bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Democratic Responsiveness? Untangling the Links Between Public Opinion and Policy
Authors: Page Benjamin I. 
Published: May 2006

Abundant evidence has been produced to demonstrate substantial empirical relationships between public opinion (in the sense of survey-measured collective policy preferences) and public policy in the United States and elsewhere. Policy outputs—what governments do—tend to correspond fairly closely with what surveys say their citizens want them to do. In my view, however, a number of important research questions remain largely open. Answers to some of them are crucial to deciding what, if anything, opinion-policy congruence has to do with democratic theory.Open Questions1. How much impact does public opinion actually have on policy making? In particular, how much of the observed relationship is causal rather than spurious, and how much causal impact proceeds from opinion to policy rather than the reverse? If public opinion simply tends to swing into line behind whatever policies decision makers come up with, or if some third force drives both opinion and policy, the implications for democratic theory are rather different from what they would be if public opinion exerted a powerful influence on government action.2. Under what circumstances is this impact larger or smaller? What kinds of political systems are most responsive to their citizens? How much difference do free elections make? High levels of economic development, education, and communications? Vigorous party competition? Parliamentary versus presidential systems? Federalism?
Opinion and Policy: A Global View
Authors: Stimson James A. , MacKuen Michael B. , Erikson Robert S. 
Published: May 2006

In a world where citizens desire to have their preferences reflected in public policy and, for instrumental reasons, policy makers share that desire, the linkage of opinion to policy still faces formidable problems. Chief among these is this: policy making is highly specific, detailed, and informed, while mass electorates choose not to attend closely enough to politics and policy to have preferences that are similarly specific, detailed, and informed. We now believe that many citizens have meaningful preferences over the general contours of government activity. At the level of whether “government should do more to …” deal with any number of problems, we now see individual citizen preferences in a somewhat more favorable light than we once did. More important, we now view change in aggregate preferences over time as expressive of real beliefs and values about public choices.But this is not enough. Policy makers face no choices as simple as “do more” or “do less.” They deal at a wholly different level. They deal at a level of specificity where public attitudes are only infrequently measured, and for good reason; mass publics in the main do not have (real) attitudes over details they cannot reasonably be expected to attend to. And yet each of those choices, complicated and specific though they are, will reflect some measure of movement at the more general level where citizen preferences are engaged. The daily choices of the C-SPAN world are obscure and arcane to typical citizens. And yet the actors in that world feel bound by citizen preferences.
The Political Contingency of Public Opinion, or What Shall We Make of the Declining Faith of Middle-Class African Americans?
Authors: Hochschild Jennifer 
Published: May 2006

Scholars who study the connections between public opinion and the policy process, and politicians who engage in making those connections, face the same two problems. First, determining what opinion the public actually holds is much more of an interpretive than a methodological exercise. Second, designing policies to respond to that (presumed) opinion is at best an inexact art and at worst a demonstration that making the wrong moves can produce more harm than good. This essay illustrates these points by examining race politics in America over the past three decades.In order to move quickly to those illustrations, let me stipulate, with minimal evidence, several starting points. First, middle-class African Americans are better off now than middle-class members of their race have ever been; well-off African Americans are getting richer at a faster rate than well-off white Americans (though from a lower absolute starting point); and middle-class African Americans are gaining ground at the same time that poor African Americans are losing it.Those points require much evidence to be completely persuasive, but they are all illustrated by a simple comparison of income quantiles by race over time (see Table 1).
Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential Election Under Approval Voting?
Authors: Brams Steven J. , Merrill Samuel 
Published: May 2006

The answer to the question we pose in the title is by no means obvious. That it might be affirmative is suggested by the facts that Ross Perot:• ran ahead of the major-party presidential candidates in several presidential preference polls at the height of his popularity in June 1992; and• on election day in November received a higher proportion of the popular vote (19.0%) than any third-party candidate since Theodore Roosevelt in 1912 (27.4%), who came in second to Woodrow Wilson that year.More significant than Perot's relatively large percentage, however, is that he appealed to many Republicans because of his conservative economic policies, especially with respect to reducing the budget deficit, and to many Democrats because of his liberal social views on issues like abortion.It is precisely this kind of wide-ranging appeal that favors candidates under approval voting (AV), whereby voters can vote for as many candidates as they like or consider acceptable in a multicandi-date election. (In a three-candidate race like the 1992 presidential election, this means voting either for one's top or one's top two choices.) Yet despite extensive research on AV (Brams and Fishburn 1983), comparisons of it that have been made with other voting systems (Nurmi 1987; Merrill 1988), and empirical studies of its actual use (reviewed in Brams and Fishburn 1992), it is no easy task to establish how candidates would fare under AV in a specific election.
Fair Division and Politics
Authors: Brams Steven J. , Taylor Alan D. 
Published: May 2006

