bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Synthetic A Priori in Strawson ‘s Kantianism
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Kant ‘s ‘general problem of pure reason ‘ (B 19)was to be solved by following ‘a special science ‘ called ‘the critique of pure reason ‘ (A 11/B 24). It would examine the ‘sources and limits ‘ (A 12/B 25) of reason ‘s power, and ‘lay down the ... plan ‘ of what he called a ‘transcendental philosophy ‘ (A 13/B 27). Ideally, such a philosophy would account for all of human knowledge in so far as it is possible a priori, including even our knowledge of what is already contained in our concepts. But Kant ‘s Critique of Pure Reason-the book by that name-would not investigate such merely ‘ana lytic ‘ knowledge. It would go only as far as is needed for the examination of ‘knowledge which is a priori and synthetic ‘ (A 14/B 28). So the whole project, and the whole question to which Kant ‘s masterpiece is devoted, is ‘How are a priori synthetic judgements possible? ‘ (B 19).
Kant ‘s Self: Real Entity and Logical Identity
Authors: Rosefeldt Tobias 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
To a certain extent Kant is a pretty good Strawsonian. In much of what he says about self-consciousness he seems to agree with Strawson ‘s claim that to be self-conscious one must conceive of oneself as a corporeal object among corporeal objects. At least he is saying that we cannot have knowledge of ourselves as individual thinking beings in so far as we regard ourselves as merely thinking beings, but rather only if we refer to ourselves as thinking human beings, i.e. beings whose bodies provide empirically applicable criteria for their identity through time. Unfortunately, Kant destroys this harmonious picture by making a couple of rather obscure remarks about something he calls ‘the constant and abiding I (of pure apperception) ‘ (A I 2 3) or ‘the identical self ‘ to which I ascribe all my representations (A 129/B 138), and of which I have an ‘a priori consciousness ‘ (A n6). These remarks are obscure because the phrase ‘a priori consciousness ‘ makes clear that the object of such a consciousness ( ‘the identical self ‘) cannot be identified with the object of empirical self-knowledge, i.e. the thinking human being. On the other hand, Kant denies the claim, maintained in rational psychology, that self-consciousness includes a priori knowledge of ourselves as immaterial, persisting, and non-composite thinking substances. So the object of a priori self-consciousness cannot be identified with such a thinking substance either.
Mind, Morality, and Explanation
Authors: Jackson Frank , Pettit Philip , Smith Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith have been at the forefront of philosophy in Australia for much of the last two decades, and their collaborative work has had widespread influence throughout the world. Mind, Morality, and Explanation collects the best of that work in a single volume, showcasing their seminal contributions to philosophical psychology, the theory of psychological and social explanation, moral theory, and moral psychology.
Folk Belief and Commonplace Belief
Authors: Jackson Frank , Pettit Philip 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Our position on eliminativism is very different from Barbara Hannan’s as far as premisses go, though we agree with her overall conclusion that eliminativism is to be rejected. We hold: (i) that beliefs and desires (and the propositional attitudes in general, but we will follow the common practice of focusing on beliefs and desires), are, according to the folk conception of them, posits of an explanatory theory of behaviour, the theory known as ‘folk psychology’; (ii) that, in consequence, neuroscience might show that there are no beliefs and desires; but (iii) that we know enough about the genesis of behaviour to know that this will not happen. The case for such a position calls for a book, not a discussion, but we will aim to say enough to indicate its possibility and appeal.
Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation
Authors: Jackson Frank , Pettit Philip 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Cognitivists are on solid ground, it seems to us, when they maintain that practical evaluations—‘this is right’, ‘this is fair’—are expressions of judgement and belief (even if these may be massively mistaken). Their non-cognitivist opponents deny the appearances when they say that such evaluations are expressive only of feeling or desire or some such non- cognitive attitude that differs from belief and its cognates in not being subject, in its own right, to the same disciplines of evidence and logic and reasoning.
