bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Long Term Prospects for Conventional U.S. Gas Supply
Authors: Zareski Gordon K. 
Published: December 2007

Society of Petroleum Engineers 6200 North Central Expressway Dallas, Texas 75206
THIS PAPER IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION
American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

Abstract
Warnings of a natural gas shortage were sounded by qualified experts as long ago as 1948, but were largely ignored by policymakers. Since the peak in 1967, the lower 48 states proved reserve inventory of natural gas has proved reserve inventory of natural gas has shrunk by more than one-third and reserve additions during this period have been less than one-half the amount necessary to maintain a constant level of proved reserves. In recent years the domestic drilling effort has responded well to higher gas prices and other incentives, but the discovery results have been disappointing. These trends could be an indication that the size of the undiscovered natural gas resource base may be the most serious constraint on future conventional gas supply.
Domestic natural gas production peaked in 1973 and has declined each year since then. Based on recent trends of annual reserve additions, the staff of the FPC projects that lower-48-state conventional natural gas production will decline to approximately 14 Tcf production will decline to approximately 14 Tcf by 1985, a 38-percent drop from the 1973 peak of 22.5 Tcf. While further increases in price incentives might ameliorate the situation somewhat, industry and government policymakers should proceed on the expectation of decreasing gas availability.
The views expressed herein are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Power Commission or of individual commissioners.

Introduction
There were two major energy events that took place in 1973. The contrast between these two events is interesting and says much about our national perception of serious energy problems. The first event, the OPEC oil problems. The first event, the OPEC oil embargo, followed by the new tough OPEC bargaining posture and skyrocketing world oil prices was given extensive press coverage, and prices was given extensive press coverage, and of course, the temporary gasoline shortage had a direct impact on the lives of most citizens. By contrast, the second major energy event in 1973 received little, if any, media coverage. This second event was the peaking of U.S. natural gas production and the beginning of its decline for the first time in the history of the modern gas industry.
Effect of Natural Gas Price Controls on Domestic Natural Gas Supply: Past, Present and Future
Authors: Campbell J.M. , Campbell Robert Allan 
Published: December 2007

Society of Petroleum Engineers 6200 North Central Expressway Dallas, Texas 75206
THIS PAPER IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION
American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

Abstract
The price of natural gas at the wellhead affects the profitability and eventually the ability of producers to supply natural gas at a rate which is at least equal to its depletion from consumption. The fundamental problem in natural gas economics is setting gas problem in natural gas economics is setting gas prices which stimulate new gas reserves, prices which stimulate new gas reserves, while maintaining a minimum contribution to inflation and other consumer costs.
In this paper two statistical models are used to evaluate the effect of several gas pricing formulas on past reserve additions and pricing formulas on past reserve additions and future reserve additions. Included in the pricing formulas considered are the FPC pricing formulas considered are the FPC proposed price increase in gas price to $1.42 per proposed price increase in gas price to $1.42 per MCF, tieing gas prices to inflation rates, and setting gas prices equal to the price of oil on a BTU basis.
Results of this study indicate that FPC pricing formulas between 1961 and 1975 pricing formulas between 1961 and 1975 reduced new reserve additions over 50 percent over what they would have been without regulation. Future pricing would never have been necessary if gas formulas, even with an increase in the new wellhead price of gas to around $1.42, will not overcome current deficiencies in gas reserves, and may even retard new additions to reserves if old pricing formulas are reinstated.

Introduction
Beginning with wellhead price controls imposed on the gas industry in the early sixties, controversy has surrounded the pricing formula for setting wellhead gas prices. Consumer groups argue that the price is too high, regardless of what gas prices may be. Industry on the other hand has suffered a form of "regulatory lag," where actual wellhead prices lag behind the cost of finding and producing gas. With insufficient incentives new additions to reserves have been less than they would had prices been set in a manner consistent with prices been set in a manner consistent with gas industry economics.
In this paper we are concerned with evaluating the effect of past pricing formulas on reserve additions, and, more importantly, estimating gains in new reserves between now and 1980 from instituting practicing more practical pricing formulas. pricing formulas.
Forecasting Energy Futures: Facility or Futility?
Authors: Schanz John J. 
Published: December 2007

Society of Petroleum Engineers 6200 North Central Expressway Dallas, Texas 75206
THIS PAPER IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION
American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

Introduction
Perhaps my early exposure to forecasting as an Air Force meteorologist was habit forming, but for one reason-or another I have been involved in long-term mineral forecasting almost continuously for nearly thirty years. During that time I have progressed from a master's thesis on forecasting future mineral demand, to a post-doctoral study at Penn State on future energy sources for Pennsylvania, to seven years in Denver as Director of the Future Gas Requirements Agency, to my last three years with Resources for the Future. I should check my high school yearbook and see if it listed me as a young man with a future.
I would like to spend a little time reflecting upon a few interesting characteristics I have noticed in the various types of projections of future supply and demand, both for energy as well as for the individual fuels. Following that, I will examine the current type of energy "outlook" and discuss why it is no longer popular to produce traditional "forecasts." You will note in the process that, along with my colleagues among the energy economists, I too will avoid making forecasts.

