bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Cosmic Body
Authors: Wallace Vesna A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Kālacakratantra's cosmology is structured on several theoretical models. In its interpretation of the conventional nature of the cosmos, the Kālacakratantra combines to some degree the Vaibhāṣika atomic theory, the Sāṃkhya model of the twenty‐five principles of the puruṣa, and prakṛti, and Jaina and Purāṇic cosmographies, with its own measurements of the cosmos (loka‐dhātu) and its own theories of the nature of the cosmos and its relation to the individual. The Kālacakra tradition intentionally uses this form of syncretism in order to provide a useful theoretical model of the Buddhist tantric view of the cosmos that will accord with its interpretation of the individual and with its model of practice. The different sections of the chapter look at different aspects of the cosmos in relation to the individual; these include the origination and dissolution of the cosmos, the configuration and measurements of the cosmos, the three realms of cyclic existence, the wheel of time, and time in the cosmos.
The Social Body
Authors: Wallace Vesna A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The two sections of this chapter discuss the individual in relation to society and the individual as society. The Kālacakratantra's views of the individual's place in society and of the individual as society are closely interrelated and provide a sociological framework for the traditional interpretation of the Kālacakratantra's history and for its eschatology and soteriology. The Kālacakra tradition's interpretation of social relations and its sharp criticism of caste divisions and social bias have multiple goals and practical applications, some of which are unique to the Kālacakra tradition and some of which are characteristic of all Indian Buddhist systems. For the Kālacakra tradition, the individual is not merely a member of the vajra (indestructible or indivisible)‐family or the society but is the vajra‐family and the society itself, and is the microcosmic manifestation of the social and religious bodies of the Buddha in both their phenomenal and ultimate aspects. The Kālacakra tradition interprets the individual as the embodiment of its society in various ways, and while doing so, utilizes a conventional classification and characterization of the social classes of India at that time and reinterprets them in the light of its broader theory of the nature and composition of the individual.
Understanding Truth
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Understanding Truth aims to illuminate the notion of truth, and the role it plays in our ordinary thought, as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Part 1 is concerned with substantive background issues: the identification of the bearers of truth, the basis for distinguishing truth from other notions, like certainty, with which it is often confused, and the formulation of positive responses to well‐known forms of philosophical skepticism about truth. Having cleared away the grounds for truth skepticism, the discussion turns in Part 2 to an explication of the formal theories of Alfred Tarski and Saul Kripke, including their treatments of the Liar paradox (illustrated by sentences like This sentence is not true). The success of Tarski's definition of truth in avoiding the Liar, and his ingenious use of the paradox in proving the arithmetical indefinability of arithmetical truth, are explained, and the fruitfulness of his definition in laying the foundations for the characterization of logical consequence in terms of truth in a model is defended against objections. Nevertheless, it is argued that the notion of truth defined by Tarski does not provide an adequate analysis of our ordinary notion because there are intellectual tasks for which we need a notion of truth other than Tarski's. There are also problems with applying his hierarchical approach to the Liar as it arises in natural language – problems that are avoided by Kripke's more sophisticated model. Part 2 concludes with an explanation of Kripke's theory of truth, which is used to motivate a philosophical conception of partially defined predicates – i.e., predicates that are governed by sufficient conditions for them to apply to an object, and sufficient conditions for them to fail to apply, but no conditions that are both individually sufficient and jointly necessary for the predicates to apply, or for them to fail to apply. While the advantages of understanding are true, to be a predicate of this sort are stressed at the end of Part 2, a theory of vague predicates according to which they are both partially defined and context sensitive is presented in Part 3. This theory is used to illuminate and resolve certain important puzzles posed by the Sorites paradox: a newborn baby is young, if someone is young at a certain moment, then that person is still young one second later, so everyone is young. The book closes with an attempt to incorporate important insights of Tarski and Kripke into a broadly deflationary conception of truth, as we ordinarily understand it in natural language and use it in philosophy.
Tarski's Definition of Truth
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter provides a detailed explanation of Tarski's definition of truth for formalized languages. It begins by indicating how he conceived the problem, how his criterion of adequacy guarantees that any definition satisfying it introduces a predicate that applies to all and only object‐language truths, and how he approached the technical problem of formulating a definition that would allow him to derive what he regarded as a “partial definition” of truth for each sentence of the object language. Next, the formal techniques employed in his inductive definitions are explained, along with the method of turning those definitions into explicit definitions (where possible), and the way in which his definitions can be shown to be materially adequate. The explication concludes with a discussion of the relationship between truth and proof in the language of arithmetic, and the outlines of Tarski's theorem of the arithmetic indefinability of arithmetical truth.
Truth, Paradox, and Partially Defined Predicates
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Presents a philosophical model of partially defined predicates, illustrates how a language could come to contain them, and provides a natural way of understanding the truth predicate in which it conforms to this model. On this view, there are sentences, including Liar sentences like this sentence is not true and “Truth Tellers” like This sentence is true, about which the rules determining whether or not a sentence is true provide no result (either to the effect that it is true, or to the effect that it is not true) – thereby blocking the usual derivation of the paradox. However, despite these promising results, it is shown that a general solution to the Liar paradox is not forthcoming, since the very activity of solving the paradox in a particular limited case provides material for recreating it in a new and strengthened form. In the second half of the chapter, it is argued that this philosophical model provides the best way of understanding Saul Kripke's formal theory of truth (despite certain uncharacteristically misleading remarks of his to the contrary). In addition to laying out the philosophical basis for Kripke's theory of truth, explanations are given of his basic technical apparatus and formal results – including fixed points, minimal fixed points, monotonicity, intrinsic fixed points, ungrounded sentences, and paradoxical sentences.
Vagueness, Partiality, and the Sorites Paradox
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Presents a theory of partially defined, context sensitive, vague predicates, each of which is associated with a default determinate‐extension – i.e., a set of things to which the rules of the language determine that it applies – and a default determinate‐antiextension – a set of things to which the rules of the language determine that it does not apply. Since these sets do not exhaust all cases, speakers have the discretion of adjusting the extension and antiextension of such a predicate F so as to include initially undefined cases – often by explicitly characterizing an object o for which F is initially undefined as being F, or as being not F. When a speaker does this, the extension (or antiextension) of F is adjusted so as to include o plus all objects indistinguishable, or virtually indistinguishable from o. This analysis is used to illuminate and defuse the Sorites paradox, the main lesson of which is taken to be that the boundary lines fixing the extensions and antiextensions of many vague predicates are inherently unstable. Although this is not a practical problem for speakers in ordinary situations, and although it does not represent any theoretical incoherence in the meanings of vague predicates, it does explain the discomfort typically generated by standard versions of the Sorites paradox.
Preparing for the Journey
Authors: Cladis Mark S. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Provides a survey of Rousseau and the issues that pertain to the relation between the public and private life. Rousseau has presented many faces: the social theorist, ethicist, political and religious philosopher, pedagogue, novelist, literary critic, psychologist, musician, and botanist. These faces we will meet, these disciplines we must cross. Additionally, not only Rousseau but the topic – the relation between public and private – cuts across many diverse fields and issues: women studies, democratic theory, modern European history, social theory, philosophy of religion, reproductive rights, social justice, privacy laws, solitude, and community. Although the book is written for many, the principal audience are members of liberal democracies with interests in social theory, political philosophy, and philosophy of religion.
Revisiting the Garden's Solitaires
Authors: Cladis Mark S. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explores in detail why neither happiness nor virtue can take root in Rousseau's account of the state of nature. The Solitaires are moral insofar as they do no harm (and hence they could be considered moral compared to the nasty and brutish creatures that populated Thomas Hobbes's state of nature); yet Rousseau was not satisfied with such minimal notions of morality, and hence I argue that his Solitaires should ultimately be considered amoral. And if happiness pertains not only to the satisfaction of needs but also to the quality or nature of them, then the Solitaire's tranquil psychology is not a sufficient condition for human happiness.
The Rush to Slavery
Authors: Cladis Mark S. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses how the precarious joy and liberty of the Second Garden (as discussed in the previous chapter) collapsed and paved the road to the pain and slavery of the corrupt City. From the division of labor came the multiplication of commodities and complex systems of exchange; from these came a heightened sense of private property and public justice; and from rules of justice came conventions of inequality and the attending humiliation. This genealogy of sorrow is driven by both psychological and sociological developments, chiefly the progression of amour‐propre (anxious self‐love) and the division of labor.
