bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Lewanika's Achievement
Authors: Bull Mutumba M. 
Published: January 2009

This article attempts to assess within a broad traditional context the efforts of Lubosi Lewanika, ruler of Bulozi from 1878 to 1884, and again from 1885 to 1916, to find solutions to the problems facing the Lozi state during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.So far scholars of Lozi history have been primarily preoccupied with assessing Lewanika's career within the context of European penetration. Whereas it is true that the extension of British Protection to Bulozi and North-Western Rhodesia came finally to be based on the treaties with Lewanika, for the Lozi state and Lewanika himself this was a solution to only one of a number of problems. And indeed to some sections of Lozi society, Lewanika's accommodation of the forces of the ‘scramble’ was not his greatest achievement.So far scholars of Lozi history have been primarily preoccupied with assessing Lewanika's career within the context of European penetration. Whereas it is true that the extension of British Protection to Bulozi and North-Western Rhodesia came finally to be based on the treaties with Lewanika, for the Lozi state and Lewanika himself this was a solution to only one of a number of problems. And indeed to some sections of Lozi society, Lewanika's accommodation of the forces of the ‘scramble’ was not his greatest achievement.The Lozi central kingship had collapsed in the middle of the nineteenth century as a result of internal political instability, a serious succession crisis, and a military defeat by the Makololo. Before the establishment of any effective colonial control, however, Lewanika had succeeded in establishing a great degree of personal control, exalted Lozi kingship above the level of ordinary people, and extended Lozi influence to its widest limits.
Frobenius in West African History
Authors: Ita J. M. 
Published: January 2009

The article as a whole argues that the observations of Leo Frobenius in West Africa between 1907 and 1912, though they are commonly ignored by Anglo-American archaeologists and anthropologists, contain material which is of value to the historian of early twentieth-century West Africa. The author examines Frobenius's methods and observations in the light of his own statements (some of them in works which have not been translated into English or French) and suggests various outside sources which could be used to check the reliability of Frobenius's accounts.The attitude of Anglo-American anthropologists is explained in terms of developments in anthropological theory since the First World War.The article examines the defects of Frobenius's anthropological method, as exemplified by his work among the Kabré of North Togo shortly after their ‘pacification’ by the Germans; and suggests that the observations themselves may be more reliable than Frobenius's method would lead one to expect.The article then considers Frobenius's archaeological method as exemplified by his work in Ife, argues that he was somewhat unscrupulous in forcing the sale of artefacts, and also, that by failing to keep adequate site records or even to supervise the digging himself, he destroyed a considerable amount of archaeological evidence at Ife. Historians should, however, study his work in Ife to note where such destruction has taken place, and what kind of evidence has been destroyed.The article suggests outside sources, both oral and written, which might enable historians to check the veracity of Frobenius's account of his own method, and also the reliability of the observations themselves. Finally, it is suggested that an assessment of the reliability of his observations in Togo and Nigeria might be generally indicative of the reliability of his observation throughout West Africa in the period 1907–12.
Forced Labour in British West Africa: The Case of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast 1906–1927
Authors: Thomas Roger G. 
Published: January 2009

It has been argued that forced labour in British West Africa did not extend to recruitment for commercial companies. One case that appears to have been overlooked is that of the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast where, at various times between 1906 and 1924, recruitment for the privately-owned gold mines of the Tarkwa-Prestea area was associated with government recruitment for public works—itself on the shadowy borderline between ‘communal’ and ‘forced’ labour.Organized recruitment for the mines was adjudged necessary because of the reluctance of local labour to work underground. The independent attitudes of even recruited labour led the mines to associate their requests for organized recruitment with pressure for much tighter labour discipline, including bringing suits for breach of contract under criminal law and the introduction of a pass law and compound system. However, these schemes were rejected by the government.The period of greatest government assistance to mine recruitment, 1920–4, ended when the high death rate among labourers at the mines was revealed and the government suspended recruitment. It is the contention of this paper that the high death rate was due not only to poor health conditions at the mines, but also to forced recruitment in a situation where there was considerable voluntary labour migration. Under these circumstances the chiefs were obliged to supply the weaker members of the community.
The African Crowd in Nairobi: Popular Movements and Élite Politics
Authors: Furedi Frank 
Published: January 2009

