bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Search for Neural Substrates Mediating Inhibitory Effects of Oestrogen on Pulsatile Luteinising Hormone‐Releasing Hormone Release In Vivo in Ovariectomized Female Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta)
Authors: Mizuno M. , Terasawa E. 
Published: April 2005

AbstractNeural substrates mediating the negative feedback effects of oestrogen on luteinising hormone‐releasing hormone (LHRH) release were studied using the in vivo push–pull perfusion method in female rhesus monkeys. Twelve long‐term ovariectomized female monkeys were implanted with Silastic capsules containing 17β‐oestradiol 2 weeks before the experiments and, on the day of the experiment, oestradiol benzoate (EB, 50 µg/kg) or oil was subcutaneously injected. Push–pull perfusate samples from the stalk‐median eminence were collected in 10‐min fractions from 4 h before to 18–20 h after EB or oil injection. LHRH and neuropeptide Y (NPY) levels in the same perfusates were measured by radioimmunoassay, and glutamate and GABA in the same perfusates were assessed by high‐performance liquid chromatography (HPLC). The results indicate that EB significantly suppressed LHRH release (P < 0.005) starting within 2 h after EB, and continued for 18 h or until the experiment was terminated. Pulse analysis suggested that oestrogen suppressed the pulse amplitude, but not pulse frequency, of LHRH release. By contrast, EB did not alter any parameters (mean release, pulse amplitude or frequency) of pulsatile NPY release throughout the experiment. HPLC analysis further suggested that neither glutamate nor GABA levels in the stalk‐median eminence were changed with oestrogen‐induced LHRH suppression. Oil treatment did not alter LHRH, NPY, GABA and glutamate levels. It is concluded that oestrogen induces suppression of pulsatile LHRH release within 2 h, but the inhibitory effect of oestrogen on LHRH release does not appear to be mediated by NPY, GABAergic, or glutamatergic neurones.
Sex and the City
Authors: Edlund Lena 
Published: April 2005

AbstractThroughout the industrialized world, young women outnumber young men in urban areas. This paper proposes that such a pattern may be linked to higher male incomes in urban areas. The argument is that urban areas offer skilled workers better labor markets. Assuming that there are more skilled males than females, this alone would predict a surplus of males. However, the presence of males with high incomes may attract not only skilled females but also unskilled females. Thus, a surplus of women in urban areas may result from a combination of better labor and marriage markets. Swedish municipality data support the results.
The Effect of Life Expectancy on Fertility, Saving, Schooling and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence*
Authors: Zhang Jie , Zhang Junsen 
Published: April 2005

AbstractWe construct a simple growth model where agents with uncertain survival choose schooling time, life‐cycle consumption and the number of children. We show that rising longevity reduces fertility but raises saving, schooling time and the growth rate at a diminishing rate. Cross‐section analyses using data from 76 countries support these propositions: life expectancy has a significant positive effect on the saving rate, secondary school enrollment and growth but a significant negative effect on fertility. Through sensitivity analyses, the effect on the saving rate is inconclusive, while the effects on the other variables are robust and consistent. These estimated effects are decreasing in life expectancy.
LESSONS FROM A MIDDLE MARKET LBO: THE CASE OF O.M. SCOTT
Authors: Baker George P. , Wruck Karen H. 
Published: April 2005

In 1986 The O.M. Scott & Sons Company, the largest producer of lawn care products in the U.S., was sold by the ITT Corporation in a divisional leveraged buyout. The company was founded in Marysville, Ohio in 1870 by Orlando McLean Scott to sell farm crop seed. In 1900, the company began to sell weedfree lawn seed through the mail. In the 1920s, the company introduced the first home lawn fertilizer, the first lawn spreader, and the first patented bluegrass seed. Today, Scott is the acknowledged leader in the “do‐it‐yourself” lawn care market, with sales of over $300 million and over 1500 employees.Scott remained closely held until 1971, when it was purchased by ITT. The company then became a part of the consumer products division of the huge conglomerate, and operated as a wholly‐owned subsidiary for 14 years. In 1984, prompted by a decline in financial performance and rumors of takeover and liquidation, ITT began a series of divestitures. Over the next two years, total divestitures exceeded $2 billion and, after years of substandard performance, ITT's stock price significantly outperformed the market.On November 26, 1986, in the midst of this divestiture activity, ITT announced that the managers of Scott, along with Clayton & Dubilier (C & D), a private firm specializing in leveraged buyouts, had agreed to purchase the stock of Scott and another ITT subsidiary, the W. Atlee Burpee Company. The deal closed on December 30.Clayton & Dubilier raised roughly $211 million to finance the purchase of the two companies. Of that $211 million, almost $191 milion, or 91% of the total, was debt: bank loans, subordinated notes, and subordinated debentures. The $20 million of new equity was distributed as follows: roughly 62% of the shares were held by a C & D partnership, 21% by Scott's new subordinated debtholders, and 17.5% by Scott management and employees.After this radical change in financial structure and concentration of equity ownership, Scott's operating performance improved dramatically. Between the end of December 1986 and the end of September 1988, sales were up 25% and earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) increased by 56%. As shown in Table 1, this increase in operating earnings was not achieved by cutting back on marketing and distribution or R & D. In fact, spending on marketing and distribution increased by 21% and R & D spending went up by 7%. Capital spending also increased by 23%.
SOME REFLECTIONS ON RECENT MONETARY TURMOIL IN EASTERN EUROPE
Authors: Miller Merton H. 
Published: April 2005

