bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Understanding Human Knowledge
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A collection of seminal papers written by eminent epistemologist and metaphysician Barry Stroud, published over the past 35 years. The main task Stroud explores in the essays is, as the title suggests, the one of understanding human knowledge as it is pursued in philosophy. Stroud defends the distinctive thesis that scepticism has a unique central place in epistemology in that it is to be regarded as a criterion both for posing the right kind of questions philosophical theories of knowledge face and for the postulation of answers to these questions. The second main theme of the book, equally intrinsically related to its overall target, is the possibility of the ‘transcendental’, broadly Kantian, project of establishing the distinctive perceptual and conceptual relationship between persons on the one hand and the world on the other. Stroud emphasizes the special invulnerability of certain aspects of our conception of the world that accompanies the conglomerate of these relationships.
Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The first essay of Stroud's collection may serve as an introduction to the guiding theme taken up in the other essays. Stroud examines the reasons why some epistemologists find unintelligible or ill‐formed not only the challenge of scepticism itself but also theories of knowledge that give positive answers to the question out of which scepticism arises. He attempts to show that responses to scepticism along these lines are either superficial or off target, and makes a case for the belief that recognition of this fact is a genuine advance towards epistemological and philosophical understanding.
Transcendental Arguments
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An exploration of the possibility of Kantian‐style a priori arguments to the conclusion that we know many of the things we think we know and that our having such knowledge is a precondition of our ability to think anything at all. Such a conclusion would both answer the challenge of scepticism and explain its perceived depth. Stroud, however, casts doubt on the possibility of success of such a project, if it is severed from the idealism in which it has been previously embedded.
Transcendental Arguments and ‘Epistemological Naturalism’
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Stroud discusses Jay Rosenberg's Peirce‐inspired epistemological naturalism in relation to the requirements of a Kantian epistemological project that answers scepticism. Stroud explores the question of the possibility of conclusions of a special metaphysical status required for the success of such a project and sketches answers that vary with the status and strength of the conclusions in questions.
The Allure of Idealism
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Stroud explicates what is required of the Kantian project in order for it to establish the failure of scepticism or a significant contribution thereto. Stroud works out the conceptual relations between transcendental arguments in epistemology and an idealist background, and concludes that the Kantian project cannot fully answer the challenge of scepticism. Stroud further argues that Jonathan Lear's Kantian reading of the later Wittgenstein, alluring the latter into the realm of idealism, does not succeed to the extent desired by Lear.
Understanding Human Knowledge in General
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Returns to the problem of working out the framework of posing the questions that a theory of knowledge is supposed to answer and the status of scepticism in such a project. Stroud argues that owing to the generality of the question and the limitations we conceptually impose on what counts as human knowledge, no satisfactory answer to the question, posed in the right way, is or could be possible. Turning to counter‐arguments against his argument, Stroud discusses externalist strategies, which are found equally unsatisfactory.
Epistemological Reflection on Knowledge of the External World
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Stroud emphasizes, against Michael Williams, the ‘naturalness’ of epistemological theorizing and the apparent irresistibility of scepticism. Stroud argues that even if philosophical assumptions or theories, rather than natural reflection on the basis of our knowledge, are the foundations of scepticism, understanding what seems to support them is likely to prove philosophically rewarding, and hence disagrees with Williams, who regards this fact as a main premise in an argument for the insignificance of philosophical scepticism for theorizing about knowledge.
The Synthetic a Priori in Strawson's Kantianism
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Deals with the project of demonstrating the possibility of conclusions with a distinctive metaphysical status, both in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which for its success depends on the analytic‐synthetic distinction, and analogously in Strawson's Kantian project that does not appeal to transcendental idealism but which nevertheless exploits the notion of a priori knowledge. Stroud identifies two conditions for the possibility of propositions with a distinctive metaphysical status: first, necessary conditions between the possession of certain concepts or conceptual capacities and others can be discovered; and secondly, certain conceptual capacities can be shown to be required for the possibility of any thought or experience at all. The distinctive status of these propositions, Stroud argues, can be described without any appeal to the analytic‐synthetic distinction and without supposing that if we know them, we know them a priori.
Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Disputes the attribution to Wittgenstein of a ‘conventionalist’ account of necessity. Conventionalism can seem appropriate given Wittgenstein's denial that there is anything in a person's understanding of the premises and rules he or she accepts, which can ‘force’ him or her to accept a particular conclusion. This conventionalist interpretation (ascribed to Michael Dummett) is resisted.
