bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
9 Research in Schools
Authors: Ross Lainie Friedman 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines the arguments for and against conducting biomedical and behavioral research in schools; whether additional human subject protections are necessary; and whose consent is necessary and how it should be procured. It is argued that while schools are a tempting venue to do biomedical and behavioral research, parents, students, teachers, school officials, researchers, and institutional review boards need to be sensitive to the unique problems that such research may raise. Schools should have written policies that address the need to protect human subjects when research is done in the school setting. Minimum guidelines for schools are presented.
11 Diabetes Prediction and Prevention Research in Childhood
Authors: Ross Lainie Friedman 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of recent diabetes prediction and prediction/prevention studies beyond the newborn period. It examines whether these studies are permissible under current federal regulations, and whether proposed modifications improve human subject protections. In the process, it is clarified whether and when children ‘at risk’ for ‘a disorder or condition’ should qualify for having ‘a disorder or condition’.
14 Research not Otherwise Approvable: A Look at One 407 Protocol
Authors: Ross Lainie Friedman 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
CFR section 46.407 of Subpart D of the federal regulations addresses research that is not otherwise approvable. Research is not otherwise approvable because either (1) it seeks to enroll healthy children, but offers no prospect of direct benefit and entails more than minimal risk; or (2) it seeks to enroll children with a disorder or condition, but offers no prospect of direct benefit and entails more than a minor increase over minimal risk. According to CFR section 46.407, such research can be permissible if it is reviewed and approved by a panel of experts convened by the secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. The regulations also require public review of the research. Prior to the year 2000, only two panels of experts were convened. This chapter examines the University of Washington’s experience with its protocol, Precursors to Diabetes in Japanese American Youth, as a case study of the strengths and limitations of the 407 process in 2001.
15 Evolution of the 407 Process
Authors: Ross Lainie Friedman 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
Fourteen 407 panels have been convened in the more than two decades since passage of Subpart D. The first two were in the early 1990s, and the remainder since 2001. This chapter provides a brief history of the first ten 407 panels, and then examines three of the last four panels. It concludes with several observations that can be gleaned from an historical and ethical analysis of the 407 process: observations that may be instructive for future 407 panels and for the protection of pediatric research subjects.
8 A Method for Thinking about Just Peace
Authors: Said Edward W. 
Published: June 2006

AbstractIn this chapter, Said argues that in the case of the Palestinians and Israelis, histories and cultures are inextricably linked ‘contrapuntally’ in symbiotic rather than mutually exclusive terms. When this understanding of circumstances occurs, it no longer seems viable to eliminate the opposition because there will always be a tomorrow in which retribution will be demanded by those who feel that an injustice had been forced upon family members or previous generations. Said emphasizes the need to think about and resolve two histories that have become interwoven, despite the fact that many have tried to define the other in contradictory terms. Part of arriving at a Just Peace entails recognizing a shared identity and common history even if this approach highlights differences. This might be a monumental task considering the trials and tribulations that have often come to pass in a conflict, but for Said, an ‘abridged memory’ is not an option that will lead to Just Peace.
Self‐Ownership and Conscription
Authors: Steiner Hillel 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis essay argues that an exception to Cohen’s understanding of the right of self-ownership might be warranted in some cases of conscription. It considers cases where one is legitimately compelled to perform uncontracted services for others by being forced to rescue them from violations of moral rights. Compensation for such conscription renders it consistent with the right of self-ownership.
Is the Basic Structure Basic?
Authors: Scheffler Samuel 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis essay focuses on Cohen’s recent arguments for extending the scope of justice beyond Rawls’s formulation. It argues for the merits of Rawls’s argument that the primary subject of justice should be restricted to social institutions. It contends that whether or not one agrees with Rawls’s view of what should count as the subject of justice, Cohen is wrong to understand the upshot of this to be either a paltry measure of redistribution or the accommodation of the untrammelled pursuit of selfish interests.
10 Impartiality, Solidarity, and Distributive Justice
Authors: Roemer John E. 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis essay considers the role of impartiality in theories of distributive justice. Impartiality is modelled by Rawls in his famous thought experiment of a veil of ignorance, where individuals reason about principles of justice without knowing fundamental aspects of themselves — such as talent or family background. It is argued that the veil of ignorance delivers recommendations that are inconsistent with prioritarianism, that is, the view that priority should be given to ameliorating the disadvantage of the worst off. Hence, prioritarianism, which is after all far weaker than strict egalitarianism, cannot be justified by appeal to a veil of ignorance. The veil of ignorance achieves impartiality, but impartiality needs to be conjoined with a principle of solidarity in order to justify the redistribution of wealth. The resource allocation rules that jointly satisfy impartiality, priority, and solidarity are described.
