bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Presidential Action and Public Opinion about U.S. Nicaraguan Policy: Limits to the “Rally ‘Round the Flag” Syndrome
Authors: Bowen Gordon L. 
Published: May 2006

The Reagan-Bush Administration vigorously pursued a “Reagan Doctrine” of aiding anti-communist freedom fighters worldwide, in no place with more controversy than toward the anti-US Sandinista Government of Nicaragua. Why, then, would the new presidency of George Bush quickly have agreed to defer asking Congress for military aid to the Contras, have agreed to send only humanitarian aid instead, and have agreed to permit four separate congressional committees each to determine whether any aid at all should be continued? Unravelling this odd turn of events can help us better to understand the under-rated influence of public opinion on American foreign policy.Most of us assume the public usually to follow presidential leadership when it comes to foreign affairs. Indeed, though very few truths are undisputed when political scientists discuss Americans' opinions on questions of public importance, one accepted inference—borne out by much scientifically-verified evidence—is the “rally ‘round the flag” syndrome. The syndrome is simple: presidential popularity in public opinion polls rises when a president acts decisively toward an international crisis. These changes in Americans' stated opinions have been measured in international crises for several decades.“Rallies” occur only when special “crisis” conditions are met. These crisis situations usually involve threats to America which are (1) remote from the everyday experience of Americans, and (2) involve threats about which the president personally informs the public, usually over the dramatically effective medium of television, and (3) involve decisive—and usually military—response at the president's direction.
The Significance of the 1992 Election
Authors: Lipset Seymour Martin 
Published: May 2006

The 1992 election was influenced by a number of factors. The personalities, or characteristics, of the candidates clearly played a role, as did the kind of campaign they ran. Economic conditions were particularly important. However, it is interesting to note that statistical models by economists predicting election results, which emphasize economic trends, were less successful in 1992 than in previous years. Political scientists were more successful.Models and PerceptionsFour years ago, Ray Fair, an economist at Yale, was hailed for an incredibly accurate prediction. Applying a model that did not include data more recent than six months before the election, he anticipated the outcome of the 1988 contest within .3 of 1%. This model did not include Willie Horton or even Dukakis. It simply analyzed the way in which parameter data anticipated support for the incumbent and the opposition. Other economically based models were also quite accurate.Successfully applying such models is enough to make journalists and politicians ill, as it suggests that everything they do or write about is useless—that the outcome of elections is determined by pre-existing structural factors, not by candidates, campaign tactics, or ideology. This time Fair was wrong! He predicted that Bush was going to win, since the economy was really not that bad. The 1991-92 downturn was more moderate than the Reagan 1981-82 recession, or the Carter 1977 decline, while the misery index—unemployment plus the inflation rate—was much worse in 1979-80. But Bush was never able to get this message across.
The End of Mega Constitutional Politics in Canada?
Authors: Russell Peter H. 
Published: May 2006

On October 26, 1992, the Canadian people, for the first time in their history as a political community, acted as Canada's ultimate constitutional authority—in effect, as a sovereign people. In the referendum conducted on that day, a majority of Canadians in a majority of provinces, said “No” to the Charlottetown Accord proposals for constitutional change.Though the referendum was only consultative and not legally binding, nonetheless the governments that supported the Accord—and these include the federal government, all ten provincial governments and the two territorial governments, plus organizations representing the four groupings of aboriginal peoples (status and non-status Indians, Inuit, and Metis)—will not proceed with ratification of the Accord in their legislative assemblies. The politicians will respect the vox populi.The referendum may have killed more than the Accord. It may very well be the last time this generation of Canadians attempts a grand resolution of constitutional issues in order to prevent a national unity crisis. If in the next few years Canada plunges once again into the constitutional maelstrom, it will be because it is confronted with an actual, not an apprehended, crisis of national unity.
A Review of Herbert Simon's Review of My View of the Discipline
Authors: Lowi Theodore J. 
Published: May 2006

Dear Professor Simon:It is an honor to be read, and read carefully, by someone of your distinction. But since you missed the major premise of my March 1992 essay, it is virtually impossible to engage in a point-by-point rebuttal. In fact, few of your propositions I'd care to rebut, not only because they are irrelevant to my argument but also because I tend to agree with you. After all, I am a product of your work of the 1940s and early 1950s, as I am of the writings of the various Chicago political scientists you singled out for praise—having read their every word, including yours, and having studied with some of them as a student and served with some as a colleague. I contributed to the revival of Gosnell's Machine Politics—Chicago Model with a foreword (1968), in which I said, among other things, “It is a masterpiece in the imaginative use of aggregate data in the study of political phenomena. A direct predecessor to the work of V. O. Key, this study is unexcelled to this day as an effort to understand political behavior in its institutional setting” (vii).
The Twenty-Seventh Amendment and Constitutional Change by Stealth
Authors: Strickland Ruth Ann 
Published: May 2006

