bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Illegal Contracts and Limited Interests
Authors: Hamson C. J. 
Published: January 2009

The case of Bowmakers, Ltd. v. Barnet Instruments, Ltd. deserves perhaps more attention than it has received. The judgment, delivered by du Parcq L.J., is per curiam. and of a strong Court of Appeal. It is a broad and easy-flowing judgment which cites few authorities and states a general rule in general terms without enumerating the exceptions to which it adverts. It accordingly gives rise to not a few difficulties. But it may well be correct on the main points which it appears to decide; and it may prove to be generally helpful in principle, upon the difficult topic of property passing under illegal contracts, if the principle involved can be extracted and stated with particularity.The facts, as determined in the Court of Appeal, are as follows:—The defendants (appellants), Barnet Instruments, Ltd., were minded to purchase from a Mr. Smith some machine tools; but instead of the defendants purchasing directly from him, in order to facilitate the financing of the transaction, it was arranged, as is customary, that Bowmakers, Ltd., the plaintiffs, should buy the machines from Smith and let them, upon normal hire purchase terms, to the defendants. Accordingly the plaintiffs, having bought from Smith, entered into three separate hire purchase agreements with the defendants: Nos. 1 and 2 of March and April, 1944, concerned new machine tools, No. 3 of June, 1944, dealt solely with a machine tool which was ‘used’. The defendants ‘after making some, but by no means all the agreed payments sold for their own advantage and converted to their use, all the machines except that one which was the subject of agreement 2, and this latter they also converted to their own use by refusing to deliver it up to the plaintiffs on demand’.
The Usual Authority of an Agent
Authors: Hornby J. A. 
Published: January 2009

1. The concept of an agent's “usual” authority is important in ascertaining the extent of the agent's actual and apparent authority.2. The contention that in English law a principal can be liable in contract for the acts of an agent exceeding the latter's actual and apparent authority as agent depends on a statement of principle by Wills J. in Watteau v. Fenwick. This statement is supported neither by the previous cases nor by Wills J.'s reasoning.3. Edmunds v. Bushell & Jones, Watteau v. Fenwick and Kinahan & Co. Ltd. v. Parry are all cases in which the agent was held out by the principal as having the authority of a principal and owner of a business; as these cases rest on apparent ownership the principal should be merely precluded from denying that the agent is owner of the assets of the business, and these cases cannot be justified in so far as they impose a more extensive personal liability on the true principal and owner.4. Although a particular managing director of a company may have a “usual” authority, he does not have a “usual” authority which is common to all other managing directors of all other companies.
Some Problems about Fundamental Terms
Authors: Montrose J. L. 
Published: January 2009

Is fitness for purpose a fundamental term in hire-purchase contracts?The need for clarification of concepts and propositions in the area of the position of exemption clauses has already been demonstrated by the discussion of the difference between “fundamental terms” and “fundamental breach”. In the Charterhouse case we have seen one variety of judicial approach arising from this difference. But there is a further conflict of judicial opinion in the case which calls for further clarification of doctrine. The three members of the Court of Appeal agree that apart from the limited provision of the Hire-Purchase Acts there is to be implied in all hire-purchase agreements a fitness for purpose term. But while Ormerod L.J. describes such a term as fundamental, Upjohn L.J. denies that it possesses this character. Donovan L.J. is probably in accord with the view of Upjohn L.J. though he makes no explicit statement. Upjohn L.J. envisages hire-purchase agreements as containing a fundamental “correspondence with description” term in addition to a non-fundamental “fitness for purpose” term. These judicial opinions are derived from the precedents. These are few in number and can be examined separately. This examination, it is submitted, will show that much of the conflict is terminological and that the subject is in need of further theoretical analysis.
Murder—Transferred Malice—Defences Not Expressly Pleaded
Authors: Gooderson R. N. 
Published: January 2009

