bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Investment in salvage equipment
Authors: Mangiameli Paul M. , Rhee S. Ghon , Tannous George F. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractManufacturers are faced with three options for disposing of excess finished items: they can (1) continue to mark down the item until it sells; (2) dispose of or scrap it; or (3) salvage it in order to reclaim valuable raw materials and components. In many situations the option of a markdown is not viable, thus the choice is to either scrap or salvage. Although many manufacturers have invested in salvage equipment, they have not deduced the impact of this investment as it affects not only the risk‐adjusted value of the project but also the production run size and the selling price. Hence, their decisions frequently turn out to be suboptimal. This paper develops a project‐valuation model that adds a new dimension to traditional capital budgeting decisions by incorporating salvage capacity.
Technical efficiency of for‐profit and non‐profit nursing homes
Authors: Fizel John L. , Nunnikhoven Thomas S. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThis paper employs data envelopment analysis to generate efficiency indices for individual nursing homes relative to a best‐practice frontier. Further analysis then shows that these ‘unadjusted’ indices represent factors other than efficiency. Regression analysis purges the indices of these confounding influences. The resulting ‘adjusted’ efficiency indices demonstrate that for‐profit homes have higher mean levels of efficiency and a more efficient production frontier than non‐profit homes. These results support the property rights hypothesis that forprofit homes are inherently more efficient than non‐profit ones.
Effective patent life of drugs in Sweden—a comparison with international studies
Authors: Andersson F. , Hertzmant P. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThe effective patent life of all pharmaceutical New Chemical Entities registered in Sweden was investigated for the period 1965‐88. Three‐year moving average effective patent life was 12.3 years in the beginning of the period, while by the end of the period it had decreased to 8.3 years. If we exclude the increase in the nominal patent term which accompanied Sweden's entry into the European Patent Convention, the effective patent life decreases over the period by over 3 months per year. This coincides with the results of similar studies in other countries. If European research‐oriented Pharmaceuticals companies are to maintain their international long‐term competitiveness, patent term restoration measures appear to be urgently needed.
Quasi‐cournot behavior in a multimarket, multiplant setting
Authors: Zappe Christopher , Horowitz Ira 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThis paper introduces multimarket selling options, capacity constraints and quasi‐Cournot conjectures into oligopolistic rivalry. It is shown that increased output responses between rivals that are producing below capacity will effect output reductions for all markets, but that increased output responses between rivals that are producing at capacity will effect an output increase in at least one market and might even result in a capacity extension and output increases in all markets.
The use of initial fees and royalties in business‐format franchising
Authors: Sen Kabir C. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThis paper provides an explanation of franchising's fee structure, drawing on principal agency and labor economics theory. The predictive framework includes constructs such as channel control, franchisor services, franchisee risk and the franchisor's capital constraints. The empirical investigation of a representative sample of franchise chains indicates that channel control is the major factor influencing the payment design. The results are used to test managerial implications about the use of an optimal fee structure in the growth of chains.
Strategic pricing of differentiated consumer durables in a dynamic duopoly: A numerical analysis
Authors: Nascimento Fernando , Vanhonacker Wilfried R. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractUnder different modes of competitive pricing behavior, profit‐maximizing price trajectories are derived for durable products in a dynamic duopoly. Open‐loop co‐operative and non‐cooperative pricing behavior is analyzed within a comprehensive model where sales of differentiated products are described by interlocked diffusion processes with realistic demand characteristics. Because of analytic complexity, the optimal trajectories implied by the control and differential‐game problems are derived numerically across an extensive set of plausible market scenarios. Manipulation of initial market conditions enables derivation of optimal competitive pricing as a function of timing of entry.
Customer perception and competitive quality strategy
Authors: Ali Abdul , Seshadri Sudhindra 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThe objective of this paper is to determine the optimum level of quality a firm should choose in a product/service, given the customers‘ perceptions of quality and the reference standard in a competitive market. Our work on this quality selection problem differs from those of past researchers in that we model explicitly customer's perceptions and the reference standard. We develop a game‐theoretic model to obtain insights into the firms’ quality selection problem. The model results suggest that the market differentially provides rewards or penalties to firms depending upon customers' perceptions as well as other market and product‐specific parameters. We contrast our findings for an oligopolist with that for a monopolist and observe that although an oligopolist often provides a better quality product, he does not do so always; especially when perceptions are sufficiently weak and the reference standard is endogenous.
Three‐parameter asset pricing
Authors: Diacogiannis George P. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThis paper expands the two‐parameter (that is, mean‐variance) linear model for the behaviour of returns on securities or portfolios into a model that takes into consideration the skewness of return distributions. As in the case of previous two‐parameter relationships, the three‐parameter risk‐return relationship is valid if and only if the reference portfolio is a three‐parameter boundary portfolio.
Operational competitiveness ratings of production units
Authors: Parkan Celik 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThe operational competitiveness of a production unit (PU) where resources are transformed into outputs of goods and services is a very important component of its overall competitiveness. A PU's operations are comprised of a number of purposeful activities that consume resources and generate rewards. The efficiency with which these activities are carried out determines the PU's operational competitiveness. A reliable rating system is prerequisite in order to control and improve operational competitiveness. In the present paper we adopt a multi‐activity view of the concept of operational competitiveness and develop a procedure to calculate ratings to help gauge the relative operational competitiveness of a set of PUs. The procedure is based on a nonparametric model but its implementation involves simple ratio‐type computations. The principal criteria for the procedure and the ratings resulting from its application are intuitive appeal, transparency, ease of computation, robustness and ability to reflect the prevailing managerial perspectives and competitive priorities. We demonstrate the application of the procedure to gauge the relative operational competitiveness of a major chartered bank's branch personnel.
Consumers' surplus and the demand for cigarettes
Authors: Reekie W. Duncan 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThis paper examines the demand for cigarettes in South Africa over a 20‐year period from 1970 to 1989. Consumption per capita was found to be significantly determined by price and disposable income per capita; but not by advertising. Price and income elasticities and consumers' surplus were computed from the demand model. The question was raised as to whether or not consumers' surplus should be regarded as having been inferred from a health‐hazard‐discounted demand schedule. The answer depends on the degree to which smoking decisions are taken with full information or, conversely, are influenced by habit. Given the latter assumption, the consumers' surplus measured for cigarette consumption is nevertheless substantially higher than the estimated health costs of smoking as computed by the Medical Research Council.
The impact of corporate strategy on the capital structure of Australian companies
Authors: Lowe Julian , Naughton Tony , Taylor Peter 
Published: June 2007

AbstractResearch into the capital structure of firms has been the subject of extensive empirical investigation but further progress may be constrained by the conventional paradigm underlying most of this work. This paper seeks to extend the debate by examining the endogenous influence of corporate strategy on financing decisions made by firms. While the theoretical specification of the possible relationship has to be developed further, various models were constructed and company data from Australia, an economy with some notoriety for fairly loose corporate debt management, was used to examine various hypothesized relationships. Our analysis suggests that corporate strategy influences capital structure, particularly for the most diversified firms, and that the emerging relationship is complex. Profit, cash flow, the rate of growth and the level of earnings risk are important additional internal influences on capital structure. The results are reasonably robust and indicate that this focus of enquiry has considerable potential for further resolution of the capital structure puzzle, as well as contributing to the debate on the impact of institutional shareholders on the corporate strategy of the firms in which they invest.
Firm‐diversification effects on performance as measured by tobin's q
Authors: Lloyd William P. , Jahera John S. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThe performance effects of firm diversification remain unclear despite a large body of prior research that has yielded mixed results due to differing performance measures, diversification measures, samples and time periods. The objective of this research is to offer further information by using Tobin's q to capture performance effects and Rumelt's related ratio as the diversification measure. The empirical results reveal no significant findings to relate diversification and performance. Given that the sample is composed of very large firms, the implication is that, at least for such large firms whose stock is likely held in well‐diversified portfolios, firm‐diversification strategies are unlikely to yield superior performance.
Multidivisional structure and capital structure: The contingency of diversification strategy
Authors: Riahi‐Belkaoui Ahmed , Bannister James W. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThis study examines the relationship between the implementation of the multidivisional (M‐form) organizational structure, capital structure and diversification strategy. Findings indicate that implementation of the M‐form structure from a hierarchical (U‐form) structure is associated with a general increase in the long‐term debt‐to‐equity ratio for all firms, a result that supports a free‐cash‐flow argument for the use of debt in restructuring to reduce the opportunism of management. Further, as implied by arguments from transaction cost economics, the debt‐to‐equity ration differs for different types of diversification strategy.
How do large minority shareholders wield control?
Authors: Butz David A. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractWhile high ownership concentrations in even the largest American corporations provide prima facie evidence that large minority shareholders wield control, the economics and finance literatures have mostly overlooked the question of how they do so. Using a simple framework adapted from work by Shleifer and Vishny (1986), this paper shows how minority shareholders can use takeover threats to discipline management. It then shows how they can bolster their threats, and hence their influence, simply by threatening to increase these minority stakes. When inside information is not too problematic, a relatively small stake can endow minority shareholders with considerable ongoing control.
