bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
British Rule and Indigenous Organization in Nigeria: A Case-Study in Normative-Institutional Change
Authors: Magid Alvin 
Published: January 2009

The article examines administrative policy in Idoma (Northern Nigeria) as a response to two dilemmas confronting the colonial power: (1) how to reconcile a persistent, even if varyingly intense, commitment to indirect rule with a desire for institutional change; (2) how to reconcile a synthesis of the two with the longrange objective of normative change, including ‘progress’ and ‘administrative efficiency’. While normative change remained a long-range colonial objective, institutional change assumed the highest short-range priority.Institutional change involved a pendular course of development: on the one hand, cultivation of strong chieftaincy and centralization based on the Fulani model; on the other, ‘democratization’, rooted first in traditional Idoma constitutionalism, and finally in Western notions of majoritarian local government. These developments are traced through three historical phases. (1) 1908–1930: occupation, pacification, boundary adjustment, and the quest for an indigenous leadership; (2) 1931–1945: systematic implementation of, and subsequent retreat from, the policy of Indirect Rule; (3) Post-World War II: centralization and ‘democratization’ of the Idoma Native Authority or local government establishment. Paradoxically, ‘democratization’ promoted the centralization of authority in Idoma.By 1960, when Nigeria became independent, it could fairly be said that the colonial power's culminating exercises in institutional change were successful. Politically and administratively, Idoma was centralized as never before. That it had yet to experience the efficiency which might have resulted from longrange normative change did not detract from that achievement.
Masai and Kikuyu: An Historical Analysis of Culture Transmission
Authors: Lawren William L. 
Published: January 2009

The tendency of East African Bantu tribes to borrow cultural features from pastoral or semi-pastoral ‘Nilo-Hamitic’ peoples has often been observed, but thus far only two serious attempts have been made to explain this phenomenon. Herskovits first put forward the idea that the tribes of East Africa formed a ‘cattle complex’ epitomized and shaped by the ‘Nilo-Hamitic’ pastoralists. In a more limited study, LeVine and Sangree concluded that the proclivity of a Bantu tribe to borrow from a ‘Nilo-Hamitic’ group was dependent upon the relative population size of the peoples in question, the success or failure of the Bantu group in defending itself against attack, and the need of the Bantu to ally themselves with a ‘Nilo-Hamitic’ tribe.The tentative history of relations between the Bantu Kikuyu and the ‘Nilo-Hamitic’ Masai established in this paper suggests that both these theories err. Beginning with the first meeting of the two tribes about 1750, the Masai inflicted great damage on the Kikuyu while both were resident on the plains near Mount Kenya. When the Kikuyu secluded themselves in the forests after about 1800, they began to experience a significant degree of success in warding off the Masai, without any need for allies. Yet borrowing went on almost without interruption throughout both periods.The actual nature of that borrowing was very different from the process which Herskovits imagined. Rather than being influenced by the way in which cattle functioned in Masai society, the Kikuyu were much impressed with the Masai as militarists, and this is reflected by the fact that the Kikuyu borrowed far more from the Masai military system than from anything relating to cattle.
Emperor Theodore II and the Kingdom of Shoa 1855–1865
Authors: Darkwah Kofi 
Published: January 2009

In the period before the rise of Emperor Theodore, the provinces in Ethiopia tended to behave like independent entities. Shoa was one of the more successful provinces in this respect. By the middle of the nineteenth century, a strong independent nationalism had developed in Shoa which threatened to stand in the way of national unity. This was not favoured by Emperor Theodore, who therefore strove to destroy provincial independence and unite all the provinces under an effective central government.For a long time it was thought that Theodore had an easy task with Shoa, defeating her in a single combat and thereafter completely pacifying the country. Recent researches have revealed that this was not the case. Theodore did not gain an easy victory over a timid enemy. On the contrary, he met with a strong and determined resistance from the Shoan kingdom. He did in the end succeed in conquering it, but he did so only after a vigorous campaign which lasted five months. His final victory was affected by two related factors which seriously weakened the morale of the Shoan soldiers. The first was the sudden death of the king of Shoa at the height of the campaign. The second factor was that the heir to the Shoan throne was a boy of ten years, and incapable of giving effective leadership in the war against the emperor. Shoan resistance collapsed with the capture of the heir and of a number of the leading personalities in the kingdom. The emperor established his own administration in the conquered territory, which he hoped would effectively execute imperial policy there.The administration was, however, unable to pacify the conquered territory, and the period of imperial control was spent suppressing one rebellion after another. On two occasions during this period, Theodore had to go down to Shoa himself to strengthen imperial attacks on the rebels. Although the Emperor managed to gain a hard-won victory over the rebels on the first occasion, he could not make any headway on the second occasion, and eventually he left the country in the hands of the rebels. Thus, in spite of all his efforts, Theodore never succeeded in gaining complete control over Shoa, and by the time he died in April i868, Shoa had already regained her independence.
The Ondo road Eastwards of Lagos,c. 1870–95
Authors: Akintoye S. A. 
Published: January 2009

