bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
3 Two Fundamental Types of Specification
Authors: Pilsner Joseph 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
In order to understand the specification of human action, it is helpful to explore the specification of two other kinds of realities: natural corporeal beings and natural motions. For Aquinas, a natural corporeal being is any creature having matter as a constituent, such as a plant or animal; a being of this kind receives its species from its form. A natural motion is any naturally occurring change, such as growing, becoming healthier, or going from one place to another. Aquinas says that any such motion receives its species from both its ‘terminus to which’ and its active principle. These two types of specification are significant for this present study not only because they reveal important information about specification, but also because Aquinas will use them as starting points from which to explain the specification of human action.
4 End
Authors: Pilsner Joseph 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
Aquinas asserts that ends specify human actions, and explains this point by comparing human actions with other realities. For example, he maintains that an end is comparable to a form in a natural corporeal being (such as a plant or animal), for just as no material creature exists or has a species without a form, no human action can come to be or be of a particular kind unless a human agent wills some definite end. Even more important for Aquinas is a comparison with natural motions (such as changes in place, colour, or size). He thinks that as a subsensory motion is specified by its active principle (the nature from which the motion arises) and its ‘terminus to which’ (the motion’s final resting point), so a human action is specified by its active principle (the rational good or end which attracts the agent) and its ‘terminus to which’ (the action’s arrival at the agent’s intended goal).
Aristotle on the Transmutation of the Elements in De Generatione Et Corruptione I. 1–4
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This essay is concerned with the contrast that Aristotle draws between ‘generation’ and ‘alteration’ in GC I.1-4, and its implications for ‘prime matter’. Aristotle believes that when one element (e.g., air) becomes another (e.g., water), this is a case of generation as opposed to alteration, and he attempts to explain what generation is in a way that will allow for this. It is argued that his attempts are clearly a failure, and are due to a mistaken appreciation of the question which should be understood as: When is the alteration of some persisting matter at the same time the generation of a new substance? It is also argued that when the question is thus revised, the answer should be that when one of Aristotle’s elements is transformed into another, this should not count as the generation of a new substance.
Aristotle's Theory of Matter
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This essay opens with a summary of Aristotle’s general position on matter and change, which leads to the question: What is the criterion of identity that we apparently need to make sense of the idea that the same matter persists through some change? The essay then explores this question on its own account, with almost no further reference to Aristotle’s own views. It is argued that although some progress can be made with this question, a fully satisfying answer is not available on Aristotelian terms. It is then questioned whether this is at all a serious defect in his conception. Some final remarks briefly indicate how his conception of matter has fared over the centuries between him and us.
Aristotle on Teleology in Nature
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This essay begins by approving Aristotle’s general argument for teleology in Physics II.8. It then explores his use of teleological explanations in the biological works, distinguishing his practice when actually giving explanations from his theory of how these explanations work. It is argued that while the practical instances usually make good sense, the theoretical explanation which identifies telos with form is wholly misleading. This brings the discussion back to the very puzzling chapter 9 of Physics II, and thence to a consideration of the idea that absolutely everything in nature is for some purpose. There are places where Aristotle seems to endorse this, although a more sober view would also assign a role to what may be called ‘laws of matter’, independent of teleology. The essay ends with some general reflections on Aristotle’s view of explanation in the natural sciences.
A Note on Aristotle's Account of Place
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This brief note discusses a thesis due to Ben Morison: that Aristotle’s account of place can be rescued from the usual objections by accepting his claim that the universe as a whole is at rest, and taking the relevant ‘surrounding body’ always to be the universe as a whole. It is argued that this defence does not work because the relevant body that Aristotle believes to be at rest is the earth, which is not (usually) a ‘surrounding’ body, but which should have played a crucial role in his account of place.
The UN Security Council and Informal Groups of States
Authors: Prantl Jochen 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This book examines the dynamics between informal groups of states and the UN Security Council in the management of conflicts in Namibia, El Salvador, and Kosovo. It sets forth three main arguments. Firstly, that informal groups of states are agents of incremental change. They proliferated in the 1990s out of the increasing demands on the United Nations to adapt to the new security environment of the post-bipolar world, without formally changing the constitutional foundation of the Organization. Secondly, that informal mechanisms may narrow the operational and participatory gap growing out of the multiple incapacities that prevent the Security Council from formulating an effective response to crisis situations. Informal groups of states may enhance Council governance if they strike a balance between competing demands of inclusiveness, efficiency, informality, transparency, and accountability. Thirdly, that the post-Cold War era has fostered an environment where the substance of conflict resolution and the process of its legitimation have become increasingly detached. The former tends to be delegated to informal groups or coalition of states, while the Security Council provides the latter. The successful merger of right process and substantive outcome may strengthen the legitimacy of the Council and make actions taken by informal settings more acceptable.
