bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Toward a Rational Theory of Decentralization: Some Implications of a Mathematical Approach
Authors: Kochen Manfred , Deutsch Karl W. 
Published: May 2006

This paper seeks to open for exploration the field of decentralization in politics and organizational design. As a first approach, it examines conditions under which decentralization is preferable from the viewpoint of rationality or cost-effectiveness. Our normative statements as to what would be best, or what should be done, are formulated first from the viewpoint of the subjects or clients, but they are expected to include the interest of the community in ensuring adequate service at low cost, and they also include the interest of the rulers, insofar as their power in the long run depends on their capacity to respond to the demands made upon them quickly enough and adequately enough to retain their political support.The political theory underlying our study assumes that modern governments retain “their just powers by the consent of the governed,” and hence that both their legitimacy and their power will depend at least in significant part on their ability to respond adequately to the popular demands made upon them. We do not deal in this study with other important criteria of preference, such as the psychological value which some of those who take the role of powerholders may put upon centralized control, or the contrary value which some of those who identify with their subjects may put upon power sharing and decentralization.
The Development of Political Ideology: A Framework for the Analysis of Political Socialization
Authors: Merelman Richard M. 
Published: May 2006

“Myself, I get confused. The President tells ya that he don't want no war, it's peace. You pick up a paper, they're bombing children. And television, the guys being interviewed, talking about peace, and the picture shows where the women and children are being bombed and slaughtered and murdered. How long if I think that way and I have had a bad feeling, how long will other people that their mentality's not strong enough, to separate the cause of it? Fear. What's gonna happen to our kids, our grandchildren?“Lotta them are afraid of their jobs, losing their jobs. Because the government's maybe got some contract with some company. For example, we got one fellow here works with the government, with this here carbonic gas or whatever it is. If he opens his mouth up too much, he can lose his job. And the senators or congressmen, they personally don't take interest in their own country, right here, what's going on.“The colored. We had a tavern on 61st and State, three and a half years, Negro neighborhood. I tell you I never was insulted no place by not a Negro person over there. They respected me highly. It took a white fella to come in and insult me because I wouldn't serve him beer, he was too drunk. And if it wasn't for these poor Negro fellas, I'd a probably killed this man. (Laughs) Because he called me a dirty name.”
Party Competition and Welfare Policies in the American States
Authors: Cnudde Charles F. , Mccrone Donald J. 
Published: May 2006

Recent comparative, quantitative studies of state politics conclude that party competition and other political variables have little or no impact on important state policies such as per pupil expenditure, old age assistance, unemployment compensation, and aid to dependent children. These are rather unexpected and disturbing conclusions for they disconfirm relationships predicted by some of the most important theoretical formulations concerning democratic politics. Before re-examining the bases for these conclusions, a review of theory is in order.V. O. Key, Jr., set the context for examining the effects of political variables on state policies. He stressed the importance of two-party competition, or bi-factionalism in one-party states, as a determinant of policy. Key sees the degree of party competition as crucial because it reflects the extent to which politics is organized or unorganized. Party competition by producing some semblance of an organized politics lessens the difficulty of lower status groups in sorting out political actors and issues, thereby enabling them to promote their own interests more effectively. Since state social welfare policies are undoubtedly relevant to the interests of “have-nots,” we can utilize state expenditures in this area as a measure of the success that these groups have enjoyed. Key's formulation, then, would lead to a simple two variable model:P = e1S = k1P + ezWhere P is inter-party competition, S is expenditure on social welfare, and e1 and ez represent error or variables left out of the system, and k1 is a constant.
Prescription and Description in Political Thought The Case for Hobbes
Authors: Campbell Blair 
Published: May 2006

