bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Urban form and globalization after September 11th: the view from New York
Authors: Marcuse Peter 
Published: March 2003

The attack on the World Trade Center will have a significant effect on urban development in New York City, not so much because it will change existing patterns, but because it will intensify them. The effect will come from the way leaders in the political and business community act after September 11th, more than from what the attack itself accomplished. Among the key effects will be a further barricading of spaces within the city, a concentrated deconcentration of business activities away from the center and their citadelization. The process of public planning is increasingly irrelevant; deplanning might be a better word for it. Decision–making is concentrated in quasi–governmental bodies, freed from the obligation to follow democratic procedures. Business groups, particularly those involved in global processes, are well organized and are pressing for planning and for subsidies serving their interests. There is publicly–oriented activity also, but less focused and not (yet?) raising distributional and social justice issues as central concerns. The net result is a further skewing of the benefits and costs of globalization.L’attaque du World Trade Center influencera considérablement l’urbanisation de la ville de New York car, non seulement elle modifiera les schémas existants, mais elle va les intensifier. Plus que des effets de l’attaque elle–même, le résultat dépendra de la manière dont les dirigeants – du monde politique et des entreprises – réagiront après le 11 septembre. Parmi les principales conséquences, on peut citer un enfermement accentué des espaces au sein de la ville, et une déconcentration concentrée accompagnée d’une ‘citadellisation’ des activités commerciales éloignées du centre. Le processus d’aménagement public perd peu à peu sa pertinence, ‘désaménagement‘ devenant peut–être un terme plus exact. La prise de décision est regroupée dans des organismes quasi–gouvernementaux, dégagés de toute obligation de respect des procédures démocratiques. Les groupes économiques, notamment ceux qui sont impliqués dans des processus mondialisés, sont bien organisés et réclament aménagements et subventions servant leurs intérêts. Il existe aussi une activité dirigée vers le public, quoique moins convergente et ne soulevant pas (encore) les problèmes de justice sociale et de répartition en termes de préoccupations essentielles. Le résultat net renforce les biais des avantages et coûts de la mondialisation.
Urban security from warfare to welfare
Authors: Light Jennifer S. 
Published: March 2003

Recent mobilization efforts to provide urban security in the American ‘War on Terrorism’ recall the expanding military–industrial complex during the nation’s preparations for the Cold War. This article suggests the current generation of American city leaders can learn much from history. Juxtaposing recent mobilization efforts alongside analogous episodes from the nation’s past reminds us that many powerful economic and political interests are well–served by the unbridled expansion of urban fear. This comparison raises important questions to be asked of current and future domestic urban security measures in the ‘War on Terrorism’.Les récents efforts de mobilisation visant à assurer une sécurité urbaine dans le cadre de la ‘guerre’ américaine contre le terrorisme évoquent le complexe militaro–industriel qui s’était développé pendant les préparatifs nationaux à la Guerre froide. La génération actuelle des dirigeants de villes américaines peut apprendre beaucoup de l’histoire. Juxtaposer ces récentes tentatives de mobilisation aux épisodes analogues du passé national rappelle que, pour beaucoup, les puissants intérêts économiques et politiques se nourrissent de l’essor incontrôlé des ‘peurs urbaines’. Cette comparaison suscite d’importantes interrogations quant aux mesures actuelles et futures en matière de sécurité intérieure urbaine dans le contexte de la ‘guerre contre le terrorisme’.
Migration Policy Objectives for European East‐West International Migration
Authors: Drbohlav Dusan 
Published: March 2003

The study contains selected results of Delphi research (subjective judgements concerning the future on a collective expert basis) on international migration between Central/Eastern (C/EEc) and Western European countries. Taking part in the research were 109 scholars and officers (70 in the first Delphi round and 39 in the second round) from all over Europe – mainly sociologists, economists, geographers and demographers dealing with the topic of migration.Results indicate growing problems and tensions in societies, the division of Europe into two parts, and the triggering rather than pacifying of further antagonisms and hostile anti‐immigrant attitudes on the Western side. As predicted, it seems that the West will further try to curb immigration by applying tighter restrictive measures. Regarding competition between Eastern Europeans and Third World immigrants in Western Europe, the preferred opinion is that “the C/EE immigrants will not significantly affect the activities of the Third World immigrants in the West because they will attempt to gain posts/jobs at higher levels of the social ladder.”Concerning policy objectives, the two most important general aims were how to contribute to migration stabilization in the East, and how to maintain and further develop stable democratic order and promote economic development.Policy objectives devoted to specific migration issues indicate that more international cooperation, more information and more democracy/tolerance is necessary. Shared objectives should be: (1) to intensify mutual contacts; (2) disseminate information on rules and regulations regarding international migration as well as to tackle the issue of harmonizing the given migration controlling systems and statistics within Europe; and (3) provide further support for temporary labour contracts for Eastern professionals and manual workers in the West.
Ethnic Return Migration: An Estonian Case
Authors: Kulu Hill 
Published: March 2003

