bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Chapter 1: Significant Utterances
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The preliminary section of the treatise, a terse passage famous in the history of grammar and semantics, begins by setting out the relation between words, thoughts and things. Words are symbols, i.e. conventional tokens, for thoughts, as well as 'signs’ of things. Truth emerges from the correct or incorrect ’combination’ or 'separation’ (affirmation and negation) of these basic words in an assertion.
Chapter 2–3: The Name and Verb
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Aristotle's definitions of the basic units of significant speech , and the way in which they are employed to form an assertion are seen here. Both 'signify something’, but the verb possesses a crucial additional role, the ’additional signification’ that its own signification and that of a ’name’ are combined, thus enabling an assertion to be true or false. The verb thus contains three elements: a basic signification, a copulative function equivalent to the role of the copula ’is’, and an indication of time, which forms a second type of ’additional signification’.
Chapter 4: Phrases and Assertions
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Aristotle moves on to define longer utterances, distinguishing those, which possess truth‐value, from those such as prayers, which do not. Also, no single word can be an assertion, since an assertion must represent a predicate as truly holding of a subject; similarly, no part of a word can have signification. At best, the elements of a compound word can only ’tend to signify’.
Chapter 10: Three Types of Assertions
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The task of classifying contradictory pairs continues in the chapters that follow, but no new exceptions to RCP are found. Here, assertions are examined and their contradictory pairs set out, beginning with the most basic, in which ’is’ is added to a name. Next the role of the verb ’to be’ as an ’additional predicate’ is seen, in sentences such as ’man is just’, and finally assertions are considered in which there is no ’to be’, and a verb is simply added to a name. Contradictory pairs are examined which involve the use of negative subjects as well as negative predicates, universally and non‐universally. We see here a careful discussion of the different ways in which negation can be applied in a sentence, and guidance on how to tell which assertions are the contradictories of which others.
Chapter 13: More on Modal Assertions
Authors: Whitaker C. W. A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The discussion of modal assertions is now broadened to include the inferences, which may be drawn between them. The Modal Square of Opposition is set out, problems with the initial formulation are revealed and dealt with by ensuring that a single sense of possibility occurs throughout (possibility is implied by necessity, not excluded by it). In a final comment, Aristotle explains the importance of these assertions: possibility and necessity are the origins of the being, and not being of everything.
Grace and Christology in the Early Church
Authors: Fairbairn Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis book addresses the question of whether the fifth‐century pronouncements about Christ's person were reflective of a genuine theological consensus in the early Church, or whether they were merely the result of political pressure or compromise between opposing christological ‘schools.’ The book seeks to use the concept of grace to clarify the question of christology. The study finds that for Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius, grace is God's gift of co‐operation to Christians as we seek to advance from the current age to a perfect future age, and Christ is the supreme example of this co‐operative grace. In contrast, Cyril of Alexandria views grace primarily as God's gift of himself to Christians by sharing with us the communion he has within himself, between the persons of the Trinity. This view of grace leads Cyril to argue that Christ must be the Son of God by nature in order to give grace to us. Furthermore, this study finds that Cassian holds to a view of grace very similar to that of Cyril. In the light of this connection between grace and christology, the book argues that the central issue of the christological controversy was whether God the Logos was himself personally present on earth through the incarnation. The study concludes by treating several other important writers from the christological controversy, and by suggesting that Cyril's understanding of grace and christology was not merely his own, but was in fact the consensus of the early Church.
Grace and the Central Issue of the Christological Controversy
Authors: Fairbairn Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter observes that some scholars see the fifth‐century christological debates as the result of politics, personal rivalry, and theological misunderstanding, others see them as the result of beginning with the duality of Christ versus beginning with his unity, and others see the debate as being over whether God was personally present in our world through the incarnation. The chapter argues that the idea of divine grace can provide a helpful clue for understanding which of these was actually the central issue of the debate, and it explains the rationale for concentrating on Theodore, Nestorius, Cyril, and Cassian. The chapter also introduces two concepts related to grace and christology: the question of the structure of salvation (three acts or two) and the concepts of the personal subject in Christ.
God's Own Son as the Source of Grace in Cyril's Later Writings
Authors: Fairbairn Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter deals with Cyril's writings during and after the controversy and argues that for Cyril, one cannot view the christological union as a communion between God and the assumed man. Instead, in order to share divine communion with us, Christ must be a unity, and his person must be that of God the Son himself. Only the Son of God can be the source of grace for Christians. The chapter discusses modern discussions about Cyril's understanding of Christ's unity, and it emphasizes the way Cyril uses a Greek term (idios) to insist on the immediacy of divine presence on earth.
