bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Initial clinical trial of epratuzumab (humanized anti-CD22 antibody) for immunotherapy of systemic lupus erythematosus
Authors: Dörner Thomas , Kaufmann Joerg , Wegener William A , Teoh Nick , Goldenberg David M , Burmester Gerd R 
Published: April 2006

AbstractB cells play an important role in the pathogenesis of systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE), so the safety and activity of anti-B cell immunotherapy with the humanized anti-CD22 antibody epratuzumab was evaluated in SLE patients. An open-label, single-center study of 14 patients with moderately active SLE (total British Isles Lupus Assessment Group (BILAG) score 6 to 12) was conducted. Patients received 360 mg/m2 epratuzumab intravenously every 2 weeks for 4 doses with analgesic/antihistamine premedication (but no steroids) prior to each dose. Evaluations at 6, 10, 18 and 32 weeks (6 months post-treatment) follow-up included safety, SLE activity (BILAG score), blood levels of epratuzumab, B and T cells, immunoglobulins, and human anti-epratuzumab antibody (HAHA) titers. Total BILAG scores decreased by ≥ 50% in all 14 patients at some point during the study (including 77% with a ≥ 50% decrease at 6 weeks), with 92% having decreases of various amounts continuing to at least 18 weeks (where 38% showed a ≥ 50% decrease). Almost all patients (93%) experienced improvements in at least one BILAG B- or C-level disease activity at 6, 10 and 18 weeks. Additionally, 3 patients with multiple BILAG B involvement at baseline had completely resolved all B-level disease activities by 18 weeks. Epratuzumab was well tolerated, with a median infusion time of 32 minutes. Drug serum levels were measurable for at least 4 weeks post-treatment and detectable in most samples at 18 weeks. B cell levels decreased by an average of 35% at 18 weeks and remained depressed at 6 months post-treatment. Changes in routine safety laboratory tests were infrequent and without any consistent pattern, and there was no evidence of immunogenicity or significant changes in T cells, immunoglobulins, or autoantibody levels. In patients with mild to moderate active lupus, 360 mg/m2 epratuzumab was well tolerated, with evidence of clinical improvement after the first infusion and durable clinical benefit across most body systems. As such, multicenter controlled studies are being conducted in broader patient populations.
Hereditary Hemochromatosis: Genetic Complexity and New Diagnostic Approaches
Authors: Swinkels Dorine W , Janssen Mirian CH , Bergmans Jürgen , Marx Joannes JM 
Published: April 2006

AbstractSince the discovery of the hemochromatosis gene (HFE) in 1996, several novel gene defects have been detected, explaining the mechanism and diversity of iron-overload diseases. At least 4 main types of hereditary hemochromatosis (HH) have been identified. Surprisingly, genes involved in HH encode for proteins that all affect pathways centered around liver hepcidin synthesis and its interaction with ferroportin, an iron exporter in enterocytes and macrophages. Hepcidin concentrations in urine negatively correlate with the severity of HH. Cytokine-mediated increases in hepcidin appear to be an important causative factor in anemia of inflammation, which is characterized by sequestration of iron in the macrophage system. For clinicians, the challenge is now to diagnose HH before irreversible damage develops and, at the same time, to distinguish progressive iron overload from increasingly common diseases with only moderately increased body iron stores, such as the metabolic syndrome. Understanding the molecular regulation of iron homeostasis may be helpful in designing innovative and reliable DNA and protein tests for diagnosis. Subsequently, evidence-based diagnostic strategies must be developed, using both conventional and innovative laboratory tests, to differentiate between the various causes of distortions of iron metabolism. This review describes new insights in mechanisms of iron overload, which are needed to understand new developments in diagnostic medicine.
“Singende Seele” or “unsingbar”? Forkel, Ambros, and the Forces behind the Ockeghem Reception during the Late 18th and 19th Centuries
Authors: BERNSTEIN LAWRENCE F. 
Published: April 2006

