bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Rebuilding War-Torn States
Authors: del Castillo Graciana 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
With the end of the Cold War, countries coming out of internal conflicts have embarked on a complex transition to peace. Violence must give way to public security. Political exclusion must cave in to the rule of law and participatory government. Former enemies must learn to live with each other and strive for national reconciliation. War-torn and mismanaged economies must reconstruct and provide a decent and licit living for their citizens. This book argues that because economic reconstruction takes place amid the constraints imposed by this multi-pronged transition, it is fundamentally different from normal development. In fact, the book attributes failures ranging from Afghanistan to Iraq, from Kosovo to several in Africa, to the development as usual approach followed. Rather, effective reconstruction is a development-plus challenge in which — in addition to the normal challenge of socio-economic development — countries need to carry out demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants into productive activities and other peace-related activities, which often have serious financial implications and involve tough choices. Peace will not last in countries that fail to address these issues. In fact, post-conflict countries have a fifty percent chance of reverting to war. The purpose of the book is to present the basic premises, lessons, best practices, and policy guidelines necessary to design an effective strategy for post-conflict economic reconstruction. Unless jobs are created and the political and security objectives of peacetime prevail at all times, peace will be ephemeral. Keeping the present course does not seem a viable option.
2 Debate on the economic consequences of peacetime
Authors: del Castillo Graciana 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
Peace is not only difficult to build, but, like war, it has important economic and financial consequences. Unlike the post-World War periods when policymakers, scholars, and practitioners debated the ‘transfer problem’ of paying war reparations, as well as the Marshall Plan, post-Cold War economic reconstruction failed to generate a rigorous theoretical and practical debate. In fact, because countries were at low levels of development, reconstruction followed a misplaced ‘development as usual’ approach, ignoring that national reconciliation is a key goal during the transition to peace in countries coming out of internal conflict. Chapter 2 argues that, given the reversal of the peace process in Lebanon and Sri Lanka and the failing transitions to peace in Afghanistan, Timor-Leste, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and others, it is not too late to initiate a debate about alternative policies and practices for effective economic reconstruction in the new context.
8 UN‐led reconstruction following NATO‐led military intervention: Kosovo
Authors: del Castillo Graciana 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
The UN-led reconstruction following the 1999 NATO-led military intervention in Kosovo provides a striking contrast in reconstruction to that of El Salvador. This chapter analyzes how UNMIK, with a mandate from the Security Council, had to perform civil administration functions that are usually the sole prerogative of a sovereign government. To perform these functions, the UN led, for the first time, ‘an integrated operation’, in which the UN set priorities and coordinated humanitarian, civil administration, democratization, and economic reconstruction activities carried out by other organizations. Without being an independent country and with its final status in limbo, Kosovo faced special challenges in policymaking for reconstruction, particularly concerning tax and customs revenue collection, financing from the IFIs, money creation, debt, and property rights, among others. This, in conjunction with misconceived economic policies and UN inability to lead an integrated operation, has failed to put Kosovo on a sound economic footing.
10 US‐led reconstruction amid US‐led occupation: Iraq
Authors: del Castillo Graciana 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
This chapter focuses on how economic reconstruction failed to become a peacebuilding factor in Iraq. Early proposals for privatization of the oil industry united Iraqis against efforts to disempower them by taking over their oil wealth and bringing in foreign contractors. Lack of legitimacy of the CPA led to uncertainty about property rights which made reactivation of investment difficult. The involvement of the UN in reconstruction as an after-effect did not resolve the legitimacy problem, and furthermore, it was naive to think that the UN would be received with open arms after twelve years of comprehensive and devastating sanctions. Debt restructuring should have been postponed for later when the government had gained legitimacy and living conditions and security had improved. Corruption and inefficiencies in procurement, construction, and other areas, as well as the need to use domestic companies and workers to create national employment as a peacebuilding measure are also discussed.
13 National reconciliation efforts
Authors: del Castillo Graciana 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
National reconciliation efforts include the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants and others affected by the war, demining, and the rehabilitation of basic services and infrastructure. This chapter argues that governments need to carry out these efforts continuously and implacably, from the early emergency phase to the end of economic reconstruction, when the country moves back to normal development. The chapter analyzes the danger that peace agreements and UN Security Council resolutions build up unrealistic expectations; the importance of ensuring proper planning, financing, synchronization, and sustainability of all peace-related programs until their full completion; the difficulty of moving away from emergency programs and humanitarian aid to the effective utilization of reconstruction aid to rebuild infrastructure, services, and other investment; and the role of governments, donors, and public-private partnerships in rebuilding and financing infrastructure. It also analyzes the rules for national reconciliation to ensure that past violence is addressed.
Credit and Community
Authors: O'Connell Sean 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
This book examines credit in working class communities since 1880, focusing on forms of borrowing that were dependent on personal relationships and social networks. It provides an extended historical discussion of credit unions, legal and illegal moneylenders (loan sharks), and looks at the concept of ‘financial exclusion’. Initially, the book focuses on the history of tallymen, check traders, and their eventual movement into moneylending following the loss of their more affluent customers, due to increased spending power and an increasingly liberalized credit market. They also faced growing competition from mail order companies operating through networks of female agents, whose success owed much to the reciprocal cultural and economic conventions that lay at the heart of traditional working class credit relationships. Discussion of these forms of credit is related to theoretical debates about cultural aspects of credit exchange that ensured the continuing success of such forms of lending, despite persistent controversies about their use. The book contrasts commercial forms of credit with formal and informal co-operative alternatives, such as the mutuality clubs operated by co-operative retailers and credit unions. It charts the impact of post-war immigration upon credit patterns, particularly in relation to the migrant (Irish and Caribbean) origins of many credit unions and explains the relative lack of success of the credit union movement. The book contributes to anti-debt debates by exploring the historical difficulties of developing legislation in relation to the millions of borrowers who have patronized what has come to be termed the sub-prime sector.
Doorstep moneylending since the 1950s
Authors: O'Connell Sean 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
This chapter explains the success of companies such as Provident Financial and Cattles (both members of the FTSE 250 by the 1990s). Their agents serviced the growing sub-prime sector and commercialized backstreet feminized affectual relationships between borrowers and lenders. The extent to which their success was dependent on the decline of pawnbroking and mail order agency (and the limitations of the government's Social Fund) is explained. The motivations and limited options of moneylenders' customers are explored as are accusations of ‘predatory lending’ and exploitation. Moneylenders fought PR battles to exclude themselves from the label ‘loan shark’, as images of criminal moneylenders increasingly replaced ones of ‘Shylocks’. The chapter examines the role of violent loan sharks, explaining their small but significant market. Particularly important was the fact that government resisted calls for interest rate caps because it feared legal lenders would abandon their riskiest borrowers, leaving them vulnerable to loan sharks.
Renewed hope for mutuality: credit unions
Authors: O'Connell Sean 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
This chapter charts the history of credit unions and their arrival in Britain during the 1960s. Initially championed as equitable alternatives to moneylenders and vehicles through which to renew community, by the 1990s their low membership levels produced pessimistic assessments of their ability to do either. The essential role of the Catholic Church and Orange Order in providing trust and the common bond in successful Irish credit unions is explained, as is the role of Irish and Caribbean immigrants in Britain. The latter turned to credit unions in response to financial exclusion. The Credit Union Act 1979, produced much optimism, but economic recession and credit liberalization in the 1980s were inopportune developments. Thereafter, philosophical splits and failure to build economically viable community credit unions dogged the movement and it had little impact on the sub-prime market. The conclusion to this chapter assesses the potential impact of ‘new model’ credit unions.
Introduction
Authors: Cohon Rachel 
Published: January 2009

