bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Berthold Goldschmidt: Orchestral Music
Authors: Matthews Colin 
Published: February 2010

With his major work, the opera Beatrice Cenci, unperformed apart from extracts, his other opera Der gewaltige Hahnrei not revived professionally since its highly successful première more than 50 years ago, the Second Quartet having to wait 17 years for its première, the remarkably original Kästner settings of 1931 still awaiting a performance, it is clear that it is not only Berthold Goldschmidt's orchestral works that have been ‘undeservedly neglected’.But of these orchestral works only one can in any sense be said to have entered the repertoire, and that, ironically, is one of Goldschmidt's very earliest works—the Comedy of Errors Overture of 1925. It is his only orchestral score in print. The three concertos—the Cello Concerto (1953), Clarinet Concerto (1954), and Violin Concerto (1951–5)—received a fair number of performances during the 1950'5 (not all of them under Goldschmidt's baton), but have virtually disappeared, along with the inventive Sinfonietta of 1945. Perhaps the least deserving of the obscurity into which they have temporarily fallen are the Ciaconna Sinfonica (1936) and the Mediterranean Songs (1958)—both of them works of real power and substance, and immediately approachable.
The Plum'd Serpent: Antonio Borgese and Roger Sessions's ‘Montezuma”
Authors: Olmstead Andrea 
Published: February 2010

The Spanish Conquest of Mexico provides stirring drama for an epic opera on an American subject It has been set by some 30 composers; the earliest is Graun's Montezuma (1755), and the best-known Spontini's Fernand Cortez, ou la Conquête de Mexique (1809). Antonio Borgese, a Sicilian who ‘fell in love with the English language’, retold the epic story to music by Roger Sessions.How did such an unlikely alliance—a Sicilian poet, an American composer, and Mexican history—come about? Sessions first met Antonio Borgese in 1934 in his home town of Hadley, Massachusetts, when Borgese was teaching at Smith College. In 1935 Borgese made a trip to Mexico, where he was overwhelmed by the early history of that country; on his return, he proposed collaborating on an opera on the subject, although he had never written a libretto. Sessions knew nothing of Mexico's history, but did possess a first edition of Prescott's Conquest of Mexico given to his grandfather, possibly by Prescott himself. Sessions read the Prescott and Bernal Diaz's account, and he too became enthralled. Borgese wisely advised against Sessions's proposed title, Tenochtitlan, arguing, ‘The opera is written for titans; we don't need a title for titans, too’. Instead, he suggested the title Montezuma.
Robert Simpson's ‘New Way’
Authors: Pike Lionel 
Published: February 2010

The Recently Issued Recording of Simpson's Eighth String Quartet has given us an opportunity to examine a change in that composer's approach to large-scale form. He himself mentioned this ‘new way’—without using such a Beethovenian expression—in a BBC Radio 3 discussion with Michael Oliver, on 6 November 1982:In earlier times I was interested in large-scale tonality, large areas of tonality: but now I'm trying to find what intervals themselves can generate, using the resonances inherent in simple intervals like the fifth, the fourth or the third. I try to generate something from that by feeling it in a novel way, by approaching the interval of a fifth as if I had never heard it before, and trying to find what can happen—or by using intervals against each other. Take two intervals, the second and the fifth; then you have a combination of intervals and you can use them in different ways against each other.
York Höller's ‘The Master and Margarita’: A German Opera
Authors: Stenzl Jürg 
Published: February 2010

