bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Constraints on Hypothetical Interactions from the Casimir Effect
Authors: Bordag M. , Klimchitskaya G. L. , Mohideen U. , Mostepanenko V. M. 
Published: September 2009

AbstractMany extensions to the Standard Model of elementary particles predict the existence of long-range interactions between neutral macrobodies in addition to Newtonian gravity. This chapter summarizes the constraints on these interactions obtained from the Casimir effect and compares them with the parallel progress in gravitational measurements. The availability of new precise measurements of the Casimir force, considered in Chapter 19, has provided further impetus for rapid progress in this direction. As a result, in the last few years, the previously known constraints on Yukawa interactions in the submicrometer range have been strengthened by up to ten thousand times. As shown in the chapter, the strongest constraints at the shortest separations follow from measurements of the Casimir force.
How is Hegelian Metaphysics Possible?
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis chapter considers what makes the Hegel's enterprise in metaphysics distinctive, and in particular how it differs from that of his great predecessor, Immanuel Kant. It is argued that while Hegel should be understood as going further in his metaphysical enterprise than Kant's critical approach would warrant, Hegel has good internal reasons for thinking that Kant's position was unstable, and thus that a more ambitious project could be vindicated, of a more traditionally ontological kind. On the other hand, it is also argued that Hegel did not go as far as offering a metaphysics of ‘the absolute’ along transcendent lines. The chapter also lays out the connecting threads that link the chapters that follow.
Hegel's Idealism
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThe nature of Hegel's idealism has been much disputed, and this chapter offers an account of it that is distinctive. Against recent commentators such as Robert Pippin, it is argued that Hegel was not a Kantian or transcendental idealist. It is also argued that Hegel was not a mentalistic idealist, offering a kind of ‘spirit monism’ that reduced the world to mind. Instead Hegel understood idealism to be the view that ‘the finite has no veritable being’, where this leads to a position according to which thought cannot grasp what truly exists through experience but only through a kind of rationalist theorizing, and that this in turn requires us to accept a form of realism about concepts. This conceptual realism makes up the core of Hegel's idealism, understood as the anti-nominalist doctrine that reality is structured by concepts that render it accessible to thought.
Did Hegel Hold an Identity Theory of Truth?
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThe aim of this chapter is to criticize Thomas Baldwin's claim that in developing an identity theory of truth F. H. Bradley was following Hegel. It is argued that Baldwin has incorrectly understood certain passages from Hegel which he cites in defense of this view, and that Hegel's conception of truth in these passages was material, not propositional — that is, it concerned the identity of an object and its concept, not a proposition and object being referred to in that proposition.
Hegel'sDoppelsatz: A Neutral Reading
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: September 2009

AbstractIn the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes that ‘what is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational’. This so-called Doppelsatz has been much discussed, with commentators offering both conservative and progressive readings of Hegel's meaning. This chapter takes a different approach, arguing that the Doppelsatz should be understood in a normatively neutral way, claiming instead that it is a defense of Hegel's philosophical rationalism, and his belief that the political world is amenable to the sort of rational investigation he offers in the Philosophy of Right.
British Hegelianism: A Non‐Metaphysical View?
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis chapter puts forward a revisionary reading of Hegel's reception in Britain at the turn of the 19th century, in suggesting that the stance of the British Hegelians is very close to the sort of non-metaphysical or category theory interpretations that have been in vogue amongst contemporary commentators. It is shown that the British Hegelians arrived at this position as a way of responding to the hostile existentialist reaction to Hegel begun by F. W. J. Schelling in the 1840s, which led them to abandon the standard Neoplatonic reading of his idealism, and arrive at the sort of non-metaphysical account which is most fully developed by J. M. E. McTaggart in his interpretation of Hegel's Logic.
Peirce on Hegel: Nominalist or Realist?
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis chapter considers one of Peirce's criticisms of Hegel, namely, that Hegel was a nominalist. The nature of this criticism is explored, particularly in the light of another of Peirce's claims about Hegel, viz. that he was overcommitted to what Peirce calls ‘Thirdness’, where it is then prima facie puzzling how Hegel can have both faults, as the latter involves a kind of realism about generality or universals which nominalists characteristically reject. The chapter then considers the justice of Peirce's criticism, where it is argued that the criticism is unwarranted, and that in some respects it is curious to find Peirce making it at all, when he could just as easily have treated Hegel as an ally in his struggle against nominalism.
Peirce, Hegel, and the Category of Secondness
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis chapter focuses on Peirce's criticism that Hegel neglected to give sufficient weight to what Peirce calls ‘Secondness’, in a way that put his philosophical system out of touch with reality. The nature of this criticism is explored, together with its relevant philosophical background. It is argued that while the issues Peirce raises go deep, nonetheless in some respects Hegel's position is closer to his own than he may have realised, whilst in others that criticism can be resisted by the Hegelian.
James and Bradley on the Limits of Human Understanding
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis chapter offers a comparative assessment of the views of William James and F. H. Bradley on the topic of human understanding and its limits. It is argued that while both have a distrust of the conceptual aspects of thought, and so share the view that the human intellect will always fail to gain absolute knowledge, they develop this idea very differently, thanks to the divergence in their respective philosophical outlooks: whereas Bradley developed it in the context of a post-Hegelian intellectualist rationalism, James did so in the context of his pragmatic humanism. The nature of the dispute between James and Bradley on this issue is explored, as an important turning point in the philosophical ‘Weltbild’ of the 20th century.
A Contract on Future Generations?
Authors: Gardiner Stephen M. 
Published: September 2009

