bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Just Peace: A Dangerous Objective
Authors: Beilin Yossi 
Published: June 2006

AbstractBeilin was a former chief negotiator for the Israeli government in the Oslo process at Camp David and Taba. He brings a valuable contribution to this volume as a practitioner and political scientist involved directly in conflict negotiations. After fulfilling his post as the Minister of Justice for the Israeli government, he became one of the lead Israeli representatives in the Geneva Accord negotiations. In this sceptical work, Beilin points to the possible dangers of speaking about the combined concepts of justice and peace, believing that there cannot be one without the other. Peace treaties have often been signed and implemented by the victors of conflict, but have left the population on either side out of the determinations of justice. Beilin presents a history filled with examples in which political leaders have bypassed opportunities for peace because they did not deem the conditions just, and thus perpetuated conflict with untold costs.
5 Rome and Serdica
Authors: Parvis Sara 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines the moves toward a second Ecumenical Council in the years after the second depositions of Athanasius and Marcellus. Constantius’ brother, Constans, is presented as a central figure in the negotiations, perhaps from as early as 340. It is argued that the decisions of the Synod of Rome, here dated to Spring 341, were not intended to be binding on the East in the absence of any Eastern bishops, but merely addressed the local problem of whether or not to continue to treat Athanasius and Marcellus as bishops in the absence of convincing evidence that they had been validly deposed. The works written by Athanasius and Marcellus in Rome at this time, the First Oration against the Arians, the Letter to Julius, and probably On the Holy Church (De Sancta Ecclesia), are examined. It is argued that all draw on a statement agreed between the two concerning a heresy, which Athanasius calls the Arian heresy and Marcellus calls Ariomania. The signatories and documents of the Eastern and Western synods of Serdica are minutely examined, and argued to show that the two alliances were now in a process of realignment. Marcellus and Athanasius were in fundamental disagreement over whether or not to issue a statement adding to the Nicene Creed, and most of the Easterners were not in as intransigent a mood as the letter written in their name might suggest. Marcellus withdrew from public engagement with the controversy shortly afterwards to obviate the need to choose between a breach with Athanasius or with his own pupil Photinus of Sirmium. He died nearly 30 years later in communion with the former, without ever having condemned the latter.
3 Kant's Arguments for His Formula of Universal Law
Authors: Parfit Derek 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This essay considers the structure of the argument for duty in the Kantian context, in which it was most influentially formed. Kant notoriously argues that the supreme principle of morality must be purely formal, by which he means that it does not direct us to act in order to achieve certain ends. Thus, any principle directed to the realization of certain ends must be merely hypothetical in character, and its motivational grounds subjective. It is shown that Kant overlooks a third possibility, namely, that there can be substantive categorical principles that objectively require us to realize certain ends regardless of our inclinations.
7. Choice and Incentive Inequality
Authors: Hurley Susan 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis essay considers the implications of self-interest for equality in the context of the ‘luck egalitarian’ view that an individual’s wealth is justly owned only if it is the result of a responsible choice. A possible response to Cohen’s argument against incentives might be that since individuals can choose to work harder on behalf of the disadvantaged, they are also partly responsible for, and entitled to, the extra wealth they produce. This view is rejected, noting that were the tax rate adjusted to accommodate responsibility for being productive, it would whittle away the benefits of productivity for redistributive purposes.
The Contract Theory
Authors: Mulgan Tim 
Published: June 2006