In seeking a basis for political obligation in the “facts” of human nature, Hobbes has created a major problem for students of political theory. Recent scholarly debate has suggested that we understand Hobbes either as a descriptive and analytic theorist, or as a normative theorist. While this logical distinction has didactic value, it is apt to produce a misunderstanding of the dynamics of political thinking. All discourse does not rest upon logic: we must distinguish political argumentation, which often goes beyond the confines of logic by manipulating our factual perceptions, from disinterested philosophical debate, which aims at clarity.Hobbes manipulates his readers' perceptions in such a manner as to preclude a number of assumptions underlying traditional moral arguments for political disobedience. While moral argument (at least of a sort) is possible, it is not necessary to the argument of the Leviathan. Hobbes grounds political obligation on one situational and two psychophysiological postulates: man's most fundamental concern is self-preservation; his passions lead him into situations of conflict which give rise to intense feelings of fear; this fear has an “enlightening value,” transforming human behavior from the merely reflexive to the contrived. Terror hence provides a strategy of fear-avoidance, a logic of survival to which the individual must conform in order to avoid future encounters with death.Thus, while Hobbes's answer to the problem of political obligation is nonmoral in the traditional sense, it is more than merely prudential. Hobbes's conception of homeostasis as informed by fear is, like morality, both universal and imperative. The natural law binds not because it is “good” but because its violation is too frequently accompanied by an all-consuming terror which the ordinary man cannot withstand.
Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part I
Authors: Nie Norman H. , Powell G. Bingham , Prewitt Kenneth 
Published: May 2006

Economic development has consequences for many aspects of social life. Some of these social consequences, in turn, have an impact on a nation's political life. Studies of social mobilization, for example, have demonstrated that economic development is associated with sharp increases in the general level of political participation. These studies report strong relationships between aggregate socio-economic measures such as per capita income, median level of education, and percentage of the population in urban areas, on one hand, and aggregate measures of political participation, such as voting turnout, on the other. Simultaneously, scholars conducting surveys of individual political participation consistently have reported that an individual's social status, education, and organizational memberships strongly affect the likelihood of his engaging in various types of political activities.In spite of the consistency of both sets of findings across many studies and although the findings appear frequently in analysis of political stability, democracy, and even strategies of political growth, we know little about the connections between social structure and political participation. With few exceptions the literature on individual participation is notable for low level generalizations (the better educated citizen talks about politics more regularly), and the absence of systematic and comprehensive theory. While the literature on the growth of national political participation has been more elaborate theoretically, the dependence on aggregate measures has made it difficult to determine empirically how these macro social changes structure individuals' life experiences in ways which alter their political behavior.
Who Pays for Defense?
Authors: Russett Bruce M. 
Published: May 2006

Theories of the economic causes of war are at least as old as capitalism, and have in recent years appeared in myriad forms. Around the turn of the last century J. A. Hobson and Lenin developed their famous arguments about the economic driving forces behind imperialist expansion; American opponents of their country's entry into World War I blamed the lobbying of munitions makers; more recently we have had C. Wright Mills and the New Left. The assertions of these theorists are not always susceptible to scientific examination, but to supplement them there have in the past few years been a number of sound and well-documented studies locating in the national economy the groups that benefit most from military expenditures. Such studies show very effectively which industries, and which states, gain disproportionately from defense spending and hence develop some special interest in maintaining or increasing those expenditures. One need not accept Marxist or other extreme positions on the causes of war to find such information relevant to identifying political pressure groups that must be countered or compensated in any effort to reduce the level of military spending.A question closely related to “Who benefits from defense spending?” is, of course, “Who pays for it?”; but curiously this second problem has received very little attention. Nothing comes free, and defense is no exception. In this paper we shall examine some evidence about what segments of the economy and society sacrifice disproportionately when defense spending rises.
Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence
Authors: Manley John F. 
Published: May 2006

All leaders are also led; in innumerable cases, the master is the slave of his slaves. Said one of the greatest German party leaders referring to his followers: “I am their leader, therefore I must follow them.”Georg SimmerPolitical scientists studying Congress have shown the same disinclination for the study of individual leaders as that of the profession as a whole. Whatever the reasons for avoiding an analysis of social and political processes from the perspective of an individual—and there are several good ones—it is difficult to ignore, if not discount, the extreme emphasis placed on personalities by experienced participants and observers of the congressional process. One may decide, with Fenno, to underplay references to specific individuals in an effort “to show how much generalization is possible short of a heavy reliance on personality data.” But the fact remains that those closest to the legislative process do see it in terms of individuals and personalities; more important, much can be learned, as evidenced by Huitt's work, by focusing on individual legislators and the contexts within which they function. Whether it is Lyndon Johnson as Senate Majority Leader searching for the man who is the “key” to a particular bill, the differences between a Rayburn and a McCormack, or the skill of a Judge Smith, the individual looms large on Capitol Hill.
The Desired Political Entropy
Authors: Theil Henri 
Published: May 2006