AbstractThis introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of the primary purpose of this book, which is reveal aspects of Hume's program in moral philosophy that have not been noticed, showing him to be as subversive a moral philosopher as he is a theorist of the mind. The book centers on two related theses: that for Hume all virtue and vice are discerned by feeling, and that for him certain virtues and vices are collectively fabricated to compensate for deficiencies in our natural human endowments. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Feeling Virtue and the Reality of Moral Distinctions
Authors: Cohon Rachel 
Published: January 2009

AbstractThis chapter considers whether Hume is a moral realist or anti-realist, and presents the moral sensing view as an interpretation of his positive theory of moral judgment. On the moral sensing view Hume is not a noncognitivist; he regards moral sentiments themselves as lacking truth or falsehood, but moral ideas for him can be true or false and are often true, in the full-blooded sense in which any ideas are true. However, the evidence shows that Hume is not a moral realist as that present-day term is most widely understood; and this is consistent with his cognitivism. Thus, we see that one form of ethical cognitivism is compatible with moral anti-realism. This position captures some of what appeals to many philosophers about moral anti-realism without having to make the counter-intuitive claim that our moral assessments are without cognitive content, and without having to invent for them a weaker notion of truth than the one we apply to other sorts of discourse.
The Common Point of View
Authors: Cohon Rachel 
Published: January 2009