Recently there has been growing interest among scholars in ethnic return migration. This article examines return migration during the post World War 2 period of descendants of Estonians who emigrated to Russia at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century.A case of return migration of West‐Siberian Estonians from the Omsk province is used as an example. Structuration theory is adopted and return migration is treated as a behavioural norm that evolves, spreads and becomes embedded within an ethnic minority living outside its homeland.The research shows that in the case of West‐Siberian Estonians the main carrier of the migration behavioural norm is a generation. The behavioural norm of Estonians born in the 1910s‐1920s has been return migration to Estonia, while the migration behaviour of the 1930s‐1940s and the 1950s‐1960s generations can be characterized by urbanization in West Siberia.Behind these inter‐generation differences in migration behaviour can be found the different socialization of the generations, appearing largely on the level of practical consciousness.The results give reason to assume that ethnic return migration over a long period depends neither directly nor indirectly on momentary environmental changes, but rather on changes in people’s values, habits, identity etc., which in the case of an ethnic minority living outside its historical homeland may be followed generation by generation.
Propensity of Canada's Foreign‐born to Claim Unemployment Insurance Benefits
Authors: Marr Bill , Siklos Pierre L. 
Published: March 2003

This article examines the relationship between claiming unemployment insurance benefits in Canada and the immigrant class under which immigrants were admitted (namely skilled workers, assisted relatives, family class, refugees), using a new data set that combines income tax and immigration records.Claims rates (or the proportion of immigrants who claimed unemployment insurance benefits) are calculated for each immigrant landing class for the cohorts of immigrants who landed in 1980, 1985 and 1989; for each cohort, annual claims rates are presented from the year after landing to 1995.The claims rates indicate that there are significant differences among the different immigrant landing classes: those admitted as skilled workers have relatively low claims rates, those in the family class or assisted relatives have higher rates, and refugees have the highest rates. For all immigrant landing classes, claims rates rise rapidly during the two or three years after arrival in Canada, but decline thereafter for all classes.Differences in claims rates on unemployment insurance benefits remain across the immigrant landing classes after general economic conditions and some characteristics of the immigrants are controlled.
Principles of Protection for Internally Displaced Persons
Authors: Mooney Erin D. 
Published: March 2003

For forced migrants who have not left their country but are internally displaced persons, human rights law provides an important framework through which to analyse and address their plight. Two principal reasons underpin this assertion.First, owing to the compelling need: human rights violations cut across all phases of internal displacement, causing its occurrence, characterizing the conditions of physical insecurity and material deprivation in which the internally displaced often find themselves, and impeding equitable and lasting solutions.Second, as internally displaced persons remain within the territory of their state, refugee law does not apply and, instead, human rights law provides the fundamental basis for addressing their plight. In addition to human rights law, other standards of international law are also relevant, namely international humanitarian law when displacement occurs in situations of armed conflict and refugee law by analogy.Drawing on these three standards of international law, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement have been developed which set out what protection should mean for internally displaced persons in all phases of displacement. This article traces the origins and provides an overview of the content of the Guiding Principles, the text of which is reproduced in full in the Appendix.
Socio‐economic Development and International Migration: A Turkish Study
Authors: Icduygu Ahmet , Sirkeci Ibrahim , Muradoglu Gülnur 
Published: March 2003