Trade with European merchants along the Guinea Coast was very important in the history of the Yoruba in the nineteenth century. But until 1870 almost all this trade was done by the western Yoruba peoples. All the important ports (Porto Novo, Badagry and Lagos) were located on the western sea-board of the Yoruba country, and from these ports trade routes radiated inland. Moreover, along the routes, Christian missionary evangelism spread. The eastern Yoruba country remained out of the stream of these formative developments.About 1870, however, owing to obstructions to trade on the western routes, the government of the British colony of Lagos tried to open a new route in the east as a roundabout means of tapping the main centres of trade in the west. But this route, the Ondo Road, soon became a great formative force in the lives of the peoples of the eastern Yoruba provinces. Compared with the main western routes, the trade on the new route was quite small. Nevertheless, its demands resulted in vastly increased productivity both in the agriculture and local manufactures of the people. Also it was along this route that missionary work—as evidenced by the building of mission stations, churches and schools—at last began to affect the eastern Yoruba areas.
Firearms in Africa: an introduction
Authors: White Gavin 
Published: January 2009

Studies of firearms in Africa undertaken at the University of London, 1967–1970, tentatively suggest that their initial impact was less than had been expected, and that their success in war rapidly declined thereafter. Local manufacture of firearms was very limited, perhaps through lack of necessity, though gunpowder was widely produced. Identifying types of firearms is a problem, though general conclusions may be drawn from contemporary references to certain types of weapons.Effective use of firearms by Africans in war often depended on muskets being used primarily for hunting and crop protection. Availability of firearms may well have made agriculture possible in areas otherwise overrun with game. For these purposes, military arms would be less suitable than the African muskets cheaply manufactured at Birmingham, all parts being handmade and thus capable of being hand-repaired in the field. Twenty million are said to have been shipped from Birmingham, and another three million from Liège; millions of surplus military weapons must also have found their way to Africa.Yet the subject can be properly studied only in Africa, where old firearms may still be found, often with their owners still available to describe their use.
Shilluk Trade and Politics from the mid–seventeenth century to 1861
Authors: Mercer Patricia 
Published: January 2009

From the mid-seventeenth century until 1861, the Shilluk, notoriously successful raiders, dominated the White Nile. Their population was largely concentrated in the riverain strip which is Shilluk-land today, yet they had undisputed control of the river down to Eleis, and raided as far north as the confluence with the Blue Nile. This ascendancy was based upon the canoe: the characteristic Shilluk tactic was the surprise mass canoe-raid upon herds or villages within striking distance of the river bank. Before the advent of Turco-Egyptian sailing ships, Shilluk canoes were the only really navigable craft on the White Nile. Another important Shilluk asset was the manpower provided by their comparatively high numbers. Most raids were carried out independently of the Shilluk king. The raiding pattern was probably established before the development of the Shilluk ‘divine’ kingship.From 1820 the Shilluk became more closely involved with the Muslim Sudan. It seems that the beginning of the ivory boom led Kordofan djellabas to open regular trade with the Shilluk. And in ever-increasing numbers, Muslim refugees from Turkish officialdom migrated into Shilluk territory. Trade between Shilluk and Muslim was largely confined to the settlement of Kaka. Its most profitable sector, the ivory trade, was governed by a strict royal monopoly, the maintenance of which gives some proof of the Shilluk king's authority. Wealth thus gained may have led to a short-lived increase in royal power. The mass of the Shilluk were unable to develop any economic alternative to the traditional raids, which continued unabated. In a new raiding pattern, Shilluk of the Kaka region joined Muslim immigrants in raids on the Dinka. Once Kaka had become a slave-market, slave raiding was probably the essential aim of these joint expeditions. Tensions between Shilluk and immigrant traders precipitated a crisis in 1860–1.
Linguistic evidence regarding Bantu origins
Authors: Greenberg Joseph H. 
Published: January 2009