Introduction
Authors: Prantl Jochen 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter introduces and defines the terms ‘informal groups of states’, ‘groups of friends’, and ‘contact groups’. It develops a synergistic analytical framework, identifying the causal mechanisms that contribute to the formation of informal groups of states by borrowing from insights of theories of agency and delegation. It challenges the proposition that centralization and independence are key functional characteristics of international organizations which enhance efficiency. Instead, it argues that decentralization via informal groups of states allows the achievement of policy goals that would be unattainable in a centralized setting. The typology of exit, voice, and loyalty is incorporated into analytical framework to explain the dynamics between informal groups and the Security Council. Such an approach provides substantial explanatory leverage to explain the institutional effects of the Security Council under conditions of systemic change. The chapter concludes with an outline of the book’s contents.
1 Janus‐faced Structure of the Security Council: Open System and Closed Shop
Authors: Prantl Jochen 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter analyzes the institutional setting of the United Nations. The underlying assumption is that the Security Council can best be described as a Janus-faced structure of both an open system and a closed shop. This notion reflects the Council’s sensitivity towards external change, while the restrictive provisions of the Charter constrain the possibilities of formal adaptation. The chapter examines: (1) the role of great powers in international organizations, (2) the role and function of the Security Council according to the Charter of the United Nations, and (3) the ‘constitutional practice’ of the Council, elaborating on certain variants of the collective security scheme as envisioned in the Charter.
6 El Salvador: Group of Friends of the UN Secretary‐General
Authors: Prantl Jochen 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
The UN Secretariat assumed the leading role as intermediary to reach a negotiated settlement of the conflict in El Salvador. The Friends of the Secretary-General on El Salvador somewhat revived the concept of the advisory committees that had been established in the 1950s. The transformation of the bipolar system created the permissive political context for a leading role of the United Nations, with the United States and the Soviet Union as guardians of the process in the background. Given the relative success of the Friends, the concept turned into a model which was subsequently applied — with mixed results — to crises in Haiti, Guatemala, Western Sahara, and Georgia.
Kosovo: Quint, G‐8, and Troika
Authors: Prantl Jochen 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter illustrates the extreme case of conducting crisis management outside the UN framework without explicit authorization of the Security Council. It argues that despite the marginalization of the Security Council in the management of the crisis, the institution continued to exert a pull on the players to seek post-hoc legitimization of the settlement. The prospect of re-involving the United Nations constituted an important precondition for the resolution of conflict. Ancillary to the first point, G-8 and Troika were instrumental in providing a platform for the re-involvement of the United Nations. Exiting the UN framework allowed the use of military force, which the Western Alliance considered necessary to achieve political outcomes. The retreat to informal settings such as Quint, G-8, and Troika allowed the merging of the military and political track of conflict management that had been disconnected.
Conclusions: Implications for Governance of the UN Security Council
Authors: Prantl Jochen 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter summarizes the causes of informal groups of states and their effects on Security Council governance. It argues that those informal settings are changing the role of the UN Security Council in the international system. The functions of diplomatic problem-solving and its collective legitimization have become separate from one another. This has implications for the understanding of power, legitimacy, and change in the theory of international relations.
I: The Meaning of the First Person Term
Authors: Gaynesford Maximilian de 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThe central claim of this book is that I is a deictic term, like the other singular personal pronouns You and He/She. This is true of the logical character, inferential role, referential function, expressive use, and communicative role of all and only expressions used to formulate first-personal reference in any language. The first part of the book shows why the standard account of I as a ‘pure indexical’ (‘purism’) should be rejected. Purism requires three mutually supportive doctrines which turn out to be myths: a) that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I (‘rule theory’); b) that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to (‘independence’); and c) that as a matter of the meaning of I, any use of the term is logically guaranteed against failure to refer (‘the guarantee’). The second part of the book shows why the radically new account of I should be endorsed as a deictic term. Substitution instances and the behaviour of I in inference reveal that it has an obligatorily deictic logical character and inferential role. I fulfils its referential function in the deictic way, providing determinacy of reference by making an individual referentially salient in the extra-sentential context. The discriminability of the referent of an I-use depends on recognizing the referentially salient individual. This is true of its discriminability both to the reference-maker and to the audience. So I has the expressive use and communicative role of a deictic term. The conclusion of the book directs research towards the next step, showing how the meaning of I may be used to elucidate the thoughts expressed by the term, and from there questions relating to self-knowledge, practical reasoning, belief-acquisition, and belief-ascription.
