bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Necessity
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Sentences can be thought of as expressing propositions or statements. The logical nominalist is right, against the logical Platonist, to hold that propositions and statements are not really existing things but mere useful fictions. A sentence is logically necessary if its negation entails a contradiction, given that its referring expressions in fact pick out the objects that they do. A sentence's entailments are a matter of the human conventions for the use of that sentence. There are kinds of necessity other than logical necessity. In particular, there is what I call ‘ontological necessity’ – everlasting uncaused existence; and what I call ‘metaphysical necessary’. Something is metaphysically necessary in my sense if either it is ontologically necessary or it is inevitably caused to exist everlastingly by something ontologically necessary.
Divine Properties
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Analyses the divine properties, which all (including perfect goodness) follow from eternal omnipotence, omniscience and perfect freedom. ‘Eternal’ must be understood as ‘everlasting’. A divine individual cannot have a beginning; but in the absence of a temporal metric, there is no difference between such an individual existing for only a finite time and existing for an infinite time. A divine individual is not a logically necessary being.
The Divine Nature
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
All the divine properties follow from one essential property of having pure limitless intentional power. An individual with this property will be metaphysically necessary. Aquinas was right to hold that what binds the divine properties together was causal power, and not – as Anselm held – being the greatest conceivable being. A divine individual is simple and does not have thisness.
The Trinity
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
There can be more than one divine individual if any others are dependent for their existence on a first one and if it is supremely good, act to cooperate with a second individual to share all that they have with a third individual. In that case, God will be a Trinity, three divine persons, the others deriving ultimately from one of these, ‘The Father’. The Nicene creed and other Christian doctrinal statements of the doctrine of the Trinity can be seen to fit this account, if we bear in mind that the words of Greek and Latin, translated into English as ‘God’ are ambiguous between a name, ‘God’ and ‘a divine being’. We do not need the notion of relative identity to explicate the doctrine of the Trinity.
The Evidence of Incarnation
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
God does not need to become incarnate, i.e. human, to forgive us, but it is good that he should do so to make his forgiveness available to us by means of an atonement for our sins; and also for many other reasons – to identify with our sufferings, show us how much he loves us, and reveal truths to us. Evidence that Jesus was God Incarnate is provided by the kind of life he led, and its culmination in the Resurrection. Other accounts of the ‘incarnation’ – monophysitism, Nestorianism, the Kenotic Theory, and modern humanistic Christologies – are less probable than the Chalcedonian one. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the Virgin Birth, and the Ascension of Christ.
Philosophical Introduction: The Background Theory
Authors: Fodor Jerry A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractConcepts as central theoretical constructs in cognitive science. Theories of concepts and theories of concept possession. Representational. The place of concepts in `representational theories of mind’. Basic assumptions of the discussion to follow: Psychological explanations are typically nomic; mental representations are the primitive bearers of intentional content; concepts are the constituents of propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires; thinking is computing; meaning is information; concepts are the typical proximal causes of behavior. Concepts as `Modes of Presentation of objects and properties’.
Unphilosophical Introduction: What Concepts Have to Be
Authors: Fodor Jerry A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Adequacy conditions on a theory of concepts: Concepts are mental particulars; they function as perceptual and cognitive categories; they are compositional; many of them are learned; they are typically public (i.e. shared by many minds). Satisfying the publicity condition presupposes a notion of conceptual identity (mere similarity won’t do).
The Demise of Definitions, Part I: The Linguist's Tale
Authors: Fodor Jerry A. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA consideration of `linguistic’ evidence for and against the view that typical concepts of `middle‐sized’ objects (DOG, CHAIR, UNCLE, DOORKNOB) are complex definitional constructions out of more primitive concepts. Critical analysis of arguments by Ray Jackendoff, Steven Pinker, and others.
The Demise of Definitions, Part II: The Philosopher's Tale
Authors: Fodor Jerry A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
A consideration of `philosophical’ evidence, the view that typical concepts are complex. Connections with questions about analyticity and learnability. The alternative view (`conceptual atomism’)‐that typical concepts are primitives‐is introduced and defended. The importance of distinguishing the semantic issues about conceptual atomism from the epistemological ones.