This article has two related purposes. The first is to attempt a clarification of certain points raised by Professor Oliver in his article, ‘The Problem of the Bantu Expansion’, published in an earlier issue of this Journal, insofar as it concerns his discussion of the alternative theories of Professor Guthrie and the present writer regarding Bantu origins. The second and more general aim is to survey the basic assumptions of Guthrie's work on Bantu insofar as it relates to the same problem. In the course of the exposition, three types of evidence are considered: the internal Bantu linguistic evidence; the linguistic evidence external to Bantu, chiefly from West African languages; and the non-linguistic, chiefly geographic evidence.It is argued that Guthrie's assumption which underlies his theory of a central ‘nuclear’ area as the point of origin, namely that the linguistically most conservative area reveals the place of origin, is contrary to empirical evidence. It is rather the area of greatest internal divergence, in this case the north-western area, which points to the earliest differentiation and hence point of origin.
The dimension of the Dutch slave trade from Western Africa
Authors: Postma Johannes 
Published: January 2009

The Dutch share in the Atlantic slave trade has been assessed largely by means of speculation. This article relies extensively on documents of the Dutch West Indian Companies (WIC), which maintained a dozen or more trading stations on the Guinea Coast, and became the principal agents of the Dutch slaving activities. For approximately 16 years (1630–1795), the Dutch played a substantial role in the Atlantic slave trade. Based on the combined criteria of available documentary evidence and fluctuating techniques of the trade, the Dutch slave trade has been outlined in three successive stages, viz. the monopoly of the first WIC (1630–74), the monopoly of the second WIC (1675–1734), and the free trade period (1735–95). Information on the first period is scarce, leaving much to speculation, but for the years after 1675 a reliable assessment is possible.On the whole, the Dutch share constituted about 10 per cent of the overall Atlantic slave trade. Annual averages (calculated by decades) ranged from less than a thousand to over 6,000 slaves. During selected years in the 1630s and 1640s, the Dutch may have become the single most active slave trading nation, but toward the end of the seventeenth century the Dutch trade stagnated while other nations drastically increased their volume. When the WIC began to relinquish its monopoly of the slave trade (1730), the volume of the Dutch trade increased until it reached its peak during the 1760s and early 1770s. As a result of the American Revolutionary War and the ensuing Anglo-Dutch war, Holland's participation in the slave trade virtually came to a halt. Feeble efforts to revivie the trade in subsequent decades failed as a result of the unstable political situation in Europe following the revolution in France and also due to the movement to suppress the slave trade.
Social and Economic Factors in the Muslim Revolution in Senegambia
Authors: Klein Martin A. 
Published: January 2009

This article is an effort to examine the way in which events during and, in some cases, before the nineteenth century shaped modern Senegambian society. It concludes:(1) That the slave trade contributed to the development of military structures and to the polarization of Senegambian societies between a warrior élite and an industrious Muslim peasant population.(2) That the change from the slave trade to legitimate commerce weakened the élites while strengthening the Muslim agriculturalists, who were able to accumulate guns and horses.(3) That tensions between the two conflicting groups go back at least to the seventeenth century, and that after 1860 they led to a series of revolutionary struggles. The agents of this revolution were a series of charismatic religious leaders.(4) That the course of this revolution was shaped by the involvement of European interests, and after 1854 increasingly by the incorporation of Senegambia in European spheres of influence.(5) That this merely postponed certain changes. By the beginning of the colonial period, Islam was clearly dominant, and Senegambia's rural populations were heavily involved in the money economy.
Long Distance Trade and the Luba Lomami Empire
Authors: Wilson Ann 
Published: January 2009

The kingdom of Luba Lomami was enlarged and strengthened by the conquest of Kalala Ilunga at an unknown date before the end of the sixteenth century. It became a large but not dominant state. The expansion of Luba Lomami is generally considered to have occurred in the early eighteenth century, as a delayed consequence of the Kalala Ilunga conquest. In this it is said to have been paralleled by the expansion of Lunda. Unlike Lunda, however, it is supposed to have suffered from severe structural deficiencies. These, it has been argued, inhibited its further expansion and, in the mid-nineteenth century, caused it to disintegrate.It is suggested here, however, that the expansion of Luba Lomami did not occur until the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century. This expansion coincided with the extension of the Bisa trading system into the chiefdoms south-east of Luba Lomami and was designed to capture this trade. Later conquests in the south may have been related to the development of Nyamwezi and Bihe trading systems. However, the principal motive for further expansion was the need to capture new sources of ivory and, to a lesser extent, slave-yielding lands. Luba Lomami's success can be attributed to its proximity to the Bisa trade route, its relatively centralized political structures, the availability of viable areas of expansion, and the existence of suitable mechanisms to incorporate the conquered chiefdoms. In the first half of the nineteenth century Luba Lomami subjected most of the area between the Lubilash and Lake Tanganyika and between the forest and the copper belt.In about 1870 the terms of the long-distance trade turned against Luba Lomami. New traders arrived carrying guns. Luba Lomami could not match the new techniques for it no longer had the resources with which to purchase guns. Its own resources of ivory and slaves were exhausted. It could no longer obtain supplies by expansion, for the traders were carving out new states on its periphery, and it was itself becoming subject to slave raids and encroachment. This external pressure weakened the political structures. Rival brothers sought the aid of mercenary traders to promote their cause. The ideological basis of the state was undermined. In a desperate attempt to obtain guns the emperors began to raid for slaves amongst their own people. The empire disintegrated and, in about 1890, the rump of the state became tributary to the trader-state of Msiri.
The mid-fourteenth century capital of Mali
Authors: Hunwick J. O. 
Published: January 2009