An empirical analysis of the corporate control, tax and incentive motivations for adopting leveraged employee stock ownership plans
Authors: Beatty Anne 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThis paper examines three motivations for leveraged ESOP adoption: as a takeover defense, as a mechanism for providing incentives to employees and as a vehicle for tax savings. ESOP adoption is more likely for companies with a higher predicted probability of takeover, but ESOP adopters have many characteristics that are different from takeover targets. Companies that adopt ESOPs can be distinguished from non‐adopting companies based on characteristics associated with the tax and incentive effects of these plans. The size of the ESOP is shown to depend primarily on the tax and incentive characteristics.
Shareholder wealth effects when an officer of one corporation joins the board of directors of another
Authors: Rosenstein Stuart , Wyatt Jeffrey G. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractOfficers of large corporations, having demonstrated expertise in managing complex organizations, would appear to be ideal additions to the boards of directors of other corporations. Shareholder wealth effects are examined for 124 announcements in which an officer of one public corporation joins the board of directors of another. The results indicate that the values of nonfinancial firms that send directors to other firms decline significantly, while those of financial senders increase significantly. Receiving firms of both types do not gain. The results suggest that for nonfinancial firms the added duties of an outside directorship distract corporate officers from managing their own firms or are signals to the market that managers are available to other firms. For financial senders, the benefits of networking appear to strongly outweigh any drawbacks. Cross‐sectional regressions suggest that prediction errors are higher for receiving firms if they have performed poorly prior to the announcement and less negative for sending firms if they have performed well prior to the announcement. Abnormal returns are negatively related to the size of the sender, adding support for the notion that busy executives are less valuable as outside directors.
Evidence on the effects of hostile and friendly tender offers on employment
Authors: Denis Diane Kowalski 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThis paper provides evidence on the effects of successful tender offers on the number of target and acquiring firm employees. No significant change in combined employment is observed, on average, over the three‐year period following offer completion. However, hostile tender offers completed between 1980 and 1984 are followed by an average 17.2% decline in employment. Net divestitures of operations over the period are responsible for some of the observed employment decrease; however, an estimated ‐12.2% change remains, on average, after adjusting for divestiture activity. Information contained in firm annual reports and in the Wall Street Journal indicates that the tender offers in the sample are often followed by considerable restructuring activity with respect to both target and acquiring firm operations. The findings suggest that acquiring firm managements may acquire new operations when the need to restructure their existing operations frees up resources, e.g. cash and/or managerial time and talent. The evidence also suggests that the corporate control market must be viewed as an integral part of the process by which US firms restructure to meet changing circumstances.
Ownership structure and board composition: A multi‐country test of agency theory predictions
Authors: Li Jiatao 
Published: June 2007

AbstractPatterns of corporate governance and control differ significantly across countries because of national differences in structures of ownership and composition of boards of directors. Based on agency theory, we examine the relationship between ownership structure and the composition of the board of directors of 390 large manufacturing firms based in Japan, Western Europe and the United States. In particular, we examine how ownership concentration, bank control and state ownership affect the percentage of outside directors on the corporate boards. The results show that, consistent with predictions of agency theory, ownership structure has significant effects on board composition.
Managerial incentives for undertaking exchange offers
Authors: Joshi Yash P. , Makhija Anil K. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThis paper empirically examines management's motivation to convey information regarding firm value through exchange offers. We report a positive relation between stock price reactions to announcements of exchange offers and managerial stockholdings, and a weak negative relation with salary plus bonus. These findings are consistent with the incentives required for managers to signal firm value through exchange offer‐induced leverage change.
The theory of corporate takeover bids: A subgame perfect approach
Authors: Deman Suresh 
Published: June 2007

AbstractIn this paper I re‐examine Grossman & Hart's (1980a) earlier work on corporate takeovers and address three main shortcomings of their theory. First, their theory implies that in the ‘Nash equilibrium’ either all shareholders will decide to tender their shares or all will refuse the raider's tender offer. Hence, they look only at the pure strategy equilibria. Second, there does not exist any free‐rider problem in the extreme cases of pure strategy equilbria because everyone sells his or her share and the raider does not have to deal with any minority shareholder in the equilibrium. On the other hand, if the raid fails and no one sells, then there is no question of dilution either. I show some mixed‐strategy equilibria using assumptions of Grossman and Hart. Third, Grossman and Hart claim that their theory rules out the possibilities of takeovers by the inefficient raider in which the shareholders who tender their shares are worse off than they would have been otherwise with the incumbent management. It appears from the model that their argument is based on rather arbitrary assumptions.
