bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
What We Believe Ourselves to Be
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses numerical identity, or being one and the same, qualitative identity, or being exactly similar, personal identity, or what is involved in our continued existence over time. According to the Physical Criterion, our identity over time consists in the continued existence of enough of our brain. According to the Psychological Criterion, our identity consists in overlapping chains of psychological continuity and connectedness. The chapter discusses how we are inclined to believe that, even in purely imagined cases, our identity must be determinate. When we ask – Would I still exist? Would that future person be me?, it seems that it must always have an answer.
How We Are not What We Believe
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines how the Psychological Criterion of identity is not circular, since psychological continuity can be described in a way that does not presuppose identity. It explores the subject of experiences; souls or Cartesian egos; how a non‐reductionist, Cartesian view might have been true. It offers spectrum arguments against both the Physical and Psychological Criteria; how we think about ourselves in a way that would be justified only if a Cartesian view were true.
Why Our Identity Is not What Matters
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPresents actual cases of brain bisection; how we might be able to divide and reunite our minds; what explains the unity of consciousness at any time; the imagined case of full division, in which each half of our brain would be successfully transplanted into the empty skull of another body; why neither of the resulting people would be us; why this would not matter, since our relation to each of these people contains what matters in the prudential sense, giving us reasons to care about these people, which are like our reasons to care about our own future;and how it is hard to believe that personal identity, or our own continued existence, is not what matters.
What Does Matter
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses how our death can seem to disappear; whether and why the continuity of the body matters; why it does not matter whether psychological continuity has its normal cause: the continued existence of enough of the same brain. The chapter examines the Branch‐Line Case, series‐persons, different tokens of a type of person, beings whose identities differ from ours because they reproduce in other ways, partial survival, and successive selves.
Personal Identity and Rationality
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: October 2003

AbstractExamines whether, if a reductionist view is true, we have any reason for special concern about our own future and gives extreme and moderate answers. It offers an argument against the Classical Self‐interest Theory, defending a discount rate, not with respect to time itself, but with respect to the degree of psychological connectedness between ourselves now and ourselves at different future times. It also presents the immorality of imprudence.
Personal Identity and Morality
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses Autonomy and Paternalism; becoming and ceasing to be a person, or human being; whether reductionism about persons undermines desert. It examines personal identity and commitments; the separateness of persons and principles of distributive justice – whether we should extend the scope of these principles, and give them less weight, whether the units for distributive principles should be lives, successive selves, or people at times, and how a reductionist view gives some support to the utilitarian rejection of distributive principles.
Morals by Agreement
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This book defends the traditional conception of morality as a rational, impartial constraint on the pursuit of individual interest or benefit. The principal obstacle faced by this conception is that the received account of rationality in economics and the social sciences identifies it with the maximization of individual interest (or more technically, utility); how then can a constraint on the pursuit of interest be rational? The key to meeting this obstacle is found in the recognition that in many situations, if each person seeks directly to maximize her utility, the outcome is sub‐optimal—i.e. at least one alternative would benefit everyone. This suggests that we think of morality in a contractarian way, i.e. as the object of a universal rational bargain in which all agree to constrain their pursuit of interest by acting on a principle that would yield optimality, i.e. an outcome such that no alternative would benefit everyone.
Such a principle is developed on the basis of the idea that rational persons seek to minimize their bargaining concessions, and establish its moral status by showing that it is an impartial constraint on everyone's behaviour. There are however two problems: (1) why would rational persons honour their agreement to act on this principle, if they could do better to violate it? and (2) what would rational persons accept as an initial position, from which they would bargain? To answer the first question, it is shown that, under plausible conditions, persons may expect to benefit from a disposition (constrained maximization) to act with others on a rationally agreed principle, rather than from a disposition (straightforward maximization) to maximize directly their individual utility. To answer the second, it is shown that the basis from which agreement proceeds must rationally be constrained by what is called the (Lockean) proviso, which prohibits bettering one's situation through interaction that worsens the situation of another. We sketch brief applications of our account of morality to questions about taxation, appropriation, relations between societies, and relations among generations. Finally, we seek to distinguish the view of human beings and fulfilment underlying our theory from the caricature of ‘economic man’, developing a conception of the liberal individual.