1 ‘Literaturoper’: Literary Opera and the ‘problem of opera’Right up to the end of the 19th century, an opera libretto was conceived differently from a stage play. This was because, from the outset, the libretto was thought out and constructed with a view to being set to music and sung. The librettist, whether he was writing in Italian or French, had to respect the conventions of this particular literary genre, conventions that were derived from a specific type of musical drama comprised of an alternation between recitatives (action) and arias or ensembles (tableaux). The use of specific lines and rhymes made the libretto into a ‘pre-composition’, and gave the composer an architectural plan to follow.
Minds, brains, and programs
Authors: Searle John R. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThis article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions. (1) Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain. I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality. (2) Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim. The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality. These two propositions have the following consequences: (3) The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2. (4) Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1. (5) Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4.“Could a machine think?” On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains. And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.
Peer-review practices of psychological journals: The fate of published articles, submitted again
Authors: Peters Douglas P. , Ceci Stephen J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractA growing interest in and concern about the adequacy and fairness of modern peer-review practices in publication and funding are apparent across a wide range of scientific disciplines. Although questions about reliability, accountability, reviewer bias, and competence have been raised, there has been very little direct research on these variables.The present investigation was an attempt to study the peer-review process directly, in the natural setting of actual journal referee evaluations of submitted manuscripts. As test materials we selected 12 already published research articles by investigators from prestigious and highly productive American psychology departments, one article from each of 12 highly regarded and widely read American psychology journals with high rejection rates (80%) and nonblind refereeing practices.With fictitious names and institutions substituted for the original ones (e.g., Tri-Valley Center for Human Potential), the altered manuscripts were formally resubmitted to the journals that had originally refereed and published them 18 to 32 months earlier. Of the sample of 38 editors and reviewers, only three (8%) detected the resubmissions. This result allowed nine of the 12 articles to continue through the review process to receive an actual evaluation: eight of the nine were rejected. Sixteen of the 18 referees (89%) recommended against publication and the editors concurred. The grounds for rejection were in many cases described as “serious methodological flaws.” A number of possible interpretations of these data are reviewed and evaluated.
Précis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information
Authors: Dretske Fred I. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractA theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the information producing it. This picture of knowledge captures most of what makes knowledge an important cpistcmological notion. It also avoids many of the problems infecting traditional justificational accounts of knowledge (knowledge as [justified, true belief’). Our information pickup systems are characterized in terms of the way they encode incoming information (perception) for further cognitive processing. Our perceptual experience is distinguished from our perceptual beliefs by the different way sensory information is encoded in these internal structures. Our ropositional attitudes – those (unlike knowledge) having a content that can be either true or false (e.g., belief) – are described in terms of the way internal (presumably neural) structures acquire during learning a certain information-carrying role. The content of these structures (whether true or false) is identified with the kind of information they were developed to carry
Human inbreeding avoidance: Culture in nature
Authors: van den Berghe Pierre L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractMuch clinical and ethnographic evidence suggests that humans, like many other organisms, are selected to avoid close inbreeding because of the fitness costs of inbreeding depression. The proximate mechanism of human inbreeding avoidance seems to be precultural, and to involve the interaction of genetic predispositions and environmental conditions. As first suggested by E. Westermarck, and supported by evidence from Israeli kibbutzim, Chinese sim-pua marriage, and much convergent ethnographic and clinical evidence, humans negatively imprint on intimate associates during a critical period of early childhood (between ages 2 and 6).There is also much evidence that, like other social animals, humans do not seek to maximize outbreeding, but rather to maintain an optimal balance between outbreeding and inbreeding.Closeinbreeding reduces fitness through inbreeding depression, butsomeinbreeding brings the benefits of nepotism. For simple, stateless, horticultural societies, the optimal balance seems to be achieved by a combination of precultural inbreeding avoidance of relatives with anr&le;&middot;25 and cultural rules of preferential marriage with kin withr&ge;&middot;25. Adjustment of the coefficient of inbreeding to other ecological settings seems to be largely cultural. An interactive model of &ldquo;culture in nature&rdquo; is presented, in which culture is seen as coevolving with genes to produce the maxiniization of individual inclusive fitness.
The codes of man and beasts
Authors: Premack David 
Published: February 2010

