bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
2 Plutarch
Authors: Karamanolis George E. 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter begins with a discussion of Plutarch’s Platonism and knowledge of Aristotle’s work. It then presents Plutarch’s most substantial discussion of how Aristotle’s philosophy compares with that of Plato. Plutarch held that Aristotle often preserves Plato’s doctrine in a more systematic form on a number of crucial issues in ethics, psychology, metaphysics, and epistemology. A different kind of systematization is provided by the case of Aristotle’s categories; this theory may be a new construction, but in Plutarch’s view, it is a development of originally Platonic elements. To the extent that Plutarch regards Aristotle as a source of Plato’s doctrine, he feels free to draw on Aristotle’s work. Thus, it is a mistake to hold that he simply used Aristotle as an ally in his polemic, compromising his Platonism. Because Plutarch is committed to Plato’s philosophy, he shows great awareness of Aristotle’s divergences from Plato’s doctrines and does not hesitate to criticize him.
4 Atticus
Authors: Karamanolis George E. 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter contends that Atticus wrote with the aim of castigating the widespread use of Aristotle’s work by Platonists and Peripatetics, who tended to use Aristotle as a guide to Plato’s philosophy on the assumption that Aristotle preserved Plato’s doctrines and/or often also followed them. Atticus argues that Aristotle opposed Plato’s philosophy systematically and that no doctrine of his can be of help in understanding Plato, or for doing philosophy in general. He holds such a view because, like Numenius, he construes Plato’s philosophy as a system based on the metaphysics of the transcendent Forms, which determine all entities including ethical values, and considers immanent Forms derivative from them. Also crucial for the evaluation of Aristotle’s doctrine is his tendency to be inspired by Stoicism and to reconstruct Plato’s doctrines relying on the parts of Plato which inspired the Stoics, as is the case with his view on the divine providence or with his view that the soul is essentially rational and yet a separable substance (against the Stoics). For Atticus, Aristotle’s difference on the Forms, the providence, and the nature of the soul entails a substantially different position in ethics. Since for Atticus ethics is the purpose of all philosophy, Aristotle’s divergence from Plato in this is taken as indicative of the fundamental conflict between Aristotle and Plato.
6 Plotinus
Authors: Karamanolis George E. 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter examines the instances in which Plotinus compares Peripatetic and Platonic views, and attempts to sketch a preliminary answer to the question of how Plotinus saw the relationship between Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies. It is argued that Plotinus’ attitude to Aristotle’s doctrines is complex and differs from case to case. In general, Plotinus is cautious in accepting Aristotelian views and when he does so, he subjects them to critical judgment. This cautiousness results from his belief that Aristotle’s metaphysics is considerably different from that of Plato and results in serious problems and inconsistencies, which Plotinus sets out to show, often targeting Alexander’s interpretation of Aristotle. Despite this, Plotinus does not show hostility to Aristotle; quite the opposite, he sometimes refrains from criticizing him. Several different uses of Aristotle by Plotinus are identified.
7 Porphyry
Authors: Karamanolis George E. 
Published: September 2006