This article makes the case for the use of “currency boards” in dealing with the monetary problems of Russia and other developing economies. The concept of the currency board was developed originally by the British in the 19th century to allow their colonies to maintain their local currencies without having an autonomous money supply or central bank. Currency boards hold out the promise of price stability because the local government gives up all discretionary powers over the money supply and the exchange rate. As the author puts it, “The country's monetary affairs, internal and external, will be running on automatic pilot, not on manual control. For the Russian people, the great advantage of this automatic arrangement, of course, is that the Russian government can no longer finance itself by inflation—that is, by printing money.”A currency board, to be sure, is not a panacea. It cannot substitute for the massive restructuring of Russian financial and governmental institutions that is so clearly needed. But, as happened in Argentina, a currency board can make that task easier by restoring stability and confidence. The promise of exchange rate stability that a currency board offers is also a major inducement to the foreign capital that is critical to the growth of the Russian as well as most developing economies.
Assessing Bond Market Developments Pot‐Euro
Authors: Codogno Lorenzo 
Published: April 2005

As a result of global trends in the financial industry, European financial markets are in the midst of a major transformation, and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is acting as a primary catalyst for such change. Over time financial integration will provide European markets with sufficient liquidity and scale to turn them into effective rivals of the U.S. markets.This paper provides a framework for assessing the likely consequences of EMU for the evolution of European bond markets. First, it discusses broad fundamental shifts in international capital flows and how EMU is expected to affect them. Second, it analyzes in some detail the two most important portfolio shifts expected to accompany Monetary Union: potential changes in currency reserves held by central banks and diversification of international investors' portfolios. Third, it considers the possibility that the asset management industry and households' increased appetite for risk will lead to a major shift on the demand side. On the supply side, it explores the likely effect of Monetary Union on government bond yield spreads and expected changes in the key pricing factors.The paper concludes with an overview of the considerable growth prospects for the European corporate bond market. In the Euromarket, which has traditionally been the preserve of borrowers of high credit standing, there have already been signs of increased interest in corporate issues, particularly lower‐rated ones. The search for higher yields by investors, greater expertise in analyzing credit risks by institutional investors, and reduced issuance in European government bond markets will combine to spur growth in the European corporate bond market. As a consequence, the traditional bank‐oriented relations will clearly weaken, and more companies will find opportunities to raise capital and obtain financing at lower cost.
HOW TO USE EVA IN THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
Authors: McCormack John L. , Vytheeswaran Jawanth 
Published: April 2005

The use of EVA in the oil industry has lagged behind that in most other industries because the accounting information reported by oil and gas concerns does such a poor job of representing management's effectiveness in adding value for shareholders. The essence of the problem is that the exploration activities of oil companies create assets whose changes in value are recognized by the stock market long before they are reflected on income statements or balance sheets. As a result, all accountingbased performance measures, including generic measures of EVA (which are derived from accounting information), fail to provide meaningful goals, decision tools, or compensation benchmarks.This article provides a new, EVAbased framework for performance measurement and incentive compensation for oil and gas firms—and for companies in extractive industries in general. The authors show that, when adjusted by a publicly available measure of hydrocarbon reserve value known as “SEC‐10,” EVA's ability to explain annual stock returns rises from under 10% to almost 50%. Moreover, because SEC‐10 has several important limitations as a measure of reserve value, there is considerable additional room for improving EVA's explanatory power. And the actual implementation of an EVA financial management system for an individual oil company can and should be based on more precise estimates of reserve value than those provided by SEC‐10.To this end, the authors provide an approach to hydrocarbon reserve valuation that captures the “real option” value of undeveloped reserves. By incorporating real option values, this new EVA financial management system for oil companies aligns management's incentives with the goal of creating shareholder wealth by rewarding managers for creating real option value as well as current cash flow—and by forcing managers to consider the optimal “exercise” of such strategic options.
TAKEOVERS, MANAGEMENT REPLACEMENT, AND POST‐ACQUISITION OPERATING PERFORMANCE: SOME EVIDENCE FROM THE 1980s
Authors: Parrino James D. , Harris Robert S. 
Published: April 2005

