bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
National Communism in Eastern Europe since the 22nd Congress
Authors: Skilling H. Gordon 
Published: June 2006

It is more than two years since the historic 22nd Congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. In contrast to the dramatic repercussions in Eastern Europe of the 20th Congress five years earlier, the impact of the 1961 meeting was at first much less striking. The renewed assault on Stalin, this time open and unrestrained, did not generate a comparable intellectual ferment or unleash political forces capable of producing a crisis of the dimensions of 1956. No doubt Khrushchev and the other Eastern European leaders were anxious to avoid the disastrous consequences of that year, when the stability, and indeed the very existence, of communism hung in the balance, at least in Hungary and Poland. This time, certainly, their efforts carefully to control the direction and tempo of change were more successful, and the modest thaw did not produce a flood. None the less, there were serious consequences, often slow in manifesting themselves and differing substantially in each country, but having a long-run potential for modifying profoundly the shape and content of communism in Eastern Europe.An entirely unforeseen result of 1956 had been the emergence of China as an influential force in world communism, challenging the hitherto predominant position of the Soviet Union. Her extraordinary intervention in the affairs of Eastern Europe during and after the Hungarian revolt had greatly contributed to the stabilizing of the situation, but had marked the emergence of a balance of power within the communist system and the beginning of a serious conflict of policy and doctrine between the two great communist states. Although the full effect of this Chinese challenge was at first somewhat obscured from view, it became increasingly clear that it would have an even more profound impact than earlier defiance by smaller states such as Yugoslavia, Poland, and Hungary. At the 22nd Congress, only the tip of the iceberg of Sino-Soviet differences protruded in the form of the Chinese protest at Khrushchev's public denunciation of Albania. The full measure of the divergence was revealed in the subsequent two years, reaching a climax in the confrontation of mid-1963.
Freedom
Authors: Dryer D. P. 
Published: June 2006

A policy or institution is often objected to on the ground that it interferes with freedom. Yet even where a policy is shown to have certain effects, it is frequently far from clear whether these effects constitute a diminution of freedom. To clear up the matter, many thinkers have tried to elucidate “the meaning of freedom.” Most who have made such an attempt have missed the mark through including within “the meaning of freedom” other things which they regard as desirable besides freedom itself. It is notorious that many who attempt to say what art is tell us only what they regard as good art. Many who try to define “law” fail to give an account applicable to bad laws as well as good laws. Recently a few attempts have been made to avoid this sort of pitfall in elucidating what is meant by the familiar word “freedom.” The latest and most ambitious attempt at this is made by F. E. Oppenheim in his book Dimensions of Freedom.If a man has freedom, he is free. Yet if someone is not free on a certain evening, we should not say on that account that he is lacking freedom. “Freedom” is not simply the substantive corresponding to the adjective “free,” as “redness” corresponds to “red.” We speak of a room as being free of dust, of a lawn as free of weeds, of milk as free of impurities. The adjective “free” is applicable in many contexts in which the substantive “freedom” is not. Freedom is literally asserted only of human beings, whether singly or in groups. When applied elsewhere, as in speaking of a tiger recovering its freedom or “freedom of the will,” it is used only metaphorically, on analogy to its literal use. Yet “freedom” is clearly also not the substantive that corresponds to the adjective “free” whenever this adjective is applied to human beings.
The Limits of Behavioural Explanation in Politics
Authors: Kim K. W. 
Published: June 2006

The unique contribution of American scholarship to the study of politics is undoubtedly the development of behaviouralism. As “a successful protest” against the limits of traditional political science, the behavioural approach has certainly broadened our perspective by calling attention to hitherto neglected areas of political research. It has also made us methodologically more sophisticated by its insistence on rigorous empiricism and on theory-building as a major task. And yet it is difficult to be convinced that “all segments of political science can be treated behaviorally,” as one student has recently claimed. Behaviouralism is certainly an effective way of studying politics. But it is quite a different thing to say that there exists no aspect of politics which cannot be treated behaviourally. It is the aim of this paper to enquire whether there may not exist segments of politics which by their very nature resist the behavioural treatment.Let us first define what is to be understood by behaviouralism. In view of its inherent “ambiguity,” it may be best to start by listing three major assertions which I think set apart behavioural explanations from other kinds of statements in political studies. These assertions are: (1) individuals rather than groups constitute proper units for analyses; (2) facts must be separated from values; and (3) legitimate explanations always run in terms of laws or generalizations, but never in terms of descriptive statements of particular occurrences.
Some Technological Relationships in the Wealth of Nations and Ricardo's Principles
Authors: Hollander Samuel 
Published: June 2006

