bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Workers' enterprises in price competition
Authors: Sertel Murat R. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractExtending earlier equivalence results for perfect competition and for (imperfect) quantity competition, here it is shown that in price competition, too, the behavior of a workers‘ enterprise (defined by the coincidence of its workers with its partners) is tamed by the worker‐partnership market so as to be identical with that of a twin entrepreneurial firm. Thus, not only is Bertrand–Nash equilibrium unaltered when an entrepreneurial firm is replaced by its workers’ enterprise twin, but such a replacement also leaves Bertrand‐von Stackelberg equilibrium intact whether we switch the leader or a follower from one form of ownership/management to the other.
A capital accumulation model of the workers' enterprise
Authors: Shimomura Koji 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThis article formulates a capital accumulation model of the workers' enterprise in which the standard adjustment‐costs theory of investment is introduced into Sertel's framework. The existence, uniqueness and local stability of the steady state are shown to be established under mild conditions and the long‐run effects of changes in the price of output, the external wage rate and the interest rate on the volume of capital and the size of membership are examined.
Advertising conjectures and the nature of advertising competition in an oligopoly
Authors: Seldon Barry J. , Banerjee Sudip , Boyd Roy G. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractWe estimate advertising conjectural variations within a simultaneous system that includes advertising and demand equations for cigarette manufacturers. This allows insight into advertising decisions in an oligopoly. The advertising conjectures are positive and statistically significant, indicating that firms do not hold Cournot conjectures as is usually assumed in theoretical models. Instead, firms perceive that their rivals will respond directly to their own advertising. We also find evidence that, while cigarette advertising rearranges market share by increasing firm‐level demand relative to rivals' demand, it also increases market demand for cigarettes. Hence there are positive spillovers from advertising in the cigarette industry.
Successful antitakeover defenses, top management turnover and stock prices
Authors: Duggal Rakesh , Cudd Mike 
Published: May 2007

AbstractPrevious studies have not addressed the question of whether successful targets of hostile bids adopt specific defenses, or whether a relation exists between the type of defense and subsequent management turnover. This study finds that sale or buyback of stock is the most common‐and probably the most successful‐form of defense employed by targets to defeat hostile bidders, and that stock buyback leads to management retrenchment in the post‐defeat period. The management turnover announcement has no impact on the target stock price and appears to convey no new information to the market.
Intra‐industry structure and the response toward rivals
Authors: Peteraf Margaret A. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThis paper is a study of the pricing behavior of airline monopolists toward potential entrant carriers from different strategic groups. The results suggest that formerly regulated carriers price lower when faced by potential entrants from the newly certified carrier group than they do when they face only potential entrants from their own group. These results are consistent with the heretofore‐untested hypothesis from Caves and Porter (1977) and Porter (1979) that rivalry is greater across groups than within groups.
Profit opportunities with the American put‐call parity when dividends are not expected
Authors: Frankfurter George M. , Leung W. K. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThe objective of this research is to study borrowing and lending profit opportunities with the put‐call parity of American options when dividends on the stock are not expected. Studying profit opportunities embedded in the put‐call parity is intriguing because of their relative simplicity. The only assumptions necessary for the parity to hold are that option markets are frictionless and generate efficient prices of puts and calls around the underlying stock price. For this reason alone (parsimony of postulates) the put‐call parity is a tempting vehicle for studying option market efficiency. In this work it is shown that both synthetic lending and borrowing parities (before and after transaction costs), on average and ex post, have negative expected profits (i.e. put‐call parity implied rates are inferior to the observed riskless rate). When certain trading rules are established, however, empirical evidence of substantial profit opportunities with both lending and borrowing with the American parity (even after considering transaction costs) is observed. It is also shown that these opportunities are greater for some stocks than for others. The existence of these disparities might be an indication that the pricing mechanism of the respective options is not always in sync. The duration of disequilibrium between the options market and the stock market suggests that such occurrences are not just random bursts.
The effects of marginal changes of ownership on multi‐level objectives in corporate groups
Authors: Kornbluth J. S. H. , Salkin G. R. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractChanges in the intra‐group linkages affect the ownership of members of the group by their parents and can have different effects on the various objectives of the group. This paper shows how one can use the standard formula for calculating ownership in a group of companies to derive a linear approximation to the marginal changes in the group structure as the result of changes in intra‐group linkages. These marginal effects can be used in linear multi‐objective and/or decentralized planning systems in the group. An example is provided on some tax‐planning effects of marginal changes of intra‐group ownership.
Supplier incentives and resource constraints under uncertainty
Authors: Seshadri Sudhindra 
Published: May 2007

