bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
H
izballah
Authors: Silverbrook Cheryl 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
Hizballah is a Lebanese‐based, Shia Muslim group founded in the ideologies of the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution. Hizballah has a very strong alliance with Iran. It has claimed responsibility for attacks targeting both Americans and Israelis. Some security analysts consider Hizballah as the world's most technologically capable terrorist organization.
I
nternational
C
ooperation and
B
ioterrorism
P
reparedness
Authors: Roffey Roger 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The global nature of biological risks has been demonstrated by outbreaks of SARS, avian and swine influenza and the potential risk of pandemics. To this can be added the increasing risks involved with international terrorism. There is a need to enhance and better coordinate international cooperation if the fight against bioterrorism is to be successful. This includes such aspects as intelligence sharing, rapid alert and response systems, training, planning, R&D, intervention teams, and medical preparedness. It is also crucial to limit the proliferation of knowledge, equipment, and personnel that could be misused for illicit purposes by organizations or states. Ongoing activities in a number of international forums (e.g., EU, NATO, WHO, OIE, FAO, BWC) are reviewed.
Laboratory Response to Bioterrorism
Authors: Zerwekh Tyler , Emery Robert 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
Laboratory response to bioterrorism is used to describe a single laboratory or network of laboratories equipped to quickly and efficiently identify biological agents (bacteria, viruses, or toxins) that might be used in a bioterrorism event. To respond to such an event, laboratories rely on rapid diagnostic techniques such as microscopy, agglutination, culturing, antibiotic susceptibility, and polymerase chain reaction. The necessity for a systematic cohesive response is critical for a successful response to an attack. Rapid laboratory recognition and confirmation of bioterrorism agents expedites the medical response. Not much attention was paid to develop a laboratory response to attacks until 2001 and the anthrax letters incidents. It was then that the conceptual need for a rapid laboratory response became a reality. This article gives details on the basic types of laboratories, categories of biological agents, laboratory response network, and the importance of early detection and surveillance.
Media and Bioterrorism
Authors: Warrick Joby 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The first deadly bioterrorism attack in U.S. history in late 2001 caught many news outlets, and public officials, unprepared. Early news coverage of what became known as the “Amerithrax” case was frequently alarmist in tone and included inaccurate information that likely contributed to a climate of confusion and fear. Since then, media interest in the topic has expanded because of the federal government's controversial investigation of the crime, as well as questions about a massive expansion of programs and spending to prepare for future biological attacks. Early missteps in coverage highlighted the need for a thoughtful approach to bioterrorism reporting that emphasizes planning, training and restraint.
M
etropolitan
M
edical
R
esponse
S
ystem
Authors: Scantlebury Kari 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The Metropolitan Medical Response System is the first and longest running federal investment program that provides support to locally developed, owned, and operated mass casualty response systems (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2002). The program aims to coordinate first responders (fire/EMS), law enforcement personnel, public health officials, emergency management personnel, medical and mental health services providers on the local level in order to mitigate the impact and consequences of a mass casualty event during the initial phase of the response until additional State and Federal assets become available and operational (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2002).
Palestinian Islamic Jihad
Authors: Silverbrook Cheryl 
Published: July 2011

AbstractPalestinian Islamic Jihad is a group composed of several loosely affiliated factions that ascribe to radical Sunni Islam. The group is based out of the Gaza Strip. Although not a Shia group, PIJ still has strong financial and political ties to Iran. This relationship raises concerns about the group's ability to access and use biological and chemical weapons.
Al‐Qa'ida
Authors: Ryan John J. 
Published: July 2011

AbstractAl‐Qa'ida continues to pose the most virulent terrorist threat to the United States and its allies. The September 11, 2001 attack against the United States remains the most lethal terrorist act in world history. The U.S. military combats al‐Qa'ida forces directly in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and security services worldwide fight al‐Qa'ida across the globe. Al‐Qa'ida has evolved from its once centralized structure into a worldwide movement; which has made it difficult, if not impossible, to eradicate.
Ricin and Abrin
Authors: Poli Mark A. 
Published: July 2011

AbstractRicin and abrin are plant‐derived protein toxins that are potent inhibitors of cellular protein synthesis. Although never used, ricin was included in the biological weapons programs of several countries, including the United States, during the first half of the 20thcentury. Both toxins are now causing concerns as potential agents of bioterror. The sources, toxicity, mechanisms of action, and detection of these toxins are briefly discussed.
Biological Simulants
Authors: Kosal Margaret E. 
Published: July 2011

AbstractSimulants are non‐pathogenic microbes or biological substitutes used as model organisms in place of more lethal biological agents. Simulants, or surrogates, have been widely used in the past to study potential biological weapons scenarios. Current use of simulants is for defensive biological purposes, including biomolecular studies and as model organisms for detector, protection, decontaminant, and other passive defensive countermeasure development.
Staphylococcal Enterotoxins
Authors: Poli Mark A. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract

Many cases of human food‐borne illness throughout the world are caused by enterotoxins produced by various strains of
Staphylococcus aureus.
While oral exposure to these toxins commonly results in the traditional food‐poisoning symptomatology, nonenteric exposure can cause much more serious, even life‐threatening sequelae. From the standpoint of biological warfare and biological terrorism, SEB is considered the serotype of greatest import. It is a versatile agent, as it can be an effective incapacitating agent at very low inhaled doses. At only slightly higher doses, it can be lethal. The toxicity, mechanism of action, and detection of these agents are briefly discussed.
Suicide Terrorism
Authors: Dolnik Adam , Silva Sara De 
Published: July 2011

AbstractIn recent years, suicide bombings have become the most lethal and popular operational method for terrorist groups worldwide. Over the last 30 years, society has witnessed more then 1500 suicide bombings carried out by at least 28 different terrorist organizations in 31 different countries, and counting. The scope of advantages of suicide terrorism for tactical as well as strategic purposes is vast, as the act itself combines an ultimate demonstration of commitment, a pragmatic military tactic, the prevention of interrogation, and an unignorable form of protest into a single operation. This entry focuses on providing the background on definitions, motivations, history, and operational characteristics of modern suicide terrorism, followed by an assessment of the potential use of suicide bombers as delivery vehicles for biological agents in the future.
Typhus, Epidemic (
Rickettsia Prowazekii
)
Authors: Eremeeva Marina E. , Dasch Gregory A. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract

Rickettsia prowazekii
has been weaponized and is well known for its explosive epidemic potential in populations infested with body lice. The taxonomy, disease, biological warfare history and weaponizaton, and properties of the organism are briefly reviewed. Finally, aspects of the transmission and epidemiology of epidemic typhus, its diagnosis and treatment, and prevention and control are discussed relative to both the natural history disease context and to the nefarious use of
R. prowazekii
as a bioweapon agent.
A
l‐
A
qsa
M
artyrs
B
rigade (
A
l‐
A
qsa
M
artyr's
B
attalion)
Authors: Silverbrook Cheryl 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The al‐Aqsa Martyr's Brigade is a terrorist group based out of Palestine, which formed as an outgrowth of Yassir Arafat's Fatah party in 2000. The group is highly disjointed; however, it has successfully carried out several small arms attacks against Israeli interests. In 2006, it was reported, but not confirmed, that Al‐Aqsa had developed chemical and biological weapons.
Anthrax
Authors: Turnbull Peter 
Published: July 2011

AbstractAnthrax is caused by the endospore‐forming bacterium,Bacillus anthracis.It is primarily a disease of herbivorous animals but, although more resistant, omnivores, carnivores and avian species can be infected. Humans generally acquire the disease through contact with infected livestock or contaminated animal products. From the standpoint of potential agents of bioaggression (biological warfare and bioterrorism), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) rateB. anthracisvery highly in terms of posing threats to public health and national security. This reflects the lethality of the disease, the ability of anthrax spores to survive processes of delivery to a target and adverse conditions en route, the ease with which the spores may be produced in large quantities in the laboratory and the ability of humans to create dose exposures vastly exceeding what can occur naturally, readily overcoming the fairly high natural resistance of humans to infection. Disease can occur in three forms depending on the route of infection. Of primary concern in a bioaggressive context is the inhalational form, caused by respiratory exposure to aerosolized spores. Lethality with this form of the disease is very high in individuals not treated at a very early stage of infection.
A
sbat al‐
A
nsar
Authors: Ryan John J. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
Asbat al‐Ansar is a small terrorist group operating out of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. The group targets the secular government and Western interests within Lebanon. There has been little Asbat al‐Ansar activity in recent years. This is likely an attempt at self‐preservation, as Lebanese forces have had success in combating Asbat al‐Ansar's main rival, Fatah al‐Islam. The group shares ties to al‐Qa'ida and has sent members to fight coalition forces in Iraq.
BioSense and Public
H
ealth
S
urveillance
Authors: Siegrist David W. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
BioSense is a program led by the Centers for Disease Control that provides a national outbreak surveillance network through which health care organizations, public health, Health Information Exchanges (HIEs), and other national health data sources are able to contribute to the common operational picture of the health of the nation. It does this by applying analytics and data visualization techniques to health data automatically provided by its partners. The program is currently being updated and improved.
Botulinum Toxin (Clostridium Botulinum)
Authors: Pilch Richard F. , Bray Mike 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
Botulinum toxin is classified as a Category A agent of bioterrorism because of the ability of an extremely small dose to interrupt cholinergic nerve transmission, leading to paralysis and death. Treatment is currently limited to the carefully supervised administration of equine antitoxin after early symptom onset, an approach that would be inadequate in the event of a massive botulism outbreak. Efforts to develop new therapies applicable to a mass‐casualty situation focus on blocking specific steps in pathogenesis and speeding the recovery of neuronal and muscular function. This entry first reviews basic features of botulinum toxin, sources of poisoning, the clinical syndrome, current approaches to diagnosis and management, and the potential of the toxin as a bioterrorist weapon. It then presents the steps in the pathogenesis and recovery from botulism at the molecular level, accompanied by a description of current research efforts aimed at developing specific therapeutic measures.
Brucellosis and Bioterrorism
Authors: Nicoletti Paul 
Published: July 2011

Abstract

Brucellosis is perhaps the most widespread zoonosis in the world. The major impacts are losses in animal production and negative effects on human health.
Brucella
spp have long been considered and studied as potential bioterrorism agents. Their impact, as which many others, would depend upon exposure and resistance of the target population and methods available for control of an outbreak. The characteristics of brucellosis in both animals and humans appear to make
Brucella
spp as inferior to several other agents as candidates for bioterrorism. The long and variable incubation period, low mortality (less panic), difficulty of exposure to large populations of humans and available treatment are some factors leading to this conclusion.
Human Poxviruses
Authors: Jahrling Peter B. , Kuhn Jens H. 
Published: July 2011

AbstractThe familyPoxviridaeincludes important and well‐known human pathogens, such as cowpox virus and vaccinia virus. Its most important member is variola virus (VARV), the etiological agent of smallpox, which is highly stable, highly infectious, and highly contagious. In the 20th century alone VARV caused ≈500 million human deaths (Tucker, 2001). Although VARV, which can only infect humans, was eradicated by 1980 via a World Health Organization (WHO) global eradication campaign (Henderson, 2009), the virus remains a top research priority in the biodefense community because (1) general vaccination against smallpox was abandoned worldwide in the late 1970s; (2) earth's human population, including the number of immunosuppressed individuals, has grown and its mobility increased; (3) the virus still exists (officially in two laboratories in the United States and in Russia; unofficially possibly in other countries (Miller et al., 2001)); (4) the virus could potentially be reconstructed from available sequence data or from reisolated from dried scabs, which can maintain infectious virus for decades (Huq, 1976); and (5) because the virus was successfully weaponized by the Soviet Union's clandestine offensive biological warfare program before and after its eradication (Alibek and Handelman, 1999; Henderson et al., 1999). A relative of VARV, monkeypox virus (MPXV), is an emerging virus in Africa and was inadvertently imported into the United States in 2003 (Reed et al., 2004). Like VARV, MPXV was weaponized in the Soviet Union (Alibek and Handelman, 1999), suggesting that close relatives of VARV could be developed as weapons by bioterrorists or other aggressors.
Identifying State‐RunBWPrograms
Authors: Nordmann Brian 
Published: July 2011

AbstractIdentifying and understanding possible state‐run biological weapons programs is a critical element for national security. Several agencies within the United States Government provide information useful to such a threat analysis. A full 19 countries are beleved to have had BW programs in the 20th century and the early part of the 21st century. The true status of any of these programs is largely unknown.
I
nternational
O
rganizations
Authors: Roffey Roger , Joliat Jacqueline N. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
Whether an outbreak is initiated deliberately or naturally, the international implications are significant. In either case, large‐scale infection could have the potential to cause massive casualties, stress emergency response capabilities, diminish workforces, impair economic activities, slow or halt trade and travel, and possibly strain diplomatic relationships. The international community's increased appreciation of these implications in recent years has lead to improved efforts in infectious disease surveillance, detection, and reporting, and enhanced international coordination and cooperation in dealing with these threats. These improvements, which were largely intended to be used for natural disease outbreaks, also provide the global networks and infrastructure necessary to detect and respond to bioterrorist threats or attacks with international cohesion. The threat of infectious disease—whether initiated by a bioterrorism event or a natural outbreak—is clearly a global one, by nature and in scope, meaning that international cooperation is integral to adequately defending against it. This entry will provide an overview of some efforts by international organizations that are currently underway to address the global infectious disease threat.
Laboratory Biosecurity
Authors: Salerno Reynolds M. , Salazar Carlos A. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract

Since the tragic events of September 2001 and the subsequent dissemination of
Bacillus anthracis
through the US postal system, the international community has begun to focus more intently on the threat of transnational terrorist groups, and, in particular, on the frightening prospect of large‐scale biological terrorism. Various strategies are being applied to combat the biological threat. Most strategies are reactionary in nature. They focus on improving the ability to detect and respond to a biological attack after it has occurred. The international community has also begun employing preventive strategies. One of the principal strategies in this category is laboratory biosecurity, which is defined as the protection of dangerous pathogens and toxins against theft and misuse. By reducing the risk that potential bioterrorists and others could acquire certain dangerous biological materials, biosecurity provides the first line of defense against biological attacks. There are several unique challenges posed by microorganisms that differentiate biosecurity from other forms of high security, and an effective biosecurity effort must take these into account. The first step towards implementing biosecurity is conducting a laboratory risk assessment. Security risk assessments help reduce risks in bioscience laboratories because they prioritize a wide range of risks, and direct management efforts toward the most effective risk reduction measures for the highest risks. Different techniques can be used to mitigate risks in different circumstances to improve security in bioscience laboratories. Although laboratory biosecurity cannot prevent biocrimes or bioterrorism, it is appropriate to take steps that reduce the likelihood that dangerous pathogens and toxins could be stolen and misused from bioscience facilities.
National Laboratories of the National Nuclear Security Agency:
L
awrence
L
ivermore
N
ational
L
aboratory,
L
os
A
lamos
N
ational
L
aboratory,
S
andia
N
ational
L
aboratories
Authors: Cleland Cathy , Lindner Duane L. , Rakestraw David , Resnick Gary 
Published: July 2011

Abstract

The three National Laboratories administered by the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Agency each have broad and comprehensive activities in support of national biodefense. The laboratories' programs address all aspects of biodefense in the areas of
Threat Awareness, Prevention and Protection, Surveillance and Detection
, and
Response and Recovery
. These efforts are supported by vigorous multidisciplinary research efforts at the labs. Many important national biodefense capabilities are the result of the laboratories' ability to draw upon their diverse technical capabilities to form multidisciplinary teams that can drive leading edge science and from it provide real world solutions
N
ational
S
cience
A
dvisory
B
oard for
B
iosecurity (
NSABB
)
Authors: Joliat Jacqueline N. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) is an advisory committee that is managed and supported by the Office of Biotechnology Activities within the Office of Science Policy at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), an operating division of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Its purpose, according to its Charter, is to “provide advice, guidance, and leadership regarding biosecurity oversight of dual‐use research, defined as biological research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health and/or national security.” This entry covers the creation of NSABB, its responsibilities and charges, and an overview of its meetings, publications, and other activities in the 5 years since its inception.
National Strategy for Biological Threats
Authors: Miller Jacqueline E. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract

The
National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats
(Strategy) is a high‐level document outlining the areas where the Obama Administration intends to focus its efforts to reduce the accidental or intentional spread of biological agents. The Strategy is meant to complement other frameworks already in place that address biological threats, emergency preparedness, and emergency response; it is not meant to implement any particular program or direct that any particular action be taken.
N
ations of
C
oncern:
T
he
R
epublic of
K
urdistan
Authors: Nelson Gail H. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The Kurdish people live in a region that straddles the international boundaries of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria without national sovereignty or nation‐state recognition. The Kurdish aspiration for an independent Kurdistan is the source of protracted insurgency throughout the Kurdish‐populated region but in particular eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, and western Iran. Kurdish extremism will remain a source of regional instability but it is unlikely the separatists will pursue WMD and bioterrorism as a means to achieve its political ends.
N
ations of
C
oncern:
S
yria
Authors: Binder Markus K. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The article discusses Syria's biological weapons capability, its support to terrorism, and finally the possibility that Syria might provide biological weapons‐related materials or information to terrorist groups. Based on the available information, the article concludes that Syria does not possess an offensive biological weapons capability even though it may possess the technical wherewithal to develop, produce, and deploy biological weapons. The article also concludes that in spite of its support to terrorism in the region, Syria has not transferred any biological weapons‐related information or material to terrorist groups and is highly unlikely to do so in the future.
Pathogens Causing Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
Authors: Kuhn Jens H. , Radoshitzky Sheli R. , Jahrling Peter B. 
Published: July 2011

AbstractViral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) are clinically similar syndromes with often high case‐fatality rates in mammals caused by taxonomically diverse viruses. Vaccines exist only for the prevention of a few VHFs, and specific antivirals are virtually absent. VHF pathogens were part of the former offensive research bioweapons programs of both the US and USSR and a few were weaponized by Soviet scientists. Here we discuss the properties of and threats posed by the major human VHF pathogens of biodefense concern.
U
nited
N
ations
S
ecurity
C
ouncil
R
esolution 1540 (2004)
Authors: Woodward Angela 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 requires all UN Member States to take legislative and other national measures to prohibit and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons to non‐state actors, particular terrorists and to report on implementation to the United Nations 1540 Committee.