Reconciling Citizen and Solitaire
Authors: Cladis Mark S. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Highlights the religious dimensions of Rousseau's thought on the middle way. Rousseau associated the deepest aspects of the public and private life with religion, and he employed a religious vocabulary when he articulated their potential reconciliation and conflict. He maintained that freedom, equality, and individual rights require support not only from law but also from shared traditions and commitments – from something like a common, secular faith. Moreover, he held that freedom of religion is necessary for individuals to flourish as human beings and as citizens. A cultivated interior life can bring personal fulfillment, and it can enable a person to become ”self‐possessed,” i.e., capable of autonomous deliberation in private and public domains. Rousseau's middle way sought to capture both the public and private aspects of religion: to champion a unifying, common faith as well as to protect private projects. In Rousseau's view, however, the success of the middle way is doubtful.
Residual Conflict
Authors: Cladis Mark S. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFocuses on the residual friction between the public and private life: private perfection versus public compromise, self‐reliance versus social dependence, self‐love versus love of the common good, private contentment versus public felicity, self‐esteem versus public pride, fidelity to a universal deity versus loyalty to a provincial civil religion. Rousseau recognized this friction, yet he refused to surrender either side of the conflict, preferring to keep them together, precariously, in spite of the tension. He went a long way, to be sure, to mitigate the polarization, and this was often achieved by his religious vocabulary. Yet the tension never disappeared in his work. In the end, his refusal to evade the tension may be his greatest contribution to modern social thought. For, determination to wrestle with such tension, without denying or eliminating it, is a hallmark of modern, democratic societies.
The Sour Taste of Success: The Israeli Peace Movement, 1967–1998
Authors: Hermann Tamar 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn the late 1960s, and especially after the 1973 war, peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) concerned to resolving the Arab–Israeli conflict, peacefully began to emerge in Israel, and in the 1980s, P/CROs became an integral, although mainly unpopular part of Israeli political life. P/CROs’ activities included consciousness raising and protest, dialog promotion, some professional service provision, and the articulation of propeace arguments. Discord amongst P/CROs over the Oslo Accords of 1993, and the conservative turn taken by the Israeli government and society after Rabin's assassination, left Israeli P/CROs weak and ineffectual by the mid 1990s. Furthermore, they had always been hamstrung by the public's perception of the P/CRO political agenda as naïve and idealistic, by their extraparliamentary status in a country that prioritized parliamentary politics, and by their homogeneous membership – older, middle class, highly educated, urban, secular Ashkenazi Jews, many of them born in the USA. While the Israeli government ultimately took advantage of the propeace attitude fostered by the P/CROs and adopted much of the program advocated by P/CROs, it consistently denied them any credit for or role in the peace process.
NGOs in the Context of National Struggle
Authors: Hassassian Maanuel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) began to develop in Palestine after the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, but only a few of these can be considered peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs). P/CRO growth was hindered by the culture of antagonism with Israel, the neopatriarchal structure of Palestinian society and the autocracy of the Palestinian Authority, and the Israeli occupation's stifling effect on civil society, and many Palestinians have preferred armed resistance. P/CROs were usually internally democratic; ideology played an important role in success or failure, most relied on international funding, and all either regarded themselves as complementing the Palestinian Authority or monitoring it. P/CRO activities included human rights advocacy, the representation of Palestinian interests to the international community, and domestic consciousness raising. However, the P/CRO contribution to peace building has been insignificant, and the true Palestinian “peace camp” is the Palestinian Authority.
A Comparative View: Peace and Conflict‐Resolution Organizations in Three Protracted Conflicts
Authors: Meyer Megan 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMost peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) were founded between 1980 and 1990, in response to heightened conflict in their regions; charismatic leaders – usually highly educated and politically astute – and local networks played instrumental roles. Most P/CROs relied on international funding. South African P/CROs received funding from foreign governments, international multilateral agencies, and religious institutions, Israeli/Palestinian P/CROs from private foreign donors and foundations, and Northern Irish P/CROs mainly from the UK and the European Union. All P/CROs used a variety of tactics, but emphasized a package of tactics that fit their members’ beliefs, interests, and skills; there was only slight variation in tactics across regions, but political context did play a small role in determining “tastes in tactics.” Almost all P/CROs, whatever their initial aspirations, became somewhat formalized as they aged. P/CROs in Northern Ireland tended to frame the conflict in terms of personal attitudes; in South Africa and Israel/Palestine, P/CRO frames emphasized systemic factors.