Innateness and Ontology, Part I: The Standard Argument
Authors: Fodor Jerry A. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The `standard’ argument against conceptual atomism: primitive concepts must be innate (i.e. common ground between empiricists and rationalists). So, if conceptual atomism is true, concept nativism must be true. Is this a reduction? The main objection to a pervasive concept nativism is that typical concepts are acquired from experience with their instances. This is explicable on the assumption that such concepts are learned. An alternative explanation is proposed, which turns on the suggestion that typical concepts express mind dependent properties.
Pragmatics
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractPragmatics—the study of language in relation to the uses of language and the context of its use ‐ is distinguished from semantics—the study of the propositional content of what is expressed in language. Pragmatic presupposition is distinguished from semantic presupposition. The apparatus developed is used to clarify Keith Donnellan's distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions.
Pragmatic Presuppositions
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractArgues that the distinction between what is asserted and what is presupposed in a statement should be described and explained pragmatically, in terms of what the speaker takes to be the background information, or common ground, shared between speaker and audience. The pragmatic notion of presupposition is used to explain two kinds of linguistic facts: first, facts about the relation between the presuppositions required by complex sentences and the presuppositions required by their constituent sentences (the projection problem) and second, facts about the behaviour of different kinds of factive verbs.
Indicative Conditionals
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAims to reconcile a unified semantic account of conditional statements with an apparent contrast between the logics of indicative and ”subjunctive” conditionals. The difference between the two kinds of conditionals is explained in terms of different constraints imposed on the contexts relative to which the different forms of conditionals are interpreted. A pragmatic concept of reasonable inference is defined and contrasted with semantic entailment. This concept is then used to explain why certain inferences involving indicative conditionals are compelling, and to diagnose a fallacy in a familiar argument for fatalism.
On the Representation of Context
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA discourse context is identified with the set of possible worlds that represents the shared information that is available to the participants in the discourse for the interpretation of speech acts. Two ways in which a speech act changes the context are distinguished. The notion of accommodation is examined, and a problem about this representation of context, raised by Hans Kamp, is addressed. The apparatus developed is applied to some problems about indefinite reference and anaphoric pronouns.
Indexical Belief
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractA puzzle about indexical or self‐locating belief is discussed. It is argued that with the help of the apparatus of propositional concepts and diagonal propositions developed in ch. 4 (’Assertion’) and 6 (Semantics for belief’), the phenomena can be reconciled with the doctrine of propositions—the thesis that the objects of belief are impersonal and timeless propositions. Alternative accounts of indexical belief, proposed by John Perry and by David Lewis are criticized.
Twin Earth Revisited
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIt is argued that externalism about the contents of propositional attitudes is supported not only by examples and thought experiments, but also by an intuitively plausible theoretical account of intentionality: the idea that the contents of intentional mental states should be explained in terms of the information that those states are disposed to carry. The theoretical account helps to bring out what is paradoxical about the externalist's thought experiments, and to show why attributions of content are essentially context‐dependent.
The Problem of Logical Omniscience, I
Authors: Stalnaker Robert C. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractFormal theories of knowledge, belief, and partial belief usually make the idealizing assumption that an agent's knowledge or beliefs are closed under logical consequence—that knowers or believers are logically omniscient. This paper aims to clarify the nature of and motivation for this idealization. It is argued that it is more difficult than is sometimes supposed to give an adequate representation of belief or knowledge that avoids this idealization. Different ways of distinguishing implicit from explicit belief are distinguished. It is argued that while one can avoid logical omniscience by building linguistic structure into the contents of belief and knowledge, this fails to address the underlying problem, which is a problem about the accessibility or availability of information to influence action.
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This is the third volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings. In this selection of his work from the 1980s and the 90s, Davidson critically examines three types of propositional knowledge—knowledge of one's own mind, knowledge of other people's minds, and knowledge of the external world—by working out the nature and status of each type, and the connections and differences among them. While his main concern remains the relation between language, thought, and reality, Davidson's discussions touch a vast variety of issues in analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, including those of truth, human rationality, and facets of the realism–antirealism debate.
First Person Authority
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Attempts to explain the assumption that a speaker's sincere self‐attribution of propositional attitudes is justified, while such justification is lacking if the attribution is done by somebody else. By tracing the source of first‐person authority, the justification of such self‐attribution, to a necessary feature of language, Davidson offers both an original solution to the authority‐problem and an escape from sceptical solutions to the problem of other minds.
