bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Hermeneutics as a … Foundationalism?
Authors: Tucker Chris 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTIt is commonly assumed, at least by continental philosophers, that epistemological hermeneutics and foundationalism are incompatible. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. If I am correct, the analytic and continental traditions may be closer than is commonly supposed. Hermeneutics, as I will argue, is a descriptive claim about human cognition, and foundationalism is a normative claim about how beliefs ought to be related to one another. Once the positions are stated in this way, their putative incompatibility vanishes. Also, to inspire further research I include an appendix which contains an unfinished prototype of a hermeneutic foundationalism.
Khortos gasteriou le bonheur est dans le pré: éthique et politique cyniques selon un poème de Cratès de Thèbes
Authors: Flores-Júnior Olimar 
Published: April 2009

AbstractThis commentary on a poem of Crates of Thebes, which was transmitted in Julian's Oration VII, To the Cynic Herakleios,and Oration IX [VI], To the Uneducated Cynics,intends to rediscuss the notions of happiness, pleasure, wealth, and justice in the context of thekata phusinlife as viewed by the Cynics. The “minimal ethics” proposed by the cynic philosophers, which many would consider as a kind of voluntary experience of suffering, appears as a possible way to secure both individual happiness and political justice.
A New Puzzle about Believed Fallibility
Authors: Benbaji Yitzhak 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTI shall consider the phenomenon of believing ourselves to have at least one false belief: a phenomenon I call believed fallibility. I shall first present a paradoxical argument which appears to show that believed fallibility is incoherent; second, note that this argument assumes that we are committed to the conjunction of all our beliefs; third, sketch a more intuitive notion of commitment in which we are not committed to the conjunction of all our beliefs and argue that the original paradoxical argument is now defused; fourth, construct a new paradoxical argument showing that if we believe that we have at least one false belief we are committed to a contradiction, employing the preferable notion of commitment; and, fifth, suggest that perhaps we might avoid the new paradox by denying that closing our beliefs under conjunction is required by rationality.
Moral Being in Contemporary Views of the Self
Authors: Vance Robert L. 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTRecent discussions of the nature of mind, emotion, and self have often intersected with renewed interest in the sources of morals and morality. In this article I examine proposals on these matters by Charles Taylor and two of his interlocutors, Thomas Wren and Justin Oakley. I describe and compare the “holistic” epistemological approaches of these three in their searches for the “moral self,” and then evaluate the adequacy of their correlative ontological proposals. Finally, I discuss the meta-ethical implications of these emotive views of selfhood in terms of the objective or subjective status of moral values to determine whether these views meet the philosophers' own criteria for moral plausibility.
Does It Matter that Nothing We Do Will Matter in a Million Years?
Authors: Brill Skott 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTPeople have inferred that our lives are absurd from the supposed fact that nothing we do will matter in a million years. In this article, I critically discuss this argument for absurdity. After explaining how two refutations in the literature fail to undermine the best version of the argument, I produce several considerations that together do take much of the force out of the argument. I conclude by suggesting that these considerations not only refute this argument for absurdity, but also constitute a motivation to be moral.
Peut-on fonder l'arithmétique sur la logique pure? La controverse entre Natorp et Rickert
Authors: Dewalque Arnaud 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTIn this article, I try to shed light on the (Fregean) project of a logic of arithmetic—as discussed by Natorp and Rickert—by outlining three main questions. Is the number a logical object? Is arithmetic reducible to logic? Is it possible to deduce the arithmetical operations from purely logical laws? I argue that rigorous distinction between these three questions makes it possible to elucidate many problems affecting the program of a logic of arithmetic. The Neo-Kantian contribution to this program is at the same time considered in a new light.
Wittgenstein Listens to Mahler: How to Do Philosophy and Compose Music in the Breakdown of Tradition?
Authors: Szabados Béla 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTThis article retrieves, situates, and interprets Ludwig Wittgenstein's overlooked remarks about the composer Gustav Mahler, and connects them with Wittgenstein's philosophical perspective and practice, as well as with his musical aesthetics.
Why There Are No Epistemic Duties
Authors: Wrenn Chase B. 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTEpistemic duties would be duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, and they would be grounded in purely evidential considerations. I offer a new argument for the claim that there are no epistemic duties. Though people may have duties to believe, disbelieve, or withhold judgement from propositions, those duties are never grounded in purely epistemic considerations. Rather, allegedly epistemic duties are a species of moral duty.
