bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Deterrence: An Empirical Psychological Model
Authors: Anthony Robert W. 
Published: November 2008

AbstractData from historical and ongoing operations against cocaine traffickers provide the basis for deriving a simple empirical mathematical expression, the willingness function, representing the psychological aspects of deterrence. The willingness function relates the willingness to perpetrate an illicit act to the perceived probability and consequences of being interdicted. This function can be generalized to estimate willingness to act when faced with a mixture of different consequences. The nonlinear willingness function provides, in turn, the basis for a deterrence model relating the probability of perpetrators being thwarted to the probability of their being interdicted. Operations against air traffickers flying cocaine base from Peru to Colombia validate the model and yield an estimate of the deterrence threshold for lethal consequences. An extension of this model estimates the effectiveness of layered defenses, taking terrorist perceptions into account. A number of critical tactical and strategic considerations are discussed, including employing surges of interdiction effort to find the deterrence threshold, assessing whether deterrence is working, preventing a collapse of established deterrence protections, and ensuring essential intelligence support. Analysis of the complex preparations leading up to the 9/11 attacks reveal the terrorists' caution and susceptibility to deterrence. Other evidence also argues for the validity of representing terrorist behavior with this function. Finally, the willingness function can be empirically tested as a possible general behavioral pattern for extreme risk taking by sportsmen, criminals, insurgents, or terrorists. Since there are many interpretations of deterrence, definitions and data sources are discussed first.
Risk Transfer and Insurance: Insurability Concepts and Programs for Covering Extreme Events
Authors: Kunreuther Howard C. , Michel‐Kerjan Erwann O. 
Published: November 2008

AbstractThis article discusses factors that determine the insurability of a risk and the extent of coverage offered by the private sector to provide protection against events where there is a low probability of a catastrophic loss. Such extreme events include natural disasters, catastrophic industrial accidents, and large‐scale terrorism. We begin the discussion by focusing, for several reasons, on insurance for natural hazards, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods. First, natural disasters have been studied for many years. Second, the concepts that define insurability of natural disasters are also applicable to other disasters. The article then discusses how federal and state governments in the United States have contributed to supplementing private insurance in dealing with catastrophe risks.
Quantitative Representation of Risk
Authors: Ayyub Bilal M. , Kaminskiy Mark P. 
Published: November 2008

AbstractThis article provides a summary of new developments in the representation of risk, including random variables relating to losses, occurrence rates, and moments and parameters. Risk results from an event or sequence of events that is called ascenario. A scenario can be viewed as a potential cause, and if it occurs, it may result in consequences with severities. The representation of risk is essential for risk communication and decision making. In this article, quantitative methods that are suitable to represent risk for homeland security applications are described, and illustrated. Loss exceedance probability distributions, loss exceedance rates, probability density functions, and descriptive point estimates are included for this purpose. Computational examples are used to illustrate these methods. The selection of an appropriate method should be based on the decision situation under consideration.
Qualitative Representation of Risk
Authors: Smith Gary R. , Scouras James , DeBell Robert M. 
Published: November 2008

AbstractA qualitative representation of risk relies on natural language, rather than mathematics, to communicate the nature and magnitude of risk. Qualitative risk representations may be necessary because the underlying risk assessment is not amenable to quantification or preferred because they are more readily understood by a broad audience. However, natural language is an imprecise communication medium that can undermine the effectiveness of the message. This article provides guidelines and examples of qualitative scales for the principal components of risk—likelihood and consequences. A qualitative risk matrix is developed to illustrate the advantages, limitations, and pitfalls in this widely used technique for displaying risk. A brief discussion of risk comparisons indicates which types of comparisons are most appropriate.
Terrorism Risk
Authors: Woo Gordon 
Published: November 2008

AbstractTerrorism risk emerged as a quantitative modeling discipline after 9/11. This article describes methods that have been developed for modeling the terrorism risk from Islamist militants. While the damage wrought by a terrorist attack is amenable to engineering loss analysis, the terrorist modus operandi is a function of human behavior, and hence requires special methods drawn from fields such as game theory, social psychology, and network analysis. In order to analyze the global terrorist threat from Islamist militants, a coherent global perspective is required that tracks the radicalization of Muslim diaspora communities.
High Consequence Threats: Electromagnetic Pulse
Authors: Frankel Michael J. 
Published: November 2008

