bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
SCEPTICISM AND THE FRAMEWORK‐RELATIVITY OF ENQUIRY
Authors: Daukas Nancy 
Published: October 2006

AbstractMany argue that sceptical enquiry is incoherent insofar as it requires a detachment from and assessment of the framework judgements that constitute our practice of enquiry. This paper accepts that enquiry is relative to a framework, but argues that the Cartesian sceptical enquiry is consistent with that relativity. Part I presents Marie McGinn's Wittgen‐steinian anti‐sceptical argument, comparing its view of enquiry to Carnap's. Part II clarifies the sense in which Wittgenstein's ‘Moore‐type’ framework judgements could be unquestionable, and argues that McGinn's antisceptical argument fails. Part III shows that the sceptical enquiry finds all our beliefs to lack justification by suspending our normal non‐sceptical framework judgement regarding perception in a way that is consistent with the framework‐relativity of enquiry, and encouraged by normal standards. The paper closes by recommending a view of scepticism as a stimulus for enquiry.1
TRUTH, PERMANENCE, AND THE REGULATION OF BELIEF: LOEB'S CARTESIAN ARGUMENT1
Authors: Miller Alexander 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIn this paper I outline an argument which Louis Loeb attributes to Descartes, which attempts to ground the epistemic priority of reason over sense‐perception in the brute psychological irresistibility of the former. I claim that the position thus ascribed to Descartes collapses into a crude form of idealism, and attempt to pinpoint precisely the flaw in the argument which gives rise to this collapse. I finish by suggesting that the same flaw might be apparent in Philip Pettit's recent development of the notion of response‐dependent concepts.
RATIONAL CHOICE: EXTENSIONS AND REVISION
Authors: Nida‐Rümelin Julian 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe rational choice paradigm has proved to be a fruitful means of analysis and explanation in various disciplines concerned with questions of practical rationality, but in various attempts to extend its fields of application the deficiencies of the original account of rational choice have become evident. This paper tries to give a systematic overview of ways in which the rational choice paradigm can be extended and modified.
FORTUNATE MISFORTUNE
Authors: Smilansky Saul 
Published: October 2006

AbstractSometimes people are unfortunate in ways which facilitate their success ‐ and happiness. This creates the perplexity whether someone can be said to have been unfortunate, if an apparent misfortune has been, overall, beneficial to his or her life. I argue that whether something is a misfortune cannot be determined in itself, even in seemingly obvious cases. It depends also upon what one makes of it, what it makes of one. In short, it depends upon what happens later. People cannot claim to have suffered a misfortune for which they are to be pitied or compensated, when this ‘misfortune’ is crucial in having made them what they are, what they are happy to be. Hard determinism aside, the notion of ‘fortunate misfortune’ lacks, however, an easy parallel in ‘unfortunate good‐fortune’.
SUPERVENIENT DUALISM
Authors: Granger Herbert 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe topic under examination is the idea of ‘supervenient dualism’, which Christopher Shields first put forward in his study of Aristotle's theory of psychology. Shields takes supervenient dualism to be a form of ‘substance supervenience’, in which an immaterial substance supervenes upon a material or physical substance. Shields, however, does not develop a convincing version of supervenient dualism because he fails to develop a convincing version of substance supervenience. A plausible version of substance supervenience can be developed in the light of Jaegwon Kim's idea of ‘multiple‐domain supervenience’, although this version of substance supervenience is not able to provide the basis for an adequate formulation of supervenient dualism. The nature of this version of substance supervenience depends upon a relation of coordination between the substances, and there does not seem to be any relation of coordination that yields a form of substance supervenience that also counts as a form of supervenient dualism.
GAME THEORY AND KNOWLEDGE BY SIMULATION
Authors: Morton Adam 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThis paper makes a connection between some developments in game theory and issues about everyday psychological knowledge. I argue that there are two‐person situations in which agents will do badly if they use a particular simple theory of rationality to predict one another's actions. If we assume that our everyday techniques for anticipating one another's actions will get better results than this, it follows that these techniques do not consist in applying a theory like this one. One alternative is that when we anticipate actions we supplement whatever theories we have with a capacity to imagine the other person's motivation. I sketch a way of modelling this capacity.1
MENTAL ARITHMETIC
Authors: Squires Roger 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe popular idea that mental calculation involves covert operations as counterparts to the scribblings, sayings or manipulations involved in classroom calculation is rejected by familiar arguments in Section I. Philosophers do not readily agree on an alternative account. Section II considers reasons why they are puzzled, reasons which encourage a return to the discredited position. The currently fashionable Causal or Functionalist view is criticised in Section III. Section IV reconsiders the stubborn fact that when someone calculates in their head they do something at the time which explains their arithmetical successes or failures. Some dispositional descriptions are rejected as inadequate. Though a restrained dispositionalism is finally supported, it does not have the implication that nothing was going on in the silence.
SCEPTICISM AND THE JUSTIFICATION OF TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM
Authors: Bermúdez José Luis 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIn this paper I explore a justification for transcendental idealism that emerges from the dialogue with philosophical scepticism in which Kant is on and off engaged throughout the Critique of Pure Reason.1 Many commentators, most prominently Strawson, have claimed that transcend‐ ental idealism is an unfortunate addition to the Critique, one that can profitably be excised in the interests of clarity and coherence.2 Against this general picture I urge that transcendental idealism is in fact a very natural consequence of some of the central doctrines of the Critical Philosophy. It is in the context of Kant's debate with scepticism that this emerges most clearly. Nonetheless, I argue that Kant's employment of transcendental idealism against the sceptic is seriously compromised by his postulating the existence of unknowable things‐in‐themselves. As long as he maintains that there are unknowable things‐in‐themselves which are responsible for our having the experience that we do have, his position seems to collapse into sceptical idealism. In the final section of the paper I suggest that the only possible escape from this difficulty would be to rule out the possibility of affirming that unknowable things‐in‐themselves exist. I also suggest that an argument to this effect exists in the Critique and that Kant's position would be more consistent had he adhered to it.
POLITICAL OBLIGATION, FAIRNESS, AND INDEPENDENCE
Authors: Wolff Jonathan 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIn the first section the problem of political obligation is motivated, and in Section 2 the core structure of the problem is laid bare. A recognition of this structure prompts reflection that the problem will appear very different to different thinkers, depending on their moral theories. It also invites the speculation that the problem will be incapable of solution on some moral theories while trivial on others. This polarity does reflect the state of much of the literature until fairly recently. However this picture is seen to be too crude, and in the third section it is shown how an interesting solution has been proposed by advocates of the ‘theory of fairness’. In Section 4 this theory is evaluated, concentrating particularly on George Klosko's version, which is, in part, rejected. However it is argued that no version of the theory is able to guarantee universal political obligations. In Section 5 it is argued that this is an unnoticed advantage of the theory, for it may well be that, morally at least, we should allow those who do not benefit from the existence of the state to escape political obligations. The consequences of this view are examined and found not to be as threatening as they might first have appeared.
MORAL RELEVANCE AND CETERIS PARIBUS PRINCIPLES
Authors: Frazier Robert L. 
Published: October 2006