In the Hebrew Bible, the issue of fairness is raised in some of the best-known narratives. Cain's raging jealousy and eventual murder of Abel is provoked by what he considered unfair treatment by God, who “paid heed” to Abel's offering but ignored his (Gen. 4:4). Jacob, after doing seven years of service in return for Laban's beautiful daughter, Rachel, was told that his sacrifice was not sufficient and that he must instead marry Laban's older and plainer daughter, Leah, unless he did seven more years' service, which he regarded as not only the breaking of a contract but also flagrantly unfair.Fairness triumphed, however, when King Solomon proposed to divide a baby, claimed by two mothers, in two. When the true mother protested and offered the baby to the other mother (whose baby had died), the truth about the baby's maternity became apparent, and “all Israel … stood in awe of the king; for they saw that he possessed divine wisdom to execute justice” (1 Kings 3:28).Solomon's proposed solution is the first explicit mention of fair division that we know of in recorded history. But it is, of course, no solution at all. Solomon had no intention of dividing the baby in two. Instead, his purpose was to set up a game between the two women, described in Brams (1980, 118–23; 1990, 17–24), that would distinguish the mother from the impostor.The solutions of the fair-division procedures we shall discuss are for two players.
Political Science and the 1994 Elections: An Exploratory Essay
Authors: Busch Andrew E. 
Published: May 2006

To a substantial extent, political scientists continue to be in a state of shock, or even denial, over the results of the November 1994 mid-term elections. This degree of surprise has been largely attributed to the failure of the 1994 elections to conform to numerous models that have successfully predicted past election results on the basis of some combination of presidential popularity and economic performance. In a broader sense, it has become fashionable to argue alternately that the voters weren't really saying anything, or that they did not know what they were saying, or that they were saying things not fit for polite company—angry, mean, and even racist things. Such an interpretation does a disservice both to our profession and to our friends and neighbors, the real people who cast those votes.It will be some time before we are able to untangle the factors that led to the Republican sweep and to see whether it was a short-term aberration or the beginning of a long-term trend in congressional elections. Nevertheless, I would like to offer a two-part explanation for the results and the consequent academic confusion: the election models that we use as both a tool and a crutch are at the same time not precise enough and too precise.They are not precise enough because they do not capture all that needs to be taken into account even on the dimensions of the economy and presidential popularity.
STV and the Representation of Women
Authors: Hirczy Wolfgang 
Published: May 2006

In an informative account of different electoral systems and their effects on representation Joseph F. Zimmerman (1994, 674) recommended the single transferable vote (STV) system on the grounds that it “provides […] broad representation with great accuracy.” Along with local jurisdictions in the United States the article mentions Ireland and Australia as countries that use STV, but fails to include Malta. This seemingly innocuous omission is not inconsequential; Malta squarely contradicts Zimmerman's conclusion that STV facilitates the “direct representation” of women.Unfortunately, Wilma Rule did not remedy the neglect of Malta in her comparative overview of women in parliaments, which appeared in the same feature on “Election Systems and Representative Democracy” (1994, 690). Inclusion in the cross-national comparison would have revealed that this small island nation carries a dubious distinction: the lowest percentage of women in its unicameral parliament. As a result of the last elections, held in 1992, there is currently only one female MP. Nor did Prime Minister Fenech Adami's cabinet include a single woman, even though the number of ministries was expanded from 10 to 13 (Fenech 1992b, 1993). In the preceding parliamentary term, 3% of the seats (2 of 69) were occupied by women.It may be argued that in social scientific inquiry and theory-building a single case does not warrant the rejection of a generalization that is otherwise sound.
The Christian Right and Republican Realignment in Oklahoma
Authors: Bednar Nancy L. , Hertzke Allen D. 
Published: May 2006

