bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Certain predicates defined by induction schemata
Authors: Wang Hao 
Published: May 2006

It is known that we can introduce in number theory (for example, the system Z of Hilbert-Bernays) by induction schemata certain predicates of natural numbers which cannot be expressed explicitly within the framework of number theory. The question arises how we can define these predicates in some richer system, without employing induction schemata. In this paper a general notion of definability by induction (relative to number theory), which seems to apply to all the known predicates of this kind, is introduced; and it is proved that in a system L1 which forms an extension of number theory all predicates which are definable by induction (hereafter to be abbreviated d.i.) according to the definition are explicitly expressible.In order to define such predicates and prove theorems answering to their induction schemata, we have to allow certain impredicative classes in L1. However, if we want merely to prove that for each constant number the special case of the induction schema for a predicate d.i. is provable, we do not have to assume the existence of impredicative classes. A certain weaker system L2, in which only predicative classes of natural numbers are allowed, is sufficient for the purpose. It is noted that a truth definition for number theory can be obtained in L2. Consistency proofs for number theory do not seem to be formalizable in L2, although they can, it is observed, be formalized in L1.In general, given any ordinary formal system (say Zermelo set theory), it is possible to define by induction schemata, in the same manner as in number theory, certain predicates which are not explicitly definable in the system. Here again, by extending the system in an analogous fashion, these predicates become expressible in the resulting system. The crucial predicate instrumental to obtaining a truth definition for a given system is taken as an example.
Conditioned disjunction as a primitive connective for the erweiterter Aussagenkalkül
Authors: Rose Alan 
Published: May 2006

It has been shown that the conditioned disjunction function [X, Y, Z] with the same truth-table as (X & Y) ∨ (Z & ) together with the logical constants t and f, form a complete set of independent connectives for the 2-valued propositional calculus and that these connectives are self-dual. This has since been generalised to the theorem which states that the conditioned disjunction function [Y, X1, X2, …, Xm, Y] with the same truth-table as (X1 & J1(Y)) ∨ (X2 & J2(Y)) ∨ … ∨ (Xm & Jm(Y)) together with the logical constants 1, 2, …, m form a complete set of independent connectives for the m-valued propositional calculus and that these connectives are self-dual. It has been conjectured by Church that conditioned disjunction together with the universal and existential quantifiers form a complete set of independent connectives for the 2-valued erweiterter Aussagenkalkül. The object of the present paper is to prove a theorem for the m-valued erweiterter Aussagenkalkül which reduces, in the case m = 2, to the conjecture of Church. In the m-valued propositional calculus if the propositional variable X occurs as a free variable in the formula then (∃X) and (X) are read “there exists X such that ” and “for all X, ”, respectively. If for a given assignment of truth-values to the remaining free propositional variables occurring in , takes the truth-value f(x), where x is the truth-value of X, then (∃X) and (X) take the truth-values min (f(1), f(2), …, f(m)), max(f(1), f(2), …, f(m)), respectively. We shall prove:Theorem. The conditioned disjunction function, together with the universal and existential quantifiers, form a complete set of independent connectives for the m-valued erweiterter Aussagenkalkül.
Algebraische und logistische Untersuchungen über freie Verbände
Authors: Lorenzen Paul 
Published: May 2006

