bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
A Plea for Transparency and Candour
Authors: Lundmark Thomas 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter comprises a short summary of the examples of judicial reasoning in the preceding chapters but with the addition of comments and criticisms by the author. In particular, the author decries a pervasive judicial practice of obscuring the value-laden nature of the judges’ calling, which, in turn, diminishes the persuasiveness and efficacy of judicial precedents. This is a critical short-coming because, in every case decision presented in the book, the judges could have decided differently but did not do so. In summary, the judges who decided these and other cases were not forced by the rule, whether statutory or case-based, to decide the cases in the way they did. