bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Explanation Versus Prediction: Which Carries More Evidential
Authors: Achinstein Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
According to one standard view, a prediction of a new fact always counts as stronger evidence for a hypothesis than an explanation of a known one. According to another view, it is the reverse. Both views are shown to be mistaken. What is important for evidence is not whether it was predicted or explained, but (in the sort of cases used by each side) what selection procedures were used to obtain the evidence. Stephen Brush's defense of ”explanationism” and Patrick Maher's defense of ”predictivism” are critically examined, as is Clark Glymour's problem of ”old evidence.”
Who Really Discovered the Electron?
Authors: Achinstein Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Although J.J. Thomson is credited with the discovery of the electron on the basis of his experiments with cathode rays in 1897, various physicists, including William Crookes, Arthur Schuster, Philipp Lenard, and others, who had also conducted cathode ray experiments claimed that they deserved the credit. This chapter provides a general definition of discovery that can be used to help resolve the question, which, as it turns out, is a complex philosophical and historical one. The relationship between discovery and evidence, as well as what's so important about who discovered the electron, are issues also discussed in the present chapter.
Morality, Mortality Volume II: Rights, Duties, and Status
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMorality, Mortality as a whole deals with certain aspects of ethical theory and with moral problems that arise primarily in contexts involving life‐and‐death decisions. The importance of the theoretical issues is not limited to their relevance to these decisions; however, they are, rather, issues at the heart of basic moral and political theory. This second volume on rights, duties, and status explores life and death as general issues in non‐consequentalist ethical theory. It comprises three parts. Part I has five chapters discussing the question of the moral (in)equivalence of killing and letting die, harming, and not aiding. Part I has two chapters and offers a discussion of the so‐called ‘Trolley Problem’ and some other closely related dilemmatic situations, for the purpose of developing a principled account of when harming some to save others is permissible and when it is impermissible. Part III has five chapters and is concerned with the further examination of the relation between restrictions on conduct and prerogatives not to make sacrifices, and how these topics relate to human rights, duties, and the existence of valuable entities and states of affairs. In addition, it is concerned with the power of agreements and of supererogatory conduct to override restrictions.
Introduction
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractStarts with an outline of the book, and then discusses the philosophical approach taken in it. Three methods used by philosophers to approach problems are considered: the first is a theory whose correctness is immediately apparent to the philosopher concerned, and whose implications for any particular cases will be accepted, even if they lead to uncomfortable results; in the second case, the philosopher starts with a theory, but one to which commitment is not so great, and whose implications for particular cases may be examined, and if they conflict, lead to alterations in the theory; and the third starts with responses to cases (practical or theoretical) with just enough detail for philosophical purposes, rather than total or tentative commitment to a theory. The method used in this book is closer to the third than any other, and is outlined.
Killing and Letting Die: Arguments for Inequivalence and the Problem of Contextual Interaction
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConsiders a new use for non‐standardly equalized cases of killing and letting die, comparing cross‐definitionally equalized killing and non‐cross‐definitionally equalized killing cases to collect evidence for the truth or falsity of Thesis E (Thesis of the Moral Equivalence of Killing and Letting Die). In addition, a comparison is made of cross‐definitionally equalized killing and letting‐die cases to test for the moral significance of what is called here ‘non‐exportable’ definitional properties of killing or letting die. With this as a foundation, two arguments are presented against Thesis E: one argument focuses on the significance of certain definitional properties of killing and letting die, and one on the transitivity argument. The first argument may tell us why killing and letting die differ morally per se, not only that they do. Two methodological issues in making these arguments are also addressed: the Principle of Contextual Interaction, and the possible failure of transitivity.
Harming, not Aiding, and Positive Rights
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConsiders what would follow if the General Equivalence Thesis (GE) of the moral equivalence of harming and not aiding (in cases in which less than life is at stake) were true. The possible existence of positive rights (or duties minus correlative rights) is considered, and an argument against positive rights by Judith Thomson is examined. Arguments are considered that attempt to derive positive rights or duties from the existence of negative rights and a warning given against the failure to consider the role of independent rights or self‐standing claims to things, and the significance of already having had something. An examination is made of how far it is possible to come, consistent with Thesis GE, toward deriving the radical conclusion that we may have a right to something to which we have no independent right or self‐standing claim if it is not permissible to take it from us.