AbstractMy goal in this paper is twofold: to provide an account of what makes properties morally relevant, and to indicate the role such properties have in our moral thinking.I suppose that a property is morally relevant just in case it must, ceteris paribus, determine the moral status (the rightness or wrongness) of actions having it. The main part of the paper concerns the conditions under which the ceteris paribus caveat is satisfied, that is, when other things are equal. I argue that the caveat is satisfied when, with respect to a proposed set of morally relevant properties, an act differs from its alternatives at most in the degree to which it has one of those properties.Since other things are seldom equal, it is natural to wonder why what is true when they are equal should be important when they are not. That is, why is moral relevance, as I characterize it, a useful moral notion? I suggest that it is only by recognizing the moral relevance of properties that we are able to engage in useful moral thinking about the future.
FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS AND NATURAL NORMS
Authors: Price Carolyn 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIn this paper, I try to develop an account of functions which might be of use to a biologist engaged in classifying and explaining natural phenomena. The most pressing difficulty facing such an account is the need to reconcile the normativity of function statements with their explanatory force. I consider two familiar accounts of function statements, offered by Andrew Woodfield (an ‘Actual Capacity Theorist’) and Larry Wright (a ‘Historical Theorist’). I examine both accounts in search of the strongest possible formulation of each type of theory. I fail to find a formulation of the ACT which is completely immune from counterexamples, but I do find a satisfactory formulation of the HT. In particular, I argue that the HT should incorporate a point central to the ACT that functions involve a means/end relationship between two devices. I then consider functional explanations: I argue that an ACT which holds that function statements are intrinsically explanatory cannot offer a satisfactory account. The account offered by Woodfield, who rejects this assumption, is adequate, though less attractive than the account suggested by the HT. I conclude by considering how the HT can account for functional norms.
ON ULTIMATE EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS1
Authors: van Woudenberg René 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThis paper is a contribution to the debate on epistemic foundationalism. Section I expounds and criticises Hans Albert's critical rationalist antifoundationalism position. Section I1 discusses Karl‐Otto Apel's ‘transcendental pragmatic’ argument for ultimate epistemic foundations. Section III suggests how the latter argument can be restated so as to avoid ambiguity and yield a plausible case for epistemic foundationalism.
NONLOCALITY, LOCAL INDETERMINISM AND CONSCIOUSNESS
Authors: Hodgson David 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that a satisfactory account of consciousness will involve both (1) local indeterminism, in that some relevant events are not wholly and unequivocally pre‐determined by immediately prior local events, and (2) nonlocality, in that, within the leeways left by local indeterminism, what happens can be immediately affected by spatially separated or extended events. I briefly consider if this can be avoided by treating consciousness as supervenient and epiphenomenal; and I suggest that current theories of consciousness break down through failure to incorporate local indeterminism and nonlocality. I conclude by outlining possible implications for freedom of the will, physicalism, and the relevance of quantum mechanics to consciousness.
CAUSALITY, INTENSIONALITY AND IDENTITY: MIND BODY INTERACTION IN SPINOZA
Authors: Koistinen Olli 
Published: October 2006