Grace and the Saviour's Personal Subject in Cassian's De Incarnatione Domini
Authors: Fairbairn Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter deals with Cassian's On the Incarnation of the Lord and argues that the understanding of grace and salvation developed in that work is consistent with that found in Cassian's monastic writings. Grace is God's giving himself personally to humanity, and only if Christ is personally God the Son is this possible. The chapter examines Cassian's insistence that Christ's person is God the Son in the light of his understanding of grace and deals with several troublesome aspects of his christology. The chapter concludes by noting the striking similarities between Cyril and Cassian, even though there was no known contact between the two men.
Introduction
Authors: Goodin Robert E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIntroduces Goodin's proposed model of reflective democracy, which is fundamentally liberal democracy. It starts by situating the overall project—which is an attempt to identify deliberative democratic methods for evoking more reflective preferences as inputs into the political process—in the more familiar traditions/theories of democratic discourse: democratic elitism, participatory democracy, and deliberative democracy. It then goes on to discuss the model of reflective democracy chosen in more detail, by looking at its precepts. These are: that inputs matter, not just outputs; that thoughts matter, not just acts, and that the mute matter, not just the vocal. The plan of the book is then outlined, with a note on what it does not include.
The Autonomy of Preferences
Authors: Goodin Robert E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis is the first of two chapters on preference democracy, and defends the Enlightenment model of social life, and the form of democratic individualism that flows from it, against communitarian challenges. It begins by briefly characterizing the sort of notions of liberal autonomy that underlie the Enlightenment model, and counterposing that even more briefly to the new communitarian rivals. Next, it describes the sort of ‘community’—a ‘community of interests’—that makes most immediate sense in terms of the Enlightenment model, showing that it is rather more expansive than communitarian caricatures of it might often lead us to suppose. Goes on to discuss various other sorts of ‘community’ to which new communitarian writing sometimes points, and then sketches the sort of accommodation that the liberal Enlightenment model can make to those various forms of communitarian challenge. Lastly, all this is reapplied to democratic theory proper, showing what difference these rival understandings of the nature of community make to how we understand democratic deliberation.
The Authority of Preferences
Authors: Goodin Robert E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis is the second of two chapters on preference democracy. It points out that theories of liberal democracy necessarily require systematic responsiveness to popular wishes, in ways that make them fundamentally ‘preference‐respecting’, but that there are many different kinds of preferences and correspondingly many different ways of respecting them. Different models of democracy are better at providing certain sorts of respect for certain sorts of preferences than others, and which model of democracy liberal democrats want to adopt therefore depends on which sorts of preferences they want to accord which sort of respect. The central claim of this chapter is that the author's preferred model of ‘democratic deliberation within’ is preference‐respecting in the right way, and that it therefore deserves a key role in any larger system of democratic accountability. The different sections of the chapter are: Respecting Preferences, Not Just Recording Them; Permissible Paternalism; Assessing Alternative Models of Preference‐Respecting Democracy; The Virtues of Sporadic Assessments: Preference‐Respecting Arguments for Indirect Democracy; and Combining ‘Democratic Deliberation Within’ and Trustee‐style Representative Democracy.
Democracy as a Condorcet Truth‐Tracker
Authors: Goodin Robert E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIt is a long‐standing debate within political philosophy generally whether we want our political outcomes to be right or whether we want them to be fair; while democratic theory has traditionally taken the latter focus, democracy can be defended in the former way as well; how that can be done is the subject of this chapter and the next. For epistemic democrats, the aim of democracy is to ‘track the truth’, while for procedural democrats, the aim is to embody certain procedural virtues. When voters are choosing between only two options, both epistemic and procedural standards point in the same direction, and in that case, Condorcet's jury theorem reassures both epistemic and procedural democrats that the correct outcome is most likely to win a majority of votes; however, where there are three or more options on the table, recommendations of the different strands of democratic theory diverge. In these cases, plurality voting is arguably the simplest and possibly the most frequently used voting rule, and this chapter demonstrates that the Condorcet jury theorem can indeed be generalized from majority voting over two options to plurality voting over many options; other decision rules, Condorcet pairwise criteria, Borda count procedures, and the Hare and Coombs systems have also been shown to have considerable truth‐seeking powers. This chapter addresses the question of which of these alternative possible democratic decision rules are the most reliable truth‐tracker in the more general ‘many‐option’ case.
