bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Commentaries of Eusebius Jerome the Presbyter on the Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Ephesians
Authors: Heine Ronald E. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Contains a complete English translation of the first book of Jerome's Latin commentary on Ephesians plus an English translation of all the Greek excerpts from Origen's commentary on Ephesians, which treat the passages from the epistle covered by Jerome in the first book. Book I begins with a lengthy prologue and then provides commentary on Ephesians 1: 1–2: 22. Jerome appears to depend on Origen in the prologue when he discusses the task of a commentator on Scripture and when he describes the idolatry and magic practiced at Ephesus as an explanation for the obscure and mysterious nature of much of the epistle. The first two chapters of Paul's epistle to the Ephesians give Origen numerous opportunities for philological comments on Paul's use of language. They also provide the basis for discussions of themes such as the creation of the world, the origin of souls, divine foreknowledge, the demonic powers, and the reconciliation of earthly beings and angels effected by Christ.
Book III
Authors: Heine Ronald E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractContains a translation of the third book of Jerome's commentary on Ephesians with a translation of the parallel excerpts from Origen's commentary. Book III begins with a prologue and then provides commentary on Ephesians 4: 31–6: 24. Origen and Jerome interpret Paul's comments in this section of the epistle on subjects such as anger, sex, obscenity in actions, speech, and thought, marriage and its symbolism in relation to Christ and the Church, and household relationships. There is a major discussion, focused especially on Ephesians 6: 12, of Paul's words about the ‘wrestling’ of the Christian ‘against the cosmic powers of darkness’.
Epictetus in His Time and Place
Authors: Long A. A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses the life of Epictetus, and situates him in his cultural and intellectual context. He was taught Stoicism by Musonius Rufus, and the salient doctrines of traditional Stoicism are compared with Epictetus’ main themes, with a view to assess his originality. Epictetus plays down Stoic paradoxes and technicalities, focusing instead on moral progress and the fallibility of ordinary persons.
The Discourses
Authors: Long A. A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSurveys the scope, themes, and style of Epictetus’ Discourses, starting with an assessment of their transmission by Epictetus’ student, Arrian. They should be read as an accurate record of how he taught the young men who were his students to internalize the principles of Stoicism and practise that philosophy in daily life. Epictetus’ expository style has three components: protreptic, elenctic, and doctrinal, for which he appeals to three respective authorities—Socrates, the Cynic Diogenes, and the Stoic Zeno.
Philosophy and Pedagogy
Authors: Long A. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Epictetus’ philosophy combines rationality, empiricism, and eudaimonism. He refutes scepticism by arguing that this stance involves self‐refutation. He requires his students to recognise that Stoicism requires complete commitment to the wish to live free from error. He divides his curriculum into three stages: ’desires and aversions’, ’appropriate actions’, and ’advanced logic’, emphasizing the need to master the first of these before going on to the others. In his self‐presentation, he distances himself from capitalized Philosophers, much as Plato distances Socrates from the Sophists.
From Theology to Ethics
Authors: Long A. A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractLike earlier Stoics, Epictetus views the goal of ethics as life in accordance with nature, but he gives that goal distinctively theonomic foundations. His conception of happiness is explored, together with his insistence that everyone is naturally motivated by self‐interest, which, when properly understood, is the precondition of a properly social identity. He construes living well as making the most skilful use of every circumstance, as exemplified by the way Socrates conducted himself at the end of his life.
Autonomy and Integrity
Authors: Long A. A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractElucidates Epictetus’ key term prohairesis, translated by volition. This is our God‐given capacity to achieve autonomy if we internalize the doctrine that genuine freedom is entirely a function of our mental disposition. For Epictetus, freedom of the will signifies not being constrained in one's mind‐set by external events. He envisions this condition as essential to the realization of moral integrity, which he takes to be an innate capacity for treating other persons with affection and respect.
The End of Arianism
Authors: Wiles Maurice 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Arianism has been extensively studied as a fourth‐century phenomenon, usually seen as brought to an end by the Council of Constantinople in the East and the Council of Aquileia in the West (both 381 ce). The chapter is concerned with the ending of Arianism as a significant movement within the early church. This involves giving special attention to the Homoians, the Neo‐Arians and the Theodosian Code in the East, to the Opus Imperfectum in Matthaeum in the West, and to Ulfila and the Goths.