The absence of popular participation in the political process of post-independent Kenya should be seen as the outcome of a political tension, which has its roots in the colonial period. The growth of Nairobi, a colonial urban centrepar excellence, provided unequal opportunities for its African population. The majority of the Nairobi Africans came to constitute the African crowd—domestic servants, the majority of workers in private and public employment, and petty traders. This group should be distinguished from the Nairobi African middle class which formed the ‘political élite’. The African middleclass possesseda fairly high level of education and had remunerative positions with government or were wealthy traders. By the mid-'forties, this group had become well integrated within the colonial system.The different, and often contradictory, interests of these two groups of people was strikingly manifested on the level of political action. The ‘popular movements’ of the African crowd were direct and often extra-constitutional. Their organizations, e.g. the 40 Group, were characteristically militant, and were often based on mass support. The ‘élite politics’ of the African middle class were strictly constitutional and moderate. Their goal—to consolidate their position within the colonial system—had obviously only limited appeal. The conflict between these two social groups was resolved by the elimination of the African crowd as a political force.
Territorial Cults in the history of Central Africa
Authors: Ranger Terence 
Published: January 2009

Recent research on the territorial cults of Central Africa allows us to arrive at some tentative general patterns. The historical development of territorial cults has been worked out most fully for Malawi. Here it seems to be agreed that there was an essentially similar early cultic pattern among the proto-Chewa, the proto-Mang'anja and the proto-Tumbuka. Cults dedicated to the High God and tended by spirit wives were widely diffused. Much of the religious history of Malawi can be seen in terms of the differing relationships of these cults with incoming political authorities, producing a richly various situation.It is not clear whether this sort of analysis can be applied to the wealth of material available on Shona territorial cults, even though the initial comparisons are suggestive. It is plain, however, that the most interesting recent work on these territorial cults suggests other dynamics of change. Shona cult history is not merely a matter of inter-relationships between cults and kings, but also very much a matter of the working out of built-in conflicts within cultic systems themselves. The much more dynamic view which it is now necessary to hold of the operations of Shona religion makes a great deal more sense of nineteenth and twentieth-century data than the previous centralized and hierarchical analysis.
Dauma et Danhome
Authors: Person Yves 
Published: January 2009

Sil'on admet cette identification, la fréquence et la persistance du nom Dauma/Doma, depuis le XVe siècle (Maqrizi), jusqu'au XVIIe (Dapper), marque donc nettement l'importance du Doma dans le système politique Jukun/Kwararafa. En dépit de son èloignement à la fois de la côte et de l'axe soudanais, ce grand pouvoir africain, dont nous soupçonnons encore à peine le rôle, a été connu, au moins vaguement, par le monde extérieur….On doit par contre écarter définitivement toute identification avec le Dahomey historique, qui n'a pu se constituer en Etat qu'au XVIIe siècle, comme ses traditions l'indiquent. En revanche l'ensemble ethnique aja apparait dans la documentation écrite dès 1539, pour le royaume d'Arida, puis en 1561 avec le nom de Povpovs, sur la carte de Bartholomeu Velho (pl. 203) et en 1570, avec la Costa Darida sur l'Atlas de Fernão Vaz Dourado (pl. 206). C'est en confrontant ces textes avec les traditions qu'on pourra éclairer les origines des peuples du Golfe du Benin.
Trade, Islam, and the Mahdia in Northwestern Wallaggā Ethiopia
Authors: Triulzi Alessandro 
Published: January 2009

The district of Belā Shangul, in the northwestern corner of the present Governorate-General of Wallaggā, Ethiopia, has played a crucial role in the introduction of Islam in western Ethiopia. The present paper attempts to show how the commercial potential of Belā Shangul was the reason for the peaceful penetration of Islam in the region in the nineteenth century, thus creating the basis for the ready acceptance of the Mahdia by the Islamized ruling families of the region later. It is due to the considerable inroads that Islam had made in the region that the first Mahdist envoys were welcomed there, and that they could operate freely from 1882 onwards.The paper further discusses the importance of Mahdist presence in the region, its impact on local society, and its attempts to penetrate the Oromo countries south and east of Belā Shangul. It argues that Mahdist rule over the region was effective until about 1890, and that the favourable attitude shown towards the Mahdia by the region's ruling families became more hostile mainly because of the harsh rule established in Belā Shangul by the Mahdist commander, Khalīl al-Khuzāni, and of the new militant Islam he introduced in the region. Khalīl's campaign of 1886 and Mahdist raids in 1888–90 further alienated the local rulers, who rebelled under the leadership of ʿAbd ar-Raḥmān of Belā Shangul proper. The reported cession of this district by the Khalifa to Menilek of Ethiopia must be seen in the political context of the time: the border district had become too burdensome for Omdurman to rule, yet its commercial and mineral resources made it too valuable to remain a no man's land.
The end of red rubber: a reassessment
Authors: Harms Robert 
Published: January 2009