Overview of a Theory
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Presents an overview of the book, introducing the problem of showing the rationality of moral constraints, and the conception of rationality as maximization, which on the face of it seems incompatible with any form of constraint. We argue, however, that moral theory is part of the theory of rational choice, arising from the structure of interaction, in which persons recognize a role for agreed mutual constraint in bringing about fair mutual advantage. We contrast the maximizing conception of rationality with the universalistic conception accepted by many philosophers, and our appeal to rational choice with the quite different appeals proposed by John Harsanyi and John Rawls. We introduce five key conceptions central to our theory: the idea of a morally free zone, the principle of minimax relative concession as the basis of justice, constrained maximization, the proviso, and the Archimedean point from which an individual can move the moral world. Finally, we raise questions about the scope of moral relationships and their place in an ideal human life.
Choice: Reason and Value
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Since our theory of morals is part of rational choice, we must examine its apparatus and assumptions, beginning from the underlying idea that an agent chooses rationally in maximizing her utility, considered as a measure of her preferences. However, we reject the purely behavioural view of preference held by some economists, arguing that rational choice depends on considered preferences that have both a behavioural and an attitudinal dimension, and are based on adequate experience and reflection. We set out the formal conditions on preferences that are required to define utility as an interval measure. We then turn to the claim that utility represents value, defending a conception of value that is subjective, dependent on affective relationships, and relative to each individual.
Strategy: Reason and Equilibrium
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Morality is concerned with interaction among persons, and so with strategic choice, in which each adopts a strategy on the basis of what he expects others to do. We state three conditions of strategically rational choice, and show that on the maximizing conception of rationality they require the expected outcome of interaction to be in equilibrium, so that each person's choice is a maximizing response to the choices of the others. We mention Nash's proof that in any finite situation, there is at least one set of equilibrium strategies, but we then introduce the well‐known result, exemplified by the Prisoner's Dilemma, that, in many situations, no set of equilibrium strategies achieves optimality. In such situations, everyone could benefit were they to interact, not on the basis of individual utility maximization, but on a basis that would yield an optimal outcome.
The Market: Freedom from Morality
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Economics celebrates an ideal of interaction free from all constraint, an ideal found in the perfectly competitive market, where equilibrium and optimality coincide. Morality can then be thought of as arising from market failure; the perfect market itself operates as a morally free zone, because the only behaviour it makes possible excludes those features of natural interaction that prevent individuals, each acting to maximize his own utility, from achieving optimality. We examine the conditions for market success—individual factor endowments, free individual activity, private goods, mutual unconcern, and the absence of all externalities—showing that these extend the freedom of the solitary individual to the context of interaction, and exclude all free‐riding, parasitism, and any form of partiality. But we note that the initial factor endowment of each person, taken as a given in market interaction, is itself subject to rational and moral scrutiny (a matter examined in Ch. 7). The chapter concludes with a discussion of utilitarian and Marxist objections to the market, both of which we reject.
Co‐operation: Bargaining and Justice
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, we turn to cooperation as the remedy for market failure, and to justice as the rational disposition to cooperative behaviour. Instead of each person choosing her own strategy, in cooperation persons agree on a single joint strategy choice leading to an optimal outcome. We argue that such a choice results from an ideal bargain among all persons, and offer an account of bargaining, in terms of the initial bargaining position, the claims rational persons would make from that position, and the concessions they would then offer to achieve agreement on a joint strategy, yielding a fundamental principle labelled ‘minimax relative concession’. We then show that this principle is equivalent to ‘maximin relative benefit’, in which the smallest gain anyone receives, measured as a proportion of the gain he would receive from being granted his claim, is as great as possible. The principle of maximin relative benefit, we claim, captures the idea of impartiality in the distribution of the benefits of cooperation, and so is a principle of fairness or justice. Thus, rational bargaining and justice coincide. But we note that the question of determining the initial bargaining position remains to be resolved, both rationally and morally; this question is in fact the same as that of determining initial factor endowments, which we raised and deferred in the previous chapter.