AbstractThis chapter addresses the question how an emotion-based theory of moral discrimination, one that in many ways assimilates moral cognition to color sensation, can explain the fundamental expectation that moral evaluations will be widely shared within a community. Hume explains the causal origin of our moral sentiments by means of the mechanism of sympathy, and he completes his account of moral evaluation with an appeal to our use of the common point of view to compensate for the variations in sympathy's workings. The account threatens to become inconsistent, first because it sounds as if Hume is backing off from his claim that moral discrimination is not an activity of reason, and secondly because he seems tacitly to retract his claim that passions (including the moral sentiments) have no representative character. The chapter offers a two-feeling interpretation that removes these inconsistencies.
The Shackles of Virtue: Allegiance to Government
Authors: Cohon Rachel 
Published: January 2009

AbstractThis chapter considers a virtue that is obviously created after the founding of human governments: deference to the civil authorities. There are difficulties in conceiving this as a virtue or even a character trait at all. There is also a fundamental puzzle in political philosophy that interests Hume: that of how masses of people can ever, by any means, be induced to obey the laws or their rulers, given that the people are so much more numerous than the enforcers. It is argued that Hume's account overcomes these difficulties and is consistent with the rest of his understanding of the artificial virtues. Hume identifies yet another fundamental human disability (the preference for the near-term good over the distant but greater good) that can be outmaneuvered by collectively fabricating a character trait and manufacturing approval of it (using our natural tendencies as raw materials). The disability is different, and so the prosthesis is different, but the basic strategy is the same.
Human Rights Values Refashioned: Liberty, Equality, and Solidarity
Authors: Fredman Sandra 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
This chapter argues that human rights hold out more than just the promise of freedom from State interference. Drawing on the work of Sen, Nussbaum, Sunstein, Rawls and others, it is argued that human rights concern the extent to which people can actually enjoy their freedom. This carries with it a substantive view of equality. The chapter rejects the traditional individualism of human rights arguing that we are social beings who can only achieve fulfilment through society. While the State needs to be restrained from abusing its power, only the State can supply what is needed for an individual to fully enjoy her human rights. The chapter also rejects the argument that positive duties require the State to intrude on individuals' moral decisions, arguing that moral neutrality is a myth, but that a commitment to human rights signals a moral commitment by the State which both enables and constrains State action.
The Structure of Positive Duties
Authors: Fredman Sandra 
Published: January 2009

Abstract
This chapter demonstrates that it is artificial to distinguish between rights according to their correlative duties. All rights give rise to both duties of restraint and positive duties. It then asks whether positive duties are sufficiently determinate to be normative. It is argued that positive duties are best understood by using Alexy's concept of principles. A principle is a norm which must be realized to the greatest extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities. Principles do not lose their prima facie binding force when outweighed by other principles. This explains why positive duties retain their normative force even when not immediately fulfilled. Nor is it necessary to specify precise standards to be determinate: it is sufficient to meet specific parameters, namely, effectiveness, participation, accountability, and equality. This analysis helps resolve the controversy over the minimum core obligation. The chapter concludes by examining the relationship between the right-holder and the duty bearer.
Second Philosophy
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: January 2009

AbstractMany philosophers these days consider themselves naturalists, but it's doubtful any two of them intend the same position by the term. This book describes and practices a particularly austere form of naturalism called ‘Second Philosophy’. Without a definitive criterion for what counts as ‘science’ and what doesn't, Second Philosophy can't be specified directly — ‘trust only the methods of science!’ or some such thing — so the book proceeds instead by illustrating the behaviors of an idealized inquirer called here the ‘Second Philosopher’. This Second Philosopher begins from perceptual common sense and progresses from there to systematic observation, active experimentation, theory formation, and testing, working all the while to assess, correct, and improve methods along the way. ‘Second Philosophy’ is then the result of the Second Philosopher's investigations. This book delineates the Second Philosopher's approach by tracing reactions to various familiar sceptical and transcendental views (Descartes, Kant, Carnap, late Putnam, van Fraassen), comparing methods to those of other self-described naturalists (especially Quine), and examining a prominent contemporary debate (between disquotationalists and correspondence theorists in the theory of truth) to extract a properly second-philosophical line of thought. The book then undertakes to practice Second Philosophy in its reflections on the ground of logical truth, the methodology, ontology, and epistemology of mathematics, and the general prospects for metaphysics naturalized.
Neo‐cartesian skepticism
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: January 2009

