bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Are base rates a natural category of information?
Authors: Connolly Terry 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe base rate fallacy is directly dependent on a particular judgment paradigm in which information may be unambiguously designated as either “base rate” or “individuating,” and in which subjects make two-stage sequential judgments. The paradigm may be a poor match for real world settings, and the fallacy may thus be undefined for natural ecologies of judgment.
Physicians neglect base rates, and it matters
Authors: Hamm Robert M. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractA recent study showed physicians' reasoning about a realistic case to be ignorant of base rate. It also showed physicians interpreting information pertinent to base rate differently, depending on whether it was presented early or late in the case. Although these adult reasoners might do better if given hints through talk of relative frequencies, this would not prove that they had no problem of base rate neglect.
Probabilistic fallacies
Authors: Kyburg Henry E. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractTwo distinct issues are sometimes confused in the base rate literature: Why do people make logical mistakes in the assessment of probabilities? and why do subjects not use base rates the way experimenters do? The latter problem may often reflect differences in an implicit reference class rather than a disinclination to update a base rate by Bayes' theorem. Also important are considerations concerning the interaction of several potentially relevant base rates.
Fallacy and controversy about base rates
Authors: Levi Isaac 
Published: February 2010

AbstractKoehler's target article attempts a balanced view of the relevance of knowledge of base rates to judgments of subjective or credal probability, but he is not sensitive enough to the difference between requiring and permitting the equation of probability judgments with base rates, the interaction between precision of base rate and reference class information, and the possibility of indeterminate probability judgment.
Which reference class is evoked?
Authors: McKenzie Craig R. M. , Soll Jack B. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAny instance (i.e., event, behavior, trait) belongs to infinitely many reference classes, hence there are infinitely many base rates from which to choose. People clearly do not entertain all possible reference classes, however, so something must be limiting the search space. We suggest some possible mechanisms that determine which reference class is evoked for the purpose of judgment and decision.
How are base rates used? Interactive and group effects
Authors: McLeod Peter J. , Watt Margo 
Published: February 2010

AbstractKoehler is right that base rate information is used, to various degrees, both in laboratory tasks and in everyday life. However, it is not time to turn our backs on laboratory tasks and focus solely on ecologically valid decision making. Tightly controlled experimental data are still needed to understandhowbase rate information is used, and how this varies among groups.
Conservatism revisited: Base rates, prior probabilities, and averaging strategies
Authors: Melone Nancy Paule , McGuire Timothy W. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractConsistent with Koehler's position, we propose a generalization of the base rate fallacy and earlier conservatism literatures. In studies using both traditional tasks and new tasks based on ecologically valid base rates, our subjects typically underweight individuating information at least as much as they underweight base rates. The implications of cue consistency for averaging heuristics are discussed.
Improving decision accuracy where base rates matter: The prediction of violent recidivism
Authors: Quinsey Vernon L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractBase rates are vital in predicting violent criminal recidivism. However, both lay people given simulated prediction tasks and professionals milking real life predictions appear insensitive to variations in the base rate of violent recidivism. Although there are techniques to help decision makers attend to base rates, increased decision accuracy is better sought in improved actuarial models as opposed to improved clinicians.
The perils of reconstructive remembering and the value of representative design
Authors: Vicente Kim J. 
Published: February 2010

