bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Warrant and Proper Function
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this book and in its companion volumes, Warrant: The Current Debate and Warranted Christian Belief, I examine the nature of epistemic warrant, that quantity enough of which distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief. In Warrant: The Current Debate, the first volume in this series, I considered some of the main contemporary views of warrant. In this book, the second in the series, I present my own account of warrant, arguing that the best way to construe warrant is in terms of proper function. In my view, a belief has warrant for a person if it is produced by her cognitive faculties functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief. In the first two chapters of this volume, I fill out, develop, qualify, and defend this view, exploring along the way some of the convoluted contours of the notion of proper function. In the next seven chapters, I consider how the proposed account works in the main areas of our cognitive design plan: memory, introspection, knowledge of other minds, testimony, perception, a priori belief, induction, and probability. Then, in Ch. 10, I consider broader, structural questions of coherentism and foundationalism. My account of warrant meets the conditions for being a naturalistic account; but in Chs. 11 and 12, I claim that naturalism in epistemology flourishes best in the context of supernaturalism in metaphysics. For, as I argue in Ch. 11, there appears to be no successful naturalistic account of the notion of proper function. In Ch. 12, I argue, further, that metaphysical naturalism when combined with contemporary evolutionary accounts of the origin and provenance of human life is an irrational stance; it provides for itself an ultimately undefeated defeater.
Warrant: a First Approximation
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In Warrant: The Current Debate, I canvassed contemporary accounts of warrant (that quantity enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief), and found them inadequate. In this chapter, I begin to develop my own account of warrant. After introducing the notions of proper function, a cognitive environment, and a design plan, I arrive at the following first approximation of warrant: a belief B has warrant for an agent S if and only if the relevant segments of S's cognitive design plan (the segments involved in the production of B) are functioning properly in a cognitive environment, sufficiently similar to that for which they were designed, and the modules of the design plan governing the production of B are (1) aimed at truth, and (2) such that there is a high objective probability that a belief formed in accordance with those modules (in that sort of cognitive environment) is true. (I add, moreover, that in these conditions the degree of firmness with which S holds B is proportional to the degree of warrant B has for S).
Warrant: Objections and Refinements
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In order to achieve a deeper understanding of warrant (and in reply to some objections), I turn in this chapter to a closer look at the idea of a design plan. I do so under the following six section headings: the max plan versus the design plan, unintended by‐products, functional multiplicity, the distinction between purpose and design, trade‐offs and compromises, and defeaters and overriders. In connection to the notion of trade‐offs and compromises in our cognitive design plan, I take up the subject of Gettier problems, trying to understand what really underlies Gettier situations and then seeing how these situations look from the vantage point of my conception of warrant. While Gettier problems do not in fact plague my account of warrant (as I try to point out), considering them nonetheless enables us to deepen our analysis of warrant. I close the chapter with a brief argument for the conclusion that my account of warrant qualifies as an example of naturalized epistemology (or naturalistic epistemology).
Perception
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, I point out a few salient features of my account of warrant as it applies to perception and perceptual warrant. On my account, a perceptual judgment of mine (or yours) constitutes knowledge if and only if (roughly speaking) that judgment is true, sufficiently strong, and produced by cognitive faculties that are successfully aimed at truth and functioning properly in an epistemic environment that is right for human perceptual powers. After a brief discussion of perceptual experience, I argue that ordinary perceptual beliefs are basic: they are not formed on the evidential basis of other beliefs I hold (e.g., beliefs about my experience). While perceptual judgments are not formed on the basis of beliefs about my experience, they are, nonetheless, formed on the basis of experience, and so I take a quick look at that claim. In the final section of the chapter, I briefly take up questions about learning to perceive, and entertain the position that many perceptual judgments are only partially basic: not formed solely on the evidential basis of other beliefs, but formed partly on the basis of present perception and partly on the basis of beliefs about what things (say, trees, or automobiles, or whatever it is that one is perceiving) look like.
A Priori Knowledge
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, I examine a priori knowledge from the perspective of my account of warrant. According to the epistemological tradition, what is known a priori is known, somehow, prior to or independently of experience; in the first section of this chapter, I attempt to clarify this claim and describe some of the general features of a priori belief and knowledge. In the second section I argue, among other things, that a priori warrant (more precisely, intuitive warrant) is fallible and comes in degrees. I go on to consider an objection to the existence of a priori knowledge based on what has been called the causal requirement (roughly, the claim that any objects of which we have knowledge must be such that we stand in an appropriate causal relation with them). I argue that there is no plausible form of the causal requirement that constitutes a good objection to the existence of a priori knowledge; along the way, I offer an argument for the conclusion that propositions cannot be concrete objects of any sort, and point out that it is quite possible to think of abstract objects as capable of standing in causal relations with us.