Inference, Belief, and Understanding
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Lewis Carroll's story ‘What the Tortoise said to Achilles’ shows that a truth's being necessary, even if it links a set of premises with a deducible conclusion, will not explain any sense in which someone is forced to draw that conclusion despite accepting the premises. The chapter attempts to bring out the implications for conceiving of a belief's being based on, or being a reason for, another belief. A theory of meaning that provides for understanding in terms of a capacity or ability on the part of the speaker must take into account the threat of regress experienced in Achilles’ predicament.
Evolution and the Necessities of Thought
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Examines the notion of necessity and the special problems it poses for knowledge. The conventionalist response is to see necessary truth as the product of thinking and the decision to act in certain ways. Against this view, it is argued that the complex grammar of the notion of necessity can be appreciated without seeking a definition of it, let alone an explanation of its source. Even though contingent facts about the processes of human knowledge cannot hope to explain the necessary truths, attention to those contingent facts might explain our acceptance of necessary truth and the role it plays in the ways we think about the world.
Quine's Physicalism
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Takes up the idea that meaning and intentional phenomena in general are indeterminate or underdetermined with respect to physical facts. What notion of physicalism is, then, needed to make physicalism a tenable thesis? The emerging characterization of physicalism—as the thesis that physical predicates are sufficient for a description of things as they are ‘fundamentally’—raises another version of the problem of indeterminacy of meaning with respect to a certain class of facts.
Defining the Faith
Authors: Louth Andrew 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
An exposition of the doctrines of the Christian Faith as John sets them forth in his On the Orthodox Faith, and his polemical writings against Monophysites, Monothelites, and Nestorians. Doctrines treated include the Trinity, Christology, creation, and human nature, prayer, and sacraments. Also included are brief accounts of the history of these doctrines up to John Damascene.
Χρυσορρόας (‘Flowing With Gold’): John the Preacher
Authors: Louth Andrew 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discussion of John's contemporary reputation as preacher and his extant sermons; of his use of rhetoric and the nature of his audience; detailed analysis of sermons on the Transfiguration of Christ and on the Dormition of the Mother of God (Theotokos), and its Mariology.
Γλυκορρήμων (‘Sweetly Speaking’): John the Poet
Authors: Louth Andrew 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A brief account of the development of Byzantine liturgical poetry, and the role of Palestinian monasticism in his development, especially the evolution of the canon. Theological and literary analysis of three canons attributed to John Damascene: on Easter, the Transfiguration of Christ, and the Dormition of the Mother of God.
Introduction
Authors: Owen David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In the early modern period, reason was considered to be one of the higher cognitive faculties, and could be considered to function independently of the other cognitive faculties, such as the senses, the imagination, and memory. The faculty psychology of the period centrally involved ideas, rejected scholastic formalism, and was both psychologically descriptive and logically normative. The primary function of reason was to account for inference. Hume's account must be understood against this background, as he uses its vocabulary and shares many of its perspectives. He departs from the tradition in rejecting faculty psychology, at least to the extent of treating reason as an independently functioning faculty. The inferential activities of reason, both demonstrative and probable, are given a distinctively new treatment in terms of the properties of the imagination.
Reason, Belief, and Scepticism
Authors: Owen David 
Published: October 2003

AbstractHume's treatment of scepticism with regard to reason is analogous to his account of probable reasoning. In neither case is Hume concerned with the justification of beliefs or the warrant of reason as much as with the explanation of the presence of beliefs. In his account of probable reasoning, the issue was the origin of beliefs; in his account of scepticism with regard to reason, the issue is the retention of beliefs in the face of sceptical arguments. The sceptical arguments threaten to lessen the degree of force and vivacity characteristic of our beliefs to the extent that they are in danger of becoming mere ideas and not beliefs at all. We know, as a matter of fact, that this result does not obtain, and Hume attempts to explain this by an appeal to a feature of his account of reasoning: lengthy chains of abstruse reasoning have little effect on us. Hume considers his ability to respond to these sceptical arguments to be a vindication of his theory of belief.