Faith and Historical Judgement in British Arian Scholarship
Authors: Wiles Maurice 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Looks at British Arian scholarship in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when Arianism was no longer a live option for faith, with a special concern for the relation between the scholars’ faith and scholarly judgement. In the nineteenth century, it looks at how Newman's historical approach is affected by the close links he saw between the early Arians and the liberal churchmen of his own day, and also considers how Gwatkin, with his more self‐consciously modern historical approach, is still led to an equally strong condemnation of Arianism. In the twentieth century, it looks at the two leading Britsh writers on Arianism, Richard Hanson and Rowan Williams (both Anglican bishops), and seeks to understand how their far more critical attitude to Athanasius and their far more sympathetic appreciation of Arian motives are nonetheless combined in each case with strong support for the orthodox Trinitarian beliefs that emerged from the Arian conflict.
Essays on Actions and Events
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This volume collects Davidson's seminal contributions to the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of action. Its overarching thesis is that the ordinary concept of causality we employ to render physical processes intelligible should also be employed in describing and explaining human action. In the first of three subsections into which the papers are thematically organized, Davidson uses causality to give novel analyses of acting for a reason, of intending, weakness of will, and freedom of will. The second section provides the formal and ontological framework for those analyses. In particular, the logical form and attending ontology of action sentences and causal statements is explored. To uphold the analyses, Davidson urges us to accept the existence of non‐recurrent particulars, events, along with that of persons and other objects. The final section employs this ontology of events to provide an anti‐reductionist answer to the mind/matter debate that Davidson labels ‘anomalous monism’. Events enter causal relations regardless of how we describe them but can, for the sake of different explanatory purposes, be subsumed under mutually irreducible descriptions, claims Davidson. Events qualify as mental if caused and rationalized by reasons, but can be so described only if we subsume them under considerations that are not amenable to codification into strict laws. We abandon those considerations, collectively labelled the ‘constitutive ideal of rationality’, if we want to explain the physical occurrence of those very same events; in which case we have to describe them as governed by strict laws. The impossibility of intertranslating the two idioms by means of psychophysical laws blocks any analytically reductive relation between them. The mental and the physical would thus disintegrate were it not for causality, which is operative in both realms through a shared ontology of events.
How Is Weakness of the Will Possible?
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDavidson attempts to analyse the case in which an agent deems some available course of action to be better on the whole than the one he actually, and intentionally, takes. He insists that the case presents a genuine problem that cannot be analysed away by tinkering with, or simply dismissing out of hand, the principles of practical reasoning that generate it––viz. that if I could, I would perform an action I want (provided I want it more than any other one), that I want to perform an action more than another one if I deem it better, and hence, that I would perform an action that I deem better than any other one if I could. Davidson dismisses various accounts from Socrates and Aristotle onwards that one way or another deny that the incontinent person acted intentionally, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of what he was doing (he also notes that these accounts mistakenly treat the problem as necessarily moral, ignoring that one might be overcome by an excessive sense of duty while knowing the course of pleasure to be the better on the whole). Presenting his own account, he notes that if reasons are causes, as Essay 1 argued, then the strongest reasons would seem to be the strongest causes––as this would evidently rule out incontinence, Davidson has to dissociate the ‘causally strongest’ reasons from those the agent deems best, to the effect that the conclusion of the practical syllogism based on the latter is no longer identical to the action the incontinent agent performs (as Essay 1 had claimed).
Agency
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examining the relation that has to obtain between an agent and an event for the latter to be an action attributed to the agent, Davidson shows there are no grammatical tests of agency: action verbs sometimes leave it open whether the action was done intentionally or not, as in ‘he fell’. He offers an alternative definition by which someone is the agent of an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional; this leaves the relation between the act and its agent intact regardless of how these are described. As this still requires illumination of what makes an action intentional, Davidson invokes causal terms familiar from Essay 1: an action counts as intentional if the agent (his beliefs and desires) caused it. However, this had better not straightforwardly reduce to ordinary event causation lest all causal effects of my actions are invariably attributed to my agency; this is called the ‘accord on effect’ by which causal transitivity makes for transfer of agency.