Abstract
A nuclear weapon detonated at an altitude greater than 40 km or so will produce an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that may subject a large region of the country to electromagnetic field intensities that disrupt, degrade, or destroy modern electronic components within the region of influence. The pulse will include a “fast” component that may electromagnetically shock computers, digital relay switches, communications equipment, supervisory control and data systems (SCADAs), and many other critical components of our national infrastructures that make ordinary life livable and keep the social fabric of society functioning. A large weapon will also include a “slow” pulse component that attacks particular vulnerabilities of the national power grid. Although it is the task of government to prevent such a high consequence scenario from being perpetrated, prudent steps may also be taken to reduce our overall vulnerability. As far as possible, these should include steps that provide dual benefits, reducing the vulnerability to EMP while simultaneously conferring other benefits. But, the foremost recommendation is to institute and then exercise a planning activity within the Department of Homeland Security.
Protection and Prevention: an Overview
Authors: Cummings John 
Published: November 2008

Abstract
The focus of this section is on protecting assets, networks, systems, and humans by preventing and/or mitigating physical attacks and damage. This article provides an overview and addresses the question “what do protection and prevention mean from a homeland security and defense perspective?” Definitions and terminologies are included in the article. Most of the emphasis is on protecting a wide variety of infrastructure elements and the people who work or reside in them. A broad range of threats and attack modes is considered—from the use of small arms and weapons to explosives to biological and chemical agents. The article discusses important auxiliary elements such as assessments, training, and preparations. Many forms of defensive components and systems are treated—from body armor to blast shields to “smart” ventilation systems. Concepts such as robustness and resilience, response and recovery, deterrence, and devaluation of potential targets/sites are discussed. Finally, advanced concepts and designs using innovative components and materials are highlighted as areas of future research and development.

This overview focuses on protecting assets, networks, systems, and humans by preventing and/or mitigating
physical
attacks and damage (see also Cyber‐Security). Background information includes the historical development of the concept of homeland security and defense following acts of terrorism on US soil in the late 1990s. A number of plans for federal and national research and development (R&D) efforts have been published. Risks from terrorism (defined here as the likelihood of threats exploiting vulnerabilities to cause consequences) must be understood and managed in a cost‐effective manner—science and technology can provide solutions to some of the most challenging concerns. It is unrealistic to think that we can protect everything and prevent all possible attacks; we must therefore be smart about our utilization of resources. We must be prepared to accept some risk and to rapidly recover if we are attacked (the fear of terrorism can do more damage to our way of life than actual attacks). Threats are dynamic and involve a wide range of possible means of attack ranging from the use of conventional explosives to biological agents to nuclear explosives. The number of possible targets is enormous and some vulnerabilities are part of the nature of a free and open society. Consequences of possible terrorist actions range from tens to thousands of lives lost and millions to billions of dollars of economic losses. Protecting our infrastructure and citizens from terrorist acts and preventing catastrophic impacts is a truly daunting challenge that will involve the efforts of many global R&D organizations. Science and technology can assist the development of systems to inform us about the status of our critical infrastructure and ultimately design advanced infrastructure that will be inherently secure, safe, and resilient.
Roles and Implications of Transportation Systems in Homeland Security
Authors: Ekern David , Crossett Joe 
Published: November 2008

AbstractState departments of transportation are responsible for planning, delivering, operating, and maintaining a vast surface transportation network that Americans depend on for safe, predictable, and easy movement of people and goods. The apparent scale and redundancy of the nation's transportation network gives a false sense of security because in many parts of the country that network is straining to keep up with the transportation demands of society and the economy. A single unexpected interruption in one location may have a dramatic ripple effect on ease and reliability of travel across a wide region. Nonetheless, surface transportation is uniquely positioned among critical infrastructures and key resources in terms of its management by agencies with broad policy responsibility, public accountability, large and distributed workforces, heavy equipment, and communications infrastructure. This institutional heft and continuous programmatic investment provide a stable base for a campaign to systematically reduce risk exposure over time through hazards capital budgeting. This article discusses the emergency preparedness capabilities that public‐sector transportation agencies are acquiring as their awareness grows about threats to safe and efficient operation of the nation's transportation network. It covers the organizational elements and planning approaches critical to developing effective all‐hazards emergency preparedness capabilities and it examines the roles that transportation agencies are developing to help prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from serious incidents.
Homeland Security and Wastewater Treatment
Authors: Mills Marc A. , Brenner Richard C. , Kreissl James F. , Suidan Makram T. 
Published: November 2008