Summary
Authors: Yang Charles D 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A nativism of domain specific information needn’t, of course, be incompatible with a nativism of domain specific acquisition mechanisms . . . But I want to emphasize that, given his understanding of POSAs [Poverty of Stimulus Arguments], Chomsky can with perfect coherence claim that innate, domain specific PAs [Propositional Attitudes] mediate language acquisition, while remaining entirely agnostic about the domain specificity of language acquisition mechanisms. To end this preliminary study of the variational approach to language, let us return to the abstract formulation of language acquisition to situate the variational model in a broader context of cognitive studies.
On an Alleged Contradiction in Aristqtle's Nicqmachean Ethics
Authors: Pakaluk Michael 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Aristotle accepts the thesis of the unity of virtues (UV), viz. that no person can truly have a single virtue without having them all. He accepts this, not because he thinks that all of the particular virtues are simply aspects or manifestations of a single thing, but rather because he believes that, precisely because they are distinct and independent, the virtues, if they are to be good, need to be coordinated in some way (NE 6. 13, 1144b9—14).
Language Contact and Language Change in Amazonia
Authors: Aikhenvald Alexandra Y 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Languages can resemble each other in the categories, constructions, and types of meaning they use; and in the forms they employ to express them. These simi-larities may be due to universal properties—for instance, all languages have clausal negation. Sometimes two languages can share the same form by pure coincidence—the Korean word for ‘two’, pronounced as [du], bears a chance similarity to Latin duo ‘two’ (cf. Aikhenvald and Dixon 2001: 1–2). Similarities of these kinds tell us nothing about the history of languages. The really significant similarities are those due to shared origin or to language contact.
Language Awareness and Correct Speech Among the Tariana
Authors: Aikhenvald Alexandra Y 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In most parts of the world, people are aware of how they speak, and are able to judge their speech as ‘correct’ or ‘incorrect’, or ‘better’ or ‘worse’—see Bloomfield’s (1927) classic paper, and also Woolard and Schieffelin (1994: 64). The ways in which linguistic ‘correctness’ and ‘incorrectness’ are rationalized relate to current doctrines, and to linguistic ideologies concerning power and value associated with a language. In their value judgements about language, speakers—consciously or not—select certain dimensions of languages and background others. The way in which speakers rationalize their intuitions relates to the structure of the languages and to their function (see the discussion in Hill 2000 and Silverstein 1985). A study of the mechanisms of language awareness can be especially instructive in the case of multilingual communities with strict rules of code-switching and an acclaimed inhibition against ‘language mixing’.
Contact in Multilingual Situations: Conclusions
Authors: Aikhenvald Alexandra Y 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
We have investigated three kinds of contact situation between Arawak and Tucanoan languages, resulting in the emergence of varied structural similarit-ies in erstwhile typologically different systems. In all three cases the amount of direct diffusion (that is, borrowing of forms) is very limited. (See Table 3.5 for contact-induced changes in Tucanoan languages, compared with North Arawak; Table 3.6 for contact-induced changes in Arawak languages, compared with ProtoTucanoan; and §2.5 for a discussion of direct diffusion in phonology.) Diffusion of grammatical patterns proceeds in a more systematic way than the borrowing of forms; and its effects are more pervasive—see §10.4.
‘Ελλ σποντος
Authors: Hoenigswald Henry 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Anna Morpurgo Davies is famous for her treatment of Ancient Greek proper names as well as for having raised anew the old question of the status of the unit, also in Greek, which we call the ‘word’. There are two issues here, related but distinct. First: did the grammarians, scholiasts, philosophers, and ordinary people have a word for the ‘word’, and if they did, how did they fit it into their discourse? And second: does a proper description of the Greek language depend on recognizing an entity which corresponds to our ‘word’—that is: did the ‘word’ exist? While no discussion of this latter point can afford to sidestep the evidence of metre and metres, there is no pretence here that the required comprehensive, critical undertaking is what the present note is about.