AbstractPorphyry was much more involved in the study of Aristotle’s work than any other Platonist before him. It is shown that Porphyry criticized Aristotle, but he also considered him to have agreed with Plato in all crucial philosophical issues in physics, psychology, ethics, and metaphysics. Porphyry did not deny that Aristotle sometimes contradicted Plato. What he denied was that these contradictions undermined their essential accord. In Porphyry’s view, most of Aristotle’s disagreements with Plato can be reduced either to difference in perspective, or to Aristotle’s misunderstandings of Plato, or to misunderstandings of Aristotle by later interpreters.
2 Sacra Facultas and the Coming of German Modernity
Authors: Howard Thomas Albert 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter begins with an examination of the 18th-century university and the forces of inertia and novelty, stagnation, and innovation that characterized it. German universities were in major decline in the 18th century, intellectually ossifying and beset by myriad administrative and financial difficulties. At the same time, the century witnessed the establishment of several important new universities — particularly the University of Halle (1694) in Prussia and the University of Göttingen (1737) in Hanover — that introduced vigorous new impulses to higher education. These ‘reform universities’ are examined for their incipiently modernizing characteristics. The statutory, curricular, and scholarly contributions made to them by theologians, foremost August Hermann Francke (1663-1727) at Halle and Johann Lorenz von Mosheim (1694-1755) at Göttingen are emphasized.
5 Theologia between Science and the State
Authors: Howard Thomas Albert 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines the conflicted renown of 19th-century German academic theology even as it charts the theological faculty’s steady diminution as a component of the overall university system. Five principal lines of inquiry contribute to this broader task. First, the chapter calls attention to how dominant intellectual, political, and social trends of the mid- and late 19th century affected university development. Second, in an effort to penetrate the internal dynamics of university theology, it focuses on Protestant theological education, that is, to what young theology students actually were supposed to learn during their university years. Third, it examines a number of histories of universities written in the late 19th and early 20th century, along with various documents from university commemorative celebrations and from international exhibitions on German higher education. Fourth, it examines the reactions of a number of foreigners to German universities, broaching also the broader international influence of German theology. Finally, it considers several issues that precipitated a crisis of identity for theology in the late 19th century.
6 Conclusion: Janus Gazing
Authors: Howard Thomas Albert 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
The theological faculty’s passage into modernity has been characterized as ‘Janus-faced’ on a number of occasions. The expression has helped convey both the scholarly virtuosity attained by Protestant academic theology in the 19th century and also theology’s institutional diminution (and near eviction) in the context of the expanding and modernizing university system. Adolf von Harnack’s eloquent and successful apologia for the theological faculty in the Preussische Jahrbücher (1919) marked in many respects a culminating statement for 19th-century university theology: the theological faculty’s public, national vindication despite much criticism and amid dizzying social and political changes. It is argued that modern theological phenomena require both synchronic and diachronic contextualization, for the consideration of a remoter past helps bring into relief the shared assumptions and general tendencies of any given present.
The Politics of Public Service Bargains
Authors: Hood Christopher , Lodge Martin 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThe traditional understandings that structure the relationships between public servants and the wider political system are said to have undergone considerable change. But what are these formalized and implicit understandings? What are the key dimensions of such bargains? In what conditions do bargains rise and fall? And has there been a universal and uniform change in these bargains? This book offers a distinct perspective to answer these questions. It develops a unique analytical perspective to account for diverse bargains within systems of executive government. Drawing on comparative experiences from different state traditions, it examines ideas and contemporary developments along three key dimensions of any Public Service Bargain: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. The book points to diverse and differentiated developments across national systems of executive government, and suggests how different ‘bargains’ are prone to cheating by their constituent parties. It explores the context in which managerial bargains — widely seen to be at the heart of contemporary administrative reform movements — are likely to catch on and considers how cheating is likely to destabilize such bargains.
1 Introducing Public Service Bargains
Authors: Hood Christopher , Lodge Martin 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter introduces the notion of Public Service Bargain (PSB) and points to variations in its three dimensions: reward, competency, and loyalty and responsibility. Based on these variations, it discusses the centrality of PSBs for politics and points to the intellectual origins of the idea. The distinction between trustee- and agency-bargains is introduced.
3 Agency‐Type Public Service Bargains
Authors: Hood Christopher , Lodge Martin 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter discusses the way in which ‘agency’ bargains need to be understood in their rather specific meaning under the law of agency. It then discusses under what circumstances democratic political systems favour agency-type bargains. Agency bargains vary on two key dimensions: on the extent of specific direction under which public servants operate, and on whether delegated agency bargains are single- or multiple-principle. Four variants of agency bargains are explored, namely serial and personal loyalist variants of agency bargains, and simple and complex forms of delegated agency bargains.
8 How Public Service Bargains Change and Fall
Authors: Hood Christopher , Lodge Martin 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter explores how public service bargains can weaken or collapse, focusing on the ways in which different types of bargain provide incentives for different ways of cheating and strategic behaviour. Varieties of cheating behaviour across different trustee and agency bargains are considered, while highlighting the various forces and strategies that can keep cheating in check. It is argued that making any PSB cheat-proof requires particular and demanding social conditions.
9 Public Service Managerialism and Public Service Bargains: Control, Blame Avoidance, and Cheating
Authors: Hood Christopher , Lodge Martin 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter uses the public service bargain perspective to analyze the contemporary theme of managerialism and demands for changing controls over public services. It shows what managerialism means for public service bargains and points to the demanding conditions of such a bargain, given the incentives to cheat that affect the various parties to this type of bargain. Given its vulnerability to cheating, the managerialist type of bargain seems likely to emerge and ‘stick’ only in some traditions and cultures.
How Things Might Have Been
Authors: Mackie Penelope 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
What are the essential properties of ordinary individuals such as people, cats, trees, and tables? The question is notoriously difficult, yet must be answered to obtain a satisfying account of the ways in which such individuals could and could not have been different from the way that they are. The book provides a novel treatment of this issue, in the context of a set of debates initiated by the revival of interest in essentialism and de re modality generated by the work of Kripke and others in the 1970s. Via a critical examination of rival theories, it argues for ‘minimalist essentialism’: an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. The book therefore presents a challenge to stronger versions of essentialism, including the view that ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences; versions of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis; and the widely held theory of ‘sortal essentialism’, according to which an individual belongs essentially to some sort or kind that determines its conditions for identity over time. The book includes discussion of the rivalry between the interpretation of de re modality in terms of identity across possible worlds and its interpretation in terms of counterpart theory. It provides a detailed defence of the apparently paradoxical claim that there can be possible worlds that differ from one another only in the identities of some of the individuals that they contain, and hence that identities across possible worlds may be ‘bare’ identities. The book also contains a discussion of the relation between essentialism about individuals and essentialism about natural kinds, and a critical examination of the connection between semantics and natural kind essentialism.
Preliminaries
Authors: Mackie Penelope 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter characterizes essentialism, and distinguishes essentialism about individuals from essentialism about natural kinds, arguing that the first does, but the second need not, involve de re (as opposed to de dicto) modality. It is argued that given certain plausible assumptions, essentialism about individuals involves a commitment to necessary a posteriori truth, although the commitment is not inevitable. The implications of the concepts of possible worlds and identity across possible worlds (‘transworld identity’) are discussed.
Individual Essences and Bare Identities
Authors: Mackie Penelope 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter introduces the question of whether ordinary individuals have non-trivial individual essences: essential properties that are not only necessary but also sufficient for their identities in all possible worlds. It argues that the issue is important, for if there are no such non-trivial individual essences for ordinary individuals, we are forced to choose from what may seem to be an unpalatable list of options: either the identities of these individuals across possible worlds can be ‘bare’ identities, or their transworld identities can be ‘extrinsically determined’, or — unless we abandon de re modal claims about such individuals entirely — we must interpret those de re modal claims in terms of counterpart theory rather than identity across possible worlds. Two arguments for non-trivial individual essences are considered. The first is an ‘indiscernibility argument’ that is related to an argument presented by Robert Adams for ‘primitive thisness’. The second is based on an argument presented by Graeme Forbes. The distinction between ‘trivial’ and ‘non-trivial’ individual essences is explained, and the relation between the theses that there can be ‘bare’ transworld identities and that there can be ‘haecceitistic’ (non-qualitative) differences between possible worlds is discussed.
Origin Properties and Individual Essences
Authors: Mackie Penelope 
Published: September 2006