Considerable difficulty is presented for students of classical economics by the ambiguous use of the term “capital.” In particular there is much room for debate concerning the importance of technological capital as distinct from wage-goods capital in classical economic literature. This problem exists in the Wealth of Nations as well as in the work of Adam Smith's successors.Malthus was quick to point out that serious error may result from Smith's analysis of wages wherein “every increase in the stock or revenue of the society” is regarded as “an increase in the funds for the maintenance of labour.” More recent writers recognize the references to “fixed capital” but imply that mere Up service was paid to such items; the emphasis was predominantly upon wage goods. In particular, it has been argued, Smith emphasized “the superior physical productivity of time-using processes” and the requirement that subsistence goods be available to permit the adoption of such techniques. “These accumulations are the simplest form of capital; machinery, tools, stocks of all sorts and human skill and knowledge are simply more complicated forms.Perhaps the strongest criticism is by Marx. Marx did not deny that “constant” capital makes an appearance in the Wealth of Nations, but, he argued, it does so only at the micro-economic level of analysis: “Adam Smith, by a fundamentally perverted analysis, arrives at the absurd conclusion, that even though each individual capital is divided into a constant and a variable part, the capital of society resolves itself only into variable capital, i.e., is laid out exclusively in payment of wages.”
Some Remarks on an Econometric Model of a Provincial Economy
Authors: Matuszewski T. I. 
Published: June 2006

It appears to be generally agreed that there ought to be a close integration of economic theory and the building of econometric models, together with the auxiliary activities of data collection and processing. If this is to be so, then every econometric model must be a special purpose model or at best a model designed for a limited range of related uses. A model is, by definition, an image of reality that is simplified according to certain criteria of what is important and what is not. Its construction necessarily reflects the main preoccupations of its builders, the relations and measures they think relevant to the problems they face, and even their particular versions of economic theory. This leaves the door wide open for differences in emphasis, in priorities, and even in fundamental interpretations of economic phenomena. In short, a model appropriate for, say, Quebec, will necessarily differ considerably from models constructed for the federal government or its agencies and from models set up by large corporations for their own use. And it is not just a matter of fitting different parameters into the same logical structure; the logical structures themselves will differ.Secondly, if true integration of model building with economic theory is to be attained, and if a solid observational basis is to be secured, we must work very close to the micro-economic level. This means that models must be disaggregated, since our most solid theoretical results are in micro-economics.
Inventory Behaviour and the Stock-Order Distinction: An Analysis by Industry and Stage of Fabrication with Empirical Application to the Canadian Manufacturing Sector
Authors: Courchene Thomas J. 
Published: June 2006

“It appears that aggregation may be pushed much further in inventory analysis than has heretofore been generally felt justified.” Originating with P. G. Darling and confirmed by M. C. Lovell, this oft-quoted assertion has in large measure been responsible for what might be termed a “consensus” (albeit implicit) on the usefulness of aggregation in empirical inventory studies. Professors Eisner and Strotz carry this interpretation to its extreme by declaring that they “prefer, at the theoretical level, to disaggregate by motive rather than stage [of fabrication].”The purpose of this study is to take a closer look at the role of the inventory components (i.e., finished goods, goods in process, and raw materials) in aggregate inventory behaviour. Paramount among the issues addressed is the Eisner-Strotz assertion: is it meaningful to speak (on a theoretical or empirical level) of motives for holding inventories without reference to the stages of fabrication?
The Income Distribution of Canadian Urban Family Saving, 1959
Authors: Asimakopulos A. 
Published: June 2006

This paper attempts to fill a gap in Canadian economic statistics. Saving by households is the largest component of net domestic saving in Canada, but lack of data has prevented any detailed examination of the saving behaviour of this sector. The periodical surveys of liquid assets provide information on the income distribution of household savings and some of the forms in which they are held, but no such distribution has been derived for household saving. A first step is made here in the analysis of Canadian household saving behaviour with the construction of income distributions of saving based on data collected by the Urban Family Expenditure Survey for 1959. The survey is not an ideal instrument for this purpose; it was designed primarily to derive detailed information on consumer expenditures, and it is not always possible to separate out, without using approximate methods, data required for saving estimates. In addition, the total sample is relatively small with only a limited number of respondents in the upper income and entrepreneurial categories which contribute substantially to total saving. However, there is no other Canadian source available for this type of study. The results obtained are of interest in themselves and their derivation can point up changes in survey methods and tabulations which would make future survey data more useful for the estimation of household saving.The 1959 survey was restricted to urban centres with a population of 15,000 or over, but there were no restrictions with respect to family size or income. A probability sample of slightly more than 3000 households was selected for the survey from the eighty-one urban areas which qualified. The sampling rate was 1/1500 in Montreal and Toronto, 1/800 in Vancouver, 1/300 in Newfoundland, and 1/600 in all other areas chosen. To obtain national averages the returns for each region were weighted to allow for differences in sampling and response rates. Response rates varied from 45 per cent in Toronto to 78 per cent in the Prairies, with an over-all average of approximately 62 per cent. No adjustment was made for differences in the response of the various family types. It was noted that “the proportion in the weighted sample of one-person units to families of two or more was below that indicated by available check data.” This lack of adjustment, if differences are significant, would bias the survey results and thus our saving estimates, if the responses varied with family type. Tables IV to VI, given below, indicate that substantial differences exist in the saving patterns of the three family sizes for which estimates were obtained.
Economic Growth and International Trade in a Simple Dynamic Leontief Model
Authors: Minabe Nobuo 
Published: June 2006

