bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Implicit Definition, Analytic Truth, and A Priori Knowledge
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter criticizes the standard truth–theoretic model of implicit definition whereby we stipulate that a word is to have whatever meaning will make true a certain set of sentences containing it. The alternative model proposed here is that, in such cases, the word derives its meaning from our way of using it, from our regarding those sentences as true—and so it acquires that meaning even if they are not true. It is argued, on this basis, that there is no route from meanings, so constituted, to our a priori knowledge in logic, arithmetic, or geometry.
The Composition of Meanings
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Each sentence derives its meaning from what its component words mean and from its syntactic structure. And the thesis of this chapter is that this is so because the meaning‐property of a sentence (e.g. ’x means DOGS BARK’) is nothing over and above the property of being constructed in a certain way from primitives with certain meanings (e.g. ’x results from substituting words whose meanings are DOG and BARK into a schema whose meaning is NS V’). In this explanation of how sentence meanings are ’composed’, absolutely nothing is presupposed about the source of word meaning (e.g. about which properties constitute ’x means DOG’, ’x means BARK’, or ’x means NS V’). Thus (contrary to Fodor and Lepore) the possibility of compositionality imposes no constraint on how the meanings of words are engendered. In particular, we see that compositionality gives us no reason to accept Davidson's explication of meaning in terms of truth conditions.
Quelling Quine's Qualms
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter scrutinizes Quine's three‐stage critique of meaning. It starts by considering how one might get from the existence of multiple adequate translations (his thesis of the ‘indeterminacy of translation’) to the non‐existence of meanings. Next it examines the main premise of this argument and shows how Quine derives it from his view of the conditions sufficient for adequate translations: that is, how he gets to the lemma that many non‐equivalent translation manuals will exist from his assumption that any good predictor of assent/dissent dispositions will be an adequate translation manual. Then it considers the basic stage in Quine's critique (which is the one that is most debatable): his derivation of the adequacy of any assertibility‐preserving manual from the pragmatic raison d’etre of translation. At the end of the chapter, the main defect in this reasoning is rectified and it is shown that proper standards of adequacy will leave us with unique translations and with a use theory of meaning.
Respect, Pluralism, and Justice
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is a collection of essays that interpret, examine critically, and extend Kant's moral and political thought on several important topics. The aim is to understand Kant, to address serious objections to his positions, and to explore ways in which contemporary Kantian theory can be fruitfully developed.
The first two essays concern fundamental elements of a Kantian theory: the type of theory it is, the ways in which it is (and is not) pluralistic, and the framework for moral deliberation that it proposes. The next three essays focus on basic respect for humanity: its implications regarding cultural diversity, the grounds for extending basic respect to all persons regardless of their offences, and reasons for treating basic respect as a guide and constraint on deliberation about moral principles rather than a source of rigoristic moral principles. The remaining five essays address recurring questions about social issues: responsibility for the consequences of one's wrongdoing, the justification of punishment, political violence, liberalism's grounds for the legitimacy of state coercion, and the conflict between conscience and authority.
A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Sets the stage for subsequent discussions by sketching a deliberative framework drawn from a combination of Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Ideas of willing universal laws, humanity as an end in itself, and autonomy are elements of the framework, which is analogous to Kant's idea of a ‘kingdom of ends’, an ideal commonwealth in which rational autonomous members legislate the laws that bind them. The framework is meant to guide and constrain reflection about how moral rules, or intermediate level principles, are to be understood and qualified, but it is not intended to be an exact decision procedure and it concerns only aspects of life for which moral rules are appropriate. Several problems in using this sort of heuristic framework are identified, and brief suggestions are made regarding ways in which the Kantian theory might be developed to meet them. The Kantian perspective has structural similarities to rule‐utilitarianism and to Rawls's theory of justice, but it differs from those in important ways.
Basic Respect and Cultural Diversity
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explores the implications of respect for humanity when interpreted as appropriately valuing persons as valuers. After briefly contrasting other historical views, the essay proposes ways for supplementing Kant's ethics by a richer account of how we actually value various things—i.e. an account sensitive to the fact that we are not merely ‘free and rational’ but also socially and historically embedded persons. The essay then explores the significance of this expanded perspective for dealing with problems raised by cultural diversity, concluding with comments on whether the ‘canon’ of college and university literature should be replaced by more culturally diverse readings.
