bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Purposes
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Intentional actions consist in agents purposing, that is ‘trying’, to bring about effects (where ‘trying’ carries no implication of difficulty or failure) or allowing some effect to occur. Purposing is an active state of exerting causal influence, and cannot be analysed in terms of passive states such as desires. We have infallible beliefs about our own purposes, but only fallible beliefs about the purposes of others. Purposes have effects, and so epiphenomenalism is false.
The Evidence of Personal Identity
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Apparent personal memory (of who one was) is fallible evidence of personal identity – in virtue of the principle of credulity. Because it is found empirically that memory of who one was normally goes with having the same brain matter as that person, brain continuity constitutes indirect evidence of personal identity – and so, even less directly and more fallibly, do similarity of appearance and fingerprints.
Schopenhauer's Addendum on Homosexuality
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Schopenhauer wrote candidly about sex at a time when almost nobody did. He saw consideration of it as the means of reproduction whereby human beings come into existence as inescapable for metaphysics, indeed for serious thinking. He conjectured that homosexual impulses were implanted by nature in adolescent and elderly males because, although they have sexual urges and can procreate, it is undesirable that they should do so, and therefore the urge is diverted. This, he thinks, is why homosexual activity has been widespread in all known societies. The manner in which he writes about it suggests that he had felt homosexual impulses himself but had not given way to them.
A Conjecture About Dylan Thomas
Authors: Magee Bryan 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Dylan Thomas made his name with one particular poem, ‘The Force that Through the Green Fuse Drives the Flower’, which he wrote and published in his teens. Not only the theme but also the imagery in detail is too close to certain passages in Schopenhauer for a coincidence to be likely. It is more probable that there was some influence. This is made more likely by the fact that there are good reasons to believe that the young Thomas had read a book called Thomas Hardy's Universe, by Ernest Brennecke, which contains many quotations from Schopenhauer, including, in its first chapter, the one closest to Thomas's poem.
A New Beginning 1629–1630
Authors: Gaukroger Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses possible reasons for Descartes's move to the Netherlands, and his avoidance of patronage there. Considers his work on optics (including the sine law of refraction and the grinding of hyperbolic lenses), music, and metaphysics (arguments for the existence of God, his transcendence, and the immortality of the soul). Also deals with Descartes's construction of an artificial, universal language, changes in his thinking about the doctrine of clarity and distinctness, his solution to the Pappus problem, his classification of curves, and his work on meteorology that he expanded into a project to explain the whole of physics. This work was considerably slowed down by his dispute with Beeckman over the authorship of ideas.
Nature and Politics
Authors: Miller Fred D. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAristotle's politics may be characterized as ‘naturalistic’, in the sense that it assigns a fundamental role to the concept of nature in the explanation and evaluation of the political community. Aristotle's naturalism is summed up in three claims: the polis (city‐state) exists by nature, human beings are by nature political animals, and the polis is by nature prior to the individual. Aristotle has been accused of inconsistency because he also asserts that the human lawgiver brings the polis into existence. This chapter, however, defends Aristotle's theory by arguing that his complex natural teleology permits nature and legislation to be cooperative causes of the political community. Also compares and contrasts his political naturalism with modern theories on the state.
The Limits of Knowledge
Authors: Lloyd A. C. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The purpose of Ch. 6 is to outline the role played by the P‐series theory in Neoplatonic epistemology. To start with, it is explained that knowledge of a P‐series consists in an order of priority and posteriority of the terms: intellect, scientific knowledge, belief, presentation, and perception. In second place, some peculiar Neoplatonic epistemological issues, e.g. how can the divine possibly know temporal truths, are carefully examined. To conclude, some particular Neoplatonic rules, which allow higher entities to have knowledge of lower ones, are investigated.
Malebranche
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Malebranche holds that the Cartesian doctrine of ideas not merely conflates logic and psychology, but it thereby opens the door to scepticism and to a voluntarist theory of the eternal truths, which Malebranche regards as both incoherent in itself and dangerous in ethics. We shall see, then, how Malebranche attempts to solve these problems by means of his theory of ideas. We shall also examine the difficulties raised by Malebranche's insistence on locating ideas in God. Since Malebranche locates all ideas in God, there is a sense in which all mental activity involving ideas might be described as ‘vision in God’, but the term ‘vision in God’ may also be taken in a narrower sense to denote Malebranche's theory of visual perception. However, in the present chapter, we shall be concerned with his theory of ideas in general and conclude that, for Malebranche, the Cartesian mind is altogether too godlike; in spite of Descartes's assurances that all knowledge depends on God, the Cartesian mind is really ‘a light to itself’.