In R. v. Porritt [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1372; 45 Cr.App.R. 348 the accused had been convicted of the capital murder of his stepfather. His defence was that he fired the fatal shot in an attempt to protect the deceased from two members of a rival gang, the Copleys, one of whom was holding a knife at his throat. He further pleaded that he was repelling an armed invasion of his home by the Copleys.The accused clearly had no desire whatever to harm his stepfather, who seems to have been an active member of the same gang as the accused. He was however prima facie guilty of murder should the prosecution establish his intent by shooting to cause death or grievous bodily harm to the Copleys, under the doctrine of transferred malice, whereby the accused is legally responsible for intended consequences even though they are visited upon an unintended victim: Hopwood (1913) 8 Cr.App.R. 143.Defences are also transferred with the malice; Conner (1836) 7 C. & P. 438, and the prosecution conceded that the homicide was justifiable if done in the honest belief that it was necessary to preserve the life of his stepfather or to protect his home from invasion. The concession was in generous terms, as the authorities require not merely honest belief on the part of the accused, but reasonable grounds for this belief: Rose (1884) 15 Cox 540. The defence that the Copleys were seeking to dispossess the Porritts carried the matter little further, except that it has been held that there is no duty to retreat in such a case: Hussey (1924) 18 Cr.App.R. 160.
The Relevance of Muhammadan Law in the Twentieth Century
Authors: Fyzee A. A. A. 
Published: January 2009

Lieutenant-General Sir John Bagot Glubb ends his work onThe Great Arab Conquestswith the following words:“The relations between Christianity and Islam today justify a brief comment. As Muhammad himself declared, Judaism, Christianity and Islam are three related religions. If we consider them alone, their differences may appear profound, but when compared to Hinduism, Buddhism or Communist atheism, they appear by contrast closely connected with one another. Yet many people regard Christianity and Islam as the great rival religions. This illusion takes its origin, I believe, from political rather than religious causes.“As our narrative has shown, the first Arab conquerors regarded Byzantium as their principal enemy. In the subsequent Arab conquests of North Africa and Spain, in the Crusades, in the invasion of the Balkans by the Turks, and in their long hostilities with Czarist Russia, nearly all Muslim wars have been directed against Christians. Conflicts between Hindus and Muslims in India have been on an altogether smaller scale and Muslims have scarcely ever been involved in hostilities against Jews except in the last forty years in Palestine.“This long-standing rivalry between Christians and Muslims has been due to political and geographical accident rather than to basic religious differences. Now that materialist atheism is challenging all spiritual values, the two religions might well make common cause against those who deny the existence of God altogether. There is, I believe, an immense field in which the two could co-operate.“The Arabic-speaking world, after four centuries of obscurity, is once again playing its part in history.
Previous Consistent Statements
Authors: Gooderson R. N. 
Published: January 2009

No expert long range forecast is needed to predict that in the near future a wind of change of a velocity and a turbulence hitherto unknown is going to sweep away many common law principles of the law of evidence regarded in the past as fundamental. In civil proceedings, the hurricane is upon us, with the thirteenth report of the Law Reform Committee, and the Civil Evidence Bill 1967, virtually providing for the abolition of the rule against first-hand hearsay and the rule against narrative, and substituting a wide discretion in the court. All the signs are that in a short time analogous reforms for criminal proceedings will be announced, and already previous statements have been rendered widely admissible by the Criminal Justice Act 1967. The object of this article is to look at the common law relating to the rule against narrative in criminal proceedings, as it is applied in England and in the United States, and to make a few comments on the procedure introduced by section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967.The rule against narrative is sometimes called the rule against self-corroboration. This is misleading, in that a witness can never corroborate himself where corroboration is required by any rule of law or practice. In the thirteenth report, the first description is said to be a misnomer, but a helpful summary of the rule is given: “what the witness himself said outside the witness-box is not evidence.” Wills describes the rule in this way: “… the witness may not repeat to the Court his own previous narratives or statements concerning the relevant facts made to other persons out of Court; when he is in the witness-box he must take his mind back, directly so to speak, to the facts he is called to prove, and must give to the Court his present recollection of those facts.”
The Completeness of Rules
Authors: Coval S. C. , Smith J. C. 
Published: January 2009