The Trolley Problem
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPart I considered how to determine whether there is a moral difference between killing and letting die per se, but in the two chapters of Part II, the consideration is when it is and when it is not permissible to kill some to save others. Ch. 6 first examines in some detail the arguments John Harris has made for a survival lottery (where we may select from among healthy people the one who will die to save another or who will share a fair risk of death with another), and considers a very limited context in which a curtailed survival lottery might be installed. The rest of the chapter is devoted to consideration of the many attempts to solve the problem of why we may not ordinarily kill one to save more (as in the Transplant Case, where a non‐consequentialist would believe that we may not chop up one innocent non‐threatening person, who would not otherwise die, to transplant his organs into a greater number of people in order to save their lives) but may kill via redirection of threats (as in the Trolley Case, where there is a choice between killing one or killing a greater number by turning/redirecting, or failing to turn/redirect, a runaway trolley). These attempts include the views of Philippa Foot, proponents of the Doctrine of Double Effect (e.g. Michael Costa), Warren Quinn, James Montmarquet, Judith Thomson, and Bruce Russell. A detailed examination is also made of whether the notion of ‘being already involved’ is a moral notion or can be given a non‐moral description.
Harming Some to Save Others
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractContinues the consideration of when it is and is not permissible to kill some to save others, by presenting a new proposal (related to an earlier one made by the author) for a Principle of Permissible Harm (PPH) for dealing with the Trolley Case and related cases. One upshot of this proposal is to show that many redirection‐of‐threat cases are not sui generis but one of a class of cases in which greater good (or its structurally equivalent component or a means that has greater good as its non‐causal flip side) may permissibly cause lesser harm. This PPH is compared with the Doctrine of Double Effect, and a morally crucial distinction concealed within the concept of ‘intending’ is pointed out. The problem then is to explain what important moral notions the PPH expresses; an investigation is made of this (focusing on the maintenance of appropriate relations between victim and beneficiaries) and of why the PPH does not govern omissions (even when there are positive rights). Concludes by examining the bearing of the PPH on the killing/letting‐die distinction, and the problem of euthanasia, also noting how its application is limited by, among other considerations, the Principle of Secondary Permissibility and the distinction between intra‐ and inter‐personal benefits.
Prerogatives and Restrictions
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe first three chapters of Part III of the book (Chs 8–10) examine the question of whether it is morally permissible to treat people in ways ruled out by the Principle of Permissible Harm (PPH; this was introduced in Ch. 7 and provides an account of certain restrictions/constraints on killing) only for the sake of minimizing violations of the PPH itself, or whether there is a constraint on doing this. Ch. 8 first examines the arguments Samuel Scheffler presents against both restrictions and constraints, and his defence of prerogatives not to maximize good or minimize harm (his Hybrid Theory); since Scheffler's views on prerogatives are in some ways related to those of Bernard Williams, the latter's views on integrity are also considered. The criticism made of Scheffler in Sect. I of this chapter is concerned with his view of the supposed gulf between prerogatives and restrictions, and consideration is given to whether too great an emphasis on an active/passive distinction does not underlie his strong opposition to restrictions and whether (by a transitivity argument) he is committed to no restrictions even in pursuing personal non‐optimal projects. Possible similarities between prerogatives and restrictions (or constraints) are considered, but the focus is on crucial differences with respect to minimizing the violation of prerogatives and restrictions, these differences giving rise to what are called the Value and Selection Problems; solutions to the Selection Problem based on asymmetries in victims and differentiation between agents are considered. Sect. II of the chapter re‐examines the foundations of a prerogative (not to maximize good or to minimize harm) that Scheffler located in the personal point of view (PPV); rejecting the sufficiency of Scheffler's account, the chapter focuses on freedom of choice over entitlements in creatures who are ends‐in‐themselves, discussing briefly the idea of reasons generated from the PPV in such creatures; finally, an examination is made of the arguments Shelly Kagan has constructed for and against prerogatives, including the Negative and Positive Arguments, and the Argument from Vividness.