Sella, subsellium, meretrix : sonantes-voyelles et ‘effet Saussure’ en grec ancien
Authors: Lamberterie Charles de 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Force est de reconnaitre que les conclusions de cette étude n’ont pas recueilli une approbation unanime. Le témoignage du chypriote pourrait aller dans le sens de la règle proposée, bien que les données soient loin d’être claires.
Zu griechisch τυ-ρóσ ‘Käse
Authors: ügger Michael Meier-Br 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Anna Morpurgo ist eine Meisterin guter Argumentation. Ich schatze ihre zahlreichen Arbeiten zur griechischen Sprachwissenschaft uber alles und widme ihr diese hier vorgetragene Einsicht in den morphologischen Bau des griechischen, avestischen und wohl auch bereits grundsprachlichen Kasewortes Richter 1968: H64; Gutsfeld 1999; Auberger 2000).
Flowing Riches: Greek αϕενοσ and Indo-European Streams
Authors: Willi Andreas 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Flicking through the etymological dictionaries of Greek can be a sobering experience: ‘unklar’, ‘unerkärt ‘inconnue’, and ‘obscure’ seem to be among Frisk’s and Chantraine’s favourite lexemes. At first sight, it may look as if there were not much harm in this: if weunderstand what Homer and Plato meant, why should we want to find out what Homer’s and Plato’s ancestors would have understood, had they read the same texts? However, ignoring etymologies also means ignoring cultural (pre)history and forsaking the historian’s goal of looking at past worlds through the eyes of those who were shaping them. Hence, etymologizing—sometimes regarded as the futile pastime of misguided acumen—remains a worthy form of philological work even if it is not crowned by the achievement of absolute certainty.
Plus ça change . . .: Lachmann’s Law in Latin
Authors: Jasanoff Jay H 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
A form like aāctus can be derived historically from earlier *ag-tosby assuming two sound changes—one that lengthened the vowel before the voiced +voiceless cluster, and another that spread the voicelessness of the *-t-leftwards. But voicing assimilation is found in every IE language and was clearly an inner-PIE process, while lengthening before voiced +voiceless clusters was a much later development peculiar to Latin, or at least Italic.
Aristotle on Pneuma and Animal Self-Motion
Authors: Berryman Sylvia 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
One puzzle surrounding Aristotle’s work De motu animalium is the function ascribed to pneuma. Why, in accounting for animal motion, does Aristotle make use of a material that is elsewhere compared to aither, the stuff of the stars? A second puzzle-one that has received more attention in recent literature-is why, in Physics 8, Aristotle calls animals ‘self-movers’ if their motion is caused by something external. A number of scholars exploring Aristotle’s reasons for assigning a particular status to animal motion have proposed philosophically sophisticated accounts of the sense in which animals have a particular responsibility for their own motion. Without denying the value of these accounts for understanding action, I suggest that Aristotle’s reason for calling animals self-movers is much simpler than that proposed in the recent literature. I also propose that his reason for calling animals self-movers is critical to understanding the role of pneuma in the account of animal motion.
Necessitation and Explanation in Philoponus’ Aristotelian Physics
Authors: Berryman Sylvia 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Recent interest in Aristotle’s metaphysics has been fuelled by the understanding of his position as an innovative attempt to steer between the reductionism of his materialist rivals, on the one hand, and the dualism of the Platonists, on the other. In biology and psychology especially, his account has occasioned renewed scrutiny from scholars, some of whom have drawn parallels to positions in contemporary philosophy that also aim to occupy some such ‘middle ground’. Others are more sceptical, pointing to significant differences between modern and Aristotelian physics, differences of a sort that would preclude any such parallels.
