate in Western countries fell in the twentieth century.
Minimalism and Truth Aptness
Authors: Jackson Frank , Oppy Graham , Smith Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Non-cognitivism in ethics holds that ethical sentences are not in the business of being either true or false-for short, they are not truth apt. No-truth theories of indicative conditionals (on one labelling of the relevant class of conditionals) hold that indicative conditionals have assertability or acceptability conditions, but not truth conditions; they are not truth apt. The arguments for these views are typically local to ethics and conditionals, respectively. They are not usually set within a specific theory of truth, and the question of how they connect to the various theories of truth is typically left unaddressed. This is surprising.’ An obvious question to ask about non-cognitivism and no-truth theories of conditionals is how they fare in the light of various views about truth.
Backgrounding Desire
Authors: Pettit Philip , Smith Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision00ADmaking, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in the foreground?
Function and Design Revisited
Authors: Buller David J 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The concept of design has played a central role in several prominent theories of biological function. Williams, for example, argues that the demonstration of design is both necessary and sufficient for the demonstration of function (1966: 209). Millikan says: ‘Having a proper function is a matter of having been “designed to” . . . perform a certain function’ (1984: 17). And Kitcher echoes: ‘the function of S is what S is designed to do’ (1993: 380). None of these authors, however, provides an analysis of design. Williams assumes, instead, that ‘design is something that can be intuitively comprehended’ by analogy with human engineering (1966: 260; see also 1992: 40).
The Continuing Usefulness Account of Proper Function
Authors: Schwartz Peter H 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the last quarter century, etiological accounts have dominated much of the debate over the concept of function. Following Larry Wright (1973), these accounts say that a trait has a function F only if it has been favored by natural selection for doing F. Even critics now agree that this approach is needed to explicate at least one of the concepts at work in biology, which some have termed ‘proper function’ (cf. Millikan 1984, 1989b). Attempting to work out the details, Griffiths (1992, 1993) and Godfrey-Smith (1994) have presented convincing arguments that an etiological account should require that the relevant natural selection occurred recently, often in the form of maintenance selection.
Human Bonding and OikeiŌsis in Roman Stoicism
Authors: Reydams-schils Gretchen 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
For he who is either fast bound in the love lures of his wife or under the stress of nature makes his children his first care, ceases to be the same to others, and unconsciously has become a different man, and has passed from freedom into slavery. The Stoics inherited from Plato2 and Aristotle (Art’ io98bi3-i4) a threefold division of ‘goods’ into ‘goods of the soul, goods of the body, and externals’. Emphasizing the opposition between soul and body, Plato also puts such a division to work in the Phaedo (63 e- 69 e; esp. 68 b, c), in order to pinpoint virtue and happiness. In this same context Plato has Socrates send his spouse, ‘the women’, and his children away (60 a; i 16 b), in order to ‘avoid the unseemliness’
Non-Rational Perception in The Stoics and Augustine
Authors: Brittai Charles 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Augustine was interested in the experience of ordinary cognitive agents. In his view, human experience involves three quite different kinds of cognitive information: the products of the non-rational faculties we have in common with animals, and those of the rational and intellectual faculties that distinguish us from them. His analyses of the relation between ordinary rational thought and intellection are relatively well known, if still profoundly puzzling. His views on the relation between ordinary thought and non-rational perception are less well known, though perhaps equally puzzling. In either case, his approach seems to lead to two problems: about the way in which the relevant faculty (the intellect, the senses) grasps its objects, and about how the information grasped by that faculty (intellectual objects, sensory input) is ‘translated’ or applied in ordinary rational thought. In this paper I look at some of Augustine’s views about the objects and contents of non-rational perception, in the hope that getting some idea of its scope will ultimately contribute towards a clearer understanding of Augustine’s conception of ordinary rational thought.
The Stative Value of the PIE Verbal Suffix *-‹éh1-
Authors: Ruijgh C J 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this paper I shall plead for the stative value of the PIE verbal suffix *-éh1-as established, among others, by Watkins (1971), and against the fientive value defended recently by Harðarson (1998) and Rix (1998). Since the passive Greek -η- aorist is used by the latter two as an argument for the fientive meaning, I shall show that the original form of this aorist morpheme was *-η-σ-.
Spoken Language and Written Text: The Case of αλλοϵ ι δ ϵ α (Hom. Od. 13. 194)
Authors: Cassio A C 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Brought back home by the Phaeacians, Odysseus wakes up in his native Ithaca but is unable to recognize it because of the mist Athena has poured around him: the features of the surrounding landscape look strangely unfamiliar to him: