bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science
Authors: Mullins Willard A. 
Published: May 2006

Although the term “ideology” is ubiquitous in modern political discourse, it is used in diverse and usually ambiguous ways which limit its value as an analytical concept. The main ambiguity arises from the fact that, as most writers use it, the concept of ideology does not provide criteria for distinguishing ideological thought from nonideological thought. Lacking this power to make concrete discriminations, the concept fails to achieve empirical relevance. This paper attempts to remedy that deficiency and save the concept of ideology for the explanation of politics.The problem of conceptualization is approached by viewing ideology primarily as a cultural phenomenon. As such, it is argued, ideology has characteristics that distinguish it from other symbol systems. Of special importance in this regard is the identification of basic differentia between ideology on the one hand, and myth and Utopia (with which ideology is often confused) on the other. The features of ideology identified in this comparative analysis are then discussed in fuller detail with a view to understanding (1) the significance of ideology in politics, and (2) the way in which the concept of ideology can help us to understand politics, insofar as politics involves ideology.
A Research Note on Machine Politics as a Model for Change in a Philippine Province
Authors: Benson Louis P. 
Published: May 2006

The purpose of this research note was to determine whether Philippine politics could be characterized as fitting a “machine politics model” (James Scott, “Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Development, APSR, 63 [December, 1969], 1142–1158). A province was selected which matched the criteria cited in Scott's model, and provincial political leaders and subleaders were asked to evaluate important considerations they used in deciding whom to support for public office.Scott proposed that in electoral political systems, support moves from a dependence on deference to a dependence on particularistic rewards, and finally to dependence on ideology. Part of the study tested the three-phase model using factor analysis on ten variables generally thought to be crucial in Philippine politics. The factor analysis revealed six factors, three which matched Scott's three phases plus: the chance of winning, the use of threats, and party loyalty. Although Scott's three-phase model was rejected as inadequate, at the descriptive level the general attributes of machine politics (particularly as Philippine politics has moved from a reliance on deference and personal loyalty to a dependence on material reward) could be used to characterize Philippine politics.
The Political Psychology of Religion in Plato's Laws
Authors: Pangle Thomas L. 
Published: May 2006

This paper explains Plato's conception of the relation between politics and “political religion” (ideology) in a nonliberal participatory republican system. The discussion is in the form of a commentary on the drama of a part of Plato's Laws. The underlying methodological assumption is that Plato presented his political teaching not so much through the speeches as through the drama of the dialogue, and that he held this to be the most appropriate form for political science because in this way political science can most effectively stimulate thought about its subject matter, the psyche involved in social action.Following Plato, we focus first on the psychological needs such a political system generates and attempts to satisfy through civil religion. We then move to a consideration of how political “theology” serves to mediate between science and society, or the philosopher and the city.The essay is intended to contribute to the Montesquieuian project engaging the attention of more and more political theorists: the endeavor to help contemporary political science and psychology escape from the trammeling parochialism of exclusive attention to twentieth century theoretical categories and empirical experiences.
An Interorganizational Analysis of Power, Conflict, and Settlements in Public Sector Collective Bargaining
Authors: Perry James L. , Levine Charles H. 
Published: May 2006

Despite increased interest in public sector collective bargaining, a survey of recent attempts to build theory about the dynamics and outcomes of union-management negotiations in public organizations reveals that little progress has been made. One approach that appears fruitful is interorganizational analysis. In an interorganizational context, organizations interact with other autonomous organizations to make joint decisions that have implications for both parties and for the larger system. This study focuses on five interorganizational variables that are useful for understanding the collective bargaining process in the public sector: (1) goal divergence; (2) stability of the relationship; (3) organizational dependence; (4) conflictual behavior; (5) contractual change.From these theoretical concepts, five propositions are derived which serve as the basis for the research hypotheses. The hypotheses were tested on a sample of 60 cases drawn from a population of 535 collective bargaining negotiations in New York City from 1968 through 1972. The test of the research hypotheses resulted in these conclusions: (1) a substantial amount of the conflictual behavior in public sector collective bargaining is explained by goal divergence, stability of the relationship, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations; and (2) contractual change is explained by goal divergence, conflictual behavior, and asymmetry of relative dependence favoring one of the organizations.
Four Theories in Search of a Reality: James Burnham, Soviet Communism, and the Cold War
Authors: Diggins John F. 
Published: May 2006