A Contemporary Look at Aristotle’s Changing Now
Authors: Broadie Sarah 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The aim of this essay is to bring two ideas together for mutual illumination. One is Aristotle’s conception of the now as ‘always different and different’ ( Physics IV 10, 218a 10; 11, 219b 12–23); the other is the modern dichotomy of time into the two aspects of order and passage. This dichotomy was first formulated in 1908 by the Cambridge philosopher J. M. E. McTaggart, who made it the basis of a brilliant and controversial proof of the unreality of time.1 From then on Mc Taggart’s distinction has dominated discussion of time among analytic philosophers; hence it provides a contemporary perspective from which to think about Aristotle’s contribution.
Platonism in the Bible: Numenius of Apamea on Exodus and Eternity
Authors: Burnyeat M F 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Let me begin with the customary modest disclaimers. About the Book of Exodus I have nothing to say. I shall refer to the narrative, but on scholarly matters my ignorance is total. About Numenius my ignorance is extensive, but compensated for by some opinions—opinions about how he responded to a famous passage in Exodus, where God reveals his name to Moses from the burning bush: ‘I am that I am’.
Extend or Identify: Two Stoic Accounts of Altruism
Authors: McCabe Mary Margaret 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Why do we act for the sake of others? Why should we act for the sake of others? These questions are demanding on ethics, not least because the first may seem disingenuous. After all—it is commonly assumed—we are all selfish: our fundamental, our most basic, psychological drive is towards our own interests. This assumption, base in both senses of the word, implies that the phenomenon of altruistic behaviour needs explaining—why do we appear to act against these base drives? The explanation is often framed (or evaded) in terms of that appearance: we seem to act for others’ sake, when in fact, albeit indirectly, we are serving our own.1 Further, any imperative to altruism, any answer to the second question, must (on the base assumption) either harness our selfishness (by showing that considering the interests of others is consistent with it)2 or transcend it (by showing that there is another source of the demand that we act altruistically).
Raz on Values and Reasons
Authors: Heuer Ulrike 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
As a preliminary way of delineating two basic alternatives for mapping the relation between reasons and values, let me pose a Euthyphro style question: (1) Is something valuable because we have reason to behave in some way with respect to it? Or: (2) Do we have reason to behave in some way with respect to it because it is valuable? Though helpful for contrasting different approaches, this question is still multiply ambiguous. It may be interpreted as a question concerning the metaphysical primacy of values or reasons respectively that is, whether there have to be things of value for there to be reasons, or vice versa.
What does aristotle mean by priority in substance?
Authors: Miakin Stephen 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
In Metaphysics Θ8 Aristotle discusses three different ways in which actuality is prior to potentiality. First, actuality is prior in definition, λóγ, to potentiality (1049b12–17). For example, in defining a capacity I cite its exercise rather than vice versa: to be visible is to be capable of being seen. Second, actuality in one way is temporally, χρóν, prior to potentiality, and in another way is not temporally prior (1049b17-I050a3). For example, take something which is actually a human being: an adult. That was preceded by something which was potentially a human being (a fertilized egg, or an infant). In that way potentiality is temporally prior to actuality. On the other hand, something else which is actually a human being (an adult parent) temporally preceded the fertilized egg: and in that way actuality is temporally prior to potentiality.
Determinism And Recurrence In Early Stoic Thought
Authors: Salles Ricardo 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
The Stoic doctrine of everlasting recurrence holds that the present world will be destroyed by a mighty conflagration, but will endlessly recur in great cycles, and is in fact the recurrence of a world that existed in previous cycles. This paper deals with a question concerning the interpretation of the doctrine: how does it relate to determinism? In particular, does it imply determinism? I shall argue that it does, and that the kind of determinism at stake is based on the notion of regularity—it asserts not just that everything is necessitated, but also that the necessity holds in virtue of strict regularities of the form ‘same causes, same effects’ under which they are subsumed.
