bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Aristotle on the Principles of Change in Physics I
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This essay is a commentary on Physics I, with special reference to the account of change in chapter 7. It is argued: (i) that Aristotle is mistaken when he attempts in the earlier chapters to present his account as the natural development of various Pre-Socratic views ‘on nature’; (ii) that as a result the main theme of his chapter 5 is a clear error; and (iii) that this raises an important question over how we should understand the apparent claims of chapter 6. All of this leads to the problem: How should we explain his remark at the end of chapter 7 that it is not yet clear whether the underlying thing, the thing that persists through change, is substance?
Aristotle's Theory of Form
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This essay is a résumé of all the ways in which Aristotle uses his notion of form in books, which one thinks of as ‘preceding’ the Metaphysics (in order of exposition, if not in order of composition). It is argued that this notion is invoked for far too many purposes; in fact for anything that cannot be explained merely by appeal to matter. As a result, it comes to be assigned many different roles which are not compatible with one another, although Aristotle never seems willing to abandon any of them. This multiplicity of roles is continued into the Metaphysics, where yet more roles are added. This is the reason why one cannot give any coherent account of the various papers that form books Z and H of the Metaphysics.
Aristotle on the Eleatics in Physics I. 2–3
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This essay argues that despite initial appearances, one can make good sense of Aristotle’s objections to Melissus (186a10-22), and one can find a comprehensible line of argument in the objections to Parmenides that follow (186a22-b12). However, the final section of chapter 3, i.e. 186b12-187a11, remains obscure. It evidently refers to an argument of Zeno’s, but it is unclear how the discussion is supposed to be relevant to that argument. A conjecture is offered, but without much confidence.
Aristotle, Zeno, and the Potential Infinite
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This essay argues that Aristotle misdescribes his own position when he sums it up as the claim that infinity can only be potential and never actual. He readily accepts that there are processes which are actually infinite, that is, never-ending. But he denies that there can ever be a time when an infinite process has been completed. This means that he has to find some fault with Zeno’s well-known argument of Achilles and the tortoise, which he does by introducing the idea that points do not exist until they are ‘actualized’. It is argued that this idea, though ingenious and certainly appropriate to the problem, does not work out in the end.
2 Emergence of Informal Groups of States
Authors: Prantl Jochen 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines the question of what triggered the emergence of informal groups of states in the form of the advisory committees in the 1950s, and argues that their establishment has to be seen against the background of great power tensions in the Security Council. The early stages of UN peacekeeping saw a shift of governance from the Security Council to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly, which fostered the emergence of informal ad hoc groupings of states. The formation of advisory committees reflected the desire of the Secretary-General to strengthen his voice vis-á-vis the Security Council. When the lack of unanimity of the permanent members prevented the Council from assuming its responsibilities, the General Assembly took charge by recommending collective measures. However, when the Security Council was able to act, its resolutions and mandates entrusted to the Secretary-General often reflected a political compromise based on the lowest common denominator among its members. The workings of the two advisory committees established in the context of crises at the Suez Canal (1956-67) and in the Congo (1960-4) illustrate these points further.
Proliferation of Informal Groups in the Post‐Bipolar Era
Authors: Prantl Jochen 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines the question of why informal groups of states proliferated in the post-Cold war era. It argues that the proliferation of groups of friends and contact groups must be analyzed in the context of the mounting pressure on the United Nations’ conflict resolution machinery to respond to more complex crises than ever before. Informal groups of states are agents of incremental change, without formally changing the constitutional foundation of the Organization. At the same time, the post-Cold War era has permitted a political context that furthers the trend towards devolution of the substance of crisis management to informal groups of states, whereas the Security Council provides — at least in most cases — the form, that is, the legitimization for state action. The functions of diplomacy and its collective legitimization have become decoupled.
1 Historical Background
Authors: Gaynesford Maximilian de 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThe historical development towards the current standard account of I as a ‘pure indexical’ (‘purism’) has two main features. First, the gradual acquisition of a logical apparatus which can distinguish genuine from non-singular referring expressions, and categorize the latter into names, descriptive terms, indexicals, and so on. Second, the development and acceptance of three supposed doctrines: that a simple rule is sufficient to give the meaning of I (‘rule theory’); that one can use I to express thoughts without having to identify what is being referred to (‘independence’); and that as a matter of the meaning of I, any use of the term is logically guaranteed against failure to refer (‘the guarantee’).