Input Democracy
Authors: Goodin Robert E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis is the first of four chapters on value democracy, and focuses on ‘input democracy’, which aims to give everyone (or, alternatively, every distinct affected interest) a ‘voice’, rather than necessarily an equal (understood as ‘equally effective’) ‘say’ over the ultimate outcome, and stands in contrast to ‘output democracy’. The two terms (or models) mark a distinction between a concern with the early and late stages of the political process, and can be viewed as who gets a vote versus how votes are aggregated; they are, of course, causally connected; while the two models are thus empirically intertwined, they are analytically distinct, and the analytics can sometimes be of practical consequence as well. After sketching the central concerns of the two models generically, Schumpeter's model is presented as the paradigmatically output‐oriented account. What might be regarded as a paradigmatically input‐oriented model is then sketched to contrast with it; this, although an analytic construct, is loosely modelled on and represented by the sort of ‘consultative democracy’ characteristic of the Nordic countries and, indeed, of ‘corporatist’ and ‘consociational’ democracies worldwide. The different sections of the chapter are: Against a Preoccupation with Outputs; Institutional Embodiments: Contrasting the Limiting Cases—Schumpeterian democracy and consultative democracy; and Why Inputs Matter, Democratically.
Representing Mute Interests
Authors: Goodin Robert E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBy imagining ourselves in the place of others, ‘democratic deliberation within’ enables us to bring their interests to bear on democratic decision‐making. Democratically desirable though that always is, it is absolutely essential when the others are in no position to speak for themselves in the ordinary course of democratic deliberations. The mute interests discussed in this chapter are future generations and non‐human interests (natural objects). ‘Democratic deliberation within’ once again provides a mechanism for including those most dramatically hard‐to‐include interests within democratic deliberations; even if those interests cannot speak for themselves, present people can imaginatively project themselves into the position of others, be they in future times or different species. That they should do so follows from the familiar liberal democratic principle of ‘equal protection of interests’, modified in two ways: on one side, that familiar liberal democratic value premise can and should be buttressed by an expanded view of what sorts of interests should count, specifically, natural objects and future generations are shown to have interests that are as deserving of protection as are those of current humans; on the other side, familiar liberal propositions about ‘equal protection of interests’ can and should be stretched to admit novel mechanisms for politically securing that goal, specifically, notions of ‘encapsulated interests’, discredited in other connections, can be rehabilitated for purposes of protecting future‐oriented and non‐human values.
Introduction: The Environmental Challenge to Pluralism
Authors: Schlosberg David 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe main issues addressed in the book are introduced, starting with discussion of the great diversity in the environmental movement, and making the point that the major groups of the movement in the United States, in taking on the role of interest groups in the liberal pluralist model, have excluded and marginalized many positions. The study to be made is described as focusing on two key concerns: how to acknowledge and recognize, rather than deny, diversity in environmentalism; and how to organize that diversity politically in a manner more inclusive than the liberal, or mainstream, environmental model. Different sections of the chapter discuss: the problems with conventional (liberal) pluralism; the democratic potential of the recognition by grassroots environmentalism of different experiences of the same event; the notion of justice embodied in the environmental justice movement – distributional equity (which can be achieved through procedural equity), recognition of the diversity of participants and experiences, and political participation (the demand for more public participation in the development, implementation, and oversight of environmental policy); and pluralism in theory and practice. The final section of the chapter provides a preview and plan of the book.
Approaches to Difference in the US Environmental Movement: Classification Schemes, Hegemonic Definitions, and Singular Motivations
Authors: Schlosberg David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Attention to the environmental movement does not guarantee a sense of respect for its diversity, so this chapter is dedicated to a study of the limitations inherent in various approaches to the study of environmentalism(s) in the United States. The argument here is that many examiners are more interested in building explanatory models than in understanding the diversity of environmentalism; hence, many models are built on a foundation of exclusion. The chapter first takes a brief look at the limits of standard histories of the environmental movement. It goes on to critically examine the current state of the literature on the environmental movement by investigating methods of classification of variety, the attempt to forge an environmental vanguard (hegemonic progressivism), and the myriad claims to unlocking the motivations of environmental actors. All of these approaches are described as having a tendency to exclude evidence, examples, or categories that do not fit the proposed model.