For over a century scholars have been attempting to locate the area and, if possible, the actual site of the capital of the Mali empire in its period of greatness. Since the 1920S attention has been focused on an area near the Sankararni river, a tributary entering the Niger from the south, upstream from Bamako. Over recent years a Polish-Guinean archaeological expedition has been digging a site there, but with inconclusive results so far.A close reading of the few descriptions we have of the capital of Mali, and in particular of the route taken by Ibn Battūta, who visited the capital in 1352, suggests that the city lay on the left bank of the river Niger somewhere between Segu and Bamako. This is in fact a ‘logical] site for the capital of an empire whose tributaries lay mainly in the savannah and Sahel belts, and in whose armies cavalry played a significant role. For this reason, and a number of others, the recent hypothesis of Claude Meillassoux, suggesting a location for the capital south of the R. Falémé (and perhaps also of the R. Gambia), seems doubtful. The proper name for the capital is also discussed.
The three-party system in Dahomey: I, 1946–56
Authors: Staniland Martin 
Published: January 2009

The ‘three-party system’ of Dahomey consists of a trio of regional fiefs, created by MM. Apithy, Maga, and Ahomadegbe in the early fifties. The development and persistence of regionalism can be attributed to a low level of economic change, an unusually high level of educational provision, a considerable diversity of ethnic groupings, and an exceptionally rapid process of enfranchisement.Formal political organizations appeared in 1945 and 1946 in response to the constitutional innovations brought about by the Constituent Assemblies in Paris. Between 1946 and 1951 territorial politics were dominated by the Union Progressiste Dahoménne, a loosely structured body which, while claiming ‘mass’ membership, had many of the same leaders as pre-war élite associations and adopted a similar philosophy with regard to colonial reform. There was little attempt to ‘mobilize’ the hinterland or to get the support of the unenfranchised. The institutional arrangements of the period did not compel politicians to strive in either direction. They did encourage the consolidation of the personal authority of the deputy, over both his political associates and the voting public.Regional parties were set up in and after 1951. Their creation was occasioned by a sudden, fivefold increase in the electorate, the granting of a second National Assembly seat to the territory, and a split within the U.P.D. leadership over the renomination of Apithy, deputy from 1946 to 1951.Northern politicians, led by Hubert Maga, exploited the division within the U.P.D. and exploited also northern resentment over the party's indifference to the region. The northern component of the regional system came into existence (the G.E.N.D.—later M.D.D.), and was quickly followed by a south-eastern ‘bloc’, the undisputed property of Apithy. In the mid-fifties a third party, the U.D.D., appeared, to absorb the residual elements of regional (and urban) support left outside the Maga and Apithy fiefs.
The three-party system in Dahomey: II, 1956–1957
Authors: Staniland Martin 
Published: January 2009

By the end of 1955, territorial politics in Dahomey were dominated by three parties, the P.R.D. of S. M. Apithy, the M.D.D. of Hubert Maga, and the U.D.D. of Justin Ahomadegbe and others. Each party relied upon electoral support in clearly defined regions: the P.R.D. depended on the south-east, the M.D.D. on the north, and the U.D.D. on the residual areas of central and south-western Dahomey. The U.D.D. claimed, however, to be a new kind of party, transcending the narrow regionalism of its rivals and commanding ‘mass’ support rather than the uncertain and conditional support provided by ‘vote contractors’.The loi-cadre reforms of 1956—7 led to an intensification of party activity, since they provided for the creation of territorial executives founded on electoral majorities and at the same time introduced universal suffrage. The 1957 Territorial Assembly elections were therefore a testing-ground for the tactics and strength of the three parties. Under pressure from the P.R.D., the U.D.D. adopted selection procedures like those of its rival. Outside the main towns, its campaigning was similar, concentrating on local issues to the exclusion of the wider questions on which the U.D.D. had hoped to take its stand.