Epistemic Conditional Probability: The Sober Truth
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In Ch. 8, I distinguished epistemic probability from objective probability and then pointed out some debilitating problems with the three main accounts of epistemic probability. In this chapter, I propose my own account of epistemic probability. I first distinguish between two sides to epistemic probability, which I call the objective component and the normative component. In typical cases where we assert that some proposition is epistemically probable, two things get asserted: that the proposition is objectively probable with respect to the evidence (the objective component), and that it is rational (or reasonable) to place a high degree of confidence in the proposition, given the circumstances of having as evidence what in fact we do have as evidence (the normative component). Attempting to unpack these two components (especially the second), I sketch the view that (roughly) the normative component of the epistemic conditional probability of A on B is the interval containing the degrees of belief a rational person could have in A, provided she believed B and was aware that she believed B, considered the evidential bearing of B on A, had no other source of warrant for B or its denial, and had no defeater for the warrant, if any, accruing to A or its denial by virtue of being thus believed on the basis of B.
Is Naturalism Irrational?
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, I continue to argue that naturalistic epistemology flourishes best in the garden of supernaturalistic metaphysics. I do so by presenting two epistemological arguments against metaphysical naturalism; the first argument is for the falsehood of naturalism, the second, and more developed, is for the conclusion that it is irrational to accept naturalism. Crucial to both arguments is the estimation of the value of a certain conditional probability, P(R/(N&E&C)), where (roughly) R is the proposition that our cognitive faculties are reliable, N is metaphysical naturalism, E is the proposition that our cognitive faculties arose by way of the mechanisms of evolution (i.e., the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary thought directs our attention), and C is a complex proposition stating what cognitive faculties we have and what sorts of beliefs they produce. In the second argument I contend that (1) it is quite plausible to think either that the rational attitude to take towards the conditional probability mentioned above is the judgment that it is low or that the rational attitude is agnosticism with respect to it, and, (2) in either case, the devotee of N & E has a defeater for any belief he holds, including N. Further, since this defeater is an ultimately undefeated defeater (as I argue), it is irrational to accept N, since it is irrational to accept any proposition such that one knows one has an ultimately undefeated defeater for it.
Death
Authors: McMahan Jeff 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAnalyzes the badness of death for those who die. Argues that our intuitions about the comparative badness of different deaths are best justified if we abandon the idea that death should be evaluated in terms of its effect on the value of life as a whole. Instead, death should be evaluated in terms of the effect that it has on what the victim has reason to care about from an egoistic point of view at the time of death. Only in this way can we adequately explain why the death of a fetus or newborn infant is less bad than the death of an older child or adult.
Killing
Authors: McMahan Jeff 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSeeks to understand why killing is normally wrong. It argues that there is no single, unitary explanation of the wrongness of killing. It begins by considering the morality of killing animals and contends that there is no morally significant intrinsic difference between all human beings on the one hand and all other animals on the other. The reason why killing an animal is morally objectionable appeals solely to considerations of interests. But killing a rational, self‐conscious being is wrong because it involves a failure of respect for that individual as a rational being. The morality of killing a fetus is governed by the same principles that govern the killing of an animal.
Beginnings
Authors: McMahan Jeff 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses abortion, infanticide, and the infliction of prenatal injury. It argues that early abortion is morally comparable to contraception and that late abortion can be justified in many cases because of the comparative weakness of the fetus's interest in continuing to live. The permissibility of abortion is not threatened either by considerations of potential or by claims about the sanctity of human life. Because there is no significant intrinsic difference between a late‐term fetus and a newborn infant, infanticide can also be permissible in a limited range of cases for the same reasons that abortion can be justified. Abortion cannot be justified, however, by appealing to a pregnant woman's right of self‐defense.
Endings
Authors: McMahan Jeff 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that we must have two concepts of death – the death or ceasing to exist of the person and the death of the human organism. Brain death is not the proper criterion for either of these. Persistent vegetative state involves the death or ceasing to exist of the person, even though the human organism continues to live. This chapter also defends the permissibility of assisted suicide and euthanasia in a broad range of cases and concludes by discussing the authority of advance directives in cases involving dementia.