Die Verbandstheorie ist bekanntlich von Dedekind an Hand seiner idealtheoretischen Untersuchungen begründet worden. Es hat sich in letzter Zeit herausgestellt, daß die wesentliche Eigenschaft des Dedekind'schen Idealsystems darin liegt, daß die Ideale einen Halbverband (§1) bilden. Die Idealtheorie führt so auf die Frage nach alien Halbverbänden über einer beliebigen halbgeordneten Menge M. Die einfache Antwort enthält §2. Ebenso einfach ist die Frage nach alien distributiven Verbänden uber M zu beantworten. In beiden Fällen ist unter den Halbverbänden bzw. distributiven Verbänden über M einer dadurch ausgezeichnet, daß alle anderen homomorph zu ihm sind. Diesen ausgezeichneten Halbverband bzw. distributiven Verband nennen wir den freien Halbverband bzw. freien distributiven Verband über M.Zu neuen Fragen kommt man bei der Untersuchung speziellerer Halbverbände über M. Es ist z.B. bekannt, daß M stets zu einem vollständigen Boole'schen Verband erweitert werden kann. Gibt es unter diesen Erweiterungen stets den freien vollständigen Boole'schen Verband über M, der dadurch ausgezeichnet ist, daß alle anderen zu ihm homomorph sind ?In §3 wird zunächst die Existenz des freien orthokomplementären Halbverbandes über M bewiesen. Mit Hilfe der hier benutzten Methode läßt sich auch der Existenzbeweis für den freien abzählbar-vollständigen Boole'schen Verband über M führen.
On natural deduction
Authors: Quine W. V. 
Published: May 2006

For Gentzen's natural deduction, a formalized method of deduction in quantification theory dating from 1934, these important advantages may be claimed: it corresponds more closely than other methods of formalized quantification theory to habitual unformalized modes of reasoning, and it consequently tends to minimize the false moves involved in seeking to construct proofs. The object of this paper is to present and justify a simplification of Gentzen's method, to the end of enhancing the advantages just claimed. No acquaintance with Gentzen's work will be presupposed.A further advantage of Gentzen's method, also somewhat enhanced in my revision of the method, is relative brevity of proofs. In the more usual systematizations of quantification theory, theorems are derived from axiom schemata by proofs which, if rendered in full, would quickly run to unwieldy lengths. Consequently an abbreviative expedient is usually adopted which consists in preserving and numbering theorems for reference in proofs of subsequent theorems. Further brevity is commonly gained by establishing metatheorems, or derived rules, for reference in proving subsequent theorems. In natural deduction, on the other hand, proofs tend to be so short that the abbreviative expedients just now mentioned may conveniently be dispensed with—at least until theorems of extraordinary complexity are embarked upon. In natural deduction accordingly it is customary to start each argument from scratch, without benefit of accumulated theorems or derived rules.
Existence of classes and value specification of variables
Authors: Wang Hao 
Published: May 2006

In mathematics, when we want to introduce classes which fulfill certain conditions, we usually prove beforehand that classes fulfilling such conditions do exist, and that such classes are uniquely determined by the conditions. The statements which state such unicity and existence of classes are in mathematical logic consequences of the principles of extensionality and class existence. In order to illustrate how these principles enable us to introduce classes into systems of mathematical logic, let us consider the manner in which Gödel introduces classes in his book on set theory.For instance, before introducing the definition of the non-ordered pair of two classesGödel puts down as its justification the following two axioms:By A4, for every two classesyandzthere exists at least one non-ordered pairwof them; and by A3,wis uniquely determined in A4.
m-valued sub-system of (m + n)-valued propositional calculus
Authors: Hoo Tzu-Hua 
Published: May 2006

An (m + n)-valued propositional calculus2 may happen to be a subsystem of an m-valued propositional calculus , though the converse is never true. This fact may give us the impression that, as m grows, the content of becomes meagre. The present treatment is intended to remove this impression by constructing a complete, m-valued sub-system of any (m + n)-valued propositional calculus.In the following we adopt the customary, autonymous mode of speech according to which symbols belonging to the object calculi or languages are used in the syntactic language as names for themselves, and juxtaposition serves to denote juxtaposition.2.1 = df stands for definational identity in the syntactic language.2.11 ≡ stands for definational identity in the object calculi.2.2 ∊, ⊂, ∩, {x1, …, xn} are used in their meanings as customarily employed in the theory of sets—∊ for class membership, ⊂ for proper inclusion, ∩ for the product operation of classes, {x1, …, xn} for the class with x1, …, xn as its only elements.2.3 x, y, z are used as unspecified natural numbers including 0. m, n, i, j are used as unspecified natural numbers other than 0.2.401 Definition. δ = df as the function of two variables defined for any x, y such that2.41 Definition. For m ≧ 2, ιm = df the function of two variables denned on the set {0, …, m − 1} such that ιm (x, y) = y − x for x ≦ y and ιn(x, y) = 0 for x > y.
The formalization of mathematics
Authors: Wang Hao 
Published: May 2006