The root causes of international migration have been the subject of many studies, a vast majority of which are based on development theories dominated by economy‐oriented perspectives. An underlying assumption is that poverty breeds migration. The results, and the conclusions drawn from these studies, differ widely. For instance, whether emigration increases when poverty becomes more extreme, or less extreme, or why it reaches certain levels, are issues on which research still offers a mixed answer.This article investigates the relationship between economic development and migration by taking into consideration the degrees of economic development that form thresholds for migration. It focuses on recent evidence on the development‐emigration relationship in Turkey which reflects a dimension of the dynamics and mechanisms facilitating or restricting migratory flows from the country.Using data from the 1995 District‐level Socio‐economic Development Index of Turkey (DSDI) and the 1990 Census, the principal aim of the article is to provide an analytical base which identifies degrees of local level of development in Turkey, relate these to international migration flows, and examine patterns of the development‐migration relationship.
International Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating Europe
Authors: Geddes Andrew 
Published: March 2003

This article examines the development of migration policy competencies of the European Union (EU) since the 1990s. It pays particular attention to policy framework that developed after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties entered into effect in 1993 and 1999 respectively.In order to chart these developments, the article focuses on five analytical themes that illustrate key trends in EU migration policy. Reasons for and implications of shift from “pillarization” in the Maastricht Treaty to “communitarization” in the Amsterdam Treaty.— Blurring of the distinction between external and internal security.— The role that supranational institutions such as the European Commission are playing (or trying to play) in policy development.— Debates about migrants' rights in an integrating Europe.— Links between migration and EU enlargement.It is argued that far from weakening EU member states or symbolizing some “loss of control”, EU cooperation and integration have thus far helped member states consolidate and reassert their ability to regulate international migration through the use of new EU‐level institutional venues. This raises legitimacy issues as the EU moves into politically sensitive policy areas.Although talk of “fortress Europe” is overblown, the EU is likely to face legitimacy challenges on both the “input” (democracy, openness and accountability of decision‐making) and “output” (implementation and compliance) elements of decision‐making.
Managing Migration: The Role of Economic Instruments
Authors: Widgren Jonas , Martin Philip 
Published: March 2003

This paper reviews economic policies and instruments available to the developed countries to reduce unwanted migration from developing countries, not all of which is irregular migration. Countries generally welcome legal immigrants and visitors, try to make it unnecessary for people to become refugees and asylum seekers, and try to discourage, detect, and remove irregular foreigners.There are three major themes:1. There are as many reasons for migration as there are migrants, and the distinction between migrants motivated by economic and non–economic considerations is often blurred. Perhaps the best analogy is to a river – what begins as one channel that can be managed with a dam can become a series of rivulets forming a delta, making migration far more difficult to manage.2. The keys to reducing unwanted migration lie mostly in emigration countries, but trade and investment fostered by immigration countries can accelerate economic and job growth in both emigration and immigration countries, and make trading in goods a substitute for economically motivated migration. Trade and economic integration had the effect of slowing emigration from Europe to the Americas, between southern Europe and northern Europe, and in Asian Tiger countries such as South Korea and Malaysia. However, the process of moving toward freer trade and economic integration can also increase migration in the short term, producing a migration hump, and requiring cooperation between emigration and immigration destinations so that the threat of more migration does not slow economic integration and growth.3. Aid, intervention, and remittances can help reduce unwanted migration, but experience shows that there are no assurances that such aid, intervention, and remittances would, in fact, lead migrants to stay at home. The better use of remittances to promote development, which at US$65 billion in 1999 exceeded the US$56 billion in official development assistance (ODA), is a promising area for cooperation between migrants and their areas of origin, as well as emigration and immigration countries.There are two ways that differences between countries can be narrowed: migration alone in a world without free trade, or migration and trade in an open economy. Migration will eventually diminish in both cases, but there is an important difference between reducing migration pressures in a closed or open world economy. In a closed economy, economic differences can narrow as wages fall in the immigration country, a sure recipe for an anti–immigrant backlash. By contrast, in an open economy, economic differences can be narrowed as wages rise faster in the emigration country.Areas for additional research and exploration of policy options include: (1) how to phase in freer trade, investment, and economic integration to minimize unwanted migration; (2) strategies to increase the job–creating impacts of remittances, perhaps by using aid to match remittances that are invested in job–creating ways.
Wissensteilung: Thünen- Vorlesung bei der Jahrestagung 2000 des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Berlin 20. September 2000
Authors: Helmstädter Ernst 
Published: March 2003

