bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Entrepreneurship and Household Saving
Authors: Gentry William M. , Hubbard R. Glenn 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
Using data from the 1983 and 1989 Federal Reserve Board Surveys of Consumer Finances, we quantify three findings about entrepreneurial saving decisions and their role in household wealth accumulation. First, entrepreneurial households own a substantial share of household wealth and income, and this share increases throughout the wealth distribution and the income distribution. Second, the portfolios of entrepreneurial households, even wealthy ones, are very undiversified, with the bulk of assets held within active businesses. Third, wealth-income ratios and saving rates are higher for entrepreneurial households even after controlling for age and other demographic variables. Taken together, these findings suggest that studies of household saving decisions in general and of the savings decisions of wealthy or high-income households in particular have paid insufficient attention to the role of entrepreneurial decisions and their role in wealth accumulation.
Welfare Reform and Non-Marital Fertility in the 1990s: Evidence from Birth Records
Authors: Joyce Ted , Kaestner Robert , Korenman Sanders 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act dramatically altered the economic incentive to bear children out-of-wedlock for economically disadvantaged women or couples most likely to avail themselves of welfare programs. We use data from vital statistics and a difference-in-differences research design to investigate whether state and federal welfare reform in the 1990s reduced rates of non-marital childbearing among women aged 19 to 39 at highest risk of welfare use, relative to women at lower risk. We find little consistent evidence for an effect of welfare reform on non-marital childbearing. This finding is similar to the literature that found little or mixed evidence for an effect of AFDC benefits. If anything, federal welfare reform has been associated with a small positive effect of two to three percent for white and black women ages 19 to 39.
Using Placebo Laws to Test "More Guns, Less Crime"
Authors: Helland Eric , Tabarrok Alexander 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
We reexamine Mustard and Lott’s controversial study on the effect of “shall-issue” gun laws on crime using an empirical standard error function randomly generated from “placebo” laws. We find that the effect of shall-issue laws on crime is much less well-estimated than the Mustard and Lott (1997) and Lott (2000) results suggest. We also find, however, that the cross equation restrictions implied by the Lott-Mustard theory are supported. A boomlet has occurred in recent years in the use of quasi-natural experiments to answer important questions of public policy. The intuitive power of this approach, however, has sometimes diverted attention from the statistical assumptions that must be made, particularly regarding standard errors. Failing to take into account serial correlation and grouped data can dramatically reduce standard errors suggesting greater certainty in effects than is actually the case. We find that the placebo law technique (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2002) is a useful addition to the econometrician’s toolkit.
What Do We Know About Cross-subsidization? Evidence from Merging Firms.
Authors: Chevalier Judith 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
A substantial empirical literature documents value-destroying “cross-subsidization” among the divisions of diversified firms. However, this literature relies upon two maintained hypotheses: that divisions of diversified firms are randomly allocated to their corporate parents and that the investment opportunities facing conglomerate divisions are identical to those of stand-alone firms in their industries. I examine the investment behavior prior to merger of a sample of firms that undertook diversifying mergers between 1980 and 1995. I show that, in my sample, investment patterns that the literature has attributed to cross-subsidization between divisions are apparent in the pairs of merging firms prior to their mergers. Thus, some of the cross-subsidization results in the literature may be attributable to selection bias. I also examine stock market responses to announcements of diversifying acquisitions. The event responses are largely independent of measures of the extent to which the merger is diversifying.
Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Authors: Cramton Peter , Schwartz Jesse A 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. Simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. This “code bidding” occurs when one bidder tags the last few digits of its bid with the market number of a related license. We examine how extensively bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids and code bids in the DEF-block PCS spectrum auction. We find that only a small fraction of the bidders commonly used retaliating bids and code bids. These bidders won more than 40% of the spectrum for sale and paid significantly less for their overall winnings.
On Vertical Differentiation Under Bertrand and Cournot: When Input Quality has Upward Sloping Supply
Authors: Frascatore Mark R. 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
This paper compares Bertrand and Cournot duopolies in which firms can vertically differentiate their products and in which input quality has upward sloping supply. Contrary to previous results, if supply is either linear or convex with a high coefficient, firms differentiate their products equally under Bertrand and Cournot, with one firm choosing the minimum quality. If supply is convex with a low coefficient, firms differentiate more under Bertrand. Profit and welfare implications are discussed, as is the strategic choice of quality as an entry deterrence strategy.
