bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Globalization the Second Wave of Colonization: Impacts on wahine Māori
Authors: Cadigan Tui 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
Māori are the first nation people of Aotearoa New Zealand, a group of South West Pacific Islands. Colonized by the British Empire, Aotearoa came into being through an act consolidated by the signing of a controversial treaty between Māori tribes and Queen Victoria of England. From their earliest encounter, Māori women, or wahine Māori, experienced a dramatic shift in their social position. Traditionally, they occupied leadership roles at all levels of society. However, colonization instigated a societal reassignment that has led them to their current position behind white males, white females, white children, and Māori males, but ahead of Māori children. Key events in history contributed to the invisibility of wahine Māori in their own context and brought them to their present crisis. To assist the reader in understanding this context, this chapter first considers some key elements of Māori spirituality, and then explores developed and developing relationships, specifically the consequences of the differences between values systems of Māori and the British colonizer. The final section describes the current reality of wahine Māori and draws some conclusions about the influence of globalization in the process.
Feminist Theologies of a World Scripture(s) in the Globalization Era
Authors: Dube Musa W. 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
In the globalization era, justice-seeking feminist theologies are challenged to sharpen and reposition themselves to speak to the issues of the time by adopting new methods, topics, and frameworks. Consequently, “the boundaries of theology need to be redrawn in the light of the creation of new global cultures” and “crucial to the task of rewriting the story of feminist theology in the light of globalization is reflecting on the nature of a theological perspective it makes.” This chapter explores the interrelations of globalization, a world scripture (the Bible), and the vision of feminist theologies.
Theology and Identity in the Context of Globalization
Authors: Aquino María Pilar 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
Globalization, identity, and feminist theology have been the object of extensive academic research, and are perhaps the concepts that have had the greatest influence on our understanding of contemporary social reality and the function of religious rhetoric in today's world. In the theological field there has been a growing need to clarify the relationship between theology and identity formation in the current context of the social processes of “globalization.” This chapter explores the systematic interaction of these three concepts to bring to light the theological pertinence of a critical feminist theology of liberation for the visions and practices of social change. Such a theology develops the most appropriate analytical and hermeneutical frameworks to face the challenges raised by the current model of globalization, in the context of the social conditions created by which, a critical feminist theology functions as a religious ethical-political force of transformation for a new world of justice. The chapter is organized as follows. The first part highlights some methodological dimensions that expose the theological relevance of critical feminist liberation theology and its significance for present-day aspirations of social change. The second part addresses some key features of today's dominant model of society characterized by kyriarchal globalization, and points out their implications for feminist theological thought. The third and final part focuses on the social function of theological knowledge in the present circumstances and discusses some aspects that may shed light on possible future developments in feminist theology.
La Morenita on Skis: Women's Popular Marian Piety and Feminist Research on Religion
Authors: Vuola Elina 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
What do a skiing Virgin Mary in the snow-covered woods of Karelia and the dark-skinned Latin American Virgins, such as the Virgin of Guadalupe, La Morenita, have in common? This chapter takes examples from two different cultural contexts—Orthodox Karelia, the region between today's Russia and Finland, and parts of Latin America—for interpretations of the Virgin Mary as one who simultaneously shares and transcends women's often intimate everyday experiences, such as sexuality, childbirth, or the loss of a child. Aspects of (women's) popular devotion to the Virgin Mary both differ from official (especially Catholic) Mariology and, interestingly, coincide with some aspects of it, especially with the view of her symbolizing and transgressing the liminal space between the human and the divine. The examples are from different geographical areas and times, representing different fields of study and methods, such as theology, anthropology, and folklore studies, some using ethnographic methods, some textual.
Wittgenstein Reads Russell
Authors: Landini Gregory 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein both left voluminous work notes and letters and they knew a great many people — statesmen, poets, academicians, lovers, and friends — who themselves wrote memoirs. Russell regarded Wittgenstein as a protégé and did much to establish a career for him. He secured the publications of Wittgenstein's oracular and unorthodox Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. He presided over the Viva which accepted Tractatus as a dissertation for Wittgenstein's Ph.D. degree (1929). Two theses have dominated the understanding of Russell's philosophy. First, in Principia Mathematica, Russell advanced a ramified type-theory of entities. Second, Russell's logical atomism is a form of reductive empiricistic epistemology. With the help of the volumes of manuscripts that Russell left, it now appears that both are false. In later years, Russell described his thoughts on the philosophy of logic and mathematics as a reluctant ‘retreat from Pythagoras’. Wittgenstein's Tractatus certainly did not intend to surrender logic to psychology, conventionalism, naturalism, or any empirical science.
