bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Insurrection
Authors: Mcdowell R B 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
At the beginning of 1798 politics in both Great Britain and Ireland were dominated by the war. France, with all its continental enemies forced to sue for peace, was now in a position to select the time and place for the decisive blow which would destroy British power. All over the British Isles extreme radicals could look forward to the speedy collapse of the established order. In Ireland the United Irishmen continued to extend their organization, secure arms and propagate their opinions. Though the Northern Star had been suppressed, the Irish radicals had two newspapers—in Dublin, the Press, started by Arthur O’Connor in September 1797 and in Cork, the Harp of Erin, which was managed by a group which included Roger O’Connor and Webb, a barrister who had been a member of the Dublin society of United Irishmen, and which began appearing about the beginning of February 1798.
History of Universities
Authors: Dunbabin Jean 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Volume X of History of Universities contains the customary mix of learned articles, book reviews, conference reports, and bibliographical information, which makes this annual publication such an indispensable tool for the historian of higher education. The articles cover a wide chronological and geographical range. They include studies on the financing of university education in twelfth and thirteenth-century France; the early modern University of Prague; Newman and Tractarian Oxford's idea of a university; and universities and élites in modern Britain. Its combination of original scholarship and comprehensive bibliographical material ensures that History of the Universities, Volume X is both intellectually stimulating and a necessary work of reference.
The Medieval Students of the University of Salamanca*
Authors: y García Antonio García 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The University of Salamanca has had a chequered history. The difficult early stage in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (1218/ 1219-1380) gave way to a period of consolidation, beginning at the end of the fourteenth century and running until the end of the Middle Ages (1381-1500). This was followed by the golden age of the University in the sixteenth century when its numbers and reputation were at a height. The University later experienced gradual but irregular decline until the first half of the twentieth century, when it again grew in importance. These vicissitudes notwithstanding, it was the foremost of the Spanish universities until the end of the ancien regime. This article only discusses the University during the late middle ages, from its foundation until the latter part of the reign of the Catholic King and Queen, Ferdinand and Isabella.
A Socioscape of Irish America
Authors: Byron Reginald 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Albany is a very Irish place in a very Irish part of the country, yet its qualities seem rather different from those which have been reported as characterizing the few remaining Irish ethnic enclaves in New York City, Philadelphia, or Boston. These big-city, traditional neighbourhoods have provided the setting for generations of scholarship on Irish America. There is a long tradition of immigration and ethnic studies which has focused on these initial places of urban settlement by the Irish, the Italians, the Jews, and others. And, studies such as Glazer and Moynihan’s Beyond the Melting Pot, which have emphasized the vibrant and enduring nature of ethnicity in these places, have had a deep influence on our views, both scholarly and popular, of the character of European ethnicity in contemporary America.
Identity and Ecology in Arctic Siberia
Authors: Anderson David G 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
This is a first-hand account of a reindeer-herding collective in the remote Taimyr peninsula of Siberia. The author gives an intimate description of the day-to-day lives of a little-known group of Evenkis as they face both economic and ecological challenges. His book therefore fills a gap in our understanding of the historical and political dynamics of northern Asia, and traces the changes caused in the region by the formation of, and the recent break-up of, the Soviet Union. It also addresses wider questions of ecological theory, nationalism, and the formation of identity. Professor Anderson’s idea of ‘nationality inflation’ provides a valuable new perspective on these topics. He shows how the Soviet state contributed to this ‘inflation’ through its creation of ‘authorized identities’ and suggests how identity policy and the discourse it generated became a powerful historical force integrating the social dynamics of economy, politics, and culture.
Separation and Immanence in Plato’s Theory of Forms
Authors: Devereux Daniel T 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
According to Aristotle’s terse report, Plato separated Forms from sensible particulars, and in doing so he departed from Socrates’ view of the relationship between universals and their participants. Until recently, most scholars accepted Aristotle’s statement as fundamentally accurate, and they understood separation to involve both the denial that Forms are immanent in sensible particulars as well as the positive claim that they are ‘ontologically independent’—that is, they do not depend for their existence on the things that participate in them. In the last few years this common and familiar view has come under attack on several fronts. As for immanence, the critics argue that the evidence is mixed; in some dialogues, e.g. the Symposium and Timaeus, there are passages in which Plato clearly rejects immanence, but in the Phaedo he seems to regard Forms as in their participants. It has also been claimed that Plato’s statements about Forms do not support a general commitment to ontological independence; the most that can be said is that in some dialogues he is committed to the independence of some Forms.
