bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Corporatist Renaissance in Post‐communist Central Europe?
Authors: Orenstein Mitchell A. , Hale Lisa E. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWhile global trends have forced labour into retreat in most countries, in post‐communist Europe, the dramatic opening to world markets in 1989 was achieved through a political breakthrough in which organized labour played a major role. Whereas trade unions under communism acted as ‘transmission belts to the working class for state policy and ideology, post‐communist governments needed to develop new roles for resurgent trade unions in a democratic society. In Poland, the post‐communist government juggled a number of different objectives in the reformation of labour market institutions. On the one hand, democratic consolidation demanded that trade unions be constituted as independent social and political forces that would support the new regime. On the other hand, liberalization demanded that trade unions moderate their wage demands so as not to foster runaway inflation. In addition, since trade unions remained the only major civil society organization with significant roots in the working class, trade unions immediately became important partners in any new political coalition. Corporatism, as advocated by the International Labour Organization office in the region, provided a compelling answer to many of these demands. This chapter argues that in Poland, the need to institutionalize a role for trade unions in the emerging democratic society led to a genuinely corporatist forum for indicative negotiation over wages, and the development of progressive social policy. Popular disillusion with structural economic reforms led to corporatist ‘pacts’ negotiated, first, by Solidarity leaders, and then, by the former communists who came to power in 1993. Finally, in 1995, to initiate a Polish tripartite council for social bargaining, using a comparison between Poland and the Czech Republic, the chapter concludes that globalization has strengthened trade unions and the pressures for including them in new forms of corporatist intermediation in post‐communist Europe. While these institutions suffer many of the same problems evident in the developed West, corporatism has become part of the institutional framework of post‐communism and appears to be here to stay.
Frege on Apriority
Authors: Burge Tyler 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In his contribution, Burge contrasts the use Kant and Frege make of the a priori in their work. Burge argues that for Kant, the conscious states of pure intuition are states that entitle a subject to make judgements of geometrical principles and provide a justification that is independent of perceptual experience. This conception Burge contrasts with Frege's philosophical explication of the a priori in The Foundation of Arithmetic.
Rationalism, Empiricism, and the A Priori
Authors: Cassam Quassim 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Quassim Cassam investigates the relation between a priori truths on the one hand and rationalist and empiricist positions on the other. He argues that we obtain a clearer understanding of the distinction between rationalism and empiricism as well as a more refined conception of a priori truths if we do not regard the question of whether there exist such truths as the dividing line, but rather concentrate on the different explanations with those respective positions for the existence of such truths.
Naturalism and the A Priori
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPenelope Maddy investigates the concept of the a priori in the context of contemporary scientific naturalism, arguing that a naturalistic account of the growth of scientific knowledge refutes the suggestion that there are a priori truths. Maddy notes the importance of Kant's conception of the a priori to her naturalism, and works out the differences and similarities between Quine's and her (Quinean) naturalism.
Apriority as an Evaluative Notion
Authors: Field Hartry 
Published: October 2003

AbstractHartry Field argues that meaning‐based approaches to explaining the apriority of certain propositions fail to succeed in their endeavour. He suggests that adopting what one calls a ‘non‐factualist’ view of justification itself removes the mystery of the apriority of such propositions, and sketches what such a view of justification involves.
Stipulation, Meaning, and Apriority
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Paul Horwich attacks meaning‐based approaches to a priori justification and puts forward a view that explains apriority in terms of innateness and psychological indispensability. He concludes that while our practice of designating certain basic a priori beliefs as justified cannot be given epistemic support, it can be described and explained.
A Priori Rules: Wittgenstein on the Normativity of Logic
Authors: Railton Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Peter Railton explores a non‐meaning‐based approach to explaining the possibility of a priori knowledge, suggesting that we regard apparently a priori principles as rules, regulative of certain practices. Railton goes on to use this idea as a foundation of comparison with Wittgenstein's views in the first part of his Philosophical Investigations.
Apriority and Existence
Authors: Yablo Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Stephen Yablo, rejecting meaning‐based approaches to apriority explanation, explores the suggestion that the apriority of existence claims within the abstract sciences might be attributable to their metaphorical nature. To this end, Yablo argues that the abstract sciences show that the theory of understanding is not the only epistemological resource open to defenders of the a priori.
Knowledge of Logic
Authors: Boghossian Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Paul Boghossian defends a meaning‐based approach to the apriority of the propositions of logic. His model is based on the idea that the logical constants are implicitly defined by some of the axioms and inference rules in which they are involved, thereby offering an alternative to those theories that deny that grasp of meaning can contribute to the explanation of a thinker's entitlement to a particular type of transition or belief.