5 The Ideal Language Project and the Non‐discrete
Authors: Laycock Henry 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThe notion of an ‘ideal language’ or ‘concept-script’ is explicated and defended, and constraints upon formal systems imposed by the ideal of transparency are explored. It is argued that non-singular symbolisms, including non-singular variables, largely fail to satisfy such constraints. In general, the semantics of non-singular expressions do not transparently reflect the corresponding ontic categories. The conditions for the possibility of transparent non-singular assertions, freed from the concept of identity, are briefly explored. The questionable influence within philosophy of the ‘Classical’ Weltanschaung is highlighted.
The Knowability Paradox
Authors: Kvanvig Jonathan L. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This book examines and proposes a solution to the knowability paradox. The paradox derives from the proof that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known, which was first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963. It identifies two problems created by Fitch’s proof: a perceived anti-realism and the paradox created by the proof. It is argued that although the two problems are related, a defence against the threat to anti-realism is no solution to the paradox. The neo-Russellian theory of quantification is considered the only acceptable solution to the paradox, since no other approach offers any hope of addressing the fundamental paradoxicality involved in asserting a lost logical distinction between actuality and possibility.
Introduction
Authors: Kvanvig Jonathan L. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This introductory chapter begins with a brief overview of the knowability paradox — a paradox deriving from a proof that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are known — which was first published by Frederic Fitch in 1963. It cites the relative obscurity of the proof and paradox since its publication, and identifies the two problems created by Fitch’s proof. The chapters included in this volume are then described.
Chapter 5 T. H. Green and the Eternal Consciousness
Authors: Sprigge T.L.S. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines the philosophy of T. H. Green, the initial leading figure among the absolute idealists who dominated British philosophy in the late 19th century. Green sought to establish that the existence and nature of human beings, especially of the human mind, was not susceptible of a purely empirical or scientific explanation. He claimed that the only possible explanation involved reference to the existence of an Eternal Consciousness, which was gradually realizing itself in the temporal world, more especially in the life of human beings. Further issues in his philosophy are examined, such as that things count as real only if they are in unchanging relations to each other, the difference between negative and positive freedom, the nature of moral choice, the superiority of a virtue ethic to a utilitarian one.
Chapter 10 Concluding Remarks
Authors: Sprigge T.L.S. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
Religion has been described in this book as ‘a truth to live by’ (that is what is thought to be a truth by the believer and is associated with ‘religious’ emotions). This last chapter considers with reference to each of the philosophers discussed at any length in this book whether his metaphysics could provide anyone who accepted it with such a ‘truth’. Each of them qualifies as religiously significant from this point of view. The truth of the system matters for anyone inclined to adopt it but what matters for others is its ethical effect upon him or her.
Karma or Grace?
Authors: Davis Stephen T. 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter defines two abstract systems of salvation called Karma and Grace. It then asks the question: On philosophical grounds alone, which is superior? Five criticisms that defenders of Karma might make against Grace are discussed, as well as five arguments that can be made against Karma. It is impossible to answer the question definitively without bringing in metaphysical questions like whether God exists, but the tentative conclusion is that Grace is superior.
2 John andThomasin Conflict—about What?
Authors: Dunderberg Ismo 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter argues that it is not tenable to assume that Thomas is dependent on John, and that the theory that their affinities go back to a common sayings source also proves problematic. The most recent theory that John was written in response to the Gospel of Thomas or to Thomasine Christians is critically examined. Scholars arguing for this theory presuppose that the figure of Thomas in the Gospel of John represents a theological position opposed by the author of this gospel, but they show no agreement as regards what this theological position is. This already suggests that the figure of Thomas in John offers too narrow a basis for far-reaching conclusions about the theology he is supposed to stand for.
3 The Figure of Thomas in the Gospel of John
Authors: Dunderberg Ismo 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter offers a closer discussion of the Johannine portrayal of Thomas. It argues that the author of John was unaware of the Syrian Thomas tradition: he never used the name Judas Thomas for this figure. It is shown that the theological positions ascribed to Thomas in recent scholarship are far from evident. It is neither clear that Thomas doubts the possibility of physical resurrection, nor it is clear that he is portrayed as an advocate of those seeking mystical ascent and a visio dei. The negative aspects in the Johannine portrayal of Thomas are not unique in this gospel. Several other followers of Jesus are cast in equally negative terms. It is not conceivable to assume that behind all these figures would be Christian communities rejected by the author of John.