Some Further Developments
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Historians of the ‘way of ideas’ tradition face a danger of falling into two opposite errors. On the one hand, by being overimpressed by the fact that they all define ideas in terms of objects of the understanding, scholars may be tempted to lump Locke, Berkeley, and Malebranche together as champions of a single theory; on the other hand, by being overimpressed by the fact that Locke, Berkeley, and Arnauld are all critics of Malebranche's theory of ideas, they may be tempted to infer that the theory of ideas as objects of some sort was not as prominent as is often supposed. In this chapter, I want to steer a middle course between these two errors by examining the reactions of Locke, Berkeley, and Reid to Malebranche's theory of ideas. I shall argue that Locke and Berkeley are critical of Malebranche not because he thought ideas are objects but because he thought they are not mental objects, and that Reid regarded this aspect of Malebranche's theory of ideas as a positive recommendation. I conclude by noting that the debate did not become central again in philosophy until the time of Frege and Husserl when the issues could be discussed without theological trappings.
Reference
Authors: Horwich Paul 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter begins with criticism of ‘description’ and ‘causal’ theories—arguing that they should not be regarded as theories of reference. There then follows a deflationary account according to which our meaning what we do by ‘refers’ consists, roughly speaking, in our acceptance of the schema, ‘n’ (in quotes) refers to n (out of quotes)—and, more accurately, in our acceptance of ‘(x)(&lt;n&gt;refers to x ↔ n=x)’, where &lt;n&gt;is the prepositional constituent expressed by the singular term, “n”. Finally, there are accounts of the utility of this notion of reference and of the meanings of names.
Proper Sensibles and Secondary Qualities
Authors: Everson Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Everson argues that Aristotle does not think of colours, sounds, as secondary qualities; rather, all sensible qualities for Aristotle are primary qualities. This implies a very ‘direct’ notion of perception; for instance, I see red because my eye undergoes a change, a material alteration that can be fully accounted for in non‐perceptual terms. This alteration differs form non‐perceptual alteration in that it involves awareness. Everson concludes that the textual evidence in both the psychological and physical works supports the literalist reading.
Perceptual Content
Authors: Everson Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Everson examines Aristotle's use of the term empeiria, particularly as it appears in Metaphysics I.1 and Posterior Analytics II.19. Empeiria is usually translated as ‘experience’, but Everson argues that it ought to be interpreted as ‘an acquired perceptual concept’. Such concepts are involved in determining the content of perceptual experience. On this account, perceptual awareness is a combination of phantasia and the presence or absence of a certain empeiria, i.e. of the acquired perceptual concept appropriate for the perceptual awareness in question.
Perception and Material Explanation
Authors: Everson Stephen 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Everson has argued that material change does occur in the perceiving sense organ; the final chapter consists of his argument that material changes are a crucial part of the explanation of perceptual awareness of the organ. Whenever there is a formal change, Everson argues, there will also be a material change, (or changes), and these determine formal changes. Everson concludes, then, that Aristotle accepts explanatory physicalism, or the thesis that all perpetual events can be explained by reference to material alterations that determine those events. Everson argues that this thesis, despite appearances, is compatible with hypothetical necessity. In conclusion, Everson argues that neither functionalism, nor supervenience, can account adequately for explanatory physicalism.
Externalist and Internalist analyses. The first‐person case. Knowing that one knows
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Participates in the internalism–externalism debate and offers broad support to the latter. If we consider evaluating others as potential informants (the third‐person perspective), externalism seems right, for the subject's awareness of her fulfilment of the third condition for knowledge is neither necessary for her to be a good informant nor for her to be regarded as an informant at all. If the inquirer judges her own trustworthiness as an informant (the first‐person perspective), then she will be in that extra state, which internalism adds to the externalist account. Yet the extra state need not be built into the concept of knowledge, for being a good informant does not require being aware of fulfilling the third condition; relatedly, one can know without knowing that one knows.
Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Objectivization forces the requirement of a high likelihood that an informant will be right if she is to be classified as a good one, but this does not, argues Craig, equal 1, for that figure has little basis in practical life. Nevertheless, the example of a lottery, and, in particular, the claim that one will not win, brings closer to our real experience the idea that one may not always be advised to act on information that has a chance of less than 1 of being true. A similar push towards this stringent idea is sometimes exerted by the wish to draw inferences from multiple premises and to be able to rely on the result. However, though real situations can require a very high likelihood, they do not force us to set it at 1; that final push comes from reflection lying outside the framework of everyday practice.