Davidson therefore sharply distinguishes ‘primitive actions’ (those mostly having to do with bodily action) from their ‘unintended begettings’ and concludes that the former, for which I can solely be attributed agency, are ‘the only actions there are’: while primitive actions allow re‐descriptions that may include their causal consequences it is mistaken to infer that the consequences themselves are included in the described action.
Freedom to Act
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This Essay defends the view that freedom to act is a causal power. Davidson believes that an agent is free to act if he can act intentionally, and he can so act in virtue of having beliefs and desires that rationalize and cause his action; thus, freedom of act is a causal power necessarily defined in terms of intention, even though the agent could not have caused the causal conditions of so acting viz. his desires and beliefs. Davidson demotes the view that freedom to act requires that one ‘could have done otherwise’: choosing something to do and doing it suffices for the action to be free, no matter what would have happened if we hadn’t chosen (besides, if as Essay 1 argued there are no distinct acts of will, it follows that ‘could have done otherwise’ could not even be analysed as withholding such an act). After addressing various objections to analysing ‘can’ and ‘is free to’ in terms of causal conditionals, Davidson ends on a sceptical note: unless we can spell out the ‘right way’ in which attitudes must cause actions if they are to rationalize them (for beliefs and desires may rationalize an action in one way and cause it in another; see Essay 5) our notions of rationalization and freedom to act must remain programmatic.
Intending
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay picks up where Essay 4 left off: how best to specify the desire and belief that rationalize and cause an action? A conjunction of desire and belief rationalize an action only when that action is suitably described; also, the desire must be expressed so that we can arrive at an action and to that end must be formulated as an explicit value judgement, says Davidson. He then proceeds to make precise the claim that rationalizing desires and beliefs must cause their action in the right as opposed to a ‘deviant’ way, i.e. the causal chain must proceed as the rationalization tells us. Davidson notes a further problem for his analysis in Essay 1: if I intend to do something but never get round to do it, my intention cannot be identified with an action it rationalizes and causes, and if I form an intention on the basis of no prior deliberative process, then I cannot identify it with any beliefs and desires I held at the time; either case seems to warrant reintroducing distinct intentions or ‘acts of will’ into our ontology. Investigating various entities they can be identified with––actions, beliefs that one will act, a form of wanting––Davidson identifies such ‘pure intendings’ as conditional value judgements and ordinary intentions as all‐out ones.
The Logical Form of Action Sentences
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Davidson attempts to state the logical form of sentences in which actions are adverbially modified (e.g. ‘Jones buttered the toast slowly, with a knife, at midnight’); he wishes to regiment them into first‐order notation such that all valid inferences to sentences containing words of the original one are preserved. He claims that the only effective way of doing so is to transform the adverbs into predicates and recognize an implicit quantification over an entity to which the predicates apply (cf Appendix A); this entity he identifies as a dated, non‐recurrent particular––an event. Rival construals that do not require such an ontology either fail to preserve the inferences or end up assigning the adverbs to distinct actions. Davidson appends his replies to various critics of the paper in which he clarifies his methodology (applying the concept of logical form to sentences of natural language), the individuation of events (see further Essay 8), and suggests how his analysis can be extended to cover tensed action sentences.
Causal Relations
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay applies the methodology of Essay 6 to singular causal statements. Rejecting rival accounts that use sentences to identify causes and effects, and an intensional connective like ‘caused it to be the case that’, Davidson prefers to construe causes and effects as referred to by singular terms; consequently, the relation of causality is extensional i.e. holds (if at all) regardless of how the terms are described. He investigates a thesis commonly attributed to Hume, whereby causal relations hold in virtue of laws or generalities that subsume their relata. After making precise the logical form of sentences stating those laws, Davidson agrees that a singular causal statement entails the existence of a nomological statement, but denies that it entails any particular such statement unless it already describes the causal relata in terms of types subsumed under that law (hence, we can know a singular causal statement to be true in the absence of knowing the correlative law).