The Right and the Good
Authors: Ross David 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The Right and the Good is a classic of 20th‐century philosophy by the great scholar Sir David Ross, which is now presented in a new edition with a substantial introduction by Philip Stratton–Lake, a leading expert on Ross. Ross's book was originally published in 1930, and is the pinnacle of ethical intuitionism, which was the dominant moral theory in British philosophy for much of the 19th and early 20th century. The central concern of the book is with rightness and goodness, and their relation to one another. Ross argues against notable rival ethical theories. The right act, he holds, cannot be derived from the moral value of the motive from which it is done; furthermore, rightness is not wholly determined by the value of the consequences of one's action, whether this value is some benefit for the agent, or some agent‐neutral good. Rather, the right act is determined by a plurality of self‐evident prima facie duties. Ross portrayed rightness and goodness as simple non‐natural properties. Philip Stratton provides a substantial introduction to the book, in which he discusses its central themes and clears up some common misunderstandings. A new bibliography and index are also included, along with editorial notes that aim to clarify certain points and indicate where Ross later changed his mind on particular issues. Intuitionism is now enjoying a considerable revival, and this new edition provides the context for a proper modern understanding of Ross's great work.
What Makes Right Acts Right?
Authors: Ross W. D. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This second chapter continues the inquiry into right started in the first, asking what makes right acts right. Historical attempts to state a single characteristic of all right actions that is the foundation of their rightness have been based on egoism and (hedonistic) utilitarianism; these are not discussed except in so far as they are contrasted with the other theory put forward, which is G. E. Moore's theory suggesting that what makes actions right is that they are productive of good. The main aspect of this addressed is that of duty (prima facie duty), and the consideration leads to a rejection of the definition of right as just productive of the best possible consequences (or optimific). The connection between the attributes of right and optimific is discussed, and the nature of acts that are right (including individual right acts) is explored in more detail. Two appendices follow Chapter II: the first discusses rights (as opposed to right); the second discusses punishment (in connection with the preceding discussion on rights).
The Meaning of ‘Good’
Authors: Ross W. D. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Having discussed right in the first two chapters of the book, the remaining five discuss good, starting here with an analysis of the meaning of good. The analysis starts by showing that the senses in which ‘good’ is used can essentially be divided into two: adjunctive or attributive—to persons or things; and predicative. These two different usages are discussed in detail in the rest of the chapter.
Moral Goodness
Authors: Ross W. D. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is the last of five chapters on good, and examines moral goodness. Ross explains the concept of morally good as either being a certain sort of character or being related in one of certain definite ways to a certain sort of character. The matter of what kinds of things are morally good is then addressed, and further advances made in defining moral goodness. These begin by considering Immanuel Kant's views on the desire to do duty, and go on to consider conscientious—or virtuous—actions, scales of moral goodness (or badness), types of good desire, and bad actions.
Causing Actions
Authors: Pietroski Paul M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
When a person acts for a reason, mental events have causal effects. This makes it tempting, given various metaphysical considerations, to identify each (human) mental event with some biochemical event. But this token identity thesis is not mandatory and it is implausible. We can instead adopt a non‐Cartesian form of dualism, according to which many mental events are causes distinct from any biochemical events, but persons are spatiotemporal things with physical and mental properties (that supervene on physical properties). Actions are themselves mental events (tryings) that typically cause bodily motions, which also have biochemical causes; and actions are typically caused by other mental events. This does not lead to an objectionable form of overdetermination, given the proposed sufficient condition for causation, which is stated in terms of explanation. An especially relevant form of explanation involves subsuming events under ceteris paribus laws. The overall account avoids objections to standard covering‐law (and regularity) conceptions of causation. An appendix addresses questions about mental content, and how such questions bear on the token identity thesis.
From Explanation to Causation
Authors: Pietroski Paul M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractCausation is (primarily) a description‐insensitive relation between events, while explanation is a description‐sensitive relation between facts, which (for these purposes) can be identified with true Fregean thoughts. Events are thus individuated more coarsely than facts, which are the senses of true sentences. But given the event analysis defended in Ch. 1, some facts are about particular events. And if a fact about one event explains a fact about another event, then the first event is a cause for the second.
Natural Causes
Authors: Pietroski Paul M. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThe proposed account of causation, in terms of explanation, does not sleight the mind‐independence of causal relations. The relevant notion of explanation is objective, even if facts are taken to be abstract Fregean ‘modes of presenting’ (or ‘ways of thinking about’) events. Causation remains a natural, and often perceptible relation between spatiotemporal particulars. But we must resist empiricist conceptions of causation.
