bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Israel’s Social Cleavages
Authors: Ben-Rafael Eliezer 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Proceeding to the second facet of the main schema, the major cleavages that make up Israeli society will now be analysed in relation to their structural parameters, that is, (I) in the context of their stratificational attributes, (2) in relation to the dominant culture with which socio-cultural groupings interact, and (3) according to the latter’s own perspectives on identity. The following discussion on the basis of the numerous works which have studied this society serve as a starting-point for our own investigations of linguistic aspects.
Solidity and Elasticity in the Seventeenth Century
Authors: Alexander Peter 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Conventional atomism deriving from Epicurus took atoms to be absolutely solid and impenetrable and yet capable of rebounding from one another on direct impact. Observable physical and chemical changes were regarded as explicable in terms of the changes in motion of constituent atoms resulting from their impact. Atomism has been rejected for various reasons, among them the belief that absolutely solid atoms could not exist, or rebound on direct impact if they did. This controversy went on and on. I wish to consider some aspects of it.
John Locke and the Polish Enlightenment
Authors: Rosicka Janina 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
John Locke was at the centre of inspiration of the English and French Enlightenment, and in Germany he rivalled Leibniz. Although it might seem that it should be comparatively easy to study the influence of someone so illustrious, it is not in fact so. As the Polish historian of philosophy Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz pointed out: ‘Although John Locke was not a genius he achieved more than genius.’ An insightful but not very clear formulation of the main problem facing a student of Locke is that there are two quite different images that we have of him. One shows him as the most influential person of the Enlightenment. The second gives a strange, incoherent picture of a compiler. How can a student examine the impact of someone who is not a genius but is in effect a genius? The most popular way specially in countries which were the recipients of English and French Enlightenment ideas--is just by mentioning his name. In this way Locke’s name has played the role of a convenient watchword whenever we refer to the Age of Reason. The set of popular judgements concerning human rights, toleration, and the senses as a source of cognition provides an acid test; anyone who upholds one item from this set is taken to be under the influence of Locke.
Introduction
Authors: Lahiri Utpal 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This work is about the interpretation of embedded interrogatives and the predicates that take interrogative complements. In Chapter 2, I provide a general introduction to various issues in the semantics of questions in both embedded and matrix contexts. I discuss a variety of approaches to the semantics of questions beginning with Hamblin (1971), Karttunen (1977), Hintikka (1976) and its variant Berman (1991) and a cursory discussion of Ginzburg (1995a, b), delineating various issues that these theories deal with and choose to account for. I discuss in some detail the proposal of Berman (1991) which notes that interrogative complements of predicates like know behave differently in various respects from those of predicates like wonder, in particular, that the interrogative complements of know-class predicates can be modified by certain kinds of adverbs of quantification whereas those of predicates like wonder cannot, a phenomenon that Berman has called the Quantificational Variability Effect (QVE).
Rhetorical Education
Authors: Romilly Jacqueline De 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
FOR the Athenians of the fifth century BC, and more generally for all Greeks of the classical period, the skill of ‘clever speaking’ or ‘speaking well’ was one that it was essential to acquire. In those days, an individual could make his voice heard directly and all major decisions were the outcome of public debates. Speech was thus an important mode of action, and it became increasingly so as democracy developed. Small wonder, then, that the art of the speaker, or rhetoric, was one of the foremost preoccupations of the Sophists’ teaching. At the beginning of Plato’s Protagoras, when the young neophyte who hastens to put himself in the master’s charge is asked what the latter teaches, the first answer that rises to his lips is precisely that Protagoras is ‘a master of making one a clever speaker’ (312 D).
Objects of Vision
Authors: Schulte Joachim 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Whenever Wittgenstein speaks of problems of perception or sense impressions he—like most philosophers—concentrates on the sense of sight: vision takes pride of place. What distinguishes his way of dealing with these problems from more traditional approaches is the fact that he tends to discuss vision or our normal seeing of something in connection and confrontation with the doubtlessly puzzling problems arising from phenomena of aspect seeing. One likely reason for this procedure is Wittgenstein’s intention of depriving ordinary vision of its character of unproblematic normality by comparing it with a set of problems which obviously raises innumerable questions. Thus he writes: ‘“Seeing the figure as . . .” has something occult, something ungraspable about it. One would like to say: “Something has altered and nothing has altered.”-But don’t try to explain it.
Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality
Authors: Bealer George 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This paper begins with a brief history of the thesis of intentionality and a review of some contemporary views. Following that, we present a problem for materialism that arises in connection with the possibility of a general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality: if no such analysis (reduction) is possible, intentional phenomena would have at least one non-physical property, namely, their intentionalit—this materialistically unanalysable general property. With this problem in mind, we will then suggest a general analysis of intentionality. We close by arguing that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share a certain central feature with the proposed analysis and that this feature entails the existence of an objective level of organization that is non-physical. This is enough to show that the traditional materialist world view is mistaken. One way in which this argument against materialism is novel is that it would go through even if, per impossibile, every particular type of mental phenomenon (pain, belief, etc.) had a materialist analysis (reduction).
Non-Reductive Physicalism?
Authors: Smith A D 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The argument of the present paper is simple and as follows: there is no such thing as non-reductive physicalism; but all reductivist2 accounts of consciousness are misguided and unacceptable; therefore physicalism is false. I shall not argue against reductive accounts of conscious states and processes: it is, I believe, sufficient for any sensible person simply to read them in order to see their inadequacy. I shall, however, say something about what reductionism means in this context. The central argument of this paper is, therefore, that physicalism is essentially reductionist. First, a few remarks on the title. I choose the term ‘physicalism’, rather than ‘materialism’, since it is in one way weaker and in another way stronger than the latter, at least in certain philosophical circles. It is weaker in that it does not restrict its ontology to things composed of matter.
The Hebraic and Hellenic Logos
Authors: Clark Stephen R L 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I have been insisting that we should treat Christian, or theistic doctrine generally, ‘philosophically’, as an expression of that journey from ‘Athens to Jerusalem’ that Tertullian thought impossible. He was not alone. Tatian too gloried in the ‘barbarity’ of Christianity: ‘this is what fixes a gulf between its saving truth and the errors of all the philosophers … [who] disagree among each other, delight in confusing the mind with labyrinthine argumentation, adopt ridiculous forms of life and know not the truth’ (Armstrong and Markus 1960: 139, after Tatian, Oratio 25). There will be plenty to agree with Tatian, for there is an unvoiced conspiracy between many who think themselves fundamentalists and many modernists to identify Faith and Unreason. If ‘Reason’ meant only the acceptance of fashionable doctrine-which is what moderns usually intend-I am as happy as any fundamentalist to join with Feyerabend in bidding it farewell (1987: 17).
Time and the Incarnation
Authors: Clark Stephen R L 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
According to our Platonizing predecessors, the world of our present experience is an image or shadow (on various levels) of the one true logos, in whose light the true identity of everything that is is known (Maximus 1985: go n. 64). The logos itself has its own smaller image within the larger image that is the world entire: ‘Wisdom is God’s archetypal luminary, and the sun is a copy and image of it’ (Philo, De Migratione Abrahamis 40 = 1929-62: iv. 155). ‘Just as the sun in rising and lighting up the world manifests both itself and the things which it lights up, so the sun of justice in rising on a pure mind manifests both itself and the principles which have been and will be brought to existence by it’ (Maximus 1985: 45). You will recall that the one logos is intellectually known to us only in its various aspects, logoi, and the sum of these, the divine mind that grasps them, is the sun of the. whole system (Philo, De Posteritate Caini 57 = 1929-62: ii. 359). Our being human at all, in the Platonic sense, rests with our capacity to lay hold upon the logos. ‘Reasoning ... is a faithful impress of the divine image’ (Philo, De Mutatione 223 = 1929-62: v. 259). If we believe instead that thought (both consciousness and intellectual activity) is a ‘perspiration of the brain’, selected over the last few millennia as an efficient way of propagating hominids, we lose all right to think that human intellect can make a model of the world at large, or that our theories (including evolutionary theory) could reasonably be considered true. The ancient faith seems saner.
Three Problems of Renormalization
Authors: Teller Paul 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
What is renormalization in quantum field theory ? Popular descrip tions talk about ‘throwing away infinities’ which occur in calcu lations, leaving behind numbers which agree extraordinarily well with experiment. This sounds crazy. But the non-technician has a hard time evaluating the situation because heretofore all present ations of renormalization have been buried in an impenetrable mass of calculational detail.
God
Authors: Gauthier David P 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
To complete our study of Hobbes’s moral and political system we must determine the role played by God. We treat God last, partly because Hobbes does so, partly because God plays only a secondary part in the system. We have shown that neither the formal structure of Hobbes’s theory, expressed in our formal definitions and the conclusions we have drawn from them, nor the material content, expressed in our material definitions and their consequences, depends in any important way on theistic presuppositions. Hobbes’s theory is intended for rational men who aim at their own preservation, whatever their religious views may be.