5 Interim Conclusion
Authors: Gaynesford Maximilian de 
Published: June 2006

Abstract‘Purism’, the claim that I is a pure indexical, is a contradictory position which requires the truth of three doctrines that have been shown to be myths: ‘rule theory’, ‘independence’, and ‘the guarantee’. A rash craving for simplicity explains its almost-universal support. ‘Purism’ is false for reasons that create a presumption in favour of a sharply diverging conception: that I is a deictic term. Thus, it is now necessary to establish what a ‘deictic term’ is, and whether I counts as one.
8 Referential Function (I)
Authors: Gaynesford Maximilian de 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThe referential function of any singular term is to provide a positive answer to the question: ‘which individual is being spoken of?’, that is, to achieve determinacy of reference. What enables a singular term to carry out this function is the ‘determinant’ of the term. Demonstration is not the determinant of deictic terms because they can fulfil their referential function by appeal to utterance-relative uniqueness, or by leading candidacy given the surrounding discourse or perceptual environment.
9 Referential Function (II)
Authors: Gaynesford Maximilian de 
Published: June 2006

AbstractI fulfils its referential function in the deictic mode. Deictic terms fulfil their referential role by the action of making an individual salient. That is the genus to which demonstration, utterance-relative uniqueness, and leading candidature belong as species. I fulfils its referential role by making an individual salient. Salience is the determinant of the term.
10 Expressive Use
Authors: Gaynesford Maximilian de 
Published: June 2006

AbstractI satisfies its expressive use in the deictic mode. It is the expressive use of any singular term to express thoughts. This requires that the speaker know the positive answer to the question: ‘which individual is being spoken of?’, that is, the term must achieve discriminability of reference for the speaker. Deictic terms require salience if they are to achieve discriminability of reference for the speaker, i.e., it is as the individual made salient that one must identify the referent of a use of a deictic term. It is as the individual made salient that one must identify the referent of a use of I.
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Authors: Stanley Jason 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
The thesis of this book is that whether or not someone knows a proposition at a given time is in part determined by his or her practical interests, i.e., by how much is at stake for that person at that time. Thus, whether a true belief is knowledge is not merely a matter of supporting beliefs or reliability; in the case of knowledge, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intertwined. This thesis, called Interest-Relative Invariantism about knowledge, is defended against alternative accounts of the phenomena that motivate it, such as the claim that knowledge attributions are linguistically context-sensitive and the claim that the truth of a knowledge claim is somehow relative to the person making the claim. The strategies available for resolving skepticism to the strategies available for resolving other philosophical paradoxes are compared. For example, contextualist solutions to the sorites paradox and the liar paradox, as well as interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox are considered. It is shown that the argument for the interest-relative character of epistemic notions is not the result of an application of a general strategy for resolving philosophical quandaries, but arises from the distinctive nature of epistemic properties.
2 Knowledge Ascriptions and Gradability
Authors: Stanley Jason 
Published: June 2006

AbstractMany expressions in natural language, such as adjectives like tall and flat, or verbs such as like and regret are gradable, meaning that they occur in comparative constructions. It makes sense to speak of something being taller than another thing, or regretting something more than something else. It is argued that ‘know’ is not a gradable expression. This raises serious worries for versions of contextualism that treat ‘know’ as denoting relations of varying strength, relative to different contexts of use.
Contextualism, Interest‐Relativism, and Philosophical Paradox
Authors: Stanley Jason 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter discusses contextualist and interest-relative accounts of the sorites paradox and the Liar Paradox. It concludes that a pure interest-relative account is completely untenable for such cases. Thus, Interest-Relative Invariantism is plausible in the epistemic case only because of specific features of epistemic notions.
Autonomy of the Will as the Foundation of Morality
Authors: Reath Andrews 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter distinguishes the various claims that make up the thesis that autonomy of the will is the foundation of morality, and offers a reconstruction of the arguments on which they depend. To do so it argues that autonomy should be interpreted as a kind of sovereignty. The model for the autonomous agent is the political sovereign not subject to any outside authority, who has the power to enact law. The chapter proceeds as follows. Section II distinguishes some of the claims that go into Kant's doctrine of autonomy. Since the Sovereignty Thesis follows analytically from the concept of an unconditional moral requirement, Section III takes up Kant's concept of a practical law, to provide supporting material for later arguments. Sections IV to VII are organized around showing that the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) and the Formula of Autonomy (FA) are equivalent in content. The equivalence of the FUL and FA is established by the two ideas just cited (the Sovereignty Thesis and the claim that the FUL is the constitutive principle of a will with autonomy). It serves as a capsule statement of Kant's thesis that autonomy of the will is the foundation of morality. Finally, Section VIII shows how the normative conception of autonomy developed in this chapter bears on the analytical arguments of Groundwork, III, where Kant identifies freedom with autonomy on the way to arguing that a free will is subject to moral principles.
