bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Chapter 4 Older Workers: Employment and Retirement Trends
Authors: Purcell Patrick 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
This chapter begins by describing the aging of the US population and it summarizes historical data on older workers' labour force participation. It then considers information on older persons' employment and receipt of pension income, which are discussed in the context information on the proportion of workers who claim retired-worker benefits before the full retirement age (65 years and 4 months for people who reach age 65 in 2004). Recent proposals to promote phased retirement through amendments to sections of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that govern the taxation of pension income are discussed.
Chapter 6 The Future of Pension Plan Design
Authors: McCarthy David 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
This chapter brings together the literature on pension compensation and optimal portfolio choice to seek solutions to the ‘pension design’ problem. It identifies the factors that must be taken into account when designing pension schemes. It then discusses life cycle models of employee preferences, presents a specific model of this type, and presents some results. It is shown that defined benefit (DB) pension arrangements magnify the risk exposure of an individual to salary risk, and both defined contribution (DC) and DB pension arrangement defer the pay of younger workers to later in their lives. In contrast, DB pensions may be a cost-effective method of compensation for older, less well-educated employees. Promising workers a stake in an underfunded pension plan is an expensive way to pay employees, particularly if the underfunding has no positive impact on effort. Giving workers 401(k) plans holding restricted company stock is also an expensive way to remunerate employees, because they are already heavily exposed to company risk.
Chapter 9 Educating Pension Plan Participants
Authors: Arnone William J. 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
This chapter argues that firms and plan sponsors have an obligation to provide financial education in conjunction with their retirement plans. A practical definition of employer-sponsored participant education is a program that helps employees develop skills to make informed decisions and take action to improve their financial well-being in retirement. This definition incorporates the following: helping individuals based on their status as employees of an organization; providing recipients with skill development, which may include either new competencies or the enhancement of existing competencies; enabling participants to make decisions about issues; providing a basis of accurate, unbiased information for such decisions; taking an action-oriented stance and thereby attempting to affect behaviour; and seeking the long-term result of improved financial well-being.
Chapter 13 The Future of Pensions in Canada
Authors: Pozzebon Silvana 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
This chapter examines the resilience of the two key components of the Canadian retirement income system: the Old Age Security (OAS) program and the compulsory, pay-as-you-go earnings-related scheme. The public pension scheme has both an unfunded component and a funded element, the CPP Investment Fund. The latter was adopted as a measure to improve public pension retirement security. The public system also embodies a balance between poverty reduction (the OAS program) and retirement income support (Q/CPP). The private pension system is generally considered the funded component of Canada's retirement system. It has proved successful in providing income replacement, particularly for those with higher incomes, who receive lower replacement rates from the OAS program due to the progressive nature of the public pension system.
Chapter 15 Risk Management and Pension Plan Choice in Japan
Authors: Usuki Masaharu 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
This chapter assesses whether changes in benefit design were influenced by sponsors' desire to control financial risk. It considers several plan financial characteristics that affect risk tolerance and asset allocation decisions, such as the funding ratio, and determines whether these variables influence decisions regarding plan termination and put-back of the contracted-out portion of Employee Pension Funds (EPFs). In particular, the chapter examines the hypothesis that plan sponsors have altered the plan type they offer to control risks in pension management. It is shown that the pension plan's funding ratio, volatility of the plan sponsor's return on equity, and the size of the pension plan relative to the plan sponsor's total assets exert an influence on decisions to change pension plan types.
The Boundaries of Welfare
Authors: Ferrera Maurizio 
Published: February 2006

AbstractTo what extent and in what ways have European integration redrawn the boundaries of national welfare states? What are the effects of such redrawing? These questions are interesting and relevant because boundaries “count”: they are a pre-requisite for bonding individuals, groups, and territorial units, and for activating or strengthening their dispositions to share. Historically, welfare state formation can be read as a process of boundary-building — essentially through the establishment of compulsory public insurance schemes. European integration has prompted a reversal of this process: free movement and competition rules have in fact started to challenge the traditional bounding prerogatives of the nation-state in the social sphere. Today, the EU constrains not only the scope and content of bounding decisions (who is entitled to share what), but also the very “right to bound” in the first place. Such constraints have far reaching economic and financial implications. But their social and political implications may be even greater, given the importance of nation-based social sharing for material life chances, cultural identities and legitimation dynamics. As shown by the chapters in this book, reshuffling the “boundaries of welfare” can destabilise the basic architecture of Europe’s national societies and political systems. In order to counter this destabilisation, a carefully designed strategy of institutional reform is needed, capable of reconciling “solidarity” and “Europe” through stronger citizenship rights and more socially friendly regulatory instruments.
2 From Public Assistance to Social Protection: Welfare State-building in European Nations
Authors: Ferrara Maurizio 
Published: February 2006