5 The Beloved Disciple in the Gospel of John
Authors: Dunderberg Ismo 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter argues that the enigmatic ‘disciple Jesus loved’ in John cannot be identified, and that the evidence for his role as the founder and the leader of the Johannine group remains meagre. The Beloved Disciple is no doubt an ideal figure in John, but he is not necessarily portrayed as a paradigm of true faith to the audience. Rather, his major function is to authenticate the contents of the Gospel of John. While he is often compared to the Paraclete in John, his figure is more closely connected with that of Jesus. He is one link in the chain of the transmission of divine revelation: the Father supplied the beloved Son with this revelation, and the Beloved Disciple was needed to transmit it to future generations.
7 The Beloved Disciple in Context
Authors: Dunderberg Ismo 
Published: June 2006

AbstractIn this chapter, the Johannine Beloved Disciple is located within the broader context of early Christian portrayals of the disciples of Jesus. First, it is pointed out how they increasingly became portrayed as authors of early Christian texts; the Beloved Disciple in John and Thomas in the Gospel of Thomas denote the first step towards this development. Special attention is devoted to the authorial fiction created in these texts. Second, the chapter points out that several other followers of Jesus were described in terms of their specific affinity with him. These figures include, in addition to the Beloved Disciple and Thomas, Mary of Magdala, James, and Bartholomew. Most of them are portrayed as having the privilege of knowing Jesus’ hidden teaching, but they differ in their willingness to disclose this teaching to other disciples. It is suggested that the Beloved Disciple in John could be understood as an ‘anti-James’, replacing the brothers of Jesus.
1 The Language of Time
Authors: Fox Rory 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines some of the key language and terminology used by 13th century thinkers. Thirteenth-century thinkers distinguished between logically indivisible boundaries and divisible parts. As applied to time, this distinction allowed them to identify and refer to two temporal elements: temporal parts and temporal boundaries. Altogether, they seem to have deployed 10 basic terms to refer to temporal elements: instans, praesens, nunc, periodus, momentum, duratio, mora, diurnitas, protensio, and quando. Although each of these words have what appear to be obvious English translations, the medieval Latin terms often contained multiple nuances which were not always reflected in the typical English words used to translate them.
2 Temporal Simultaneity
Authors: Fox Rory 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines 13th century views of ‘simultaneity’ and their implications. It shows that medieval Latin word ‘simul’ (simultaneous) had a wide set of meanings and uses, only some of which were reserved for discussions of temporality. Since 13th century thinkers clearly valued Aristotle’s insights, the tendency was to follow his approach and understanding of temporal simultaneity, defining it in terms of temporal priority and temporal posteriority. While this approach was reductively simple, it also had the consequence of defining out of consideration the set of issues which contemporary thinkers refer to as the question of whether time can be disunified or not. Essential to formulating that question is the possession of a metaphysics and language, which will make it possible to talk of instants which are neither before nor after each other, without that entailing that the instants are temporally simultaneous.
8 Sempiternity, Angelic Time, and the Aevum
Authors: Fox Rory 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines the import and meaning of the terms sempiternitas, perpetuitas, and aeviternitas or aevum. The terms sempiternitas and perpetuitas were often used interchangeably since they were basically used to refer to limitless particulars and their durations. Medieval figures recognized two types of limitlessness: durations which had no end and durations which had neither a beginning nor an end. As the terms perpetuitas and sempiternitas could be used of both kinds of durations, it is not unusual to find them used of God, angels, souls, and heavenly bodies. The terms aeviternitas and aevum were often used in a similar way, and were sometimes used synonymously with perpetuitas and sempiternitas. Nevertheless, there were serious disagreements amongst 13th century thinkers about the nature of the aevum, in particular whether it was extended or not.
The Specification of Human Actions in St Thomas Aquinas
Authors: Pilsner Joseph 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
Thomas Aquinas believed that human actions have kinds or species. He divided human actions into good, evil, or indifferent, and subdivided them into more particular kinds such as almsgiving, murder, fraternal correction, or theft. From his earliest consideration of this topic in the Commentary on the Sentences to his latest in the Summa Theologiae, he used five different terms — end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive — to identify what gives species to human actions. Some difficulties have been noted with respect to his thinking on this subject. A first such difficulty is that his teaching on a few of these terms seems at times inconsistent. For example, although Aquinas maintains in some texts that circumstances can give species to human actions, he seems to deny that they can in other texts. Further, although on some occasions he holds that a remote end is irrelevant for the specification of human actions, on other occasions, he seems to assert that a remote end is the most important principle for such specification. It is not easy to see at first how these seemingly contradictory statements can be true at the same time. A second difficulty is that it is hard to grasp how end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive could all refer to what specifies human actions. Although certain similarities in meaning can be recognized among them, no term seems to be a strict synonym of any other, ruling out an easy reconciliation. This monograph examines Aquinas’s understanding of these five terms to resolve these difficulties and propose a coherent account of his teaching on the specification of human actions.