Constraining Rights and the Value of Status
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamine the question of whether it is morally permissible to treat people in ways ruled out by the Principle of Permissible Harm (PPH; this was introduced in Ch. 7 and provides an account of certain restrictions/constraints on killing) only for the sake of minimizing violations of the PPH itself, or whether there is a constraint on doing this. Having considered alternative grounds for a constraint in Ch. 9, Ch. 10 fleshes out a victim‐focussed, agent‐neutral, rights‐based view founded in a strengthened PPH right (constraint), which protects against minimizing violations of the right by violating the right; consideration is given to whether and in what sense minimizing violations of PPH rights by violating them would be both strictly irrational and also exhibit lack of concern for the right. Rejecting this as a route to founding the constraint (on grounds that strict irrationality would arise only if there were already a constraint (or an absolute right not to be killed)), a constraint is generated by focusing on a concern that is at the heart of the PPH and applying it to the pursuit of any goal (utility or minimization of rights violations), the chapter considers how the permissibility of minimization would alter every person's status, and examines the distinction between eliminating a right, violating it, and infringing it, focussing on the significance of negative residues of, and compensation for, rights violations. An exploration is made of whether the structure of deontological and consequentialist theories can be brought closer together via the agent‐neutral value of an inviolable status (of a certain sort), though a distinction is made between the irrationality argument against minimizing the violation of constraints, and support for a concept of the person as strongly inviolable. It is also considered whether creatures who are inviolable are therefore more important entities whose existence makes the world a better place and whether belief in a constraint affects both how good the world is and the effect of acts done in accord with or in opposition to the constraint; further examination is made of the futility of permitting minimization of rights violations by violating rights (‘futilitarianism’) by contrasting the role of utility vs rights per se in motivating minimizing.
The Evolution of Cooperation and Consciousness
Authors: Miles Rebekah L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An examination is made of Rosemary Radford Ruether's naturalist moral realism, whose naturalist, ecofeminist ethic locates both God (divine presence) and human norms in natural processes, particularly in evolution. Transcendence of immediate context and experience is possible through conscious participation in natural evolutionary development into the future. Ruether's moral realism is evident in her confidence that humans can know the good by looking to nature, including human nature, and this same confidence makes her an idealist about the potential to eliminate domination by creating new selves, theologies, and social structures. Moreover, Ruether's description of normative human nature focuses on boundedness to nature and the self's unique faculty of consciousness as an expression of nature; it does not include the human capacity for radical transcendence of or freedom over nature and consciousness. Thus, it is argued, Ruether offers grounding for moral norms in her naturalist moral realism, but she lacks a mechanism to judge those norms and to account for the resilience of human sin and the potential of human creativity to transmute nature.
Battling for Truth in the Beloved Community
Authors: Miles Rebekah L. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An examination is made of Sharon Welch's political realist position. Welch, in contrast to Ruether, locates moral norms and the divine in particular human communities, and all moral claims are radically relative to those particular contexts. Appeals to an experience or reality that transcends our interactions in communities are illusory justifications of our own relative positions, since only within community interaction can we transcend ourselves as we see the limitations of our understandings through the criticism of others. Welch is a political realist in the sense that she is suspicious of the power interests hidden behind truth claims, and she is cynical in her skepticism of any substantive grounding for moral claims. It is shown that each of these proposals undercuts a crucial aspect of feminist moral judgment and, thus, does not lessen, but rather unintentionally supports, further domination.
The Islamic Leviathan
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIslamism is often associated with oppositional social movements. However, increasingly, Muslim states too have served as agents of Islamism. They have adopted Islamization strategies, and realigned state ideology and policy‐making to reflect Islamist ideals and to fulfill demands of Islamic ideology. They have done so not only as a reaction to Islamist challenges from below but also to harness the energies of Islamism to expand state power and capacity. By co‐opting Islamism, they have strengthened the postcolonial state. Pakistan during the Zia ul‐Haq period, and Malaysia under Mahathir Mohammad have been at the forefront of this trend, devising Islamization from above strategies that allowed these weak states to effectively alleviate limitations before exercise of state power and to pursue goals such as economic growth. The Islamization of the postcolonial state underscores the importance of religion and culture to state power and capacity.
The Colonial Legacy
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn Malaya and India, the British devised a system of indirect rule whereby they relied on local norms, social organizations, and indigenous institutions of authority such as landlords and sultans who managed the daily lives of their subjects but were controlled by the British through treaties. Both the colonial states used patronage to rule, creating dependencies between local authorities and the colonial state, and also creating economic, legal, and social structures that, along with the patronage, divided the society vertically.
From Independence to 1969
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza 
Published: October 2003

AbstractMalaysia and Pakistan were created from the rump of British colonialism in India and Southeast Asia. Both states lacked national identity or a unified polity that preceded independence. Both confronted social divisions that were the legacy of the colonial era. In fact, in both countries the struggle for independence was not directed against the British, but was a competition of racial, religious, and ethnic rivals. As weak states, they were unable to proceed with effective state formation. Economic Disparities in Malaysia led to racial and ethnic tensions. Weak state institutions and constitutional crises led to ethnic tensions in Pakistan.