Explaining the A Priori: The Programme of Moderate Rationalism
Authors: Peacocke Christopher 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Christopher Peacocke investigates the question of how we should conceive of the relations between understanding and the a priori, thereby forming the basis on which the dispute between meaning‐based and non‐meaning‐based approaches to explanations of the possibility of a priori propositions could be settled. To this end, Peacocke suggests a programme for moderate rationalists.
Implicit Definition and the A Priori
Authors: Hale Bob , Wright Crispin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Bob Hale and Crispin Wright hold a meaning‐based approach to the explanation of a priori propositions. In their contribution, they develop the model of implicit definition, also suggested by Boghossian in this collection, and in particular, investigate its explanatory potential with regard to some cases of a priori knowledge.
Representation, Scepticism, and the A Priori
Authors: Jackson Frank 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Frank Jackson investigates the theoretical commitments of certain stances about semantics as far as they shed light on the dispute between meaning‐based and non‐meaning‐based approaches to explaining apriority. Jackson argues generally that anyone who agrees that sentences have representational content and who is not a sceptic should accept that there are a priori truths that outrun the logical truths.
The Status of Logic
Authors: Shapiro Stewart 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It seems that if a thinker in an argument arrives at an empirical conclusion, then some of the belief‐formation or reasoning principles she employs must be a priori if the reasoning is to be knowledgeable. Stewart Shapiro accepts this claim, and investigates the way in which the basic principles of logic must have an a priori status if the process of empirical confirmation of propositions reasoning that involves such principles of logic is to make sense.
Transcendental Philosophy and A Priori Knowledge: A Neo‐Kantian Perspective
Authors: Friedman Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
It seems that if a thinker in an argument arrives at an empirical conclusion, then some of the belief‐formation or reasoning principles she employs must be a priori if the reasoning is to be knowledgeable. Michael Friedman investigates the existence of empirically defeasible a priori warrants, focussing on the principles that are constitutive of the spatio‐temporal framework within which a particular scientific theory is formulated.
Externalism and A Priori Knowledge of Empricial Facts
Authors: Brewer Bill 
Published: October 2003

AbstractBill Brewer explores a solution to a reductio ad absurdum argument template, one instance of which has the conclusion that we can know the proposition ‘someone has interacted with water’ a priori. Brewer holds that empirical knowledge of water is required for a thinker to possess the concept ‘water’ in the first place, so this knowledge cannot be said to be derived a priori by means of the argument.
The Psychophysical Nexus
Authors: Nagel Thomas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Thomas Nagel investigates the status of a priori knowledge in the context of the mind‐body problem. A priori reflection on the concepts of mental and physical properties seems to show that mental state and event types could not be identical with physical state event types. Nagel wishes to block the conclusion that it really does show this because he finds the resultant property dualism profoundly unsatisfactory.
Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self‐Knowledge
Authors: Peacocke Christopher 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe paper argues that our self‐ascription of occurent psychological attitudes is consciously based. It rejects the trichotomy that considers self‐knowledge to be accounted for, by observation, by inference, or by nothing. Instead, conscious attitudes provide the thinker with a reason for self‐ascribing an attitude to the content that occurs to the thinker, when in possession of the relevant concepts. Developing this account for the case of belief, a conscious belief is shown to provide the thinker with a reason to self‐ascribe to it because of the role such states play in the possession conditions for the concept of belief. The conscious attitudes appealed to in the account must be characterized independently of their self‐ascription, and a number of rival accounts of consciousness are rejected. In addition, the paper examines the relations between consciouness and attention by exploring the notion of a conscious thought as occupying the thinker's attention.
An Eye Directed Outward
Authors: Martin M. G. F. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The paper is a response to Peacocke's chapter. It begins by exploring and recasting his distinction between objects of attention and occupying attention. It goes on to consider cases of self‐ascription based on conscious episodes that are not authoritative, thereby suggesting that Peacocke's treatment needs a way to characterize the kinds of conscious thought, which can provide a rational basis for authoritative self‐ascription. One such kind of case is where knowledge of one's belief arises from one's apparent knowledge of how matters stand in the world. This raises a puzzle as to how directing our attention outward at the world should be to give rise to the knowledge of our own minds, and it is argued that Peacocke's possession‐conditions account of self‐ascription does nothing to solve it.