Zest for both system and objectivity is the formal logician's original sin. He pays for it by constant frustrations and by living ofttimes the life of an intellectual outcaste. The task of squeezing a large body of stubborn facts into a more or less rigid system can be a painful one, especially since the facts of mathematics are among the most stubborn of all facts. Moreover, the more general and abstract we get, the farther removed we are from the raw mathematical experience. As intuition ceases to operate effectively, we fall into many unexpected traps. The formal logician gets little sympathy for his frustrations. He is regarded as too rigid by his philosophical colleagues and too speculative by his mathematical friends. The life of an intellectual outcaste may be a result partly of temperament and partly of the youthfulness of the logic profession. The unfortunate lack of wide appeal of logic may, however, be prolonged partly on account of the fact that very little of the well-established techniques of mathematics seems applicable to the treatment of serious problems of logic.The axiomatic method is well suited to provide results which are both exact and systematic. How attractive would it be if we could get an axiom system in which all the axioms and deductions were intuitively clear and all theorems of mathematics were provable? Such a system would undoubtedly satisfy Descartes who admits solely intuition and deduction, which are, for him, the only “mental operations by which we are able, wholly without fear of illusion, to arrive at the knowledge of things.” Indeed, according to Descartes, intuition and deduction “are the most certain routes to knowledge, and the mind should admit no others. All the rest should be rejected as suspect of error and dangerous.”
Distributivity and an axiom of choice
Authors: Collins George E. 
Published: May 2006

In this paper a theorem will be established which states that a particular axiom of choice is equivalent to complete distributivity of union and intersection. The theorem will be formulated and proved in the system of logic of [4]. In addition to definitions of [4], the following will be used.In terms of these definitions, the theorem can be formulated as follows.The dual of this statement, obtained by interchanging I and U, is also a theorem and has a similar proof.
The consistency of the ramified Principia
Authors: Fitch Frederic B. 
Published: May 2006

When the axioms of infinity and choice are added to the system of logic of the second edition of Whitehead and Russell's Principia mathematica, and when, as in the second edition, the axiom of reducibility is omitted (so that the ramified nature of Russell's theory of types, especially his distinction between “orders,” is not in effect obliterated), the resulting system will hereafter be referred to as “the ramified Principia.” It will be shown that a certain system S, slightly stronger than the ramified Principia, is consistent, so that the ramified Principia itself is consistent. From Gödel's theorem it will then follow that the sort of mathematical induction employed in the consistency proof of S cannot be adequately handled within S or within the ramified Principia.The method of proving the consistency of S will be roughly as follows: A consistent non-constructive system S′ will be defined by means of induction with respect to a serial well-ordering of all the propositions of S. It will then be shown that every true proposition of S is a true proposition of S′, so that S must also be consistent.1. Preliminary conventions.1.1. Definition. By a “symbol” is to be understood any typographical expression which does not consist of a horizontal collinear sequence of expressions. Expressions formed by adding indices to either of the two upper or two lower corners of a symbol will also be considered symbols.
On the number of complete extensions of the Lewis systems of sentential calculus
Authors: McKinsey J. C. C. 
Published: May 2006

We say that a system S of sentential calculus is an extension of a system R, if R and S have the same class of (meaningful) sentences, and every provable sentence of R is also provable in S. If the two classes of provable sentences do not coincide, we call S a proper extension of R.By a complete system of sentential calculus is meant one which is itself consistent, but has no consistent proper extensions. Thus one cannot add a new independent primitive sentence to a complete system without obtaining an inconsistent system. The usual two-valued sentential calculus is complete in the sense defined.It has been shown by Lindenbaum that every incomplete system of sentential calculus possesses at least one complete extension. In this paper we shall examine how many complete extensions there are of some of the Lewis systems of sentential calculus. We shall show that there is only one complete extension of S4 (and hence also of S5, which is an extension of S4), and that there are infinitely many complete extensions of S2 (and hence also of S1, since S2 is an extension of S1). We leave open the question how many complete extensions there are of S3.
Proof of the independence of the primitive symbols of Heyting's calculus of propositions
Authors: McKinsey J. C. C. 
Published: May 2006

