bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Role of a potential endoplasmic reticulum retention sequence (RDEL) and the Golgi complex in the cytotonic activity of Escherichia coli heat‐labile enterotoxin
Authors: Cieplak Witold , Messer Ronald J. , Konkel Michael E. , Grant Christopher C. R. 
Published: October 2006

SummaryRecent experimental evidence indicates that Escherichia coli heat‐labile enterotoxin and the closely related cholera toxin gain access to intracellular target substrates through a brefeldin A‐sensitive pathway that may involve retrograde transport through the Golgiendoplasmic reticulum network. The A subunits of both toxins possess a carboxy‐terminal tetrapeptide sequence (KDEL in cholera toxin and RDEL in the heat‐labile enterotoxins) that is known to mediate the retention of eukaryotic proteins in the endoplasmic reticulum. To investigate the potential role of the RDEL sequence in the toxic activity of the heat‐labile enterotoxin we constructed mutant analogues of the toxin containing single substitutions (RDGL and RDEV) or a reversed sequence (LEDR). The single substitutions had little effect on Chinese hamster ovary cell elongation or the ability to stimulate cAMP accumulation in Caco‐2 cells. Reversal of the sequence reduced the ability of the toxin to increase cAMP levels in Caco‐2 cells by approximately 60% and decreased the ability to elicit elongation of Chinese hamster ovary cells. The effects of the heat‐labile enterotoxin were not diminished in a mutant Chinese hamster ovary cell line (V.24.1) that belongs to the End4 complementation group and possesses a temperature‐sensitive block in secretion that correlates directly with the disappearance of the Golgi stacks. Collectively, these findings suggest that the brefeldin A‐sensitive process involved in intoxication by the heat‐labile enterotoxin does not involve RDEL‐dependent retrograde transport of the A subunit through the Golgi‐endoplasmic reticulum complex. The results are more consistent with a model of internalization involving translocation of the A subunit from an endosomal or a trans‐Golgi network compartment.
HOW TO BEAT A SCEPTIC WITHOUT BEGGING THE QUESTION
Authors: Greco John 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIn this paper I offer a solution to scepticism about the world which neither embraces idealism, nor ends in a stalemate, nor begs the question against the sceptic. In the first part of the paper I explicate the sceptical argument and try to show why it has real force. In the next part of the paper I propose a version of the relevant possibilities approach to scepticism. The central claim of the proposed solution is that a sceptical possibility undermines knowledge only if the possibility is true in some close possible world. But since there is no reason to believe that I am deceived by an evil demon or that I am a brain in a vat in some close possible world, there is no reason to accept an essential premise of the sceptical argument, i.e. that the sceptical scenarios are relevant possibilities. Finally, I argue that the solution proposed does not embrace idealism, end in a stalemate, or beg the question.
THE FALSE PROMISES OF RISK ANALYSIS
Authors: Hansson Sven Ove 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe relatively new discipline of risk analysis promises to provide objective guidance in some of the most controversial issues in modern high‐technology societies. Four conditions are discussed that must be satisfied for this promise to be fulfilled. Since none of these conditions is satisfied, risk analysis does not keep its promise. In its attempts to reduce genuinely political issues to technocratic calculations, it neglects many of the factors that should influence decisions on risk acceptance. A list of tentative guidelines is given for numerical decision support that encourages democratic decision‐making instead of trying to evade it.
ANTITHEISM: A REFLECTION
Authors: New Christopher 
Published: October 2006