Externalism and Authoritative Self‐Knowledge
Authors: Macdonald Cynthia 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This paper defends a qualified observational model of authoritative self‐knowledge, which centres on two features of ordinarily observable characteristics that help explain a subject's direct awareness of them. The first is that they are basic, in that one does not have to know of any underlying fact in virtue of which they apply when they do; and the second is that it is generally necessary and sufficient for the application of such a characteristic that it seems to a normal observer, in normal circumstances, that it does apply. The view is defended against two well‐known misgivings about modelling such knowledge on observation: first, that there is a telling structural disanalogy, since observation normally involves three components, namely, the item perceived, an intermediary, non‐conceptual sensation state, and a judgement grounded in that sensation state, whereas self‐knowledge of an intentional state apparently involves analogues of the first and third components only, namely, a first‐order content‐bearing state and the second‐order state that it validates; and second that, whereas the relations between a perceptual state and the item perceived are causal and contingent, those between first‐ and corresponding second‐order intentional states are in general non‐contingent, and so not merely causal.
Self‐Knowledge: Special Access Versus Artefact of Grammar—A Dichotomy Rejected
Authors: Fricker Elizabeth 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The paper examines a dichotomy between special access accounts of authoritative self‐knowledge and constitutive accounts that treat such authority as a feature of the ‘grammar’ of self‐ascriptions, and concludes that it is a false one. Firstly, special access theories are shown to include not just Cartesian views but also a number of different kinds of accounts of the nature of mental states and our self‐knowledge of them. One group comprises functionalist accounts—special access theories, which involve non‐Cartesian conceptions of the individuation of conditions of mental states, and need make no play with any form of ‘inner perception’. Secondly, it is argued that there is space for intermediate theories according to which ‘grammar’ and empirical regularities collaborate inextricably to hold our actual mental state concepts together, and play a joint role in explaining the reliability of our basic self‐ascriptions of mental states. Finally, it is shown that all viable concepts of mental states, which can be competently self‐ascribed in a non‐inferential way, must be multi‐criterial concepts and not wholly fixed by ‘grammar’.
Self‐Knowledge and Resentment
Authors: Bilgrami Akeel 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The paper pursues the question: what makes self‐knowledge of our intentional states special, what makes it different from other kinds of knowledge? It does so by contrasting a ’constitutive’ view of self‐knowledge with a perceptual model of self‐knowledge, and claims that if the former can be shown to be plausible, that will establish the special character of self‐knowledge. It then follows Crispin Wright in setting up a biconditional, which links the first‐order and second‐order intentional states as a prima facie mark of the constitutive view of self‐knowledge. In the rest of the paper, however, a quite different understanding of the biconditional is provided from the one in Crispin Wright's work. The biconditional is given support by a normative conception of agency owing to Strawson's conception of freedom, and a normative conception of intentionality. The overarching claim of the paper is that the special character of self‐knowledge is of a piece with the special nature of the agent's or first person point of view, and at bottom, both self‐knowledge and the point of view of agency are of a piece with the irreducibility of norms and values to states of nature, as natural sciences study them.
Reason and the First Person
Authors: Burge Tyler 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The first part of the paper focuses on the role played in thought and action by possession of the first‐person concept. It is argued that only one who possesses the I concept is in a position to fully articulate certain fundamental, a priori aspects of the concept of reason. A full understanding of the concept of reason requires being inclined to be affected or immediately motivated by reasons—to form, change or confirm beliefs or other attitudes in accordance with them—when those reasons apply to one's own attitudes. The cases where rational evaluations of acts and attitudes rationally motivate immediate implementation of the evaluations to shape the acts and attitudes are distinguished from cases where they do not, by the use of the first‐person concept to mark those acts and attitudes as one's own. The second part of the paper examines asymmetries between self‐knowledge and knowledge of other minds. The usual view that self‐knowledge has an immediate and a priori warrant, whereas knowledge of others’ minds rests on observation and inference is disputed. A sketch is given of knowledge of other minds that can be non‐inferential and can rest on an intellectual, non‐perceptual entitlement. When one seemingly understands an utterance in interlocution, one is a priori prima facie entitled to suppose that it comes from a rational source, and because knowledge of other minds can be immediate and epistemically grounded in intellectual, non‐empirical entitlements, it is distinguished from self‐knowledge not by being necessarily inferential or by being necessarily grounded in perception, but by being in some known contrast with thought known as one's own.
Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self‐Knowledge
Authors: McLaughlin Brian P. , Tye Michael 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The paper defends the view that privileged access to our thoughts is compatible with content externalism against the charge, levelled by Michael McKinsey, Jessica Brown, and Paul Boghossian, that the combination of privileged access to thoughts and content externalism leads to absurd consequences about what can be known about the environment independently of empirical investigation.
