Persona, cilvēks un subjektivitāte fenomenoloģiskā skatījumā
Authors:   Rīgas Stradiņa universitātes Humanitāro zinātņu katedra, Grīnfelde Māra , Vēgners Uldis ,   Rīgas Stradiņa universitātes Humanitāro zinātņu katedra
Published: March 2024

In their article “Person, Human Being and Subjectivity in Phenomenology”, Māra Grīnfelde and Uldis Vēgners look at three types of human attitudes of consciousness through the prism of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. First, the authors describe the concept of attitude itself. Attitudes express a person’s relationship to objects in the broadest sense, whether they be things, living beings, events, abstract ideas, or ultimately the person himself and their feelings, emotions and attitudes. Even when people say they are indifferent (they have no attitude), they do have an attitude, i.e., neutral attitude. In Husserl’s philosophy, however, attitude is not a particular approach to a particular object, but a comprehensive point of view of consciousness, perspective or stance towards objects in general. Husserl defines attitude in general terms as a habitually determined style of life of the will, with its predetermined will-directions and interests, with destinations, cultural achievements, the overall style of which is thus determined. The authors describe the three characteristic types of attitude in greater detail, according to Husserl’s phenomenology: personalistic, naturalistic and phenomenological. The personalistic attitude is the “the self as a person”, which Husserl also calls the naturalistic attitude. The word “natural” is not meant here as the one characterising or belonging to physical nature, but as opposed to that artificially created and maintained. Man does not have to do anything to adopt a personalistic attitude, because he finds himself in it from the beginning and in the very essence. The naturalistic attitude is “Me as a representative of the species” – man can experience themselves not only as an embodied person but also as a specific living nature, a specific specie that experiences itself and other living organisms as natural objects, so that man can be studied by the methods of natural science. Unlike the personalistic attitude, which is characterised by motivational relations, the naturalistic attitude operates in causal, i.e., causal, relations. Phenomenological attitude “the self as a transcendental subjectivity” – as is the case with the naturalistic attitude, the phenomenological or transcendental attitude is artificial; one does not tend to live it as a person in everyday life, but as the result of a special intellectual effort which, in order to persist in it, requires practising and habit-forming. The authors conclude that transcendental subjectivity is meaningful because it makes everything experienced mean something to us. Whereas the self in the personalistic and naturalistic attitudes can die and is therefore mortal, the transcendental self does not die because it is not a living being but rather a condition of experience of living beings. The transcendental self can only begin and end. / Māra Grīnfelde un Uldis Vēgners rakstā “Persona, cilvēks un subjektivitāte fenomenoloģiskā skatījumā” skata cilvēku caur Edmunda Huserla fenomenoloģijas prizmu. Saskaņā ar Huserla fenomenoloģiju autori detalizētāk apraksta trīs raksturīgākos attieksmes veidus: personālistisko, naturālistisko un fenomenoloģisko. M. Grīnfelde un U. Vēgners secina, ka transcendentālā subjektivitāte ir jēgpilna. Pateicoties tai, viss, ko mēs pieredzam, mums kaut ko nozīmē. Ja es personālistiskajā un naturālistiskajā attieksmē varu nomirt un tādēļ esmu mirstīgs, tad transcendentālais es nemirst, jo nav dzīva būtne, bet gan drīzāk dzīvo būtņu pieredzes nosacījums. Transcendentālais es var tikai sākties un beigties. Atslēgvārdi: Subjektivitāte; fenomenoloģiskais skatījums; Es kā persona; Es kā cilvēka sugas pārstāvis; Es kā transcendentālā subjektivitāte.