Practical Wisdom
Authors: Broadie Sarah 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The main topics are Aristotle on the structure and psychology of rational choice (prohairesis); on practice and production; on practical versus theoretical truth; on particulars as the sphere of practice; on ends and means in deliberation; and on the relation of character and intelligence in practical wisdom. The chapter argues against “Grand End” interpretations of this Aristotelian virtue.
Pleasure
Authors: Broadie Sarah 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
No one understands better than Aristotle how deeply the desire for pleasure is rooted in human and animal nature. He must show that while pleasure can threaten morality, it also lies at the heart of human rational perfection. His complex reactions to neutralism (“The good is beyond pleasure and pain”), and to the hedonism of Eudoxus, shape his views about pleasure, activity, and completeness.
Human Morality
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book defends a conception of morality as moderate in content and pervasive in scope, and as possessing an authority that derives in part from its deep roots in human psychology. According to Scheffler, the point of view of morality and that of enlightened self‐interest stand in a relation of potential congruence, a relation that he explains by reference to three central ideas. The first is that even though moral considerations and considerations of self‐interest do sometimes conflict; moral norms must be capable of integration into a coherent, attractive human life. The second is that individuals can develop psychological structures that make moral motivation possible and that shape individual interests so as to reduce the conflict between the moral and the personal points of view. And the third idea is that it is a practical, social task to achieve a measure of fit between the demands of morality and the interests of the individual. The view of morality developed in the book embodies what Scheffler calls an Ideal of Humanity, and Scheffler maintains that this ideal coheres with the totality of our firmly held values and considered convictions.
Plato's Ethics
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book is an evolution of Plato’s Moral Theory where Irwin presented for the first time his personal interpretation of Plato’s ethics. The aim of this book is to demonstrate that Plato’s rejection of Socrates’ instrumentalism is one of the key elements in the development of Plato’s philosophical perspective. The book, which is structured in 20 chapters, is a dialogue by dialogue commentary, which discusses Plato’s ethics in context of his metaphysics and epistemology. The first chapters study how in his early dialogues (Laches, Charmides, and Euthydemus) Plato interprets Socrates’ method and doctrines. Then, from chapter 6 to 9, it is illustrated how in later dialogues (Gorgias, Meno, Protagoras) Plato tries to defend and support Socrates’ theories against some possible critics. The core of the book (chapters 10 through 18) is devoted to a careful analysis of how Plato in the Republic develops his own views, moving away from the positions of his master. Lastly, in the two final chapters how the mature views of the Republic are advanced in the late dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws) is examined.
The Protagoras
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

AbstractChapter 6 offers a detailed analysis of the Protagoras conceived as the first dialogue in which Plato starts to reflect on the failure of the early dialogues and to provide definitive solutions to moral problems. Although the dialogue is labelled as aporetic, one part of it--the discussion of hedonism--is considered dialectal. How the hedonism of the Protagoras tries to be an advancement of the one of the early dialogues is examined. Then the two theories of virtues are presented: the “unity thesis” and the “reciprocity thesis.” The former holds that all the virtues are the same, while the latter holds that all the virtues imply each other. Finally, it is emphasised that despite their differences, Plato does not dismiss any of the views.
Republic II: Objections to Justice
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn this chapter, Plato’s view of justice is presented, which possibly differs from Socrates’. Plato’s “sufficient thesis” (virtue is sufficient for happiness), is compared with the “comparative thesis” (virtue is always better then non-virtue), held by Glaucon and Adeimantus. A detailed discussion of all the relevant problems of book II, the relation between happiness and justice, is outlined. In conclusion, some aspects of Plato’s view are critically evaluated.
Republic IV: Justice and Happiness
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a satisfactory account of Plato’s theory of justice. Firstly, a study of the role and the functions of the rational part of the soul are offered. Secondly, some crucial aspects of happiness are illustrated. These considerations are important to introduce the account on justice. Two kinds of justice are distinguished: psychic justice (P-justice) and common justice (C-justice). The former expresses the relation between the different parts of the soul, whereas the latter refers to the interaction among people. In conclusion, it is analysed why P-justice is self-regarding, while C-justice is other-regarding.