Something in Between
Authors: Sumner L W 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In the first sentence of his excellent book Well-Being, Jim Griffin announces that he intends to offer answers to three questions: ‘What is the best way to understand “well-being”? Can it be measured? Where does it fit in moral and political philosophy?’ Although al1 three questions are of obvious importance, and although the answers he develops to all of them have been deservedly influential, I intend in this discussion to focus exclusively on the first. As Griffin comes to define this project more precisely, it takes the form of seeking the best formal account of well-being or (as the utilitarians would have it) ‘utility’. By calling such an account ‘formal’, Griffin means to distinguish it from the classical utilitarian view on which ‘utility’ was the supreme substantive prudential (and ethical) value. By contrast, on the account he defends’ “utilitf’... is not to be seen as the single over-arching value, in fact not as a substantive value at all, but instead as a formal analysis of what it is for something to be prudentially valuable to some person’ (WB 31-2).
Anna Karenina and Moral Philosophy
Authors: Glover Jonathan 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is obvious that Anna Karenina is not in the ordinary sense a work of phi losophy. It is a novel, a story about a group of particular people. Admittedly some of the characters ‘philosophize’ in a popular sense, expressing opinions on life, death, love, morality, and religion. But the book does not have the apparatus of a real piece of philosophy: arguments, analysis of concepts, rebuttals of opposing points of view. Yet virtually anyone who reads it must come away with the sense that it is not just a book about those particular people, and that its subject matter includes some of the central philosophical questions.
On Knowledge, Truth, and Value: Nietzsche’s Debt to Schopenhauer and the Development of his Empiricism
Authors: Clark Maudemarie 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Nietzsche expresses his debt to Schopenhauer very clearly Schopenhauer is his ‘great teacher’, his ‘first and only educator’. He is less clear concerning what his philosophy owes to Schopenhauer. He counts ‘Schopenhauer as Educator’ in his essay of that title not because of any doctrine he accepted, but because Schopenhauer provided him with a model of the philosophical life; and the passage about his ‘great teacher’ tells us not what he learned from Schopenhauer, but only that he arrived at his own view of morality by engaging in a struggle with Schopenhauer’s values.
True Belief In The Meno
Authors: Dimas Panagiotis 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Socrates also asserts that from having such true belief the boy can go on to acquire knowledge if he is asked the same questions many times and from many points of view (85 c 10—d 1). But he never offers a demonstration of him doing that. Nor does Socrates argue that he could do it; he merely asserts it over no more than two lines
Resailing socrates. Δ∊uτ∊ρos Πλous: a criticism of rowe’s. explanation In Phaedo 99c 6-102a 8‘.
Authors: Eck Job Van 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One of the difficulties in Plato studies is that of providing a coherent and adequate interpretation of the exposition Socrates gives in Phaedo 99 D ff. of how he has engaged in his ’econd voyage in search of the al-rta. (99 c 9-0 I): an interpretation, that is, which accounts for the fact that all those present at Socrates. last discussionamong them Simmias and Cebes-as well as the two participants in the dialogue, Phaedo and Echecrates, agree on the dearness of Socrates. words up to 102 A I, .even for someone of small intelligence. (102A 4-5). This is what Professor Rowe intends to do in his paper .Explanation in Phaedo 99 c 6-102 A 8. [.Explanation.] in Volume XI of this journal, pp. 49-69. As I fundamentally disagree with this interpretation I would like to take the opportunity to comment here on Rowe’ article. My procedure will be as follows. First I shall set forth the main points of Rowe’ reading (Section I); then I shall offer my criticisms (Section II); and finally I shall present the outline of an alternative interpretation (Section III).
Aristotle’S Modal Syllogistic
Authors: Brennan Tad 
Published: November 2023

abstract
This volume extends the work that Patterson introduced to the world in an article in Oxford Studies some years ago. As in that article, Patterson offers a new solution to the old and vexed question of how best to make sense of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. He makes many novel proposals, which may be summed up under three heads. First, he creates a new logical symbolism, which he claims is requisite for an adequate representation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic. Second, he detects two kinds of copular relations at work in the syllogistic, the copulae of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ necessity, and argues that these are distinct from de re and de dicto necessity. Third, he argues that the modal syllogistic can only be understood on the supposition that its semantics is thoroughly essentialist; true premisses are true, and valid syllogisms valid, only in virtue of the structure of Aristotelian essences.
Method and Argument in the Study of Aristotle
Authors: Charles David 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The Companion fully succeeds in its aim of giving ‘the most accessible and comprehensive guide to Aristotle currently available’. It is intended for philosophy students (graduate and undergraduate) new to Aristotle, who share ‘a legitimate interest in what Aristotle represents for us, as philosophers now’ working in the analytical tradition (Introduction, p. x). They will, it is hoped, read the Companion and ask themselves whether Aristotle’s views (as represented here) are true or (at least) defensible, whether they are capable of being modified or qualified, and (‘come to that’) whether Aristotle meant exactly what he is represented as saying (p. xii). The aim is to give an account of some areas of Aristotle’s philosophy in a form which makes them accessible to non-specialists so that they can then ask philosophical and exegetical questions about the account offered. The non-specialist and specialist alike will be helped in their further reading by an excellent and user-friendly bibliography.
