The Response to Piper Alpha: Recent Offshore Safety Developments in the U.K.
Authors: Taylor B.G.S. , Wallace I.G. , Ward A. 
Published: October 2008

ABSTRACT
Immediately after the Piper Alpha disaster in July 1988 the UK offshore operating companies reviewed their "software" procedures such as permits to work and initiated "hardware" changes based on lessons learned from the disaster. These included the provision and siting of emergency shutdown valves, subsea isolation systems, the prevention of smoke ingress to accommodation, the provision of better marking and screening of emergency walkways, and improved firefighting systems.
The Government Inquiry into Piper Alpha, headed by Lord Cullen, was given two tasks, first to determine the cause of the disaster and, secondly, to recommend how similar disasters could be prevented.
Lord Cullen's report was published on 12th November 1990. It recommends sweeping changes to the UK regulatory regime and lists 106 specific recommendations for consideration by Government and industry. UKOOA endorses the recommendations and will monitor their implementation by operating companies as well as coordinating the industry studies needed to support them UKOOA's preliminary response to the detailed recommendations is outlined.

INTRODUCTION
The UK Offshore Operators Association (UKOOA) represents the 36 oil and gas companies which are designated operators of licences on the UK Continental Shelf. Its main objectives are to provide an industry forum for discussion of matters of mutual interest to its members and, as appropriate, to provided its members with a means of communication with government and other relevant bodies. Its strength lies in the work of its committees; there are 39 permanent committees and sub-committees, all of which are manned by volunteers from UKOOA's member companies.
The Piper Alpha disaster shocked the industry and the general public. In the aftermath of the personal tragedies came the inevitable self-examination and uncertainty. The designs and operating procedures, which for so long had seemed dependable and safe, now looked vulnerable. What had gone wrong? How could it be put right so that a similar accident could not happen again?
The Public Inquiry headed by Lord Cullen was given the task of answering these vital questions. In Part 1 of the Inquiry, Lord Cullen established the cause of the disaster and in Part 2 of the Inquiry he dealt specifically with measures to prevent a future major accident. UKOOA did not participate in Part 1 but under the umbrella of UKOOA the offshore operating companies gave evidence to Lord Cullen and his assessors on all the issues which he identified as relevant to Part 2 of the Inquiry.
These are listed below:Location and protection of accommodationMeans of mitigating the effects of explosionMeans of ensuring the integrity of emergency systemsMeans of ensuring safe and full evacuationPermits to workControl of the processRisk assessmentThe management of offshore safetyThe offshore safety regime 63 expert witnesses gave evidence, of whom 34 represented UKOOA. Other sources of evidence included the Health & Safety Executive, the Department of Energy, the Trades Unions, the Department of Transport and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.