AbstractWhy is there no sustained tradition of argument concerning the existence of a supreme (omniscient and omnipotent) being who is perfectly evil, as there is about one who is perfectly good? Arguments which are reflections of the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments, and arguments based on personal experience or the occurrence of antimiracles (harmful events not explicable by science) could have provided at least as good grounds for belief in such a being (ie for antitheism) as their originals in fact provide for theism. An imaginary encyclopedia entry, in which fictional antitheistic arguments and thinkers are presented, illustrates this point. The reason for the nonexistence of a tradition of antitheism seems therefore to be that it is merely emotionally, not that it is rationally, less inviting than theism.
FREEDOM OF THE WILL AND MENTAL CONTENT
Authors: Gillett Grant 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe idea of freedom of the will seems to conflict with the principle of causal efficacy implicit in many theories of mind. The conflict is normally resolved within a compatibilist view whereby the desires and beliefs of the agent, replete with a respectable if yet to be elucidated causal pedigree, are taken to be the basis of individual freedom. The present view is an alternative which erects mental content on a framework of rule following and then argues that rule‐following is conceptually distinct from causally produced activity. The normative aspect of rule‐following defies reduction to descriptive or dispositional terms. According to this view we cannot get beyond the agent as a self‐determining rational individual in formulating a theory of mind and action. The theory is neo‐Kantian in that it identifies rules or conceptions of laws as central in human thought. It, follows Wittgenstein's treatment of rule‐following and generates a plausible (but non‐causal) account of mental explanation and weakness of the will.
SLOTE'S SATISFICING CONSEQUENTIALISM
Authors: Mulgan Tim 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe article discusses Michael Slote's Satisficing Consequentialism, which is the view that moral agents are not required to maximise the good, but merely to produce a sufficient amount of good. It is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism is not an acceptable alternative to Maximising Consequentialism. In particular, it is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism cannot be less demanding in practice than Maximising Consequentialism without also endorsing a wide range of clearly unacceptable actions. It is then argued that Slote's inability to provide adequate reasons for moral satisficing stems from a mistaken analogy between rationality and morals. The sense of ‘good enough’ which is relevant to morality is one which focusses on the effort an agent puts in, rather than on the outcome she produces. However, replacing outcomes with efforts would undermine Slote's Consequentialist project. Finally, it is suggested that similar problems will be faced by others who seek to construct essentially Consequentialist theories which are not unduly demanding.
SUPERVENIENCE AND MORAL REALISM
Authors: Shafer‐Landau Russ 
Published: October 2006

AbstractSimon Blackburn has developed an interesting challenge to moral realism based on its alleged inability to account for supervenience relations between the moral and nonmoral. If supervenience holds, then any base property once giving rise to a supervening one must always do so. The realist accepts supervenience, but also (according to Blackburn) accepts the claim that nonmoral base properties do not necessitate the moral ones that supervene on them. This combination is thought deadly, because it leaves the realist without an explanation of why ethical supervenience should be true.I offer three responses on behalf of the moral realist. The first rejects the need for explanation, arguing that supervenience should be understood as closely analogous to Leibniz's law, which, I argue, needs no defense. I next argue that ethical naturalism may be right, and if so, would provide an adequate response to Blackburn. Lastly, I show that the success of Blackburn's arguments implies a global antirealism, and so does not, as he claims, amount to a special problem for realism in ethics.
AKRASIA
Authors: Wilkerson T. E. 
Published: October 2006

AbstractAristotle's account of akrasia is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons. First, his account of the problem is coloured by a number of unattractive assumptions and preoccupations; second, his central claim, that akrasia involves a temporary displacement of knowledge, deals at best with only a small number of cases; third, he is wrong to suppose that the akrates is typically someone overwhelmed by passion. We need to follow Davidson in recognising that the central problem consists in a failure to convert intention into action. Any solution must involve a recognition that we are dealing with a range of very different kinds of case, which demand different kinds of treatment. For example sometimes agents are overtaken by passion; sometimes they coolly and calmly do the wrong thing; sometimes they are insincere; sometimes they are suffering from a weakness of will; sometimes they are guilty of some kind of self deception; and sometimes they may have difficulty in comparing the goods and evils available.
COGNITIVE CLOSURE AND THE LIMITS OF UNDERSTANDING
Authors: Sacks Mark 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe paper begins by distinguishing between two ways of effecting the dissolution of a philosophical problem: reductive and philosophical. Of these, the former holds out deflationary prospects greater than those of the latter. Attention focuses specifically on McGinn's proposed dissolution of the mind‐body problem. Examination of his argument reveals that his naturalist dissolution involves traditional non‐naturalist constraints, in a way that counts against his deflationary conclusions. At best his treatment constitutes a philosophical, rather than a reductive dissolution. But there is reason to think that it might in fact constitute a mere relocation of what is, essentially, the same problem that it set out to dissolve.
DESCARTES AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ETERNAL TRUTHS
Authors: Cleve James 
Published: October 2006

