bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Reemployment after Migration from East to West Germany: A Longitudinal Study on Psychosocial Factors
Authors: Schwarzer Ralf , Hahn André 
Published: January 2008

235 migrants est‐allemands ont été interviewés trois fois dans les deux ans qui ont suivi leur arrivée à Berlin‐Ouest en 1989. Leur crainte du chômage, enregistrée dès le départ, a été rapportée plus tard à leur statut professionnel et au nombre de mois de travail. Ceux qui avaient des attentes élevées trouvaient plus facilement un emploi. Les femmes étaient plus pessimistes que les hommes quant à leurs chances de retrouver du travail. Les attentes étaient indépendantes de l'optimisme fondamental et autres traits de personnalité. Dans la seconde partie de l'étude, les plaintes relatives à la santé, l'évaluation du stress et les ressources sociales ont été reliées à la durée du travail. Selon un modèle structurel, les principaux prédicteurs de la durée du travail étaient les attentes initiates et l'état de santé. Celui‐ci agissait à travers les attentes dans un premier temps et à travers l'estimation du stress et les ressources sociales dans un second temps. Un autre modèle transformant l'état de santé en variable dépendante convint également aux données, mais comme il ne reposait pas sur exactement le même échantillon, il ne pouvait pas invalider le premier modèle. On peut conclure de cette recherche que les attentes relevaient de facteurs non psychologiques et qu'une mauvaise santé abaissait la probabilité de retrouver un emploi, en partie parce qu'elle augmentait le stress et réduisait les ressources sociales.Two hundred and thirty‐five East German migrants were interviewed three times during a two‐year period after their transition to West Berlin in 1989. Their unemployment expectations, which were recorded at the onset, were related to employment status and number of months on the job later on. Those with higher expectations were more successful in gaining a job. Women were less likely to expect reemployment than men. Expectancies were independent of dispositional optimism and other personality traits. In the second part of the study, health complaints, stress appraisals, and social support were related to employment duration. Within a structural model, initial expectancies and illness were the major predictors of employment duration. Illness operated through expectancies at Time 1, and through stress appraisals and social support at Time 2. A second model with illness as a dependent variable did also fit the data but this was not based on exactly the same sample and therefore could not invalidate the first one. From this study, it is concluded a) that expectancies were based on factors other than psychological ones, and b) that illness reduced the likelihood of reemployment, partly through increased stress and decreased social support.
Work and Personality: Use of the NEO‐PI‐R in Industrial/Organisational Psychology
Authors: Costa Paul T. 
Published: January 2008

L'inventaire NEO Révisé de la Personnalité (NEO‐PI‐R) est une mesure actuelle de 30 traits qui renvoient aux cinq facteurs de base de la personnalité normale. II a fourni des preuves de sa fidélité et de sa validité aussi bien dans des recherches théoriques qu'appliquées et plusieurs études montrent qu'il contribue à prédire la performance professionnelle. Le domaine et les facettes du NEO‐PI‐R sont analysés avec quelques résultats issus de son application en psychologie des organisations.The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO‐PI‐R) is a contemporary measure of 30 traits that define the five basic factors of normal personality. In both research and applied samples it has shown evidence of reliability and validity, and several studies suggest that it has utility in the prediction of job performance. The domain and facet features of the NEO‐PI‐R are discussed along with some issues in its use in industrial/organisational psychology.
Transparency: A Necessary Requirement for the Construct Validity of Assessment Centres
Authors: Kleinmann Martin , Kuptsch Constanze , Köller Olaf 
Published: January 2008