Must Respect Be Earned?
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Addresses the questions, why should we respect humanity in all persons? and why not regard extremely immoral persons as having forfeited all respect? Respect for persons as persons is distinguished from respect for personal merit and conventional roles, but that someone is a person is not sufficient to explain why we must respect the person. The essay sketches some Kantian grounds, formal and substantive, for presuming that all human beings ought to be respected, and then addresses several objections. For example, should we respect sociopaths? The Kantian legislative perspective sketched earlier suggests reasons for a strong presumption for treating basic respect for humanity as non‐forfeitable, and arguably neither self‐protection, just punishment, nor legitimate moral censure require that we set aside the presumption.
Donagan's Kant
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractReviews at length Alan Donagan's Kantian ethical theory, as primarily expressed in his book, The Theory of Morality. Donagan's method of developing the theory by examining a tradition of Judeo‐Christian ethical beliefs is contrasted with Kant's method, which like Rousseau's, analyses relatively formal features of moral judgements to determine their basic presuppositions. Then, doubts are raised about Donagan's attempt to derive a list of strict substantive moral rules from the imperative to respect humanity. Arguably, at least in the Groundwork, Kant's idea that rational nature is an end in itself is a ‘thinner’, a more formal moral requirement than Donagan's. Thus interpreted, the idea makes the Kantian basic moral framework better able to serve as a guide for conflict resolution and conscientious judgement in a world of diverse values, moral disagreement, and uncertainty.
Kant on Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution?
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAlthough Kant is often regarded an extreme retributivist regarding judicial punishment, the need to deter crime also plays a significant role in his theory of criminal law. Kant's special way of combining deterrence and retribution, however, must be distinguished from others that are less plausible. Kant thought that criminal punishments should be designed to match the victim's empirically discernible losses in degree and kind, except when this would be impossible or degrading; for courts cannot measure the ultimate moral desert of criminals. Arguably, Kant's justification of the practice of punishment is not deeply retributive, but punishment is also not a mere disincentive in a ‘price’ system of social control. For better or worse, punishment tends to convey a public message of moral disapproval of the criminal conduct; and, though this de facto expressive function is not for Kant, the purpose or justification of punishment, it may help explain his concern for making the severity of punishments proportional to the gravity of crimes and his refusal to allow exceptions for merely pragmatic reasons.
A Kantian Perspective on Political Violence
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis essay is a critical examination of Kant's strict opposition to political violence even against corrupt rulers. Granting that Kant's arguments are inadequate to support his extreme position, in order to develop a more reasonable Kantian position, the essay develops the framework for moral deliberation suggested in earlier chapters, a framework that combines core ideas from each of Kant's formulations of the Categorical Imperative. Though only a perspective for deliberation, not a decision procedure, this arguably rules out the most extreme positions, prohibitive and permissive, about political violence and revolution. Despite Kant's personal beliefs, although the values implicit in his fundamental principle fail to support easy, inflexible solutions, they impose strong presumptions against lawless coercion and killing, undermining social order, treating persons as dispensable, underestimating options, arrogant faith in one's own judgement, and reckless simplicity in political thinking.
Conscience and Authority
Authors: Hill Thomas E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSketches three distinct ways of conceiving of conscience, arguing that none of these gives us reason to suppose that conscience guarantees morally justifiable decisions about when to resist authoritative orders. These are a popular religious conception, a cultural relativist conception, and a Kantian conception. In Kant's view, conscience can at best signal that our practices are at odds with our moral beliefs or that we have failed to scrutinize them sufficiently; and hence, although Kant holds that conscience cannot err, its role, in effect, is limited to warning us and punishing us for doing less than our best to live by our considered moral judgements. To justify moral judgements there can be no substitute for reasonable moral deliberation and discussion. Even from a Kantian perspective, our particular moral judgements are fallible and conscience presupposes moral judgement.
Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick‐Dretske analysis
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The author contends that in the state of nature we need some detectable property of informants that correlates well with their being right about p. This yields a twofold criticism of Robert Nozick's truth‐tracking analysis of knowledge. First, it is not necessary that the informant be a good tracker in all close possible worlds, merely those that are open possibilities, those the inquirer cannot rule out as being non‐actual. Second, the inquirer cannot set herself directly to pick out a good tracker of p, so Nozick's favoured knowledge‐conferring property lacks the necessary epistemic accessibility.