ABSTRACT
In 1868, Wilhelm Ambros lauded a number of compositions by Johannes Ockeghem, including the triple canon Prenez sur moy. Emphasizing the expressive qualities of this music, he suggested that its composer had breathed into it a “singing soul.” Some decades earlier, Johann Forkel also focused on Prenez sur moy, dismissing it, however, as “unsingable.” The present study examines the cultural and intellectual forces that gave rise to these strikingly contradictory assessments.
Enlightenment historians are generally thought to have charted the flow of history according to a progressive paradigm. Late medieval music often fared poorly viewed from this perspective, drawing criticism for its failure to reflect the refinements of modern music. Initially, Forkel toed this line, but his comments about examples of 15th-century music in the Allgemeine Geschichte der Musik also reveal his capacity to strike a relativist pose regarding some of them, and even to offer unqualified praise. The changes in Forkel's position are traced to philosophical writings known to have been part of his library, and to his conviction that the music of Johann Sebastian Bach was superior to that of his own time. Taking that stand surely must have raised questions in his mind about his earlier commitment to the progressive view of history.
Forkel's openness to new historiographical approaches suggests that he, of all Enlightenment writers on music, might have found value in Ockeghem's music, all the more so because he was better informed about Ockeghem's preeminent stature in his own day than anyone else at the time, and owing to his awareness of a current German tradition that regarded Ockeghem as “the Bach of his day.” Yet Forkel's deprecation of Ockeghem's music is among the strongest in the literature. His negative stand can be traced to his admiration for a 16th-century tract on teaching music, the Compendium musices by Adrian Petit Coclico, who demonizes Ockeghem as an icon of the scholastic approach to music. Forkel's own commitment to a humanistic orientation in music pedagogy surely led him to view Coclico as a kindred spirit.
“Deaf as Ulysses to the Sirens Song”: The Story of a Forgotten Topos*
Authors: Vredeveld Harry 
Published: April 2006

Avaunt, Inchantress! - I am deaf as Adders;Deaf asUlyssesto theSireniSong,Who strove in vain to lure him to Destruction.— Lewis TheobaldRichly suggestive on a variety of levels, Odysseus's encounter with the Sirens in Homer'sOdysseyremains one of the best-known episodes in world literature. This article exhumes a once popular variant of that story and tells how wise Ulysses, contrary to the ancient myth, came to stop his own ears against all allurements.
Some Effects of Neutralization
Authors: Wicker Cyrus F. 
Published: April 2006

A neutral state may at any time lay aside its neutrality and engage in war. This is recognized, though with a somewhat mediaeval flavor, by Macchiavelli in his counsel to the ideal prince, where he advises the latter never to remain neutral in a war between his neighbors, but to join with one side or the other, since by his aid that side would gain the victory and he could share in the spoil.However unlikely it may be that such motives would bear weight to-day, it is nevertheless true that the right to make war at will exists in every sovereign state unless, by reason of international agreement, it is placed altogether outside of the realm of war and devoted to perpetual peace. The duties of simple, or self-imposed neutrality are now clearly recognized and quite generally observed. The neutral state must maintain exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over its land and territorial waters, and is bound as well to prevent within its borders all acts inconsistent with complete impartiality toward belligerents. It must, moreover, regulate the use of its harbors and coaling stations according to the recognized provisions of international law; it is bound to prevent the enlistment within its borders of troops destined for foreign service, and, finally, it is compelled to acquiesce in the penalties incurred by its subjects when engaged in the carriage of contraband goods, breach of blockade, or resistance to the belligerent rights of stoppage, visit and search.
Studies on the Eastern Question Part III. (Continuation from January and April Numbers.) (Chapter I—Bulgarian Independence.)
Authors: Scelle G. 
Published: April 2006

1. The Chief Executive. — The Christian government of which Article 1 of the Treaty of Berlin speaks was to have as its first element a prince freely elected by the people.This liberty of election was not, however, absolute. A restriction was placed, but only one, we believe: no member of the reigning European dynasties could be elected Prince of Bulgaria. It is easy to discover the reason for this provision, which under a general and impersonal form, was aimed directly at Russia. It was not desired that a grand duke, installed in Bulgaria, should make of the Principality an autonomous province of the Muscovite Empire. Nothing in the protocols of the Congress of Berlin permits the belief that there was any desire to push the precautionary measures further than that. If this condition was fulfilled, that the prince elected by the people should not belong to a reigning dynasty of the Powers, the choice of the Bulgarians would not be contested. Article III states, however, that this choice must be confirmed by the Sultan with the assent of the great Powers. Apart from the single case referred to in the text, could this confirmation and assent have been refused? On this point even the language of the Treaty of Berlin and the protocols of the Congress are not at all clear. It seems that very little concern was shown over the accumulation on this point of the germs of a thousand difficulties. Neither was it foreseen what would be the effect of Article III in case, for instance, only certain Powers should have refused their assent. Would a majority have sufficed or would unanimity have been necessary? And what if the confirmation of the Sultan should have been given while the assent of the Powers had been refused, or inversely ? All are questions difficult of solution. Many constructions have been proposed. The simplest, we believe, is this one. If the election was to be free — and that was the intention of the Congress — the confirmation of the Sultan and the approbation of the Powers should properly have followed an election regularly conducted, that is to say, one in which the person elected did not belong to a reigning family. The opposition of the Sultan or of the Powers, if based upon personal considerations, would have conflicted with the principle of free election. The right of the Sultan was purely honorary. It calls to mind what happens in Egypt where the case is seen of an hereditary Khedive who receives the investiture. In saying “ hereditary ” we imply that the investiture could not be. refused. It is given, however, because nominally the Sultan is the suzerain of the Khedive, as he was, nominally the suzerain of the Prince of Bulgaria.
Sanctions of International Arbitration
Authors: Dumas Jacques 
Published: April 2006