The process of how to amend the U.S. Constitution is the least discussed and least examined aspect of the Constitution. The vagaries surrounding the amendment process were highlighted in 1992 as the Twenty-Seventh Amendment gained momentum and eventual ratification.Compensation of Members of Congress: The Twenty-Seventh AmendmentAs one of the original proposals accompanying the Bill of Rights, and first proposed in 1789, the congressional pay raise amendment was included in order to limit the ability of Congress to change the compensation of its members. It was proposed by James Madison and later passed by both houses of Congress. The amendment stated: “No law, varying the compensation for the services of senators and representatives, shall take effect until an election of representatives shall have intervened.” Three state conventions, concerned that members of Congress might arbitrarily grant themselves salary raises, proposed that no salary improvements should occur before the next election of representatives (Livingston 1956).
Political Parties and Representation: The Case of Japan
Authors: Pempel T. J. 
Published: May 2006

Japan, the non-Western world's first country to introduce and continue a parliamentary system of government, and one of the most stable democracies in the industrialized world today, provides an excellent case for the study of political parties and representation.—It was the first non-Western country to introduce a parliament in 1890 and mass male suffrage in 1925.—Political parties and popular elections were an important basis for governance in the period prior to World War II, and have been the sole basis for the selection of Japan's governments since then, making Japan one of the few non-Western examples of electoral representation.—Japan today, despite free elections and a competitive multiparty system, has had an unbroken string of governments formed exclusively by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party since that party's formation in 1955, making Japan the best example of uninterrupted conservative rule among the advanced industrialized democracies.—There are enough similarities and differences in Japan's electoral and party systems to make it an informative, but not totally anomalous, comparative case study for those generally interested in these phenomena.
Reforming Campaign Ads
Authors: West Darrell M. 
Published: May 2006

Dissatisfaction with paid campaign advertisements in recent elections has generated heartfelt pleas for fundamental change in the ways elections are conducted. Following the example of Australia and until recently West Germany, some have called for an outright ban on television campaign ads in the United States. Others more worried about the effect on last-minute deciders have suggested the application of the French model, where ads are banned during the closing weeks of the campaign (Schoenbach, 1987: Penniman and Ranney, undated).These calls undoubtably reflect the deep frustration felt by viewers over the poor educational quality of advertisements in the United States. But it is far too simple to blame ads for these deficiencies. The problem of political commercials is as much a function of campaign structure and voter reactions as candidate behavior. Structural and attitudinal changes in the nature of campaigns have loosened the forces which used to restrain elite strategies. The rise of a mass-based campaign system at a time when candidates have powerful means of influencing viewers creates big incentives for media campaigns. Voters are bombarded with spot ads precisely because of the short-term possibilities evident in recent races (West, 1991a; 1991b).Since the problem of advertisements goes much deeper than ads themselves, it is unlikely that the elimination of television ads would solve the problems which plague American elections. After all, nonsubstantive appeals by candidates did not originate with television ads in 1952. Fluffy rhetoric has a long tradition in American politics (Jamieson and Campbell, 1988).
New Thinking and New Foreign Policy Under Gorbachev
Authors: Zwick Peter 
Published: May 2006

New thinking (novoye myshleniye) is the foreign policy component of Gorbachev's systemic reforms, which include the more familiar perestroika (restructuring) and glasnost (openness). These three elements of reform are integral and mutually supportive: new thinking in foreign policy contributes to the restructuring of the Soviet economy, and domestic economic reform and political openness influence the implementation and direction of Soviet foreign policy. Therefore, new thinking in foreign policy must be understood in the larger context of Mikhail Gorbachev's vision of the Soviet future, rather than merely as a revision of certain aspects of Soviet international behavior.As with perestroika and glasnost, Gorbachev has had a difficult time translating “new thinking” into new policy. Internal political resistance, systemic inertia, and ideological obstacles have hampered the implementation of all Gorbachev's reforms, but the implementation of “new thinking” in foreign policy has encountered the additional obstacle of a skeptical international audience that must be convinced by Soviet deeds that new thinking is more than declaratory policy. The problem for Gorbachev is that he must simultaneously convince the world that his new thinking is, in fact, “new,” and his comrades that new thinking is consistent with the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism.After four years in power, Gorbachev is beginning to face the ideological, political, and economic inconsistencies and contradictions of perestroika, glasnost, and new thinking. It is now clear, for example, that perestroika of the economy will not result from bureaucratic restructuring but must include a fundamental change in the role of the market in pricing, allocation, and production decisions.
A China Witness
Authors: Elkin Stephen L. 
Published: May 2006