Wittgenstein On Mathematics
Authors: Potter Michael 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
The philosophy of mathematics was one of Ludwig Wittgenstein's central concerns from the beginning of his philosophical career until close to the end: it is one of the issues addressed in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. When Wittgenstein returned to philosophy and to Cambridge in 1929, it was the problem of the infinite that he started to consider — first of all in concert with Frank Ramsey. As far as one can judge, Wittgenstein and Ramsey seem to have moved together towards finitism, that is, a rejection of the extensional view of generalisation in the case of infinitely many propositions. Wittgenstein deduces that the sense of an arithmetical generalisation is its inductive proof. In addition, Wittgenstein argues that there is no problem of inconsistency until we actually find an inconsistency. He attributes the existence of hidden contradictions to ambiguity in the rules. As early as 1930, Wittgenstein was explicit about the ‘unbridgeable gulf between rule and application’, which is the essence of the rule-following argument.
Wittgenstein On Surveyability of Proofs
Authors: Marion Mathieu 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
Philosophers of mathematics are often divided between ‘mainstream’ and ‘maverick’. Ludwig Wittgenstein could hardly be classified as ‘mainstream’. He had in common with other ‘mavericks’, however, a critical stance towards the value of the ‘mainstream’ philosophy of mathematics of his days, mostly but not only as he knew it from the logicist tradition of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Frank Ramsey, and Rudolf Carnap. Wittgenstein's remarks on the ‘Übersichtlichkeit’ or ‘surveyability’ of proofs were read as forming part of an argument in support of a radical ‘anti-realist’ account of mathematics, which coincides with ‘strict finitism’ in the foundations of mathematics. This article argues that Wittgenstein's ‘surveyability argument’ is best understood not as an argument concerning the length of proofs but as involving the recognition that formal proofs possess a non-eliminable visual element, neglected by Russell. It also discusses the consequences that Wittgenstein drew from his argument, especially as they relate to the larger issue of the cogency of mathematical ‘explicativism’.
From Logical Method to ‘Messing About’: Wittgenstein on ‘Open Problems’ in Mathematics
Authors: Säätelä Simo 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
David Hilbert claimed that all mathematical problems can be solved. While Ludwig Wittgenstein agrees, he also wants to distinguish between different uses of the word ‘problem’. ‘Open problems’ in mathematics are often understood as being expressed by mathematical propositions that are undecided in the sense that they are not known to be provable or disprovable within currently accepted systems of mathematics. Wittgenstein thinks, controversially, that it is nonsensical to treat such ‘propositions’ as genuine mathematical propositions. On the other hand, he does not want to claim that it is illegitimate for mathematicians to concern themselves with problems such as Goldbach's conjecture, or Fermat's last theorem. This article explores the way Wittgenstein dealt with these issues in the early 1930s, focusing on his treatment of Fermat's theorem. It also looks at how Wittgenstein's treatment of these issues reflects a development towards a less dogmatic view of what is involved in mathematicians' claims to understand such ‘propositions’, which is an important part of the development of his philosophical views from the ‘middle’ to the ‘late’ philosophy.
The Life of The Sign
Authors: Minar Edward 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
Groping for direction in the midst of his investigation of rule-following in Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein remarks: ‘Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about’. This article examines Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, his methods, and the instructions he provides for our use of his ‘album’ of ‘sketches’. It examines some features of how agreement functions in Wittgenstein's treatment of rule-following by working toward an interpretation of his apparently climactic conclusion in Investigations: ‘If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definition but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so’. To locate the significance of agreement in the practice of rule-following, this article looks at Wittgenstein's remarks about ‘the life of the sign’, a theme from the outset of the Investigations.
Meaning and Understanding
Authors: Stroud Barry 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
Almost from the beginning of his return to philosophy in Cambridge in 1929, Ludwig Wittgenstein was concerned not only with the relation of sentences or propositions to reality but also with the idea of someone's thinking or meaning or understanding something in a particular way. He also returned to the idea of a ‘limit’, this time to ‘the limit of language’. In the early parts of Philosophical Grammar, Wittgenstein takes up the question of how one can talk about ‘understanding’ or ‘not understanding’ a sentence. The implications of middle-period reflections on the impossibility of understanding language and meaning ‘from outside’ are illustrated and developed at many points and in many ways throughout Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein's remark that it is impossible to describe the fact that corresponds to a sentence without simply repeating the sentence is immediately followed by the observation that ‘this has to do with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy’.