La validité de construction des centres d‘évaluation et la performance perçue des candidats sont‐elles sensibles au fait que ceux‐ci aient ou non connaissance des dimensions jugées pertinentes? 119 étudiants de 1° cycle ont participéà une session de centre d’évaluation dans des conditions de transparence et de non transparence. II est apparu que la validité de construction était supérieure quand les participants connaissaient les dimensions recherchées et le comportement attendu de leur part. En outre, les notations des sujets de la condition “transparence” qui admettaient avoir soumis leur conduite aux dimensions attendues bénéficiaient d'une validité discriminante et convergente supérieure à celle des notations des sujets qui affirmaient n'avoir tenu aucun compte des dites dimensions. L'impact de la transparence des dimensions recherchées sur la validité de construction des centres d‘évaluation est discuté.The present study tested whether the construct validity of assessment centres and the perceived performance of candidates were influenced by whether or not the requirement dimensions were made transparent for participants. A total of 119 college students participated in an assessment centre under either transparent or nontransparent conditions. Results showed that construct validity was higher when participants knew the requirement dimensions and what behaviour was required of them. In addition, the ratings of subjects in the transparency condition who reported that they had oriented their behaviour towards the requirement dimensions had higher convergent and discriminant validity than the ratings of subjects who reported that they disregarded the requirement dimensions. The consequences of the transparency of requirement dimensions for the construct validity of assessment centres are discussed.
The Assessment of Optimistic Self‐beliefs: Comparison of the German, Spanish, and Chinese Versions of the General Self‐efficacy Scale
Authors: Schwarzer Ralf , Bäßler Judith , Kwiatek Patricia , Schröder Kerstin , Zhang Jian Xin 
Published: January 2008

L'auto‐efficacité générale est mesurée grâce à une courte échelle composée de dix items. Son usage est très répandu et elle a été adaptée à plusieurs cultures. Cet article compare des versions qui ont été proposées à des étudiants: 430 Allemands, 952 Costariciens et 293 Chinois. lies validités internes sont respectivement de.84,.81 et.91. L'unidimensionnalité de l'échelle est réapparue dans tous les échantillons. L'équivalence items‐modèle interlinguistique ne fut que modérément approuvé par des analyses factorielles de confirmation. On a trouvé des différences au niveau des moyennes des scores totaux entre les langues. De plus, une intéraction entre sexe et langue s'est manifestée. Des corrélations avec la dépression, l'anxiété' et l'optimisme ont fourni des éléments complémentaires en faveur de la validité de construction.General self‐efficacy is measured by a widely used parsimonious ten‐item scale that was developed for use in several cultures. The present paper compares the verions that were examined in samples of 430 German, 959 Costa Rican, and 293 Chinese university students. The internal consistencies were.84,.81, and.91, respectively. The unidimensional nature of the scale was replicated in all samples. Multilingual item‐pattern equivalence was only moderately supported by confirmatory factor analyses. Mean differences of sum scores between languages were found. Moreover, an interaction between gender and language emerged. Correlations with depression, anxiety, and optimism provided some further evidence for construct validity.
Forecasting the Real Exchange Rate
Authors: BURNS T. , LOBBAN P.W.M. , WARBURTON P. 
Published: January 2008

This brief examines the historical relationship between exchange rates and relative inflation rates for a group of major industrial countries. It establishes the concept of the ‘real exchange rate’ and the ‘productivity‐adjusted real exchange rate’ (PARE) as essential in understanding these relationships and projecting them into the future. It puts the discussion into the context of company decision making, as one important factor in the rate of return likely to accrue from different methods of supplying an overseas market.Differences in productivity between countries explain the divergences in prices of ‘non‐traded goods’. To give a simple example, a haircut costs much more in New York than in Madrid since high US wages reflect high productivity which does not apply in many parts of the service sector. These differences rule out the acceptance of the over simple ‘purchasing power parity’ approach which assumes that exchange rates will settle at a point where all prices (in terms of a common currency) are the same everywhere, or move together. Even after account has been taken of differences in productivity growth, productivity‐adjusted real exchange rates (PARE) ‐ though reasonably stable ‐ can still show some deviations, or ‘blips’. The ‘blip’ may occur because of rapid changes in the actual exchange rate or in domestic prices, in which case it is likely to prove temporary and the PARE rate will tend to adjust back to its normal level. But it may come from major structural changes, in which case PARE will be altered permanently within definable limits. A way of recognising the different categories of ‘blip’ is suggested in the brief.The PARE framework is then used to provide a guide to UK businesses who are concerned to calculate the future sterling value of foreign currency sales or, more generally, to estimate their competitiveness in supplying specific export markets. (The method used would apply equally well to other countries.) This is done by showing step‐by‐step the forecasting procedure to compute sterling's effective exchange rate to 1981 on assumptions concerning respective rates of inflation, monetary policy and the impact of North Sea oil. The computation shows that a sustained period of exchange rate stability is possible for the UK, even if UK inflation rates remain significantly above the world level for the next two years.
Medium term Prospects for the UK economy
Authors: KEATING GILES 
Published: January 2008