Introduction
Authors: Kane Robert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe chapter shows how the issue of free will and determinism (including questions about necessity, fate, predestination, and related topics) arose historically in various traditions of Eastern and Western philosophy. It also shows how the traditional problem of free will has been transformed in modern times as a result of new developments in the sciences and humanistic studies. Four questions are introduced about free will that have come to the fore as a result of these new developments and will be discussed in the remainder of the book: (The Compatibility Question) Is free will compatible or incompatible with determinism? (The Significance Question) Why do we want free will? (The Intelligibility Question) Can we make sense of an indeterminist or incompatibilist free will? (The Existence Question) Can such a free will exist in the natural order and if so, how?
Will
Authors: Kane Robert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe notion of “will” is analyzed from a historical and contemporary perspective along with a cluster of closely related notions: practical reason, choice, decision, intention, motives, acts of will, free judgments of the will (libera arbitria voluntatis), and the notion of the “voluntary.” Three senses of “will” are distinguished: “desiderative will” (what one wants, desires or prefers), “rational will” (what one chooses, decides or intends), and “striving will” (what one tries, endeavors or makes an effort to do). It is argued that the “will” in all three of these senses must be involved in an adequate account of “free will.”
Ultimate Responsibility
Authors: Kane Robert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter turns to the second and (I argue) the more important criterion for free will, namely, ultimate responsibility (UR). A series of theses are defended that explain what this criterion entails and why it is incompatible with determinism. In the process, the chapter critically examines new compatibilist accounts of free will, such as the “hierarchical theories” of Harry Frankfurt and others (involving second‐ and higher‐ order desires and volitions). The chapter also discusses the notion of “covert non‐constraining (CNC) control,” the kind of hidden control of human behavior that one encounters in scientific utopias like that described in B. F. Skinner's Walden Two. The notion of “self‐forming actions” (SFAs) is defined and shown to be pivotal to understanding what it means to say that something is done “of one's own free will.”
Significance
Authors: Kane Robert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses what I call the “Significance Question” for free will: Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? I argue that there are a number of things that we do, and should, want when we want genuine free will and that these things, properly understood, require an incompatibilist or nondeterminist account. They include (1) genuine creativity, (2) autonomy or self‐legislation, (3) true desert for achievements, (4) moral responsibility in an ultimate sense, (5) being suitable objects of reactive attitudes such as admiration, gratitude, resentment and indignation, (6) dignity or self‐worth, (7) a true sense of individuality or uniqueness as persons, (8) (freely given) love and friendship, and others. The chapter introduces what I call a “dialectic of selfhood” in order to show why these traits require an incompatibilist account of free will.
Plurality and Indeterminism
Authors: Kane Robert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWe turn to the “Intelligibility Question” about free will: How, if at all, can one make sense of a free will that is incompatible with determinism? If free choices are not determined, they must be undetermined. But undetermined events, it is often argued, occur by chance; and choices or actions that occur by chance would be “arbitrary,” “capricious,” “random,” “irrational,” and not under the control of agents – hence not responsible actions at all. These familiar charges are traced to “plurality conditions” for free will: free agents must not only be able to choose and choose otherwise, they must be able to choose and choose otherwise, either way rationally, voluntarily, intentionally, and having voluntary control over their choices. In order to satisfy these plurality requirements, traditional incompatibilist or libertarian theories of free will have usually appealed to obscure or mysterious forms of agency or causation, which are problematic for a number reasons discussed in the chapter.
Moral and Prudential Choice
Authors: Kane Robert 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An attempt is made in this chapter and the following two to give an incompatibilist or indeterminist account of free will that is consistent with current scientific knowledge without assuming any obscure or mysterious notions of agency or causation. A number of topics are discussed in the process of constructing this theory: self‐forming actions (SFAs) or willings (SFWs), moral and prudential choice, divided will, indeterminate efforts, chaos theory, non‐equilibrium thermodynamics, quantum physics, neural networks, weakness of will, mind and body, plural voluntary control, choosing for reasons, consciousness and purpose, self‐networks, chance, folk psychology and the brain, value experiments, and others.
Objections and Responses
Authors: Kane Robert 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe indeterminist theory of free will presented in Chs. 8 and 9 is further developed in this chapter by responding to a series of objections. The issues raised by these objections involve indeterminacy and possible worlds, explanation and probability, non‐deterministic causation, rational explanation of actions, character building and the historical dimension of responsibility, strength and weakness of will, choice, responsibility and indeterminism, action and indeterminism, control and responsibility, agent causation, and self‐determination.