Legislating for a Realm of Ends: The Social Dimension of Autonomy
Authors: Reath Andrews 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter uses the connection between Kant's conception of autonomy and his concept of a realm of ends to explore a number of issues about the nature of autonomy. It begins by developing some general observations about how freedom and autonomy may be related to governance by rules and standards. We tend to think that rules restrict free activity, but there are also rules that make meaningful and creative activities possible. Attention to the different functions that rules serve, specifically to their constitutive role, supplies another key element in dissolving the conflict between autonomy and governance by rules. The chapter then considers instances where the freedom to engage in certain activities and governance by rules are not in tension. It introduces rules with a special (non-restrictive) function, but there is no thought that these rules are self-imposed or self-chosen. This framework is applied to Kant's conception of the autonomy of the moral agent.
Agency and Universal Law
Authors: Reath Andrews 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter offers some reflections about how the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) has been understood by those who think that it can provide substantive guidance about choice and action. If the FUL were a purely formal criterion of universalizability, it would not reliably lead to any substantive moral judgments. These theorists have not, in general, understood the FUL as purely formal. Rather, they have incorporated a conception of rational agency into this formula, either explicitly or implicitly. The chapter is organized as follows. Section II briefly discusses some of John Rawls's remarks about what he has called Kant's ‘moral constructivism’ — specifically his claim that a conception of the person plays a central role in specifying the content of a constructivist moral conception. Section III asks how the FUL needs to be understood if it is to play its intended role in the extended argument of the Groundwork. Section IV shows why one is entitled to read a conception of rational agency into the FUL, and then considers some of the elements of this conception. In particular, it tries to make precise different senses in which rational agents with autonomy are independent spheres of judgment and choice and the sources of their own actions. Finally, Section V looks at various ways in which this conception of autonomous agency figures in determining whether a maxim can be willed as universal law without inconsistency.
Self-Legislation and Duties to Oneself
Authors: Reath Andrews 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter considers some of Kant's ‘foundational’ remarks about duties to oneself and some of the problems that they raise. It focuses on the problems that emerge from Kant's attempt to dispel an apparent conceptual difficulty that he thinks attends the concept of duties to oneself. Essentially, he takes a fairly straightforward concept and, rather than shedding light on it, puts it under a cloud. The chapter begins with a brief commentary on the introductory sections of Kant' s treatment of duties to oneself. It then focuses on the general model of duty that appears to be operative in these passages. It considers how we should understand this general model of duty if we are to accommodate duties to oneself, and with how duties to oneself fit into a general model of duty that can be supported on independent grounds. The chapter also examines the connection, if any, between duties to oneself and Kant's notion of self-legislation — his thesis that the agents who are subject to moral requirements must be regarded as their legislators. Finally, it asks how duties to oneself fit into the social conception of morality and practical reason that can be attributed to Kant, and some variant of which is widely accepted among contemporary theorists who draw inspiration from Kant (constructivists, contractualists, and so on).
From Marx and Mao to the Market
Authors: Swinnen Johan F.M. , Rozelle Scott 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThe changes which led to the emergence of China as a global economic powerhouse, the integration of ten Central and Eastern European countries into the European Union (EU) and the uncertain path of Russia towards a market economy all started with the agricultural reforms in the Chinese countryside in the late 1970s. Since then, the changes have occurred so fast and the impact has been so vast that the importance of understanding the forces that unleashed this process, how these changes became possible, and the lessons for other developing countries cannot be overestimated. This book analyzes the economics and politics of agricultural reforms by comparing reform processes, their causes and effects across this vast region. The authors draw on a wide range of studies and new data, which compare reforms and economic impacts in more than 25 countries. They present a series of conclusions and implications on the role of economic reforms in growth, and the importance of initial conditions and political constraints in explaining the choices that were made and their effects.