AbstractGraeme Forbes has argued that many ordinary persisting things (including people, animals, and plants) can be attributed non-trivial individual essences that include distinctive features of their origins. According to Forbes, this enables us to interpret de re modal claims about such individuals in terms of identity across possible worlds without embracing ‘bare identities’. This chapter considers various problems that Forbes’s proposal confronts, and concludes that there are no plausible candidates for non-trivial individual essences of the type that his theory requires. A version of Chisholm’s Paradox about identity across possible worlds, and of the ‘Four Worlds Paradox’ identified by Nathan Salmon are discussed.
Extrinsically Determined Identity and ‘Best‐Candidate’ Theories
Authors: Mackie Penelope 
Published: September 2006

AbstractThis chapter discusses the proposal that identities across possible worlds may be determined by ‘extrinsic’ features, and compares this with an analogous ‘best-candidate’ account of identity over time, according to which the identity of an object that exists at one time with an object that exists at another time may depend on the presence or absence of ‘competing candidates’. It argues that even if a best-candidate account of identity over time is acceptable, the ‘extrinsic determination’ account of identity across possible worlds should be rejected in favour of either a ‘bare identities’ or a counterpart-theoretic account.
Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties I: Substance Sortals and Essential Sortals
Authors: Mackie Penelope 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines versions of so-called ‘sortal essentialism’. This is the view that some sortal concepts (roughly, concepts that provide criteria of identity or principles of individuation) represent essential properties of the things to which they apply. This chapter argues against Baruch Brody’s version of sortal essentialism, which appeals to a version of an ‘overlap requirement’ on de re possibilities, in order to argue that substance sortals — sortal concepts that must apply to an object throughout its existence if they apply to it at all — are essential sortals.
A Theory of Political Obligation
Authors: Gilbert Margaret 
Published: September 2006