Knowledge and involvement. What makes truth valuable?
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
The concept of knowledge is a concept formed and operated by active beings who need to direct their activity. This, according to Craig, explains two features associated with the concept of knowledge: (1) the fact that we want true beliefs (for if we are genuinely to direct our activity, we must have true beliefs about the consequences of such and such an action or inaction), and (2) the fact that we actively seek the truth and therefore try to ‘track’ it, rather than merely hoping to hit it.
Other locutions: Knowing Fred. Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London—and German
Authors: Craig Edward 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Discusses what it is to know X (e.g. to know Fred) rather than to know whether p. The early parts give reasons for assimilating ‘knows Fred’ to ‘knows whether p’, while giving methodological justification for not regarding this assimilation as hindered by the fact that some languages translate ‘know’ differently in the two cases. The claim that ‘knows X’ means, at core, being sensorily acquainted with X or being in the company of X, is rejected; possessing certain types of information about X is what the core meaning consists in. Later parts relate ‘knows X’ to ‘knows how to’, suggesting that it implies a capacity. Clarification of the relationship between this assimilation and the earlier one is left to the next section.
Interaction
Authors: Ameriks Karl 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter focuses on a host of issues that are central to Kant's philosophy in general, and his understanding of the mind in particular, even though they do not correspond to the heading of a specific paralogism. I explain how the modern problem of interaction, in general, dominated Kant's early work, and how Kant's views on the specific issue of mind‐body interaction always have to be approached in this context. Indicative of the complexity of his position here is the fact that in the Critique's second ed., Kant changes the topic of the fourth paralogism, to have it focus on the metaphysical issue of mind‐body interaction, whereas in the first ed., it concerns the epistemological relation of the self to external objects. I explain how and why the latter topic becomes central to other parts of the second ed. Critique, especially, the new section called the Refutation of Idealism.
Identity
Authors: Ameriks Karl 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
This chapter concerns Kant's views on the issue of personal identity, the topic of the third paralogism. This is an especially complicated topic for Kant because it immediately requires bringing together non‐temporal (noumenal) and temporal (phenomenal) aspects of the self: something is one and the same ‘person’ only if in a certain way it is one and the same mental substance over time. I note the striking diversity of readings of Kant's argument here—some suggest the issue is primarily epistemological and empirical, others see that it is metaphysical. I also show how the range of recent analytic discussions of personal identity mirrors the basic options that Kant anticipated, at least implicitly.
Iamblichus' Work on Pythagoreanism: Title, Plan, the First Four Books
Authors: O'Meara Dominic J. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
In this chapter, the first four (extant) books of Iamblichus's work On Pythagoreanism are examined as relating to a unitary scheme. Iamblichus's interpretation of the role of Pythagoras in the revelation of philosophy, of the nature of Pythagorean philosophy, and of the place and nature of mathematics and of arithmetic in that philosophy are described.
Arguments from Consciousness and Morality
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Humans are conscious beings – they have mental events – sensations, thoughts, and intentions. Science might one day produce a list of correlations between mental and brain events, but it is immensely improbable that science would ever be able to explain why a particular mental event was correlated with a particular brain event, or with any event at all. Theism can explain this in terms of God choosing to being about certain kinds of mental life. By contrast, moral truths being in essence necessary truths, have no possible grounds for a good argument to God.
The Constructibility Quantifiers
Authors: Chihara Charles S. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSketches the basic idea for the approach taken. A mathematical system is to be developed in which the existential theorems of traditional mathematics are to be replaced by constructibility theorems: where, in traditional mathematics, it is asserted that such and such exists, it will be asserted in this system that something or other can be constructed. Thus, constructibility quantifiers are introduced in this chapter as logical constants of formal systems. The logic of the constructibility quantifier is explained in each case via possible worlds semantics, which is used as a didactic or heuristic device.
Constructibility and Open‐Sentences
Authors: Chihara Charles S. 
Published: October 2003

AbstractSince the constructibility quantifiers, used in the mathematical system to be developed, will all assert the constructibility of open sentences, an explanation is given of the kinds of open sentences that will be asserted to be constructible. Each of these open sentences will be assigned to a specific ‘level’, depending on the kind of objects or open sentences that can satisfy it, thus providing the basis for the Simple Type Theoretical characteristic of the system to be developed. The satisfaction relation under discussion will be taken to be a primitive of the system. The relevance of Quine's objections to modality for this system is taken up.