Traditional Keynesian trade multipliers ignore intermediate goods. Professors Harrod and Johnson have considered them in a limited sense; both used a one-sector model. The objects of this paper are: to consider the effect of intermediate goods on the trade multiplier by use of a matrix trade multiplier; to consider their effect on the rate of growth of both exports and outputs of commodities; and to discuss the stability conditions of a balanced growth rate in a simple dynamic Leontief model.Harrod took intermediate goods into account only as a deduction from exports or investments when he considered the multiplier process. Johnson considered them more explicitly. In his model, an economy uses a primary factor of production, say labour, and foreign-made intermediate goods to produce consumption goods. However, the economy does not use home-produced intermediate goods, and all home-produced goods are consumption goods (so that the economy exports only consumption goods). In a more realistic model, the autonomous increment of demand for investments or exports would create two kinds of multiplier processes: one through the increment of demand for home-produced consumption goods, the other through the demand for home-produced intermediate goods. Each industry uses a primary factor of production and both home-made and foreign-made intermediate goods. Consumers demand both domestic and foreign consumption goods.
The Ricardian Theory of Production and Distribution
Authors: Knight Frank H. 
Published: June 2006

On the assumption that the primary interest in the “ancients” in such a field as economics is to learn from their mistakes, the principal theme of this discussion will be the contrast between the “classical” system and “correct” views. The system is taken in the sense indicated by the title, with little regard to other writers than Ricardo's own great master and the two successors most competent and closest to his own spirit, Senior and Mill. While our special interest is distribution theory, it is useful to have in the background clear views of essential doctrines or points of view in the authors' theory of value or price; for these are often closely connected with fallacies in the other field. It will be appropriate to give by way of introduction a kind of formal list of main deficiencies and sources of error in the system as a whole. At least seven such “aberrations” appear to have vital importance.The first to be noticed is the unfortunate conception of value, in negative terms—cost, interpreted as “pain”—instead of positive terms—desire or utility. This fallacy occurs explicitly in the parts of the argument which have come to be referred to in the literature as the “philosophical” account of value. Specific discussion of the determination of value (price) as a quantity (the “empirical account”) runs, indeed, largely in other, more “correct” terms, of the equalization of return from productive expenditure in different fields through correct allocation.
The Gerrymander of 1882
Authors: Dawson R. MacGregor 
Published: June 2006

John A., the Sachem, speaks:……….“It must be grantedThat our friends are badly scattered,And the chances are against usIn Ontario at presentAs the country is divided.Therefore let us re-distributeWhat constituencies are doubtfulSo as to enhance our prospects;Hive the Grits where they alreadyAre too strong to be defeated;Strengthen up our weaker quartersWith detachments from these strongholds;Surely this is true to natureIn a mighty Tory chieftain!”Environment and heredity affect the development of the nation as much as they affect the development of the individual; and Canadian history is written, for the most part, around the conflicting forces of British inheritance and American propinquity. An excellent example of the latter is found in the low condition of Canadian political morality which was most conspicuous during the first fifty years of responsible government. While this was unmistakably national in many of its manifestations, its rise and continuance were due in no small measure to the proximity of the United States; and the temptation for the Canadian politician to emulate in a modest way the methods of a Tweed, a Croker, or a Philadelphia Gas Ring, proved in a deplorable number of instances to be irresistible. The prevalence of bribery at elections (particularly before the introduction of the ballot in 1874), the strengthening of the party position by the award of contracts and the appointment of supporters to office, the series of questionable “deals” and practices of which the Pacific Scandal was the most notorious—these were evidences of native sins which had received American inspiration and encouragement and which corrupted extensively Canadian political life.
The Goal of Indian Assimilation
Authors: Beatty Willard W. 
Published: June 2006