In their study of 197 U.S. takeovers from the 1980s, the authors find that the most important determinant of superior post‐merger operating performance is whether the target company's management is replaced or retained. When the target CEO is replaced, the post‐merger firm's annual cash flow returns outpace industry standards by 2 to 3%. In contrast, when target top management remains after the merger, operating returns do not exceed industry averages.The effect of management replacement is even more pronounced in those cases where the industry is consolidating. But, for those takeovers that are followed by significant investment (and thus presumably in growth industries), management replacement does not make a significant difference in post‐acquisition performance.
GLOBAL EVIDENCE ON THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM
Authors: Dimson Elroy , Marsh Paul , Staunton Mike 
Published: April 2005

The size of the equity risk premium—the incremental return that shareholders require to hold risky equities rather than risk‐free securities—is a key issue in corporate finance. Financial economists generally measure the equity premium over long periods of time in order to obtain reliable estimates. These estimates are widely used by investors, finance professionals, corporate executives, regulators, lawyers, and consultants. But because the 20th century proved to be a period of such remarkable growth in the U.S. economy, estimates of the risk premium that rely on past market performance may be too high to serve as a reliable guide to the future.The authors analyze a 103‐year history of risk premiums in 16 countries and conclude that the U.S. risk premium relative to Treasury bills was 5.3% for that period—lower than previous studies suggest—as compared to 4.2% for the U.K. and 4.5% for a world index. But the article goes on to observe that the historical record may still overstate expectations of the future risk premium, partly because market volatility in the future may be lower than in the past, and partly because of a general decline in risk resulting from new technological advances and increased diversification opportunities for investors. After adjusting for the expected impact of these factors, the authors calculate forward‐looking equity risk premiums of 4.3% for the U.S., 3.9% for the U.K., and 3.5% for the world index. At the same time, however, they caution that the risk premium can fluctuate over time and that managers should make appropriate adjustments when there are compelling economic reasons to think that expected premiums are unusually high or low.
OUTSIDE UPSIDE: FINDINGS FOCUS THROUGH FINANCE OUTSOURCING
Authors: Clements Stewart 
Published: April 2005

More and more companies are outsourcing aspects of the finance and accounting function to cut costs and increase process efficiency. This article draws on survey results and numerous real‐world examples to make the case for outsourcing finance and accounting functions, either outright or through shared service centers. As expected, cost and efficiency gains can be dramatic. But there are also important strategic benefits, including the freedom to focus on core businesses, greater access to specialist knowledge, standardization of processes across business units, and the ability to launch operations quickly without staffing back offices.Maximizing the benefits of outsourcing requires careful planning and execution. Executives who have successfully navigated the process recommend allowing adequate time to ensure buy‐in and consensus building, incorporating the appropriate performance‐based incentives, taking steps to build morale during the transition, ensuring proper oversight, and building a strong partnership with the provider. When properly implemented, outsourcing is a powerful ally in the corporate struggle to cut costs—and it can be a vital complement to strategy as well.
HEDGE FUNDS: WHAT DO WE KNOW?
Authors: Edwards Franklin R. , Gaon Stav 
Published: April 2005

Hedge funds are attracting increased attention because of their reputation for earning superior (risk‐adjusted) returns. Hedge Fund Research Inc. estimates that in 2001 there were about 7,000 hedge funds with investor capital of about $600 billion. And yet the diversity of hedge funds, combined with a general lack of transparency, makes the hedge fund industry something of a “black box.”This article provides an overview of the legal structure of hedge funds, the various fund investment strategies, and the existing research on overall hedge fund performance. Without uniform and comprehensive reporting requirements, it is difficult to ascertain the size and scope of hedge fund investments. Nonetheless, current research provides persuasive evidence that hedge funds earn positive risk‐adjusted returns, on average, in contrast to their counterparts in the mutual fund industry. In an attempt to explain these higher returns, the authors begin by noting that hedge funds are subject to considerably less regulation than other investment institutions because their client base is limited to wealthy individuals and institutions. Hedge funds can thus employ investment strategies that mutual funds and pension funds are prohibited from pursuing, such as short selling, high leverage, derivatives, concentrated holdings, and limited redemptions. As a result, the funds may be able to earn excess returns by operating in illiquid and specialized markets where there is a shortage of arbitrage capital. At the same time, and perhaps even more important, hedge funds are in a better position than conventional mutual funds to attract skilled managers because of their use of performance‐based incentive fee structures.
PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTING IN EMERGING MARKETS
Authors: Leeds Roger , Sunderland Julie 
Published: April 2005