AbstractOne subsidiary aim of this book is to motivate a return to Consequentialism in political philosophy by highlighting its comparative advantage over its main contemporary liberal rival in the area of intergenerational justice: the Contract Theory. It explores both the contractarianism of David Gauthier and the liberal egalitarianism of John Rawls, who represent two general alternatives to the strategy of building political theory on a Consequentialist account of individual morality. This chapter presents new objections to both Gauthier and Rawls, based on their inability to do justice to basic needs in an intergenerational context.
Value Theory
Authors: Mulgan Tim 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter rejects the common assumption that we can construct a theory of value in isolation from our theory of right action on the grounds that our strongest moral convictions concern the morality of actions rather than the values of possible worlds. Moderate Consequentialism (which does not always oblige us to produce the best available outcome) can separate judgements of value from judgements of right action. This flexibility enables us to dissolve familiar puzzles without abandoning standard Consequentialist value theory. For instance, to solve Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion, a lexical view is defended using both Kantian and Consequentialist arguments. This chapter begins with a sketch of the theory of well-being required by moderate Consequentialism. Its primary focus will be on theories of aggregation: accounts of the relationship between the value of an outcome and the values of the individual lives it contains.
Hybrid Moral Theories
Authors: Mulgan Tim 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter applies Samuel Scheffler’s ‘Hybrid View’ to the morality of reproduction. It concludes that the Hybrid View does not provide a satisfactory account of our obligations to future generations, as it cannot accommodate either reproductive freedom or parental obligations. The Hybrid View fails because it cannot appreciate the collective moral significance of reproduction. This failure is shared by all other theories that retain the individualist focus of Simple Consequentialism, and thus motivates the exploration of collective forms of Consequentialism, which begins in Chapter 5.
Reproductive Freedom
Authors: Mulgan Tim 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter first establishes a strong prima facie Rule Consequentialist case in favour of reproductive freedom. Arguments against reproductive freedom are then examined and found wanting. Rule Consequentialism does not seek any precise population target, although the next generation must be large enough to provide cultural continuity and small enough not to overburden the environment. The empirical evidence suggests that in a stable society governed by an ideal code where women are provided with adequate education and a wide range of opportunities, a sustainable birth rate can be achieved. Reproductive freedom is thus no threat to the survival of society.
Optimism and Pessimism
Authors: Mulgan Tim 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter begins with a basic list of intuitively plausible principles of intergenerational justice, against which Rule Consequentialism can be measured. It then establishes the Rule Consequentialist commitment to political liberty and shows how that commitment is strengthened in the intergenerational case. It is shown that Rule Consequentialism copes with the possibility of future declines in aggregate well-being much better than its opponents, such as Rawls’s liberalism. This is illustrated using the current dispute between growth optimists and ecological pessimists.
The Limits of Rule Consequentialism
Authors: Mulgan Tim 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter focuses on a single problem for Rule Consequentialism: whether it makes unreasonable demands under partial compliance. It recaps the arguments of The Demands of Consequentialism, and then asks if an intergenerational perspective make Rule Consequentialism more or less palatable under partial compliance. It concludes that while the demands of Rule Consequentialism are moderate and plausible in some areas, they are extreme and somewhat implausible in others, and that the comparative stringency of Rule Consequentialism’s demands in different areas is often very peculiar. Rule Consequentialism cannot be a plausible complete moral theory. So long as it presents itself as a complete theory, its accounts of reproduction and future generations must themselves be unreasonably demanding.
The Paradox
Authors: Kvanvig Jonathan L. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines the logical structure of the knowability paradox, presenting the details of the proofs that underlie the paradox, and clarifying which elements of these proofs give rise to paradox. It argues that there is no simple and obvious logical mistake in the derivation of the knowability result. A paradox has deep significance only if it arises from plausible premises. Those in question in Fitch’s proof are the claim of epistemic modesty, that some truths will never be known, and the knowability principle that all truths are knowable. Although the second claim does not have the same intuitive pull as the first, there are substantive grounds in its favour; grounds that some hold show that all truths are knowable, but which show at the very least that it is plausible to maintain that all truths are knowable.
What's Paradoxical?
Authors: Kvanvig Jonathan L. 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter explores the different grounds for accepting the claim that all truths are knowable, the assumption central to the derivation of Fitch’s result. It argues that although there is no compelling argument for holding that all truths are knowable, there are various positions in which this feature of semantic anti-realism fits naturally; rejecting this puts serious tension into a broad range of philosophical outlooks, including theism and physicalism. In the end, the paradox should be felt by everyone, even those who do not accept the knowability claim, because the heart of the paradox is not simply in what is implied by the knowability claim, but in a lost logical distinction between what is actual and what is possible.
Rules for the Knowledge Operator
Authors: Kvanvig Jonathan L. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines the idea that the logical principles governing the knowledge operator are the root cause of the paradox. There are two such principles: the first is that knowledge implies truth, and the second is that knowledge distributes over conjunction, so that knowledge of a conjunction constitutes knowledge of the conjuncts. It is argued that the paradox cannot be avoided by questioning these principles.
Reservations about the Underlying Logic