Abstract(1) The miscitations of seminal experiments in the base rate literature adds to the existing database of systematic miscitations of wellknown psychological experiments. These miscitations may be caused by a process of reconstructive remembering. (2) Representative design should be the methodological core of Koehler's call for ecologically valid research. This approach can benefit both basic and applied research.
Base rates do not constrain nonprobability judgments
Authors: Windschitl Paul D. , Wells Gary L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractBase rates have no necessary relation to judgments that are not themselves probabilities. There is no logical imperative, for instance, that behavioral base rates must affect causal attributions or that base rate information should affect judgments of legal liability. Decision theorists should be cautious in arguing that base rates place normative constraints on judgments of anything other than posterior probabilities.
The goal of treatment for motor impairment is not to “normalize” but to “functionalize” through facilitative modulation and enabling context
Authors: Goldberg Gary , Mayer Nathaniel H. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAdaptations occurring in the central nervous system (CNS) in the presence of pathology arenotuniformly “good” for the organism when viewed in a functional context. A functional reordering of CNS priorities can be produced by allowing restructuring of the external context or through modification of neuromuscular physiology or anatomy designed to reduce the inherent restriction of functional movement in upper motor neuron syndrome. In fact, volitional control can often be “unmasked” through such interventions. Therapeutic interventions should not be directed toward “normalization” of motor patterns but should permit a functional reordering of CNS priorities that would otherwise not be possible.
Should stereotypic movement synergies in hemiparetic patients be considered adaptive?
Authors: Levin Mindy F. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe motor deficits observed in patients following some lesions of the central nervous system may be viewed as falling at one extreme of the continuum of possible motor behaviours. They are usually associated with an impaired ability to select and control specific movements from the available repertoire. Such movements may not be viewed as abnormal. However, it is unlikely that the primary motor deficits can all be considered adaptive.
What is the appropriate criterion for therapeutic intervention in the motor domain?
Authors: Sparrow W. A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractObservations are made on Latash & Anson's theme that changed motor patterns should not be viewed as pathological. Normality in motor control might be characterised in terms of qualitative differences in control mechanisms rather than differences in movement patterns. Understanding of the concepts implicit in instructions to subjects should be confirmed. Principles of energy expenditure in atypical movements are outlined. If restoration of normality is not adopted as a criterion for therapeutic intervention, what might be proposed as an alternative?
On optimality and movement disorders: A dynamic systems perspective
Authors: van Emmerik R. E. A. , Wagenaar R. C. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe argument that disordered or changed motor patterns can be adaptive or optimal given the constraints imposed is supported. Two major points of criticism are made, concerning the perceived superstates of the primary disorder and the absence of a systematic approach to identifying this adaptivity and optimality. We have tried to give the general outlines of such an approach to disordered movements from a dynamic systems perspective.
Optimal search strategies for optimal motor solutions: Self-determination or informed guidance?
Authors: Walter C. B. , Kamm K. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractImpoverished resources may direct the pathologic central nervous system toward local solutions during ontogeny. The resultant motor behavior can be systemically optimal without being functionally optimal. Therapeutic intervention should focus on facilitating function (rather than “normalcy”) by encouraging behavioral exploration through appropriate combinations of task and environmental variations with respect to individual capabilities. Some health professions have already adopted this philosophy.
Intentional relations and social understanding
Authors: Barresi John , Moore Chris 
Published: February 2010

AbstractOrganisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities may be termed “intentional relations.” We present a four-level framework of social understanding that organizes the ways in which social organisms represent the intentional relations of themselves and other agents. We presuppose that the information available to an organism about its own intentional relations (or first person information) is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents’ intentional relations (or third person information). However, through the integration of these two sources of information, it is possible to generate representations of intentional relations that are uniformly applicable to the activities of both self and other. The four levels of the framework differ in the extent to which such integration occurs and in the degree to which imagination is involved in generating these representations. Most animals exist at the lowest level, at which integration of first and third person sources of information does not occur. Of nonhuman species, only great apes exhibit social understanding at intermediate levels, at which integration of these sources of information provides uniform representations of intentional relations. Only humans attain the highest level, at which it is possible to represent intentional relations with mental objects. We propose that with the development of the imagination, children progress through three stages, equivalent to the later three levels of the framework. The abnormalities in social understanding of autistic individuals are hypothesized to result from a failure to develop integrated representations of intentional relations.
Comparative cognitive studies, not folk phylogeny, please
Authors: Allen Colin 
Published: February 2010

AbstractBarresi & Moore (B&M) provide a useful tool for the comparative study of social cognition that could, however, be improved by more subtle analysis of first person information about intentional relations. Knowledge of misrepresentation also needs to be better handled within the theory. I urge skepticism about B&M's sweeping phylogenetic claims.
Moral competence is cognitive but (perhaps) nonmodular
Authors: Dwyer Susan 
Published: February 2010

AbstractBarresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upondomain-generalchanges in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.
Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind
Authors: Premack David , Premack Ann James 
Published: February 2010

AbstractBarresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.
Memory metaphors and the real-life/laboratory controversy: Correspondence versus storehouse conceptions of memory
Authors: Koriat Asher , Goldsmith Morris 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe study of memory is witnessing a spirited clash between proponents of traditional laboratory research and those advocating a more naturalistic approach to the study of “real-life” or “everyday” memory. The debate has generally centered on the “what” (content), “where” (context), and “how” (methods) of memory research. In this target article, we argue that the controversy discloses a further, more fundamental breach between two underlying memory metaphors, each having distinct implications for memory theory and assessment: Whereas traditional memory research has been dominated by thestorehousemetaphor, leading to a focus on thenumberof items remaining in store and accessible to memory, the recent wave of everyday memory research has shifted toward acorrespondencemetaphor, focusing on theaccuracyof memory in representing past events. The correspondence metaphor calls for a research approach that differs from the traditional one in important respects: in emphasizing the intentional –representational function of memory, in addressing the wholistic and graded aspects of memory correspondence, in taking an output-bound assessment perspective, and in allowing more room for the operation of subject-controlled metamemory processes and motivational factors. This analysis can help tie together soine of the what, where, and how aspects of the “real-life/laboratory” controversy. More important, however, by explicating the unique metatheoretical foundation of the accuracy-oriented approach to memory we aim to promote a more effective exploitation of the correspondence metaphor inbothnaturalistic and laboratory research contexts.
Memory, metamemory, and conditional statistics
Authors: Bjork Robert A. , Wickens Thomas D. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractKoriat & Goldsmith's distinction between encoding processes and metamnemonic decision processes is theoretically and practically important, as is their methodology for separating the two. However, their accuracy measure is a conditional statistic, subject to the unfathomable selection effects that have hindered analogous measures in the past. We also find their arguments concerning basic and applied research mostly beside the point.
Sexual-selection accounts of human characteristics: Just So Stories or scientific hypotheses?
Authors: Newcombe Nora , Baenninger Mary Ann 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWe evaluate three of Geary's claims, finding that (1) there is little evidence for sex differences in object- vs. person-orientation; (2) sex differences in competition, even if biologically caused, lead to sex differences in mathematics only given a certain style of teaching; and (3) sex differences in mental rotation, though real, are not well explained in a sociobiological framework or by the proximate biological variables assumed by Geary.
The twain shall meet: Uniting the analysis of sex differences and within-sex variation
Authors: Rowe David C. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractSpatial and mathematical abilities may be “sex-limited” traits. A sex-limited trait has the same determinants of variation within the sexes, but the genetic or environmental effects would be differentially expressed in males and females. New advances in structural equation modeling allow means and variation to be estimated simultaneously. When these statistical methods are combined with a genetically informative research design, it should be possible to demonstrate that the genes influencing spatial and mathematical abilities are sex-limited in their expression. This approach would give an empirical confirmation of Geary's evolutionary speculations.
Spatial visualization and sex-related differences in mathematical problem solving
Authors: Sherman Julia A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractSpatial visualization as a key variable in sex-related differences in mathematical problem solving and spatial aspects of geometry is traced to the 1960s. More recent relevant data are presented. The variability debate is traced to the latter part of the nineteenth century and an explanation for it is suggested. An idea is presented for further research to clarify sex-related brain laterality differences in solving spatial problems.
We are far from understanding sex-related differences in spatial-mathematical abilities despite the theory of sexual selection
Authors: Tan Üner 
Published: February 2010

AbstractI have provided evidence that Geary's model does not explain male dominance in spatial abilities by sexual selection. The current literature concerning the relations of nonverbal IQ to testosterone, hand preference, and right- and left-hand skill, as well as the organizing effects of testosterone on cerebral lateralization during the perinatal period, does not support Geary's arguments.
Nonlinear nonequilibrium nonquantum nonchaotic statistical mechanics of neocortical interactions
Authors: Ingber Lester 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe work in progress reported by Wright & Liley shows great promise, primarily because of their experimental and simulation paradigms. However, their tentative conclusion that macroscopic neocortex may be considered (approximately) a linear near-equilibrium system is premature and does not correspond to tentative conclusions drawn from other studies of neocortex.
Why does the human brain need to be a nonlinear system?
Authors: Kowalik Zbigniew J. , Wrobel Andrzej , Rydz Andrzej 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWe focus on one aspect of Wright & Liley's target article: the linearity of the EEG. According to the authors, some nonlinear models of the cortex can be reduced (approximated) to the linear case at the millimetric scale. We argue here that the statement about the linear character of EEG is too strong and that EEG exhibits nonlinear features which cannot be ignored.
Multiscale neocortical dynamics, experimental EEG measures, and global facilitation of local cell assemblies
Authors: Nunez Paul L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractMultiscale dynamics, linear approximations, global boundary conditions, experimental verification, and global influences on local cell assemblies are considered in the context of Wright & Liley's work. W&L provide a nice introduction to these issues and a reasonable simulation of intermediate scale dynamics, but the model does not adequately simulate combined local and global processes.
Is there chaos in the brain?
Authors: Preissl Hubert , Lutzenberger Werner , Pulvermüller Friedemann 
Published: February 2010