Knowing One's Own Mind
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Is an attempt to resolve the following apparent difficulty: given that the contents of our minds are in part determined by external factors of which we are ignorant, how is it possible for us to know these contents without the need to appeal to evidence? Davidson resolves this difficulty by, among other things, giving up the idea of ‘objects before the mind’, for the attributes of such objects cannot be hidden from the agent.
The Myth of the Subjective
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter is a direct attack on the idea of a subjective–objective dichotomy resulting in a fundamental distinction between uninterpreted experience and an organizing structure of concepts. Consequently, Davidson attacks the foundation of all metaphysical and epistemological dualisms and the philosophical stances based upon them. He attempts to make a case for their replacement by a view that combines the denial of objects before the mind with the claim that empirical knowledge does not and need not have an epistemological foundation.
What Is Present to the Mind?
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter is a further attempt to exorcise the traditional belief that in experiencing objects, there must be objects present to the mind. Davidson further illuminates and restates the arguments in the two preceding papers and offers more illuminating examples to make his case. He concludes that in experiencing objects, there are no objects before the experiencer's mind, for the attributes of such objects could not be hidden from the agent.
The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Having attacked a number of features that some views have regarded as constitutive of the concept of ‘the self’, Davidson now discusses those features that he thinks should replace the traditional ones. He especially emphasizes the special authority that our propositional attitudes are equipped with and the irreducible role of indexical sentences. In Davidson's opinion, the thoughts expressed by indexical sentences relate us to the world around us and thereby form a constitutive component of our concept of the self.
Rational Animals
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractThis chapter is an attempt to specify some of the constitutive components of human rationality. Drawing on conclusions previously defended (mainly in his essay ‘Thought and Talk’), Davidson argues for the mutual dependence of thought and language. Given the characteristically holistic framework of the discussion, Davidson regards this conclusion as being established by antecedent empirical knowledge rather than by considerations that secure a necessary footing.
Empirical Content
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Explores Schlick's and Neurath's dispute over the foundations of empirical knowledge, and thereby equips ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’ with commentary and historical background. Davidson works out the difficulties involved in drawing epistemological conclusions from a verificationist theory of meaning and argues that there are promising hints of a better theory, akin to Davidson's coherence theory of truth and knowledge, in the logical positivists’ writings.
Epistemology and Truth
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
As the title of the paper suggests, chapter 12 discusses the relation between epistemology and truth. Davidson criticizes two main (and apparently opposing) positions according to which truth is, respectively, radically non‐epistemic or to be spelled out in modal epistemological terms. Instead, Davidson suggests a partial reconciliation of the two positions by arguing that truth has to be in one way or other connected to true belief.
Epistemology Externalized
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAttempts to radically revise the still predominant Cartesian underpinnings of epistemological theorizing, by attacking the belief that all knowledge is and all epistemology should be primarily based on first‐person knowledge. Davidson holds that a necessary condition of knowledge is third‐person knowledge, in the sense that all kinds of knowledge presuppose the concept of objective truth and such a concept is only accessible to communicative creatures that share a common world of objects in space and time. Knowledge, therefore, far from arising through moves from the subjective to the objective, emerges holistically.
Three Varieties of Knowledge
Authors: Davidson Donald 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter could function as an introduction to the current collection of Davidson's papers, in that it deals with the three types of knowledge the book is concerned with, namely knowledge of our own minds, knowledge of other minds, and knowledge of an external reality. Davidson's main aim is to sketch the project of examining the nature and status of each type of knowledge and the connections between them, and he hints at the answers he is about to give.
The Heirs of Plato
Authors: Dillon John 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn this book, John Dillon investigates the development of the Academy in the 70 years after Plato's death in 347 b.c. He discusses the careers of the Academy's chief figures, in particular, Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo, the three successive heads in the period generally known as ‘The Old Academy’. Dillon's main thesis is that these philosophers set the agenda for the major intellectual traditions that were to follow: Speusippus stimulated developments in what became known as ‘Neopythagoreanism’, which itself was to prove fruitful for ‘Neoplatonism’; Xenocrates initiated much of what we call ‘Middle Platonism’; while Polemo anticipated the chief ethical doctrines of the Stoics. Dillon proposes to argue that the basis of all later Platonism, and to some extent Stoicism as well, is laid down during the period in question by a series of innovations in, and consolidations of, Plato's teachings; furthermore, Dillon considers how, and how much, of the philosophy of Aristotle was absorbed into Platonism. Ch. 1 discusses the physical and organizational structure of the Academy under Plato, focussing on problems to do with the actual location of the Academy and on the methods, goals, and themes of its research. Special attention is paid to the relationship between Plato's written and unwritten doctrines. Ch. 2, 3, and 4 are devoted to individual studies of lives and doctrines of the three heads of the Academy after Plato: Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemo respectively. Ch. 5 discusses the contributions of four minor figures connected with the Academy: Philippus of Opus, Hermodorus of Syracuse, Heraclides of Pontus, and Crantor of Soli. In the Epilogue, Dillon discusses the relations of the Academy with both Peripatos and the Stoa.