Mathematics without Numbers
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Develops a structuralist understanding of mathematics, as an alternative to set‐ or type‐theoretic foundations, that respects classical mathematical truth while minimizing Platonist commitments to abstract entities. Modal logic is combined with notions of part/whole (mereology) enabling a systematic interpretation of ordinary mathematical statements as asserting what would be the case in any (suitable) structure there (logically) might be, e.g. for number theory, functional analysis, algebra, pure geometry, etc. Structures are understood as comprising objects, whatever their nature, standing in suitable relations as given by axioms or defining conditions in mathematics proper. The characterization of structures is aided by the addition of plural quantifiers, e.g. ‘Any objects of sort F’ corresponding to arbitrary collections of Fs, achieving the expressive power of second‐order logic, hence a full logic of relations. (See the author's ‘Structuralism without Structures’, Philosophia Mathematica4 (1996): 100–123.) Claims of absolute existence of structures are replaced by claims of (logical) possibility of enough structurally interrelated objects (modal‐existence postulates). The vast bulk of ordinary mathematics, and scientific applications, can thus be recovered on the basis of the possibility of a countable infinity of atoms. As applied to set theory itself, these ideas lead to a ‘many worlds’—– as opposed to the standard ‘fixed universe’—view, inspired by Zermelo (1930), respecting the unrestricted, indefinite extendability of models of the Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms. Natural motivation for (‘small’) large cardinal axioms is thus provided. In sum, the vast bulk of abstract mathematics is respected as objective, while literal reference to abstracta and related problems with Platonism are eliminated.
Maximization: Some Evaluative Problems
Authors: Stocker Michael 
Published: October 2003

AbstractAddresses the central claim of maximization that we must do what is best. It is argued that maximization is neither morally nor rationally required. Maximization cannot adequately deal with the ethical concepts of superogation, self‐regard, amusement, and friendship; furthermore, the central claims of moral and rational choice do not involve maximization. Moral and rational appraisal of a choice of action requires evaluating its contribution to a whole (a life or a project), where the whole need not be the best available, only good enough.
The Necessity of Natures
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
I argue that each object has many essences (sometimes referred to as ‘hacceities’ or ‘natures’). A property E is an essence of object x if and only if E is essential to x and in every possible world everything distinct from x has the complement of E essentially. I then elaborate on the nature of essences and examine the relationship between essences and proper names. My view is that John Stuart Mill was mistaken in his belief that proper names do not express properties. In fact, proper names express essences and I make use of this fact in addressing the famous problem of Hesperus and Phosphorus.
God, Evil, and the Metaphysics of Freedom
Authors: Plantinga Alvin 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Chapter 9 is the first of two chapters that apply the findings of the previous eight chapters of The Nature of Necessity to some traditional problems in natural theology. The Problem of Evil is the objection to theism that holds that the conjunction of the propositions, God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and There is evil in the world, is necessarily false. The Free Will Defense is an effort to show the two propositions are compatible, and in the process of the defence, I use the concept of transworld depravity. I then prove that the possibility that every essence suffers from such depravity entails that it is possible both that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good and that there is evil in the world. I conclude by addressing special problems caused by natural evil and by arguing that the Probabilistic Problem of Evil is unsuccessful.
From Ignorance to Irrationality
Authors: Unger Peter 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Defends the claim that skepticism about knowledge entails skepticism about rationality. It argues that if anybody is ever justified or reasonable in believing anything, then he or she must know something to be so. Hence, if nobody can ever know anything, nobody can ever be justified or reasonable in believing anything either. This argument is supported by considerations about the entailments of sentences of the form “S's noun is that p.” Even if only a limited form of skepticism about knowledge is endorsed, the chapter argues, the principle that it should be possible for one to know one's reasons yields a far‐reaching skepticism about rationality.
Descriptivism and the Error Theory
Authors: Hare R. M. 
Published: October 2003

Abstract
Hare explicates descriptivism and J. L. Mackie's error theory and explains what is wrong with them with respect to moral disagreement and the prescriptive force of moral terms. The meaning of moral words, and their logic, lead us to believe that moral judgements are universal or universalizable prescriptions that are either overriding or related to overriding principles. When ordinary people use moral words, they are not intending to ascribe objective prescriptive properties to action. They are, in fact, intending to ascribe ordinary descriptive properties like the property of being, or the breaking of a promise. However, as a result of this state of affairs, individuals can very easily fall into the conceptual error of thinking that there are objective prescriptive properties. Hare seeks to show why philosophers make this mistake.