AbstractFriedrich A. Hayek’s notion of division of knowledge arouses new interest in an economy for which knowledge represents the most important resource. Hayek’s problem was how to use the knowledge scattered in society efficiently. In Hayek’s solution the prices emerging by competition play the crucial role. They indicate to the individual agents what they can do expediently for their own advantage and also for society, even though they dispose only of limited (implicit) knowledge. But which conditions must be fulfilled in order that the agents are prepared to engage in an interactive process of division of knowledge? - New Institutional Economics does not yet answer this question. It is only interested in questions of interactions in view of a division of labor. Its central notion of transaction is not appropriate for the analysis of the interactive process of division of knowledge, where sharing of knowledge matters. The contribution of the article mainly consists in the attempt to provide a New Institutional Economics basis to the division of knowledge problem. ß
Nationality: Some Replies
Authors: Miller David 
Published: March 2003

This paper defends the principle of nationality against a number of critical objections made in recent issues of the Journal. It starts from the claim that national solidarity has served and continues to serve as an essential support to liberal democratic institutions and practices of social justice. Such national allegiances are not easy to defend if one begins from a cosmopolitan standpoint. But defending them does not mean embracing everything that people ordinarily believe — a political philosophy that begins from existing national sentiments can be sharply critical of the practices that are said to embody those sentiments. In particular justice, although its principles are context‐dependent, is more than merely subjective.The idea that nations are historic communities is defended against the charge that such ‘communities’ are in fact divided along lines of class, ethnicity, etc. Membership imposes obligations, but these are not merely to repeat what our ancestors have done; they are redefined in each generation. A principle of nationality that is reiterative and democratic, recognising the equal claims of other nations, and giving priority to the way the present inhabitants of a territory understand their identity, can remedy weaknesses in liberalism without licensing aggressive forms of nationalism.
Normal variation and abnormality: an empirical study of the liability distributions underlying depression and delinquency
Authors: van, den Oord Edwin J.C.G. , Pickles Andrew , Waldman Irwin D. 
Published: March 2003

Background: Scale scores in studies of emotional and behavioural problems often possess highly skewed distributions. The long upper tails of these distributions place a small proportion of the population at some distance from the main body of the distribution. This invites an interpretation of their forming an abnormal group, one that may be qualitatively distinct.Methods: Item‐response models were fitted to data on parent and self‐rated depression and delinquency from four large samples of children or adolescents.Results: We found that underlying liability distributions show very little or no evidence of non‐normality.Conclusions: The results suggest that (i) the skewed nature of the scale scores may be largely measurement artefacts, (ii) the distributions provide no evidence of a qualitatively distinct process generating abnormality as compared to normal variation and (iii) for characterising the whole distribution, including normality and abnormality, the selection of items in typical current assessments of emotional and behavioural problems is not optimal.
Exploring the borderlands of autistic disorder and specific language impairment: a study using standardised diagnostic instruments
Authors: Bishop Dorothy V.M. , Norbury Courtenay Frazier 
Published: March 2003

Background: Two studies were conducted to test claims that pragmatic language impairment (PLI – previously referred to as semantic‐pragmatic disorder) is simply another term for autistic disorder or pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDDNOS). Method: In Study 1, 21 children aged from 6 to 9 years with language impairments were subdivided on the basis of the Children's Communication Checklist into 13 cases of pragmatic language impairment (PLI) and eight cases of typical specific language impairment (SLI‐T). Parents completed the Autism Diagnostic Interview – Revised (ADI‐R) and the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ), and the children were given the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule – Generic (ADOS‐G). In Study 2, a further 11 children with SLI‐T and 18 with PLI were assessed using the SCQ and ADOS‐G. In addition, six children diagnosed with high‐functioning autism and 18 normally developing children were assessed. Results: There was good agreement between ADI‐R and SCQ diagnoses, but poor agreement between diagnoses based on these parental report measures and those based on ADOS‐G. In many children, symptom profiles changed with age. Four PLI children from Study 1 and one from Study 2 met criteria for autistic disorder on both parental report (ADI‐R or SCQ) and ADOS‐G. Many of the others showed some autistic features, but there was a subset of children with pragmatic difficulties who were not diagnosed as having autism or PDDNOS by either instrument. These children tended to use stereotyped language with abnormal intonation/prosody, but they appeared sociable and communicative, had normal nonverbal communication, and showed few abnormalities outside the language/social communication domains. Conclusions: Presence of pragmatic difficulties in a child with communication problems should prompt the clinician to evaluate autistic symptomatology, but it is dangerous to assume that all children with pragmatic difficulties have autism or PDDNOS.