Consonnes et voyelles: les fonctions de l'Être et de l'Autre dans le Sophiste de Platon (251a–259e)
Authors: Teisserenc Fulcran 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTThis article aims at understanding the functions of the forms of Being and the Other in Plato's Sophist. In contrast with a linguistic interpretation purporting to draw a distinction between uses of the verb “to be,” I shed light on the ontological role ascribed to “the great genus” in the interweaving of forms. Focusing on the vowel analogy, I argue that the roles of Being and the Other respectively are that of a connector and a separator actualizing the participations and the differences between the forms. The outcome of this analysis is to offer an explanation of the dialectical methods described in that dialogue in a rather obscure, abstract way; the much-debated question of self-predication can be settled without recourse to selfparticipation.
Actions, Reasons, and Intentions: Overcoming Davidson's Ontological Prejudice
Authors: McGuire John Michael 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTThis article defends the idea that causal relations between reasons and actions are wholly irrelevant to the explanatory efficacy of reason-explanations. The analysis of reason-explanations provided in this article shows that the so-called “problem of explanatory force” is solved, not by putative causal relations between the reasons for which agents act and their actions, but rather by the intentions that agents necessarily have when they act for a reason. Additionally, the article provides a critique of the principal source of support for the thesis that reason-explanations are causal explanations, namely, Davidson's argument in “Actions, Reasons, and Causes.” It is shown that Davidson's argument for this thesis rests crucially on two mistakes: his definition of intentional action and his ontological prejudice against intentions.
Locke vs. Hume: Who Is the Better Concept-Empiricist?
Authors: Weintraub Ruth 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTAccording to the received view, Hume is a much more rigorous and consistent concept-empiricist than Locke. Hume is supposed to have taken as a starting point Locke's meaning-empiricism, and worked out its full radical implications. Locke, by way of contrast, cowered from drawing his theory's strange consequences. The received view about Locke's and Hume's concept-empiricism is mistaken, I shall argue. Hume may be more uncompromising (although he too falters), but he is not more rigorous than Locke. It is not because of (intellectual) timidity that Locke does not draw Hume's conclusions from his empiricism. It is, rather, because of his much sounder method.
Guerre et paix selon Leibniz
Authors: Griard Jérémie 
Published: April 2009

AbstractThis article deals with Leibniz's dynamic conception of political order. Leibniz reduces the sovereignty of States to the monopoly of coercion by setting apart jurisdictional monopoly and sovereignty. With this new definition of sovereignty however, war becomes the core of international relations. The sovereigns' ability to make war is the condition to take part in law of nations, whose precise aim is to prevent wars. Peace can only exist if there is a balance between opposite forces of similar magnitude that cancel each other.
The Right to Life after Death
Authors: Simpson Evan 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTImagining a future world in which people no longer die provides a helpful tool for understanding our present ethical views. It becomes evident that the cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, and courage are options for reasonable people rather than rational requirements. On the assumption that the medical means to immortality are not universally available, even justice becomes detached from theories that tie the supposed virtue to the protection of human rights. Several stratagems are available for defending a categorical right to life under these circumstances, but none is compelling. Justice and human rights should therefore be understood as social conventions whose stability depends upon rejecting a tyranny of the immortals in favour of cultural traditions that connect rights and liberties with the means for their enjoyment.
Une critique d'explication par les causes finales: l'anticontractualisme de Hume. Une histoire naturelle du politique
Authors: Bonicco Céline 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTThis article proposes to show how David Hume's critique of contractualism is the political consequence of his analysis of causality. Hume rejects contractualism mainly for methodological reasons: explanations based on final causes are never satisfying. Therefore, contractualism applies to the political sphere the argument from design presented in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. The genesis of politics unfolded in A Treatise of Human Nature must be seen as a particular application of the only pertinent way of explaining phenomena, i.e., natural history, in which sympathy immanently configures and reconfigures society. The final cause must be replaced by the efficient cause. Hume's political theory—either positive or negative—and epistemology cannot be dissociated.
The Pragmatics of Empty Names
Authors: Wyatt Nicole 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTFred Adams and collaborators advocate a view on which empty-name sentences semantically encode incomplete propositions, but which can be used to conversationally implicate descriptive propositions. This account has come under criticism recently from Marga Reimer and Anthony Everett. Reimer correctly observes that their account does not pass a natural test for conversational implicatures, namely, that an explanation of our intuitions in terms of implicature should be such that we upon hearing it recognize it to be roughly correct. Everett argues that the implicature view provides an explanation of only some of our intuitions, and is in fact incompatible with others, especially those concerning the modal profile of sentences containing empty names. I offer a pragmatist treatment of empty names based upon the recognition that the Gricean distinction between what is said and what is implicated is not exhaustive, and argue that such a solution avoids both Everett's and Reimer's criticisms.
