bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Intergovernmental Organizations and Foreign Policy Behavior: Some Empirical Findings
Authors: McCormick James M. , Kihl Young W. 
Published: May 2006

In this study, we evaluate whether the increase in the number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) has resulted in their increased use for foreign policy behavior by the nations of the world. This question is examined in three related ways: (1) the aggregate use of IGOs for foreign policy behavior; (2) the relationship between IGO membership and IGO use; and (3) the kinds of states that use IGOs. Our data base consists of the 35 nations in the CREON (Comparative Research on the Events of Nations) data set for the years 1959–1968.The main findings are that IGOs were employed over 60 percent of the time with little fluctuation on a year-by-year basis, that global and “high politics” IGOs were used more often than regional and “low politics” IGOs, that institutional membership and IGO use were generally inversely related, and that the attributes of the states had limited utility in accounting for the use of intergovernmental organizations. Some of the theoretical implications of these findings are then explored.
Representative Deliberations and Representative Decisions: Proportional Representation and the Borda Rule
Authors: Chamberlin John R. , Courant Paul N. 
Published: May 2006

The development of social choice theory over the past three decades has brought many new insights into democratic theory. Surprisingly, the theory of representation has gone almost untouched by social choice theorists. This article redresses this neglect and provides an axiomatic study of one means of implementing proportional representation.The distinguishing feature of proportional representation is its concern for the representativeness of deliberations as well as decisions. We define a representative in a way that is particularly attentive to this feature and then define a method of selecting representatives (a variant of the Borda rule) which selects a maximally representative body. We also prove that this method of selection meets four social choice axioms that are met by a number of other important social choice functions (including pairwise majority decision and the Borda rule).
Is Minimax Regret Applicable to Voting Decisions?
Authors: Mayer Lawrence S. , Good I. J. 
Published: May 2006

In a recent article (“The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis,” APSR, 68 [June, 1974], 525–536) John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina suggest that a (potential) voter may be rational in deciding whether to vote and yet not use the expected-utility calculus introduced for this purpose by Downs and Tullock and extended by Riker and Ordeshook. The authors suggest that a rational voter, in deciding whether to vote, may use the minimax regret criterion due to the late L. J. Savage. Define the regret of an Act A as the difference, if the true state of nature were known (in advance), between the best expected payoff that could be obtained and the expected payoff that would be obtained by act A. Then the minimax regret criterion requires the decision maker to act in such a way as to minimize the maximum regret that he can suffer.They also discuss the fact that the minimax regret criterion does not require the voter to supply any (objective or subjective) estimates of the probabilities associated with the various outcomes of the election. Thus they feel that it is an attractive criterion for decision making under “uncertainty” as opposed to decision making under “risk.”
Comment on Burnham's “Theory and Voting Research”
Authors: Converse Philip E. 
Published: May 2006

I am very grateful to Dean Burnham for his labor in checking out a number of “plausible rival hypotheses” that I proposed some years ago might account for the bundle of changes in American voting statistics he had first described in his seminal 1965 paper. I had pointed out these possibilities with some vigor, since if they could be shown to have empirical merit, they would seem to put a rather different light on those historical changes, relative to the interpretations Burnham originally provided.I now read the current paper as indicating that for the areas covered, changes in registration practices do appear to have affected turnout adversely, following one of our original rival hypotheses. It also suggests, however, that this registration change does not begin to account for all of the decline in turnout that occurred around 1900, particularly in states like Pennsylvania. It goes on to imply that some other familiar factors affecting turnout, such as party competition, also contributed to that change. In effect, the turnout decline not accounted for by structural change seems greatest where the realignment of 1896 moved states from competitive to rather noncompetitive status (the more frequent case); but states moved by the same events from noncompetitive into competitive status, like Missouri and, in fact, numerous other upper midwestern states, do not show the same pattern as Pennsylvania.All this is well and good, particularly as Burnham in his penultimate paragraph sets aside the 1965 conspiratorial interpretation of the change that had originally prompted our own brief inquiries as to probable causes.
Institutionalization, the Ombudsman, and Bureaucracy
Authors: Hill Larry B. 
Published: May 2006