The African rubber boom, which lasted from 1890 to 1913, had a significant economic and political impact on many parts of Africa. While the broad outlines of the boom were determined by the world market, the numerous local and regional variations were influenced more by the depletion of the rubber supplies. The factors that influenced the depletion varied according to whether the region in question was a free trade area or a concession area.The end of the notorious concession companies in the Congo Independent State has generally been attributed to the efforts of English and Belgian reformers. Recent research on Abir, a major Congo concession company, has revealed that attempts at reform were ineffective, and that exhaustion of the of the rubber supplies had caused the rubber system in the Abir concession to break down by 1906, when serious debate on the Congo question was just beginning in Europe.The article shows how the Abir system, which was designed to constantly increase production, led to depletion of the rubber resources. When the depleted areas merged, the territory passed into a period of crisis during which Abir lost control and production plummeted. Production figures for other Congo concession companies suggest that events in their territories followed a similar pattern.
The making of an imperial slum: Nyasaland and its railways, 1895–1935
Authors: Vail Leroy 
Published: January 2009

This paper is meant to be a contribution towards assessing the impact of the colonial experience upon Nyasaland, concentrating upon the decision-making processes involved in building the railways that served Nyasaland and the impact that they had upon Nyasaland's economy. In the early 1890s British metropolitan interests became alive to the strategic and commercial importance of Portuguese East Africa south of the Zambezi. To further British interests in the area, imperial decisions were taken to protect the British proxy there, the Mozambique Company. This protection included support for the Trans Zambesia Railway project. This support was calculated to protect British interests from American commercial threats, but the cost of the railway was placed upon the Nyasaland administration. Lumbered with the burden of the railway guarantees, Nyasaland's economy stagnated in the 1920s and African agricultural development was impeded. As a result, by the end of the twenties Nyasaland was being described as ‘the Cinderella of Africa’.In the late 1920s a second major project was approved. This was the construction of the Zambezi bridge. Again, the decision to build this was not taken with the interests of Nyasaland in mind, but rather in order to provide steel orders for a stagnating British steel industry in 1929. The one possible moneymaker for the bridge and railway system, coal from Moatize, was prevented from being developed lest it compete with Welsh coal. And when the decision to build the bridge was made, it was decided that Nyasaland should pay.
Palace and Jihād in the Early ʽAlawī State in Morocco
Authors: Mercer Patricia 
Published: January 2009

The early ʽAlawī state has repeatedly been described as heavy and efficient military government. In practice it functioned as a relatively loosely-knit tribute state. The achievement of its notable and long-lived second sultan Ismāʽil (1672–1727) was to shed the aegis of Fez, his economic metropolis, and set up an increasingly gigantic palace, beside a market town, as an independent political base. His central government there was characterized by minimal use of coin and minuscule central bureaucracy. For military support the sultan at first relied chiefly upon free troops, associated by fictional kinship with his most notable wife: later he relied increasingly upon black slave guards. But the motors of government at large were not imperial troops, whose functions were essentially deterrence and the hallmarking of government activity; they were provincial governors, bound to the sultan by ties of individual loyalty. These governors were responsible for the extraction of tribute destined for the palace.Religion gave increased coherence to this state. This was not so much because of its association with literacy, as because it enabled the sultan, who needed religious prestige, to enhance his unremarkable claim to descent from the Prophet, by taking up the Islamic mantle of ‘Commander of the Faithful’. This was a forceful image for propaganda that could counter the close association between the palace and Moroccan Jewry. It could also validate demands for loyalty throughout the empire. A hard Islamic line was expressed injihād, or holy warfare, against Christendom. The sultan's limited resources and his other military commitments prevented him from conducting activejihādmuch above the level of token confrontation. But there was also a moraljihād, waged, in so far as this was possible, by rejection of cultural and economic ties with Europe.
A New Survey of Radiocarbon and Thermoluminescence Dates for west Africa
Authors: Calvocoressi D. , David Nicholas 
Published: January 2009

There are signs that the familiar bias towards research on the Later Stone Age of the southern Sahara and Sahel and on the Iron Age of other parts of West Africa is beginning to be redressed, although Nigeria and Ghana still furnish the vast majority of dates from the southern coastal states. Historical and protohistorical archaeology is becoming increasingly popular, and some areas, for example southern Mali, are receiving serious attention for the first time. Dates are now appearing in large numbers; this paper reports on 355 new radiocarbon and thermoluminescence dates.Multi-disciplinary research has helped to clarify the Holocene environmental and cultural-stratigraphic sequence in several areas, including the Aïr and Ténéré in Niger and coastal Mauretania and Senegal. There is now strong evidence of a centre of copper metallurgy in the Azelik region of Niger in the 1st millennium b.c. which may well have facilitated the spread of iron working to Nigeria. At the same time, new dates from Mali may indicate a second diffusion route through the western Sahara. In Nigeria, new and early dates for the Nok culture are supported by thermoluminescence dating. Recent work on the later Metal Age of Senegal has permitted the description of four partially overlapping zones, and should soon lead to understanding of their internal and external relationships. Similarly, a substantial body of data has been accumulated, though not yet published, on the Iron Age of the Inland Niger delta. In the more southerly parts of West Africa, several new dates from just north of the forest refer to the emergence of the earliest Akan groups in Ghana and of Oyo in Nigeria. Previously reported dates from Ife and Benin have now been supplemented by a series of thermoluminescence dates.
Nxele, Ntsikana and the Origins of the Xhosa Religious Reaction
Authors: Peires J. B. 
Published: January 2009