AbstractExposing the chimpanzee to language training appears to enhance the animal's ability to perform some kinds of tasks but not others. The abilities that are enhanced involve abstract judgment, as in analogical reasoning, matching proportions of physically unlike exemplars, and completing incomplete (external) representations of action. The abilities that do not improve concern the location of items in space and the inferences one might make in attempting to obtain them. Representing items in space and making inferences about them could be done with an imaginal code, but representing relations and judging the relations between them, as in analogies, requires a more abstract code. Language training cannot instill such an abstract code, but for species that have the code to start with, it may enhance the animal's ability to use it.
Brain organization for language from the perspective of electrical stimulation mapping
Authors: Ojemann George A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractA model for the organization of language in the adult humans brain is derived from electrical stimulation mapping of several language-related functions: naming, reading, short-term verbal memory, mimicry of orofacial movements, and phoneme identification during neurosurgical operations under local anesthesia. A common peri-Sylvian cortex for motor and language functions is identified in the language dominant hemisphere, including sites common to sequencing of movements and identification of phonemes that may represent an anatomic substrate for the “motor theory of speech perception.” This is surrounded by sites related to short-term verbal memory, with sites specialized for such language functions as naming or syntax at the interface between these motor and memory areas. Language functions are discretely and differentially localized in association cortex, including some differential localization of the same function, naming, in multiple languages. There is substantial individual variability in the exact location of sites related to a particular function, a variability which can be partly related to the patient's sex and overall language ability and which may depend on prior brain injury and, perhaps subtly, on prior experience. A common “specific alerting response” mechanism for motor and language functions is identified in the lateral thalamus of the language–dominant hemisphere, a mechanism that may select the cortical areas appropriate for a particular language function.
Rational belief
Authors: Kyburg Henry E. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThere is a tension between normative and descriptive elements in the theory of rational belief. This tension has been reflected in work in psychology and decision theory as well as in philosophy. Canons of rationality should be tailored to what is humanly feasible. But rationality has normative content as well as descriptive content.A number of issues related to both deductive and inductive logic can be raised. Are there full beliefs – statements that are categorically accepted? Should statements be accepted when they become overwhelmingly probable? What is the structure imposed on these beliefs by rationality? Are they consistent? Are they deductively closed? What parameters, if any, does rational acceptance depend on? How can accepted statements come to be rejected on new evidenceShould degrees of belief satisfy the probability calculus? Does conformity to the probability calculus exhaust the rational constraints that can be imposed on partial beliefs? With the acquisition of new evidence, should beliefs change in accord with Bayes' theorem? Are decisions made in accord with the principle of maximizing expected utility? Should they be?A systematic set of answers to these questions is developed on the basis of a probabilistic rule of acceptance and a conception of interval-valued logical probability according to which probabilities are based onknownfrequencies. This leads to limited deductive closure, a demand for only limited consistency, and the rejection of Bayes' theorem as universally applicable to changes of belief. It also becomes possible, given new evidence, to reject previously accepted statements.
An analysis of psychotherapy versus placebo studies
Authors: Prioleau Leslie , Murdock Martha , Brody Nathan 
Published: February 2010

AbstractSmith, Glass, and Miller (1980) have reported a meta-analysis of over 500 studies comparing some form of psychological therapy with a control condition. They report that when averaged over all dependent measures of outcome, psychological therapy is. 85 standard deviations better than the control treatment. We examined the subset of studies included in the Smith et al. metaanalysis that contained a psychotherapy and a placebo treatment. The median of the mean effect sizes for these 32 studies was. 15. There was a nonsignificant inverse relationship between mean outcome and the following: sample size, duration of therapy, use of measures of outcome other than undisguised self-report, measurement of outcome at follow-up, and use of real patients rather than subjects solicited for the purposes of participation in a research study. A qualitative analysis of the studies in terms of the type of patient involved indicates that those using psychiatric outpatients had essentially zero effect sizes and that none using psychiatric inpaticnts provide convincing evidence for psychotherapeutic effectiveness. The onty studies clearly demonstrating significant effects of psychotherapy were the ones that did not use real patients. For the most part, these studies involved small samples of subjects and brief treatments, occasionally described in quasibeliavioristic language. It was concluded that for real patients there is no evidence that the benefits of psychotherapy are greater than those of placebo treatment.
Précis of The Modularity of Mind
Authors: Fodor Jerry A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe Modularity of Mind proposes an alternative to the “New Look” or “interaetionist” view of cognitive architecture that has dominated several decades of cognitive science. Whereas interactionism stresses the continuity of perceptual and cognitive processes, modularity theory argues for their distinctness. It is argued, in particular, that the apparent plausibility of New Look theorizing derives from the failure to distinguish between the (correct) claim that perceptual processes are inferential and the (dubious) claim that they are unencapsidated, that is, that they are arbitrarily sensitive to the organism's beliefs and desires. In fact, according to modularity theory, perceptual processes are computationally isolated from much of the background knowledge to which cognitive processes have access. The postulation of autonomous, domain-specific psychological mechanisms underlying perceptual integration connects modularity theory with the tradition of faculty psychology, in particular, with the work of Franz Joseph Call. Some of these historical affinities, and some of the relations between faculty psychology and Cartesianism, are discussed in the book.
Pain and behavior
Authors: Rachlin Howard 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThere seem to be two kinds of pain: fundamental “sensory” pain, the intensity of which is a direct function of the intensity of various pain stimuli, and “psychological” pain, the intensity of which is highly modifiable by such factors as hypnotism, placebos, and the sociocultural setting in which the stimulus occurs.Physiological, cognitive, and behavioral theories of pain each have their own view of the nature of the two kinds of pain. According to physiological theory and cognitive theory, “psychological” pain and “sensory” pain are both internal processes, with the former influencing the latter as central processes influence peripheral processes. According to behavioral theory, “sensory” pain is a reflex (a respondent) while “psychological” pain is an instrumental act (an operant). Behavioral theory claims that neither kind of pain is an internal process — that both are overt behaviors.Although both physiological theory and cognitive theory agree with common sense that pain is internal, they disagree with commonsense intuitions at other points. They are no better at explaining the subjective experience of pain than is behavioral theory. They have not generated treatments for pain that are superior to those generated by behavioral theory. There is no basis for the frequent claim by antibehaviorist philosophers and psychologists that behaviorism, because it cannot explain pain, is less capable of explaining mental phenomena than physiology or cognition.
The organization of human postural movements: A formal basis and experimental synthesis
Authors: Nashner Lewis M. , McCollum Gin 
Published: February 2010