Heidegger et la destruction du scepticisme
Authors: Schürch Franz-Emmanuel 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTIn this article, I wish to shed a new light on Heidegger's philosophical position toward idealism and realism. This will be accomplished through an analysis of Heidegger's account of the problem of scepticism in §43 ofSein und Zeit.Heidegger's position toward scepticism has often been overlooked or treated candidly by scholars and, as a result, misunderstood in the larger philosophical world, who frequently equated Heidegger's philosophy with some form of scepticism. By highlighting some crucial ambiguities in the unfolding of §43, I show that inSein und ZeitHeidegger is elaborating a radical refutation of scepticism even though it will ultimately only be accomplished in theBeiträge zur Philosophie.
Ethical Consumption, Consumer Self-Governance, and the Later Foucault
Authors: Quastel Noah 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTThis article analyzes the later work of Michel Foucault on ethics, freedom, and self-governance as it applies to the ethics of consumption and to new ethical consumerist movements such as fair-trade coffee. Foucault's emphasis on practices of the self helps elucidate the virtue ethics involved in consumption choices. Ethical consumption is cast as a set of practices of self-development: through critical activity and the quest for freedom, persons seek to transform themselves to live in reciprocal relationships with other persons and nature. This requires public deliberation and collective action to effect change within ourselves and our practical systems of consumption and production.
Mopes, Dopes, and Tropes: A Critique of the Trope Solution to the Problem of Mental Causation
Authors: Alward Peter 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTA popular strategy for resolving Kim's exclusion problem is to suggest that mental and physical property tropes are identical despite the non-identity of the mental and physical properties themselves. I argue that mental and physical tropes can be identified without losing the dispositional character of mentality only if a dual-character hypothesis regarding the intrinsic characters of tropes is endorsed. But even with this assumption, the causal efficacy of the wrong dispositions is secured.
L'interprétation du principe de la propriété de soi au sein du libertarisme de gauche
Authors: Dietsch Peter 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTAny substantive notion of self-ownership presupposes well-defined property rights over external resources. Left-libertarians usually limit this category to natural resources. I argue that in a specialized economy, substantive selfownership equally needs to be complemented by a definition of property rights to the cooperative surplus. The natural way for left-libertarianism to provide such a definition is to view the cooperative surplus as an external resource and to distribute it equally. The second part of the article makes the general point that a complete theory of justice needs to take a stance on distribution in various contexts. Articulating the differences between these contexts allows us to gain a better understanding of how left-libertarianism relates to other theories of justice.
Toward a Modest Correspondence Theory of Truth: Predicates and Properties
Authors: Marino Patricia 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTCorrespondence theories are frequently charged with being either implausible—metaphysically troubling and overly general—or trivial—collapsing into deflationism's “‘P’ is true iff P.” Philip Kitcher argues for a “modest” correspondence theory, on which reference relations are causal relations, but there is no general theory of denotation. In this article, I start by showing that, understood this way, “modest” theories are open to charges of triviality. I then offer a refinement of modesty, and take the first steps toward articulating a modest correspondence theory, giving a particular account of the relation between predicates, properties, and extensions. Finally, I argue that my account does not collapse into a deflationary one.
Romantic Love and Knowledge: Refuting the Claim of Egoism
Authors: Foster Gary 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTRomantic love and its predecessor eros have both been characterized as forms of egoistic love. Part of this claim is concerned specifically with the relation between love and knowledge. Real love, it is claimed, is prior to knowledge and is not motivated by it. Romantic love and eros according to this view are egoistic in that they are motivated by a desire for knowledge. Agapic love characterized by bestowal represents a true form of love unmotivated by selfish desires. I argue that such an emphasis on bestowal at the expense of knowledge or appraisal of the beloved is problematic. The knowledge dimension of romantic love, rather than contributing to selfishness, can be a means of freeing us from egoism when we understand identity in its relational or social form.
Communauté et société, Collingwood contre les sociologues
Authors: Jaffro Laurent 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTThe opposition between community and society set out by Collingwood in hisNew Leviathan(1942) should be compared with the distinction betweenGemeinschaftandGesellschaftthat Tönnies had introduced in 1887. The debate on ideal types of social organizations apparently pertains to «pure sociology» and was continued by Durkheim and Weber. However, Collingwood's use of this distinction may be construed as an attack on the very idea of sociology in the name of the primacy of rational will.
Wittgenstein on Colours and Logical Multiplicities, 1930–1932
Authors: Blank Andreas 
Published: April 2009

AbstractThis article explores Wittgenstein's little known remarks on colour from his notebooks of the early 1930s. It emphasizes the importance of the notion of logical multiplicity contained in these remarks. The notion of logical multiplicity indicates that Wittgenstein, as in the years of the Tractatus, is committed to a theory of logical space in which every colour is embedded. However, logical multiplicities in his remarks of the early 1930s do not depend on an apparatus of simple objects, states of affairs, and elementary propositions. I suggest that, in this period, the logical multiplicity of colour space is a matter of how we see colours.