Compliance: Maximization Constrained
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Justice requires that one act on a fair optimizing strategy when one can—that is, a strategy that will yield an outcome that (nearly) satisfies the standards set by minimax relative concession and optimality. We now address the problem raised by Hobbes's Foole—be it ever so rational to agree to minimax relative concession, is compliance with it rational, as opposed to directly maximizing one's own utility? We distinguish a straightforward maximizer, who is disposed always to maximize his own utility, from a constrained maximizer, who is disposed to refrain from utility maximization in favour of fair optimality, and show that persons with the latter disposition can expect to do better so long as there is a significant proportion of them in the population and reasonably able to identify one another and to avoid misidentifying straightforward maximizers. We argue that this shows the rationality both of constrained maximization as a disposition and of the choices constrained maximizers make. We claim that a population of constrained maximizers would be rationally stable, and compare this to Robert Trivers's claim that a population of reciprocal altruists would be genetically stable.
The Initial Bargaining Position: Rights and the Proviso
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Takes up the questions of the initial bargaining position and the initial factor endowment, raised in Chs. 6 and 4 respectively. We reject James Buchanan's identification of the initial bargaining position with the outcome of non‐cooperative interaction, and John Harsanyi's identification of it with the threat point. Instead, we argue that, as the basis of market and cooperative interaction, it must rule out all taking of advantage—bettering oneself through worsening the situation of others. We term this condition the ‘proviso’, deriving it from Robert Nozick's interpretation of Locke's insistence that in acquisition, one leave ‘enough, and as good’ for others. We show how the proviso constrains directly maximizing behaviour, and we then demonstrate its role in introducing a structure of individual rights to person and property, rights that define each person's initial bargaining position and factor endowment. We show that the proviso satisfies our standard of impartiality, and why rational persons would accept the proviso, as part of a narrow interpretation of compliance with the requirements for cooperation. We show that cooperation in the absence of the proviso tends to be unstable, and to depend on ideologies, entrenched historical factors, and differential technologies, all of which undermine the equal rationality of persons on which an impartial morality depends.
Persons, Peoples, Generations
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, we consider some of the implications of our theory. We first discuss taxation to cover the cost of supplying pure public goods, suggesting that a flat tax may best fit the requirements of the principle of minimax relative concession. We show that the right to collect factor rent is not part of the liberty assured by either the proviso or minimax relative concession. We defend the right under the proviso of individuals to appropriate productive resources originally held in common provided that in so doing they provide new and better opportunities for those affected. We discuss briefly the vexing problem of encounters between societies at very different levels of development, including the European appropriation of North America. We introduce four criteria to govern a partial ordering of ways of life in terms of advancement or human development: (sustainable) density of population; (average) duration of life; material well‐being; and most important, breadth of (effectively available) opportunity. Finally, we discuss relations among persons of different generations, showing how the principle of minimax relative concession provides a way of determining the rational rate of investment (forgoing present consumption), yielding steadily increasing well‐being.
The Ring of Gyges
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Is a rational morality a necessary evil—a mean between what an individual would judge best—bettering his situation at whatever cost to others, and worst—having one's situation worsened at other's pleasure? It would seem that Glaucon's fable of the ring of Gyges may be applied to our account of morality. And indeed, matters may be worse—a contractarian morality such as we have developed may seem to be a tool for the clever and strong to use in domination, using the language of cooperation to conceal the reality of exploitation. If we understand ourselves on the model of economic man, treating all basic motivation as exemplifying asociality and all human relationships as contractual, we may find these conclusions hard to escape. Even though we could understand the rational arguments in support of morality, our feelings would be engaged only by our own concerns, and we would lack any affective capacity for morality.
The Liberal Individual
Authors: Gauthier David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
We appeal to Bernard Suits's Grasshopper to support the thesis that what has intrinsic value in human life is engagement in activities that have instrumental value. The implication of this view is that scarcity in the form of human fulfilment is necessary for human life to have point, and so is the humanly necessary evil. Participation with others to diminish scarcity has necessary instrumental value, and, we argue, for that reason has intrinsic value. A morality of agreement is the foundation of welcome participation, and so, despite its imposition of constraints, necessary to valuing participation and extending that value to one's fellow participants. We then turn to the character of an essentially just society, and show that it is a society not of ‘economic men’ but of liberal individuals, autonomous beings free to choose their own goals and their affective ties with others, and willingly maintaining the moral and social conditions that make this autonomy possible. We note certain doubts about the possibility of creating an essentially just society, but conclude with Nietzsche's account of human beings as having ‘the right to make promises’ to ‘stand as their own guarantors’, and identify this with the ability to interact with one's fellows and the world in a new and distinctive way, which we have called ‘constrained maximization’.