In an article published in the December 30, 1967 issue of the Dutch weekly magazine Vrij Nederland, Mr. Frans Grosfeld suggested the following modification of the procedure of parliamentary representation of political parties. Instead of the conventional method of allocating to each party a number of representatives proportional to the number of votes cast for the party, he proposed to allocate a number of representatives which is proportional to the square of the number of votes. Thus, when there are n parties and when p1, …, pn are the proportions of the total number of votes obtained by these parties, the idea is to allocate a fraction qi of the representatives to the ith party determined byMr. Grosfeld made this suggestion for the Dutch political system, because in his view n is so large and even the largest pi belongs to a minority party, so that on many occasions several months of negotiations were necessary to obtain a coalition cabinet of one form or another. By squaring the pi's one obtains much larger relative differences between the larger and the smaller parties, and one party or a pair of politically related parties then has a much better chance of obtaining a parliamentary majority. Also, the system (1.1) provides an incentive for parties to merge, which contributes to a reduction of the degree to which the country is politically divided. This system should be contrasted with another system which is applied on a rather large scale, viz., that of declining any seat to those parties whose pi is less than a pre-assigned fraction θ (for example, θ = .03).
Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries
Authors: Inkeles Alex 
Published: May 2006

In this paper I will endeavor to do the following: (1) test how far certain concepts dealing with individual orientations to politics, previously used in studies of relatively advanced European societies, are appropriate to populations in developing countries; (2) ascertain how far these separate dimensions of individual political orientation cohere as a syndrome, indicating the existence of a general underlying dimension of “participant citizenship;” (3) identify elements among common orientations to politics which cannot be incorporated in this general syndrome; and (4) assess the importance of certain social experiences or forces in inculcating the qualities of participant citizenship in individuals exposed to these influences.These objectives will be better understood if they are seen in the context of the larger research program of which this report is a part, namely the Harvard Project on the Social and Cultural Aspects of Economic Development. The project is an investigation of the forms and sources of modernization in individuals. Its focus is on the person rather than the society or the institution, and its emphasis is socio-psychological rather than purely sociological or structural. Six countries are represented: Argentina and Chile, East Pakistan and India, Nigeria and Israel. This report will not, however, emphasize national differences, but rather treat each sample as another replication of the basic design. We assume that if something holds true for six such different countries, it must be a powerful connection indeed.
Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends in California
Authors: Mueller John E. 
Published: May 2006

Entering the polling booth on Tuesday, November 3, 1964, the typical California voter found himself confronted with an immense sheet of finely-printed green paper, a dirty black rubber stamp, a tiny ink pad, and thirty decisions to render. A few minutes later (the legal maximum is 10) he emerged and numbly surrendered to a clerk his ballot, now slightly embellished, like the fingers of his decision hand, with black ink stains.Most of his decisions were made on a lengthy array of propositions. In these, questions on an assortment of issues were posed, each couched in language tedious and obscure—as only minds trained in the finest law schools could devise.This study seeks to gain some knowledge about factors which influence the vote on these propositions. It employs a somewhat unorthodox method: an analysis of the voting patterns on actual ballots. The ballots furnish attractive data because they are, after all, completely accurate records of the results of those minutes of decision-rendering in the artificial privacy of that cramped polling booth.It would be impossible by this method to generate a comprehensive theory about proposition voting behavior—too much information about the individual voter is forever lost by the secrecy incorporated in the balloting procedure. Nevertheless a contribution can be made in several areas of relevant concern, areas currently dominated more by folklore and mythology than fact or theory.
Party, Ideology, and the Congressional Challenger
Authors: Fishel Jeff 
Published: May 2006

Political Science, like Leo Durocher, is not distinguished by an excessive concern with losers.Although the reasons are not difficult to fathom, theories of recruitment and representation which omit systematic examination of those who are rejected, in addition to, those selected, will only imperfectly comprehend the political conditions and consequences this process implies.This study, part of a broader cross-national examination of legislative recruitment, focuses on a largely-ignored but perennial figure among the ranks of American political losers: those candidates who challenge incumbents for seats in the House of Representatives.Few elective institutions in American political life have achieved the degree of stability which since the depression has characterized membership in the House. At no time since 1932 has the percentage of first-term members exceeded 26 percent and in the last 15 years, it has been rare when more than 15 percent of those incumbents who actively sought reelection were defeated. The 1964 election was considered a striking anomaly when “only” 80 percent of the membership returned to the 89th Congress. It is not an exaggeration to concede that, collectively, congressional challengers stand somewhere between the Harold Stassens and Norman Thomases of campaign history in their impressive disregard for the first objective of American major-party politics: winning.
Gunnell on “Deductivism,” the “Logic” of Science and Scientific Explanation: A Riposte
Authors: Gregor A. James 
Published: May 2006