Conceiving of Pain
Authors: O'Sullivan Brendan , Hanks Peter 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTIn this article we aim to see how far one can get in defending the identity thesis without challenging the inference from conceivability to possibility. Our defence consists of a dilemma for the modal argument. Either “pain” is rigid or it is not. If it is not rigid, then a key premise of the modal argument can be rejected. If it is rigid, the most plausible semantic account treats “pain” as a natural-kind term that refers to its causal or historical origin, namely, C-fibre stimulation. It follows that any phenomenon that is not C-fibre stimulation is not pain, even if it is qualitatively similar to pain. This means there could be phenomena that feel like pain but are not pain since they are not C-fibre stimulation. These possible phenomena can be used to explain away the apparent conceivability of pain without C-fibre stimulation. On either horn of the dilemma, the identity theorist has ample resources to respond to Kripke's argument, even without wandering into the contentious territory of conceivability and possibility.
Strategic Reliabilism and the Replacement Thesis in Epistemology
Authors: Buckareff Andrei A. 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTIn their recent book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment, M. Bishop and J. D. Trout have challenged Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) in all its guises and have endorsed a version of the “replacement thesis”—proponents of which aim at replacing the standard questions of SAE with psychological questions. In this article I argue that Bishop and Trout offer an incomplete epistemology that, as formulated, cannot address many of the core issues that motivate interest in epistemological questions to begin with, and so is not a fit replacement.
LaCritique de la raison pureface aux scepticismes cartésien, baylien et humien
Authors: Smith Plinio Junqueira 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTIn his critical period, Kant thought that scepticism was a threat to the metaphysical enterprise of Enlightenment. He consequently tried to tackle three of its species: Baylean scepticism, which doubts that reason could establish any truth concerning its ideas; Humean scepticism, which must be distinguished from Hume's formulation of the problem if we want to show that synthetica priorijudgements are possible; and Cartesian scepticism, which puts in doubt the reference of empirical concepts to things in the external world. Kant's treatment reveals the fundamental role played by scepticism in his critical enterprise not only as a triple challenge to the critical project, but also as an ally against idealist dogmatism.
Foucault, Weber et l'histoire du sujet économique
Authors: Steiner Philippe 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTThis article deals with Michel Foucault's 1977–79 lectures on political economy. In the first part, we highlight his views on the market, which is equated to a social device instrumental in governing individuals so that they are induced to allow the ruler to reach his goal, which is providing security to the population. In the second part, we consider together Foucault's and Weber's views on the economy, since Foucault's concept of technique of the self is similar to Weber's concept of life conduct, which is central in his sociology of religion. This opens the way to a history of the modern economic behaviour considered as a form of ascetism.
Williamson and the Argument from Luminosity
Authors: Monaghan P. X. 
Published: April 2009

ABSTRACTMany of the results of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and Its Limits depend upon his argument that many, if not all, of our mental states fail to be luminous in the sense that if we are in them, then we are in a position to know that we are in them. The purpose of this article is to show that his argument is unsound. I conclude by distinguishing between partial and total luminosity, and by arguing that even if mental states are not totally luminous, they are at least partially so.
Molecular cloning and evolutionary analysis of the GJA1 (connexin43) gene from bats (Chiroptera)
Authors: WANG LI , LI GANG , WANG JINHONG , YE SHAOHUI , JONES GARETH , ZHANG SHUYI 
Published: April 2009

SummaryGap junction protein connexin43 (Cx43), encoded by the GJA1 gene, is the most abundant connexin in the cardiovascular system and was reported as a crucial factor maintaining cardiac electrical conduction, as well as having a very important function in facilitating the recycling of potassium ions from hair cells in the cochlea back into the cochlear endolymph during auditory transduction processes. In mammals, bats are the only taxon possessing powered flight, placing exceptional demand on many organismal processes. To meet the demands of flying, the hearts of bats show many specialties. Moreover, ultrasonic echolocation allows bat species to orientate and often detect and locate food in darkness. In this study, we cloned the full-length coding region of GJA1 gene from 12 different species of bats and obtained orthologous sequences from other mammals. We used the maximum likelihood method to analyse the evolution of GJA1 gene in mammals and the lineage of bats. Our results showed this gene is much conserved in mammals, as well as in bats' lineage. Compared with other mammals, we found one private amino acid substitution shared by bats, which is located on the inner loop domain, as well as some species-specific amino acid substitutions. The evolution rate analyses showed the signature of purifying selection on not only different classification level lineages but also the different domains and amino acid residue sites of this gene. Also, we suggested that GJA1 gene could be used as a good molecular marker to do the phylogenetic reconstruction.