AbstractContract theories — such as contractarianism and contractualism — seek to justify (and sometimes to explain) moral and political ideals and principles through the notion of ‘mutually agreeable reciprocity or cooperation between equals’ (Darwall 2002). This chapter argues that such theories face fundamental difficulties in the intergenerational setting. Most prominently, the standard understanding of cooperation appears not to apply, and the intergenerational setting brings on a more severe collective action problem than the traditional prisoner's dilemma. Mainstream contract theorists (such as Gauthier and Rawls) have tried to overcome such difficulties by postulating some kind of chain of connection between generations. However, as this chapter maintains, thus far such attempts have proven inadequate. Given this, it seems either that mainstream contract theory needs to be rethought, or that a new, specifically intergenerational, contract theory is needed.
Three Models of Intergenerational Reciprocity
Authors: Gosseries Axel 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis chapter explores the specificities, strengths, and weaknesses of the idea of reciprocity as a basis for intergenerational obligations. Three models are presented: descending, ascending, and double reciprocity. Each of these three models is tested against three objections. The first objection asks why having received something from someone would necessarily entail the obligation to give back. The second objection questions the ability of each model to justify the direction of reciprocation. A final objection looks at the extent to which reciprocity-based views adjust the content of our obligation to the fluctuations in population size.
A Value or an Obligation? Rawls on Justice to Future Generations
Authors: Heyd David 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis chapter reviews Rawls' attempt to address the theoretical problem of extending the principles of justice to future generations. It examines the two options suggested by Rawls for solving the problem: the ‘general assembly’ and ‘the present-time-of-entry’. It argues that Rawls does not directly address the problem of the identity of future (possible) people, which means that the conditions for the inclusion of future people in the original position cannot be fully determined. Rawls wishes to offer a theory of just intergenerational distributions but it turns out that such a theory is logically dependent on the number and identity of future people, an issue which cannot itself be fixed in terms of an ideal contract under a veil of ignorance. The conclusion of the article is that the scope of the group in which the principles of justice are decided and implemented cannot itself be determined by a contractarian method.
What Motivates Us to Care for the (Distant) Future?
Authors: Birnbacher Dieter 
Published: September 2009

AbstractRecognising moral responsibility in the abstract is generally not causally sufficient for complying with it in relevant situations, not even in the absence of strong conflicting motives. In the case of responsibility towards future generations this gap widens, for many reasons: prognostic uncertainty, anonymity of ‘moral patients’, lack of reciprocity, and sheer temporal distance. The chapter discusses how far these deficiencies in direct motivation to responsibility to future generations can be compensated by indirect motivations such as those postulated by the ‘chain-of-love’ model, by community ties, and by the wish to preserve what one values. The chapter also considers the role institutions might play in the channelling of indirect motivations and in internal and external self-binding, such as constitutional and other legal norms and the setting up of national and supranational councils capable of correcting the short term orientation of legislative bodies.
Preference‐formation and Intergenerational Justice
Authors: Bykvist Krister 
Published: September 2009

AbstractIt has been proved to be extremely difficult to find a theory of beneficence that would provide both a coherent and plausible account of our responsibilities to future generations. Matters seem to be even worse if we adopt a desire-based theory of well-being. If we assume that the well-being of a person crucially depends on how well her preferences are satisfied, then we need to worry not only about which persons to create, but also which desires to create. A satisfactory desire-theory, it is argue here, must define what is better for a person in terms of his absolute desires, not his comparative ones, and discriminate between desires on the basis of the values of their objects.
Egalitarianism and Population Change
Authors: Arrhenius Gustaf 
Published: September 2009

