bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Chapter 5 The Protection‐Pull Factors: Multiple Pathways to Early Exit
Authors: Ebbinghaus Bernhard 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThere are multiple pathways to early exit from work: early pensions (retirement age before 65), flexible and partial pensions, special preretirement schemes, long-term unemployment benefits, and disability pensions. Early exit from work often emerged as an unintended consequence of progressive social policies. But once institutionalized, these exit pathways were difficult to reform, particularly in Continental European welfare states. In contrast, fewer and less generous pathways exist in Scandinavia, Anglophone economies, and Japan.
Chapter 7 Exit from Early Retirement: Paradigm Shifts, Policy Reversals, and Reform Obstacles
Authors: Ebbinghaus Bernhard 
Published: September 2006

AbstractGovernments have realized the negative impact of early retirement on social expenditures and labor costs, responding with a paradigm shift away from passive labor market policies. Governments seek to reverse early exit by raising the retirement age in pension systems, reforming disability insurance, closing special early retirement programs, activating older workers, and fostering gradual transitions to retirement. These reforms met many obstacles given the entrenched multiple pathways and status quo defense of the social partners, particularly as benefits came to be viewed as acquired rights.
Chapter 8 Conclusion: From Path Dependence to Path Departure?
Authors: Ebbinghaus Bernhard 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis concluding chapter summarizes the main findings of the book, evaluating the protection-oriented ‘pull’ and production-oriented ‘push’ approaches to explain the long-term development and cross-national variations in early exit from work. It discusses the difficulties of ‘path dependence’ as well as the opportunities of institutional change to reverse early retirement policies. It recommends a paradigm shift away from early retirement in combination with integration policies that facilitate older workers to remain active.
Models, Truth, and Realism
Authors: Taylor Barry 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This book mounts an argument against one of the fundamental tenets of much contemporary philosophy, the idea that we can make sense of reality as existing objectively, independently of our capacities to come to know it. Part One argues that traditional realism can be explicated as a doctrine about truth — that truth is objective, that is, public, bivalent, and epistemically independent. Part Two argues that a form of Hilary Putnam’s model-theoretic argument demonstrates that no such notion of truth can be founded on the idea of correspondence, as explained in model-theoretic terms. Part Three argues that non-correspondence accounts of truth-truth as superassertibility or idealized rational acceptability, formal conceptions of truth, and Tarskian truth also fail to meet the criteria for objectivity. Along the way, it also dismisses the claims of the latter-day views of Putnam, and of similar views articulated by John McDowell, to constitute a new, less traditional, form of realism. The Coda bolsters some of the considerations advanced in Part Three in evaluating formal conceptions of truth, by assessing and rejecting the claims of Robert Brandom to have combined such an account of truth with a satisfactory account of semantic structure. The book concludes that there is no defensible notion of truth that preserves the theses of traditional realism, nor any extant position sufficiently true to the ideals of that doctrine to inherit its title. So the only question remaining is which form of antirealism to adopt.
Realism and Objective Truth
Authors: Taylor Barry 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter begins by examining and adapting a characterization of realism offered by Michael Devitt, settling on an initial formulation of realism about objects of kind K as the doctrine that objects of kind K exist objectively, and explaining objective existence in terms of intersubjective warrant. Since object realism is an inadequate framework for the discussion of some debates between realists and their opponents, the apparatus of situations and facts is invoked to do justice. However, the argument discussed in literature reveals that the apparatus of situations is too fragile to bear any explanatory weight. The developing analysis can be freed from reliance on this apparatus by semantic ascent, where fact realism is supplanted by semantic realism. Realism is linked with a commitment to the applicability, across the field for which realism is maintained, of a concept of truth which is intersubjective, epistemically independent, and bivalent.
Realism Explicated
Authors: Taylor Barry 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter sets out to extract more of the properties of objective truth. It inquires into the principles governing certification. Principles governing the logical connectives are borrowed from Crispin Wright, and tested for adequacy against intuition, particularly on the question of the distributivity of objective truth across the connectives. It is argued that objective truth can be explicated as truth with the hallmark traits, without commitment to the literal truth of the framework, which has helped us to identify them.
Changing the Rules
Authors: Taylor Barry 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter examines other ways the Argument from Completeness might be attacked. It identifies two strategies that the realist might deploy in order to avoid the difficulties engendered by the applicability of the Completeness Theorem to the ideal theory. The first is to insist that the theory be cast in some non-first-order language which resists completeness. The second is to allow ideal theory to continue to be rendered in first-order form, but to argue for a semantics in which interpretations take such a new shape that there is no longer any guarantee that any consistent theory has a model in the new sense.