Components of a Critical Pluralism: Ethics and Processes
Authors: Schlosberg David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The acceptance of multiplicity as the precondition of political action is central to the new generation of theorists and activists that the author designates as ‘critical pluralists’. In political and social theory, a range of authors has finally begun to respond to a lament broached by Mary Parker Follett in 1918: pluralists early in the century had acknowledged difference, she noted, but they had not arrived at the heart of the question – what is to be done with this diversity? This chapter examines some of the contemporary responses to Follett’s question and constructs a list of practices necessary to build political relations across difference. These get at issues of justice beyond the material, concerning both recognition and participatory process, and it is argued that agonistic respect (William Connolly 1991), attempts at intersubjective understanding (Seyla Benhabib 1992; Jurgen Habermas 1970; Axel Honneth 1992), inclusive, open discourse free from domination and the possibility of reprisals (John Dryzek 1990; John Forester 1989; Habermas 1984, 1987), and the development of a particular form of solidarity are all crucial to the practices suggested by a new generation of pluralist theory. Solidarity (unity without uniformity) is complex in that it centres on the process of reconciling difference with the need for concerted political action. The author focuses on how the notion of unity suggested by Follett was discarded by the second generation of pluralism, but is now mirrored by numerous contemporary theorists, including Richard Rorty (1989), Donna Haraway (1991), and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1987).
Towards the Good Society, Once Again?
Authors: Esping‐Andersen Gøsta 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis is an introductory chapter to the book, and it addresses the need for a new look at the welfare state in Europe. The different sections of the chapter are: The new welfare challenge; Emerging blueprints for reform; Towards a viable new European welfare architecture—the need for a more effective methodology, the principles of justice, welfare as social investment, and rethinking security in old age; The three welfare pillars —markets, families, and government; Similar challenges for different welfare regimes— the Scandinavian welfare model, the ‘liberal’ welfare model, and the continental European welfare model; From national regimes towards a European model; and Rewriting the social contract—a new family policy, a new gender contract, social inclusion through employment, the generational contract.
A New Gender Contract
Authors: Esping‐Andersen Gøsta 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter addresses two closely woven issues: that of harmonizing (making compatible) the dual aims of careers and motherhood that most European women now pursue; and that of achieving full gender neutrality (equality) in the allocation of opportunities, life chances, and welfare outcomes. The main aspects addressed in investigating the multi‐dimensional compatibility problem are: the heterogeneity of women's preference sets (family centred, career centred, or dual role), public support for working mothers, the job supply, the role of wages, and motherhood. The main aspects addressed in investigating gender equality across the life course are: gender segregation in the labour markets, gender differences in pay, female life choices, and the extra costs and risks of employing women. It is argued that neither social nor labour‐market policy will solve these gender inequality issues, and the possibility of a domestic solution is discussed.
The Quality of Working Life in Welfare Strategy
Authors: Gallie Duncan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThree main issues are addressed in this chapter. The first section, ‘Dimensions of employment disadvantage’, points out that although the central policy orientation for enhancing social inclusion in Europe is increasing the employment rate, this is at best only a partial solution, because of the restricted possibilities for social participation and ongoing learning and training that many low‐skilled jobs offer. The second section, ‘Employment disadvantage in the life course’, shows that not only does low‐skilled employment provide rather limited life opportunities but also enhances the risk of persistent labour‐market marginalization. The last section, ‘Welfare and work: the future agenda’, addresses the fact that the principal emphasis in social policy has been on tackling the risk of social exclusion after people have entered unemployment (through the application of training and incentives), whereas, a long‐term preventative programme is needed that will protect people from the risk of labour‐market marginalization by ensuring continuous skill enhancement over their working lives.
A New Social Contract for the Elderly?
Authors: Myles John 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe key issues addressed in this chapter are how to manage the transition to pension reform in Europe so as to satisfy principles of intergenerational equality and intra‐generational justice, while also contributing to the further democratization of retirement among men and women that has already started. The main sections of the chapter are: Managing the transition; The economics of ageing; Redesigning the retirement contract.
A State of Mind
Authors: Williamson Timothy 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The chapter proposes the view that knowing is a mental state. It is a factive mental state, in the sense that only truths are known; by contrast, believing is a non‐factive mental state, because both truths and falsehoods are believed. Knowledge is the most general factive mental state, of which perception and memory are sub‐species. Knowledge cannot be given an analysis as a combination of belief, truth, and other factors. Rather, belief is to be understood in terms of knowledge in a way similar to what are known as disjunctive accounts of perception; to believe something is, roughly, to act as though one knew it; a successful belief is knowledge.