1 Introduction
Authors: Pilsner Joseph 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
A crucial task for any moral theory is to determine what makes a human action to be of a certain kind. For instance, what makes almsgiving to be in its own species rather than in the species of theft or selling? Aquinas addresses this issue in a few of his works, most notably Commentary on the Sentences, De Malo, and the Summa Theologiae. However, a puzzle arises when his writings are examined carefully. Aquinas uses five different terms — end, object, matter, circumstance, and motive — to signify what gives species to human actions. Although similarities in meaning can be discerned among certain of these terms, it is difficult to grasp how all five could refer to what specifies human actions. In this monograph, the five terms used by Aquinas are examined and compared to propose a more comprehensive account of his teaching on specification of human action.
5 Object
Authors: Pilsner Joseph 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
Aquinas asserts on many occasions that human actions are specified by their objects. Two meanings he gives to the term ‘object’ are particularly significant. On some occasions, he uses ‘object’ to mean a thing in so far as it possesses a formal quality by which it defines a related action, habit, or power. To illustrate, as the colour of something (not its smell or taste) defines sight, so distinctive differences in what is willed determines whether human actions are morally good, evil, or indifferent, and whether they belong to more particular moral species such as almsgiving or adultery. On other occasions, Aquinas has a second meaning for ‘object’, namely, a proximate end. In this case, when he says an object specifies, he means that a proximate end (such as ‘taking an innocent life’) determines a moral species (such as ‘murder’), and that no further end an agent may pursue (such as wealth) is necessary to make this determination.
6 Matter
Authors: Pilsner Joseph 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
Aquinas sometimes says that matter specifies a human action, and frequently uses ‘matter’ as an alternative term for ‘object’. He does not hold that all matter can determine a human action’s species, but only that matter to which an action is specially related, called the ‘matter about which’ an action takes place or its ‘due’/‘undue’ matter. Aquinas has two different ways of explaining how matter can specify. On occasion, he argues that just as particular kinds of matter predispose for certain substantial forms (for instance, only flesh and bones can accommodate the human soul), so the distinctive characters of things willed predispose for certain kinds of human actions and habits (for example, pleasures of touch predispose for temperance, not courage). In other contexts, Aquinas uses explanations more familiar in his moral teaching: he says that matter specifies because a human agent wills some matter as an end, or because matter possesses a distinctive formal aspect (like an object’s).
8 Motive
Authors: Pilsner Joseph 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
Aquinas says that motives are responsible for the specification of human action. ‘Motive’ can generally refer to any principle of movement, but two meanings are especially significant in the context of the voluntary. First, one sees ‘motive’ referring to what attracts a person to action. In this context, Aquinas calls motives ‘proper objects of the will’ and insists that they specify as ‘ends’ of human action. Second, one sees motives referring to causes related to appetite. For example, Aquinas differentiates gluttony into five species (named by circumstances) because each species is associated with a distinctive motive, as when rapid digestion (motive) incites concupiscence and defines the species of gluttony called ‘too soon’. Since Aquinas holds that a passion is morally relevant only to the extent that it is voluntary, motives regarding appetite must be willed somehow for them to determine a species of sin.
9 Proximate and Remote Ends
Authors: Pilsner Joseph 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
There is an apparent paradox with respect to Aquinas’s teaching on proximate and remote ends. On some occasions, he seems to assert that a proximate end specifies a human action, while the remote end is inconsequential. On other occasions, he appears to hold not only that a remote end gives a species to a human action, but also that this species has greater formal influence than the species from a proximate end. The way to resolve this paradox is to realize that Aquinas addresses two different questions with respect to the specification of human action. Sometimes, he is exploring what is required to determine a particular species of human action. In this case, he thinks that willing a proximate end (such as ‘having intercourse with another’s spouse’) is sufficient to determine this action’s species (adultery), and that no further end would add something critical for making this determination. On other occasions, he is wondering what the species of an action would be in a case where a particular proximate end (such as theft) is already being willed by an agent for a particular remote end (such as murder or almsgiving). In this case, he believes that the human action in question has two moral species, one from each end; the species from the remote end has a kind of formal primacy, since the proximate end is being willed for the remote end’s sake.