bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Chapter 11: Sophistic Puzzles Concerning Simple and Complex Assertions
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter takes up the question of simple and complex assertions from Chs. 5 and 8. This thinking is applied to solving sophisms involving double predications, such as ’Is Socrates a pale walking man?’, different parts of which demand different answers. There is a discussion here of dialectical questions, and what kinds of assertions constitute proper answers. This chapter is closely tied to discussions in the Topics and Sophistic Refutations. Like the discussion of RCP in Chs. 7 to 9, it is aimed at drawing the line between the safe ground of genuine dialectic, and the dangerous region of questions, which seem to have answers, but do not.
Chapter 14: Contrary Beliefs
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The investigation of contradictory pairs has so far dealt only with assertions. Now we see the study turn to the relation between utterances and thoughts, established in Ch. 1. Aristotle questions which beliefs are contrary to each other, that is, which are the most opposite possible. He argues that the deepest error on a subject is to hold the belief that contradicts it exactly. Contrary beliefs are expressed by assertions that contradict each other. Therefore, if we demonstrate that a certain assertion expresses an erroneous belief, we have shown that it is contradictory must be accepted as true. This is refutation, the goal of all dialectical argument. In this chapter, then, Aristotle establishes the vital principle on which dialectic, and all the work of the Topics, rests. This final chapter of the De Interpretatione thus acts as the summation of the treatise, demonstrating the importance of the study of contradiction for dialectic.
Conclusion
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
By reading the De Interpretatione closely and in order, we see that the work is not a series of detached episodes but a coherent whole, dedicated to the study of contradictory pairs of assertions. The treatise begins by discussing the necessary preliminaries, including the name, verb, and assertion (Chs. 1 to 6), before moving on to examine contradictory pairs of many kinds, including three classes in which RCP (the rule that one member is always true and the other false) is violated (Chs. 7 to 9). The study of contradiction in the De Interpretatione is central to dialectic, establishing the limits beyond which dialectical question and answer must not go, showing how to arrange assertions into their correct contradictory pairs, and finally proving why it is that contradiction underpins refutation, the goal of all dialectical argument.
Christ as the Uniquely Graced Man in Theodore and Nestorius
Authors: Fairbairn Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter finds that Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius understand salvation as the human ascent from the current imperfect age to a perfect future age (the second katastasis), and grace is God's gift of indwelling, aid, and co‐operation in that ascent. Christ is the supreme example of this co‐operative grace and is divine in the sense that he is indwelt by God the Son in a unique way. As this uniquely graced man, Christ is the one who blazes the trail for Christians, who then follow him in the ascent to the future age.
Grace as the Sharing of Divine Communion in Cyril's Early Writings
Authors: Fairbairn Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter deals with Cyril of Alexandria's writings prior to the Nestorian controversy and asserts that Cyril sees salvation as God's action through the incarnation to rescue humanity from a predicament it could not escape. Grace is primarily God's giving himself to humanity through Christ, and the chapter analyses the various aspects of himself God shares with people. The chapter argues that grace is pre‐eminently God's giving humanity divine sonship by sharing the communion he has within himself, between the persons of the Trinity. The heart of the chapter is an extended discussion of two Greek terms (idios and oikeiotes) that Cyril uses to describe both the difference between Christ's sonship and ours, and the way God shares this communion with us.
Grace as Deepening Communion With God in Cassian's Monastic Writings
Authors: Fairbairn Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter deals with Cassian's monastic writings and rejects the typical scholarly view that Cassian understands salvation as a ladder leading to union with God and that grace is simply God's help in enabling the monk to ascend this ladder. Instead, the chapter shows that for Cassian, union with God is not an absorption into the divine, but rather it is communion with God. Furthermore, the chapter argues that God has given the Christian this communion at conversion and that the monk seeks to deepen and appreciate it more fully. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the implications of this reading of Cassian.
Grace and the Logos' Double Birth in the Early Church
Authors: Fairbairn Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn the light of the book's treatment of grace and christology, this chapter argues that the central issue in patristic christology was not whether Christ was one person or two or whether one spoke of one nature or two, but whether God the Son was personally present on earth through the incarnation. The chapter asserts that the key phrase expressing this issue was the ‘double birth’ of the Logos. Those who insisted that God the Son must be and was personally present insisted that the Logos was born twice (of the Father eternally and of Mary in time). This chapter looks briefly at John Chrysostom, John of Antioch, Celestine, Leo, and the Chalcedonian Definition and concludes that belief in the double birth of the Logos was the faith of the entire Church in the fifth century, with only a small handful of dissenters.