Right-wing and Left-wing attitudes toward the cold war are strikingly similar because in some cases the anti-communist is himself an ex-communist. This is particularly true of James Burnham, a former disciple of Leon Trotsky and presently the diplomatic columnist of William F. Buckley's National Review. Burnham's writings have had profound influence in America, especially at the time of the outbreak of the Korean War when officials in Washington saw in his books both an answer to “containment” and the first theoretical formulation of the new policy of “liberation-rollback.”Burnham's own views on the cold war, however, have undergone a number of significant changes and revisions. At different times in his career he has offered four different and often contradictory interpretations of communism: (a) first, the Soviet Union as a “managerial” state that marks the end of Trotsky's dream of “permanent revolution”; (b) next, communism as the latest expression of Machiavellianism that augers the eclipse of liberal democracy and seemingly the inevitability of Stalin; (c) then, during the early cold war period, managerialism and Machiavellianism are dropped and Soviet behavior is now attributed to a Marxist Weltanschauung that replaces power politics with ideological determinism; (d) finally, Burnham criticizes Kennan, Morgenthau, and Lippmann for failing to adopt a “dialectical” viewpoint in order to understand the “dual” nature of the Soviet Union-an ironic reinvocation of Trotsky's earlier message to the Old Left.The article attempts a critical analysis both of Burnham's shifting perspectives and of the ethical dilemmas in his political thought. It may also be read as a chapter in the intellectual history of the cold war.
Types of Primary and Party Responsibility
Authors: Telford Ira Ralph 
Published: May 2006

A chief criticism of the American party system is the lack of party responsibility. In the view of some students, one characteristic of our political system that contributes to this irresponsibility is the practice in some states of allowing individuals to vote in primaries without regard to their partisan allegiances. In such an open primary Republicans may, if they wish, vote in the Democratic primary, and vice versa. The contrasting, and more common, practice is the closed primary, in which participation is restricted to party “members.” Some political scientists think that the closed primary, by subjecting legislators to the presumed discipline of periodic scrutiny by their party's members, induces a greater measure of party regularity than the open primary, in which the official has to satisfy a more motley clientele. This position was taken in the best-known statement of the “party government” school, the 1950 report of the APS A Committee on Political Parties:The closed primary deserves preference because it is more readily compatible with the development of a responsible party system…. on the other hand, the open primary tends to destroy the concept of membership as the basis of party organization.Other political scientists have expressed doubts about this presumed relationship between primaries and party responsibility, but there has been no systematic empirical evidence on the point. This paper will examine the relationship between primaries and party responsibility by comparing the party regularity of senators from open primary and closed primary states.
Über ω-Unvollständigkeit in der Peano-Arithmetik
Authors: Hasenjaeger G. 
Published: May 2006

Unter der Peano-Arithmetik verstehe ich im Folgenden eine über dem Prädikatenkalkül der ersten Stufe formalisierte Arithmetik der natürlichen Zahlen, in der als außerlogische Konstanten nur Symbole für die Null, die Nachfolgeroperation und die Gleichheitsbeziehung (die als mathematischer Grundbegriff aufgefaßt wird) vorkommen.Ein Ausdruck H(c), in dem c die einzige freie Variable ist, heiße: ∀-defekt in Bezug auf ein (deduktives) System S, wenn (a) für jede Ziffer , und (b) nicht ∀xH(x) ϵ S.Im allgemeinen wird das deduktive System durch ein Axiomensystem in Verbindung mit einer Syntax gegeben sein. Auf diesen Fall soil die Redeweise sinngemäß übertragen werden.Ein System S heiße ω-unvollständig, wenn es einen in Bezug auf S ∀-defekten Ausdruck gibt.Ein Axiomensystem A heiße kategorisch, wenn beliebige absolute Modelle (s. Abschnitt IV) von A isomorph sind.Die Kategorizität stellt eine gewisse Vollständigkeit des Axiomensystems dar. Daß solche Axiomensysteme ω-unvollstandig sein können (bzw. im Fall der ausdrucksreicheren Arithmetik nach Gödel sogar müssen), ist eben das Überraschende.Ich werde im Folgenden für zwei kategorische Axiomensysteme der Peano-Arithmetik die ω-Unvollständigkeit in Bezug auf die Prädikatenlogik der ersten Stufe nachweisen. In beiden Fallen gelingt der Nachweis der ω-Unvollständigkeit durch Diskussion eines ∀-defekten Ausdrucks H(c).
Eine Bemerkung zu Henkin's Beweis für die Vollständigkeit des Prädikatenkalküls der ersten Stufe
Authors: Hasenjaeger G. 
Published: May 2006

Im Folgenden wird eine Vereinfachung der Beweisanordnung für Henkin's Theorem [2] p. 162 angegeben (Abschnitt I). – Die Vereinfachung zeigt sich u.a. darin, daß für den abgeänderten Beweis eine Abschätzung der “projektiven Klasse” (im Sinne der Kleene-Mostowski'schen Theorie der projektiven Mengen von natürlichen Zahlen) für das zu konstruierende Modell gelingt (Abschnitte II–IV). Die Kenntnis der Henkin'schen Arbeit wird vorausgesetzt.Um eine maximale widerspruchsfreie Menge Γω von geschlossenen Formeln, in der zu jeder Existenzaussage (∃x)A(x) eine Beispielaussage A(uij) vorhanden ist, zu erhalten, führt Henkin einen Turm von Kalkülen S0, S1, …, Si, … und dessen Vereinigung Sω ein. Abwechselnd wird dann die gegebene Menge von Formeln in Si zu einer maximalen widerspruchsfreien Menge Γi erweitert und in Si+1 durch Hinzunahme von Beispielaussagen für alle Existenzaussagen aus Γi ergänzt, für die das nicht schon in einem früheren Schritt geschehen ist. Γω ist dann die Vereinigung aller Γi.Die Vereinfachung besteht nun darin, daß – nach Erweiterung von S0 zu einem Kalkül S* durch Hinzunahme einer einfachen Folge u1, u2, … von “neuen” Konstanten – in S* zu jeder Existenzaussage eine bedingte Beispielaussage gebildet wird. K sei die Klasse dieser Aussagen, Λ die gegebene widerspruchsfreie Menge; dann wird Λ* = K ◡ Λ in S* einmal zu einer maximalen widerspruchsfreien Menge ergänzt.Unter Verwendung der Standard-Anordnung aller geschlossenen Formeln von S* erhalten wir für diejenigen von der Form (∃x)A(x) eine Aufzählung (∃x)Ai(x), dazu eine Indexfolge ji (i =1, 2, …), definiert durch:
Strong completeness of fragments of the propositional calculus
Authors: Rose Alan 
Published: May 2006

There has recently been developed a method of formalising any fragment of the propositional calculus, subject only to the condition that material implication is a primitive function of the fragmentary system considered. Tarski has stated, without proof, that when implication is the only primitive function a formulation which is weakly complete (i.e., has as theorems all expressible tautologies) is also strongly complete (i.e., provides for the deduction of any expressible formula from any which is not a tautology). The methods used by Henkin suggest the following proof of theTheorem. If in a fragment of the propositional calculus material implication can be defined in terms of the primitive functions, then any weakly complete formalisation of the fragmentary system which has for rules of procedure the substitution rule and modus ponens is also strongly complete.
Steps toward a constructive nominalism
Authors: Goodman Nelson , Quine W. V. 
Published: May 2006

We do not believe in abstract entities. No one supposes that abstract entities—classes, relations, properties, etc.— exist in space-time; but we mean more than this. We renounce them altogether.We shall not forego all use of predicates and other words that are often taken to name abstract objects. We may still write ‘x is a dog,’ or ‘x is between y and z’; for here ‘is a dog’ and ‘is between … and’ can be construed as syncate-gorematic: significant in context but naming nothing. But we cannot use variables that call for abstract objects as values. In ‘x is a dog,’ only concrete objects are appropriate values of the variable. In contrast, the variable in ‘x is a zoölogical species’ calls for abstract objects as values (unless, of course, we can somehow identify the various zoological species with certain concrete objects). Any system that countenances abstract entities we deem unsatisfactory as a final philosophy.
On relations as coextensive with classes
Authors: Quine W. V. 
Published: May 2006

In a previous note I showed a new way to define the ordered pair. I made use of the notations ‘Nn’ (for class of natural numbers) and ‘Sv’ (for successor of v), remarking that they are readily defined without appeal to ordered pairs or relations. Adopting the auxiliary abbreviation:
I defined the ordered pair thus:
On ordered pairs
Authors: Quine W. V. 
Published: May 2006

Wiener, in 1914, reduced the theory of relations to that of classes by construing relations as classes of ordered pairs and defining the ordered pair in turn on the basis of class theory alone.1 The definition, as improved by Kuratowski,2 identifies the ordered pair x;y with uxyi(ix U iy).In terms of Russell's theory of types, x;y in the above sense is two types higher than x and y. Even when we abandon Russell's theory of fixed types of objects in favor of a theory of stratified formulae,3 there is still significance in saying that ‘x;y’ is of type 2 relative to ‘x’ and ‘y’—meaning that a test of the stratification of any context involves assigning a higher number by 2 to ‘x;y’ than to ‘x’ and ‘y’.
Quantification theory and empty individual-domains
Authors: Hailperin Theodore 
Published: May 2006

In a recent paper by Mostowski [1] we find an investigation of those formulas of quantification theory which are valid in all domains of individuals, including the empty domain. Mostowski gives a complete set of axioms for such a first order functional calculus (the system is called “”) and a comparison is made with a form of the usual calculus, Church's in [2]. It is pointed out that is much less elegant; in particular, the distributivity laws for quantifiers (e.g., (x){A . B) .{x)A . (x)B) do not hold in general, and likewise the rule of modus ponens does not preserve validity in all cases.In this paper we show that a not inelegant system is obtained if one modifies Mostowski's approach in two respects; and once this is done a somewhat neater proof of completeness can be given.The first respect in which we diverge from Mostowski is in the treatment of vacuous quantifiers. For him if p has no free x, then (x)p and (∃x)p are both to have the same value (interpretation) as p1. But this is not the only way to assign values to vacuous quantifications. For when universal quantification is viewed as a generalized conjunction, the formula (x)Fx has the significance of Fa . Fb…. for as many conjunctands as there are individuals in the domain, and if Fx should have the “constant” value p, then (x)p is to mean the conjunction of p with itself for as many times as there are individuals in the domain (compare the arithmetical ).
Banishing the rule of substitution for functional variables
Authors: Henkin Leon 
Published: May 2006

Let and be (well-formed) formulas of the functional calculus, let c be an n-adic functional variable, and let a1, …, an be distinct individual variables. Church has defined the metalogical notation to indicate the formula resulting from when each part of of the form c{1, …, n) (such that the occurrence of c is free in ) is replaced by the formula which arises from by replacing every free occurrence of ai by i, i, = 1, …, n. (Here 1, …, n may be any individual variables or constants, not necessarily all distinct.) The notation is not defined for all , , c, a1, …, an, however, but only for those cases (specified in detail by Church) when the resulting formula constitutes a valid substitution instance of the formula according to the standard interpretation of the functional calculus.The full and correct syntactical statement of the conditions (under which this type of substitution is permissible) has proved so arduous, that it seems to have been rendered in error more often than not. Unfortunately the functional calculi are often set up as deductive systems in which this type of substitution occurs as one of the primitive rules of inference, or in one of the axiom schemata. Thus the beginning student who is introduced to the calculi through such a formulation is forced to cope from the outset with details which have proved treacherous even to the initiate. For this reason it is desirable to seek alternative formulations of the functional calculi in which this type of substitution is not mentioned.
A relative consistency proof
Authors: Shoenfield Joseph R. 
Published: May 2006