AbstractDescartes's view that the eternal truths of mathematics and logic have been established by God and depend on his will does not merely commit him (as some commentators have suggested) to denying that such truths are necessarily necessary; it abolishes their necessity altogether. For similar reasons, some contemporary views also unwittingly abolish necessity.
DOUGHNUTS AND DICKIE
Authors: Zangwill Nick 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIn this paper, I assess Dickie's institutional theory of art. I compare the earlier and later forms of the theory, and I point to various problems of detail with these accounts. I then proceed by arguing that Dickie's definition excludes Krispy Kreme doughnut boxes from possessing the status of being works of art, and it excludes those who made them from possessing the status of being artists. The intention is not to offer a counter example to Dickie's account. Rather, the complaint is that there could be no philosophical point or interest in a concept of art which excludes these doughnut boxes. The best way to see this is by contrast with a concept of art that includes them. Thus I outline what I call a ‘creative’ account. What we want is a concept of art which helps us understand a certain phenomenon in the world – the phenomenon that we call ‘art’. In this light, I argue that Dickie's institutional theory tells us nothing about why people want to make art and nothing about why they want to experience it. By contrast, the creative theory, which embraces both doughnut boxes and things in galleries, is more explanatory.
WHEN DEDUCTION LEADS TO BELIEF
Authors: Grimaltos Tobies , Hookway Christopher 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe paper questions the common assumption that rational individuals believe all propositions which they know to be logical consequences of their other beliefs: although we must acknowledge the truth of a proposition which is a deductive consequence of our beliefs, we may not genuinely believe it. This conclusion is defended by arguing that some familiar counterexamples to the claim that knowledge is justified true belief fail because they involve propositions which are not really believed. Beliefs guide conduct or issue in assertion by answering questions which arise in the course of deliberation and conversation, but the troublesome cases present propositions which do not present the agent's answer to any question. The paper concludes by sketching the conditions under which the deductive consequences of our beliefs can be believed.1
DISPOSITIONS, BASES, OVERDETERMINATION AND IDENTITIES1
Authors: Mumford Stephen 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIn this paper I aim to make sense of our pre‐theoretic intuitions about dispositions by presenting an argument for the identity of a disposition with its putative categorical base. The various possible ontologies for dispositions are outlined. The possibility of an empirical proof of identity is dismissed. Instead an a priori argument for identity is adapted from arguments in the philosophy of mind. I argue that dispositions occupy, by analytic necessity, the same causal roles that categorical bases occupy contingently and that properties with identical causal roles are identical. The validity of the argument depends upon the possibility of overdetermination of disposition manifestations being rejected. ‘Ungrounded dispositions’ are dismissed as not genuine dispositions. Identity conditions for dispositions and categorical bases are outlined.
ARGUMENTS FROM CONCEIVABILITY1
Authors: Prudovsky Gad 
Published: October 2006

AbstractWhat can be inferred from the fact that something is, or is not, conceivable? In this paper I argue, contrary to some deflationary remarks in recent literature, that arguments which use such facts as their starting point may have significant philosophical import. I use Strawson's results from the first chapter of Individuals in order to show that Galileo's arguments in favour of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which are based on premises concerning conceivability, should not be dismissed: they are the first step towards recognising an important conceptual truth.
DEDUCTIVE CLOSURE, SCEPTICISM AND THE PARADOXES OF CONFIRMATION1
Authors: Vahid Hamid 
Published: October 2006