Authors: Kvanvig Jonathan L. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter explores the challenge to the proof of Fitch’s results presented by intuitionism, and the prospects of this viewpoint in avoiding the paradox that results. It argues that adopting intuitionistic principles of reasoning will not help avoid the paradox. It merely changes what is paradoxical from a lost distinction between known truth and knowable truth, to a lost distinction between unknown truth and unknowable truth. Since paradox remains in both cases, the solution to the paradox must be found elsewhere.
Chapter 2 The God of Spinoza
Authors: Sprigge T.L.S. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter begins with an account of the life of Spinoza. It then discusses his great work, the Ethics, and the proof of its fundamental claim that there is just one substance, and that everything else which in any manner exists is a mode of it. There follows an account of Spinoza’s form of determinism and its ethical and religious significance and of his distinction between rational and irrational action. Finally there is a discussion of Spinoza’s views on institutionalized religion, and on Jesus. The chapter ends by asking whether Spinozism offers a ‘personal religion’.
Chapter 3 Hegelian Christianity
Authors: Sprigge T.L.S. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
After a brief discussion of Kant’s critique of attempts to prove the existence of God, this chapter turns to Hegel. After some account of his life, there follows an account of his early posthumous theological essays. The chapter moves on to his final system. Some account is offered of his dialectical method and the progression from Pure Being, through the three great categories of The Idea in itself or The Logical Idea, The Idea outside itself or Nature, and the Idea in and for itself or Spirit. This terminates in what Hegel calls Absolute Spirit, which itself terminates in The Absolute Religion, that is to say Christianity. Hegel’s peculiar version of the doctrine of the Trinity is discussed. Finally the question as to the real religious value of Hegel’s system is raised.
Chapter 4 Kierkegaard and Hegelian Christianity
Authors: Sprigge T.L.S. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter discusses the position presented by Kierkegaard in his two related works: Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, which were published under the pseudonym, Johannes Climacus. It is shown that in Fragments, Climacus merely tried out the idea of God incarnating himself to achieve mutual love with men in spite of their fallen state, but did not specify Christianity as proclaiming the realization of this idea. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript, the focus is more explicitly on Christianity. Kierkegaard’s most thorough discussion of ethics, Works of Love, is also examined, which emphasizes the need for Christians to grow out of worldly self-love and embrace a life of suffering.
Chapter 6 Bernard Bosanquet
Authors: Sprigge T.L.S. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter begins with a description of the life and early works of Bernard Bosanquet which show some remarkable insights into the future of Christianity. It then turns to his later work, particularly his Gifford Lectures. Its strange mixture of materialism and idealism is considered and explained. Accounts and evaluations are provided of his views on panpsychism, on the State, on the problem of evil, on teleology, and on how all things operate according to the kind of whole to which they belong. His ethical outlook is charged with a lack of compassion and this is exhibited in his connection with the Charity Organization Society.
Chapter 8 Process Philosophy and Theology: Whitehead and Hartshorne
Authors: Sprigge T.L.S. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
Whitehead and Hartshorne are considered the founding fathers of process philosophy as a fully worked out metaphysic. Both believe that the basic stuff of the world is experience, which comes into being in what William James called ‘drops of experience’ or ‘momentary experiential wholes’. Both believe that each such momentary whole prehends earlier such wholes, and makes itself into a unitary reality with these prehended past wholes as its raw material. They also believe that creativity is a basic feature of reality. Their views on process theology, proofs of God’s existence, and ethics are discussed.
Christian Philosophical Theology
Authors: Davis Stephen T. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This book exposes and defends crucial items in the theological world-view of Christianity from the perspective of Christian philosophy. The topics considered include the nature of religious unbelief, the existence of God, the nature of God, religious faith, creation, revelation, Christology, redemption, scripture, and the beatific vision. The book revolves around questions like: Why believe in God? What is God like? Who was Jesus Christ? What is incarnation? How are humans redeemed? How should theology be done?
The Epistemic Status of Belief in God
Authors: Davis Stephen T. 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter presents a theistic proof called the Generic Cosmological Argument (GCA). In outline form, the GCA runs as follows: (1) if the universe can be explained, then God exists; (2) everything can be explained; (3) the universe is a thing; (4) therefore the universe can be explained; (5) therefore, God exists. The GCA is also defended against objections.
Jesus Christ: Saviour or Guru?
Authors: Davis Stephen T. 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
In this age of theological pluralism, even within Christianity, is there good reason to affirm the incarnation of Christ as expressed in the Creed of Chalcedon? To affirm as much is to commit oneself to what is called a maximal christology, as opposed to the many minimal christologies available today. It is argued that the New Testament picture of Jesus is unified and consistent. The purpose of the incarnation is to show what God is like, to make it possible for human beings to know God, and to defeat God’s enemies. To accomplish as much, Jesus had to be truly human and truly divine. Four indications that Christ was divine are considered: his willingness to forgive sins, his reference to God as Abba, his willingness to speak “with authority”, and his implicit claims to be divine.
‘Seeing’ the Risen Jesus
Authors: Davis Stephen T. 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter argues that when Mary Magdalene, Peter, and others saw the risen Jesus, their “seeing” was a case of a normal vision. This is the natural way to read the New Testament accounts, especially given the physical detail contained in many of them. Six possible arguments in favor of objective vision are discussed. Two arguments in favor of normal seeing are presented: that the early church interpreted the “seeing” as normal vision, and that it is theologically significant that the “seeing” was normal. It underscores the reality of the incarnation, and places the church in a strong apologetic position.
Was Jesus Mad, Bad or God?
Authors: Davis Stephen T. 
Published: June 2006