Abstract
Wastewater results from mankind's use of water in all aspects of daily life. Historically, increasing population density forced mankind to abandon localized disposal (cesspools, septic tanks, etc.) toward collection and conveyance of contaminated water away from population centers for prevention of disease and protection of water. The aggregate of these contaminated waters has become known as wastewater or sewage. The first sewer system in a major city in the U.S. was constructed in New York City in 1895. Storm water conveyance has been documented as the major reason for the construction of sewers. This article describes the treatment of wastewater and public vulnerability to disruptions of wastewater collection.
Most of the modern large treatment plants are comprised of primary settling, or clarification (primary treatment), and secondary biological treatment consisting of biological oxidation, followed by separation of solids, The liquid treatment sequence is followed by one or more tertiary treatments (to reduce control nutrients and solids in final effluent). Effluent disinfection is the final step in order to reduce pathogenic potential.
Although disruptions in wastewater collection and treatment are of secondary nature and not as critical as disruptions to drinking water, power, communications, and public health system, there can be severe implications associated with wastewater collection disruption. Impacts on human health, economic effects, and longer term ecological effects are discussed.
Water Supply and Wastewater Management Regulations, Standards, and Guidance
Authors: Leiby Vanessa M. 
Published: November 2008

Abstract
An extensive system of regulations, standards, and guidance has been put in place over the last 35 years to protect human health and the environment from exposure to chemical and microbial contaminants, hazardous materials, and pollutants from human activity. These include provisions in the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the Clean Water Act, and other environmental laws. There are also a number of laws that relate to protection and access to sensitive information. More recently, a number of Presidential Directives relative to homeland security have been issued, and the SDWA has been amended by the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. This article briefly describes these laws and highlights those aspects that offer potential benefits to avoiding or mitigating the consequences of intentional acts of terror.
Roles of Federal, State, and Local Authorities in Water Infrastructure Security
Authors: Roberson J. A. 
Published: November 2008

Abstract
The role of federal, state, and local authorities in water infrastructure security has been evolving over the past several years based on 9/11, and Katrina and other natural disasters. This article summarizes some of the Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) that impact water security and summarizes how the HSPDs are being implemented by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). This article summarizes the current state and local role in water security, and how state and local authorities fit into this evolving federal role.
Designing an Optimum Water Monitoring System
Authors: Grayman Walter M. 
Published: November 2008

AbstractIn a perfect world, utility managers would like to have the capability to monitor water quality in their system on a real‐time basis. Real‐time water quality data can be used to detect unusual contaminants in the source water or distribution system, assist in routine operations of the water system, and fulfill regulatory requirements. However, the complexity and scale of drinking water systems as well as the number of potential contamination agents present real challenges to implementing cost‐effective monitoring systems. Methods do exist to assist in the design of optimal systems. The goal of this article is to provide guidance and technology options for implementing these approaches.
Interdependent Energy Infrastructure Simulation System
Authors: Toole G. Loren , McCown Andrew W. 
Published: November 2008

Abstract

This article discusses interdependent energy infrastructure simulation system (IEISS). The primary function of IEISS is to enable homeland security analysts and decision makers to understand and accurately assess intrinsic vulnerabilities in critical US infrastructures and those vulnerabilities that result from other forms of attack. It provides a high‐quality, flexible, and extensible actor‐based approach that has been used for

analyzing interdependent infrastructures;

understanding and answering questions of importance to homeland security such as identifying potential events that cause catastrophic system failure;

developing policy procedures that will aid in the prevention of physical terrorism.
Managing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies: The Ontario Approach
Authors: Nelson Bruce D. 
Published: November 2008