The Status of Natural Properties
Authors: Taylor Barry 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter examines the case for natural properties made by David Lewis. Section 5.1 looks at the role such properties play in Lewis’s system. Section 5.2 sets out his reasons for believing in them: that they are required to accommodate Moorean facts about the similarity of objects; and that they are indispensable to philosophical theorizing. Section 5.3 proposes an alternative to natural properties: these are the T-cosy predicates, defined by the role predicates play in theories. Section 5.4 argues that T-cosy predicates can be used to accommodate the Moorean facts as well as natural properties can do; and section 5.5 that where natural properties have an uncontroversially legitimate role to play in philosophical theory, T-cosy predicates will once again do the job. The conclusion is that natural properties constitute unnecessary metaphysical baggage, to be rejected along with the Eliteness Constraint they underpin.
Taking the Hierarchy Seriously
Authors: Taylor Barry 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines Crispin Wright’s account of truth as superassertibility, and the account with which Putnam proposes in Reason, Truth, and History — of truth as idealized rational acceptability. It is argued that both can be represented as attempts to take a version of Part One’s Hierarchy of Certification as a serious analytic tool rather than as a disposable heuristic ladder.
Neuroscience, Psychoanalysis, and Memory
Authors: Cavell Marcia 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
Although psychoanalysis has been attacked on every conceivable level, contemporary research supports Freud’s most important thesis: that much mental functioning is unconscious, and kept out of consciousness by anxiety and defence against anxiety. Research also supports other important Freudian propositions, such as that childhood catastrophes reverberate in the adult mind, causing pathological ways of thinking and behaving; that memory has different ways of working, many of which are unconscious; and that anxiety misunderstood fixes us neurotically to the past. This chapter focuses on the concepts of the unconscious and emotional memory. It argues that as there are many kinds of unconscious mental processes, so are there multiple memory systems, each obeying different rules of operation, which interact to produce the subjective experience of remembering.
On Judgment
Authors: Cavell Marcia 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter discusses Freud’s idea of ‘the reality principle’ as in effect containing an analysis of the necessary conditions for prepositional thought. In calling ‘the setting-up of the reality principle’ a ‘momentous step’, Freud is explicitly contrasting judgments about things as they are with wishes, or expressions of personal taste, or sentences that look like judgments about what is but that are really expressions of disguised wishes. With judgment, come the capacities for reality testing, and also for fantasy, self-deception, delusion, and illusion. Attempts by psychoanalysts, notably Melanie Klein and Wilfred Bion, to derive prepositional thought from fantasies are criticized.
Self-Reflections
Authors: Cavell Marcia 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter claims that investigations into the nature of the self that do not consider the background conditions for being able to think thoughts such as ‘I am thinking’ or ‘I believe that p’, are bound to give a peculiar idea of selfhood. One can take neither the capacity for self-reference nor the unity of the self, as given; such unity as there is comes about through processes of integration. It is argued that Harry Frankfurt’s idea of integrity as wholehearted caring is unsatisfactory because it neglects the roles of other people and an openness to reality in the integrating process.
Irrationality and Self-Transcendance
Authors: Cavell Marcia 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter discusses the thoughts of Davidson and Freud about irrationality. It then examines the problem of self-transcendence, where a person forms a positive or negative judgment of some of his own desires, and acts to change these desires. From the point of view of the changed desire, there is no reason for the change — the reason comes from an independent source, and is based on further, and partly contrary, considerations.
Experience and the World's Own Language
Authors: Gaskin Richard 
Published: September 2006

AbstractJohn McDowell’s attempt to revive the doctrine of empiricism in a ‘minimal’ or ‘transcendental’ form is seriously undermined by inadequacies in the way he conceives what he styles the ‘order of justification’ connecting world, experience, and judgement. For example, his conception of the roles played by causation and nature in this order is threatened with vacuity. The requirements of self-consciousness and verbal articulacy which he places on subjects participating in the justificatory relation between experience and judgement are unwarranted, and have the implausible consequence that infants and non-human animals are excluded from the ‘order of justification’, and thus deprived of experience of the world. Above all, McDowell’s position is vitiated by a substantial error he commits in the philosophy of language: following ancient tradition rather than Frege’s radical departure from that tradition, he locates concepts at the level of sense rather than at the level of reference in the semantical hierarchy. This error generates an unwanted Kantian transcendental idealism which in effect delivers a reductio ad absurdum of McDowell’s metaphysical economy. To correct this mistake, Frege must first be followed in his location of concepts at the level of reference. Second, one must move beyond Frege to locate not only concepts but also propositions at that level. This, in turn, requires the serious consideration of an idea which McDowell mentions only to reject, that of objects as speaking to us ‘in the world’s own language’. Despite the correction recommended here, if empiricism is to have any chance of success, it must be still more minimal in its pretensions than McDowell allows. In particular, it must abandon the individualistic and intellectualistic construction which McDowell places on the ‘order of justification’.