Grammatical relations across languages
Authors: Farrell Patrick 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
There are essentially three broad classes of fact about languages for which a theory of grammatical relations needs to be responsible. First, it appears that, at least in terms of their head-marking and dependent-marking systems for indicating grammatical relations, most languages draw a fundamental distinction between two basic roles, corresponding roughly to a category with agent as prototype and a category with patient as prototype. However, the different ways in which these categories are defined constitute one of the main syntactic typologies of languages. Secondly, in addition to active vs. passive voice alternations (see Section 1.2) and alternations between an object + oblique construction and a corresponding double-object construction (see Section 1.3.2), there are various kinds of “ relation-changing” and voice con-structions in languages that have important implications for an understanding of grammatical-relation systems. Thirdly, languages frequently have verb classes or constructions for which the dependents manifest some but not all of the properties of canonical subjects or objects (as, for example, with the dative-subject construction in Icelandic discussed in Section 1.2).
Role and Reference Grammar
Authors: Farrell Patrick 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Role and Reference Grammar (RRG) (Foley and Van Valin 1984, Van Valin and La Polla 1997, Van Valin 1993, to appear) provides an interesting contrast to Relational Grammar precisely because it focuses considerable attention on the issue that RG needs to address most but doesn” t, that is the details of a presumed relationship between verb meaning and grammatical relations. Furthermore, while drawing a clear line between semantic roles, which are ascribed considerable importance, and syntactic functions, the latter are held to be defined and used in language-specific and even construction-specific ways that are subject to considerable variation and the former are ascribed a relatively central role in accounting for grammatical phenomena. Whereas RG attempts to provide a framework for analysing the syntactic component of grammar, which is assumed to be autonomous in the sense of Chomsky (1957), RRG maintains that syntax cannot be properly understood without an integrated account of the semantic and pragmatic functions of language. The design of RRG from its inception has been informed by a concern for accounting for the grammatical properties of typologically and genetically diverse languages, considered on their own terms. It has been utilized in grammatical descriptions of a wide variety of languages and its central ideas have been widely appealed to in theory-neutral typological and descriptive work.
Self-reference and self-awareness
Authors: Shoemaker Sydney 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
If we consider the logical powers of first-person statements and the role played by the first-person pronoun in communication, nothing seems clearer than that in all first-person statements, including “avowals,” the word ‘I’ functions as a singular term or singular referring expression. Statements expressed by the sentence “I feel pain” have it in common with those expressed by sentences like “He feels pain” and “Jones feels pain” that they contradict the proposition “Nobody feels pain” and entail the proposition “Someone feels pain.” In these and other ways “I feel pain” behaves logically as a value of the propositional function “X feels pain.” Moreover, in all first-person statements, including “psychological” or “experience” statements, the word ‘I’ serves the function of identifying for the audience the subject to which the predicate of the statement must apply if the statement is to be true (what it indicates, of course, is that the subject is the speaker, the maker of the statement). And this is precisely the function of a referring expression.
The inverted spectrum
Authors: Shoemaker Sydney 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
As best I can determine, the idea of spectrum inversion made its first appearance in the philosophical literature when John Locke, in the Essay, entertained the possibility that “the same Object should produce in several Men’s Minds different Ideas at the same time; e.g. the Idea, that a Violet produces in one Man’s Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a Marigold produced in another Man’s, and vice versa.”1 It was obviously part of Locke’s supposition that the color experiences of the two people differ in such a way that the difference could not manifest itself in their behavior and their use of color words, and we will take this as an essential feature of full-fledged inter subjective spectrum inversion.
Self and substance
Authors: Shoemaker Sydney 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Nowadays the question whether the self is a substance, and whether the identity over time of a person requires the identity of a substance, has a musty smell to it. We recognize it as a question that played a central role in the intriguing discussions of personal identity in Locke, Butler, Hume, and Reid; but it has not been the central question in contemporary discussions of personal identity, and in most such discussions it is simply not addressed.
Introduction
Authors: Beall JC 
Published: November 2023

Abstract
Philosophers work at the limits of language; that is where standard principles are challenged; that is where paradoxes are found. The task, at least with respect to natural language, is to learn from such limiting cases; the task is to figure out what the paradoxes teach us about the very language we speak. The papers in this volume address (for the most part) two sorts of paradox: semantic and soritical.