Abstract
The Province of Ontario developed the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program based upon risk management, business continuity process, and the collaboration of three levels of government and the private sector. It addresses the resiliency of systems and networks and their ability to function at some level throughout a threat. It is an all‐hazards approach that concentrates its efforts in the prevention and mitigation pillars of emergency management. The systems are addressed by sectors and their information sharing networks are an integral part of the program. The program includes a modeling program that is fed by the work of the sectors and addresses the strength of relationships amongst the sectors’ dependencies and interdependencies. The program's work is validated through an annual interdependency exercise involving all sectors and smaller exercises on particular threats or identified vulnerabilities between sectors. The most valuable part of the program is the sharing of knowledge throught the information‐sharing network.
Infrastructure Dependency Indicators
Authors: Brown Theresa 
Published: November 2008

AbstractThis article provides examples of infrastructure dependencies and representative dependency indicators developed in the course of creating models of infrastructures for disruption analyses. Infrastructures are a complex set of interconnected, interdependent systems on which the nation, commerce, industry, and individuals depend. Indicators provide a starting point for describing and evaluating infrastructures and their effects on each other, populations, and commerce. Indicators do not provide historical or situational context, although they can be designed to account for long‐term dynamics. The dynamics of infrastructure dependencies and interdependencies are due to variable supply and demand conditions occurring due to diurnal, seasonal variations as well as changes in physical infrastructure or the management of operations. Examples of widely used indicators developed for individual infrastructures and sectors are provided along with new indicators based on models of dynamic dependencies.
Nano‐Enabled Power Sources
Authors: Wang Enoch , Doughty Daniel H. 
Published: November 2008

Abstract
Nanotechnology has become an important tool in security and military applications and has potential to provide important new contributions. As security devices become more portable and shrink further in size, the performance of existing power source technologies is pushed to their limits. Nanotechnology is an enabling technology since it offers an opportunity to extend or revolutionize the performance of energy storage and conversion devices. Nanotechnology, especially nanomaterials, has demonstrated revolutionary improvement in several power source technologies. In the case of batteries and capacitors, nanomaterials have resulted in the commercialization of several high power or high energy cells. This article reviews emerging nano‐enabling applications in energy harvesting and energy conversion technologies as well as projects future trends of nanomaterials for power source applications.
Security and Safety Synergy—Advancing Security with Human Factors Knowledge
Authors: Dahlström Nicklas , Dekker Sidney 
Published: November 2008

AbstractSecurity and safety share fundamentally important features as operational activities with the goal to protect people, property, and the smooth economical functioning of organizations and society. In safety‐critical industries, safety is seen as the positive outcome of management of problems and trade‐offs that are rooted in systems' complexity, goal interaction, and resource limitations. This perspective has led safety research to shift focus and go beyond individual acts and move to systematic aspects of human, technological, and organizational performance. It involves dealing with problems connected to regulations and standardized procedures, technology and automation, and efforts to understand the impact of communication, group dynamics, leadership, and culture on safety. In spite of distinct differences in the nature of threats (intentional/unintentional), there are many areas (use of standardized procedures, human factors training, and modeling for increased understanding of adverse events) where knowledge and experiences from safety operations can fruitfully spill over to security. To establish cooperation between these two fields, for example on regulatory and procedural development, training and simulation, as well as operational evaluation, would be to produce synergies not yet known today.
Human Behavior and Deception Detection
Authors: Frank Mark G. , Menasco Melissa A. , O'Sullivan Maureen 
Published: November 2008

AbstractHuman intelligence is the key to stopping terrorism, and therefore it is essential to know when the information obtained is false. This article briefly outlines the research on behavioral clues to deception, as well as research on people's abilities to spot deception once it has happened. We find that there is no clue or clue pattern that is specific to deception, although there are clues specific to emotion and cognition. In general, behavioral clues are only limited in their abilities to identify deception and that there are still behavioral measurement issues that may plague research on deception. Moreover, a closer examination of the laboratory research suggests that many research studies are not relevant to security contexts, thus the research literature may underestimate the usefulness of behavioral information—particularly for the utility of identifying emotional and cognitive states. We also find that most people, unaided by technology, cannot detect lies from behavioral information, but that some groups do show significantly higher levels of accuracy—although more research is needed to understand why. We conclude that a more directed interaction with scientists and practitioners—in both lab work and in the real world, in creating real‐world databases, identifying base rates for malfeasant behavior in security settings, optimizing training, and identifying preexisting excellence within security organizations can more rapidly capitalize on the usefulness of behavioral information in security settings.