AbstractDoes one have special obligations to support the political institutions of one’s own country precisely because it is one’s own? In short, does one have political obligations? This book argues for an affirmative answer, construing one’s country as a political society of which one is a member, and a political society as a special type of social group. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles. They come, rather, from one’s participation in a special kind of commitment: a joint commitment. This theory is referred to as the plural subject theory of political obligation since, by the author’s definition, those who are party to any joint commitment constitute a plural subject of some action in a broad sense of the term. Several alternative theories are compared and contrasted with plural subject theory, with a particular focus on the most famous — actual contract theory — according to which membership in a political society is a matter of participation in an agreement. The book offers plural subject accounts of both social rules and everyday agreements, and includes discussion of political authority and punishment.
The Membership Problem
Authors: Gilbert Margaret 
Published: September 2006

AbstractDoes membership in a political society obligate one to support the political institutions of that society? Dubbed the membership problem, its terms are given some initial clarification. Among other things, a society is construed as a social group in a relatively narrow sense illustrated with examples. The membership problem is carefully distinguished from several distinct but closely resembling problems familiar from the literature of political philosophy. Importantly, it concerns obligations that are genuine but not necessarily best referred to as moral obligations.
Obligations: Preliminary Points
Authors: Gilbert Margaret 
Published: September 2006

AbstractPeople speak of ‘obligations’ in a variety of contexts. This chapter offers a partial characterization of the broad class of obligations with which this book is concerned. This class is important from the perspective of practical reasoning, since reason requires one to fulfill such an obligation all else being equal: they provide one with sufficient reason to act in a certain way. Further, they are independent of one’s inclinations or self-interest. This class includes directed obligations, which are a matter of one person’s owing an action to another, but does not include imputed obligations.
Objections to Actual Contract Theory
Authors: Gilbert Margaret 
Published: September 2006

AbstractIn spite of its long history and evident appeal, an actual contract theory of political obligation now tends to be rejected. This chapter focuses on two standard objections to the theory, the no-agreement objection, which depends on the empirical claim that most people have not agreed to uphold any political institutions; and the no-obligation objection, which argues that even if they had, not all of the agreements made would obligate the participants. It invokes the possibility that one or more parties entered a pertinent agreement or supposed agreement in coercive circumstances, and the possibility that the agreement is to uphold morally suspect political institutions. The no-agreement claim is clearly a problem for the theory given the tests proposed in chapter 3; the no-obligation objection may be open to rebuttal. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of some contemporary alternatives to actual contract theory: arguments that appeal to subjective identification and relationships, with reference to those offered by John Horton, Joseph Raz, and Nancy Hirschmann.
Summary and Prospect
Authors: Gilbert Margaret 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
The book’s argument is summarized and its conclusions are brought to hear on two classic situations of crisis: Socrates awaiting the death penalty in prison, and Antigone in her conflict with the ruler of her political society, Creon. Emphasis is given to the point that though obligations of joint commitment are absolute in the sense discussed, and supersede one’s personal inclinations and self-interest as such, it is possible for other considerations to ‘trump’ them. Antigone believed there were such considerations in her case; Socrates seems not to have thought so. A number of avenues for further empirical investigation and moral inquiry are noted.
Justification without Awareness
Authors: Bergmann Michael 
Published: September 2006

AbstractVirtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, creating a deep divide among its practitioners. Internalists insist that such awareness is required for justification whereas externalists insist that it is not. The first part of this book argues that internalism faces an inescapable dilemma: either it leads to vicious regress problems and, ultimately, radical skepticism or it is entirely unmotivated. The second part of the book begins by developing the author’s own externalist theory of justification, one imposing both a proper function and a no-defeater requirement. It concludes by demonstrating the failure of two prominent critiques of externalism: that it is infected with epistemic circularity and that it cannot respond adequately to skepticism. Together, the two parts of the book provide a decisive refutation of internalism and a sustained defense of externalism.
A Dilemma for Internalism
Authors: Bergmann Michael 
Published: September 2006

Abstract
According to internalists, for a belief to be justified it is not enough that it has certain virtues (such as being reliably formed or supported by the evidence), the person holding it must be aware that he has those virtues. This awareness requirement, which internalists think is necessary for justification, comes in two forms: strong and weak. This chapter argues that internalists face the following dilemma: if they endorse the strong awareness requirement, they are faced with regress problems leading to extreme skepticism; if they endorse the weak awareness requirement, they lose the main motivation for their internalism.