AbstractAccording to Spinoza mental events and physical events are identical. What makes Spinoza's identity theory tempting is that it solves the problem of mind body interaction rather elegantly: mental events and physical events can be causally related to each other because mental events are physical events.However, Spinoza seems to deny that there is any causal interaction between mental and physical events. My aim is to show that Spinoza's apparent denial of mind body interaction can be reconciled with the identity theory. I argue that Spinoza had both an extensional and an intensional concept of cause and when Spinoza seems to deny mind body interaction he is having in mind the intensional concept of cause. This intensional concept of cause corresponds to that of causal explanation. I will argue that Spinoza anticipated Donald Davidson's view that even though mental events cannot be explained by referring to physical events and vice versa, mental and physical events are causally related to each other.
NON‐CONDITIONAL ‘IF’S
Authors: Slater B. H. 
Published: October 2006

AbstractTwo uses of ‘if are discussed which do not involve conditions. The first is illustrated in the example ‘If he's here, I don't see him’, the second in ‘He's not a dunce, if a trifle stupid’. A third non‐conditional use, cognate with the first is also mentioned: it would be illustrated in the example ‘If he's a Dutchman, I'll eat my hat’. It is argued that recent attempts to formulate a logic of conditionals have distorted our understanding of ‘if, by ignoring these uses, sometimes deliberately. Specifically, as a result, many arguments involving ‘if have been misjudged as invalid, because the expectation has been that ‘if expresses a condition. It is suggested that the traditional analysis of ‘necessary and sufficient conditions’ in terms of ‘if and only if, is partly to blame for these misunderstandings. And the proper understanding of ‘if’ which emerges shows it is quite fully captured in the propositional calculus.
THE DANTO‐WOLLHEIM MEANING THEORY OF ART
Authors: Yanal Robert J. 
Published: October 2006

AbstractArthur Danto in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace and Richard Wollheim in Painting as an Art have each advanced a certain meaning theory of art (MT), more specifically, a theory according to which something is a work of art just in case it expresses a proposition. The first part of this essay sets out that view in more detail, with textual support that Danto and Wollheim do in fact hold that theory. The second part offers reasons against accepting MT. (1) There seem to be persuasive counterexamples to MT: objects that are clearly works of art but which do not appear to exhibit any tendency towards propositionality. (2) Neither theorist provides an explanation as to why someone with something to say would choose to, as it were, hide his thought behind a painting. (3) MT will force a theory of the evaluation of art that parallels the evaluation of (say) scientific or philosophical thought. Artworks will be judged according to the profundity of the thoughts they express rather than by their aesthetic features – which would make Duchamp a greater artist than Monet!
RELATIVISM AND ANTI‐REALISM
Authors: Young James O. 
Published: October 2006