Pension systems in integrated capital markets
Authors: Casarico Alessandra 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
The paper studies the effects on factor prices and welfare of the integration in a perfect world capital market of countries that differ in the degree of funding of their pension systems. It focuses on two large economies running respectively a pay-as-you-go and a fully funded pension system and it first analyzes the open economy implications of the different pension designs under the assumption that the pay-as-you-go system is balanced and in steady state equilibrium. It then elaborates on the institutional structure of the pay-as-you-go system to analyze how its degree of maturity, its expenditure profile and the presence of debt financing affect factor prices and welfare in open economy. Finally, it focuses on pension reform issues. The paper shows that, under perfect capital mobility, the differences in the degree of funding of the pension systems cause divergent welfare effects across generations and across countries. It shows that the design features of the pay-as-you-go scheme play a role in the world equilibrium and it identifies which of them can amplify or reduce the open economy linkages operating through the pension schemes.
Ambient environmental inspections and commitment towards enforcement policies: substitutes or complements?
Authors: Franckx Laurent 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
We consider an inspection game between polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency that can inspect ambient pollution before inspecting individual firms. We assume that the enforcement agency's objectives do not perfectly correspond with the objectives of the legislative body who determines the standards for compliance and the fines for non-compliance, and that the enforcement agency can determine its inspection policy independently. However, contrary to Franckx (2002), we assume that the agency can commit to inspection probabilities. We show that this commitment power radically changes the value of ambient inspections.
If the legislator imposes an infinite fine, commitment power and ambient inspections are perfect substitutes: both allow the agency to obtain perfect compliance without actually inspecting firms. However, with upper limits to the fine, ambient inspections and commitment power are complements. Indeed, if the agency does not conduct ambient inspections, it can only obtain perfect compliance by announcing high probabilities of firm inspections. With stringent upper limits to the fine, this implies high inspection costs. However, if the agency conducts ambient inspections, it can announce probabilities of firm inspections that are conditional on behavior that will not be observed in equilibrium, and all firms will comply.
Incentives to Invest in Transport Cost Reduction - Conceptual Issues and an Application to Electronic Commerce
Authors: Bandulet Martin , Morasch Karl 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
Do firms have proper incentives to invest in transport cost reduction? We discuss this question in a duopoly with a local firm and a distant competitor that may invest in a reduction of marginal transportation costs. In a two-stage game with investment in the first and duopoly competition in the second stage, we compare profit-maximizing investment with (constrained) welfare maximization by a social planer. Intuitively, a firm will overinvest if the negative impact on its competitor exceeds the gain in consumer surplus. We analyze how the relative strength of these two effects depends on market demand, firm conduct and investment costs. Applying our results to electronic commerce, we argue that for physical goods either overinvestment or the efficient decision not to invest is the most likely outcome while the specific characteristics of digital products yield either underinvestment or an efficient investment level that reduces transportation costs to zero.
The Geography of Intra-Industry Trade: empirics
Authors: Venables Anthony J. , Rice Patricia G. , Stewart Martin 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
This paper uses bilateral trade data for OECD countries at the 3-digit industry level to investigate the geography of intra-industry trade (IIT). IIT diminishes with distance and much of the existing empirical literature suggests that this is an inherent characteristic of such trade, arguing that trade in sectors intensive in IIT is choked off rapidly by distance. We show that the dependence of IIT on geography arises not because of any inherent feature of the effects of distance on such trade, but because of the spatial structure of countries’ supply and demand characteristics; close countries do a lot of IIT because they have similar economic structures.
Legal Hold-up in Cotenancy
Authors: Baucells Manel , Lippman Steven A. 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
Our analysis (Baucells and Lippman [2001]) of the problem of legal hold-up in co-ownership, in which legal partition is the only remedy to force a sale, proceeded as if a sale of the asset could be effected at any time at a fixed price if the cotenants agree. Here we utilize the more realistic assumption that potential buyers appear intermittently (in accord with a Poisson process and that the price offered is drawn from a specified distribution).