God and Goodness
Authors: Rice Hugh 
Published: October 2003

AbstractProposes an abstract conception of God, which identifies the will of God with the basic facts about good and bad. I argue that this conception does justice both to the nature of goodness and to the sovereignty of God. And, while it is does not represent God as a person, it allows for the attribution to him of properties that form the key elements of many people's conception of God. I argue that a belief in God, so conceived, is a natural extension of ordinary scientific outlook and a belief in objective value. I defend this belief in objective value and claim that it is reasonable to explain the existence of the world in terms of such value. In the latter part of the book, I discuss the problem of evil, and the question of whether there are good reasons for believing in miracles. Finally, I discuss the value of rational belief in God.
The Scientific Outlook
Authors: Rice Hugh 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that the ordinary scientific outlook is not characterized by the sort of metaphysical hygiene and epistemological security that are sometimes thought of as the goals of empiricism. It is committed to a belief in order; it is committed to a belief in rationality—that some reasons for beliefs are good reasons, and some bad; it is committed to explanation. These commitments, I shall be arguing, provide a foundation for a belief in God.
Objective Value
Authors: Rice Hugh 
Published: October 2003

AbstractHume thought that people's ‘beliefs’ about morality were really just feelings. I argue that people have genuine beliefs about good and bad, right and wrong. I consider arguments against the existence of objective value based on its alleged epistemological and metaphysical oddity, and the existence of disagreements. I argue that these moves can be countered, and, in particular, that for the most part such arguments would tell equally against the existence of objectively good reasons for belief.
The Possibility of Knowledge of Necessary Truths
Authors: Rice Hugh 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Concerned with the question of how our beliefs in necessary truths can be reasonable. In the course of considering this general question, I argue that our belief in objective value—that some things are good and others bad—commits us to the view that such beliefs are capable of being reliable, at least to some extent. And this belief in reliability, in its turn, commits us to the idea that value can make a difference; that the fact that it would be good that something should be so, for instance, can have a bearing on the ways things are—by having a bearing on what beliefs we form. So objective goodness can explain.
Miracles
Authors: Rice Hugh 
Published: October 2003

AbstractDiscusses the relation between miracles and the laws of nature and the question of whether we could have a good reason to believe in miracles—i.e. to believe that God directly intervenes in the world. I argue that such divine intervention would not be necessary, since God could achieve his purposes through his original act of creation, but that it might, nonetheless, be good that he should respond to his creatures. I also note that, on the abstract conception of God proposed, God will constantly affect the workings of the world through our perception of his will.
The Importance of Rational Belief
Authors: Rice Hugh 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that rational belief is important in so far as we are interested in the truth, and that deference to authority does not provide an attractive alternative. Also argues that it cannot be made out that it would be good to have an irrational belief in God by appealing to the importance of trust or, as Pascal's wager does, to the good consequences of belief in God, if he exists. I go on to consider the value of belief in God, when conceived in the way proposed. I conclude that, valuable as this may be, what is most valuable is the knowledge of God's will; because that is knowledge of what is good and what is bad.
From Metaphysics to Ethics
Authors: Jackson Frank 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConceptual analysis is currently out of favour, especially in North America. This is partly through misunderstanding of its nature. Properly understood, conceptual analysis is not a mysterious activity discredited by Quine that seeks after the a priori in some hard‐to‐understand sense. It is, rather, something familiar to everyone, philosophers and non‐philosophers alike—or so I argue. Another reason for its unpopularity is a failure to appreciate the need for conceptual analysis. The cost of repudiating it has not been sufficiently appreciated; without it, we cannot address a whole raft of important questions.I have always been suspicious of excessively abstract theorizing in philosophy. I think that an important test of metaphilosophical claims is whether they make good sense in the context of particular problems. The discussion in the book is, accordingly, anchored in particular philosophical debates. The basic framework is developed in the first three chapters via a consideration of the role of conceptual analysis in the debate over the doctrine in metaphysics known as physicalism, with digressions on free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, and then applied in the last three chapters to current debates over colour and ethics.