TYPES OF ENERGY FORECASTS

The Next-Year Forecast
Although I do not want to devote much attention to extremely short-range energy forecasts, I should at least mention how they fit into the forecasting scheme. In this classification we find the trade press or industry association forecasts which link the production and consumption of energy or the individual fuels to the business outlook for the next year. These may be simple composites of expert opinion or they are the product of fairly complex analyses where expected changes in energy prices and supply are applied to many-sectored input-output models of the economy to determine what effect energy will have on demand, employment, GNP, or other parts of the economy. Or, in the reverse, they start with certain assumptions as to next year's GNP, the industrial production index, number of cars to be manufactured, and other variables, to determine what energy products will be required month-by-month. products will be required month-by-month. These are interesting exercises for use by the energy executive, the financial community, or government officials. However, as we have found, our short-term business forecasting has its share of problems and frequently misses the mark.
Recent Developments in FPC Regulation of Natural Gas Prices
Authors: Attwell J. Evans , Schenkkan P.M. 
Published: December 2007

Society of Petroleum Engineers 6200 North Central Expressway Dallas, Texas 75206
THIS PAPER IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION
American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

Abstract
Until and unless Congress passes deregulation legislation, interstate gas ceiling prices will be set by the Federal Power prices will be set by the Federal Power Commission. In 1976, the FPC issued orders setting out a complex new nationwide rate structure an made decisions affecting the use of various procedures for making interstate sales at prices procedures for making interstate sales at prices above the nationwide rates. These order decisions are reviewed. The current gas crisis demonstrates the continuing failure of cost-based regulation by the FPC and underscores the importance of deregulation to minimize future shortages.

Introduction
As this paper goes to the printer's, our nation is experiencing its worst natural gas crisis ever. Prolonged cold weather, including the coldest average temperatures ever recorded for many parts of the Southeast, have increased demands on interstate pipelines supplying most of the country. Because of limited supplies, a number of such pipelines are unable to meet the needs of their highest priority customers. Schools and factories have closed. President Carter estimates that 200,000 workers have been laid off. Supplies to residences and small commercial users have been severely restricted. Many governors have declared states of emergency.
The winter will end, but the crisis will not. It has been growing for years. In fact, for several years, only unusually warm winters have contained the crisis at manageable levels. Gradual recognition of the crisis has focused more and more political attention on the question of natural gas price regulation. In 1976, this attention reached such levels that the year began and ended with hopes for Congressional deregulation. It will be interesting to see what impact the winter of 1977 will have on deregulation legislation in the new session.
In the meantime, the Federal Power Commission is stuck with the job of regulating interstate natural gas prices. 1976 was a "vintage" year for Commission regulation, highlighted by the adoption of new nationwide rate ceilings to govern interstate producer sales.
Oil Company Divestiture
Authors: Slick W.T. 
Published: December 2007

Introduction
The development problems that face those of us in the energy industry are formidable. While as engineers we are accustomed to approaching such tasks in tangible, physical and economic terms, the significance of these traditional concepts is becoming increasingly dependent on a growing number of imponderables. This is particularly true in the area of government policy, which has injected many uncertainties into our business. These political intangibles are frustrating and difficult to grapple with, but must be taken fully into account, for they can drastically affect cost assumptions and, more fundamentally, our ability to do the job. Of the numerous legislative issues facing the energy industry, none is more potentially serious than Congressional efforts to break up the oil companies and to prohibit their diversification into other fuels. This question will be answered in some detail later, but, before doing so, it is appropriate to briefly review other key governmental issues that could also significantly affect the progress of U.S. energy development.