In applying the Nash bargaining solution, we select the disagreement point in accord either with Nash's methodology of rational threats or with reservation values. While neither methodology for selecting the disagreement point produces a credible threat when the agents incur legal costs, we argue that the rational threats approach produces more reasonable answers. Our main analysis considers the impact of a Poisson arrival of offers and an exponential time to court upon the optimal bargaining strategies of the cotenants.
Measuring the Impact of Welfare Benefits on Welfare Durations: State Stratified Partial Likelihood and Fixed Effect Approaches
Authors: Fitzgerald John M 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
Previous studies of welfare durations in the U.S. have analyzed the role of welfare benefits on the length of time recipients remain on welfare. Typically these studies use individual data and estimate the benefit effects based on both cross-sectional variation across locations and time variation within locations. Cross sectional results on benefit effects may be biased due to unobserved state specific differences in welfare programs or attitudes. This paper compares two strategies for dealing with the problem when estimating welfare exit hazard models: stratification of baseline hazards by state and the inclusion of state fixed effects in the hazards. Although the results show that high benefit states appear to have unobserved characteristics that lead to longer spells, the results also show that increases in welfare benefits do not directly increase welfare durations once one controls for state specific effects.
What Determines Environmental Performance at Paper Mills? The Roles of Abatement Spending, Regulation, and Efficiency
Authors: Shadbegian Ronald J , Gray Wayne B 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
This paper examines the determinants of environmental performance at paper mills, measured by air pollution emissions per unit of output. We consider differences across plants in air pollution abatement expenditures, local regulatory stringency, and productive efficiency. Emissions are significantly lower in plants with a larger air pollution abatement capital stock: a 10 percent increase in abatement capital stock appears to reduce emissions by 6.9 percent. This translates into a sizable social return: one dollar of abatement capital stock is estimated to provide an annual social return of about 75 cents in pollution reduction benefits. Local regulatory stringency and productive efficiency also matter: plants in non-attainment counties have 43 percent lower emissions and plants with 10 percent higher productivity have 2.5 percent lower emissions. For pollution abatement operating costs we find (puzzlingly) positive, but always insignificant, coefficients.
An Economic Assessment of Parents' Self-Composure: The Case of Physical Child Abuse
Authors: Agee Mark D , Crocker Thomas , Shogren Jason F 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
This paper uses a maximum likelihood procedure that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity in the sample to implement a preference-based model to assess factors that influence parents' likelihood of losing their composure and physically abusing their children. A basic supposition of the model is that parents prefer to deal with parent-child conflict by choosing tactics and behaviors that do not exceed a specified level of violence; however, endogenous parent and child behaviors and exogenous circumstances may arouse parents' emotions that cause this level to be exceeded. Our results suggest policy interventions that influence such circumstances and associated behaviors may strongly influence the incidence of physical child abuse. We estimate the ex ante annual value parents attach to risk reductions of self-composure losses associated with excessive parent-child violence. This value is shown to be greater than currently estimated annual savings in ex post costs associated with a comparable decrease in U.S. physical child abuse incidence.
Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization With Evasion
Authors: Gandelman Néstor , Hernández-Murillo Rubén 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
We examine a two-jurisdiction tax competition environment where local governments can only imperfectly monitor where agents pay taxes and risk-averse individuals may choose to cross borders to pay lower taxes in a neighboring location.
In a game between local authorities, we find that, when communities differ in size, in equilibrium the smaller community sets lower taxes and attracts agents from the larger jurisdiction. With identical communities, tax rates must be equal.
Finally, we examine the incentives of jurisdictions to harmonize tax rates and find that, whenever the smaller community benefits from tax harmonization, the larger jurisdiction will benefit also.
Spatial Competition and Merger
Authors: Higgins Richard S , Johnson Paul A , Sullivan John T 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
We consider a computational equilibrium model of spatially differentiated Bertrand competition and apply it to merger analysis. Two pricing paradigms are studied: one where firms cannot price discriminate among customers and one where firms can. The model encompasses many details that make it highly realistic. A detailed example illustrates several insights into merger analysis that are not readily apparent through traditional means. The most important of these is that merger of substitute products under Bertrand price competition need not result in a price increase.