Distinction between Informant and Source of Information; its nature and point. Application to putative ‘knowledge without belief’ cases; and to comparativism: Goldman
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The author distinguishes between informants (people who tell us things) and sources of information (like arboreal growth rings or states of human beings), and argues that the concept of knowledge is tied to the former and not the latter. The distinction is then used to cast light on the (quasi‐) necessity of the belief condition for knowledge and on comparativism, the view that a person might be said to know p in circumstances in which the alternative is q, but not to know p if the alternatives include r. Goldman's famous papier‐mâché barn thought experiment is also discussed. Craig concludes that where belief is lacking or knowledge appears comparativistic, the subject does not have genuine knowledge, for she is a mere potential source of information, not an informant.
Being right by accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The practical explication is employed to explain why accidental fulfilment of the conditions for knowledge leads us to withhold the ascription of it, and what is meant by accidental in this context. The inquirer wants her informant to have some detectable property, X, possession of which correlates well with being right about p, and for this correlation to be law‐like, and for the continuation of the correlation in any given instance to be non‐accidental. At this point, a dilemma arises: either X must entail that S is right about p (too strong), or X must give a high probability of being right as to p (but then it is possible for X to be present but for S to be wrong on p). This property of p, inherent in the explicated concept of knowledge, thus mirrors a feature which, to judge by the discussion of the Gettier problem, the analysed concept has too.
Local v. Global Reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses the relative merits of local reliabilism (exemplified by Nozick's theory) and global reliabilism (exemplified by Colin McGinn's theory). Craig concludes that the explicated concept of knowledge implies, in nearly all cases, the idea of a wider competence on the part of the informant (as espoused by global reliabilism), even though it does not entail it. This is because, in most cases, we will trust our informant over p if and only if we believe her to be good at discerning the truth over a range of related matters.
Insufficiency of the various analyses. The ‘No false lemma’ principle. Its rationale—and its effect
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The practical explication suggests that all attempts to state necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge will either produce a set of conditions that is insufficient, or will achieve sufficiency only by including conditions too strong to be necessary. This is illustrated with respect to the JTB (justified true belief) analysis, reliabilism, the causal theory, and the NFL (no false lemmas) principle. For the first three, it is always possible to think of circumstances such that, even though the subject reached the belief p by the required means, she was right against all the odds, given those further circumstances. And if justification (or some other condition) is stipulated to entail the truth of p, then this imposes an impossibly strong condition or serves merely to reiterate the famous first condition for knowledge. As for NFL, this calls for a near‐omniscience on the inquirer's part, so that it is too strong to be a necessary condition for knowledge.
Objectivisation. The ‘cart before the horse’ objection—and the response
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Introduces the principle of objectivization, which explains how concepts interpreted subjectively in the early stages of the state of nature, concepts that answer to the relatively immediate needs of the isolated individual, become objectivized, i.e. refer to entities that fulfil more universal needs, as the individual both becomes more reflective and finds himself in a social setting. This principle is invoked by Craig in the context of admitting that someone may know without being a good informant, for the fully objectivized concept of knowledge seems not to be identifiable with the concept of a good informant, but he insists that the point and nature of the former is still best understood in terms of the latter.
Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses scepticism of the kind exemplified by Descartes's deceitful demon thought experiment, and argues that we need to find the seeds of both scepticism itself and of the resistance to it in the everyday concept of knowledge. Operating with the explicated concept, this means attributing to it a suitable degree of objectivization. Peter Unger's argument for scepticism, which suggests that the objectivization involved is absolute, is rejected on the grounds that there are no identifiable practical factors that would push the process that far and that the suggestion leaves the extent of the resistance to scepticism a mystery. Craig concludes that the explicated concept reflects practical factors that cause objectivization to stop short of scepticism but that the very impetus of objectivization also pushes us towards it.