After a proliferation of emerging market funds in the 1990s, growth has slowed drastically due to disappointing preliminary results. Private sector funds initially appeared promising because of the burgeoning demand for capital in emerging markets, the new receptivity of governments to foreign investors, and the prospect of high returns. But in many cases, the regulatory and legal frameworks did not provide adequate investor protection, and dramatic differences in accounting standards, corporate governance, and exit potential created problems. These problems are often accentuated because local owners are adept at navigating the legal and accounting systems, placing investors at a disadvantage.As global competition intensifies, local policies, regulations, and business practices are becoming increasingly important in attracting investors. Local governments must institute the reforms necessary to improve the investment environment, including the strengthening of shareholder rights and corporate governance standards and improving access to public equity markets. Development finance institutions must provide direction and leadership in these areas. And fund managers must align their business models more closely with emerging market realities by establishing a local presence, adopting a more hands‐on approach to monitoring their investments, and developing creative exit strategies.
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM
Authors: Kroszner Randall S. 
Published: April 2005

This paper develops three basic economic principles for effective corporate governance: (1) information accuracy and timeliness, (2) management accountability, and (3) auditor independence. Accuracy and timeliness of information is critical to providing market participants with the data necessary to monitor and evaluate managers. Management accountability focuses on strengthening the incentives of managers to act in shareholders' interests and on increasing the likelihood and magnitude of punishment for wrongdoing. Auditor independence reduces the incentives and likelihood that auditors would give managers more leeway to undertake fraudulent or questionable acts.The author provides a preliminary assessment of how well legislative reforms, such as the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, regulatory changes at the SEC, and private sector responses such as those from self‐regulatory organizations like the NYSE and NASDAQ, conform to these economic principles. The paper concludes by commenting on current proposals from the SEC on “shareholder democracy” and emphasizing the importance of balancing private and public regulatory responses.
Control Premiums and the Effectiveness of Corporate Governance Systems
Authors: Dyck Alexander , Zingales Luigi 
Published: April 2005

This article summarizes the findings of the authors' study, published recently in the Journal of Finance, that use control premiums paid in large block sales to assess the quality of corporate governance systems. The authors report significant variation in such premiums, with countries like the U.S. and U.K. showing premiums of less than 10% while premiums for countries like Brazil running in excess of 60%.The study also uses these measures to determine which institutions tend to be most effective in helping minority shareholders limit the diversion of wealth by insider or controlling shareholders. Notable among such institutional variables are better accounting standards, legal protection of minority shareholders, and law enforcement. But the authors also emphasize the importance of a number of extra‐legal factors, including more intense product market competition, diffusion of an independent press, and a high rate of tax compliance.
DOES INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CONTAGION REALLY EXIST?
Authors: Karolyi G. Andrew 
Published: April 2005

In the 1990s, exchange rate crises followed stock market crashes and sharp economic contractions, with devastating effects on countries around the world. The frequency and extent of these events led many policymakers, regulators, journalists, and market participants to declare a “crisis of global capitalism” and to call for a new “international financial architecture.” When financial crises occur in neighboring countries in rapid succession, it is tempting to believe that financial distress is capable of spreading like a contagious disease. Moreover, it is logical to look for potential carriers of such a disease among market participants such as commercial banks, international mutual funds, and global investors.The problem, however, is that much of the evidence does not support the idea of international financial contagion. This article surveys and synthesizes the empirical evidence on international asset price co‐movements, the volatility of cross‐border capital flows, and the relationship between those flows and asset prices. A careful reading of this evidence suggests that the observed co‐movements during the 1990s might not have been excessively large, given the global economic and capital market environment. As the author suggests, the appearance of what some might call contagion could instead be attributed to errors in domestic financial policies that have simply been repeated many times by affected countries in response to common economic shocks. And this in turn implies that while the various reform proposals to date have been directed mainly at the international and supra‐national level—involving questions such as the appropriate exchange rate and international financial market regimes, and how to organize the IMF and the World Bank group of the future–the most important questions may be those concerning government policy at the national level. Fiscal and monetary policymakers may need to rethink how their governments regulate access to the domestic financial sector, how their markets are supervised by the central bank, and how such supervision can be used to improve risk management for the financial service sector.