AbstractTo undermine much of what we ordinarily claim to know, sceptics have often appealed to a principle (known as the principle of closure) according to which knowledge (justification) is closed under known entailment. In this paper after expounding the views of Stein, Klein and others, I shall argue that they all fail to take note of different contexts in which the principle of closure is applied. The relevance of the principle of closure for scepticism is then analyzed in the light of, what I call, the ‘infectious’ character of epistemic contexts. I shall also highlight the similarities in the behaviour of the concepts of justification and confirmation and appeal to certain solutions to the paradoxes of confirmation to provide a comprehensive account of the different instances of the principle of closure.
SENSATION, INTENTIONALITY, AND ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS: MALEBRANCHE'S THEORY OF THE MIND
Authors: Jolley Nicholas 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIn general, seventeenth‐century philosophers seem to have assumed that intentionality is an essential characteristic of our mental life. Malebranche is perhaps the only philosopher in the period who stands out clearly against the prevailing orthodoxy; he is committed to the thesis that there is a large class of mental items ‐ sensations ‐ which have no representational content. In this paper I argue that due attention to this fact makes it possible to mount at least a partial defence of his notorious doctrine of ‘the rainbow‐coloured soul’; Malebranche's doctrine is a striking anticipation of modern adverbial theories of sensation. I then argue that failure to appreciate the non‐intentional character of sensations for Malebranche vitiates one recent attempt to explain why he accepted the Cartesian doctrine of the beastmachine; in contrast to the Radners, I suggest that Malebranche has the philosophical resources to offer an interesting theory of animal consciousness, and that his failure to develop such a theory rests largely on his acceptance of certain theological arguments. The paper ends by speculating about how Malebranche's theological commitments may have encouraged him to adopt the philosophically important thesis that intentionality is not the mark of the mental.
PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE SURPRISE‐EXAMINATION PARADOX*
Authors: Weintraub Ruth 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIn this paper I consider the surprise examination paradox from a practical perspective, paying special attention to the communicative role of the teacher's promise to the students. This perspective, which places the promise within a practice, rather than viewing it in the abstract, imposes constraints on adequate solutions to the paradox. In the light of these constraints. I examine various solutions which have been offered, and suggest two of my own.
FELDMAN'S JUSTICIZED ACT UTILITARIANISM
Authors: Persson Ingmar 
Published: October 2006

AbstractIn Confrontations with the Reaper Fred Feldman puts forward puts forward an ethical theory called ‘justicized act utilitarianism’, JAU, according to which an act is morally right if and only if it maximizes universal justice level, i.e., brings it about that as many as possible get what they deserve. It is here argued that JAU is exposed to objections under the force of which it either loses its special emphasis on justice or its utilitarian character. It is also contended that, contrary to what Feldman suggests, JAU does not deal more plausibly with procreation and abortion than do more familiar forms of utilitarianism. Rather, it deals less plausibly at least with abortion, due to difficulties in the concept of desert.
IS NONDEFECTIVELY JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF KNOWLEDGE?
Authors: Jacquette Dale 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe traditional conception of knowledge as justified true belief is refuted in two famous counterexamples by Edmund L. Gettier. Roderick M. Chisholm has attempted to rescue a version of the traditional conception by distinguishing between defective and nondefective kinds of justification, and redefining knowledge more specifically as nondefectively justified true belief. Chisholm's revised definition avoids Gettier's counterexamples, but goes too far in the opposite direction, imposing conditions that are too narrow and not jointly necessary for knowledge. Chisholm's definition excludes some claims that intuitively constitute genuine knowledge1 by entailing that if a true belief is invalidated as knowledge when defectively justified by a total body of evidence that also makes evident at least one false proposition, then no knowledge whatsoever can be supported by the same evidence. An alternative analysis of knowledge is proposed, according to which the potential loophole between the state of affairs that justifies belief in a proposition, and the state of affairs that makes the proposition true, permitted by the traditional concept of knowledge and discovered by Gettier's counterexamples, is closed by redefining knowledge as semantically‐epistemically evidentially relevant justified true belief.
Jointness In Production and Factor‐Price Equalization *
Authors: Jones Ronald W. 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThis paper argues that the presence of activities which yield outputs jointly does not damage the case for factor‐price equalization. the crucial condition for equalization is similar to that in the no‐joint production case: the number of common activities with independent input vectors that are actively used in both countries at least match the number of factors, and factor endowments lie sufficiently close. Indeed, joint production may increase the range of commodity prices for which factor prices are equalized by commodity trade.
The International Transmission of Tax Policies In A Dynamic World Economy*
Authors: Turnovsky Stephen J. , Bianconi Marcelo 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe international transmission of tax shocks are analyzed in a two‐country infinite‐horizon representative agent framework. the viability of the tax regimes, arising from the arbitrage conditions characterizing equilibrium in a perfect world capital market, is emphasized. Conditions for both short‐run and long‐run viability are derived, and the two polar regimes of source‐based and residence‐based taxation are discussed. In general, the former is found more likely to satisfy the viability conditions than the latter. With equity financing, the long‐run viability of residence‐based taxation is likely to require the harmonization of tax and/or dividend policy. the main features of the dynamic adjustment paths following a tax increase are characterized.
Is World Trade Becoming More Regionalized?*
Authors: Anderson Kym , Norheim Hege 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThe rise in intraregional trade shares and the proliferation of regional trade agreements does not necessarily mean economies excluded from those agreements are harmed. Trade data show that the share of each region's GDP that is traded extraregionally has been growing steadily following its fall in the 1930s. That is, the rapid growth of OECD countries' trade among neighbors has been accompanied by (albeit somewhat less rapid) growth in extraregional trade. This does not constitute proof that regional agreements benefit outsiders, but it at least throws doubt on the opposite conclusion.
Exchange Rate Expectations and the Risk Premium: Tests For A Cross Section of 17 Currencies*
Authors: Frankel Jeffrey A. , Chinn Menzie D. 
Published: October 2006

AbstractSurvey data on a broad cross section of 17 currencies are used to determine whether the forward discount moves primarily in response to changes in expectations of depreciation, or in the risk premium. We find that, in contrast to earlier studies involving developed country exchange rates, variation in the risk premium is a quantitatively significant factor in movements of the forward discount. However, changes in expectations also have a substantial effect.
Commercial Policy Towards Multinational Corporations Under Imperfect Information*
Authors: Donnenfeld Shabtai 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThis paper examines host country government (HCG) commercial policy towards imports resulting from intrafirm trade conducted by a multinational corporation (MNC). the effectiveness of the HCG's commercial policy is impaired by its limited information about the MNC's cost of production. the commercial policy consists of restrictions on intrafirm transactions. We construct and characterize the optimal commercial policy under imperfect information and find that under imperfect information the optimal policy entails a distorted transfer price and a lower level of intrafirm trade relative to the full information case. Welfare implications of commercial policy under imperfect information are also examined.
How Useful Is an Ec‐Wide Monetary Aggregate As an Intermediate Target For Europe?*
Authors: Bayoumi Tamim A. , Kenen Peter B. 
Published: October 2006

AbstractThis paper looks at whether the aggregate ERM money supply has been a useful predictor of short‐term changes in inflation and growth, and of long‐term trends in price levels among the core ERM countries. the evidence suggests that over the period since 1987 the ERM money supply performs at least as well, and arguably better, than the individual nominal aggregates in predicting nominal aggregates such as inflation and the price level, while neither money supply is a good predictor of real activity.