In the seven weeks from later April to early June China has displayed to the world—and to itself—politics at its best and worst. It is in the comparison of the two that the true horror of what has occurred can be seen. The worst is easy to specify. It is the massacre of unarmed civilians by soldiers who have been called on to defend those reluctant to give up power, and to aid them in a struggle with other leaders who would displace them.Politics at its best can perhaps be suggested by describing some scenes that I witnessed during my stay in Beijing throughout the month of May. In one of the many peaceful demonstrations, journalists marched under a banner saying “We don't believe what we write.” In a different demonstration, school teachers proudly marched at the head of a column of their junior high school students, all of whom were dressed up in school uniforms. Perhaps most suggestive and poignant of all were the parents holding up their babies to the marchers as if to say, you are the future and I show you my allegiance by displaying those who have the most to gain from your courage.All of these moments were embedded in an outpouring of good will, good humour, discipline and inventiveness the likes of which the world has rarely if ever seen. It was as if the students wished to prod the political leadership by the sheer force of their example of restraint and courage.
‘Exceptionalism’ in American Politics?
Authors: Shafer Byron E. 
Published: May 2006

American politics seems constantly surprising even to many of its most attentive domestic observers. It seems nearly unfathomable to many of their foreign counterparts. Is there something about American politics which really is distinct, even unique, in world perspective? Something which implies that this politics can be understood only in terms of the peculiar characteristics of the larger political system in which it occurs? Something which justifies the old term for such nearly untranslatable peculiarity—something “exceptional”?If there is an exceptionalism to American politics, it must by definition be found in one or more of three areas. It must be found in the public attitudes at the base of that politics, especially in what people want from politics or in how they think about the process of politicking. It must be found in the key organizations in the middle of that politics, those which link individual citizens to the institutions of government, especially political parties and interest groups. And/or it must be found at the very top in those institutions of government themselves, in distinctive conformations or distinctive operation.To anticipate the analysis here: I believe that the array of American national institutions of government qualifies as exceptional. I am sure that the key arrangement structuring the nature and behavior of our parties qualifies. And I suspect that a peculiar and wide-spread attitude toward politics is additionally distinctive, though I am least confident about this.
Climbing Down from the Hill: The Decline of America and the National Crisis in Economic Policymaking
Authors: Richter Stephan-Gotz 
Published: May 2006

For a period of more than three years, from spring 1985 through the summer of 1988, the U.S. Congress labored hard to come to terms with the nation's staggering trade deficit. Since the voluminous ‘Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988’ was passed into the law, much of the ensuing policy debate has focused on whether or not this legislation is protectionist in nature. Far less attention has been given to an issue which deserves at least as much attention: What lessons regarding the future of economic policy making can be drawn from this lawmaking experience?A Major Case of Legislative Miscarriage?An argument can be made that, after all the agitation, commotion, and self-flagellation which went into the legislative exercise, the one tangible result of the 1988 Trade Act was the preservation of the status quo ante. Viewed in a critical light, one could go further and argue that what really happened was the performance of a national rite. This rite involved a large group of players who each invested vast amounts of political energies into the effort of making a new trade law. The problem was that their inputs traveled along largely predetermined paths and primarily satisfied the actors' symbolic needs, while it only obscured a national policy issue urgently awaiting resolution.As the standard textbook of American politics has it, Congress is to respond to every pressure group knocking at its door. Members indeed introduced a myriad of provisions which covered every angle of trade policy, from the regulation of imports of aluminum, titanium, sugar and photo albums down to the outright prescription of world market shares as well as of interest and exchange rate policies abroad.
Institutional Conflict Over Presidential Appointments: The Case of Clarence Thomas
Authors: Shefter Martin 
Published: May 2006

The fight over the confirmation of Clarence Thomas for a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court was another round in a struggle between Congress and the White House for control over the government of the United States. The intensity of the battle over the Thomas nomination reflected the Republican determination to counter the attacks upon presidential appointees that Democrats in Congress staged in the course of this struggle.The conflict over the Thomas confirmation became so fierce largely because it turned into a two-way battle. The Democratic attack upon Thomas was met by a Republican counterattack upon Anita Hill, who accused Thomas of sexual harassment. Republican senators evidently decided that the time had come to fight efforts by Democratic Congresses to curtail the power of Republican presidents.Battles between Congress and the presidency have become central to American politics in recent years. As the Republicans tightened their hold on the White House and the Democrats their grip on Congress, each party came to despair of gaining control of the opposition's bastion by defeating it in the electoral arena. Instead, each party sought to strengthen the institution it normally controls while weakening the one it regarded as beyond its reach electorally (Ginsberg and Shefter 1990).In particular, Congress attempted to reduce the president's ability to gain power from his control over the national security apparatus by sponsoring a number of legislative restrictions on the foreign policy powers of the president—the War Powers Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and the Foreign Commitments Resolution.
On the Unpredictability of the Supreme Court
Authors: Baum Lawrence 
Published: May 2006