AbstractProcurement in environments of cost uncertainty and asymmetric information require special arrangements such as the linear incentive contract. Usually the buyer is motivated to make investments that can relieve temporary supplier resource constraints during the procurement. Special problems arise, however, due to interactions between investments in suppliers and the risk‐incentive trade‐off achieved by the incentive contract. A cost signaling model is proposed to overcome these problems, where a supplier offers an equity share in the profit from the incentive contract to the buyer in return for a priori investment. The equity share signals the supplier's private cost information, and forms the basis for the buyer's investment decision. Under equilibrium the buyer can expect to recover the entire amount provided to the supplier through his or her share of the profit.
Management's reporting strategy and imperfection of the capital market
Authors: Tzur Joseph , Yaari Varda (Lewinstein) 
Published: May 2007

AbstractSince the decision on the reported outcome is delegated to the management of the firm, it is commonly held that when the capital market is imperfect the manager achieves consumption smoothing by smoothing the reports relative to the actual outcome. Modeling the firm as a principal‐agent contract shows the contrary. When the capital market is imperfect the firm's reporting strategy is conservative, as the manager never reports more than the actual outcome because of fear of an unfavorable future outcome. When the capital market is perfect the firm either smooths the report‐reports more than the actual outcome when the actual outcome is low and reports less than the actual outcome when the outcome is hig‐or reports more than the actual outcome in order to take advantage of the sharing rule being an increasing function of the report.
Price rigidity: An exploration of the demand side
Authors: Roufagalas John 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThis paper presents an exploration of the demand‐side effects of unanticipated price changes. Consumers faced with these changes may have to reoptimize their income allocation. Reoptimization is costly, and reoptimization costs result in kinked demand curves. The existence of such kinked demands provides an additional explanation of the observed nominal price rigidity. In addition, examination of unexpected nominal price changes during inflationary periods provides some justification as to why nominal price adjustments are large, infrequent and almost never downward.
International acquisitions in the united states: Evidence from returns to foreign bidders
Authors: Mathur Ike , Rangan Nanda , Chhachhi Indudeep , Sundaram Sridhar 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThis paper provides evidence on the minimally explored topic of abnormal returns earned by stockholders of foreign bidders seeking to acquire a target firm in the USA. Four sources of influence on abnormal returns are identified: changes in net wealth of the bidder associated with changes in exchange rates; possible value‐destroying managerial discretionary behavior by bidders with excess cash flows, as suggested by Jensen; comparative advantages for foreign bidders domiciled in relatively favorable tax jurisdictions; ownership status of the target, i.e. whether the target is an entire firm and whether it involves divested assets. The study includes 77 firms from 10 countries. The results show that stockholders of foreign bidders earn significant, negative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of an acquisition in the USA. These abnormal returns become increasingly negative over the 15 days after the announcement of the acquisition, indicating that more information about the acquisition is revealed to investors subsequent to the initial announcement. Cross‐sectional regressions indicate that relative exchange rates and cash positions explain variation in abnormal returns. A decline in the value of the dollar increases abnormal returns for the foreign bidder, thus supporting the net wealth hypothesis. The results also show that cash‐rich foreign firms tend to enjoy higher abnormal returns when making acquisitions in the USA. The result provides support for the Froot and Stein cash‐constrained hypothesis rather than for Jensen's free‐cash‐flow theory.
Explaining Downstream Integration
Authors: Majumdar Sumit K. , Ramaswamy Venkatram 
Published: May 2007