Reflective Democracy
Authors: Goodin Robert E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDemocracy used to be seen as a relatively mechanical matter of merely adding up everyone's votes in free and fair elections. That mechanistic model has many virtues, among them allowing democracy to ‘track the truth’, where purely factual issues are all that is at stake. Political disputes invariably mix facts with values, however, and then it is essential to listen to what people are saying rather than merely note how they are voting. The great challenge is how to implement that deliberative ideal among millions of people at once. In this book, Goodin offers a solution: ‘democratic deliberation within’. Building on models of ordinary conversational dynamics, he suggests that people simply imagine themselves in the position of various other people they have heard or read about and ask, ‘What would they say about this proposal’? Informing the democratic imaginary then becomes the key to making deliberations more reflective—more empathetic, more considered, and more expansive across time and distance. After an introductory chapter, the book has eleven further chapters arranged in three sections: Preference Democracy (two chapters); Belief Democracy (four chapters); and Value Democracy (five chapters, including a conclusion).
Negotiating Beliefs
Authors: Goodin Robert E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis is the first of four chapters on belief democracy, and discusses democratic bargaining in relation to beliefs. Disputes over beliefs sometimes get resolved through persuasion, but in the real world of democratic politics, more are resolved through negotiation; each person still believes the truth of the proposition they originally advocated, but each sees the need to ‘get on with it’, so all agree to treat certain propositions ‘as if true’, for the particular purposes at hand. The latter process is what is called here ‘bargaining over beliefs’, and the aim in this chapter is to show that that is a form of bargaining, on a par with any other, in ways that economists and democratic theorists inspired by them can and should take on board. Ordinarily, many different modes of bargaining are intertwined, and the presence of the more familiar forms (‘bargaining over distributions’ or ‘over values’) blinds us to the presence of less familiar ones (‘bargaining over beliefs’); in the different cases analysed in this chapter, in order to bracket out these confounding factors, the focus is on situations in which familiar forms of bargaining seem necessarily absent. Even there, however, it is shown that bargaining of a sort might still occur; moreover, the sort of ‘bargaining over beliefs’ identified in those atypical situations is not confined to them alone, since elements of it can also be perceived to be at work in more common sorts of social and political bargaining.
Democracy as a Bayesian Persuader
Authors: Goodin Robert E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractShows how Bayesian thinking should make democratic outcomes so rationally compelling. Bayes's formula provides a mathematical expression for specifying exactly how we ought rationally to update our a priori beliefs in light of subsequent evidence, and the proposal is that voters are modelled in like fashion: votes, let us suppose, constitute (among other things) ‘reports’ of the voter's experiences and perceptions; further suppose that voters accord ‘evidentiary value’ to the reports they receive from one another through those votes; and further suppose that voters are rational, and that part and parcel of their being rational is being prepared to revise their opinions in light of further evidence (including evidence emanating from one another's votes‐cum‐reports). In this process, each of us treats our own experiences and perceptions as one source of evidence, and regards our own report as right; in that sense, we are perfectly sincere when we vote in a particular way, although we also acknowledge that our own experiences and perspectives are particular and peculiar, and hence our own perceptions are themselves inconclusive; because of that, voters striving to behave rationally should sincerely want to adjust their a priori beliefs in the light of all other experiences and perceptions that are reported at an election. Bayesian updating of that sort may well lead people who started out believing (and voting) one way to end up believing (and genuinely wanting implemented) the opposite way, just so long as sufficiently many votes‐cum‐reports point in that different direction; in other words, Bayesian reasoning can, and in politically typical cases ought to, provide people with a compelling reason to accede to the majority verdict. In this way, Bayesianism ‘rationalizes’ majority rule in a pretty strong sense; indeed if anything, it underwrites majoritarianism too strongly.
