bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Context, Vagueness, and the Sorites: Comments on Shapiro
Authors: Keefe Rosanna 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Shapiro and Raffman have, together. told an interesting and plausible psychological and pragmatic story about many of our judgements involving vague predicates. Shapiro explains how, if we focus on changes in conversational context (prompted by changes of score, in Lewis’s sense), then the fact that, when taken through a Sorites series, subjects will at some point jump from applying the Sorites predicate to denying that it applies, does not mean that those subjects are violating a plausible principle governing judgement, a principle that he labels the tolerance principle.
Against Truth-Value Gaps
Authors: Glanzberg Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Many things are neither true nor false: shoes and ships and sealing wax, to name a few. But these things are neither true nor false because they are not the kinds of things that can be either. There are also some things that are apt for being true or false. Preferences vary on exactly what these things are. Common candidates include utterances, interpreted sentences paired with contexts, and propositions. Can there be something that is apt to be true or false, but fails to be either This is the question of whether there are substa11tial truth-value Baps. It has been a persistent idea in the philosophy of language that there are substantial truthvalue gaps.
Is the true self individualn in the Platonist tradition from Plato to Averroës?
Authors: Sorabji Richard 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
For the Platonist tradition there is a problem, as briefely mentioned in chapter two, of whether the true self is individual. The problem starts with Plato ;s belief that the true self is the rational soul or the intellect. Many people tend to think of intellect as a less distinctively individual part of their psychology, although it may seem more distinctive to philosophers, whose profession is intellectual discussion. As regards soul, Plato himself speaks as if all soul is one, indivisible except amongst bodies (Timaeus 35A 1– 6). And we shall see that Plotinus and Themistius think it even clearer that all intellect is one and indivisible.
Syntax
Authors: Hudson Richard 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
By far the most controversial characteristic of WG syntax has always been the adoption of dependencies rather than phrases as the basis for sentence structure (Hudson 1984: 75). Most theories of syntax have followed the American tradition of phrase-structure analysis which started with the Immediate-Constituent Analysis of the Bloomfieldians (Bloomfield 1933; Wells 1947; Harris 1951) and which was formally defined by Chomsky (Chomsky 1957). This gives a part–whole analysis in which sentences are divided into successively smaller phrases until the parts are syntactic atoms—morphemes in some theories and words in others. In contrast, the dependency tradition is much older, with roots in Paninian grammar (Bharati, Chaitanya, and Sangal 1995) and in the ancient grammars of Greek, Latin (Covington 1984; Percival 1990), and Arabic (Owens 1988). In this tradition, the main unit of syntax is the word, and all grammatical relations relate one word to another; these relations have had various names such as ‘connection’ (Tesnière 1959) but the term ‘dependency’ has a respectable ancestry and the great advantage of alluding to the asymmetrical relationship between a superordinate and subordinate word.
Hong Kong
Authors: Simpson Andrew 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Modern-day Hong Kong is a territory of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) which has undergone a quite extraordinary development in its recent history, from being a small fishing port in the early nineteenth century to becoming one of the most high profile, cosmopolitan, and economically successful cities in Asia during the last forty years. Having functioned as a British colony from 1842 until 1997, Hong Kong is now (once again) an integral part of ‘mainland China’, where it currently enjoys the status of ‘Special Administrative Region’ (SAR) and the opportunity to continue with its pre-hand-over economic and social systems for a fifty-year period following 1997, the Chinese government in Beijing having pledged not to interfere in the internal a fairs of the territory during this time. Because Hong Kong is therefore now a component part of the PRC, an examination of language and national identity issues in Hong Kong could have been included as a section within this volume’s chapter 7 on mainland China. However, due to the special complexity of Hong Kong’s past and present circumstances, there are good reasons for deciding to devote an independent chapter to the study of Hong Kong here. First of all, what is commonly characterized as the basic identity of Hong Kong and its inhabitants was formed during a period when Hong Kong was largely isolated from mainland China due to twentieth-century political developments in China and Hong Kong’s status as a British colony. Secondly, Hong Kong currently functions with a socio-economic system which is significantly different from that of the rest of China, as part of the Chinese government’s promise of ‘One Country, Two Systems’; constraints on life in Hong Kong are therefore markedly different from those further north in the rest of the PRC. Thirdly, the level of post-industrial economic development present in Hong Kong is greater than that in most areas of mainland China, as is the degree with which Hong Kong maintains regular international connections with other countries in the rest of Asia and the West.