It is impossible to tender a reply to Professor Gunnell's essay, “Deduction, Explanation and Social Scientific Inquiry,” that would be both brief and adequate. It would be impossible to be brief because Gunnell conjures up a tagraggery of issues, none of which he seems prepared and/or disposed to resolve. But no matter how extensive a reply might be, it would still be impossible to conceive it as adequate for I am not sure that I, or anyone else, can determine precisely what he means to say in the essay before us. It is impossible for me to determine with any specificity whatsoever, for example, what it means to say:Logical empiricism as an approach to the philosophy of science has been concerned with developing formal representations or reconstructions of the logical structure of scientific explanation and with a meta-logical analysis of the language applied to science. In this view there is a very strict correlation between the philosophy of science and formal logic.I haven't the foggiest notion what a “metalogical analysis of the language applied to science” might mean. I had always understood “metalogic” to refer to discourse employing logic as its object language—just as metamathematics would be a language employed in the analysis of mathematics as an object language.
Science and the Philosophy of Science: A Rejoinder to Professors Goldberg and Gregor
Authors: Gunnell John G. 
Published: May 2006

Since both Mr. Goldberg and Mr. Gregor have limited their responses principally to my specific criticisms of the deductive model, it would seem appropriate to emphasize once more the purpose of this criticism. The issue which I wish to raise, using the discussion of the deductive model as a vehicle, goes far beyond the model itself and even the approach to the philosophy of science which it represents. It should be apparent that there may be little chance of resolving the differences that stand between the respondents and myself regarding either the character of the philosophy of science as a discipline of inquiry or its product, but to some extent these differences can be separated from the more general problem of the relationship between social science and the philosophy of science.I suggested that there is a significant intellectual lag or gulf between political science and contemporary work in the philosophy of science. This situation need not, in principle, be viewed as odd or even undesirable since the distance between philosophy and other fields of science is at least as great. What is unique about political science is that, although it has lost touch with philosophy, it has to a large extent derived its conception of science and its notion of the procedural rules of empirical inquiry from a restricted body of literature in the philosophy of science, i.e., traditional logical empiricism.
Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability
Authors: Prewitt Kenneth 
Published: May 2006

A generally accepted interpretation of American politics today is associated with the “theory of electoral accountability.” The salient features of this theory are well known. The thesis was initially shaped in Schumpeter's classic work on democracy, and since has been elaborated by a generation of scholars. The elaboration, especially where grounded in empirical studies, has established (1) that the public, being largely apathetic about political matters and in any case ill-informed regarding public issues, cannot provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the maintenance of democratic procedures; (2) that a liberal political and social elite are committed to the preservation of democratic forms, at least more committed than the average citizen; therefore, (3) what maintains the democratic tradition is not extensive public participation in political policy-making, but, instead, competition among elites whose behavior is regulated by periodic review procedures. Competition among elites and review by citizens of political leaders are provided by elections. Thus elections hold political leaders accountable to non-leaders.Writers associated with this general position have recently come under scholarly attack. The critique, directed at the first two assertions, can be reviewed briefly: although true that the public is not well-informed politically and is not actively engaged in political life, this is not to be attributed to the inherent traits of citizens so much as to the structure of political opportunities in the United States. Moreover, although true that research has detected among political leaders a greater commitment to democratic procedures than is the case for the ordinary citizen, this commitment is to procedures in which only the leaders participate.
A New View of Political Accountability for Economic Performance
Authors: Chappell Henry W. , Keech William R. 
Published: May 2006

Most political support models imply that in evaluating economic performance, voters use a standard that would provide poor predictions of the future and leave the economy vulnerable to manipulation by vote-hungry politicians. Drawing on macroeconomic theory, we develop a simple standard of evaluation which encompasses a concern not only for current economic outcomes, but also for accurately assessed future consequences of current policies. We find that political support for the president can be explained as well by models that assume that voters use this sophisticated standard as by models that assume voter naivete.Our analysis questions the wisdom of measures typically used to assess voter evaluation of economic performance in a variety of theoretical contexts. The results also help to explain the absence of convincing evidence that governments exploit voter ignorance in manipulating the economy.