Has Curriculum Closed the Test Score Gap in Math?
Authors: Rose Heather 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
This study examines the extent to which convergence in mathematics course-taking behavior is responsible for narrowing the Hispanic-white and the black-white test score gaps during the 1980s. Mathematics curriculum is measured in detail using high school transcript data from both High School and Beyond and the National Education Longitudinal Study of 1988. After controlling for demographic, family, and school characteristics, changes in curriculum account for about 60 percent of the narrowing Hispanic-white test score gap between 1982 and 1992. However, the black-white test score gap did not drop significantly.
Producers and Predators in a Multiple Community Setting
Authors: Han Shinkyoo , Ochs Jack 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
This paper analyzes an extension of a model of production and predation due to Grossman (1998) to a multiple community setting. In a multiple community setting, defense expenditures in any one community have the property of a local public good. Such expenditures produce effects on other communities. These effects include changes in the distribution of population among communities, the redistribution of predatory effort over communities, and an induced change in the predator/producer ratio in the economy as a whole. The question we address is whether the level of defense chosen by local governments so as to maximize the per capita consumption of their own producers, given defense levels elsewhere, always produces a second-best outcome. Our analysis shows that if the number of communities is fixed, fully rational local government decision-making leads to the same level of defense activity and equilibrium per capita consumption as would be chosen by a central planner. However, if individual local governments are boundedly rational, in the sense that they do not anticipate the effects of their own defense activity on the equilibrium predator/producer ratio and distribution of producer activity, then competition among local governments never achieves a first-best outcome. Furthermore, the equilibrium associated with competition among boundedly rational local governments can sometimes yield a lower consumption per capita in equilibrium than would be achieved if there were no local governments and each agent who chose to be a producer also chose his/her own level of defense.
Race, Ethnicity, and Gender Differences in the Relationship Between Substance Use and Adolescent Sexual Behavior
Authors: Averett Susan L , Rees Daniel I , Duncan Brian , Argys Laura 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
Previous researchers have noted that the positive correlation between substance use and sexual behavior is stronger for white adolescents than for their black and Hispanic counterparts. Using an instrumental variables approach to control for the possible endogeneity of substance use, and data from The National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we estimate the effects of alcohol and marijuana use on the probability of being sexually active by race, ethnicity, and gender. Our results suggest that there exist potentially important racial, ethnic and gender differences in the relationship between substance use and sexual behavior. This information may be valuable for policymakers interested in reducing sexual activity among teens.
Time In Purgatory: Examining the Grant Lag for U.S. Patent Applications
Authors: Popp David , Juhl Ted , Johnson Daniel K.N. 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
As patent applications increase, and the range of patentable technologies increases, the length of time it takes for an invention to go through the examination process at the U.S. Patent Office has increased. Concerns over the distributional effects of these changes have been expressed during policy debates. We use data on U.S. patent applications and grants to ask who is affected by longer grant lags. We augment this analysis with interviews of patent examiners, leading to a better understanding of the examination process. Our analysis finds that differences across technology are most important. These differences do not erode over time, suggesting that learning effects alone will not reduce grant lags. Inventor characteristics have statistically significant effects, but the magnitudes are small.
Interest Groups and Get Out the Vote Drives
Authors: Cadigan John 
Published: December 2005

Abstract
This article analyzes voter mobilization and interest group activity within a citizen-candidate model. Interest groups influence the decisions of 'high cost’ voters by running a 'get out the vote’ campaign. Membership fees paid by citizens joining an interest group finance the vote drives. Because citizens choose whether to join an interest group, size is an endogenous feature of equilibrium outcomes. In contrast to the existing literature, it is shown that smaller groups may have greater influence. Importantly, this result does not depend on the ability of smaller groups to overcome the free rider problem. Intuitively, because smaller groups may have a less diverse membership, they can advocate more extreme policy outcomes. An interest group’s influence is shown to depend on voting costs and the separation between candidate positions. The presence of multiple interest groups mitigates an interest’s influence, resulting in inefficiency.