Indian and white relations in the United States have continuously been influenced by the profound conviction of the white man that he is of a superior creation. It is not an attitude reserved for the American Indian—it extends to the members of every non-white race; nor is the attitude peculiar to citizens of the United States—it is shared by our British cousins, and is basic in Latin American relations. In spite of all our democratic protestations, this colour response vitally affects every aspect of the lives of all the members of many of our minority groups.While many of the missionary minded from early colonial days onward have striven to “educate,” “civilize,” and “Christianize” the Indians, the great mass of the white population continued for many years to look upon the Indians as members of a sub-human group. To be honest with ourselves, many of our citizens still hold to this point of view.In the light of this fact, it is surprising that the government of the United States has maintained as unblemished a record of respect for Indian land titles as is the case. Throughout our relations with the tribes, even though our citizens have invaded Indian territory, sold Indians liquor, incited Indians to revolt, and then put down that revolt with bloody fury, we have preserved the legal position that the Indians held title to the land of the United States when the white man landed; and we have scrupulously treated with each group as we pushed them westward, to extinguish the Indian title by treaty and compensate the tribes in some fashion. In those early days, very little was said about assimilation. We continuously promised Indians that after we had pushed them far enough west to get them out of the way, we would let them settle down and live their lives as independent nations. It is still technically correct to refer to the Six Nations in New York State; or to the Cherokee, Choctaw, or Chickasaw Nations in Oklahoma. Until Oklahoma was admitted to statehood, the United States dealt with these Indians as members of independent nations.
The Reparations Problem Again
Authors: Gottlieb Manuel 
Published: June 2006

The mishandled problem of reparations and inter-Allied war debts looms large in customary analyses of the wreckage of the European peace settlement after World War I. The seminal source of trouble then was the insatiable appetite of the Versailles victors for “spoils,” joined by the Shylock American insistence on repayment of war debts.After World War II the war debt problem was gently erased, but reparations proved even more troublesome. Although those powers which a generation before had moulded the Versailles Treaty were, under American leadership, comparatively tame in their reparations demands, the Soviets were not. This is readily understandable, since the German armies spent their destructive fury on Eastern and not on Western lands. The Soviet loss of life and resources in repelling German armies from the heart of Russia was truly colossal. The war wiped out hard-won advances (factories, inventories, power plants, residences, tractors) achieved since 1917 under lash and by dint of incredible austerity.1 The Soviet economy was planned and, with its insistent commodity needs, could absorb immense quantities of manufactured goods. Despite bomb-smashed German city centres and residences, German manpower remained, as well as powerful industrial facilities which operated up to the closing months of the war. Any trained observer would expect the Soviets to demand maximum one-time drainage and continuing arrangements whereby some German industrial facilities would be worked by some German labour to produce goods and services for Eastern benefit. This was precisely the policy later carried out within the Soviet Zone of Germany which, if it was not “milked dry,” was converted into a massive pumping station for current product reparations.2 A less self-regarding Soviet policy toward the leading “ex-enemy” country would have been astonishing in view of the substantive drainage from “liberated” satellite areas.
The Dollar Shortage in Theory and Fact
Authors: Ellis Howard S. 
Published: June 2006

The “shortage of dollars” seems unfortunately to mean all things to all men; hence we must try first to come to a precise definition of the problem. I have myself, in my personal affairs, experienced both a dollar crisis and a chronic shortage of dollars; and I suppose that most mortal creatures have the same difficulties, expressible equally well in terms of their own or of other countries' currencies. But in this sense, which is really nonsense, the “shortage” means only that we have not attained to an “economy of abundance.” Official pronouncements on the problem do not always escape this nonsense.A much more sophisticated interpretation of the dollar shortage, but one which I am sure must finally be rejected, is “an excess of dollars used over dollars supplied, the difference being made up by borrowing on short-term account from the United States and shipping gold to the United States.” The peculiar character of this definition of Professor Seymour Harris is dramatically shown by the dollar shortage of the thirties, which was marked—and indeed by common knowledge to a large extent caused—by thewithdrawalof American short-term capital from Europe, and the flight of capital, mostly short-term,fromEuropetothe United States. Quite possibly Professor Harris might wish to extend his definition from an outflow of short-term capital from the United States to an inflow also, to be able to cover the European capital flight case. This solution would then apparently associate the idea of a dollar shortage with anundesirableshort-term capital movement in either direction, but it would fail to specify in whatrespectthe movementisundesirable. Furthermore, one would be forced to relinquish the idea of a dollar shortage in all cases in which no capital exports or imports take place.