The Riddle of the Academy
Authors: Dillon John 
Published: October 2003

AbstractIn this chapter, Dillon explores a number of questions regarding, firstly, the nature and structure of the Academy that Plato founded and bequeathed to his successors, and, secondly, the nature and doctrines he arrived at before his death. After examining the evidence, Dillon concludes that Plato purchased a private property, with its own garden, in the late 380s, located alongside a grove, or public park, which was outside the walls of Athens, and which was called the Academy after the hero for whom the park was named: Hekademos. Academic discussion in the last stage of Plato's career centres on the Theory of Forms as Form Numbers; in logic, the doctrine of diairesis or the logical divisions; and, in Ethics, the understanding of the virtues as means between extremes of ‘too much’ and ‘too little’; also important is the distinction made in the Laws between goods of the soul and external goods. Much of the physical or cosmological speculation of the Old Academy is focussed on the interpretation of the nest of problems presented by the Timaeus, which is not taken literally by Plato's successors; and on the attempt to reconcile this with Plato's oral teachings, i.e. the Unwritten doctrines.
Speusippus and the Search for an Adequate System of Principles
Authors: Dillon John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Plato's nephew Speusippus was already over 60 when he assumed the headship of the Academy on his uncle's death, and his reign was short (347–339). Aristotle is our principle source for the Old Academy (i.e. prior to 322), which is problematic, as Aristotle tends to be rather tendentious in the way he treats his contemporaries; but apart from Aristotle's evidence, we have very little to go on regarding Speusippus’ philosophy, as only two of his works, On Pythagorean Numbers and the Letter to Philip survive. The most original and influential aspect of Speusippus’ thought is his discussion of the nature of the first principles, in particular, his development of Plato's notions of the One and the indefinite Dyad (which Speusippus called the ‘One and Multiplicity’), and his attempt to explain how the totality of being came to be from these principles. Speusippus was innovative in his understanding of Platonic cosmology, as presented in the Timaeus, although his innovations, e.g. the notion of World‐Soul, did not make their mark until the Neopythagoreanism of the first two centuries A.D. Speusippus’ ideas on happiness and pleasure were already criticized by Plato in the Philebus, but he may have influenced the stoics on this point; while Aristotle, despite his barbed comments, probably learnt a lot from Speusippus’ logic, which included work on genera and species, and on ambiguity as the source of Sophist fallacies.
Xenocrates and the Systematization of Platonism
Authors: Dillon John 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Xenocrates, who had accompanied Plato on one of his visits to Sicily, became head of the Academy in 339 B.C. Xenocrates stays close to what he takes to be the cosmological doctrine of Plato's Timaeus; indeed Xenocrates’ doctrine may be seen as something of a retreat from Speusippus’ radical position, perhaps in response to Aristotle's criticisms. Dillon reconstructs Xenocrates's cosmological or metaphysical scheme as comprising a pair of first principles, the Monad, or Nous, and the Dyad, or the ‘Everflowing’, to which the Pythagorean tetraktys corresponds as the active counterpart; and a World‐Soul, which receives the forms from the Supreme God's mind, and projects them upon the physical plane. In Logic, Xenocrates remained faithful to Platonic logic, rejecting the Aristotelian categories, although he did argue that the species was prior to the genus; in Ethics, while keen to formalize Plato's teachings, Xenocrates ends up with a position very similar to Aristotle's, in that he emphasizes the needs of the body as well as those of the soul. Xenocrates had a dominant effect on the development of Platonism, because he systematized what he took to be Plato's philosophical system, thus laying the foundation for the ‘Platonic’ system of philosophy; it is Xenocrates’ definition of Form, for instance, which became the standard definition of a Platonic Form.