The sudden expulsion of the Xhosa across the Fish River in 1811–12 created a practical and conceptual crisis which the traditional political authorities were unable to resolve. Two commoners, Nxele and Ntsikana, emerged in this vacuum, each proposing his own solution to the problems posed by the white irruption. Although these responses were religious responses, they were neither irrational nor incomprehensible. Xhosa religion had long functioned as an instrument for the control of the material world. By incorporating selected Christian concepts with the Xhosa world-view, Nxele and Ntsikana were able to provide the Xhosa with acceptable explanations of past events and prescriptions for future action.Nxele urged resistance and Ntsikana preached submission, but an examination of their personal histories shows that these final conclusions were more the product of exterior pressure than interior revelation. It may be suggested that the future reputations of the two men, like their past actions, will be determined more by the popular mood than by anything they themselves did or said.
Towards a Less Orthodox History of Hausaland
Authors: Sutton J. E. G. 
Published: January 2009

The historiography of Hausaland has laboured under a strong tradition of orthodoxy which recent secondary works have inherited from the more-or-less primary oral-cum-written sources. General cultural evidence (linguistic, ethnographic and archaeological) has been regarded as subsidiary, so that its potential for reconceptualization and for critical reevaluation of the conventional sources and orthodox interpretations has been missed. Instead, antiquarian approaches have been encouraged. Thus the view has persisted that Hausa as a cultural and linguistic entity has an antiquity running to several millennia, and also that it originated in the Sahara or around Aïr, whence it was pushed southward by desiccation or by Tuareg nomads. Contrarily, the clear message of linguistic geography and of Hausa's place within the Chadic family is that Hausa. expanded from east to west across the savanna belt of northern Nigeria. And the relative homogeneity of the language and culture within this vast zone indicates that the spread is quite recent (within the present millennium, say). It would have involved some assimilation, of previously settled peoples of the northern Nigerian plains, most of whom wouldl have spoken languages of the ‘Plateau’ division of Greenberg's Benue–Congo subfamily, of Niger-Congo.This Hausaization, as it proceeded from its old bases in eastern Hausaland, would have been both a cultural and an ecological process, through which woodland would have been converted into more open and continuous savanna to support grain-cultivation and a denser peasant population. This process would have reached western Hausaland (Zamfara and Kebbi) around the middle of this millennium. Cattle – and Fulani herdsmen – would in time have played an important role in this cultural ecology (and in restricting the tsetse zones).The old theory of a northern origin for the Hausa is bound up with the problem of Gobir in north-western Hausaland. Gobir's claim to be one of the original seven kingdoms (Hausabakwai) is probably a late invention. Moreover, the common assumption that Gobirawa Hausa migrated from Aïr seems to derive from a misinterpretation of the written sources.Finally thebakwailegends are reconsidered. Despite the scepticism of some modern critics, the legends appear to reflect, albeit in idealized form, a real historical development. They represent a foundation charter for the Hausa as a multi-state ethnicity, and enshrine the vague memory of how Hausaland and ‘Hausaness’ began from a series of small centres and hill-bases on its eastern side. Thus the interesting argument of Abdullahi Smith, that the Hausa people emerged long before state systems arose among them, is disputed. Rather, these should be seen as two facets of a single process during the present millennium.
The Iron Age Sequence South of the Vaal and Pongola Rivers: some Historical Implications
Authors: Maggs Tim 
Published: January 2009

The region south of the Vaal and Pongola rivers, being the southernmost on the continent to be settled by Bantu-speaking, Iron Age communities, is important in understanding the spread of these societies. Until recently, archaeological discussion has mostly been based on Schofield's work of the 1930s and 1940s, which is here shown to be substantially incorrect, and an outline of the new sequence is given.New work on the Early Iron Age in Natal is sufficiently advanced to demonstrate a highly selective pattern of site location which, together with what we know of the economy, gives us some insight into the ecology of these communities. This enables us to estimate the limits of distribution in areas where there has been less archaeological exploration. It also indicates that ecological factors are significant in the rapid initial spread of the Early Iron Age.The beginning of the Later Iron Age in this region is characterized not only by an abrupt change in ceramic styles but by other cultural and perhaps economic changes involving site location, architecture and aspects of technology. The most striking single factor is the expansion, beyond the coastal plain and wooded valleys of the Early Iron Age, into much of the interior grasslands. By at least the seventeenth century a dense population was established in many of these areas and their settlements can often be correlated with historically known groups on the basis of oral and ethnological links.