Moral Dilemmas
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Moral Dilemmas is the second volume of collected essays by the eminent moral philosopher Philippa Foot. It fills the gap between her 1978 collection Virtues and Vices and her acclaimed monograph Natural Goodness, published in 2001. Moral Dilemmas contains the best of Prof. Foot's work from the late 1970s to the 1990s. In these essays, she develops further her influential critique of the ’non‐cognitivist’ approaches that have dominated moral philosophy over the last fifty years. She shows why it is a mistake to think of evaluations in general (or moral judgements in particular) as distinguished from ‘statements of fact’ by a special connection with the feelings, attitudes, or commitments of an individual speaker. Instead, she portrays thoughts about the goodness or badness of human action as like (though also unlike) the evaluation of other operations of human beings, and those of all living things. She also discusses moral relativism, utilitarianism, and moral dilemmas, as well as some subjects of special relevance to medical ethics. This work contains a select bibliography of the publications of Philippa Foot. With Prof. Foot's other two books, these essays present her distinctive and lasting contributions to twentieth‐century moral philosophy.
Utilitarianism and the Virtues
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Attacks Utilitarianism as a moral theory. Utilitarianism is a particular form of Consequentialism, and as such it is radically flawed; depending as it does on a vacuous use of expressions such as ‘best state of affairs.’ Genuine uses of such words are ‘agent relative,’ requiring as a background the desires or interests of particular individuals or groups. But in moral philosophy this relativity is supposed to be left behind. Right or wrong is supposed to be determined in relation to a best possible state of affairs ‘from a moral point of view.’ But what does this mean? It is true that a more or less determinate end is internal to the virtue of benevolence, but benevolence is not the whole of morality.
Morality, Action, and Outcome
Authors: Foot Philippa 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This essay is an expansion and refinement of the key ideas and distinctions that Foot advances in ‘Killing and Letting Die’ (V.). Here, she defends two morally relevant distinctions: firstly, that between ‘what we do’ and what ‘we allow to happen’ and secondly, what we aim at (‘direct intention’) and what we only foresee as the result of what we do (‘indirect intention’). Utilitarianism as a moral theory is, Foot claims, at fault in overlooking these important distinctions. She describes cases in which although it would be thought permissible to let one person die if we could then save a greater number, we should be outraged by the idea that we could kill one person in order to save them (Rescue I and Rescue II in Essay V.). Moreover, the impermissibility of even allowing one person to die deliberately in order to use the body to save others shows that the distinction between doing and allowing must be supplemented by the distinction between direct and indirect intention. Foot therefore argues that Utilitarianism is a deficient moral theory in that it overlooks these complexities of agency. This mistake came from the attempt to ground all moral judgements in purely causal relationships to better or worse ‘states of affairs,’ and in the latter part of the essay Foot calls into question the whole idea of ‘good states of affairs from a moral point of view’ that Utilitarians suppose to stand as the one foundation of all moral judgements.
The Plan of the Categories
Authors: Wedin Michael V. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWedin argues, against prevailing opinions, that Aristotle's account of homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy, with which the Categories begins, must be understood as an integral part of the treatise. The three ‘onymyies’, as Wedin calls them, are grouping principles, or one‐over‐many principles, that each collect a number of items under a single term. Wedin focuses on synonymy in particular, because it enables Aristotle to construct a theory of the fundamental kinds of things that are, and as such provides the basis for the system of the categories. For Wedin, the Categories is not just concerned with classification but also with ontology and semantics: it offers a theory about the underlying ontological implications of standard categorical statements, with the aim of determining what must exist, and in what relations these things must stand, in order for the statements to be true.
Nonsubstantial Individuals
Authors: Wedin Michael V. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractWedin addresses the debate over whether nonsubstantial individuals, that inhere in a subject but are not said of a subject, i.e. accidents, such as the pallor of Socrates, are nonrecurring particulars or a kind of determinate universal. Wedin examines the secondary literature on this topic and divides it into two schools of thought, determined by the contributions of J.L. Ackrill and G.E.L. Owen. According to Ackrill, individuals in non‐substance categories are particular to the substance they are in; Owen critiques Ackrill's view, and proposes that these items can recur in more than one subject and hence are a sort of universal. Wedin finds Owen's thesis unsatisfactory, even after supplementing it with an improved version due to Michael Frede; instead, Wedin argues for a revised version of Ackrill's interpretation of nonsubstantial individuals as nonrecurrent particulars. According to Wedin, Aristotle is committed to individuals only—e.g. to Socrates and to the particular bit of pallor in him: this conclusion has an important bearing on the ontological status of individuals and on the primacy of substance to nonsubstantial items.