Wittgenstein and Idealism
Authors: Cerbone David R. 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
Of the many sources of interpretive conflict in Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy, one of the most recalcitrant is the question of his philosophy's ultimate commitment to idealism. Those who argue that Wittgenstein must in the end be some kind of idealist will cite, among other things, his appeal to ‘forms of life’ (either as diverse or ultimately and emphatically singular), his attention to the (alleged) constitutive role of, variously, our practices, community, or ‘mindedness’ in the formation of concepts, and his apparent dismissal of philosophical problems and questions as instances of speaking ‘outside’ of language-games. That just these features of Wittgenstein's philosophy converge to make for an ultimately idealist philosophy is succinctly summarised in Thomas Nagel's characterisation. Nagel, who labels Wittgenstein ‘one of the most important sources of contemporary idealism’, traces this influence to his views on ‘the conditions of meaning’.
Wittgenstein on The First Person
Authors: Child William 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
Questions about the self, the use of ‘I’, and the first-person point of view arise throughout Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings. This article explores two interrelated issues. First, what is the function and significance of the first-person pronoun? Second, what is the relation between the first-person point of view — the point of view that each of us has on ourselves, our experiences, and our mental states — and the second- or third-person point of view — the point of view we adopt towards others, their experiences, and their mental states? When ‘I’ is used ‘as object’, Wittgenstein says, ‘the possibility of an error has been provided for’; when ‘I’ is used ‘as subject’, ‘no error is possible’. Wittgenstein has identified a genuine feature of certain self-ascriptions: immunity to error through misidentification. One of Wittgenstein's aims in Philosophical Investigations is to offer an account of the ‘language-game’ of ascribing sensations and attitudes to oneself and others that does justice to both first-person and third-person aspects of the mental, while avoiding the twin extremes of Cartesian introspectionism, on the one hand, and behaviourism, on the other.
Private Experience and Sense Data
Authors: Snowdon Paul 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
In the mid 1930s, Ludwig Wittgenstein was immersed in problems about, amongst other things, experience, or perhaps one might say, our thought about experience. One record of his developing thinking are the notes that Rush Rhees himself made of the lectures by Wittgenstein on these topics which Rhees attended in 1936, published under the title ‘The Language of Sense Data and Private Experience’, in Philosophical Occasions. The ideas that Wittgenstein is developing in these notes and lectures culminated in the discussion of the same topics in Philosophical Investigations. What views about sense data and private experience is Wittgenstein proposing? Wittgenstein suggests that bad philosophy is produced by the ‘bewitchment of intelligence by language’. In addition, he brings out a genuine contrast between the status of the idea of the private object account of perception and the idea of private objects as involved in the experience of sensations. It is natural to read Wittgenstein's brief discussion of the so-called ‘visual room’ in Philosophical Investigations as another engagement with the sense datum model of perception.
Privacy
Authors: Schulte Joachim 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
In his Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein does very little to explain what he means by ‘private’. To illustrate Wittgenstein's willingness to combine the adjective ‘private’ with all kinds of nouns, this article gives a list of such nouns based on his ‘Notes for Lectures on Private Experience’ and ‘Sense Data’: definition, experience, game of chess, impression, justification, language, language game, memory, personal experience, sensation, sense data, visual image. Items like justification, definition, and the game of chess are not covered by ‘experiences’, while impressions, sensations, and visual images are probably meant to fall under this heading. Objectivity is one idea that Wittgenstein contrasts with privacy. And objectivity, he suggests, presupposes that the people concerned use a language in the minimal sense of making recognizably regular use of what we can conceive of as symbols. The idea of an inner world as well as all those notions connected with it form only part of what Wittgenstein is driving at when he uses the word ‘private’ in relevant contexts.
Action and The Will
Authors: Hyman John 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
In Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein talks about action and the will. The main ideas we need to be acquainted with in order to understand Wittgenstein's remarks on this topic are, first, Arthur Schopenhauer's neo-Kantian theory of the will, which Wittgenstein seems to have fully accepted in 1916, and which still influenced his thinking in 1947, and second, the theory advanced in William James's The Principles of Psychology, which Wittgenstein encountered in the 1930s, and rejected root and branch. Schopenhauer and James were in turn reacting, in very different ways, to the empiricist theory of the will, which received its classic exposition in John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. This article argues that Wittgenstein's treatment of action and the will in Philosophical Investigations is seriously flawed. Wittgenstein fails to disentangle the active/passive distinction and the voluntary/not voluntary distinction; he fails to see that voluntariness is not only an attribute of activity, but of passivity as well; and he confuses action and motion.