It has always been urged, both by sceptics and by believers, that the test of the practicability of international arbitration stands on the question of sanctions. And yet, by a striking inconsistency, the same authors who agree on the primordial importance of this problem have constantly failed to resolve it. In fact they have hardly ever attempted to explain its terms.In spite of my reluctance to quote my own work, I am obliged to say that the only book ever devoted to this one great problem was my comprehensive treatise on “ Sanctions of International Arbitration,” the French edition of which appeared in 1905, with a preface by Baron d’Estournelles de Constant. President Roosevelt, whose great energies and high statesmanship were then devoted both to the negotiations of the Peace of Portsmouth and to the preparation of the program of the Second Hague Conference, courteously permitted me to dedicate the book to him, and therefore I dare say that, though the study of all the great European authors who, since Grotius, have led the way to the present state of international law was my constant guide, I did not lack of American inspiration.
The International Naval Conference of London, 1908–1909
Authors: Stockton C. H. 
Published: April 2006

The cause for the creation of this conference and for ite resultant codification of naval prize law can be found in the convention to establish an International Prize Court drawn up and signed at the Second Hague Conference by most of the powers in attendance.Article 7 of this convention reads as follows:
If a question of law to be decided is covered by a treaty in force between the belligerent captor and a power which is itself, or whose subject or citizen is a party to the proceedings, the court is governed by the provisions of the said treaty.In the absence of such provisions, the court shall apply the rules of international law. If no generally recognized rule exists the court shall give judgment in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity.The above provisions apply equally to questions relating to the order and mode of proof.
Fortification of the Panama Canal
Authors: Olney Richard 
Published: April 2006

In the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850 the United States and Great Britain agreed that neither would ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the canal or the vicinity thereof. The Hay-Paunceforte treaty of 5 February, 1900, by clause 7, stipulated as follows:
No fortifications shall be erected commanding the canal or the waters adjacent. The United States, however, shall be at liberty to maintain such military police along the canal as may be necessary to protect it against lawlessness and disorder.
The Orinoco Steampship Company Case Before the Hague Tribunal
Authors: Dennis William Cullen 
Published: April 2006

On the 9th of April, 1911, the Hague court will celebrate its first decennial. The first decade of the court was opened by the submission on the part of the United States and Mexico of the Pious Fund case to the tribunal for its decision, and of the eight cases so far submitted to the court and brought to trial during the first decade, the United States has been a party in four, and in a fifth, the Japanese House Tax case, the United States agreed to abide by the result. The last case to be tried was the Orinoco Steamship Company case submitted by the United States and Venezuela.Both the Pious Fund and the Orinoco Steamship Company case raised important questions vitally affecting the future of international arbitration. Both cases were peculiar in that they dealt with a question which had already been once before decided by an arbitral tribunal. In both cases the effect of the previous arbitral decision was submitted as a preliminary question to the Hague court. In the Pious Fund case the preliminary question submitted was as to whether the claim, as a consequence of the former decision of Sir Edward Thornton, umpire under the convention between the United States and Mexico of 1868, was within the principle of res judicata. The court sustained the contention of the United States, by holding that the rule of res judicata applies to international arbitral sentences “ rendered within the limits of the jurisdiction fixed by the compromise,” and accordingly rendered judgment in favor of the United States, without considering the merits of the claim.
Private Property on the High Seas
Authors: Bower Graham 
Published: April 2006

War, therefore, is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.If our opponent is to be made to comply with our will, we must place him in a situation which is more oppressive to him than the sacrifice which we demand.As long as the enemy is not defeated he may defeat me; then I shall be no longer my own master; he will dictate the law to me as I did to him.—Clausewitz on War.
The Constitutionality of Treaties
Authors: Wright Quincy 
Published: April 2006

The framers of the American Constitution did not anticipate or desire the conclusion of many treaties. For this reason they made the process of treaty conclusion difficult, requiring that the President act only with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present, some even wishing to require adhesion of the House of Representatives or a two-thirds majority of the entire Senate.This hope, however, has scarcely been realized. With a total of 595 treaties from its foundation to August, 1914, the United States has averaged more than four a year, and for the twentieth century fifteen a year, or a treaty ratified every three weeks. Along with the steady increase in the number of treaties concluded a year, there has been a change in their usual character. Jefferson’s warning against “entangling alliances” might be interpreted as a warning against treaties, for at that time the faithful observance of treaties commonly amounted to passive if not active alliance. Aside from definite guarantees of offensive or defensive alliance, the pious hope of “perpetual peace and amity” between the contractuaries, special privileges in war and neutrality, reciprocal favors in commerce and navigation, the termination of war, transfer of territory, fixation of boundaries, and recognition of status were the common subjects of treaty stipulation. The provisions were of a character indicating the competitive nature of international society. By mutually enjoying special privileges, the contracting states hoped to improve their political position with respect to other states of the world. Thus the carrying out of treaty provisions was ordinarily a matter for the political organs of government.
The American-German Conference on Prisoners of War
Authors: Stone Raymond 
Published: April 2006