II. GOVERNMENTAL ISSUES

Oil and Gas Controls
Particularly pressing is the question of oil and gas price controls and allocation regulations.
Current Developments in Oil and Gas Taxation, Including Current Partnership Developments
Authors: Burke Frank M. 
Published: December 2007

THIS PAPER IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION
American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

Introduction
The past 2 years have seen significant legislative, administrative, and judicial developments that have had significant direct and indirect impact on the taxation of the oil and gas industry. It is the purpose of this outline to review such developments in the following order.The Tax Reform Act of 1976The Tax Reduction Act of 1975Current Developments in Oil and Gas Farm-Out ArrangementsRevenue Agent Guide - Guidelines for Examination of Drilling FundsThe Limited Partnership - Pre- and Post-Larson and Zuckman Post-Larson and ZuckmanRecent Administrative Rulings and Judicial Decisions - Other than Larson and Zuckman

THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976 (TRA)
TRA contains a number of significant changes specifically affecting the oil and gas industry. As indicated below, the changes raise serious questions as to whether oil and gas exploration and development activities should (or, in fact, can economically) be carried on in noncorporate form.
The law may represent the culmination of an effort on the part of certain government officials to cause oil and gas activities to be carried on in corporate form. For the past 32-years, the solution to substantially all punitive tax reform proposals aimed at oil and punitive tax reform proposals aimed at oil and gas operations has been to incorporate. This attitude, to some degree, now has been formalized in the law.
Perhaps the most far-reaching change affecting corporate and noncorporate taxpayers engaged in the oil and gas business is the new requirement (reflected in new Section 1254 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954*) that, upon disposition of oil and gas properties (domestic or foreign) after Dec. 31, 1975, taxpayers will be required to recapture all or some part of the intangible drilling and development costs (IDC) paid or incurred after Dec. 31, 1975, as paid or incurred after Dec. 31, 1975, as ordinary income to the extent that the property is disposed of at a gain (or is deemed to have been disposed of at a gain).
The Reliability Of Econometric Models
Authors: Merklein H.A. 
Published: December 2007

Society of Petroleum Engineers 6200 North Central Expressway Dallas, Texas 75206
THIS PAPER IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION
American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

Abstract
There is no question that the increase in crude-oil prices, as viewed by oil importers, is a cost-push phenomenon: it involves the displacement of the importing nation's aggregate supply curve. Whatever the economic impact of increased crude oil prices in importing nations, the use of demand management policies cannot successfully counteract what is in effect a supply problem.
Yet, based on the results of a study involving an econometric model, U. S. government officials maintain thatthe price/employment impact of the 1973/74 increase in crude oil prices was very substantial and long-lasting (at least until 1980), anddemand management policies can be used to soften that impact on both the price-level and unemployment fronts.
No matter how complicated the mathematics of the argument, the results of this econometric study are inconsistent with observed market behavior and with economic theory. This suggests, of course, that the econometric model itself is wrong. It is the purpose of this paper to implant an awareness in the paper to implant an awareness in the reader's mind concerning the limitations of econometric models.

Introduction
One would think that the question of the inflationary impact of rising crude oil prices has now been put to rest, since most economists who have seriously looked into the problem have come up with essentially the same answer—a rare phenomenon for this breed of people who phenomenon for this breed of people who (according to Bernard Shaw), if laid end to end, will reach no conclusion. It is generally agreed that the inflationary impact of rising crude-oil prices, assuming no changes in the money supply, has been a one-time increase in the U. S. GNP deflator on the order of two to three percent. This has been discussed repeatedly percent. This has been discussed repeatedly by this author. Nobel-Prize Winner Milton Friedman has been quoted as saying that "inflations are made at home by governments, and governments found it convenient to blame the oil crisis for their troubles." Harvard 's Professor Haberler has expressed similar thoughts, as have the OECD and countless others.
Economics of Offshore Oil Production
Authors: Kuuskraa Vello A. , Ryan Paul , Muller John M. 
Published: December 2007

Society of Petroleum Engineers 6200 North Central Expressway Dallas, Texas 75206
THIS PAPER IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION
American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

Abstract
Projections indicate that offshore areas will provide much of the nation's future supply of petroleum. The amount of oil that is ultimately recovered from these areas will be profoundly affected by public policies currently profoundly affected by public policies currently under consideration by the federal government, such as changing oil prices, varying federal leasing policies, investing in research and development, and delaying development.
This study was conducted to examine the effects of these policies on offshore oil production. Previously available models of production. Previously available models of offshore cost models were limited severely for this purpose because they often ignore the important variables to water depth and field size and because they frequently fail to account for the full range of essential costs.
The model developed for this study sought to remedy these shortcomings by incorporating these variables and including all costs. Projections of undiscovered reserves were Projections of undiscovered reserves were distributed by water depth and field size based on the distribution of existing federal offshore fields and onshore fields. These were added to the existing reserves to comprise the full data base. The Gulf of Mexico was chosen for the initial detailed analysis reported here.
This paper presents the detailed models and methods, and displays the sensitivity of offshore production to a range of alternative public policies. public policies