Japan
Authors: Gottlieb Nanette 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The major language of Japan is Japanese, spoken by most of the 127.5 million people living in the Japanese archipelago stretching from Okinawa in the south to Hokkaido in the north. Dialectal variations exist, but the standard form of the language, based since 1916 on the dialect of an area of Tokyo, is that taught in schools and used in all areas of Japan. Estimates of how many people worldwide speak the language vary: many sources (e.g. Crystal 1987) limit the number to the population of Japan itself, ignoring the possible heritage speakers living in other parts of the world such as Hawaii, the west coast of North America, and Brazil, while others speculate that when all the overseas and other learners of Japanese since the late 1970s are taken into account another ten million may be added to that number (Katō 2000: 3).
Symposium: Defining Presentism
Authors: Crisp Thomas M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One sometimes hears the following argument put against presentism. Presentists say: “Only present things exist. “ But consider the verb “exist “ in the quoted sentence. Is it tensed or untensed? Suppose tensed: then the presentist ‘s thesis amounts to the claim that only present things exist now-a trivial truism. Suppose untensed: then her thesis is equivalent to the claim that only present things existed, exist, or will exist-a manifest falsehood: plenty of things (e.g. the Roman Empire) existed or will exist which aren ‘t present. The upshot: presentism is a trivial truism or an obvious falsehood. Either way, it ‘s not a very interesting piece of metaphysics.
Nonlocal correlations are generic 1 n infinite­dimensional bipartite systems
Authors: Clifton Rob 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The observables of a bipartite quantum system are represented by the set of all self adjoint operators on the tensor product of two Hilbert spaces H1 ® ‘H2, whose dimensions we shall denote by d1 and d2, taking d1 :S: d2 without loss of generality. It is well known that when d1 2: 2 the states of the system can be nonseparable, and it is this possibility that much of the new technology associated with quantum information and computation theory relies upon. Prompted by concerns about whether the very noisy mixed states exploited by certain models of NMR quantum computing are truly nonseparable (Braunstein et al. 1999, Linden & Popescu 2001), de­ tailed investigations have shown that, whenever d2 &lt; oo, there is always an open neighborhood of separable states surrounding the maximally mixed state (d1d2)­1 I® I (Zyczkowski et al. 1998, Caves
Representation and Unexploited Content
Authors: Cummins Robert , Blackmon Jim , Byrd David , Lee Alexa , Roth Martin 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this chapter, we introduce a novel difficulty for teleosemantics, namely, its inability to account for what we call unexploited content— content a representation has , but which the system that harbors it is currently unable to exploit. In Section 2, we give a characterization of teleosemantics. Since our critique does not depend on any special details that distinguish the variations in the literature, the characterization is broad, brief, and abstract. In Section 3, we explain what we mean by unexploited content, and argue that any theory of content adequate to ground representationalist theories in cognitive science must allow for it.¹ In Section 4, we show that teleosemantic theories of the sort we identify in Section 2 cannot accommodate unexploited content, and are therefore unacceptable if intended as attempts to ground representationalist cognitive science. Finally, in Section 5, we speculate that the existence and importance of unexploited content has likely been obscured by a failure to distinguish representation from indication, and by a tendency to think of representation as reference.
Two Mistakes About Credence and Chance
Authors: Hall Ned 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
David Lewis’s influential work on the epistemology and metaphysics of objective chance has convinced many philosophers of the central importance of the following two claims: First, it is a serious cost of reductionist positions about chance (such as that occupied by Lewis) that they are, apparently, forced to modify the Principal Principle-the central principle relating objective chance to rational subjective probability-in order to avoid contradiction. Second, it is a perhaps more serious cost of the rival non-reductionist position that, unlike reductionism, it can give no coherent explanation for why the Principal Principle should hold. I argue that both of these claims are fundamentally mistaken. David Lewis’s conception of the challenges involved in giving a philosophical account of objective chance [Lewis 1980; 1994] has shaped that of almost every other philosopher working in the field. (For a sampling, see Black [1998], Halpin [1998], Hoefer [1997], Ismael [1996], Roberts [2001], Strevens [1995; 1999], Sturgeon [1998], and Vranas [2002].) I think this conception embodies two key mistakes. The first concerns an alleged cost incurred by Lewis and other philosophers who advocate reductionism about chance. The second concerns an alleged cost incurred by their non-reductionist opponents. A summary: Lewis recognized early on that objective chance and subjective probability-the sort of probability that measures rational degree of belief-exhibit an important connection: a rational agent’s degrees of belief should conform in a certain way to her degrees of belief about the chances. Other philosophers had also recognized this connection; but Lewis provided perhaps the most sophisticated presentation of it, in the form of his famous ‘Principal Principle’ [1986b]. At the same time, Lewis’s reductionism about chance held that facts about chance at a world somehow reduce to-and so, supervene on-the totality of categorical (i.e., non-modal) facts about that world.