I Minimal empiricism and the ‘order of justification’
Authors: Gaskin Richard 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
McDowell’s minimal empiricism holds that empirical thought’s directedness at the world is routed essentially via experience. He wants us to conceive experience not as an interface but as a conduit, enabling us to be open to the world. On this conception, experience mediates in both a causal and a normative way between world and mind. However, there are difficulties with a number of his formulations of his position. It is argued that these can be overcome if McDowell is represented as offering a staging-post model according to which causal and normative relations obtain between world and experience on the one hand, and experience and judgement on the other. With that model in place, McDowell thinks we will be able to move to a simpler model in which experience functions as a relation between world and mind, rather than itself a relatum.
III Experience and judgement
Authors: Gaskin Richard 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThere are several obstacles in McDowell’s thought to his embracing a conduit conception of experience. The main ones are: the idea that thinkers are free in making observational judgments, the suggestion that subjects are infallible about how things seem to them to be, and the individualistic and intellectualistic construction which McDowell puts upon the ‘order of justification’. The last of these means that McDowell insists that each individual must have self-conscious and articulable access to the propositional contents which justify his or her observational judgements. It is argued that this is a mistake: a subject can have an experience with a particular content even if he, she, or it lacks the mental resources to entertain self-conscious and verbalizable thought about that content, and so lacks the capacity to make the observational judgment which that experience would justify.
V Diagnosis and treatment
Authors: Gaskin Richard 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
McDowell’s view is that if infants and animals did have conscious experience, they would be confronted with private objects in Wittgenstein’s sense — bits of unstructured sensory Given. It is argued that since we are obliged to accord conscious experience to infants and animals, McDowell is in effect saddled with supposing that they confront Kantian things-in-themselves, objects which are noumenal with respect to the conceptual. This fits with his location of the world at the level of sense rather than reference in the Fregean semantic hierarchy. On McDowell’s metaphysical picture, objects — the inhabitants of the realm of reference — are banished from the world to a noumenal penumbra. To unpick ourselves from this nominalistic entanglement, we need to follow Frege in locating concepts/properties at the level of reference. McDowell’s hostility to doing so, which seems to be based on a fear of an excessive platonism, must be set aside.
VI The world's own language
Authors: Gaskin Richard 
Published: September 2006

AbstractIt is not enough to merely locate objects and concepts (properties) at the level of reference. If these are not to be merely two different kinds of thing-in-itself, we also need to locate propositional combinations of objects and concepts at that level. It is argued that semantical and metaphysical considerations oblige us to take this step beyond Frege. We should recognize the existence of both true and false propositions at the level of reference, and identify the world with the level of reference, so understood. That yields a good sense in which the world ‘speaks its own language’, an idea McDowell mentions only to reject. The resulting linguistic idealism, provides the only safe context in which a genuinely minimal empiricism can thrive.
7 The Knowledge of God
Authors: Hägg Henny Fiskå 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
The relationship between Clement’s apophaticism and his epistemology is discussed. Particular attention is paid to the consequences of the negative way to God — as an expression of Clement’s view of God’s absolute incomprehensibility — and to the negative way’s relation to the positive, or cataphatic way: the way of knowing the unknowable.
Open Economy Complications
Authors: Stiglitz Joseph E. , Ocampo José Antonio , Spiegel Shari , Ffrench-Davis Ricardo , Nayyar Deepak 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter extends the analysis of the previous chapter to an open economy by introducing exchange rate policy; analyzing the complex relationships between exchange rate, fiscal, and monetary policies; and examining the ways in which capital flows complicate traditional analyses. Despite the greater complexities associated with open economy macroeconomics, the policy conclusions for a closed economy remain remarkably unaffected. While Keynesians and heterodox economists believe that government should actively intervene, conservatives remain skeptical about the desirability of such interventions. The objective of this chapter is to shed some light on how economists can come to such diverse views on economic policy. The first section examines the macroeconomic effects of exchange rates on employment, trade, inflation, aggregate demand, growth, and balance sheets. The second section examines the complex interactions between fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies in open economies with either fixed or flexible exchange rate regimes. This section also examines the effects of interest rates and exchange rates on capital flows in both crisis and non-crisis situations.