AbstractIn this chapter, C.S. Lewis’ famous trilemma argument in favor of the divinity of Christ (Jesus was either mad, bad, or God) is developed, and a version of it is defended. The crux of the argument is the assertion that Jesus himself implicitly claimed to be divine. This assertion is buttressed by the notion that prayers and worship were addressed to Jesus, that he forgave sins, that he addressed God as Abba, that he spoke with authority and even in places overthrew the law, and that he declared that one’s relationship to him would determine one’s eternal fate. The trilemma argument is also defended against objections.
10 Is Kenotic Christology Orthodox?
Authors: Davis Stephen T. 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThere are two main theories to explain how incarnation was possible: classical christology and kenotic christology. This chapter defends one version of kenoticism. The biblical issue is: which theory best captures the Jesus that we find described in the Gospels? The philosophical issue is: in order to be “truly human”, must the Logos limit itself or divest itself of certain divine properties? Kenoticism is orthodox because it is consistent with Scripture (as seen in Philippians 2:1-11) and with classical creeds. Three objections to kenoticism are answered.
Bodily Redemption
Authors: Davis Stephen T. 
Published: June 2006

AbstractHuman beings face two great problems: guilt and death. Although disembodied existence is in some sense possible, it would be an attenuated existence since we are normally embodied beings, and complete and ideal existence for us is embodied. Matter is not evil because it was created by God, who is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good. We are redeemed from guilt and death by the life, death, and resurrection of Christ. Despite Catholic and Protestant differences at this point, Christians largely agree that we are justified by faith in Christ. Two different scenarios for the general resurrection are discussed, as well as the beatific vision.
The Resurrection of the Dead
Authors: Davis Stephen T. 
Published: June 2006

AbstractThis chapter discusses the general resurrection. It first establishes that classical mind/body dualism — a theory seen (in different forms) in Plato and Descartes — is not the Christian position. Temporary disembodiment, which is the theory of life after death and the interim state held by most theologians, is discussed. The nature of the disembodied interim state, the reunification of body and soul at the Parousia, and the nature of the gloried body are also explored. It is argued that contrary to certain philosophers, this overall picture of the general resurrection is coherent. Christian theologians differ on whether the new glorified body consists of the same matter as the pre-mortem body, but both theories are possible. John Perry’s arguments against survival of death are answered.
4 Jesus' I‐Sayings inThomasand their Relationship to Johannine Traditions
Authors: Dunderberg Ismo 
Published: June 2006

AbstractA close analysis of I-sayings in Thomas and their relationship to Johannine writings supports the conclusion that there was no mutual dependence between these texts. The following sayings in Thomas are examined in detail: 13, 17, 28 (incarnation), 61 (equality with God), 71 (the temple saying), and 77 (‘I am the light’). Affinities between these sayings and the Gospel of John go back to their common background in Jewish Wisdom literature and in early Christian theology. Nevertheless, the way some important theological issues, such as incarnation and equality with God are discussed in these two gospels suggest that they were written in about the same time — in the turn of the 1st and 2nd century. Many of their common ideas find parallels in the early Christian literature from this period.
Time and Eternity in Mid-Thirteenth-Century Thought
Authors: Fox Rory 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This book examines 13th century views about time, particularly the views of Thomas Aquinas and his contemporaries in the middle of the century. As medieval thinkers considered time to be just another duration alongside the durations of aeviternity (the aevum) and eternity, the scope of the study covers all three durations, culminating in an examination of God’s relationship to time. Chapter 1 opens the discussion by examining some of the key language and terminology which 13th century thinkers used. Chapters 2-5 examine the topological properties of time: the properties that determine its shape and structure. Chapter 6 investigates the metrical properties of time: the properties pertaining to time when it is considered as a measure. Chapter 7 looks at the criteria, factors, and language which 13th century thinkers typically took as entailing that a particular would be in time. Chapter 8 explores how 13th century thinkers discussed existence outside of time, particularly as it was applied to aeviternity and aeviternal beings. Chapter 9 examines the content of the medieval concept of eternity, and how these ideas are best rendered in contemporary language. Chapter 10 examines the specific question of how 13th century thinkers viewed God’s relationship to time.
3 Priority, Posteriority, and Causality
Authors: Fox Rory 
Published: June 2006

Abstract
This chapter focuses on the other two temporal relations: temporally before (temporal priority) and temporally after (temporal posteriority), examining the notions in themselves before turning to the related question of 13th century attitudes to the causal theory of time. Thirteenth-century accounts of simultaneous causation undermine the possibility that 13th century thinkers would have accepted that temporal relations could be reduced to more fundamental causal relations, since the existence of simultaneous causation implies that causal orderings and temporal orderings could be uncoupled. The notion of backwards causation is also explored as part of the general investigation of causation and causal sequences.