As Good As It Gets: Lewis on Truth in Fiction
Authors: Hanley Richard 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
David Lewis’s approach to analysing truth in fiction, significantly amended by ‘Postscripts’ in 1983, has been widely criticized on three main grounds, and it seems fair to say that nearly every writer on the subject thinks that one of these grounds is sufficient to show that Lewis is mistaken. I argue that with some minor revision, Lewis’s approach survives all extant objections. Indeed, I judge the Lewis approach to be even more successful than Lewis himself seems to think. David Lewis offers a way to analyse what is true in a fiction [1983]. More precisely, Lewis offers an approach, and gives two distinct but related analyses, remaining resolutely neutral on which of the two is more correct, and maintaining that neither analysis is completely correct as it stands. I shall defend the Lewis approach in the face of objections from Alex Byrne, Gregory Currie, Michael Gettings, Robin Le Poidevin, John Phillips, Graham Priest, and Lewis himself. Lewis’s approach has two core ideas. First, we properly regard typical fictions as if they were stories that are told as known fact. A fiction is a story told by a particular person on a particular occasion, and storytelling is pretence; typically pretence by the teller that he is relating a story which he knows to be true. Second, fictions are told and received against a ‘background’, such that there is more to truth in the fiction than its explicit content. Neither of these ideas is unique to Lewis. The novelty and elegance of his approach is the application, to the problem of the generation of ‘background’ fictional truths, of a modal semantics developed for the treatment of counterfactuals.
The Ballad of Ugly Dave
Authors: Mackenzie Jim 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In reading over some of David Lewis’s papers and calling to mind his face and tone of voice (recalling David Armstrong’s description of him, the machine in the ghost), I came upon a puzzle he once posed, and which I have not seen taken up. Perhaps a discussion of it can contribute to his memory. In his postscript to ‘Truth in fiction’ [1983], Lewis considers a song in which the narrative voice claims to be a stockman called Ugly Dave and proceeds to skate about the many things he can do. Lewis construes the song thus: ‘The singer makes believe that he is Ugly Dave telling boastful lies’ [280]. Lewis points out that there is a fiction in the fiction, for Ugly Dave’s lies are themselves a fiction. In the fiction-within-a-fiction, Dave’s lies are true; but in the outer fiction, they are merely empty boasts. But why, asks Lewis, does the iteration not collapse? ‘When the singer pretends to be Ugly Dave pretending to tell the truth about himself, how does this differ from pretending to be Ugly Dave reallytelling the truth about himself ?’ [ibid.]We do many things with language, and part of understanding an utterance is to decide what it is that the speaker is doing by uttering it. A string of numerals may be a telephone number, the result of a tennis match, or the price of something; when the boss says that the door is open, this may be a description of the room, a complaint about the draft, or an instruction to leave. Error in interpreting what a speaker is doing with an utterance may lead to error in understanding the utterance.
Modal Realism with Overlap
Authors: McDaniel Kris 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In this paper, I formulate, elucidate, and defend a version of modal realism with overlap, the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that I defend has several interesting features: (i) it is committed to an ontological distinction between regions of space time and material objects; (ii) it is committed to compositional pluralism, which is the doctrine that there is more than one fundamental part-whole relation; and (iii) it is the modal analogue of endurantism, which is the doctrine that objects persist through time by being wholly present at each moment they are located. Despite David Lewis’s impressive arguments for modal realism, it is safe to say that it has won few adherents. Moreover, modal realism with overlap (henceforth: ‘MRO’)-the view that objects are literally present at more than one world-is probably the least popular position to occupy in modal metaphysics. Consequently, the possibility that a version of modal realism with overlap might be a serious contender has been virtually ignored. However, we ought to examine MRO more carefully for the following reasons. First, one reason for rejecting modal realism is that it allegedly implies a counterpart-theoretic account of de remodality, according to which claims about the properties that an object could have had are made true by the existence of a counterpart of that object which has those properties. But modal realism per seis not committed to counterpart theory. One realist alternative to counterpart theory is modal realism with overlap.