AbstractWe examine the downstream integration decision by businesses, deriving hypotheses from the transaction cost literature which are empirically tested for a sample of 1392 businesses operating in a wide spectrum of industries. Our results provide corroboration for each dimension of the transaction cost framework in explaining why firms might integrate their downstream business activities. Given the large cross‐sectional sample, our results provide some evidence of the general validity of the transaction cost framework within the context of downstream integration.
R&D spillovers and innovative activity
Authors: Acs Zoltan J. , Audretsch David B. , Feldman Maryann P. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThe new learning has raised a number of explanations why smaller enterprises may, in fact, tend to have an innovative advantage, at least in certain industries. The purpose of this paper is to identify the degree to which university and corporate R&D spills over to innovative activity at the state level. We find substantial evidence that spillovers are facilitated by the geographic coincidence of universities and research laboratories within the state.
The dividend policies of all‐equity firms: A direct test of the free cash flow theory
Authors: Agrawal Anup , Jayaraman Narayanan 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThis paper finds support for Jensen's (1986) hypothesis that dividends and debt are substitute mechanisms for controlling the agency costs of free cash flow. We find that dividend payout ratios of a sample of all‐equity firms are significantly higher than those of a control group of levered firms. Further, within the group of all‐equity firms, firms with lower managerial holdings have higher payout ratios. These results hold after controlling for free cash flow and growth rates. Overall, our evidence suggests that dividends and managerial ownership are substitute mechanisms for reducing agency costs in all‐equity firms.
Managerial efficiency and survivability in professional team sports
Authors: Scully Gerald W. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractStudents of organizational sociology tend to believe that managerial efficiency has less to do with individual talent than with the environment in which firms operate. Economists and fans know that this is not true in sports. Measures of managerial efficiency are constructed for baseball, basketball and football coaches. Survival analysis is utilized to measure coaching tenure probabilities in these sports and coaching tenure is shown to be related to managerial efficiency.
Major league baseball division standings, sports journalists' predictions and player salaries
Authors: Smyth David J. , Smyth Seamus J. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThis paper analyzes the accuracy of predictions of division baseball winners and rankings for the 1982 to 1990 seasons. The forecasts in Sport, Sports Illustrated and the New York Times are more accurate than purely random forecasts except at predicting the National League winners. The journalists are better at predicting division winners, but not division rankings, than a naive model that assumes this season's rankings, will be the same as last seasons's. Combining the forecasts in the three publications does not result in greater forecasting accuracy. A model that uses the relative average salaries of teams significantly outperforms the journalists at predicting division rankings and, when allowance is made for ‘George Steinbrenner effect’, also at predicting division winners.
Bargaining power and the structure of salaries in major league Baseball
Authors: Marburger Daniel R. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThe relationship between bargaining power and the structure of salaries in major league baseball has been a subject of much empirical study. The evidence provided in this paper suggests that eligibility for final‐offer arbitration does not result in a ‘fixed’ reduction in monopsonistic exploitation. Rather, the level of exploitation diminishes markedly in the first season of eligibility and continues to decrease in subsequent seasons. By the time the player reaches free agency eligibility, he can expect to earn the same single‐season salary that he would as a free agent.
Do anti‐ticket scalping laws make a difference?
Authors: Williams Andrew T. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractTicket scalping is the practice of buying tickets at one price and reselling them at a higher one. The practice is controversial and currently almost half the states regulate the resale of tickets to one degree or another. As with other laws that regulate economic activity, the question immediately arises: ‘Who benefits from the law?’ Economists typically view transactions between willing buyers and willing sellers, such as ticket scalping, as welfare improving. They also view any interference with free market transactions as suspect and as possible evidence of rent harvesting. In an attempt to quantify the economic impact of anti‐ticket scalping laws this paper presents a regression model of ticket price determination for National Football League teams and uses it to test the proposition ‘Do anti‐ticket scalping laws make a difference?’
A common‐trends and error‐correction approach to forecasting corporate bond returns
Authors: Taylor William M. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractIt is found that one unit root, common trend, is shared by the monthly price indices of the top four ratings of corporate bonds. Addition of an index of low‐grade bonds to the vector time series results in two common trends. Consistent results are provided by dynamic factor analyses. The returns for the system of cointegrated indices can be represpnted by an error‐correction model using past returns and cointegrating vectors. This model can provide more accurate forecasts than a common VAR that omits the cointegrating vectors. The common‐trends analysis provides specific linear combinations, or cointegrating portfolios, of the index price levels that are stationary. The cointegrating portfolios associated with the two common trends have returns that are related to T‐bill returns and unanticipated inflation.
The design of executive stock options
Authors: Young Leslie , Quintero Socorro M. 
Published: May 2007