Democratic Deliberation Within
Authors: Goodin Robert E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe focus of deliberative democrats is ordinarily on deliberation in its ‘external‐collective’ aspect, but deliberation also has an ‘internal‐reflective’ aspect to it, which consists of the weighing of reasons for and against a course of action; in that sense, it can and ultimately must take place within the head of each individual, even in external‐collective settings. Deliberative democrats suppose that outcomes will be democratically legitimate only in so far as they emerge through external‐collective processes of deliberation involving a free and equal exchange among everyone who will be affected by them, and that ideal seems eminently feasible in small‐scale societies, but in large‐scale mass societies, they are not and cannot be. The challenge facing deliberative democrats is thus to find some way of adapting their deliberative ideals to large‐scale society, where it is not feasible to arrange face‐to‐face discussions across the entire community; solutions to that problem are not easily found. After briefly surveying various flawed attempts to rescue external‐collective forms of deliberative democracy from the problems of time, numbers, and distance, the author offers a counterproposal: that we ease the burdens of deliberative democracy in mass society by altering our focus from the ‘external‐collective’ to the ‘internal‐reflective’ mode, shifting much of the work of democratic deliberation to within the head of each individual; deliberation, on this account, is less a matter of making people ‘conversationally present’ and more a matter of making them ‘imaginatively present’ in the minds of deliberators. The different sections of the chapter are: Two Types of Deliberation; Unsuccessful Adaptations—[of deliberative democracy in large‐scale mass societies]; Another Approach: Deliberation Within; Dangers of Internal Deliberation; Informing the Democratic Imagination; and From Democratic Deliberation to Democratic Legitimacy.
Representing Excluded Interests
Authors: Goodin Robert E. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Democratic inclusion used to be regarded as mainly a matter of expanding the franchise: if democracy was viewed as a merely mechanical process of taking a vote, aggregating votes, and declaring a winner, all that had to be done was to bring everyone in, give them a vote and let them look after themselves in the ensuing electoral fray. However, as concerns with social exclusion have broadened, faith in that simplistic model of democratic inclusion has waned. Mere inclusion, as per the mechanistic model of aggregative democracy, is not enough to meet all the new concerns—some affected interests will always be left out through those sorts of processes. The author argues that ‘democratic deliberation within’ offers the best way—and with the necessarily mute interests discussed in the next chapter, the only way—to address those new democratic concerns. The different sections of the chapter are: The Importance of Inclusion; Underlying Intuitions; The Hidden Costs of Inclusion Talk; The Political Functions of Inclusion Talk; Toward a Non‐Exclusive Concept of Political Authority; and ‘Democratic Deliberation Within’ as a Concomitant, and a Substitute.
Environmental Justice and the New Pluralism
Authors: Schlosberg David 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn this first ever theoretical treatment of the environmental justice movement, David Schlosberg demonstrates the development of a new form of ‘critical’ pluralism, in both theory and practice. Taking into account the evolution of environmentalism and pluralism over the course of the century, Schlosberg argues that the environmental justice movement and new pluralist theories now represent a considerable challenge to both conventional pluralist thought and the practices of the major groups in the US environmental movement. Much of recent political theory has been aimed at how to acknowledge and recognize, rather than deny, the diversity inherent in contemporary life. In practice, the myriad ways people define and experience the ‘environment’ has given credence to a form of environmentalism that takes difference seriously. The environmental justice movement, with its base in diversity, its networked structure, and its communicative practices and demands, exemplifies the attempt to design political practices beyond those one would expect from a standard interest group in the conventional pluralist model. The book is arranged in four parts: I. Environmentalism and Difference: The Pluralist Challenge (two chapters); II. Critical Pluralism in Theory (two chapters); III. Environmental Justice: Critical Pluralism in Practice (two chapters); and IV. Conclusion (one chapter).
Pluralism and Difference: A Genealogy of Multiplicity
Authors: Schlosberg David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An examination is made of a genealogy of pluralist approaches to multiplicity and difference in the twentieth century, starting with William James (1976 [1912], 1977 [1909]), who began his study of pluralism with a ‘radical empiricism’ that is opposed to a more singular, monist position. James argued that our experiences of empirical events diverge, and one explanation could never encompass all of those experiences; other political pluralists (Arthur Bentley, Ernest Barker, Harold Laski, Mary Parker Follett) took James’s critique of absolutism and applied it to the state. Post-Second World War pluralists used the concept of heterogeneity in a much more constricted sense to defend and promote self-interested interest groups. However, more recently, there has been a return to multiplicities, and Donna Haraway’s (1988) description of ‘situated knowledges’ and ‘embodied objectivity’, in which she argues for ‘epistemologies of location’ where claims of knowledge can only be considered partial, resurrects James. The argument here is that a return to such original notions of pluralism helps validate the diversity of experiences and knowledges that grow out of the variety of ways we are all situated in any number of experiences, including environmental degradation.