David Lewis and Schro dinger’s Cat
Authors: Papineau David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In ‘How Many Lives Has Schro dinger’s Cat?’ David Lewis argues that the Everettian no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics is in a tangle when it comes to probabilities. This paper aims to show that the difficulties that Lewis raises are insubstantial. The Everettian metaphysics contains a coherent account of probability. Indeed it accounts for probability rather better than orthodox metaphysics does. On 27 June 2001, not four months before his untimely death, David Lewis delivered the third Jack Smart Lecture at the Australian National University. His title was ‘How Many Lives has Schro dinger’s Cat?’ &gt; and he spoke on a topic which is absent from his published writings, the interpretation of quantum mechanics. More specifically, he discussed the ‘no-collapse’ interpretation of quantum mechanics pioneered by Hugh Everett III [1957]. Lewis allowed that this interpretation offers initial theoretical attractions, but also argued that it suffers from irremediable flaws. If you have heard of Everett because of his association with the ‘many-worlds’ interpretation of quantum mechanics popularised by Bryce Dewitt [1970; 1973], you might suppose that there is some affinity between the no-collapse interpretation and Lewis’s philosophical realism about possible worlds. But this would be a mistake. While Everett’s interpretation does add extra ‘branches’ to the reality recognized by common sense, these additions fall far short of Lewis’s multiplication of worlds. For a start, the extra ‘branches’ that Everett adds to reality all lie within the actual world that evolves from the actual initial conditions in line with the actual laws of physics-these branches by no means include all possibilities. Moreover, Everett’s branches are best conceived, not as sundering’s of the whole universe, but rather as entities that spread out causally at finite speeds, ‘like ripples on a pond’, as Lewis puts it. For example, in the Schro dinger’s Cat experiment, firstthe photon branches into a deflected and undeflected version when it passes through the half-silvered mirror; thenthe detector branches into a triggered and untriggered state when it interacts with the photon; thenthe poison bottle branches into a smashed bottle and an unsmashed bottle under the influence of the detector; and so on, culminating in the cat branching into a live and dead cat, and the human observer branching into a self who sees a live cat and a self who sees a dead cat. &gt;
The Context of Essence
Authors: Paul L A 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I address two related questions: first, what is the best theory of how objects have de remodal properties? Second, what is the best defence of essentialism given the variability of our modal intuitions? I critically discuss several theories of how objects have their de remodal properties and address the most threatening ant essentialist objection to essentialism: the variability of our modal intuitions. Drawing on linguistic treatments of vagueness and ambiguity, I show how essentialists can accommodate the variability of modal intuitions while holding that objects have their modal properties independently of contexts. Essentialism is a doctrine about objects and their properties. Roughly, an object 0 has property P essentially when 0 must have P in order to be the object that it is. &gt; If 0 has P essentially, then, necessarily, in any world in which 0 exists, 0 must have P. &gt; Given that an object has the same essential properties in every possible world in which it exists, we can think of the essential properties as capturing the nature of the object. According to this picture, essentialism is grounded upon de remodality: the essential properties of an object are a feature of the way these objects are in themselves, and are not merelyan artefact of the waywe talk or think about them. &gt; I think it is a fact about mycat, C. Louise, that she could not have been a banana. This is a fact about her. It is a fact about a particular protein that for it to exist it must include certain amino acids.
A Priority and Externalism
Authors: Hawthorne John 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
If an epistemological distinction fails to carve at the epistemological joints, then it is not worthy of serious and protracted discussion. The residual issue of whether the putative distinction is incoherent or merely gerrymandered ought not to strike anyone as especially important. My own externalist commitments—epistemological and semantic—lead me to think that the a priori– a posteriori distinction is not a particularly natural one, and hence that its importance to epistemology has been grossly overestimated.1 I shall be defending that perspective in what follows. Discussions of a priority typically assume that there is a distinguished subclass of beliefs whose epistemic status does not depend upon experiential encounter with the world.
From Mental/Physical Identity to Substance Dualism
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
“Mental properties are the same as physical properties”, “mental events are the same as physical events”, “mental substances are the same as physical substances”—says many a physicalist. “Mental properties and events supervene on physical properties and events”, and “mental substances supervene on physical substances”—says many another physicalist. Whether these claims are true depends first on what is meant by “substances”, “properties”, and “events”, “mental” and “physical”, and by “supervene”; and then on what are the criteria for one property, event, or substance being the same as another.
A Materialist Ontology of the Human Person
Authors: van Inwagen Peter 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I will begin by setting out a metaphysical position that is so abstract that it hardly deserves the name ‘position’. (Perhaps it would be better called a ‘metaphysical framework’.) This very abstract position constitutes the metaphysical perspective from which I view all philosophical problems, including those problems that pertain to the human person. If you think this perspective is skewed, you will not find much to agree with in what I am going to say about the ontology of the human person.