J. M. Steiner has argued, in a fashion to be gone into in a moment, that inevitably “the judge retains a field of choice” in legal decision. This choice is substantive and not merely discretionary in some soft sense which would find discretion, like judgment, necessary to the application of any and all rules. The thesis is not the weak one that an official, say a sports referee, must judge—and be allowed the discretion to judge—whether an infraction has been committed before he can apply the relevant rule. It is the strong one that, sometimes at least, an official must himself supply additional premises, which are from “outside” the law, for his decision. These external premises are of the same level of substance and import as any statute or precedent might be.His argument for this position is negative in form. He holds that since no ordered set of “principles” or goals can give guidance on cases “outside” their range, and since many such cases will systematically exist, the law in order to be decisive—a virtue of high worth—must allow the judge the power to complete the legal argument for such excluded cases. He will do so presumably by supplying the missing premise from his “field of choice” and ex hypothesi not from precedents or statutes. Let us suppose, along with Steiner, that the set of premises whose adequacy is in question is a set which contains the goals of the law. Steiner's position then is that any such set which exists within the law and is “closed” to addition by the judge will be systematically inadequate for some or many cases which can come before him for decision.
Cause and Consideration: A Study in Parallel
Authors: Markesinis B. S. 
Published: January 2009

Students interested in the concepts of cause and consideration must, surely, have been struck by two things. The first is the extraordinary tenacity which has enabled these concepts to survive the attacks of eloquent critics who have doubted their utility. The second is their equally remarkable ability to accommodate the most divergent comparative theories. For the study of the two notions has led some to argue that they are, in reality, the same; others to insist that they are totally different; while yet another school of thought could be taken to doubt whether there is “any point in comparing cause and consideration, even to contrast the two.”The study of the legal systems of many countries—notably of the systems of West Germany, and Switzerland—reveals that there can be built a theory of contract which ignores the concepts of cause (as the French understand it) or consideration (as the Common lawyers have come to apply it over the years).
The Application of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 to Consumer Hire Agreements
Authors: Palmer Norman , Yates David 
Published: January 2009

I. IntroductionThe anomaly of including consumer hire agreements within the purview of the Consumer Credit Act 1974 is more apparent than real. Although contracts of hire do not generally involve the provision of credit, they frequently afford a method of long-term disposition akin to such deferred-purchasing devices as hire-purchase and conditional sale. Indeed, one of the decisions which featured most prominently in the Crowther Committee's discussion of this form of surrogate credit involved a hirer who had failed to realise that the contract under which he held the chattel (a caravan) was one which precluded any acquisition of title by him. The abuse to which this type of transaction was subject clearly justified an extension of the Act to certain forms of consumer hiring. This extension was consonant with the policy, advocated by Crowther, of regulating transactions according to their function rather than their form.
Ratification and the Release of Directors from Personal Liability
Authors: Partridge R. J. C. 
Published: January 2009

When “ratification” is raised as an issue in relation to directors' breaches of duty, the difficulty which is most commonly discussed is how to draw the line between ratifiable and non-ratifiable breaches.What has received considerably less attention is the meaning of “ratification” itself. This is evidenced, not the least, by the variety of other names attributed to the process performed by the general meeting when it “ratifies” a breach of duty. This has variously been described as “adoption,” “confirmation,” “affirmation,” or mere “approval.” Ironically, it is clear that the concept has nothing to do with “ratification” as it is understood in the law of agency, though this is the name most widely used.
Legislative Supremacy and the Rule of Law: Democracy and Constitutionalism
Authors: Allan T. R. S. 
Published: January 2009