Externalism, Architecturalism, and Epistemic Warrant
Authors: Davies Martin 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExternalism about some mental property, M, is the thesis that whether a person has M conceptually depends, in part, on the person's environment. Architecturalism about M is the thesis that whether a person has M conceptually depends, in part, on the person's internal cognitive architecture. I consider a number of arguments of the form (MC):(1) I have mental property M;(2) If I have mental property M, then I meet condition C; Therefore, (3) I meet condition C . . . These arguments are potentially problematic to the extent that premise (1) can be known with first‐person authority and premise (2) can be known by way of a philosophical argument for an externalist or architecturalist thesis. For, in that case, knowledge of both premises can be had without rising from the armchair, and there is a transparently valid argument from these premises to the conclusion (3). Yet it is intuitively implausible that I have a non‐empirical route to substantive knowledge about my environment or about my cognitive architecture.I suggest that we can avoid this problem of armchair knowledge if we allow that there are principles that limit the transmission of epistemic warrant from the premises to the conclusion of even palpably valid arguments.
First‐Person Authority and the Internal Reality of Beliefs
Authors: Raffman Diana 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The paper is a response to Davies, arguing that he misdiagnoses the difficulties with the architecturalist and externalist arguments he targets. Whether or not there are independent grounds for the principles limiting the transfer of epistemic warrant across known entailments, the problem with both types of argument is that they equivocate. It is shown that, in each case, if the premise (1) I have mental property M, expresses something about which the subject is non‐empirically authoritative, it should be viewed as empty of subtantial empirical content; whereas if premise (2) If I have mental property M, then I meet condition C, expresses something knowable a priori, then since its consequent involves substantial empirical content, so must the antecedent. Hence, the modus ponens step is flawed because of equivocation.
The Simple Theory of Colour and the Transparency of Sense Experience
Authors: Edwards Jim 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An argument is offered that externalism can compromise the first‐person transparency of mental contents. The premises are John McDowell's view that experience is passively structured by concepts, and the Simple Theory of Colour advocated by John Campbell, according to which those properties that are the actual semantic values of colour concepts are just as they appear to normal observers under standard conditions. An example is offered to suggest that it must be an epistemic possibility that the semantic values of such concepts, as externally determined, are not the properties the Simple Theory takes them to be. The possibility highlights a mismatch between the properties that the colour concepts present as their semantic values and their actual, externally determined semantic values. Such a mismatch is shown to induce an incoherence into colour concepts leaving them unfit passively to structure our colour experience. Under such circumstances, it would not be transparent to a subject on the basis of colour experience, whether those experiences are conceptually structured by concepts answering to the Simple Theory, or precisely what content they carry.
On Knowing One's Own Language
Authors: Smith Barry C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The problem of self‐knowledge is examined and the linguistic strategy for tackling it is explored. The strategy attempts—as in Davidson's and Wright's discussions of self‐knowledge—to ground knowledge of one's mind on knowledge of what one means in speaking one's mind. If knowing what one is saying in speaking a language is to provide a means of knowing one's own mind, it cannot simply be a part of it. But if no account of knowledge of what one means is offered, there will be a lacuna in the strategy. The paper considers what form a full account should take, and argues that it will have to combine first‐personal, third‐personal and sub‐personal elements of our knowledge of language. All three elements are necessary to explicate what is made available in, and expressed by, instances of disquotational knowledge, such as ‘Snow is white’ means that snow is white.. Immediate and authoritative knowledge of which sentences are grammatical depends on the internal workings of the language faculty and their impact on the conscious experience of the speaker, but immediate and authoritative knowledge of word meaning is not solely a matter internal to the speaker. Knowledge of word meaning is knowledge of public norms that govern our use of words, which introduce third‐personal standards into our first‐personal use. It is argued that our knowledge of word meaning is immediately authoritative about objective standards governing the proper use of our words, and so the authority attaching to these disquotational pronouncements is substantial and not merely an artefact of disquotation. Without an account of that knowledge the lacuna in the linguistic strategy remains.
On Knowing One's Own Language
Authors: Higginbotham James 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe paper challenges Smith's contention that disquotational knowledge amounts to substantial knowledge, arguing that nothing more than such knowledge, thinly conceived, is needed to account for first‐personal knowledge of one's meanings. However, a distinction is offered between the kind of authority that attaches to disquotational claims and that which attaches to our intuitive judgements about what we mean. The latter may fall short of genuine knowledge while still involving entitlement and a presumption of correctness. Each species of authority is assessed with respect to issues in Smith's paper, and the view is defended that neither species is threatened by externalism. The extent of our linguistic knowledge is further explored with respect to a particular range of linguistic data.