When, in 1914, the Great War broke upon an astonished world, we rather took comfort to ourselves in the thought that no matter how swiftly and vigorously military operations might be prosecuted, the Conventions of Geneva and of The Hague would insure humane care and chivalrous treatment to the prisoners of war of both sides. Perhaps unconsciously we based our feeling of assurance in this regard upon two assumptions. The first of these was that the terms of those conventions were of themselves legally binding upon the parties to the great conflict; and the second that in this day and generation of high development in the elements of morality and humanity the belligerents would feel themselves morally if not technically constrained to abide by the principles, and to follow, in practice, the honorable provisions of the conventions.There are two particular conventions falling under consideration in this connection. These are, the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, generally referred to as Hague IV of 1907; and the Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime War of the Principles of the Geneva Convention of 1906, commonly known as Hague X of 1907. Each of these agreements contains a provisional article, practically identical in the two instances, worded substantially as follows:The provisions contained … in the present convention do not apply except between contracting parties, and only if all the belligerents are parties to the convention.
The Fourteenth Year of the Permanent Court of International Justice
Authors: Hudson Manley O. 
Published: April 2006

The fourteenth year of the Permanent Court of International Justice has been one of its lean years. The Court’s output has been small, and action by governments with reference to its maintenance and functioning has been somewhat less significant than in some of the earlier years.During 1935, the Court was in session for 107 days as compared with 120- days in 1934,178 days in 1933, and 240 days in 1932. The 34th session, from February 1 to April 10, 1935, was largely devoted to the case relating to Minority Schools in Albania, in which an advisory opinion (the 26th) was given on April 6,1935. The 35th session, from October 28 to December 4, 1935, was largely devoted to the case relating to the Consistency of Certain Danzig Decrees with the Constitution of the Free City of Danzig, in which an advisory opinion (the 27th) was given on December 4,1935. At the close of the year two cases were pending on the docket of the Court.
Willingness to Bear Arms as a Requirement of Naturalization
Authors: Hudson Manley O. 
Published: April 2006

A landmark of the law of naturalization in the United States, established by the Supreme Court after a tortuous course of decision, has now found legislative confirmation in a provision in the Internal Security Act of 1950.The oath of petitioners for naturalization provided for in §4 (3) of the Act of 1906 required a declaration of willingness “to support the Constitution and laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to the same”; and the Act provided that the naturalization court must be satisfied that during his residence the petitioner has behaved as a man “attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same.”For some years the question was put to petitioners, “If necessary, are you willing to take up arms in defense of this country?” A negative answer to this question led to a denial of the petition in U. S. v. Schwimmer (1929), 279 U. S. 644. This was followed in U. S. v. Macintosh (1931), 283 U. S. 589, and U. S. v. Bland (1931), 283 U. S. 636. Despite these decisions, no change was made in the required oath when the Nationality Act was revised in 1940. Yet the three earlier decisions were overruled in U. S. v. Girouard (1946), 328 U. S. 61, on the ground that the required oath might properly be taken by a person unwilling on religious grounds to bear arms.
The International Law Commission Re-Examined
Authors: Lee Luke T. 
Published: April 2006

Commenting on the International Law Commission m the eighth year of its existence, Professor Julius Stone urged the conversion of the Commission
from a body of learned lawyers preparing draft codes for Governments, which either do not want any code or want a code with different provisions, into an International Law Research Center for the basic problems arising in the more dynamic, changeful, and disrupted segments of international law. … [T]he International Law Commission is not destined to solve or transform the basic problems of international law and society in pursuance of its present mandate. Not even its staunchest protagonists can give to the continuance of this present mandate much more than a token, time-marking value pending the appearance of a different world situation.
The Revocation of the Mandate for South West Africa
Authors: Dugard John 
Published: April 2006

After twenty years of frustrated attempts to bring South Africa to accept her international obligations in respect of South West Africa, the United Nations General Assembly resolved on October 27, 1966, to terminate South Africa’s right to administer the Territory. In this resolution the Assembly declared that
South Africa has failed to fulfil its obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated Territory and to ensure the moral and material well-being and security of the indigenous inhabitants of South “West Africa, and has, in fact, disavowed the Mandate.