“… for it is impossible that one should be Judge and party, for the Judge is to determine between party and party, or between the Government and the party; and an Act of Parliament can do no wrong, though it may do several things that look pretty odd;”City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod. 669, 687, per Holt C.J.“And forasmuch as the legislature always have justice and truth before their eyes, and their false recitals (if there are any) are made upon false information, from thence it follows that they do not intend any one to be concluded by such recital grounded upon falsehood, for he that says to the contrary affirms that their interest is to oppress men wrongfully, which is indecent to be said of them, and he who insists that some shall be concluded by such falsehood, impugns the intent of the makers of the Act, and in that the Act itself, for the Act is nothing else but the intention of the makers of it.”The Earl of Leicester v. Heydon (1570) 1 Plowden 384, 398.
Legislating in Defence of the French Language
Authors: Munday Roderick 
Published: January 2009

In the preface to his memoirs, Casanova outlined his reasons for writing them in French. Having noted that the clarity, precision and grace of the French language are such that a cultivated person cannot help but fall beneath its spell, he went on to mention one further feature:It is worth observing that among all the living languages in the republic of letters, French is the only one which its presiding judges have sentenced not to enrich itself at the expense of the other languages.Arguably this is a proud posture for a language to strike, hermetically cocooned within a self-imposed cultural bridewell. Nevertheless, Casanova's observation was, to a degree, an accurate representation of the cultured French of his day and, curiously, is probably truer today that it has ever been.
The Logic of “Exceptions”
Authors: Williams Glanville 
Published: January 2009

Every so often the Appeal Committee of the House of Lords produces a decision that sets back the rational development of the criminal law for several years or decades.Other courts do this too. But when the lords are at fault it is particularly disappointing: because they should be the élite of the judiciary; because they have the time to consider their decisions properly; because counsel who argue cases before them (having thrashed them out in two lower courts) should be unusually well-prepared; because the lords have the authority to overrule ill-considered decisions of the lower courts; and because their own pronouncements are (if things go wrong) especially hard to overturn. What makes these aberrational decisions particularly disconcerting is that the lords commonly show no appreciation of, and make no attempt to answer, the powerful arguments in the existing literature against the position they adopt.
“Occidere” and the Lex Aquilia
Authors: Andrews N. H. 
Published: January 2009

This paper is concerned with the way in which the verb occidere was treated in the Lex Aquilia and with the explanation for this.Professor Dieter Nörr appears to have offered the most recent explanation of the narrow scope given to the verb in the first chapter of the statute. He makes two points. First, he traces the distinction between direct killing (occidere) and indirectly causing death (mortis causam praestare or praebere) to early Greek law and speculates that this distinction was transmitted into Roman law through the Greek schools of rhetoric. Secondly, he suggests that the Lex Cornelia de sicarüs et veneficis included the phrase mortis causam praestare. If true, this second point would show how firmly the distinction had become established. The phrase would also have provided an obvious parallel for the jurists when engaged in interpreting the Lex Aquilia.
Liability for Crime
Authors: Barnes Henry 
Published: January 2009

The Penal Code of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic: ‘Article 10. Persons who commit socially dangerous acts shall be liable to the application of measures of social defence of a judicial-correctional character only—(a) if they acted deliberately,i.e., if they foresaw the socially dangerous consequences of their acts, or desired those consequences, or knowingly permitted them to happen, or(b) if they acted carelessly,i.e., if they did not foresee the consequences of their acts although they ought to have foreseen them, or if they light-mindedly hoped to avert auch consequences.’
The two Ernests—I
Authors: Oliphant Mark L. 
Published: January 2009

ON 11 JANUARY 1939 after a visit to Berkeley, I wrote a letter to Ernest Lawrence that contained the following paragraph:
“I find it very difficult to thank you for the magnificent and instructive time which I had in Berkeley. It was truly fine of you to be so liberal of time and of thought on my behalf. I know of no laboratory in the world at the present time which has so fine a spirit or so grand a tradition of hard work. While there I seemed to feel again the spirit of the old Cavendish, and to find in you those qualities of a combined camaraderie and leadership which endeared Rutherford to all who worked with him. The essence of the Cavendish is now in Berkeley. I am sincere in this, and for these reasons I shall return again some day, and I hope very soon.”
Preparation of high-school teachers of science
Authors: Buchta J. W. 
Published: January 2009