AbstractFor some years there has been a controversy about whether brain state variables such as EEG or neuronal spike trains exhibit chaotic behaviour. Wright & Liley claim that the local dynamics measured by spike trains or local field potentials exhibit chaotic behaviour, but global measures like EEG should be governed by linear dynamics. We propose a different scheme. Based on simulation studies and various experiments, we suggest that the pointwise dimension of EEG time series may provide some valuable information about underlying neuronal generators.
The EEGdataindicate stochastic nonlinearity
Authors: Pritchard Walter S. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWright & Liley contrast their theory that the global dynamics of the EEG are linear with that of Freeman, who hypothesizes an EEG governed by (nonlinear) deterministic-chaotic dynamics. A “call for further discussion” on the part of the authors is made as to how either theory fits with experimental findings indicating that EEG dynamics are non-linear but stochastic.
The form of chaos in the noisy brain can manifest function
Authors: Tsuda Ichiro 
Published: February 2010

AbstractI would like to emphasize the significance of chaotic dynamics at both local and macroscopic levels in the cortex. The basic notions dealt with in this commentary will be noise-induced order, chaotic “itinerancy” and dissipative structure. Wright & Laley's theory would be partially misleading, since emergent nonlinearity rather than the linearity at even a macroscopic level can actually subserve cortical functions.
Multiscale modeling of brain dynamics depends upon approximations at each scale
Authors: Wright J. J. , Liley D. T. J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWe outline fresh findings that show that our macroscopic electrocorticographic (ECoG) simulations can account for synchronous multiunit pulse oscillations at separate, simultaneously activated cortical sites and the associated gamma-band ECoG activity. We clarify our views on the approximations of dynamic class applicable to neural events at macroscopic and microscopic scales, and the analogies drawn to classes of ANN behaviour. We accept the need to introduce memory processes and detailed anatomical and physiological information into any future developments of our simulations. On the issue of intrinsic cortical stability and the role of extrinsic fibre systems in maintaining stability, we argue that this position is not in extreme contradiction to those of our commentators, and that the mechanisms implicit in our simulations' properties imply rich computational possibilities. We discuss some of the reasons for and against the existence of significant global resonances in the brain and explain why such behaviour appears absent in our simulations. Last, we discuss other phenomena, such as rhythmic driving of the cortex, which have not yet been introduced into our models, and indicate lines for future development of the simulations.
Who determines the value of drug-taking behavior? Cultural considerations for a theory of behavioral choice
Authors: Hinson Riley E. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractHeyman's analysis of addiction suggests that drug taking is irrational. The irrationality of drug taking, however, may depend on the acceptance of mainstream society's view of what is valuable. Consideration of the addict's viewpoint and cultural aspects of drug taking may be useful in trying to fathom the “rationality” of drug taking.
Melioration and addiction
Authors: Houston Alasdair I. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractI discuss various theoretical issues concerning maximizing, matching, and melioration. The model of addiction based on melioration has the key feature that a reduction in drag use increases both the value of drag-taking and the value of conventional activities. I found Heyman's target article stimulating. I don't feel competent to comment on drags but I do have some thoughts, both general and specific, on the theoretical issues.
Self-control and impulsiveness: Resolution of apparent contradictions in choice behavior
Authors: Logue A. W. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractChoosing the smaller, less delayed reinforcers of drug abuse (including cessation of withdrawal) over the larger, more delayed reinforcers of a healthy life can be described as impulsiveness (the opposite of self-control). Examination of drug abuse using a self-control/impulsiveness framework can help explain many of the puzzles about this behavior, while tying drug abuse into a large research database.
In search of the relevant behavioral variables
Authors: Plaud Joseph J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractHeyman s analysis of the relevant complex behavioral variables associated with addiction is evaluated in relation to identifying the appropriate variables in behavior analysis. The model of behavioral allocation and choice known as melioration, discussed by Heyman as a way to understand the complexities of addiction, is examined and contrasted with another model of matching called ratio invariance, which is offered in this commentary as another behavioral account with a significant potential for resolving the contradictions of addiction.