AbstractWhat is the role of equality in the evaluation of populations of different sizes in respect to their goodness? The field of population ethics has been riddled with paradoxes which purport to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies. Parfit's well-known Mere Addition Paradox is a case in point. These paradoxes challenge at a fundamental level the existence of a satisfactory theory of our duties to future generations and intergenerational justice. This chapter discusses whether egalitarian concerns can help us solve these paradoxes. It is claimed that whereas egalitarian considerations are applicable in different number cases and can help us solve the Mere Addition Paradox, such considerations are not of much help in another paradox. The implications of the Priority View in different number cases are also examined.
Intergenerational Justice, Human Needs, and Climate Policy
Authors: Wolf Clark 
Published: September 2009

AbstractAnthropogenic climate change policy involves tradeoffs between the rights and welfare of present and future people. A theory of justice should provide guidance to help make these tradeoffs appropriately and fairly. This chapter develops a revised Rawlsian theory of intergenerational justice, and applies it to the problem of climate policy. But unlike the received Rawlsian view, the view developed in this chapter considers the incorporation of a ‘needs principle’ as a first principle of justice. This principle specifies that meeting basic needs is the first priority of justice, prior even to the principle protecting fundamental liberties.
The Problem of a Perpetual Constitution
Authors: Muñiz‐Fraticelli Víctor M. 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis chapter critically assesses the argument that it is unjust for one generation to bind subsequent ones to a certain political structure through a perpetual constitution, that is, one intended to govern a society for an indefinite period of time, without requiring periodic re-enactment or ratification. In the context of Thomas Jefferson's protest against constitutional perpetuity, and James Madison reply, it argues that the Madisonian position provides better reasons of both prudence and justice in favour of a perpetual constitution. Against Michael Otsuka's more recent objections, it defends a perpetual constitution on a combination of instrumental, consensual, and ontological grounds. Finally, it discusses the implications of interpretation and amendment on constitutional perpetuity, and the instances in which there might be good reasons to abandon perpetuity and reconstitute political society.
Global Frameworks or State-based Insolvencies—the Problem of Cross-border Insolvency
Authors: Mevorach Irit 
Published: September 2009