Prospects for the economy several years ahead are even more uncertain than projections of the near future. e overnment policy is currently particularly uncertain e iven that a general election is due to occur in the next 15 months. This article presents three ‘alternative scenarios’, one based on Conservative Party policies, the others on the spirit of Labour Party policies.The first case described is our central forecast. It is a continuation of current Conservative Party policies. The second and third cases are based on our interpretation of Labour Party policies. These policies are assumed to involve widespread use of government intervention, planning, wage and import controls. Monetary targets are relaxed or abandoned. We consider two possible out comes of such policies. Under one outcome the policies are relatively successjul in boosting output and employment without greatly raising inflation. Under the other out comes, output is lower than on current policies and inflationt much higher.
Economic Background to the Coal Dispute
Authors: ROBINSON BILL 
Published: January 2008

SummaryThis Briefing Paper attempts to explain the economic forces behind the decline of the coal industry. The main findings (presented in the order in which the argument is developed) are:

Coal output has been declining throughout this century. This decline accelerated in the 1950s and 1960s when coal was faced with competition from oil.
The decline was arrested by the the oil price increases of the 1970s which have allowed coal to establish and maintain a price advantage over alternative fuels. Despite this, coal has not increased its market share over the past decade.
Because of energy conservation, in response to the price increases of the 1970s, total energy demand has fallen over the past ten years.
With coal holding a stable share of a static market, the output projections for the industry drawn up in the 1970s including those in the 1974 “Plan for Coal” are now totally outdated.
Even if total energy demand were to expand, there would not necessarily be increased demand for British coal, which is more expensive to produce at the margin than alternative sources of supply (from the US, South Africa and Australia).
Home‐produced coal enjoys some natural protection from overseas competition because of high transport costs. In addition there is a tax on fuel oil and informal restrictions on imports. These partially insulate the domestic price of coal from changes in the world price.
The cost of producing coal has risen substantially in real terms since 1973‐4, despite a major investment programme. Productivity has risen slightly faster than the national average, but wages and non‐wage costs have risen very much faster.
The upward pressure on costs has come partly from the mineworkers' climb from twelfth to first or second place in the wages' league; and partly from the failure to close non‐economic pits fast enough.
This pressure on costs meant that by 1981‐2 less than half of the industry's total output was produced at profitable pits, which employed only 65,000 mineworkers.
There is a large tranche of marginally uneconomic pits which may be unprofitable one year but profitable another, and there is a strong case for keeping such pits open.
The number of pits which are profitable at the margin is very sensitive to movements in costs. I f mineworkers' wages had risen only in line with the national average for manufacturing over the period 1973‐4 to 1981‐2, the number of jobs in profitable pits would have been 95,000 rather than 65,000.
The subsidy per man in the most inefficient pit in 1981‐2 was of the order of £14000. The subsidy per man in the marginal pit at break‐even point for the industry as a whole was nearly £5000.
Under a cash limit system every pound spent on subsidising miners is a pound less available to spend elsewhere. Subsidising coal miners is a costly way of preserving jobs compared with alternatives.
THE AUTUMN STATEMENT
Authors: Budd Alan , Dicks Geoffrey 
Published: January 2008