In this paper I shall show that no one of the four primitive symbols of Heyting's calculus of propositions is definable in terms of the other three. So as to make the paper self-contained, I begin by stating the rules and primitive sentences given by Heyting.The primitive symbols of the calculus are “⅂”, “∨”, “∧”, and “⊃”, which may be read, respectively, as “not,” “either…or,” “and,” and “if…then.” The symbol “⊃⊂”, which may be read “if and only if,” is defined in terms of these as follows:The rule of substitution is assumed, and the rule that S2 follows from S1 and S1⊃S2; in addition it is assumed that S1∧S2 follows from S1 and S2. The primitive sentences are as follows:
The hypothesis that infinite classes are similar
Authors: Fitch Frederic B. 
Published: May 2006

Let “the hypothesis of similarity” be the hypothesis that all infinite classes are similar (have the same power or cardinal number). It will be shown that the system of logic of Whitehead and Russell's Principia mathematica (without the axiom of reducibility) is consistent when to its axioms are added all the following:(1). The hypothesis of similarity.(2). The axiom of infinity.(3). The axiom of choice.(4). The contradictory of the axiom of reducibility.If (2) – (4) but not (1) are employed in Principia, it must therefore be the case that Cantor's theorem is not deducible, since it contradicts (1). If (2) and (3) but not (1) and (4) are employed, then a proof of Cantor's theorem must require the use of some sort of reducibility principle.The first step in the required consistency proof is to modify in certain respects the system S of a previous paper. Immediately after definition 3.5 the following definition is to be added:3.5.1. If a is of the form (b,c), where x is an S-variable and where b and c are S-constants neither of which is of higher order than that of x, then a is an S-proposition.
Arithmetical representation of recursively enumerable sets
Authors: Robinson Raphael M. 
Published: May 2006

A set S of natural numbers is called recursively enumerable if there is a general recursive function F(x, y) such thatIn other words, S is the projection of a two-dimensional general recursive set. Actually, it is no restriction on S to assume that F(x, y) is primitive recursive. If S is not empty, it is the range of the primitive recursive functionwhere a is a fixed element of S. Using pairing functions, we see that any non-empty recursively enumerable set is also the range of a primitive recursive function of one variable.We use throughout the logical symbols ⋀ (and), ⋁ (or), → (if…then…), ↔ (if and only if), ∧ (for every), and ∨(there exists); negation does not occur explicitly. The variables range over the natural numbers, except as otherwise noted.Martin Davis has shown that every recursively enumerable set S of natural numbers can be represented in the formwhere P(y, b, w, x1 …, xλ) is a polynomial with integer coefficients. (Notice that this would not be correct if we replaced ≤ by <, since the right side of the equivalence would always be satisfied by b = 0.) Conversely, every set S represented by a formula of the above form is recursively enumerable. A basic unsolved problem is whether S can be defined using only existential quantifiers.
On ω-inconsistency and a so-called axiom of infinity
Authors: Quine W. V. 
Published: May 2006

The purpose of the present paper is to dispel such mystery as may be traceable to use of the ill-chosen term ‘ω-inconsistency’ and to a certain application of the term ‘axiom of infinity’. The application of ‘axiom of infinity’ which I have in mind is made by Rosser in his penetrating studies of the system of my New foundations. Let me begin with a synopsis of that system, which I shall call NF.NF assumes as primitive just the membership connective ‘ϵ’, the truth functions, and quantification over a single style of variables ‘x’, ‘y’, etc. without type distinctions. The axioms, superimposed on standard quantification theory, comprise the axiom of extensionality ‘(x)(x ϵ y · = · x ϵ z) · y ϵ w · ⊃· z ϵ w’ and the axioms of abstraction, these latter being all sentences of the form ‘(∃y)(x)(x ϵ y · = Fx)’ in which the sentence supplanting ‘Fx’ is stratified (i.e., adaptable to type theory by some assignment of types to variables).
Some proofs of independence in axiomatic set theory
Authors: Mendelson Elliott 
Published: May 2006