AbstractThis chapter traces the historical origins and early developments of European welfare states up to the Second World War in terms of external and internal boundary building. It highlights the role of cleavage and centre periphery structures in moulding institutional choices, in particular, the choice between a universal and an occupational approach to social insurance — the former prevailing in the Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries, and the latter prevailing in Continental and South European countries.
Nonexistence (1998)
Authors: Salmon Nathan 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
It is argued that reference to the nonexistent, and belief of nonexistent propositions, are commonplace. True, singular, negative existentials vary by the semantic nature of the subject term or the ontological status of its designatum. The most common true negative existentials involve names that designate nonexistent things-actual past things, actual future, merely possible, or impossible. Fiction is not a case in point; fictional characters are real. Error is merely accidental fiction.
Modal Logic Kalish-and-Montague Style (1994u)
Authors: Salmon Nathan 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
The natural-deduction deductive apparatus of Donald Kalish and Richard Montague from their textbook, Logic: Techniques of Formal Reasoning (second edition co-authored with Gary Mar) is extended to the most popular “normal” systems of modal propositional logic (T, B, S4, and S5) — the logic of what might have been — making significantly greater use of the Kalish-and-Montague deductive apparatus than had been utilized in the earlier attempts.
Impossible Worlds (1984)
Authors: Salmon Nathan 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
It is argued, against Randolph Carter, that if there are merely possible worlds, then indeed there are also impossible worlds. Worlds are things, but impossible worlds are not impossible things. A world, in the sense in which the actual world is only one among many, is a maximal scenario, a total way for things to be-all things. The actual world is the way things are. Merely possible worlds are ways things might have been but are not. Impossible worlds are ways things could not have been.
Identity Facts (2002)
Authors: Salmon Nathan 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
For any x there can be nothing y such that there is no fact that x = y and at the same time no fact that x ( y. For if there were, then y would differ from x in this respect: that there is no fact that x is it and no fact that x is not it. In this case there is a fact that x ( y. In short, identity is always determinate. This argument is defended at length against the most developed response to date, that of Terence Parsons. The proof is also contrasted with a similar proof due to Gareth Evans.
Wholes, Parts, and Numbers (1997)
Authors: Salmon Nathan 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
It would appear to be provable that there cannot be exactly exactly two and a half oranges on the table. For the orange-half on the table is itself not an orange. An orange is a whole orange (or nearly enough so), whereas an orange-half, whatever else it is, is not a whole orange (nor even nearly so). Thus, there are only two oranges on the table, together with a third thing that (despite its color, taste, etc.) is no orange. This paradoxical conclusion is rejected. Instead a non-classical understanding is adopted on which the numerical quantifier ‘there are exactly n’, surprisingly, creates a nonextensional context.
On Content (1992)
Authors: Salmon Nathan 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
It is argued that Frege might be properly interpreted as having employed a notion of logical content — more fine-grained than his notion of Bedeutung (extension) yet more course-grained than Sinn. Expressions have the same logical content, in this postulated translation for Frege’s ‘Erkenntniswerte’, if they are logically equivalent. Strictly synonymous expressions (those having the same sense) have the same logical content, but the converse is not generally true-else, for Frege, all mathematical truths would be the same “thought,” or proposition, e.g., that 2 is even and that eΠ = -1.
On Designating (2005)
Authors: Salmon Nathan 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
A new interpretation is proposed for the notorious “Gray’s Elegy” passage in Bertrand Russell’s ground-breaking essay, On Denoting. The passage is Russell’s central argument for the doctrine — surprising, yet crucial to Russell’s philosophical program — that definite descriptions are not singular terms. Two elements of Russell’s objection — the commitment to a hierarchy of indirect senses and the complaint that the hierarchy is a practical impossibility — have been rediscovered in more recent philosophy. Possible responses are: one on behalf of Fregean theory, another on behalf of Millianism.
The Very Possibility of Language (2001)
Authors: Salmon Nathan 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
Many philosophers have argued that a sentence like ‘Chris believes that the Earth is round’ actually mentions particular words rather than any proposition. Alonzo Church demonstrates that this is incorrect by translating both the original sentence and its proposed paraphrase into another language. Doing so illustrates that the original sentence and its proposed paraphrase contain different information. The latter, at most, merely describes what it is that Chris is supposed to believe — specifying it as the content, whatever that may turn out to be, of such-and-such words — whereas the former identifies what Chris is alleged to believe. Michael Dummett’s failure to appreciate this fundamental point leads to a dramatic collapse of his own theory, which has the preposterous consequence that language as we know it is altogether impossible.
Tense and Intension (2003)
Authors: Salmon Nathan 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
It is demonstrated how to incorporate the traditional notion of a proposition as eternal and unvarying in truth value into a semantic theory like that of David Kaplan, by distinguishing among not three (as in Kaplan’s work), but four levels of semantic value: extension, content, content base, and meaning. Unlike the semantic content, the content base of a sentence may be temporally neutral, and may thus vary in truth-value with time. This semantic theory supports that generally unrecognized fact that the semantic content of a predicate, like ‘is reading’, is a temporally indexed attribute (reading at t, t a time), and hence changes as the predicate is evaluated with respect to different times.
On Meaning, Meaning, and Meaning
Authors: Millikan Ruth Garret 
Published: February 2006