Introduction
As existing petroleum resources dwindle and energy demand rises, the need for new domestic energy supplies becomes more important. Onshore exploration and development, improved oil recovery, and synthetic fuels may provide substantial portions of these new supplies, but offshore oil undoubtedly will be a major contributor.
Offshore oil production already makes a substantial contribution to domestic supply — accounting for about 16 percent of current domestic oil production - and its future role is expected to grow. Though projections vary, recent estimates indicate that the offshore area may provide from 30 to 65 percent of the future domestic oil supply (Table 1).
As shown in Table 1, these estimates of the quantity of future (undiscovered) recoverable offshore oil vary dramatically — from a low of 26 billion to a high of 200 billion bbl.
The Effect of Oil Price Policy on Tertiary Oil Recovery
Authors: Henry James D. 
Published: December 2007

Society of Petroleum Engineers 6200 North Central Expressway Dallas, Texas 75206
THIS PAPER IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION
American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

Abstract
Recent studies have shown that the potential reserves and rate contributions potential reserves and rate contributions from tertiary oil vary over a wide range. The contribution may be very substantial or quite insignificant. One major variable is oil price. The way in which oil price is applied, i.e., oil price policy, is also very important. If we are to recover significant volumes of tertiary oil in a continued oil-price-controlled environment, the incremental barrels of tertiary oil will require a price or price policy equivalent to at least free market price. Timing is critical because many of the major tertiary prospects are approaching their economic limit.

Introduction
Within the last few years, there has been a considerable amount of discussion concerning the increasing inability of the United States to supply its own energy fuels. A recent study by a task force for the National Petroleum Council included a projection according to which the producing rate projection according to which the producing rate of crude oil from known U. S. reservoirs would drop from the current rate of less than eight million barrels per day to less than three million barrels per day within the next ten years. This is shown in Figure 1. This rate represents the total crude oil production from primary, secondary and existing tertiary projects from all known U. S. reservoirs, excluding the North Slope, and excluding future revisions, extensions, and discoveries.
To arrest and possibly reverse this decline in domestic crude oil production will require a combination of programs, such as accelerated leasing, exploration, and development of offshore areas and frontier areas such as Alaska, as well as aggressive implementation of tertiary recovery to recover more of the oil we have already found.
The object of this paper is to examine the stakes and constraints to faster implementation of tertiary programs. Particular emphasis is given to the effect of domestic oil price policy, as set out in current FEA regulations.

TERTIARY POTENTIAL
Conventional primary and secondary recovery processes still leave approximately two thirds of the oil that is found in the ground.
Conversions to Electric Power Change Trends in Energy Demand
Authors: Larson Charles A. 
Published: December 2007

Society of Petroleum Engineers 6200 North Central Expressway Dallas, Texas 75206
THIS PAPER IS SUBJECT TO CORRECTION
American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers, Inc.

Abstract
The total demand for energy is expected to increase from 75 Quads in 1975 to 177 Quads in the year 2000. While the growth in total demand is forecast at 3.5 per cent, electric energy growth is forecast at 6.8 per cent, at almost twice the average rate.
Nuclear power, which makes up only two per cent of today's energy sources, is expected per cent of today's energy sources, is expected to constitute about 37 per cent of total energy demand by the year 2000. In the electric utility industry about 8 per cent of its energy comes from nuclear sources now. By the year 2000, about 59 per cent of all electric energy might be from nuclear sources.
Conversions to electric energy are most likely in the residential, industrial and transportation sectors. Residential electric heating predominates the space heating market. Industrial predominates the space heating market. Industrial conversions are caused by shortages of natural gas and concern over foreign imports of oil. Also, the industrial market is best able to implement "soft" technologies which conserve energy. Electric cars and expanded electric mass transportation may cause conversions in the transportation sector.

CONVERSIONS TO ELECTRIC POWER CHANGE TRENDS IN ENERGY DEMAND
What changes are taking place in the demand for energy? What is causing the conversions to electric power? What are the consequential effects of energy conversions on the oil and gas industry? These and other important questions can best be answered by analyzing a 25-year energy model which describes and explains changing trends in energy demand.

The Energy Model
It appears advisable to look forward over a 25-year period to the year 2000 in order to examine some marked changes in the energy picture. Consequently, a 25-year energy model picture. Consequently, a 25-year energy model was constructed which shows changes in the sources and uses of energy. The trend in total energy demand compared with the trend in electric energy demand is shown on Fig. 1. During 1975 the total normal energy demand was approximately 75 Quads (10 15 Btu's) after adjustment for abnormal weather conditions.