bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Partisan Patterns of House Leadership Change, 1789—1977
Authors: Nelson Garrison 
Published: May 2006

This study of 364 leadership selections in the U.S. House from 1789 through 1977 discovered that Democrats have a higher proportion of appointed leaders than Republicans; their leaders move between posts in an ordered succession; their appointed leaders are often “removed from above” by their elected ones; and their leaders are subjected to infrequent and unsuccessful caucus challenges. Republicans rely upon election to choose their leaders; their leaders' rate of interpositional mobility is very low; their appointed leaders were never removed by their elected ones; and their leaders face the contests at the same rate as the Democrats do, but the incidence of successful challenges is much greater. They are “removed from below.”Majority vs. minority status had little statistically significant impact upon leadership contests and what variation appeared indicated that challenges were more frequent in the majority party where the stakes are higher and the rewards are greater than in the minority. Regardless of electoral consequences, however, Republican leaders are more vulnerable to caucus defeat than Democratic ones, which lends further support to the contention that party identity is more important than party status.
The J-Curve Theory and the Black Urban Riots: An Empirical Test of Progressive Relative Deprivation Theory
Authors: Miller Abraham H. , Bolce Louis H. , Halligan Mark 
Published: May 2006

A time-series analysis of individual level, perceptual data disconfirms the J-curve theory of the black urban riots (i.e., that they arise because a period of progress was followed by a sharp decline) and suggests that ambiguities surrounding black people's perceptions of their economic situation probably led to the frustration that culminated in urban violence.The methodological component of the research deals with such problems of relative deprivation-based research as: (1) the substitution of aggregate, objective-level indicators for perceptual theoretical concepts; (2) the correspondences between objective and perceptual data on both a point-by-point basis and across time-series patterns; (3) the empirical implications of failing to look at important subgroup distinctions; and (4) the crucial assumption of all forms of relative deprivation theory that future expectations of need fulfillment, especially in the period of rising satisfactions, are a function of current levels of need fulfillment. The research calls for modifications in the structure and application of relative deprivation theory in light of the findings in these areas.
Public Choice Theory and Natural Resources: Methodological Explication and Critique
Authors: Sproule-Jones Mark 
Published: May 2006

The article is a methodological examination of public choice analysis, with particular reference to the currently topical policy field of natural resources. It is also a methodological critique of public choice analysis on logical, epistemological, and normative grounds. Its purpose is to make scholars of natural resources management aware of the substantive and methodological features of the public choice approach to the field, and to make public choice scholars and philosophers of science aware of the methodological grounds of the approach.The so-called hard core of concepts of public choice are first described in relation to the natural resource policy field, and the selection of these hard core concepts, as well as their distinguishing features from political science, economics, and public administration, are justified. The argument is advanced that the hard core is interrelated by the methodological criterion of logical consistency—one interpretation of the notion of rationality—and the criterion accounts for the impetus behind the growth of the paradigm. It is also argued that the paradigm is buttressed and protected from rival approaches at an epistemological level, and it is shown that a variety of epistemologies have been linked to the approach. Finally, I argue that the congruence of public choice with this variety of epistemologies makes many of the criticisms about the normative implications of the approach inaccurate and misleading.
Economic Conditions and National Elections, Post-Sample Forecasts of the Kramer Equations
Authors: Atesoglu H. Sonmez , Congleton Roger 
Published: May 2006

There has long been a division of opinion among economists concerning the effects of economic developments on voting behavior. In his well-known study, Kramer (1971a) concluded that the fluctuations in economic activity have a systematic influence on U.S. congressional elections. His findings were challenged by various economists, including Stigler (1973).The purpose of this paper is to extend the analysis of Kramer's results by examining the post-sample forecast performance of his models. As noted by Christ (1966, pp. 546–49), the acid test of a time series model is its ability to perform well outside the sample period. The results discussed below demonstrate that Kramer's equations have relatively good post-sample predictive ability. The findings thus support the view that short-term economic fluctuations have important effects on national elections. However, the results also suggest that economic factors alone are not sufficient to account for all variations of voter behavior.
Stabilizing the Military Environment
Authors: Osgood Robert E. 
Published: May 2006

Ever since President Eisenhower broached the “open skies” proposal in 1955, American “disarmament” policy has given prior emphasis—apart from diplomatic and propagandistic purposes—to the objective of stabilizing the military balance of power, as distinguished from the traditional objective of abolishing or reducing the arms that sustain that balance. So Secretary of State Herter on February 18, 1960, described the first goal of America's disarmament policy as creating “a more stable military environment” by reducing the risk of war resulting from a surprise attack launched by miscalculation or from the promiscuous spread of nuclear weapons production. And so on May 25 President Eisenhower took the occasion of the U-2 incident to reiterate the urgent need for an international agreement providing mutual assurance against surprise attack; and on September 22, in an address to the U.N. General Assembly, proposed a United Nations surveillance body to permit nations to prove to each other that they are not preparing to launch a surprise attack.If stability is the objective, then arms control policy is clearly the logical complement rather than the antithesis of defense policy. Yet in the absence of an overall strategy of stability, linking arms control with military strategy, the two may work against each other. Thus in the context of recent developments in missile technology, stabilizing the military environment requires the American government to make a basic decision, not only about arms control, but about the whole strategy of deterrence, lest its concern for providing mutual assurance against surprise attack conflict with its reliance upon a nuclear response to discourage a wide range of aggressions.
Political Recruitment and Party Structure: A Case Study
Authors: Seligman Lester G. 
Published: May 2006

The recruitment of political candidates is a basic function of political parties: a party that cannot attract and then nominate candidates surrenders its elemental opportunity for power. Two stages may conveniently be distinguished in the process of recruitment. Certification includes the social screening and political channeling that results in eligibility for candidacy, while selection includes the actual choice of candidates to represent parties in the general election. Selection is at the focus of the contest for power within parties, and is my focus here.Considering its importance we know too little about the dynamics of the nominating process. Most of what we do know derives from the analysis of two modal institutional types of political selection: the convention system and the primary system. Experience indicates that despite their manifest purposes, these contrasting institutional types have not necessarily resulted in widely different internal party structures. A variety of party patterns in one-party states—from the tightly controlled machines in Virginia to the transient and multiple factionalism of Florida—flourish in the framework of the direct primary system. Patterns of diffusing factionalism on the one hand, and of disciplined party organizations on the other are also found in states without primaries. Perhaps a closer look at the active participants in the processes of selection, and their interrelationships, may shed some further light on significant factorsin party structure. By interviewing candidates in party primaries we hoped to disclose the steps in nomination and the precise political relationships involved.
The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa
Authors: Berg Elliot J. 
Published: May 2006

Africans in French Tropical Africa have recently been called on to make several farreaching political decisions. Two basic questions have been at issue: the nature of the relationship between France and the African territories, and the nature of relations between the African territories themselves. On the first question, the Referendum of September 28, 1958 on the Constitution of the Fifth French Republic gave Africans the choice between total independence and internal autonomy within “The (French) Community.” With regard to their mutual relations, the territories which made up the federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa could remain tied together politically, or they could sever all formal political connections among themselves; in French African political terminology, the second issue has been whether or not the individual territories should form “primary federations.”The issue of total independence or internal autonomy within “The Community” was temporarily decided at the 1958 Referendum, when eleven of the twelve territories of French West and Equatorial Africa voted to remain with France, Guinea alone choosing immediate independence. Since then several members of “The Community” have initiated negotiations with France for the full transfer of sovereign powers to local African governments, and the indications are that all French-speaking West Africa will be fully independent within the near future.The outcome of the second question—political relations among the African territories–is not so clear. The trend up to now has been against the re-creation of primary federations.
Hobbes's Confusing “Clarity”—The Case of “Liberty”
Authors: Pennock J. Roland 
Published: May 2006

The Leviathan has been described as “original, persuasive, solid, coherent.” General commentaries on Hobbes usually single out his logic for special praise; more detailed critiques generally unearth a mass of confusions and inconsistencies. Confusions and inconsistencies there certainly are; more, I believe, than one would expect to find in the work of a man of such undeniable logical powers. Speculation upon the psychological explanation of this fact is intriguing, but no part of the purpose of the present article. It is part of my purpose, however, to contend that Hobbes's passion for clarity and certainty may have played a part in leading him to adopt perverse definitions, to which even he did not consistently adhere and which constituted a major source of confusion. Conversely, I disagree with those who say his analytical system is sound and only his empirical assumptions about human nature are open to serious criticism.More specifically, one may profitably inquire whether there is some central concept that serves as a focal point for many of these difficulties. For example, it is often suggested, with merit, that Hobbes's perversion, or inversion, of the traditional meaning of “jus naturale” plays such a role. Without making any exclusive claim or denying the insights that may be gained by concentrating attention upon other focal points, my hypothesis is that understanding of Hobbes may be deepened by an examination of his use of the word “liberty.” I shall deal first with his definitions of the term, and then in turn with his applications of it to natural right and natural law, to sovereignty by acquisition, and finally to the social contract. I shall argue that his method, as illustrated by his definitions, leads him occasionally into confusion or inconsistency, and more frequently tends to confuse the reader and so to enable Hobbes to make an unsound conclusion appear sound, by means of specious reasoning. In particular, I shall contend that Hobbes's treatment of liberty (1) leads him into self-contradiction regarding the extent of natural liberty, (2) enables him to argue persuasively but speciously in support of the obligation to obey a sovereign who has attained his position by violence, and (3) prevents him from developing an acceptable theory of political obligation.
Logic of many-sorted theories
Authors: Wang Hao 
Published: May 2006