2 Questions of Reference
Authors: Gaynesford Maximilian de 
Published: June 2006

Abstract‘Rule theory’, or the claim that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I, is a myth. Theorists have not shown that it is even possible to say what this rule is, what it means, what it determines, or what functions as its context. No such rule could be sufficient to give the meaning of I because there are areas which it does not cover, there are areas in which it applies but is insufficient, there are occasions on which it should not be applied, and there are occasions on which it cannot be applied.
3 Questions of Expression
Authors: Gaynesford Maximilian de 
Published: June 2006

Abstract‘Independence’, or the claim that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to, is a myth. It depends on a two-step argument from explanation: that it would make no sense to ask certain questions, and that we must appeal to ‘independence’ to explain this phenomenon. But other explanations are available, such as a pragmatic account. Alternatives are preferable since ‘independence’ not only threatens the referential character of I, its use to express thoughts about particular objects, and its communicative role, but also undermines a plausible account of the links between I-use and empirical identity criteria.
11 Communicative Role
Authors: Gaynesford Maximilian de 
Published: June 2006

AbstractI fulfils its communicative role in the deictic mode. It is the communicative role of any singular term to communicate thoughts. This requires that the audience know the positive answer to the question: ‘which individual is being spoken of?’, that is, the term must achieve discriminability of reference for the audience. Deictic terms require salience if they are to achieve discriminability of reference for the audience, i.e., it is as the individual made salient that one must identify the referent of a use of a deictic term. It is as the individual made salient that one must identify the referent of a use of I.
3 Knowledge Ascriptions and Context‐Sensitivity
Authors: Stanley Jason 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter considers a range of context-dependent constructions, and concludes that there are sufficiently significant disanalogies between all of them and the behavior of epistemic predicates such as ‘know that the bank is open’ to cast doubt upon contextualism in epistemology. It is argued that even if knowledge ascriptions were context-sensitive, this fact about them would not have the explanatory value accorded to it by the contextualist.
Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Contextualism
Authors: Stanley Jason 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter is devoted to a thorough-going comparison of Interest-Relativism Invariantism and contextualism. It argues that the contextualist is committed to a worse error-theory than the advocate of Interest-Relativism Invariantism. It concludes by arguing that neither contextualism nor Interest-Relative Invariantism helps with the problem of skepticism.
Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination
Authors: Reath Andrews 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter explores two parallel topics in Kant's moral psychology: respect for the moral law as the motive to moral conduct, and the influence of inclinations on the will. It explains some of Kant's views about respect for the moral law and its role in moral motivation, and this leads to a consideration of the sensible motives that respect for the law limits, as well as the more general question of how Kant thinks that inclinations affect choice.
The Categorical Imperative and Kant's Conception of Practical Rationality
Authors: Reath Andrews 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter outlines an explanation of how Kant grounds morality in reason. It argues that all rational choice is guided by normative considerations (reasons with normative force for the agent). In moral choice, the reasons from which the agent acts are in fact sufficient to justify the action to anyone. Such a view underlies Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative, and offers the best understanding of the connection that he draws between moral principles and the nature of practical reason. The chapter offers a reconstruction of the derivation of the Formula of Universal Law in the first two sections of the Groundwork. Section II provides an overview of the argument of Groundwork, I, which explains how Kant thinks that the concept of morality implicit in ordinary thought leads to the Formula of Universal Law (FUL). Sections III through V explain, respectively, what leads Kant to undertake another derivation of the FUL in Groundwork, II — this time one that traces it to the nature of practical reason; his conception of practical reason; and how it is most fully expressed by the Categorical Imperative.