The Individuation of Events
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Davidson notes that none of his key claims in the theory of action (Essay 1, Essay 2, Essay 3, Essay 4, Essay 5), nor his analysis of action sentences (Essay 6) or causal statements (Essay 7), will work unless we can talk of the same action, or event, under different descriptions, descriptions that, if they refer at all, must refer to the same thing and not change the referent of the re‐described expression. This requires that there are singular terms denoting events that can be variously referred to, and Davidson investigates the motivations for believing that ordinary language speakers refer to them already and readily concede their existence. He stresses that it is singular terms rather than sentences as a whole that refer to events, since sentences are only existential and generic with respect to events; i.e. sentences merely say that at least one event of a certain kind occurred without referring to any particular one of them (see also Essay 9). Against Strawson, Davidson argues more generally that events constitute a fundamental ontological category that cannot be dispensed with in favour of an ontology that only recognizes ordinary enduring objects. After examining the general need to provide identity and individuation conditions for entities whose existence we are committed to, Davidson asks how well that need is met in the case of material objects, and provides such conditions for events in terms of their causes and effects (see also Appendix B).
Events as Particulars
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Davidson repeats the motivation for accepting the existence of events that he brought out in Essay 8, especially stressing that natural languages supply not only appropriate singular terms apparently denoting events but also the appropriate machinery of reference including quantification and identity‐statements involving those terms. He then looks at an alternative theory, espoused by Roderick Chisholm, in which events are not particulars but universals, denoted not by singular terms but expressed by complete sentences. Davidson asks how well the theory succeeds in dealing with adverbial modification (see Essay 6), whether Chisholm's events can be counted or quantified over, and whether a sentential theory can avoid collapsing all co‐referring ‘events’ into the one event that occurs (an argument Davidson spelt out in greater detail in Essay 8). More generally, he investigates what makes an entity ‘recurrent’, stressing the context‐relativity of required similarity across instantiations.
The Material Mind
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay continues the question from Essay 12 on the nature of psychology as a science, except that it engages hypothetically with a very precise knowledge of the physical workings of the mind. If we succeed in building a physical machine that perfectly imitates human behaviour, we can predict its behaviour on the sole basis of purely physical terms; nevertheless, to the extent that psychological explanations appeal to the concepts of desire, belief, and intention, they remain definitionally irreducible to such predictions (Essay 11, Essay 12). Inversely, regardless of how well advanced our neurophysiology is, it would provide no shortcut to the kind of interpretation required for the application of psychological concepts. After explaining at length what the application of those key concepts involves, Davidson stresses that their definitional irreducibility does not threaten a materialist metaphysics, provided we are willing to settle for a non‐reductive variety (see Essay 11).
Hempel on Explaining Action
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
After acknowledging Hempel as an ‘early partisan’ of the causal theory of action, Davidson takes issue with him on whether explanations that rationalize actions make essential appeal to laws. Apart from clarifying in which sense, and to what degree, laws are ‘implicit’ in rationalizations, Davidson explores the nature of law that might be involved. Where Hempel had provided a uniform (‘deductive‐nomological’) model of explanation on which all explananda can be deduced from laws, whether reason explanation or explanation in physics, Davidson holds that the law backing the causal relation between an action and its reason need not be spelt out for the explanation to be valid (Essay 7); indeed, the causal relata insofar as they are described in intentional terms cannot be thus subsumed under law. There are no law‐like generalizations relating desires and beliefs (from which reasons are constructed, see Essay 1) and the actions they cause (Essay 11) because rationality, which constitutively governs the attributions of these desires and beliefs, is uncodifiable, and the mental, inextricably holistic––a conclusion Davidson reaches, as in Essay 12, by appeal to Frank Ramsey's work on subjective probability.
Theories of Meaning and Learnable Languages
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDavidson asks what properties a language must have to be learnable. He criticizes a (then) popular response that models the order of language acquisition on the epistemological priority of the types of expressions learnt; he labels this position the ‘building‐block theory’ (see further Essay 16). He discusses Strawson's critique of Quine's elimination of singular terms and shows how it is likewise premissed on the questionable derivation of claims about language learning from purely a priori considerations. On the positive side, Davidson proposes that a language is learnable by a creature with finite means if the language's number of semantic primitives or undefinables is finite. Using this criterion, he demonstrates that various theories in the philosophy of language introduce an infinite number of semantic primitives into the language and thus make it unlearnable; theories he alleges of this error (1) model quotations on names of expressions (Tarski, Quine; cf Essay 6), (2) analyse belief attributions in terms of linguistic marks (Scheffler, Carnap) or distinct one‐place predicates for each attributed belief (Quine; cf Essay 7), or (3) postulate intensional entities into their overall semantic framework (Frege, Church).