Formal Approaches
Authors: Stiglitz Joseph E. , Ocampo José Antonio , Spiegel Shari , Ffrench-Davis Ricardo , Nayyar Deepak 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter discusses advances in formal economic theory by examining how different positions among economists arise from their different assumptions and models. The discussion focuses on ways in which real world economies differ from the ‘competitive equilibrium’ model that has become the benchmark model. The current benchmark competitive equilibrium framework includes new classical, representative agent, and real business cycle models which assume that all markets (including the labor market) have clear, perfect information, complete markets (including perfect capital and insurance markets), perfect wage and price flexibility, perfect competition, perfect rationality, and no externalities. If these models accurately portrayed reality, the economy would be efficient and there would be no need for government intervention. The assumptions of these models, however, are unrealistic and it is difficult to reconcile the required macro-formulations with what is known about microeconomic behavior (without resorting to ad hoc assumptions about the nature of the stochastic shocks to preferences and technology). The inadequacies of these models are even greater for developing countries where information imperfections are more pervasive and more markets are missing or incomplete (e.g., insurance markets). Accordingly, economic research since the 1990s has focused on identifying the most important limitations of the standard competitive model, particularly those limitations that help to explain the nature of economic volatility.
The Argument for Tripartition
Authors: Lorenz Hendrik 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter argues that Republic-style partition of the soul amounts to a position that can fairly be characterized in terms of two main claims. First, the proper subjects of desires and aversions are not whole souls, but in each case some part or other of the soul in question. Secondly, the parts of the soul that are the proper subjects of desires and aversions are unified in the strong sense that it is impossible for a given soul-part to desire something and at the same time to be averse to it.
Introduction
Authors: Lorenz Hendrik 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
In a much-discussed passage in Republic 10 (602c-603b), Plato appears to divide the rational soul-part into two distinct sub-parts. By considering the passage in its context, the chapter shows that appearance to be false. It closes by spelling out what can be learned about Plato’s psychological theory by reflecting on the passage, once it is properly interpreted.
The Workings of phantasia
Authors: Lorenz Hendrik 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter discusses Aristotle’s version of the association of ideas. It exposes a rich conception of sense, or the perceptual system, which can account not only for acts of sense-perception, but also for associating one thing with another, remembering things, and being reminded by something of something else. So conceived of, the perceptual system can also account for the occurrence of action-guiding representations that are indeterminately complex, and at the same time relevant and suitable to the perceiving subject’s current circumstances.
Phantasia and Practical Thought
Authors: Lorenz Hendrik 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
Given the richness of Aristotle’s conception of sense, the question arises of what he takes to be distinctive of the intellect and its functioning. The chapter therefore offers a detailed account of practical thought, as Aristotle conceives of it. For Aristotle, practical thought has a number of distinctive features that centre on the ability to apprehend ‘for the sake of’ relations, which include, but are not limited to, means-end relations. The chapter concludes that Aristotle has a well-grounded and defensible distinction between intellectual and non-intellectual cognition.
Reason and Non-rational Desire
Authors: Lorenz Hendrik 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
The chapter explores Aristotle’s moral psychology, arguing that it not only leaves room for, but in fact requires, a conception of non-rational or non-intellectual cognition along the lines set out in Chapters 8-11. Even though it is part of Aristotle’s moral psychology that all of a human being’s cognitive and motivating conditions are rational in a way, this leaves intact a clear sense in which appetite and spirit are non-rational forms of motivation, and also a clear sense in which at least some of the cognition involved in such motivation is non-rational.
On Images
Authors: Kulvicki John V. 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This book argues that what it is to be a picture does not fundamentally concern how such representations can be perceived, but how they relate to one another syntactically and semantically. This kind of approach, first championed by Nelson Goodman in his Languages of Art, has not found many supporters in part because of weaknesses with Goodman’s account. It is shown that a properly crafted structural account of pictures has many advantages over the perceptual accounts that dominate the literature on this topic. Part I (Chapters 1-5) presents the account and draws out some of its immediate consequences. In particular, it explains the close relationship between pictures, diagrams, graphs, and other kinds of non-linguistic representation. Also, it undermines the claim that pictures are essentially visual by showing how many kinds of non-visual representations, including audio recordings and tactile line drawings, are genuinely pictorial. Part II (Chapters 6-10) shows that the structural account of depiction can help to explain why pictures seem so perceptually special. Part III (Chapters 11-12) provides a new account of pictorial realism and shows how accounting for realism relates to an account of depiction in general.