AbstractA contract between manager and shareholder comprising salary plus options which are sometimes out of the money implies less risky managerial income but weaker incentives than a contract comprising salary plus stocks (or options which are always in the money) which leaves the manager as well off. Increasing the exercise Price and the salary so that (1) there are some states where the options cannot be exercised but (2) the manager is as well off as before always leads initially to a reduction in effort which outweighs any gains from improved risk sharing, leaving the shareholder worse off.
Vertical mergers and the balance of trade
Authors: Pan Chih‐Min 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThis paper examines the relationship between the vertical merger and the balance of trade. Our results show that the effects of the vertical merger on the trade balance and consumers' welfare depend on the production technology adopted by the final good manufacturers. The vertical merger will improve both the trade balance and consumers' welfare when fixed‐coefficient technology is adopted. However, these positive effects could not be held when variable‐coefficient technology is used to produce the final good.
A model for risk classification of banks
Authors: Kumar Sameer , Arora Sant 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThis paper deals with designing a bank risk classification scheme based on readily available performance data. This risk rating is referred to as ‘Risk rating’. Due to non‐availability of data on CAMEL rating (C rating), R risk rating has potential for studying risk‐based premiums insurance policy and for determining optimal frequencies for variable frequency on‐site examination policy. A composite non‐performance measure is developed to estimate probability of failure of a bank based on performance data available in bank call reports by fitting a Logit curve and estimating its parameters using maximum likelihood method. Division of banks into healthy and watchful types is based on critical dividing value of probability of failure.
The impact of institutional stockholders and managerial interests on the capital structure of firms
Authors: Firth Michael 
Published: May 2007

AbstractWhen the self‐interests of management and stockholders conflict, this is likely to manifest itself in different attitudes towards risk. Managers are hypothesized to desire low levels of debt in the firm's capital structure, while outside stockholders, who hold diversified portfolios, will tolerate higher debt ratios. Empirical results provide evidence in support of the hypotheses. The presence of institutional investors constrains management's discretion in setting capital structure and a positive relationship is identified between their fractional and dollar‐value ownership of a firm and debt‐assets ratios. Institutional investors will act in a manner that is consistent with the goals of other outside stockholders.
Strategic management under duopoly
Authors: Hwang Hong , Mai Chao‐Cheng 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to present a general conjectural variation model to provide an integrative treatment of strategic management under duopoly. It is shown that the nature of the desired distortion of managers' incentives depends critically on the magnitudes of the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs as well as the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives. In particular, it has been demonstrated that when the owners' conjectural variations with respect to incentives are zero, the owners will motivate their managers to maximize profits and provide no incentives for sales under consistent conjectures. However, the owners make their managers behave more (less) aggressively and produce more (less) than profit‐maximizers if the managers' conjectural variations with respect to outputs are larger (smaller) than the actual response.
Innovation, market structure and firm size: A simultaneous equations model
Authors: Koeller C. Timothy 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThis study uses a hwequation model and data for four‐digit SIC manufacturing industries to examine the joint endogeneily of output measures of innovation activity and market structure (industry concentration). Its results confirm recent studies finding high concentration to have a negative effect on innovation output (especially smabfinn innovations), and Anding that large‐firm innovations and small‐finn innovations respond Werently to economic and technological conditions. The study also reveals that, contrary to some previous research, and consistent with modern ‘Schumpeterian’ propositions, innovation output (especially largefirm innovations) has a significant positive effect on industry concentration.
Venture capitalist participation and the post‐issue operating performance of IPO firms
Authors: Jain Bharat A. , Kini Omesh 
Published: May 2007

AbstractPrevious studies have identified the value‐added potential of venture capitalist monitoring in the initial public offering (IPO) market. We test this proposition by comparing the post‐issue operating performance of venture capitalist‐backed IPOs with a matched sample of non‐venture capitalist‐backed IPOs. We find that venture capitalist‐backed IPO firms exhibit relatively superior post‐issue operating performance compared to non‐venture capital‐backed IPO firms. Further, the market appears to recognize the value of monitoring by venture capitalists as reflected in the higher valuations at the time of the IPO. Finally, we find that proxies for the quality of venture capitalist monitoring are positively related to post‐issue operating performance.
Insolvency, moral hazard and expense preference behavior: Evidence from US savings and loan associations
Authors: Gropper Daniel M. , Beard T. Randolph 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThis article applies the expense preference methodology to a study of determinants of employee compensation and occupancy costs for large samples of mutual and stock savings and loan associations. Strong evidence that insolvency is associated with significant increases in these costs is obtained. Further, we find that the effect of insolvency on managerial expense preference behavior is more pronounced for mutual than stock associations.
A classroom exercise on executive incentive compensation schemes
Authors: Elitzur R. Ramy 
Published: May 2007

AbstractThis paper describes a classroom exercise that has been used in several graduate courses. The exercise provides the students with a framework for understanding the rationale behind some of the mechanisms we observe in reality: incentive compensation plans for executives, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), auditing, and lawsuits against auditors. As such, the exercise provides some answers for several questions of ‘why’ before getting into the ‘how’ of reporting. The case can be used in courses dealing with financial accounting, managerial control and microeconomics in the MBA level.