On November 8, 1994, Oklahoma Democrats were stunned by an unprecedented GOP tide in the midterm elections. Just two years before, the Democrats still looked like the majority party: they held the governor's office, a 5-3 majority in the congressional delegation, and huge majorities in the state legislature. On Wednesday morning they woke up to a new reality. Republicans swept the offices of governor and lieutenant governor, picked up seats in the state legislature, and seized a remarkable 7-1 majority in the congressional delegation. Not since 1920 had the Republicans sent a majority to Washington, and never by such a margin.Of equal significance is the nature of that congressional delegation. All five of the victorious Republican House members and both of the senators have ties to the Christian Right and received strong backing from conservative Evangelical voters. The lone surviving Democrat is conservative Representative Bill Brewster. From the standpoint of the Christian Right, therefore, the elections were a smashing success; Oklahoma's delegation to Washington will be highly sympathetic to their policy goals.What produced this outcome was a fortuitous blend of discontent, resources, and opportunity. Successful social movements need resources to channel discontent and favorable opportunities to exploit. All of these came together in Oklahoma. Discontent with the drift of secular society, accentuated by deep displeasure with President Clinton (who embodied the “counterculture” in the White House), galvanized conservative Evangelicals. In turn, this discontent was channeled by sophisticated Christian Right leaders and fueled by expanding resources (money, media outlets, and a volunteer corps).
The Christian Right in the Old Dominion: Resurgent Republicans or Holy War?
Authors: Wilcox Clyde , Rozell Mark J. , Coker J. Bradford 
Published: May 2006

In early 1994, Virginia Senator Chuck Robb appeared extremely vulnerable. Once touted as a potential Democratic presidential candidate, Robb spent much of his first term defending himself against charges that he had attended parties where drugs were used, had engaged in extramarital affairs, and had known that his aides had possessed illegally taped cellular telephone conversations of long-time rival Governor Douglas Wilder.Robb's difficulties began soon before he launched his campaign in March 1994. He issued a letter to Virginia Democratic leaders and activists in which he admitted to having extramarital sex, although he consistently denied that this contact had ever included inter-course. This fine distinction made him no friends among moral conservatives, who disapproved of any extramarital activity, or among liberals, who found his behavior sexist and his account implausible.Yet on election night, Robb survived a Republican tidal wave to win a surprisingly easy victory over Republican candidate Oliver North, of Iran-Contra notoriety. North spent approximately $20 million, more than four times Robb's total, and deployed a huge volunteer army that covered the state with placards. He had the strong endorsements of Reverends Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, and could count on the organizational efforts of the Christian Coalition, the Family Foundation, and the National Rifle Association. In the home state of the former Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition, however, North failed to carry Lynchburg (a stronghold of Falwell and the former Moral Majority), or Chesapeake, and only narrowly carried Virginia Beach (home of both Robertson and the Christian Coalition).
Rosy Scenario: The Republican-White Evangelical Alliance Holds in Iowa
Authors: Nesmith Bruce 
Published: May 2006

Beginning with the 1980 presidential campaign, the Republican coalition became dramatically more heterogeneous by the incorporation of white Evangelical Protestants. Galvanized by the desire to promote traditional moral values, these new Republicans were characterized by lower social status and less libertarian values than many regular Republicans.Thus, this Republican-white Evangelical alliance contained, from the beginning, a strong potential for conflict and division. Its success has depended on the ability of Republican candidates to manage these differences. Such management, in turn, depends on the issues raised, candidate strategies, media agenda-setting, and the underlying state of public opinion. Two opposite outcomes have always been possible.One possibility might be termed the “rosy scenario,” where economic and social conservatives combine to pursue common electoral and policy goals (see Nesmith 1994, 129-32). Models for this scenario are Reagan's victories in 1980 and 1984, as well as George Bush's election in 1988. This scenario might mean Republicans could take advantage of a public climate combining a “reaction against modernity” and the “moral emptiness of the public square” with “a general renewal of confidence in the market” (Reichley 1986, 35; Hutcheson 1988). At a minimum it would require a measure of pragmatism by all party factions, accepting and supporting each other's candidates regardless of divisions over specific issues. The chance of overturning Democratic control, either locally or nationally, could cement such interfactional cooperation.
Television, Individualism, and Social Capital
Authors: McBride Allan 
Published: May 2006