AbstractTo understand how language works, one must first look to the cooperative functions that various language forms perform, understanding these on a biological model as what these forms accomplish that keeps them in circulation. Next, one should look at language mechanics, at how language forms perform their functions, and especially to the conditions in the world that are necessary to support their specific functions. These are, in part, truth conditions, which are determined by a kind of “meaning” called “semantic mapping functions” — “functions,” this time, in the mathematical sense. Last, the psychological mechanisms that are involved in implementing the functions of various language forms must be described. A proper understanding of these mechanisms eliminates the need to introduce anything akin to intensions or Fregean senses in the understanding of linguistic meaning.
The Son and the Daughter: On Sellars, Brandom, and Millikan
Authors: Millikan Ruth Garret 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
The positions of Brandom and Millikan are compared with respect to their common origins in the works of Wilfrid Sellars and Wittgenstein. Millikan takes more seriously the “picturing” themes from Sellars and Wittgenstein. Brandom follows Sellars more closely in deriving the normativity of language from social practice, although there are also hints of a possible derivation from evolutionary theory in Sellars. An important claim common to Brandom and Millikan is that there are no representations without function or “attitude”.
Cutting Philosophy of Language Down to Size
Authors: Millikan Ruth Garret 
Published: February 2006

AbstractTwo mistaken assumptions lay at the heart of the mid-century philosophy of language. First, unlike the act of knowing an empirical fact, the act of referentially meaning something, though perhaps not of actually referring to something, is completed within the mind itself. Second, a univocal term in a public language is associated with a psychological state common to all competent users. It is shown how to deny both assumptions by showing that the purpose of a thinker intending a certain referent is not a psychological purpose, but a biological purpose.
Semantics/Pragmatics: (Purposes and Cross-Purposes)
Authors: Millikan Ruth Garret 
Published: February 2006

AbstractA new analysis of convention and of linguistic function yields a robust description, in naturalistic terms, of the distinction between semantics and pragmatics. For a number of different but instructive reasons, this distinction is intrinsically blurry, depending on statistics over individual psychological processing techniques. Implications for the theory of language interpretation are discussed, with the conclusion drawn that there are many ways of grasping the content that the specific speaker intends to convey without employing a theory of mind. A coordinate claim is that during normal conversation, it is not language that is most directly perceived by the hearer but rather the world that is most directly perceived through language.
Preliminary Study of Aristotle's Causes
Authors: Johnson Monte Ransome 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
Aristotle considers nature, art, spontaneity, luck, necessity, and intelligence to be causes, and they fit into the four kinds of cause that he distinguishes throughout works on natural philosophy. The four kinds of cause, e.g. matter, mover, form, end, are not themselves causes, but are classes of causes. The causes can be combined in various ways, and the same thing can be classified as several kinds of cause. Causes play a crucial role in scientific demonstration: the middle term in a syllogism of natural science. But only intrinsic (as opposed to incidental) causes can play this role, and so it is important to distinguish between things that happen to be predicated of a cause (such as paleness of a the sculptor), and things essential to a cause (such as the art of sculpture). Due attention to these distinctions can show how Aristotle thinks that various causes can be integrated (such as ends and movers) in a way that is still explanatory, and how causation does not violate temporal sequence, requiring “backwards causation”.
Teleology and Elements
Authors: Johnson Monte Ransome 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
Did Aristotle consider the properties of the elements to be teleologically explicable? According to some commentators, he did not, but considered these to operate according to material, moving, or mechanical causes. According to others, he did, and this is evidence of his commitment to an “overall” or “global” teleology. Both of the positions are wrong. Aristotle did consider each of the elements teleologically explicable, but he considered the beneficiaries of their properties and motions to be the elements themselves. This is relatively clear in the case of ether, the element that composes the heavenly bodies: it has a simple motion in a circle, which is a manifestation of the intelligence of the extra-terrestrial bodies. But the other elements are included in a cycle of transmutation that guarantees their perpetual existence. This is a benefit to them according to the axiom: it is better to exist than not exist. Thus, rainfall is a necessary and cyclical process (happening completely independently of the needs of living things), but it is also somehow benefits the elements that are transformed in the process, for in so doing they complete cycles that resemble or imitate the eternal cycles of the heavenly bodies.
Teleology and Organisms ii: Specific Explanations
Authors: Johnson Monte Ransome 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
Aristotle normally begins a teleological explanation of a living thing with an identification of its goods (reproduction, pleasure, intelligence, etc.). The existence of these goods implies certain requirements or “hypothetical necessity”. For example, if a fish is to survive and reproduce, it must be able to acquire food, which requires that it move, and so it must have fins, which in turn require tissues, and these must be composed of a certain combination of the elements. Some features of living things are not necessary for its survival, but only as a concomitant to some other necessity (for example the production of waste residua is a product of nutrition, but is not itself for the sake of something), or because it is better for the creature that way. The case of animal behavior shows that Aristotle does not indulge in anthropomorphism: apparently purposeful behavior (such as the weaving of webs by spiders, and the building of nests by birds) is not caused by deliberation. In fact, far from assimilating animal to human behavior, Aristotle goes the other direction and shows how many purposeful human activities (especially in the arts) happen without deliberation.
Teleology and Humans
Authors: Johnson Monte Ransome 
Published: February 2006