Certain axiomatic systems involve more than one category of fundamental objects; for example, points, lines, and planes in geometry; individuals, classes of individuals, etc. in the theory of types or in predicate calculi of orders higher than one. It is natural to use variables of different kinds with their ranges respectively restricted to different categories of objects, and to assume as substructure the usual quantification theory (the restricted predicate calculus) for each of the various kinds of variables together with the usual theory of truth functions for the formulas of the system. An axiomatic theory set up in this manner will be called many-sorted. We shall refer to the theory of truth functions and quantifiers in it as its (many-sorted) elementary logic, and call the primitive symbols and axioms (including axiom schemata) the proper primitive symbols and proper axioms of the system. Our purpose in this paper is to investigate the many-sorted systems and their elementary logics.Among the proper primitive symbols of a many-sorted system Tn (n = 2, …, ω) there may be included symbols of some or all of the following kinds: (1) predicates denoting the properties and relations treated in the system; (2) functors denoting the functions treated in the system; (3) constant names for certain objects of the system. We may either take as primitive or define a predicate denoting the identity relation in Tn.
Modal functions in two-valued logic
Authors: Fitch Frederic B. 
Published: May 2006

In this paper it will be shown that the fundamental modal functions (“… is necessary,” “… is possible,” etc.) may be represented in the ordinary two-valued logic of propositions, relatively to a subset S of the set K of all propositions of the logic. The only restriction on S is that no member of S can occur in any other member of S. The representation concerns the set SK consisting of all members of K in which occur members of S. Every member of SK may be regarded as a truth-function of the members of S. If S consists of only one member, P, and if f(P) and g(P) are any members of SK, then we define ∣f(P)∣ as (f(P)·f(~P)). The proposition “f(P) is S-necessary” may then be expressed by ∣f(P)· Furthermore we may express “f(P) is S-impossible” by ∣~f(P)∣, abbreviated to f(P)*; we may express “f(P) is S-possible” by abbreviated to f(P); and we may express “f(P) S-strictly implies g(P)” by (f(P)·~g(P))*, abbreviated to f(P)⊰g(P). Thus is obtained a novel analysis of modality, contrasting, on the one hand, with Carnap's syntactic theory of modality, and, on the other hand, with Lewis's view of modal concepts as underivable from other logical concepts. We would maintain that modal concepts are not absolute, but always relative to some S, generally unspecified.In the formal exposition which follows, we shall assume tacitly but not explicitly the important distinction between the symbols we are discussing and symbols denoting or designating the former.
Gödel Theorems for Non-Constructive Logics
Authors: Rosser Barkley 
Published: May 2006

Introduction. In setting up his definition of analyticity, Carnap uses various non-constructive rules, of which we shall be concerned with only one. This one we shall call simply “Carnap's rule.” It can be roughly stated thus: If f(0), f(1), f(2), … are all provable, then (x)f(x) shall be provable.In this paper will be briefly considered the logics got by starting with the system of Principia plus Peano's axioms and allowing one, two, …, ω, ω+l, and so on up to, but not including ω uses of Carnap's rule (interspersed with uses of the ordinary rules), as well as the system which includes Principia and Peano's axioms and is closed under application of Carnap's rule and the ordinary rules. Under suitable assumptions as to consistency, it is shown that in each of these logics there occur undecidable propositions and that a formula which states the consistency of the logic exists in the logic but is not provable in the logic. An interesting side result is that the logic got by allowing co applications of Carnap's rule is not closed under Carnap's rule.
The combinatory foundations of mathematical logic
Authors: Curry Haskell B. 
Published: May 2006