Typical statements that may be gleaned from a variety of studies and compilations of data on the preparation of high-school teachers are:
“Training in physics ranged from 8 to 55 semester hours with the median at 16. Only 13 (about 25%) had majored in physics.”
“The average number of semester hours in physics taken by the science teachers was 10.”
“One third of the physics teachers had fewer than 10 semester hours in physics.”
AICAR Preconditioning Prevents Postischemic Leukocyte Rolling and Adhesion: Role of KATP Channels and Heme Oxygenase
Authors: GASKIN F. SPENCER , KAMADA KAZUHIRO , YUSOF MOZOW , DURANTE WILLIAM , GROSS GARRETT , KORTHUIS RONALD J. 
Published: January 2009

ABSTRACTObjective: We previously demonstrated that pharmacologic activation of AMP‐activated protein kinase (AMPK) with 5‐aminoimidazole‐4‐carboxamide 1‐β‐D‐ribofuranoside (AICAR) 24 hours prior to (AICAR preconditioning; AICAR‐PC) ischemia/reperfusion (I/R) prevents postischemic leukocyte‐endothelial cell adhesive interactions (LEI) by a mechanism initiated by endothelial nitric oxide synthase (eNOS)‐dependent NO production during the period of AICAR‐PC. The major aim of this study was to examine the role of ATP‐sensitive potassium (KATP) channels and heme oxygenase as mediators of the antiadhesive effects of AICAR‐PC during I/R 24 hours later.Methods: Intravital fluorescence microscopy was used to quantify LEI in the small intestine of AICAR‐preconditioned C57BL/6J mice treated with KATP channel or heme oxygenase inhibitors during I/R 24 hours after AICAR‐PC in separate experiments.Results: I/R induced marked increases in LEI relative to sham control mice, proadhesive responses that were prevented by AICAR‐PC 24 hours prior to I/R. The effects of AICAR‐PC to prevent postischemic LEI were abolished by KATP channel or heme oxygenase inhibition during I/R.Discussion/Conclusion: Our results indicate that the antiadhesive effects of AICAR‐PC are mediated by KATP channel‐ and heme oxygenase‐dependent mechanisms during I/R.
MatrixDB, a database focused on extracellular protein–protein and protein–carbohydrate interactions
Authors: Chautard Emilie , Ballut Lionel , Thierry-Mieg Nicolas , Ricard-Blum Sylvie 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
Summary: MatrixDB (http://matrixdb.ibcp.fr) is a database reporting mammalian protein–protein and protein–carbohydrate interactions involving extracellular molecules. It takes into account the full interaction repertoire of the extracellular matrix involving full-length molecules, fragments and multimers. The current version of MatrixDB contains 1972 interactions corresponding to 4412 experiments and involving 259 extracellular biomolecules.
Availability: MatrixDB is freely available at http://matrixdb.ibcp.fr
Contact: nicolas.thierry-mieg@imag.fr; s.ricard-blum@ibcp.fr
Supplementary information: Supplementary data are available at Bioinformatics online.
ProMoT: modular modeling for systems biology
Authors: Mirschel Sebastian , Steinmetz Katrin , Rempel Michael , Ginkel Martin , Gilles Ernst Dieter 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
Summary: The modeling tool ProMoT facilitates the efficient and comprehensible setup and editing of modular models coupled with customizable visual representations. Since its last major publication in 2003, ProMoT has gained new functionality in particular support of logical models, efficient editing, visual exploration, model validation and support for SBML.
Availability: ProMoT is an open source project and freely available at http://www.mpi-magdeburg.mpg.de/projects/promot/.
Contact: mirschel@mpi-magdeburg.mpg.de; mirschel@mpi-magdeburg.mpg.de
Supplementary information: Supplementary data are available at Bioinformatics online.