The United States Supreme Court today is an object of intense speculation. After two decades of anticipation by Court watchers, the Court may be ready to enter a new era in its history. Commentators debate what the new era will look like, if it does indeed develop. Will the Court reject altogether its mission of protecting individual liberties? If so, what new role will it adopt?Because the Supreme Court is an important and intriguing institution, such speculation is understandable. But ultimately, even the most perceptive observers have a limited capacity to predict the Court's direction as a policy maker. These difficulties in prediction reflect a fundamental reality about the Court: its path is not the inevitable product of the political and social forces that shape its behavior. Rather, less systematic factors can influence the Court's path, making the Court's role as a policy maker largely upredictable.
Coalitions, Cues, Strategic Politics, and the Staying Power of the Religious Right, or Why Political Scientists Ought to Pay Attention to Cultural Politics
Authors: Leege David C. 
Published: May 2006

The decade of the 1980s began with a former naval officer and Southern peanut farmer, a deeply religious, Sunday-school teaching president being unseated by a former sportscaster and union leader, a divorced and remarried Hollywood movie star-turned-politician. The religious right claimed credit for the defeat of that born-again Baptist, convinced that Ronald Reagan and his Republican party would restore the social and moral values that had crumbled, especially under liberal Democratic administrations. It was a heady period for evangelical leaders, quiescent on the public scene, some say since the 1920s, others say the 1950s. They were concerned again not simply with the salvation of souls but the transformation of society. Mastering the new instruments of television and direct marketing appeals, evangelical leaders had money, organizational moxie, and mass followings. They put their moral agenda into the national legislative arena—and came up with few victories.The decade ended as ironically as it began. First, “The Fall”: televangelists Bakker and Swaggart were discredited for their moral peccadillos; faith-healer Oral Roberts, for his lack of business acumen. Televangelist Pat Robertson tried for the presidency but discovered that he could not even gain the support of evangelical leaders. Jerry Falwell, who endorsed George Bush rather than pentecostalist Robertson, chose to disband his Moral Majority and emerged with a much weaker, seldom noticed organization.
The 1990 Congressional Election Results and the Fallacy That They Embodied an Anti-Incumbent Mood
Authors: Alford John R. , Hibbing John R. 
Published: May 2006

Given all the hype in 1990 about an “anti-incumbent” mood that was supposed to have swept the electorate, it is not too surprising that immediately after the congressional elections of that year most pundits claimed to see clear evidence of this mood in the results. But it is surprising that now, as we approach the next election day, more relaxed and objective analysis has not corrected this erroneous view of what actually transpired in 1990. Thus, before this misconception becomes an indelible part of conventional wisdom, and before the events of 1992, which may include something closer to an authentic anti-incumbent mood, are compared to a mistaken view of the events of 1990, we would like to offer an alternative and, we would argue, more accurate interpretation of the 1990 congressional elections.November 6, 1990 was to have been the day the fortifications of entrenched incumbents—relentless constituency service, massive warchests, and intimidation of prospective quality challengers—were overwhelmed by the poorly-armed but righteously indignant masses. These masses were incited by brave challengers who concocted clever taunts about the insular and haughty denizens of Washington castle life. These hated insiders, it was said, were surrounded by doting courtiers, undeserved privileges, and unbelievable treasures, and the outsiders were finally going to have their revenge.
The ‘Minimax Blame' Rule for Voter Choice: Help for the Undecided Voter on Novembere, 1988
Authors: Wuffle A. 
Published: May 2006

Consider an election in which all the choices are dismal, albeit some perhaps even more dismal than others. How should voters in such an election choose whom to vote for or whether or not to vote?It has been suggested (Riker and Ordeshook, 1973; cf. Weisberg and Grofman, 1981) that a voter is unlikely to vote if no choice exists whose election would yield him any appreciable degree of delight. Such a voter is alienated from the system. Consider, now, an election whose outcome is virtually certain. The conventional wisdom is that such certainty as to outcome should depress turnout, since ceteris paribus, voters who come to see their vote as making no difference should be less likely to vote than when they saw themselves as having a chance, however remote, to influence the outcome.