Wittgenstein on Scepticism
Authors: Pritchard Duncan 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
The problem of scepticism informs all of Ludwig Wittgenstein's writing, from the remarks on solipsism in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to his final notebooks dealing with G. E. Moore's famous commonsense response to scepticism, published as On Certainty. Wittgenstein offers a picture of the structure of reasons that is the very picture that we ordinarily employ, at least when we are not in the grip of the alternative philosophical picture which the sceptic employs. Wittgenstein refers to hinges as propositions throughout On Certainty. The proponent of the non-propositional view has a fairly stiff exegetical task on her hands. A less radical form of non-epistemicism which avoids this difficulty holds that while hinges are indeed propositions, they are not fact-stating propositions but rather express norms. According to contextualism, the hinges are known just so long as one does not enter a context where such hinges are brought into question. It would seem that Wittgenstein's approach to scepticism has important ramifications for contemporary epistemology even if it is set within an externalist framework.
Grammar in the Philosophical Investigations
Authors: McGinn Marie 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
Ludwig Wittgenstein describes the kind of investigation he is engaged in Philosophical Investigations as ‘a grammatical one’. He speaks of looking for ‘grammatical differences’ and of ‘the rules of grammar’; and he makes a distinction between the ‘surface grammar’ of a word and its ‘depth grammar’. He traces the misunderstandings which he holds to lie at the root of philosophical problems and paradoxes to ‘grammatical illusions’, and to the creation of ‘grammatical fictions’. It is clear that he places the concept of grammar and of grammatical investigation at the heart of his understanding of the aims and methods of his later philosophy. Understanding what he means by the terms ‘grammar’, ‘depth grammar’, and ‘grammatical investigation’ is therefore fundamental to an understanding of the Investigations. It is possible that a perspicuous representation is concerned with a dimension of use that focuses on how speakers operate with words. Moreover, Wittgenstein has been interpreted as aiming to clarify the use of the concepts of understanding, meaning, and thinking.
Aspect Perception and Philosophical Difficulty
Authors: Baz Avner 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
This article traces a new line of thought through, or actually to, Ludwig Wittgenstein's writings on aspect perception. Its point of bearing is the second part of the Brown Book. It show that the trail of philosophical reflection that apparently naturally leads Wittgenstein in the Brown Book from questions concerning how we ought to conceive of our various mental states (and processes) — that is, from what is arguably one of the underlying overall concerns of the first part of Philosophical Investigations — to the topic of aspect perception, is in fact philosophically interesting. It is also different from what previous attempts to relate the remarks on aspects to the first part of the Investigations would have made one expect. An important point of departure for Wittgenstein's work was that he found literally incredible the dominating conception of philosophy. This article explores aspect perception, aspect-blindness, and philosophical difficulty. It discusses the ‘illusion’ or ‘delusion’ that Wittgenstein detects in those moments in which we attend to instances of Φing in order to find out what Φing is.
Wittgenstein and The Moral Dimension of Philosophical Problems
Authors: Backström Joel 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
Ludwig Wittgenstein's so-called Big Typescript from the early 1930s includes a famous chapter on ‘Philosophy’. This article examines how Wittgenstein saw the character of the philosophical problems he was dealing with, in particular the connection between them, language trouble, and the broadly speaking moral-existential difficulties apparently referred to in the opening statement. It is crucial to realise that reflection on the possible intertwining of philosophical problems and moral difficulties will not only challenge standard conceptions of philosophy, but also of morality. Wittgenstein always stresses the ‘depth’ of philosophical problems. Through his patient work of reflection and questioning of philosophical preconceptions and prejudices, he reveals how difficult it is, not just to free oneself from their grip but to realise that one is in their grip.
Wittgenstein on Religious Belief
Authors: Mulhall Stephen 
Published: January 2012

Abstract
This article is based on three assumptions. The first is that Ludwig Wittgenstein's impact in the philosophy of religion has been more a function of the work of those inspired by him than of his own writings on this topic. The second is that Wittgensteinian philosophers of religion took their primary inspiration from Wittgenstein's later approach to philosophy in general, as manifest in the Philosophical Investigations, rather than from his specific writings on religion. The third assumption is that such Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion has been burdened virtually from its outset by the fateful charge of fideism. This charge originated with Kai Nielsen, who argued that assumptions common to a range of Wittgensteinian authors entailed an unacceptable immunisation of religious belief against rational criticism (just as theological fideists hold that religious belief is grounded on faith rather than reason). This article also explores Cora Diamond's development and application of a third perspective known as ‘The Realistic Wittgenstein’, in addition to the first two: ‘The Fideist Wittgenstein’ and ‘The Canonical Wittgenstein’.