This article proposes an authority based conception of the phenomenon of institutionalization. Whereas most social science writing on the subject focuses either upon the organization's internal structural integration (such criteria as well-boundedness, universalism, complexity, and coherence often are employed) or upon its ability to cope with environmental challenges (the concepts of adaptability and autonomy have been suggested), I propose that an organization'soffensive capabilitiesvis à vis environmental actors be viewed as a measurement of its institutionalization.Principally based upon fieldwork in New Zealand bolstered by additional research in Scandinavia, Britain, and Hawaii, this study focuses upon the institutionalization of the ombudsman—an increasingly popular bureaucratic control mechanism. A sociometric analysis of ombudsman-bureaucratic interaction is undertaken, and four questions are investigated: How extensive is the interaction? How consequential is the threat posed by complaints? What demands does the ombudsman make? How cooperative is the agency in responding? The investigation provides answers which are indicative of the ombudsman's successful institutionalization. That is, the office performs its mission and has established itself with the environmental actors as an authority figure.
The Future of Community Control
Authors: Fainstein Norman I. , Fainstein Susan S. 
Published: May 2006

The nature of community control ideology, its relation to more general political consciousness, and its social correlates are explored. The primary data are drawn from two main sources: a survey of the attitudes of 362 civic and political leaders in seven districts of New York City conducted in 1972 using a combination of structural and reputational indicators to identify the sample; and intensive participant observation in three of these districts during 1973–74, along with 175 semi-structured, in-depth interviews with individuals in district-level voluntary organizations, interest groups, political parties, poverty boards and agencies, and “street-level” bureaucratic roles.Both quantitative and qualitative analyses suggest that the great majority of leaders subscribes to a democratic rather than a race-conflict rationale for community control, but that there is a strong independent relationship between minority group status and operational support for community control. Possible explanations for this finding include the present interests of minority groups in American cities, the functional inadequacies of the political party structure, and the developmental history of the civil rights movement and its ideology. The relationship between race and community control may fade, however, if community control ceases to be a useful vehicle for advancing the interests of minority groups. One crucial determinant will be the identifications and beliefs of minority group members who are recruited into urban bureaucracies. Another is whether experience with decentralized city agencies indicates that movement toward increased community involvement in government leads, in fact, to enhanced power and patronage for minorities. The data point to a continuing attachment to the community control ideology but also a recasting of it in a more qualifiéd and complex form.
Models of Statistical Relationship
Authors: Weisberg Herbert F. 
Published: May 2006

The choice among measures of relationship has increasingly become a matter of the interpretation of their intermediate values. Interpretations are important, but a prior question is the statistic's implicit model of a relationship—what it considers a perfect relationship, and what it considers a null relationship. A family of models based on combinations of certain maximum- and null-value conditions is analyzed in this paper. The distinction between the models can be used to shed light on the stakes involved in the choice among dichotomous variable measures as well as that among familiar ordinal statistics.The models are ordered in terms of their leniency, and the coefficients based on each model are specified. An empirical analysis shows that the different measures are positively correlated, but those measures based on different models can differ sharply from one another. Statistics based on the same model covary regardless of differences in their interpretations. Since different models are intended to measure different concepts, multiple coefficients can allow investigators to examine their data in greater detail. Several political examples of the use of multiple models are provided.
Ordinal Preference Games: An Analysis of Legislative Coalition Formation Without Transferable Utility
Authors: Koehler David H. 
Published: May 2006

Two important findings from n-person game theory are that coalition formation is superadditive if and only if a game possesses an empty core, and Riker's size principle. Up to the present, both theorems have been proved and critiqued under the assumption of transferable cardinal utility.This analysis eliminates the cardinal utility assumption on the grounds that it is generally inconsistent with the conditions that characterize collective choice on political issues. Instead, a model of collective decision making is set forth in terms of ordinal preferences, and the two theorems are reconsidered. The superadditivity theorem survives intact, whereas the size principle is weakened. Circumstances are identified in which there is no incentive to reduce an oversized winning coalition; however, under no condition is there an incentive to increase the size of a winning coalition. A number of coalition-size hypotheses are tested using roll-call data from the U.S. Senate. The results raise new questions about the role of coalition formation in legislative voting strategy.
Deeds Under a Doctrine: Civil Liberties in the 1963 Term
Authors: Murphy Walter F. 
Published: May 2006

Judged by any standards the 1963 term of the United States Supreme Court was one of momentous importance to the future of the American political system. Most immediately, the Justices once again found themselves embroiled in political controversy, their decisions attacked by the Republican party platform, by the Republican presidential candidate and by many members of Congress.Among the more notable deeds of the 1963 term were decisions writing into the margins of the Constitution the formula “one man, one vote” as the proper rule for apportioning electoral districts for the House of Representatives and for both houses of state legislatures. The Court also invalidated two acts of Congress, and in the field of criminal justice introduced several new principles while overturning supposedly settled law. In addition the Court again struck down officially sanctioned prayers in public schools.For its part, Congress seriously considered constitutional amendments to reverse the school prayer decisions of this and previous terms, and to modify the doctrine of the reapportionment cases. The House went so far as to pass a bill to remove from federal courts jurisdiction to hear apportionment suits.
A logical measure function
Authors: Kemeny John G. 
Published: May 2006