Legislating the Moral Law
Authors: Reath Andrews 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter spells out two distinct senses in which the rational will legislates moral requirements: one that holds for the Categorical Imperative, and a different sense that holds for particular categorical imperatives or moral requirements. The Formula of Universal Law is a law that Kant derives from the nature of rational volition or rational choice. In this sense, it is a law that the rational will legislates or gives to itself. Roughly, the will is a law to itself since the nature of rational volition leads to a principle that governs its own exercise, namely the Categorical Imperative. To understand the sense in which rational agents legislate particular moral requirements, it is important to bear in mind that Kant is led to this idea by considering how such requirements get their normative authority. Kant appears to claim that the agents who are subject to moral law must be the ‘legislators’ from whom these requirements receive their authority, because only then can we explain their unconditional authority as categorical imperatives. The view ascribed to Kant is that the reasons to comply with moral requirements are given simply by the reasoning that establishes them as requirements, from which it follows that moral agents are bound to moral requirements in such a way that they model the source of their authority.
Agency and the Imputation of Consequences in Kant's Ethics
Authors: Reath Andrews 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter analyzes the structure and underlying rationale of Kant's principles of imputation (Zurechnung), with particular concern for his principles governing the moral imputation of bad consequences. It shows how Kant's principles make the imputation of actions and consequences a question for practical reason, rather than a straightforward factual, causal, or metaphysical issue. For Kant, the imputation of actions and consequences is made within the context of, and depends upon, the application of first-order moral norms governing conduct (those setting out strict moral requirements). It suggests that Kant's principles of imputation are generally sound, though they need to be qualified in important ways.
Why did the Communist Party Reform in China, but not in the Soviet Union?
Authors: Swinnen Johan F. M. 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter explains why reforms were possible during the 1970s in China under the Communist regime, but not in the Soviet Union. It argues that the reasons are a combination of a change in leadership and grassroots pressure. Different choices were made in China than in the Soviet Union because the countries had different initial conditions in the countryside, particularly in terms of technology, incomes and wealth, and the structure of the economy; all affected the choices of the Communist leadership and the actions of citizens.
Whose Body is it Anyway?
Authors: Fabre Cécile 
Published: June 2006

AbstractIn the prevailing liberal ethos, if there is one thing that is beyond the reach of others, it is our body in particular, and our person in general. Our legal and political tradition is such that we have the right to deny others access to our person and body, even though doing so would harm those who need personal services or body parts from us. However, we lack the right to use ourselves as we wish in order to raise income, even though we do not necessarily harm others by doing so — even though we might in fact benefit them by doing so. This book aims to show that according to the principles of distributive justice which inform most liberal democracies — both in practice and in theory — it should be exactly the other way around. If it is true that we lack the right to withhold access to material resources from those who need them, we also lack the right to withhold access to our body from those who need it; but we do, under some circumstances, have the right to decide how to use it in order to raise income. The book argues in favour of the confiscation of body parts and personal services, as well as the commercialization of organs, sex, and reproductive capacities.
A Rights‐Based Theory of Justice
Authors: Fabre Cécile 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter sets out the theory of justice which underpins the book’s central claims. It argues that all human beings have a fundamental interest in living a minimally flourishing life of which autonomy and well-being are central components, which in turn, implies that they all have rights against the better-off to the material resources they need to lead such a life. However, the better off are under a duty to help if, and only if, they would not jeopardize their own prospects for a minimally flourishing life.
6 Self‐transformation, Self‐organization, and Evolutionary Adaptation in the Economic Process
Authors: Metcalfe J. Stan , Ramlogan Ronnie 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter focuses on the connection between economic adaptation and economic development and growth. It argues that economic adaptation is inseparable from the growth of knowledge, and that market based dynamics give adaptation a form that is central to change in modern capitalism. Reallocation of resources is the consequence of different beliefs; the imagination that the economic world can be organized differently. This is the primary reason why economies evolve and adapt, in that they are instituted variation, selection, and developmental processes.
Holism about Reasons
Authors: McKeever Sean , Ridge Michael 
Published: June 2006

AbstractParticularists often try to draw support for their view from the alleged context sensitivity of reasons, and more specifically holism. According to holism about reasons, a consideration that is a reason in one context may not be similarly a reason in another context because of differences in the presence or absence of defeating and enabling conditions. This chapter distinguishes several versions of the argument from holism, and shows that despite wide currency, no version establishes any significant particularist thesis.