AbstractUnlike Descartes, contemporary philosophers tend to regard the possibility that I might be dreaming as a serious threat to the reasonableness of my ordinary beliefs about the world. Here the Second Philosopher's point of view is illustrated by her reaction to this challenge, especially as it is posed by Stroud. In the end, she sees the sceptic as asking her to defend her usual ways of finding out about the world without using any of those methods in the process. This strikes her as a coherent and even understandable request, and one she has no idea how to satisfy. What she denies is the contention that it arises simply from careful scrutiny of her ordinary methods and that it must be satisfied in order for her ordinary beliefs to be reasonable.
Putnam's anti‐naturalism
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: January 2009

AbstractUp through the early 1970s, Putnam was another conspicuous naturalist, e.g., he suggested that a correspondence theory of truth might emerge from an ordinary empirical investigation of the effectiveness of human language use. By the late 1970s, he comes to regard the correspondence theory as emblematic of an extra-scientific ‘metaphysical realism’, which he rejects in favour of an equally extra-scientific account of truth in terms of idealized rational warrant. As with Kant and Carnap, the Second Philosopher finds this two-level view unmotivated and its methods unclear. The chapter goes on to examine Putnam's various objections to ‘naturalism’ as he understands it and to show how they miss the mark if addressed to Second Philosophy.
An illustration: truth and reference
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: January 2009

AbstractThis chapter lays out the background to the current debate between correspondence theorists and disquotationalists in the theory of truth: from Tarski, to Field, to Leeds. The disquotationalist's idea is that we don't need a robust theory of reference (like a causal theory) or truth (like typical correspondence theories), that the role of truth in our account of the world can actually be filled by a simple logical device of disquotation, as proposed by Quine among others. The Second Philosopher develops a pair of diagnostics to differentiate disquotational from correspondence theories (according to which Tarski turns out to have been a disquotationalist), and ends with a discussion of Field's notion of an ‘indication relation’ (in favourable cases, one's beliefs are good indicators of the facts).
Reconfiguring the debate
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: January 2009

AbstractThis chapter digresses from the inquiry into truth and reference to consider the nature of the debate as described so far. One underlying motivation for both Tarski and Field is some variety of physicalism, for example in Field's analogy between a disquotational account of reference and a physicalistically unsatisfactory account of valence. In contrast, the Second Philosopher is disinclined to set preconditions on what an acceptable theory must be like. The proposed account of valence, she argues, was actually an important empirical achievement (unlike the disquotationalist's trivial account of reference), and the push for a deeper explanation took place within a specific line of chemical inquiry, not in response to an overarching principle like physicalism. For the Second Philosopher, the debate over truth also takes place within a specific empirical inquiry, namely the earlier Putnam's call for an explanation of the efficacy of human language use.
Undoing the Copernican revolution
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: January 2009

AbstractKant's two-level scheme allows him to say two things at once: speaking empirically, logic is objectively true (empirically real) because of the structure of the world (e.g., because it's made up of objects-with-properties, standing in ground-consequent relations); speaking transcendentally, logic is true because of the necessary structure of any discursive intellect (transcendentally ideal). To make use of these attractive ideas, the Second Philosopher needs to combine them on one level: as a first approximation, she proposes that a rudimentary logic is true of the world because of its structural features, that humans believe this logic because their cognitive apparatus allow them to detect those structural features, and humans are so-configured because the world is so-structured. This chapter spells out the structural features at work here, beginning from Kant's categories and modifying in light of Frege's work (to reach the notion of a ‘KF-structure’).
The status of rudimentary logic
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: January 2009

AbstractAccording to this second-philosophical account, rudimentary logic is contingent on certain very general structural features and is true only when and where they are present. (We tend to think logic truth is necessary because its outlines are so fundamental to our cognition; KF-structure comes built into our very notion of a possible world.) Whether or not it counts as a priori depends on one's account of a priority, but it does appear to reside in our innate or nearly innate cognitive structures; it requires no training, no particular experience, and will naturally seem self-evident or obvious to us. Rudimentary logic isn't empirical in a psychologistic or Quinean sense, but it could in principle be overturned empirically (quantum logic is not a successful example, pace Putnam), assuming our feeble human brains were up to the task of thinking in an alternative way. Finally, there seems little to recommend the idea that it is true by virtue of meaning (the contemporary version of analyticity), and even if it were, this wouldn't settle the empirical question of whether or not those meanings are applicable in a given situation.