LetCbe an axiom system formalized within the first order functional calculus, and letC′ be related toCas the Bernays-Gödel set theory is related to the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. (An exact definition ofC′ will be given later.) Ilse Novak [5] and Mostowski [8] have shown that, ifCis consistent, thenC′ is consistent. (The converse is obvious.) Mostowski has also proved the stronger result that any theorem ofC′ which can be formalized inCis a theorem ofC.The proofs of Novak and Mostowski do not provide a direct method for obtaining a contradiction inCfrom a contradiction inC′. We could, of course, obtain such a contradiction by proving the theorems ofCone by one; the above result assures us that we must eventually obtain a contradiction. A similar process is necessary to obtain the proof of a theorem inCfrom its proof inC′. The purpose of this paper is to give a new proof of these theorems which provides a direct method of obtaining the desired contradiction or proof.The advantage of the proof may be stated more specifically by arithmetizing the syntax ofCandC′.
The Sheffer functions of 3-valued logic
Authors: Martin Norman M. 
Published: May 2006

In previous papers, Post, Webb, Götlind and the present author have described some Sheffer functions (in Swift's terminology, “independent binary generators”) in m-valued logic. Professor J. Dean Swift has recently isolated the symmetric Sheffer functions of 3-valued logic. In the present paper, we will prove some properties of Sheffer functions in m-valued logic and isolate all of the Sheffer functions of 3-valued logic.Before we proceed we will define some terms which we will find convenient. A set of functions in m-valued logic is functionally complete, if the set of the functions which can be defined explicitly from the functions of the set is exactly the set of all functions of m-valued logic. A function is functionally complete, if its unit set is functionally complete. A Sheffer function is a two-place functionally complete function. If i and j are truth values (1 i, j ≤ m), we will say i ~ j (D), if D is a decomposition of the truth values 1, …, m into 2 or more disjoint non-empty classes and i and j are elements of the same class. A binary function f(p, q) satisfies the substitution law for a decomposition D, if for any truth values h, i, j, k, whenever h ~ j (D) and i~k(D), then f(h, i) ~ f(j, k) (D). The function f(p,q) satisfies the co-substitution law for D, if for any truth values h, i, j, k, whenever f(h, i) ~ f(j, k) (D), then h ~ j (D) or i ~ k (D). We will say f(p, q) has the proper substitution property, if there is a decomposition of the truth values into less than m classes for which it satisfies the substitution law.
Computability and λ-definability
Authors: Turing A. M. 
Published: May 2006

Several definitions have been given to express an exact meaning corresponding to the intuitive idea of ‘effective calculability’ as applied for instance to functions of positive integers. The purpose of the present paper is to show that the computable functions introduced by the author are identical with the λ-definable functions of Church and the general recursive functions due to Herbrand and Gödel and developed by Kleene. It is shown that every λ-definable function is computable and that every computable function is general recursive. There is a modified form of λ-definability, known as λ-K-definability, and it turns out to be natural to put the proof that every λ-definable function is computable in the form of a proof that every λ-K-definable function is computable; that every λ-definable function is λ-K-definable is trivial. If these results are taken in conjunction with an already available proof that every general recursive function is λ-definable we shall have the required equivalence of computability with λ-definability and incidentally a new proof of the equivalence of λ-definability and λ-K-definability.A definition of what is meant by a computable function cannot be given satisfactorily in a short space. I therefore refer the reader to Computable pp. 230–235 and p. 254. The proof that computability implies recursiveness requires no more knowledge of computable functions than the ideas underlying the definition: the technical details are recalled in §5.