Innovative Opportunities and Dependencies: Illustrations from Mobile Communications
Authors: Holmén Magnus , Magnusson Mats , McKelvey Maureen 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter examines the role played by innovative opportunities in driving economic transformation through dependencies between actors. It explores the extent of experimentation and inertia when actors identify, act upon, and realize innovative opportunities. Innovative opportunities are used to capture dependencies between key processes in innovation, as well as understand the systemic effects present in complex innovation activities characterized by uncertainty. The dependencies are illustrated by case studies of the early stages of development of technology and business platforms in the telecom industry. Empirical observations demonstrate dependencies between different actors which result in ‘systemic’ effects. These take the form of dependencies across different types of opportunities (technological, entrepreneurial, and productive ones), as well as dependencies across different elements of these processes (value perception, resource mobilization, and value appropriation). Such interdependencies are the force helping to drive flexibility and stability in economic transformations.
The Great Experiment: Public–Private Partnerships and Innovation in Design, Production, and Operation of Capital Goods in the UK
Authors: Davies Andrew , Salter Ammon 
Published: June 2006

AbstractPublic-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are becoming the key mechanism for the design, production, and operation of capital goods in the UK public sector and elsewhere. This chapter focuses on the central motivations behind the movement towards PPPs, and explores the impact of these new contractual arrangements on innovation in the capital goods sector. The greatest impact of the new arrangements appears to be the emergence of a PPP industry and a new division of labour among private providers and public procurers of capital goods. In addition to its traditional role as designer and builder of systems, the private sector has taken on greater downstream responsibility for the operation and maintenance of systems previously handled in-house by public sector organizations.
The Effects of Technological Change on the Boundaries of Existing Firms
Authors: Robertson Paul L. , Verona Gianmario 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter explores the reciprocal relationship between technological innovation and the boundaries of the firm, and the paths in which firm boundaries might be expected to follow under different circumstances. It argues that while one might follow Langlois (2003) in believing that there will be a tendency for large, vertically-integrated firms to become less common in the technological environment that is currently unfolding, other tendencies will also be afoot, leading to a spectrum of different types of inter- and intra-firm relationships. This includes the creation of new giant enterprises whose evolution in the early 20th century was described by Chandler (1962, 1977) as the imposition of a ‘visible hand’ to reduce uncertainties in market-based relationships.
Transitions, Transformations, and Reproduction: Dynamics in Socio‐Technical Systems
Authors: Geels Frank W. , Kemp René 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter explores innovating and technological transformation in terms of competing socio-technical systems which evolve over long time periods. It examines changes in functional systems both from a theoretical and empirical perspective. It offers a typology of system changes and two brief case studies based on multilevel analysis: the hygienic transition from cesspools to integrated sewer systems (1870-1930) and the transformation in waste management (1960-2000) in the Netherlands. Three types of processes through which systems may change are described: reproduction, transformation, and transition. In the case of reproduction, there is no fundamental change at the meso level (the orientation of dominant actors, regime rules, and key technology or knowledge base), which is the case when stabilizing factors dominate. In the case of transitions and transformations in sociotechnical systems, there are meso-level changes created either by problems or new opportunities afforded by changes in technology and changes in the overall landscape. Transitions and transformations can only occur when developments at multiple levels amplify each other. This is worked out in a scheme of dynamic interactions between actors, systems rules, and social networks. The novelty of the scheme is that a regime perspective is combined with an actor perspective.
Principled Ethics
Authors: McKeever Sean , Ridge Michael 
Published: June 2006

AbstractMoral philosophy has long treated principles as indispensable for understanding its subject matter. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. This book meets this particularist challenge head on and defends a distinctive view called ‘generalism as a regulative ideal’. After cataloguing the wide array of views that have gone under the heading ‘particularism’, the reasons why the main particularist arguments fail to establish their conclusions are explained. Generalism as a regulative ideal incorporates what is most insightful in particularism (e.g., the possibility that reasons are context sensitive - ‘holism about reasons’) while rejecting every major particularist doctrine. The book resists the excesses of hyper-generalist views according to which moral thought is constituted by allegiance to a particular principle or set of principles. It argues that in so far as moral knowledge and wisdom are possible, all of morality can and should be codified in a manageable set of principles, even if we are not yet in possession of those principles. Such principles are not objects of mere curiosity, but play an important role in guiding the virtuous agent.