The Treasury's forecast, published with the Autumn Statement, has been widely heralded as showing a surprisingly cheerful picture for next year as far as both output and inflation are concerned. In fact it is close to the forecast which we produced in October. Here we compare the two forecasts and then consider how our forecast is affected when we adopt the Treasury assumptions on asset sales and the exchange rate. We find that the Treasury is more optimistic than we are on investment and that holding the exchange rate ‐ which is needed to produce the official inflation forecast ‐ requires rather higher interest rates than we assumed in October and this widens the gap between our forecast for GDP and the Treasury's forecast.We also consider how the government should respond to lower North Sea oil revenues. Taking a permanent income approach, we suggest that the PSBR should be allowed to rise by £2bn on this basis. The same approach, however, suggests that an extra £71/2bn of asset sales should be used to cut the PSBR not taxes. On balance therefore this analysis indicates that next year's PSBR target should be lowered by £1/2bn from the £71/2 bn contained in the 1985 MTFS.
BARGAINING FOR LOWER INFLATION
Authors: Budd Alan 
Published: January 2008

Industrialists are concerned about the high level of interest rates. The government is refusing to take deliberate steps to cut them, particularly at a time when the exchange rate has been falling in response to events in oil markets. However, the government has suggested that wage moderation offers the best chance of a fall in interest rates. Can this be interpreted as a promise of a reward for good behaviour?The idea of a policy bargain, whereby the authorities promise some kind of fiscal or monetary stimulus as a reward for moderation in wage settlements, is not new. An explicit bargain of this type was offered by Mr Healey in 1976 and again in 1977. In each year he offered tax cuts contingent on the negotiation of a new pay policy. Some have interpreted Mr. Lawson's comments at the recent NEDC meeting as offering a similar type of bargain on interest rates. As far as we can tell, that interpretation is incorrect; there are however interesting and important questions about whether policy should respond to lower inflation.We argue that, in general, lower inflation will itself produce favourable automatic responses for real demand within a nominal policy framework. The question of the effects of wage moderation is rather more complex. We believe that no policy adjustment is necessary. This also appears to be the government's view.
Economic Viewpoint: The Dangers of “Reaganomics”
Authors: ROBINSON BILL , DICKS GEOFFREY 
Published: January 2008

After four years of steady output growth, and with the prospect of even faster growth this year, capacity constraints are emerging and inflation has doubled from the low point of May 1983. But unemployment has not fallen and some commentators are still calling for fiscal expansion. The ranks of the expansionists have been swollen by the signs of economic slowdown in the US, which have prompted the OECD to call for “an international configuration of policy‐settings conducive to a performance that is both sustainable and adequate”. The noted US‐based economist Rudiger Dornbusch has also called for a fiscal expansion worth about £5bn as part of a general plan to expand borrowing in Europe while the US cuts its deficit. The obvious objection to such a policy prescription is that it would be inflationary. However proponents of reflation are now careful to couch their expansionary fiscal policies in an anti‐inflation framework of tight monetary discipline.In this Economic Viewpoint we take issue with this prescription. We show that there are good theoretical reasons why the combination of tight monetary policy and fiscal expansion will always produce high interest rates and an uncompetitive exchange rate, and we show how this happened to Japan in the mid‐1970s as well as to the UK in 1980 and to the US at the present time. Our examination of these earlier episodes suggests that, although this policy mix is generally successful in boosting consumption and containing inflation, its longer‐term effects on investment and net trade are adverse. Even in a large, relatively‐closed economy these adverse consequences mean that the policies have sooner or later to be reversed. In a small open economy this reversal will happen sooner rather than later.
Economic Viewpoint: Does broad money matter?
Authors: BUDD ALAN , HOLLY SEAN 
Published: January 2008