The Politics of Networking in the Grassroots Environmental Justice Movement
Authors: Schlosberg David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The central claim of this work is that the diverse and fast-growing environmental justice movement in the United States embodies the newly emerging concepts and practices of critical pluralism, so this chapter turns to the environmental movement for examples of this in practice. Specifically, it looks at the new network structures and processes that have been adopted by grassroots environmental movements, which make connections, and create solidarity out of an understanding and respect for both differences and similarities, and work from a variety of places with a wide array of tactics. The chapter begins by exploring the value of difference (plurality) in the movement, and continues by examining the bases of the environmental justice movement in a number of pre-existing social and political networks, looking at how these networks link issues and establish alliances among diverse groups, how they form in order to deal with environmental issues of varying dimensions, and how they are structured organizationally. The author also examines some of the reasons why this form of organizing is a tactical strength, as it confronts (mirrors and maps) itself onto changing practices in capital movement and political oversight. Finally, in an initial attempt to evaluate the network form, some of the difficulties in, and criticisms of, networking as a social-movement strategy are explored.
Communicative Practices and Communicative Demands in the Environmental Justice Movement
Authors: Schlosberg David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An exploration is made of how the environmental justice movement in the United States has taken on some of the communicative and participatory demands and practices of critical pluralism. The movement has been critical of the communicative methods of the mainstream – the top-down organizational structure and its one-way nature of communication, and the lack of attention to issues of public participation in policy-making – and issues of communication have been a central focus in the development and demands of environmental justice. Accepting the diversity and the situated experiences of individuals and cultures has fostered the use of, and demand for, a variety of innovative communicative processes. Internally, the movement has attempted to employ more open discursive processes, paying particular attention to communication within and across diverse groups. Externally, the movement has made demands with regard to issues of communication and more discursive and participatory policy-making on government agencies, particularly the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Environmental Justice and the Prospects for a Critical Pluralism
Authors: Schlosberg David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In concluding the book, this chapter begins an evaluation of critical pluralism in practice – begins because both critical pluralism and the environmental justice movement are young, and a thorough evaluation will have to be done over time. However, it is possible to explore at this point the successes of the model and the movement, as well as some of the possible problems that it faces now and in the future. In this initial attempt at evaluation, a number of questions are addressed about the value and sustainability of critical pluralist practice in the environmental justice movement in the United States, as well as the possibility of the expansion of such practices into the larger environmental movement.
A Child‐Centred Social Investment Strategy
Authors: Esping‐Andersen Gøsta 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe introduction to this chapter considers the paradox that now that European society is ageing, it is becoming quite urgent that more is invested in the welfare of children, in contrast to the situation in the post‐war decades, when Europe was youthful and welfare policies came to focus on the elderly. An examination is then made of how welfare risks concentrate across households, focusing both on families with children generally, and on high‐risk lone parent and work‐poor households in particular. Next, the impact of family welfare on citizens’ life chances, particularly during early childhood, is addressed. Women's paid employment emerges as a key ingredient in any strategy to combat poverty in families with children, and it is noted that this calls for a much more concerted strategy of equalizing women's opportunities (discussed in the next chapter). It is nonetheless vital that any sustainable and effective policy for combating social exclusion must combine child‐, family‐, and women‐friendly policies within an integrated strategy, on which the social quality and economic efficiency of twenty‐first‐century Europe will largely depend.
The Self‐Transformation of the European Social Model(s)
Authors: Hemerijck Anton 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter addresses the kinds of policies that are feasible and fair in instituting new welfare state models in Europe, given the existing large differences in welfare state design and decision‐making structures across Europe. These differences are discussed, and the characteristics of the different models outlined. Further sections of the chapter discuss bounded innovation in the welfare state, and deepening social Europe through open coordination.
Knowledge and its Limits
Authors: Williamson Timothy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The book develops a conception of epistemology in which the notion of knowledge is explanatorily fundamental. It reverses the traditional programme of trying to analyse knowledge as a combination of truth, belief, and other factors, such as justification. Rather, belief is a state whose successful form is knowledge, and justification is on the basis of knowledge, which is acquainted with evidence. Knowing is as much a mental state as believing, but it is world‐involving because one can know only what is true; the book extends the externalist conception of mind from the contents of mental states to the attitudes to those contents. As with other mental states, one cannot always know whether one is in the state of knowing. It is argued that this is a special case of a much more general phenomenon; no non‐trivial conditions are such that one is always in a position to know that they obtain whenever they in fact do so. This result has disturbing implications for the nature of rationality, because one is not always in a position to know what it is rational to do. Traditional arguments for scepticism fail because they assume that one is always in a position to know what one's evidence is. The speech act of assertion is also governed by a norm of knowledge. A final chapter explores the limits on what can be known that are revealed by the so‐called paradox of knowability.