Organizing Practice: The Elements of Ethics
Authors: Blackburn Simon 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Ethics is about how we live in the world. It separates the things we will do gladly from those we will not do, or not do without discomfort. It classifies the situations we aim for, and those we seek to avoid. It is displayed in our attitudes to ourselves, such as pride, or self-satisfaction, or guilt, or shame. It is also displayed in our attitudes to others: whether they behaved well, or went the extra mile, or did their bit, carried their burdens, lived or died in ways we admire. Our ethics is shown in the things we forbid, or tolerate, or require. It is shown in the reactions we have as we think of the characters of people, or the events they cause, or the nature of the societies they form. To develop an ethical personality is to become sensitive to different aspects of things, and to be disposed to use them to influence or determine attitudes, emotions, and choices. Ethics is a practical subject, manifested in our reactions to things and the motivations we feel. Ethics puts pressure on our choices, and we use ethical considerations to guide the choices of others. The practical role of ethics is what defines it.
Self-Control, Reason, and Freedom
Authors: Blackburn Simon 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In Chapter 2 we came across Durer’s version of Plato’s famous image of the charioteer.1 In this picture, reason, the charioteer, controls the potentially unruly horses of desire. The model sets up the classic way of thinking of ourselves as self-controlling, rational decision-makers. We are aware that in the cockpit of our emotions there are unruly forces, but with calm and care we can usually control them. Here is the classic dualism of heart and head, desire and reason, with reason in control so long as things are going well. Apollo, in the light, rules Dionysus, in the dark.
Hume and the Culture of Science in the Early Eighteenth Century
Authors: Barfoot Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In 1724 Robert Steuart, professor of Natural Philosophy at Edinburgh, founded a class library. An early catalogue has survived, entitled The Physiological Library. Begun by Mr. Steuart, and some of the students of natural philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, April 2. 17z4: and augmented by some gentlemen; and che students of natural philosophy, December 1724. This was printed in 1725, by which time there were 149 members, or “Benefactors”—150 if we include Steuart himself. The catalogue provides a list of members, dividing them into three categories. Forty-nine natural philosophy students appear in the first category (p. 5); thirty-eight gentlemen in the second (pp. 6-7), plus five more who joined later and whose names are included at the end (p. 62). A further fifty-seven natural philosophy students who joined the Library in December are listed in the third category, and here the name ‘David Hume’ appears.
Computer Models of Mind: Are they Socially Pernicious?
Authors: Boden Margaret A 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Three centuries ago, Spinoza made the shocking claim (pub lished only after his death) that a scientific psychology, fully consistent with our knowledge of bodily mechanism, is in principle possible. accused his opponents of underestimating the potentialities of mechanism: ‘they do not know what the body can do, nor what can be deduced from the consideration of its nature alone’. The Enlightenment saw publication of the Comte de La Mettrie’s L’Homme machine-a title whose ‘Shock! Horror!’ quality rivals the headlines in the sensationalist twentieth-century newspapers. And a hundred years later, the eccentric Lady Ada Lovelace (daughter of the notorious Lord Byron) argued that a machine based on Charles Babbage’s Analytical Engine might carry out other types of computations besides mathematics, being able, for instance, to ‘compose elaborate and scientific pieces of music of any degree of com plexity or extent’.
Which Imperatives for Right? On the Non-Prescriptive Character of Juridical Laws in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals
Authors: Willaschek Marcus 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
‘Right’, according to Kant, is ‘the sum of the conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a universal law of freedom’ (MS 6:230). The realm ofRight2 allows us to ‘unite’ everyone’s spheres of free agency by symmetrically limiting each person’s freedom just as much as necessary to guarantee the same degree of freedom to everyone. From this conception of Right, Kant derives a rule he calls the ‘universal law of Right’: ‘so act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law’ (MS 6:231).
A Kantian Justification of Possession
Authors: Westphal Kenneth R 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The nature and justification of rights to ownership have been both central and vexed in Modern and contemporary philosophy; central, because so many of our individual and joint activities depend on the use and distribution of goods; vexed, because there are competing definitions, justifications, and sets of rights to individual and joint use of goods. Kant believed that his Critical philosophy could both clarify and resolve some of the most basic issues involved in this debate. However, with rare exception, Kant has not been viewed as a major theorist on these topics. This is due, in part, to the difficulty of Kant’s philosophy, to the relative neglect of Kant’s Rechtslehre even among Kant scholars until quite recently, and to the brevity and obscurity of Kant’s arguments about the right to possession found therein. I contend, nevertheless, that Kant establishes some very significant points about our rights of possession.
Why Not Hard Determinism?