Republic V–VII
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter endeavours to demonstrate the relevance of the epistemological and metaphysical doctrines of books V, VI, and VII for Plato’s ethics. Firstly, the role played by the analysis of the sight-lovers theory and how it relates with the other aspects of this books is investigated. Secondly, the relevance of the doctrine of the Good as the supreme form and its analogy with the sun is evaluated. Thirdly, how the line and the cave fit with Plato’s discussion and the role they play is examined.
Reason and Virtue
Authors: Irwin Terence 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The last chapter analyses how Plato’s ethical views are developed in the later dialogues (the Philebus, the Statesman, and the Laws). In the last dialogue Plato tries to harmonise the different virtues. The relations between pleasure, happiness, and desire are analysed. Finally, the role played by the cardinal virtues in the later dialogues is examined, in particular, a certain attention toward the condition of wisdom and how it is related to the other virtues.
Externalism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExternalist analyses of knowledge are motivated, at least in part, by the fact that in Gettier examples, S, the person who claims to know p, is right in believing that p, but only as a matter of luck. The most natural way of ruling out these lucky hits on the truth is to demand that S's belief must stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the fact believed. The chapter examines an early version of this approach offered by Goldman. It also examines BonJour's objections to any purely causal (or reliabilist) account of knowledge.
Foundationalism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Foundationalist theories of justification attempt to solve the Agrippa problem by finding some way of bringing the infinite regress of reasons to a nonarbitrary halt. This chapter concentrates on Chisholm's attempt to do this. Such a theory faces a double task: the first is to find suitable starting points that do not themselves stand in need of justification – Chisholm appeals to what he calls self‐presenting properties to do this.
The second is to show that from these starting points, a suitably large domain of those knowledge claims that we take to be justified is justified. Criticisms are offered of both parts of this program. It is also argued that, in various places, Chisholm begs the question against skepticism.
Internal Coherentism
Authors: Fogelin Robert J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Coherentists attempt to solve the problem of infinite regress by rejecting what they sometimes call “the linear conception of knowledge.” Coherentists adopt, instead, a holistic conception of justification. This chapter examines BonJour's efforts to develop a coherentist account of empirical knowledge. BonJour faces two tasks: the first is to specify the conditions for a system of beliefs to be coherent, the second is to provide an argument showing that a system possessing these features provides justification for the beliefs it contains. To be coherent, according to BonJour, a system must be both logically and probabilistically consistent, be rich in inferential connections, not be divided into isolated subsystems, and be free of anomalies. Finally, to be justified in believing something, a person must be able recognize that his belief has this status in his system of beliefs. This position is criticized on a number of grounds. It seems to have the consequence that no human being has ever been justified in any of his empirical beliefs. Nothing seems to rule out the multiple‐choice problem of there being two equally coherent but incompatible systems of belief.
From Morality to Virtue
Authors: Slote Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There has been a recent revival of interest in virtue ethics. Some have asked for more attention to the virtues within the compass of familiar underlying approaches to morality like utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. However, others have argued that a freestanding and systematic form of virtue ethics would have advantages over other large‐scale approaches. The present work is the first to attempt such a systematic and freestanding or independent virtue ethics.
Rudiments of Virtue Ethics
Authors: Slote Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Virtue ethics treats aretaic, as opposed to deontic, concepts as fundamental and focuses in the first instance on character traits or motives rather than actions. Virtue ethics also contrasts with utilitarianism (or consequentialism) because although both these approaches are self‐other symmetric, they embrace different forms of symmetry. Utilitarianism holds that one's concern for oneself should be no different, fundamentally, from the concern one has for each and every other individual. But such ”in sensu diviso” symmetry differs from an ”in sensu composito” symmetry that would have us be equally concerned with ourselves and with others considered as a class. Commonsense virtue ethics subscribes to the latter kind of symmetry because of the way in which it gives equal or nearly equal weight to both self‐benefiting and other‐benefiting virtues.
Virtue, Self, and Other
Authors: Slote Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In commonsense terms, many traits count as virtues independently of the benefit they bring their possessors or others. For example, the courage to face the fact that one has cancer may actually make things less pleasant for both the cancer victim and his/her friends and relations. In addition, many virtuous traits have both self‐regarding and other‐regarding versions: e.g. honesty, loyalty, and trustworthiness. A commonsense virtue ethics makes use of that fact to underscore the significance and plausibility of its self‐other symmetric approach to ethical theory.