Students of political culture and political theory (Pool 1990; Postman 1985; Merelman 1984, 1989, 1991; Habermas 1975) hypothesize that values associated with individualism have become increasingly prevalent in recent years, with distressing consequences for politics and governance. Putnam (1995), in an article that appeared in these pages, observes that there has been a decline of “social capital” in the United States since 1972 as well, as measured by the number of visits Americans make to family and friends, the number of organizations to which they belong, the amount of trust they report having in other people, and the amount of involvement they report in politics. Ehrenhalt, in his discussion of the tenure of the late Mayor Daley of Chicago, notes that the United States has changed from a society that reveres obedience, authority, order, and a closed political system, to one that reveres freedom, choice, and an open political system.To Americans of the baby-boom generation, authority will always be a word with sinister connotations, calling forth a rush of uncomfortable memories about the schools, churches, and families in which baby-boomers grew up. (1997, 85)It is not only the case that social capital has declined, but political capital, as measured by partisanship and confidence in the institutions of government, has also declined over the past several decades (Luttbeg and Gant 1995). If individualism is a causal factor in the decline of social and political capital, the relationship can be explained by the fact that individualism is by nature loose-bounded (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990); self-seeking behavior is the norm, as are self-negotiated relationships.
Searching for Government Performance: The Government Performance and Results Act
Authors: Radin Beryl A. 
Published: May 2006

If there is a single theme that characterizes the public sector in the 1990s, it is the demand for performance. A mantra has emerged in this decade, heard at all levels of government, that calls for documentation of performance and explicit outcomes of government action. While this demand has emerged from governors' offices, state legislatures, and city and country governments, perhaps no activity better embodies this request than the federal Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993, the legislation that has structured expectations for performance-based management in the federal government (see Radin 1998).The law that was enacted in August 1993 had its origins in legislation introduced by Republican Senator William Roth in 1990. Until Clinton's election in 1992, the legislation remained in the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. However, with the blessing of the Democratic White House, the legislation sailed through both houses of Congress with overwhelming bipartisan support. Despite the breadth of support, there was very little real debate over its provisions, and the legislation that was enacted was framed in very general and often abstract terms. The final bill contained little more than the good government rhetoric familiar to students of public administration. The appropriations and authorizing committees, believed to be major users of the information generated by the law, gave little—if any—attention to the requirements.
Observations on a Post-Gingrich House
Authors: Andres Gary J. 
Published: May 2006

The U.S. House of Representatives is in the midst of its second operational transformation in five years. Compared to the post-1994 “Gingrich-led revolution” (Drew 1996), Republican leadership strategies are considerably different in the 106th Congress under the direction of Speaker J. Dennis Hastert and his team.This essay outlines five strategies the new House leadership team has implemented to correct past problems, shape members' behavioral norms (Weingast 1979), and manage their razor-thin majority. While it's still too early to gauge the ultimate success of these strategies, my conversations with members of the House Republican leadership, other members of Congress, House staffers, and political operatives involved with the day-to-day functioning of the U.S. House, reveal a pattern of strategic changes and accompanying modifications in member norms aimed at managing the legislative majority in the 106th Congress.
Scholar, Witness, or Activist? The Lessons and Dilemmas of an AIDS Research Agenda
Authors: Siplon Patricia 
Published: May 2006

The study of AIDS, as a disease, a social problem, or, in my case, as a political phenomenon is necessarily difficult and invasive. Learning about AIDS requires invasion of the most private spheres of peoples' lives, involves watching people at their most vulnerable, and often requires becoming closely involved with people whose lives and circumstances are far away from the researcher's own comfort zone. As the title of this essay suggests, my research has led me to take on a variety of roles; first, in order to gather the information I sought and, later, because of the information I had gathered. Roughly speaking, these roles can be characterized with respect to the distance of the researcher from the subject matter. As a scholar, I endeavored, particularly in the early stages of my research, to hold myself apart from what I saw and to compare my findings against those of other researchers. However, as time moved on, I found myself increasingly playing two other roles, roles I have come to characterize as witness and activist. My efforts to lessen the distance between the subjects of my research and myself resulted from both practical and personal motivations. As a practical matter, like many other social scientists, I quickly discovered that I had far greater access to information—in the form of written documents, interviews, and observation opportunities—as an insider. Personally I found myself wanting to contribute what I could to help solve, or at least lessen the severity of, the problems unfolding all around me.As I have moved closer to the subjects of my research, and to the perspectives they hold, I have been forced to confront head-on a perennial dilemma of scholars: objectivity. How does one study an issue “objectively,” particularly when the issue is fraught with controversy? Does taking a side render future observations invalid? Is there some magic line between researcher and subject that is not to be crossed? If so, where is it?The findings presented below represent what I have discovered about interest organizing and political activism in the context of AIDS.