Authors: Smilansky Saul 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
By showing the compatibilist’s position to be gravely problematic, in Chapter 3, my argument seems to point us naturally towards incompatibilism. Because we saw in Chapter 4 that there is no libertarian free will, we must move, like (at least partial) incompatibilists, in the direction of hard determinism. So much of our daily practice-blame, ridicule, punishment, and perhaps any substantial inequality of attitude or treatment-is unjust. Things, however, are not that simple. The hard determinist’s position is untenable because there is another, compatibilist, side to the Core Conception, and the partial tenability of compatibilism will need to be recovered. This will occupy us in the present chapter. Hence, as we shall go on to see in Chapter 6, any final position has to take into account what I propose to call the Fundamental Dualism consisting of compatibilism and hard determinism.
Introduction to a Philosophy of Music
Authors: Kivy Peter 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Philosophy of music has flourished in the last thirty years, with great advances made in the understanding of the nature of music and its aesthetics. Peter Kivy has been at the center of this flourishing, and now offers his personal introduction to philosophy of music, a clear and lively explanation of how he sees the most important and interesting philosophical issues relating to music. Anyone interested in music will find this a stimulating introduction to some fascinating questions and ideas.
A Little More History
Authors: Kivy Peter 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
For most people in the world, ‘music’ means sung music. For most people in human history, ‘music’ meant sung music. The modern ‘problem of music’ is the child of pure instrumental music: absolute music; music alone. What is the problem, and how did it arise? In the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the seventeenth century, the composer’s life was devoted mostly to the composition of vocal music: for the Church, for secular occasions, and, later, for the opera house and for occasions of State. This is not to say that music played on instruments alone was unknown in these pre-Modern periods. Some of it was vocal music played on instruments. But some of it, as well, was written especially for the organ, or harpsichord, or lute, or even specified combinations of instruments. There was,indeed, instrumental music before the eighteenth century.
Why should you Listen?
Authors: Kivy Peter 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Why should you listen to symphonies, sonatas, string quartets, and the rest of what constitute the absolute music repertoire? On first reflection that sounds like a pretty silly question (as do so many other questions that we think of as the peculiar domain of philosophy). Such music has given pleasure for centuries to generations of listeners of all kinds. It is very likely it will give pleasure to you if you are willing to take the trouble to listen in an appropriate way. That’s why you should listen. Do you need a better reason? But that would be to misconstrue the real significance of the question, Why should you listen? Of course the question already assumes that you know absolute music gives pleasure or satisfaction or whatever else you think best describes your experience.
Discussion
Authors: Clapin Hugh 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Haugeland Can’t you have, as it were, standardly intended targets for representational types, where you can then talk about their intrinsic accuracy, relative to that? I mean, you buy a map of Chicago, it says Chicago on it. Even though someone might misuse it by targeting St. Louis but- Cummins I think those cases are funny. I think that they’re intended to have Chicago as their targets when they are produced.
Comments on Smith on Cummins
Authors: Cummins Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Let’s start with the personal stuff. Smith says that some of the things I say-for example, that the difference between a left and right hand cannot be represented-sound downright loopy. Well, I guess, having been ‘outed’, I may as well come clean. I confess, then, to having had intimate relations with loopy ideas for decades. Smith is right, I suspect, in thinking that my claim that true representation is grounded in isomorphism is the loopiest idea in Representations, Targets and Attitudes (hereafter RTA). Several factors, however, combine to comfort me. The first is that the scientific truth is often loopy.
Brian Cantwell Smith on Evolution, Objectivity, and Intentionality
Authors: Dennett Daniel 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Like the rest of us, Smith wants to steer between the Scylla of GOFAI and the Charybdis of Dynamical Non-Representational Systems, and he adds to the feast his own bounty of acute observations and tempting proposals about how such a rehabilitation of mental representations would go. But he and Haugeland, unlike the rest of us, are ontologists who think we need to reach way back and rehabilitate the whole of metaphysics in order to do this job right. Yikes.
Introduction
Authors: Harcourt Edward 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is common enough to find ideology mentioned side by side with the aesthetic in theoretical discussions, from the more or less straightforwardly Marxist to more subtle recent elaborations.1 So it is surprising, on the face of it, that the notions of ideology and of the moral or ethical are discussed together comparatively rarely, and in the mainstream of analytic moral philosophy (as far as I know) hardly at all,2 and this despite the fact that analytic philosophy is often to be found working with an undifferentiated idea of ‘value’ designed to encompass aesthetic and ethical value alike. One reason for the anomaly may be that the concept of ideology has hitherto been at home mainly in social science, or in philosophical traditions other than the analytic,3 while moral philosophy —some would say moral thought more generally, at least thought in which the moral figures under that description-can seem, no doubt for good enough reasons of history and culture, to