1. Gödel's theorem that sufficiently strong formal systems cannot prove their own consistency and Tarski's method for constructing truth-definitions can be combined to give several independence results in axiomatic set theory. In substance, the following theorems can be obtained: (a) The existence of inaccessible ordinals is not provable from the axioms of set theory, if these axioms are consistent, (b) The axiom of infinity is independent of the other axioms, if these other axioms are consistent, (c) The axiom of replacement is independent of the other axioms, if these other axioms are consistent. In all cases, V = L will be included as an axiom.The result (a) concerning inaccessible ordinals already has been proved in Shepherdson [10] and Mostowski [6], but their proofs are somewhat different from the one given here. According to Mostowski [6], Kuratowski essentially had a proof of (a) in 1924. Propositions (b) and (c) have been proved, for axiomatic set theory without the axiom V = L, by Bernays [1] pp. 65–69. The method of proof used in this paper is due to Firestone and Rosser [2].An outline of a similar proof along these lines is given in Rosser [7] pp. 60–62.As our system G of set theory, we choose Gödel's system A, B, C, as given in [4], except for the following changes.
A further consistent extension of basic logic
Authors: Fitch Frederic B. 
Published: May 2006

1.1. In two previous papers a consistent theory of real numbers has been outlined by the author, using a system K′. This latter system is an extension of a system K, which is “basic” in the sense that every finitary (recursively enumerable) subclass of its well-formed expressions is in a certain sense represented in it. The system L described below is a further extension of K. The system K′ lacks two important features possessed by L: a symbol for a special kind of implication (or “conditionality”) and a symbol for the modal concept “necessity.” The presence of the implication symbol, and the additional assumptions that go with it, make available in L various kinds of restricted universal quantification not available in K′, for example, universal quantification restricted to the real numbers of the author's theory of real numbers.1.2. If ‘~[a & ~a]’ is a theorem of L, then the proposition expressed by ‘a’ may be said to L-satisfy the principle of excluded middle. I t is always the case that ‘a’ L-satisfies the principle of excluded middle (or rather that the proposition expressed by ‘a’ does so) if and only if ‘a’ or ‘~a’ is a theorem of L. An example of a proposition that does not L-satisfy the principle of excluded middle is that expressed by ‘’, namely the proposition that asserts that the class of classes that are not members of themselves is a member of itself.
A note on nominalistic syntax
Authors: Martin R. M. 
Published: May 2006

In this note two independent comments are offered concerning nominalistic syntax.If one has a nominalistic theory of natural numbers (or positive integers) at one's disposal, one can of course readily formulate a nominalistic syntax by the familiar method of arithmetization. A nominalistic theory of natural numbers is formulated in a previous paper by the author, and thus a basis for a nominalistic syntax is already provided. (The objection that this theory is infinitistic would appear without force, because it provides the only known nominalistic basis for the theory of general recursive functions. On a finitistic basis one merely throws out this vital domain of mathematical theory.)The second comment is concerned with nominalistic syntax as formulated by Goodman and Quine. The nominalistic construction of natural numbers alluded to above owes much of its power to a primitive device of ancestral quantification. This device is somewhat more powerful than the notions Goodman and Quine allow themselves. Now nominalistic syntax in their somewhat narrower sense can be formulated by utilizing a relation akin to the relation L of the theory of ordered individuals developed elsewhere by the author. ‘L’ here is to designate the relation between inscriptions of being wholly to the left of.The Goodman-Quine primitive ‘C’, designating a relation of concatenation, and their primitive ‘Part’ with its field confined to inscriptions, can be defined in terms of ‘L’. Thus:.(This definition is essentially that of ‘P’ in O.I.)