The Mooring of Philosophy
Authors: Obbink Dirk 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
As an argument, it may not sound like much. But to some Epicureans of Cicero’s day this was all you needed to know: a medicine sufficiently powerful to be dubbed ή Τϵαϕα&Τμακοс or fourfold, semi-metrical protective charm-recite it as protection against fear of god, death, and evil.
The Liar Paradox and the Stoics
Authors: Mignucci Mario 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The external history of the ancient versions of the Liar paradox is easily traced. We know that it was probably invented by Eubulides,1 and a version of it may have been known by Aristotle.2 A development of Aristotle’s view can be found in the anonymous commentary on the Sophistical Refutations traditionally ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias.3 But it is surely Chrysippus the philosopher who dedicated more efforts in ancient times to solve the paradox. He devoted an astonishing number of works to the Liar, as the catalogue of his books preserved by Diogenes Laertius shows. At least seven titles mention the Liar paradox,4 and we may think that some of the others were dealing with the same problem.5 Besides, Chrysippus’ Logical Investigations contain a few lines dedicated to the Liar paradox.6
The Stoic Sage in the Cosmic City
Authors: Obbink Dirk 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Much attention has been given to the Stoic concept of the universe as a city, its development as a political model, and its influence on subsequent thought, especially theories of natural law. The notion develops over time through a succession of thinkers, from Zeno’s exclusive city of the wise, and Chrysippus’ conception of the cosmos as a polity of gods and wise men, to Cicero and the later view that all men live (or ought to live) under the same canons of natural law. While this development is clear in outline, answers to other questions are less clear. Posing solutions to them offers some general inroads into Stoic political theory. Was the transition occasioned by changed political circumstances, or was it a reposting of doctrine in response to salvos from philosophical quarters? What does Chrysippus expect us to think that the Stoic sage will actually do in a community of gods and wise men that is not in any ordinary sense a polis, in fulfilment of his essentially political nature? How does the notion of universal law come to be reapplied within the framework of existing cities?
Chrysippus’ Theory of Causes
Authors: Bobzien Susanne 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
We know very little about Chrysippus’ theory of causation. Our textual evidence which names Chrysippus directly and can be straightforwardly considered as belonging to a theory of causes is this: a passage in Stobaeus (Eel. 1.138.23-139.4) that presents Chrysippus’ basic account of causation; a distinction of causes in Cicero’s On Fate (Fat. 41-5); and an indirect reference to a distinction of causes in Plutarch’s On Stoic Self-Contradictions (Stoic rep., ch. 47).various works by Galen, Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism book 3 and Against the Mathematicians book 9, and Clement’s Miscellanies book 8.9 we find excerpts and summaries of causal theories of medical, later Stoic, and Peripatetic origin. (A trace of a later Stoic theory of causes can be found in Alexander of Aphrodisias’ On Fate 192.18-19.) The reports are mainly eclectic in character, often uncritically juxtaposing and mixing together various theories. But they have one thing in common: they treat the theories they report as finished taxonomies of causes. They present sets of technical terms that are used as names for mutually exclusive classes of causes, so that it is possible to assign any cause to precisely one class (and naturally there are no empty classes). In most cases, causes of more than one type are described as cooperating in one instance of causation.
The Incoherence of Thrasymachus
Authors: Everson Stephen 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The ability to find sound and interesting arguments in philosophical texts is perhaps the historian of philosophy’s central skill-and the greater is the appearance of inconsistency, invalidity, or simple silliness in a text, the greater is the skill demonstrated in showing that it in fact contains a compelling argument for an interesting conclusion. It is natural enough, then, that the confrontation between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the first book of the Republic should prove attractive to Plato’s commentators. At first sight, Thrasymachus comes across not only as bad-mannered but as confused, his complacency undercut by his inability seriously to pursue a philosophical argument. Starting off at 338 c by throwing out the proposition that justice is ‘nothing other than the advantage of the stronger’, he proceeds at 338 E to assert that justice is the advantage of the established government, at 339 A to repeat the claim that it is the advantage of the stronger, then at 339 c to assent to the claim that it is to obey the law, before, having apparently changed his mind about what it is to be a ruler of a state, finally maintaining at 343 c that it is the ‘good of another’. It is now perhaps scholarly orthodoxy to maintain that, despite all this, Thrasymachus is presented by Plato as having a coherent theory of justice, although unsurprisingly scholars have not found agreement as to what that theory actually is.