By a logical measure (for a given language) we mean a syntactically defined function which associates some value with each well-formed formula of the language. Various such logical measures have played a fundamental role in the development of Logic and the Philosophy of Science. The purpose of this paper is to define a logical measure which has much wider applications than measures so far studied.The new measure has two fundamental advantages, which will be referred to throughout the paper. First of all it can be applied to more (and richer) languages than the older measures. Most of the measures now in use are restricted to the first-order functional calculus, and frequently even to a first-order calculus with one-place predicates only. The measure to be defined will be applicable to richer languages as well, e.g., to functional calculi of all finite orders. But even as far as the first-order functional calculus is concerned, the new measure has a great advantage: We do not have to require that the atomic sentences of the calculus be independent. The previous measures depended in their construction on the requirement that “the basic statements of the language express independent facts.”By an atomic sentence we mean a well-formed formula formed by applying an h-place primitive predicate to h individuals (a well-formed formula no part of which is well-formed); by a permissible conjunction we mean a conjunction of atomic sentences and negations of other atomic sentences; and the requirement of independence is that an atomic sentence (or its negation) is logically implied by a permissible conjunction only if it (its negation) is one of the components of the conjunction.
On the reduction of the decision problem. Third paper. Pepis prefix, a single binary predicate
Authors: Kalmár László , Surányi János 
Published: May 2006

It has been proved by Pepis that any formula of the first-order predicate calculus is equivalent (in respect of being satisfiable) to another with a prefix of the formcontaining a single existential quantifier. In this paper, we shall improve this theorem in the like manner as the Ackermann and the Gödel reduction theorems have been improved in the preceding papers of the same main title. More explicitly, we shall prove theTheorem 1. To any given first-order formula it is possible to construct an equivalent one with a prefix of the form (1) and a matrix containing no other predicate variable than a single binary one.An analogous theorem, but producing a prefix of the formhas been proved in the meantime by Surányi; some modifications in the proof, suggested by Kalmár, led to the above form.
On virtual classes and real numbers
Authors: Martin R. M. 
Published: May 2006

In a simple, applied functional calculus of first order (i.e., one admitting no functional variables but at least one functional constant), abstracts or schematic expressions may be introduced to play the role of variables over designatable sets or classes. The entities or quasi-entities designated or quasi-designated by such abstracts may be called, following Quine, virtual classes and relations. The notion of virtual class is always relative to a given formalism and depends upon what functional constants are taken as primitive. The first explicit introduction of a general notation for virtual classes (relative to a given formalism) appears to be D4.1 of the author's A homogeneous system for formal logic. That paper develops a system admitting only individuals as values for variables and is adequate for the theory of general recursive functions of natural numbers. Numbers and functions are in fact identified with certain kinds of virtual classes and relations.In the present paper it will be shown how certain portions of the theory of real numbers can be constructed upon the basis of the theory of virtual classes and relations of H.L.The method of building up the real numbers to be employed is essentially an adaptation of standard procedure. Although the main ideas underlying this method are well known, the mirroring of these ideas within the framework of the restricted concepts admitted here presents possibly some novelty. In particular, a basis for the real numbers is provided which in no way admits classes or relations or other "abstract" objects as values for variables. Presupposing the natural numbers, the essential steps are to construct the simple rationals as virtual dyadic relations between natural numbers, to construct the generalized or signed rationals as virtual tetradic relations among natural numbers, and then to formulate a notation for real numbers as virtual classes (of a certain kind) of generalized rationals. Of course, there are several alternative methods. This procedure, however, appears to correspond more to the usual one.
Note on two theorems of Mostowski
Authors: Doss Raouf 
Published: May 2006

The present note is conceived as a sequel to Mostowki's paper, Über die Unabhängigkeit des Wohlordnungssatzes vom Ordnungsprinzip (which will be quoted as “M.”).In that paper Mostowski considers a system of axioms , very close to the system of axiomatic set theory of Bernays, but where the axiom of choice is not supposed to hold. Mostowski proves that the well-ordering theorem (Wohlordnungssatz) cannot be derived from the system plus the principle of simple ordering (Ordnungsprinzip).
Deducibility with respect to necessary and impossible propositions
Authors: Emch Arnold F. 
Published: May 2006