AbstractWhereas the previous chapter considered the extent to which we should link between group members when resolving legal problems associated with groups, this chapter asks how to deal with the international element of the MEG insolvency, i.e., whether we should aim to unify insolvency process across borders. It considers the main schools of thought in cross-border insolvency, mainly the universality-territoriality dilemma, as well as the application of these theories in practice — examining different frameworks for cross-border insolvency including international initiatives at harmonization of insolvency laws. The chapter concludes with suggesting that both universalism and territorialism have a role to play in resolving the group insolvency problem. In deciding whether to apply universalism or territorialism based solutions consideration should be given to the degree to which the solution will achieve the goals of insolvency, but also to the type of MEG in default and the level of interference with state separateness which is invoked.
Equitable Distribution and Accountability
Authors: Mevorach Irit 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis chapter focuses on pursuing fairness (substantive and procedural). It examines the compatibility of global consolidation mechanisms in light of these goals. It suggests that fairness in distribution requires that in ‘business integrated’ insolvent MEG cases, coordinated solutions should be pursued if this will benefit the group as a whole while not significantly harming certain entities. The system should otherwise respect rights of creditors vis-à-vis the entity to which they belong, and not mix assets and debts across the MEG (with ‘asset integration’ cases an exception). It also asks whether possible changes in the law applicable (following a change in the forum as a result of applying consolidation on a global level) fit with fairness in distribution, and suggests that it is indeed the case contingent on the application of certain safeguards. Global consolidation in appropriate cases also ensures accountability provided that mechanisms are in place to encourage participation, and that those in charge of global consolidation posses sufficient expertise.
The inherited microbiota of arthropods, and their importance in understanding resistance and immunity
Authors: Hurst Gregory D.D. , Darby Alistair C. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This chapter begins with a brief review of the diversity of insect–symbiont interactions. It then proposes that symbionts are similar to constitutive defences: the insect always pays a metabolic cost. However, secondary symbionts can be lost easily if the selection pressure exerted by a parasitoid relaxes, for example. Aside from protection, there is another twist to the story. In most cases, these symbionts will be expressing pathogen-associated molecular patterns (PAMPs) similar to, or the same as, those of the pathogen. Moreover, the host needs to ensure that the symbionts cooperate. This establishes a very interesting perspective on the evolution of the insect's immune system: maintaining and managing symbionts could constitute a formidable selection pressure for the evolution of a policing system, such as immunity.
Costs and genomic aspects of Drosophila immunity to parasites and pathogens
Authors: Kraaijeveld Alex R. , Wertheim Bregje 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This chapter begins by focusing on the parasites and pathogens known to attack or infect D. melanogaster (or other Drosophila species), from macro-parasites, such as parasitoids and mites to microbial (fungal and bacterial) pathogens to viruses. It concentrates on the main selection pressures for and against resistance against these parasites and pathogens. High resistance is selected for when the benefits it incurs outweigh its costs. For each parasite/pathogen, the chapter summarizes the existing knowledge on abundance in the field, fitness effects of parasitism/infection, and costs of resistance, where it distinguishes between costs of actual resistance and costs of the resistance mechanism. The second section of the chapter shifts the focus to the genomic level. Over the last few years several papers have been published where microarrays have been used to investigate D. melanogaster resistance to parasites and pathogens. The chapter considers what these studies are telling us about Drosophila resistance mechanisms and about the associated costs.
Ecological and evolutionary implications of specific immune responses
Authors: Sadd Ben M. , Schmid-Hempel Paul 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This chapter approaches the question of immune specificity from an evolutionary ecology perspective. For the sake of clarity, immune specificity is addressed on two levels. First, immune specificity is considered in the light of evidence for specific interactions between hosts and parasites. The importance of these specific interactions for questions concerning genetic diversity is then discussed. The second level on which immune specificity is addressed in the context of immune priming. It must be stressed that these two phenomena are almost certainly not mutually exclusive. For instance, the level of primed defences may be constrained by the innate defence capacity of an individual. Consequently, immune priming may play a role in the formation of specific interactions between hosts and parasites when re-infections are persistent or infections are chronic. Prior to concluding, the chapter considers sociality, and in particular immune defence within social insects.
Theses on Cinema as Philosophy
Authors: Livingston Paisley 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This chapter criticizes what the chapter calls the ‘bold thesis’, which is the conjunction of the idea that films can make an original contribution to philosophy, and the idea that this contribution can be achieved primarily or even entirely through means exclusive to the cinematic medium. A dilemma argument against this thesis is set forth: either support for the bold thesis depends on a claim about a cinematic contribution that cannot be paraphrased and so can be reasonably doubted, or it rests on a contribution that can be paraphrased, in which case the clause about medium specificity is betrayed. As an alternative to the bold thesis, the chapter advocates a moderate thesis whereby a film-related contribution to philosophy can be of value even when the philosophical content is neither original nor conveyed primarily by means exclusive to the cinematic medium. This chapter discusses Aaron Smuts' proposed solution to the problem of paraphrase, which makes reference to an argument advanced by Sergei Eisenstein in the ‘For God and Country’ sequence of October.
Bergman, Kaila, and the Faces of Irrationality
Authors: Livingston Paisley 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This chapter introduces the little-known connection between Ingmar Bergman's films and what the director identified as his major philosophical source — a treatise in philosophical psychology authored by the Finnish positivist, Eino Kaila, in 1934. Bergman proclaimed that reading this book was a tremendous philosophical experience for him and that he found some of Kaila's central claims shattering but true. Bergman added that he ‘built on this ground’. As Kaila's book has only been translated into Swedish and Danish, many Bergman commentators remain oblivious to its contents. This chapter surveys Kaila's positions and describes ways in which Bergman's work was informed by the questions and claims in Kaila's book. More specifically, the chapter focuses on Kaila's interest in various types of inauthenticity and motivated irrationality. Various Bergman films are discussed, but special attention is paid to his 1980 From the Life of the Marionettes.
Conclusion
Authors: Livingston Paisley 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This concluding chapter discusses the tradeoffs faced by different interpretative approaches. The interpreter who freely chooses or invents a framework of philosophical assumptions to apply to a film often fails to elucidate any philosophizing actually accomplished by the film-maker. While pedagogically useful as illustrations of philosophical points, such interpretations of fictions provide no justification or confirmation of these philosophical generalizations. On the other hand, interpreters who seek to discover the film-maker's philosophizing encounter other constraints, such as a lack of evidence or the film-maker's failure to engage sufficiently with complex philosophical debates. Bergman's cinematic oeuvre exemplifies those cases where author-oriented appreciation and philosophical interpretation can coincide. Bergman's vivid and stirring fictional explorations of general issues pertaining to human motivation, knowledge, and value can stimulate and guide philosophical reflection. To take an interest in the Kaila-inspired topics broached in Bergman's films yields an enhanced appreciation of Bergman's artistry and of the skill with which he and his gifted performers broached these issues in cinematic fictions.
Introduction
Authors: Ott Walter 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis chapter sets up the division the book will explore: the split between “top‐down” and “bottom‐up” views of the laws of nature. The scholastic view is a bottom‐up picture: although God must concur with the powers of bodies, those bodies determine the precise course of events. Descartes's invention of the laws of nature results in a top‐down picture: what happens in the world depends directly on the will of God.