Alteration and Aristotle’S Activity-Change Distinction
Authors: Heinaman Robert 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Aristotle believes that there are two broad categories of events—activities and changes. Despite the crucial importance of the idea of an activity for his philosophy, it is only on rare occasions that Aristotle attempts to explain what an activity is supposed to be. This he does by contrasting the properties of activities with the properties of changes. Thus, as is well known, Aristotle affirms that, while in the case of an activity such as seeing, a subject sees a colour and has seen the colour at the same time, in the case of a change such as walking from Thebes to Athens, it is not the case that a subject has walked from Thebes to Athens at the same time that it is walking from Thebes to Athens. Aristotle believes that there are four kinds of change-change of substance, or generation and destruction; change of place, or locomotion; change of size, or growth and diminution; and finally, change of quality, or alteration. All have their special characteristics and problems, but here I focus on the differences between alteration on the one hand and locomotion and change of quantity on the other. The fundamental difference is that, whereas locomotion and change of quantity occur over a ‘path’ that is a continuum, alteration, at least in many cases, has a path which is discontinuous. I shall argue that because of this and other peculiarities of alteration, several features which Aristotle attributes to changes in the course of distinguishing them from activities do not, in fact, apply to many alterations.
From Kant to Fichte: A Reply to Franks
Authors: Rosen Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In his paper Paul Franks uses philosophical material that will be unknown to many of us to answer some questions which we can all recognize. Briefly: how did they get there from here? How was it that in such a short space of time German philosophy moved from the transcendental idealism of Kant’s first Critique to the Absolute and Speculative Idealism of Schelling and Hegel? Bundled up in that question are some familiar further issues:
Causation and Subjectivity
Authors: Vogel Jonathan 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
It is part of our philosophical lore that Hume called the status of causation into question, and that Kant attempted to answer him. For Hume, there are no necessary connections in nature, so the reality of causal relations is attenuated or diluted, at best. Kant argued, in opposition, that human subjectivity would be impossible unless nature contains the very ‘synthetic’ connections Hume refused to countenance. Humean reductionism or anti-realism with respect to causal connections has remained compelling down to the present day. However, I will try to show that some current formulations of this view encounter a difficulty not unlike the one Kant himself tried to press. The line of thought I develop may be regarded as a transcendental argument, and I go on to consider it in that light.
Hun1e’s Theory of the Self Revisited
Authors: Penelhum Terence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
THIS paper is in two parts. I begin the first part with a brief resume of a previous discussion of Hume’s Section ‘Of Personal Identity’, and follow it with a response to some criticisms of my interpretation of that Section. The authors of these criticisms consider that Hume’s account of personal identity is less sceptical and more defensible than I suggested. In responding to them I look again at some difficult but important problems in Humean exegesis. In the second part I turn to some criticisms that are commonly levelled against Hume, and which I have been inclined to subscribe to myself in the past. I do not think that a proper assessment of these criticisms depends upon accepting or rejecting the reading of Hume I try to defend in the first part, so the two parts of the essay are largely independent of each other.1 I now incline to believe, how ever, that the criticisms I shall deal with in the second part are criticisms to which Hume has, or could find, quite plausible answers.
Natural Belief and Religious Belief in Hume’S Philosophy
Authors: Penelhum Terence 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
THE most widely held view of Hume, in his own day and since, has been that he is a deliberate secularizer: that he seeks to persuade us that there are no good reasons to hold religious beliefs. With minor reservations that will become obvious, I think this is true. Probably the next most widely held view of Hume is that he is, at least in one key respect, a sceptic: namely that he considers our most obviously indispensable beliefs, such as that in the continued and independent existence of objects of perception, to be held by us not because we have good reasons for them, but because of the power of the ‘sensitive’ part of our natures. This view of him is also, I think, clearly true. There is an obvious tension, however, between these two opinions. One would expect someone who held that key human beliefs were not due to reasons, to be less persistently determined than Hume is to show the absence of such reasons in the case of religious beliefs. since such a determination suggests this absence is peculiar to them. Hume is quite aware of this tension, and is still engaged in dealing with it at the very end of his career.
Practical Inference
Authors: Anscombe G E M 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
I will write in appreciation of, but some dissent from, this paragraph of von Wright’s: Now we can see more clearly, I think, wherein the claim to logical validity of the practical inference consists. Given the premises X now intends to make it true that E He thinks that, unless he does A now, he will not achieve this and excluding, hypothetically or on the basis of investigations, that he is prevented, then his actual conduct, whatever it may “look like”, either is an act of doing A or aims, though unsuccessfully, at being this. Any description of behaviour which is logically inconsistent with this is also logically inconsistent with the premises. Accepting the premises thus forces on us this understanding of his conduct,-unless for some reason we think that a preventive interference occurred right at the beginning of his action.