Strategic incentives for multinational operations
Authors: Veugelers Reinhilde 
Published: June 2007

AbstractA simple game‐theoretic model is set up to analyze when strategic considerations may dominate and possibly counteract the traditional motives for MNE operations such as locational and firm‐specific advantages. Firms can choose to operate internationally out of defensive considerations to avoid a worse outcome where they would have to compete with rival MNEs while not enjoying the cost advantages associated with multinational operations. The model further specifies when the timing of the decision to become a MNE may entail strategic advantages, with the first mover restricting the multinational expansion of its rival.
Revisiting the line‐of‐business restrictions
Authors: Sappington David E. M. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThe telecommunications industry has undergone significant changes since the divestiture of the Bell System. These changes, particularly in state and federal regulatory policy, have served to increase the social costs and decrease the social benefits of the line‐of ‐business restrictions imposed by the Modification of the Final Judgement (MFJ). The increased costs and reduced benefits of the MFJ provide a strong case for their abolition.
The competitive effects of line‐of‐business restrictions in telecommunications
Authors: Arrow Kenneth J. , Carlton Dennis W. , Sider Hal S. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractWe review the original rationale for the line‐of‐business restrictions faced by the RBOCs and discuss changes in the conditions that motivated them. These changes include: (1) reduced incentives for local exchange carriers (LECs) to shift costs from unregulated to regulated businesses; (2) improved deterrence and monitoring of discrimination in providing network access; and (3) recognition that antitrust laws apply to abuse of market power in local exchange. We also analyze trends in prices charged by RBOCs and other LECs which suggest that the opportunity to engage in cost shuting is of little or no significance today. We conclude that eliminating the remaining line‐of‐business restrictions is not likely to raise significant new competitive concerns but consumers are likely to benefit from entry by RBOCs into now‐prohibited businesses, many of which are highly concentrated.
The benefits of releasing the bell companies from the interexchange restrictions
Authors: Brandon Paul S. , Schmalensee Richard L. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractWe foresee substantial benefits to consumers if the regional telephone companies arereleased from the Modified Final Judgement's interexchange services restrictions. Smaller interexchange service customers, largely neglected because of the inadequate competitiveness of the incumbent interexchange carriers, would receive much of these benefits. Since divestiture, state and federal regulatoy agencies have developed a robust set of regulatory safeguards, which would prevent regional telephone companies' anticompetitive actions in the interexchange market. If, instead of theorizing about possibilities, one looks at the actual experience in unregulated post‐divestihue regional telephone company markets, one finds no signs of anticompetitive telephone company behavior. The regional telephone companies' access services are experiencing substantial competition. Given those facts, we do not believe that it matters to the health of interexchange competition whether competitors are attacking other regional telephone companies' services. Still, their other services arc being attacked, and this will limit any residual ability of the regional telephone companies to subsidize their interexchange operations by shifting costs to regulated ratepayers. In short, we see substantial benefits and low risks in allowing the regional telephone companies to enter the regional interexchange services market.
Competition in long‐distance and telecommunications equipment markets: Effects of the MFJ
Authors: Hausman Jerry A. 
Published: June 2007

AbstractThe Modification of Final Judgement (MJF) is now 10 years old. The MFJ was a historic change in US antitrust policy and in telecommunications policy. Pre‐divestiture AT&T was divided into a single company, AT&T, which was allowed to compete in long‐distance markets, telecommunications equipment markets and (with some delay) information service markets. Seven regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) were permitted to provide local service and nearby long‐distance service. However, the BOCs were not permitted to enter the three markets reserved for AT&T. In 1991 the Information Services restriction was eliminated for the BOCs. However, the ban on provision of (interLATA) long distance and equipment remains. The policy experiment was quite interesting since no other nation has followed the USA, despite numerous other countries ending the formerly monopoly status of their telecommunications provider. In this paper I evaluate how competitive the remaining markets reserved for AT&T, and from which the BOCS are banned, have become. I conclude that (interLATA) long‐distance market for residential and small business users, by far the largest fraction of users of long distance is currently uncompetitive. AT&Ts prices are constrained by FCC regulation, not by competition. AT&T has market power and is exercising market power. For equipment markets, I find a good deal more competition. However, I conclude that the BOCs could not impede competition in long distance and that removal of the MFJ restrictions would be pro‐competitive. Thus, I conclude that removal of the MFJ estrictions on the BOCs would be pro‐competitive, would increase economic efficiency, and would improve consumer welfare.