Two explanations of scepticism: the first‐person approach, and the absolute perspective
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers and rejects two common explanations of the roots of scepticism. The first, that finds them in a first‐person approach to epistemology that takes as its central question ‘what do I know?’, is rejected on the grounds that first‐personalism results from thinking about certain normally ignored possibilities and gives no explanation of why they are so ignored, and therefore no adequate explanation of scepticism. The second, that scepticism is the offspring of an ‘absolute’ conception of truth, is espoused by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel. Craig argues that since no explanation is given of why it is impossible in principle to attain the absolute conception, the only way adhering to the idea of such a conception can lead to scepticism is if we raise independently the traditional sceptical possibilities.
Testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Considers the transmission of knowledge by testimony and the principle that if someone who knows that p tells me that p, I myself then know that p. When considered with the notion of the good informant in mind, the principle as it stands is false. The inquirer must in general, to gain knowledge in this way, acquire her information from a person who believes that p, and be disposed to tell others that p as a result of being told that p by the informant (without traversing any deviant route to the belief that p), and have an indicator property that correlates well with having the right answer to whether p. Michael Wellbourne's claim that ‘believing the speaker’ is sufficient for knowledge transmission is criticized as being either straightforwardly false, or relatively unilluminating.
Kant's Theory of Mind
Authors: Ameriks Karl 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book presents the first extensive analysis in English of Kant's systematic criticism of dogmatic accounts of the mind as a distinctive object.
This criticism has been much admired, especially in Anglophone circles, but interpreters have rarely paid attention to its full historical context and the many different dimensions of its treatment of the mind.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant organizes his criticism in terms of four fundamental fallacies or ‘paralogisms’ of ‘rational psychology’, and he discusses these under the heading of four traditional topics: substantiality, simplicity, identity, and ideality of the soul.
A close analysis of Kant's earlier work, including notes from his lectures on metaphysics (most of which have been only recently published in German), demonstrates that Kant's most fundamental views here concern several topics that are not listed as one of the four explicit paralogism headings.
In particular, his views on causality, judgement, and the mind's immateriality, independence (freedom), and immortality have a hidden and central importance.
Throughout his career, Kant's views evolved on these topics, especially in the period of the extensive revisions of the paralogisms for the second ed. of the first Critique, when Kant published his major works on ethics, the Groundwork and the second Critique.
In this period, he also developed his most sophisticated discussions of apperception and transcendental idealism.
The volume outlines and evaluates the history and structure of each of Kant's major arguments in this area, and it comments on their relation to major lines of interpretation and developments in contemporary philosophy.
It concludes that Kant's ultimate position on most doctrines concerning the mind is much closer to rationalism than is generally appreciated, and that this position also maintains, for the most part, a revolutionary critical perspective that remains highly relevant for current discussions.
Ideality
Authors: Ameriks Karl 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter discusses the most general aspects of Kant's discussion of the self and gives an overview of the full range of topics that he covered in his philosophical discussion of ‘psychological’ issues. There are two especially important issues requiring further discussion here: apperception and idealism. I explain the significance of Kant's Critical distinction between ‘apperception’ and ‘inner sense’, and discuss different views on how these terms might be defined. I then discuss the radical nature of Kant's claim about the transcendental ideality of all our determinate theoretical self‐knowledge, and evaluate various hypotheses about how to interpret transcendental idealism in general.
Approach to Aesthetics
Authors: Sibley Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Includes some of the most significant of Sibley’s published papers as well as five new essays previously unpublished. The point of the book is not a systematic introduction to aesthetics, but rather a theoretical discussion of some core topics. The first three papers study the difference and the relation between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties. Papers 4–6 show how aesthetic properties depend on non-aesthetic ones. In papers 7–9 is discussed the difficulty in finding criteria of aesthetic merit. The distinction between attributive and predicative use of adjectives and its application to the cases of beautiful and ugly is considered in Chs 12–14. The nature of aesthetic and the relation between concepts of the aesthetic of art are the arguments of papers 10 and 15. Finally, papers 11 and 16 investigate the impossibility of isolating and defining a ‘purely music’ experience and illustrate the ontological status of works of visual art respectively.
Syrianus
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Plutarch of Athens's successor, Syrianus, held views on the history of philosophy, in particular, concerning Pythagoras's place in that history, similar to those of Iamblichus and Hierocles. These views as reflected in Hermias's commentary on Plato's Phaedrus, are described, as is Syrianus's use of Iamblichus's On Pythagoreanism, in his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, with regard to the structure of reality, and number in psychology, physics, and metaphysics.