In investigations of the foundations of mathematics we can distinguish two separate tendencies. On the one hand, one may seek to define his subject with greatest possible explicitness: to obtain a formulation which satisfies the most exacting demands for precision, and which is at the same time free from paradoxes and adequate for the purpose. On the other hand, besides the problem of formulation, there is that of simplification; one can seek to find systems based upon processes of greater and greater primitiveness. The reduction of a piece of mathematics to a formal system, and still further to a completely formalized system (as explained, for example, in my New York address a year ago), is a step toward the first of these objectives. But it is evident that one can formalize in various ways, and that some of these ways constitute a more profound analysis than others. Although from some points of view one way of formalization is as good as any other, yet a certain interest attaches to the problem of simplification, as is shown by the attention which some of the greatest mathematicians have devoted to it.The researches about which I am reporting today are directed toward the second of these objectives. In fact we are concerned with constructing systems of an extremely rudimentary character, which analyze processes ordinarily taken for granted. This is properly part of the business of mathematical logic. Of course there are those, even among logicians, who doubt the utility of this sort of thing—who profess to have no interest in improvements which do not lead to increases in deductive power or what not. However that may be, this second objective certainly has some interest in its own right; and it is this interest which has formed the primary motivation for these researches.
Bemerkungen zum Begriff der inhaltlichen Widerspruchsfreiheit
Authors: Mostowski Andrzej 
Published: May 2006

In dem vorstehenden Aufsatz hat A. Tarski den Begriff der inhaltlichen Widerspruchsfreiheit (content-consistency) einer Aussagenmenge eingeführt. Der Verfasser hebt hervor, daß die inhaltliche Widerspruchsfreiheit keine innere Eigenschaft der Aussagenmenge selbst ist, sondern vielmehr auf die jeweilige Definition dieser Menge bezogen werden soll. Es ist also a priori möglich, daß wir, von zwei verschiedenen Definitionen einer und derselben Aussagenmenge E ausgehend, das eine Mal feststellen, daß E inhaltlich widerspruchsfrei ist, und das andere Mal, daß E nicht inhaltlich widerspruchsfrei ist. Daß dies tatsächlich in vielen Fällen vorkommt, zeigt folgender einfacher Satz:I. Eine definierbare Satzmenge E, die alle gültigen Formeln des Aussagenkalküls enthält und in Bezug auf die Abtrennungsregel abgeschlossen ist, ist dann und nur dann in Bezug auf jede ihrer Definitionen inhaltlich widerspruchsfrei, wenn sie ausschließlich aus wahren Aussagen besteht.Daß diese Bedingung hinreichend ist, hat Tarski (a. a. O. Satz 7.1) bewiesen. Nehmen wir nun an, E enthalte einen falschen Satz f (ohne freie Variable), und es sei ϕ irgendeine Definition von E. Die Aussagefunktion ψ = f¯→ϕ ist offenbar ebenfalls eine Definition von E. Wird ψ als Definition von E angenommen, so hat x(E) die Form einer Implikation mit dem Vorderglied f¯, welche auch die Aussage x sein könnte. x(E) gehört daher immer der Menge E an, woraus wir mit Rücksicht auf Bedingung 3.4 aus dem vorstehenden Artikel schließen, daß E in Bezug auf die Definition ψ nicht inhaltlich widerspruchsfrei ist, w. z. b. w.
Transfinite ordinals in recursive number theory
Authors: Goodstein R. L. 
Published: May 2006

The possibility of constructing a numerical equivalent of a system of trans-finite ordinals, in recursive number theory, was briefly indicated in a previous paper, where consideration was confined to ordinals less than ε (the first to satisfy ε = ω). In the present paper we construct a representation, by functions of number-theoretic variables, for ordinals of any type.In addition to definite numerals, and numeral variables, we introduce majorant variables σ, ω, ωr, r ≧ 1. A relation containing a single majorant variable σ is required to hold, not necessarily for all non-negative integral values of σ, but for all values greater than some assigned constant.
Two semantical paradoxes
Authors: Yuting Shen 
Published: May 2006

Consider the statement:(1) What I am saying cannot be proved.Let us suppose that this statement can be proved. Then it must be true, i.e., in its own words, it cannot be proved, which contradicts our supposition.Therefore the statement cannot be proved, since our supposition has led to a contradiction. In other words, the statement is true. In this way we have proved the statement.Therefore the statement both can and cannot be proved.In the second part of the argument, if we speak of proving (1) in a given formal system S, then we cannot draw the conclusion that we have proved the statement in S. For it is possible that the argument cannot be formalized in S. Indeed, as we know, Gödel shows in his famous article of 1931 that for suitable systems S, it is possible to construct in S a statement saying in effect that the statement itself is not provable in S. The conclusion Gödel draws, we may recall, is that the statement thus constructed is true but not provable in S. Thus no contradictions arise in this way if we are confined to provability in a given system.A dual of (1) is the following:(2) What I am saying can be refuted.Let us suppose that this statement is true, or, in its own words, that it can be refuted. Then it must be false, which contradicts our supposition.Therefore the statement is false, since our supposition has led to a contradiction. In this way, we have refuted the statement. We see that the statement can be refuted; in other words, it is true.