Last October the Chancellor of the Exchequer suspended the target for the broad money supply (£M3). It was reinstated in this year's Budget with a range of 11 to 15 per cent. Its growth is currently exceeding even that apparently generous target. (On the terms of the original Medium‐Term Financial Strategy in 1980, the growth should have been cut to 5 to 9 per cent by 1983–4.) Does this rapid growth of £M3 matter? Does it raise the threat of higher inflation some time in the future, or can the government now readily abandon £M3 completely and concentrate instead on some other measure of the money supply – or indeed abandon monetary targeting altogether?The relevance of £M 3 as an intermediate target depends on whether there is a stable demand for it. We report econometric evidence which suggests that there is a stable demand for £M3, which depends, among other things, on the rate of inflation. We believe that the unexpectedly rapid growth of the money supply since 1981 partly reflects an adjustment of desired money balances to lower inflation. But once this process of adjustment is complete, monetary growth must be brought to far lower levels. We conclude that the government should continue to use £M3 as an intermediate target, supported, as at present, by a narrow measure.
THE 1987 BUDGET
Authors: Budd Alan , Dicks Geoffrey , Breedon Francis 
Published: January 2008

Our pre‐Budget forecast published last month correctly anticipated the main Budget measures (with the exception of the decision not to re‐valorise excise duties) and is very close to the Treasury's own forecast. We have updated the forecast for the Budget measures and other new information. Compared with the February Economic Outlook, our post‐Budget assessment has revised down slightly the short‐term forecast for output, inflation and the current account deficit. Consequently we share the Treasury's view that output will rise 3 per cent this year, but we are a little more optimistic on the outlook for inflation and the current account.In holding the PS BR to last year's expected outturn of £4bn, and more particularly in cutting the PSFD by £11/2zbn, the Budget represents a tightening in fiscal policy. Whether the overall policy stance is tightened depends on the response of the monetary authorities. Early indications are that the government will prevent interest rates from falling as far or as fast as they would otherwise do and that the exchange rate will be allowed to rise. This implies a tightening of policy in order to head off problems on inflation or the balance of payments. This argument is supported by the Treasury's own forecast, which is more pessimistic on both inflation and the current account than its predecessor in the Autumn Statement, and explains the Chancellor's decision not to re‐valorise excise duties. The post‐Budget forecast incorporates this change in policy. We now assume that the sterling index averages 70 this year and that base rates fall to 9 per cent by the end of the year.
The Conduct of Monetary Policy Without Monetary Aggregates
Authors: CURRIE DAVID 
Published: January 2008

A central dilemma for the monetary authorities is how to determine monetary policy. The increasing unreliability of monetary aggregates has led over the past few years to less concern for monetary targeting, both in the UK and elsewhere, and a greater influence for the exchange rate on monetary policy. But in the UK, most recently, there has been a move away from setting monetary policy in relation to the exchange rate and external considerations in favour of setting monetary policy in relation to domestic demand. Not surprisingly, this shift has occurred at a time of rising concern about domestic overheating. It illustrates the dilemma of whether monetary policy should be driven by domestic demand considerations or by external, exchange rate considerations. This dilemma is not just confined to the UK for it is a real source of conflict underlying the Louvre Accord and its successors that seek to determine G7 exchange rates in a cooperative manner.In what follows, we argue that exchange rate developments should have an appreciable influence on monetary policy, since this is helpful in attaining stable inflation. But we also suggest that this influence should not go too far, since this stability of inflation may be at the expense of stability of domestic demand and output. Targeting of exchange rates within narrow bands is unlikely to be desirable, unless fiscal policy can be used more flexibly to stabilize domestic demand. This suggests that, in the period up to the spring, the use of monetary policy to hold the £/JDM exchange rate within narrow limits may have been overdone. More seriously, international exchange rate agreements among the G7 countries are likely to founder under adverse market pressures, unless current imbalances in fiscal policy are adjusted. In the absence of greater flexibility in fiscal policy, policy makers will have to trade off domestic and exchange rate considerations in determining monetary policy. An important outstanding issue that needs further consideration is what indicators should be used for monetary policy, in a world in which monetary aggregates provide unreliable signals.