Inasmuch as my discussion of the formal properties of “System L,” presented elsewhere, is substantially the same as that presented by Lewis in a previous issue of this Journal, I shall confine my remarks in this brief rejoinder to the problem of deducibility with respect to necessary and impossible propositions—since it is specifically the solution of this problem which will determine the adequacy of the calculus of logical implication as a canon and critique of deductive inference.The problem, as originally presented, can be stated succinctly in the following inconsistent triad: (1) All necessarily true principles are logically dependent on or deducible from one another, i.e., are equivalent, (2) All principles of logic and mathematics are necessarily true, and (3) Some principles of logic and mathematics are not logically dependent on or deducible from one another, i.e., are independent. These three propositions are logically inconsistent in the sense that the conjunction of any two of them will logically imply the falsity of the third. Now if Lewis should affirm the first and third of these propositions, then he should concede the falsity of the second. This concession, it was believed, he was not likely to make, inasmuch as it would seem to involve a repudiation of a doctrine (the tautological character of every logical and mathematical truth) with which he has particularly identified himself. If, in view of this fact, he should accept, instead, the second and third of these propositions, then he should concede the falsity of the first.
Systems of transfinite types involving λ-conversion
Authors: L'Abbé Maurice 
Published: May 2006

The problem of constructing formal systems involving transfinite types was briefly suggested many times in the literature. Actually few attempts have been made to develop such systems. In particular, there exists a system based on a set of axioms and rules of inference suggested by Church and worked out in detail by E. Bustamante in his dissertation. Recently, John Kemeny has reformulated this system in a simplified way and has obtained an interesting hierarchy of systems. It so happens that all these systems considered by Kemeny may be regarded as successive extensions of a particular formulation of the theory of finite types, namely a certain monadic functional calculus of order ω whose main ideas are due to Tarski.There exists on the other hand a quite different formulation of the theory of finite types which is due to Church. It is a formulation which incorporates certain features of the calculus of λ-conversion, and which has revealed itself quite advantageous for certain purposes. The formulation of the theory of transfinite types which we are going to introduce in this paper may be considered as an attempt to generalize Church's formulation of the theory of finite types.
Two concepts from the theory of models
Authors: Henkin Leon 
Published: May 2006

In this note we point out that two concepts which have been introduced separately into the theory of models are extensionally equivalent. The basic ideas can be expressed conveniently in the terminology of Tarski's theory of arithmetical classes. It will be recalled that an arithmetical class is a class consisting of all algebraic structures which satisfy some fixed sentence of the first-order functional calculus. A more general concept is that of a quasi-arithmetical class, whose elements are all algebraic structures which satisfy some fixed set of first-order sentences.Now where H and K are any two classes of algebraic structures, Abraham Robinson has defined the relation H is persistent with respect to K to mean that (i) H∩K is non-empty, and (ii) whenever M ϵ H∩K, M′ is an extension of M, and M′ ϵ K, then M′ ϵ H. Concerning this notion Robinson has established the following theorem: If K is the class of abelian groups (or of commutative fields) and H is an arithmetical class which is persistent with respect to K, then H∩K contains a group (or field) which is finite. This leads us to the following definition.
Axiom schemes for m-valued functional calculi of first order. Part II
Authors: Rosser J. B. , Turquette A. R. 
Published: May 2006

In part I of the present paper axiom schemes and rules of inference were defined for m-valued functional calculi of first order with s(m > s > 1) designated truth-values. A proof of plausibility was given, and it was shown that it is not difficult to extend to m-valued functional calculi of first order certain concepts that are closely analogous to the ordinary 2-valued notions of “consistency with respect to an operator” and “absolute consistency.” The purpose of the present paper is to show that the concept of “deductive completeness” may be extended to m-valued functional calculi of first order. For this purpose we define “analytic formula” for the m-valued case and show that if a formula is analytic, then it is provable in our formalization of m-valued functional calculi of first order.In proving deductive completeness for the m-valued case, it is possible to use a method which is analogous to that used by Gödel in establishing the completeness of 2-valued functional calculi of first order. However, in the present paper we will indicate only very briefly how the Gödel procedure may be extended to the m-valued case. Our chief concern will be the problem of extending to our formalization of m-valued functional calculi the more elegant proof of deductive completeness for the 2-valued case which has recently been developed by Leon Henkin.