Abstract
Humans are capable of intentionally pursuing goals that they consciously set for themselves, and thus a different order of teleology applies to them, one which places them in the domain of ethics and politics. Every inquiry, art, and science has a goal, and they can broadly be classified into the productive-practical on the one hand, and the theoretical, on the other. Practical knowledge aims at practical goods by grasping causes for the sake of producing effects, while theoretical knowledge aims at grasping causes for the sake of knowledge itself, an intrinsic good. The ultimate good for a human can be identified by a process of elimination: whatever is the highest good for another kind of organism cannot be the unique good for this kind of thing, and so the end of human life cannot be nutrition, reproduction, growth, perception or pleasure, for these are the proper goods of other kinds of organisms. This leaves knowledge, in particular theoretical knowledge. It is argued that Aristotelian teleology cannot be anthropocentric, or else it would be impossible to identify the unique human good by elimination, and the activity of the final good for humans (contemplation and knowledge of causes) would have no real object.
The Case for Zombies
Authors: Kirk Robert 
Published: February 2006

AbstractThe definition of zombies is clarified, and the main arguments for the alleged possibility of zombies are examined. The ‘conceivability argument’ is influential: zombies are conceivable; whatever is conceivable is possible; therefore zombies are possible. Chalmers’s arguments for conceivability are given special attention, notably his use of Block’s homunculus-head; the apparent gap between physical information and facts about experiences; Jackson’s ‘knowledge argument’; and the argument from the ‘absence of analysis’. It is argued that none of the arguments is conclusive.
Zapping the Zombie Idea
Authors: Kirk Robert 
Published: February 2006

AbstractAlthough the zombie idea seems to fit in with some ‘natural and plain’ intuitions (Chalmers), it conflicts with others. Reinforced by the ‘jacket fallacy’, it both feeds on and feeds an incoherent conception of phenomenal consciousness. The ‘sole-pictures argument’ shows that a certain variety of epiphenomenalism is inconceivable in the relevant sense. Then it is argued that if zombies are conceivable, so is that kind of epiphenomenalism. If the reasoning is sound, the inconceivability of zombies follows. Among other corollaries of the main conclusion is that the idea of the inverted spectrum (transposed qualia) without physical differences is incoherent too.
Decision, Control, and Integration
Authors: Kirk Robert 
Published: February 2006

AbstractSome creatures are pretty obviously deciders, others obviously not; and there are indeterminate cases. This chapter considers some examples that are in various ways not straightforward. Discussing them helps to clarify the key notions involved in the basic package, especially those of ‘decision making’, ‘control’, and the ‘integration’ of basic-package capacities; and to sharpen the contrasts between deciders and other behaving systems. It also prepares the ground for the conclusion that the idea of the basic package raises no serious philosophical problems. Examples discussed include protozoa; bees; the human embryo, foetus, and neonate; the artificial giant; some machines described by Block; and the ‘machine-table robot’.