Malaysia, 1981–1997
Authors: Nasr Seyyed Vali Reza 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the 1980s, Malaysia adopted the policy of state‐led Islamization. The ruling UMNO party co‐opted ABIM, fashioned itself as an Islamically oriented party, and adopted many Islamist ideas. The state created Islamic institutions, and supported Islamic cultural, political, and economic activities. It used Islamization to expand its power and to penetrate the Malay society. The state also embarked on rapid economic growth to address racial tensions. It used its control of Islam to manage Islamic politics and define Islamic values with a view of economic growth and accommodating globalization.
Introduction
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Presents an argument for Lessing's significance for German intellectual history as well as his significance for modern Protestant theology. The assertion made here is that Lessing, as a pioneer among the nontheologians who fostered the development of modern theology, belongs to the arena of the history of theology, even though he was not a theologian by profession. The task of articulating Lessing's theology or philosophy of religion is a difficult task that demands meticulous treatment. In order to escape the famous dilemma posed by Friedrich Loofs when he claimed that Lessing's “esoteric view” is concealed behind impenetrable “exoteric” walls, we consider the question of methodology for Lessing studies and reexamine old interpretive methods. The new method introduced here involves a heuristic and contextual interpretation of each of Lessing's cardinal texts, or an “intellectual assay” into the hidden and presumably rich vein of his thought with an eye to systematic reconstruction in future.
Lessing and Christianity
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Surveys Lessing's relationship with Christianity and theology in preparation for a detailed analysis of particulars in the ensuing chapters. The survey depicts in general terms Lessing's long and deep‐rooted engagement with Christianity. A glance at Lessing's formative period as well as his later involvement in the “fragments controversy” (Fragmentenstreit) provides instructive hints as to the salient features of his theological thought. In an attempt to identify Lessing's real intention and his theological position in this fierce theological dispute, the question is raised as to why Lessing ventured, anonymously, to publish Reimarus's posthumous manuscripts. Investigation suggests that Lessing's act of publishing the Fragments from an Unnamed Author can be construed as an act intended to serve the pursuit of truth.
The Religious Thought of the Young Lessing
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Analyzes the young Lessing's religious thought with special attention to his early writings, particularly Religion, Some Thoughts about the Moravians, The Jews, and The Christianity of Reason. These poetic, theological, dramatic, and philosophical writings illustrate his religious skepticism, his theological critique, his ideal of universal humanity, and certain speculative reflections. The analysis shows that in his early years Lessing still vacillated among four ways of thinking: Lutheran orthodoxy, pietism, deism, and Leibniz‐Wolffian metaphysics. But these early writings also contain many of the germs of the religious‐philosophical thought of his mature years. The inquiry demonstrates that the young Lessing displayed brilliantly in these early writings something of his later genius both as a theological critic and as a philosopher of religion.
The Controversy Between Lessing and Goeze
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Analyzes the confrontation between Lessing and Goeze during “the second stage of the fragments controversy,” i.e., the stage when the target of criticism was no longer the author of the fragments but the editor who had ventured to make them public. The Lessing‐Goeze controversy began when Goeze, the Hauptpastor in Hamburg who was notorious as “the Inquisitor” and who looked on himself as the defender of Lutheran orthodoxy, launched a fierce attack on Lessing, the ducal librarian at Wolfenbüttel and the editor of Fragments from an Unnamed Author. Lessing's defense took the form of a series of polemical writings: A Parable; Axioms; the eleven‐installment Anti‐Goeze; and The Necessary Answer to a very Unnecessary Question. It is observed that what was of highest importance for Lessing was the “truth question,” whereas Goeze's sole concern was the preservation of established Lutheran orthodoxy. Lessing's intention to discuss the question of the truth of Christian revelation in open forum was marred by his opponent's recourse to the civil authorities.
Lessing's “Ugly Broad Ditch”
Authors: Yasukata Toshimasa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explicates the meaning of Lessing's famous metaphor or image of the “ugly broad ditch” (der garstige breite Graben). This image is a metaphorical expression of his proposition that “accidental truths of history can never become the proof for necessary truths of reason.” Lessing asserts that since the “proof of the spirit and of power” has lost its erstwhile validity, the Christian religion, the quintessence of which Lessing regards as genuine Christian love, must authenticate itself solely by its “inner truth.” But Karl Barth, calling the authenticity of Lessing's “ugly ditch” into question, weighs Lessing's problem (“historical distance”) unfavorably against Peter's problem (“the real distance” between God and human beings). Faced with Barth's sharp criticism, we argue that Lessing's “ugly ditch” involves not just a problem of “historical distance” but a theological problem of existential appropriation, a problem of great importance for the modern person.