AbstractA scheme for understanding the organization of human postural movements is developed in the format of a position paper. The structural characteristics of the body and the geometry of muscular actions are incorporated into a three-dimensional graphical representation of human movement mechanics in the sagittal plane. A series of neural organizational hypotheses limit a theoretically infinite number of combinations of muscle contractions and associated movement trajectories for performing postural corrections: (1) Controls are organized to use the minimum number of muscles; (2) frequently performed movements are organized to require a minimum of neural decision-making.These hypotheses lead to the prediction that postural movements are composed of muscle contractile strategies derived from a limited set of distinct contractile patterns. The imposition of two mechanical constraints related to the configuration of support and to requirements for body stability with respect to gravity predict the conditions under which individual movement strategies will be deployed.A complementary organizational scheme for the senses is developed. We show that organization of postural movements into combinations of distinct strategies simplifies the interpretation of sensory inputs. The fine-tuning of movement strategies can be accomplished by breaking down the complex array of feedback information into a series of scalar quantities related to the parameters of the movement strategies. For example, the magnitude, aim, and curvature of the movement trajectory generated by an individual strategy can be adjusted independently.The second half of the report compares theoretical predictions with a series of actual experimental observations on normal subjects and patients with known sensory and motor disorders. Actual postural movements conform to theoretical predictions about the composition of individual movement strategies and the conditions under which each strategy is used. Observations on patients suggest how breakdowns in individual steps within the logical process of organization can lead to specific movement abnormalities.Discussion focuses on the areas needing further experimentation and on the implications of the proposed organizational scheme. We conclude that although our organizational scheme is not new in demonstrating the need for simplifying the neural control of movement, it is perhaps original in imposing discrete logical control upon a continuous mechanical system. The attraction of the scheme is that it provides a framework compatible with both mechanical and physiological information and amenable to experimental testing.
Four frames suffice: A provisional model of vision and space
Authors: Feldman Jerome A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThis paper presents a general computational treatment of how mammals are able to deal with visual objects and environments. The model tries to cover the entire range from behavior and phenomenological experience to detailed neural encodings in crude but computationally plausible reductive steps. The problems addressed include perceptual constancies, eye movements and the stable visual world, object descriptions, perceptual generalizations, and the representation of extrapersonal space.The entire development is based on an action-oriented notion of perception. The observer is assumed to be continuously sampling the ambient light for information of current value. The central problem of vision is taken to be categorizing and locating objects in the environment. The critical step in this process is the linking of visual information to symbolic object descriptions; this is calledindexing, from the analogy of identifying a book from index terms. The system must also identifysituationsand use this knowledge to guide movement and other actions in the environment. The treatment focuses on the different representations of information used in the visual system.The four representational frames capture information in the following forms: retinotopic, head-based, symbolic, and allocentric. The functional roles of the four frames, the communication among them, and their suggested neurophysiological realization constitute the core of the paper. The model is perforce crude, but appears to be consistent with all relevant findings.