AbstractI characterise a relativist account of truth as one according to which the truth value of a sentence can vary without its meaning changing. Relativism is to be contrasted with absolutism, which states that the truth values of sentences cannot change, so long as their meanings remain constant. I argue that absolutism follows from the realist account of meaning and truth conditions. According to realism, the meaning of a sentence consists in objective truth conditions and sentences are true if and only if certain objective conditions obtain. Relativism is a consequence of anti‐realism. Anti‐realists believe that the meanings of sentences consist in recognisable conditions and that sentences are true if and only if certain recognisable conditions obtain. I contrast the sorts of relativism which results from partial, empiricism‐based anti‐realisms, and global anti‐realism, which is linked to a coherence theory of knowledge. I offer a few remarks on how global anti‐realists can restrict the scope of their relativism.
INTENTIONALITY AND ONE‐SIDED RELATIONS
Authors: Haldane John 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIntentional states appear to relate thinkers to objects and situations even when these latter do not exist. Given the concern to allow that thought is a mode of engagement between subject and world, many writers have presented relational theories of intentionality and introduced odd relata to account for thought of the non‐existent. However there are familiar epistemological and ontological objections to such accounts which give reason to look for other ways of accommodating the appearance of relationality. A little explored possibility is to countenance not odd relata but odd relations, ones not requiring existent terms other than those which ground the relation on the side of the subject. Proposals to this effect by Findlay and Grossmann are underdescribed and not obviously different from more familiar odd relata theories. Here a more developed view is explored, which derives from scholastic accounts of intentionality, in particular that presented by John of St Thomas, as this has been elaborated and defended in recent writings by John Deely. While judging it to fail, I suggest that it leads us towards an older tradition according to which the intentionality of thought is constituted by the occurrence of the forms of things in the mind. ‘Formally and principally the whole difference between a mind‐independent relation and a mind‐dependent one comes down to this, that a physical relation has a mind‐independent fundament with a coexistent terminus while a mental relation lacks such a foundation.’(Joannes a Sancto Thoma, Cursus Philosophicus: Ars Logica; Tractatus de Signis)1
VARIETIES OF VIRTUE ETHICS
Authors: Oakley Justin 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe revival of virtue ethics over the last thirty‐five years has produced a bewildering diversity of theories, which on the face of it seem united only by their opposition to various features of more familiar Kantian and Utilitarian ethical theories. In this paper I present a systematic account of the main positive features of virtue ethics, by articulating the common ground shared by its different varieties. I do so not to offer a fresh defence of virtue ethics, but rather to provide a conceptual map that locates its main claims and arguments in relation to those of rival theories, and identifies its distinctive contribution to contemporary ethics. I set out six specific claims which are made by all forms of virtue ethics, and I explain how these claims distinguish the theory from recent character‐based forms of Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism. I then use this framework to briefly survey two main strands of virtue ethics which have been developed in the literature.1
DO EXPLANATORY DESIRE ATTRIBUTIONS GENERATE OPAQUE CONTEXTS?
Authors: Reshotko Naomi 
Published: October 2006

AbstractMany philosophers assert that psychological verbs generate opaque contexts and that the object of a psychological verb cannot be replaced with a co‐referring expressionsalva veritateas the objects of non‐psychological verbs can be. I argue that the logical and linguistic concerns which govern this assertion do not transfer to observational and experimental situations because the criteria that we use in order to verify that an observed subject has one hypothesized desire rather than another provide inconclusive evidence when we don't allow for all regular substitutions in psychological contexts. This becomes more obvious when we contextualize intentional behavior within the appropriate framework by recognizing that, in order to make sense of any desire attribution, we must understand the subject experiencing the desire to be pursuing each desired situation as a means to a further overarching goal. I conclude that the object of desire should always be readde re.
Factor‐Price Equalization By Trade In Joint and Non‐Joint Production
Authors: Samuelson Paul A. 
Published: October 2006

AbstractSans joint products, relative factor prices do determine relative goods prices. Free trade in goods thus can hope to equalize factor returns when this relationship is monotone and therefore uniquely reversible. However, when joint production obtains, often the same relative factor prices can entail an infinity of relative goods prices depending upon the composition of tastes and demand. In consequence, trade's equalization of goods prices is compatible with factor‐returns inequality. Generic and singular relationships are described.
The Fallacy of Free Trade *
Authors: Batra Ravi 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to explode the myth of free trade. Productivity and real wages in the United States rose sharply between 1950 and 1972, but since then real earnings have been falling in spite of a continuous rise in productivity. It turns out that America was more or less a closed economy until 1972, as its trade/GNP ratio was close to 10%; but since then it has become an open economy. the theoretical model shows how real wages may fall in an open economy, but not in a closed economy, in spite of rising productivity.
International Adjustment With Habit‐Forming Consumption: A Diagrammatic Exposition*
Authors: Obstfeld Maurice 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThis paper presents a simple diagrammatic analysis of an open economy's external adjustment process under habit‐forming individual preferences. the exposition focuses on the consumption side and alms to make transparent the linkage among wealth, past consumption experience, and current consumption. an extension of the standard representative‐agent model to a growing economy of overlapping generations completes the paper. Under habit formation an agent's consumption exhibits a form of hysteresis, in that his current consumption depends on his past consumption experience as well as initial assets. In the overlapping‐generations model aggregate hysteresis disappears in the long run.
GATT, Preferential/Regional Trading Blocs and Agricultural Trade*
Authors: Mccalla Alex F. 
Published: October 2006

AbstractAgricultural trade impasses have again frustrated the GATT process. Interest in preferential/regional trading blocs is increasing. the paper probes the theoretical and empirical consequences of preferential arrangements instead of multilateral liberalization. It concludes that in a second‐best world preferential arrangements could either improve or decrease global welfare. For agricultural trade, previous experience suggests that in regional groupings such as the EC trade diversion exceeded trade creation. This results from trade distorting domestic policies. Prospects for liberalization of agricultural trade under either GATT or preferential arrangements are limited. the consequences for small agricultural exporters are not positive.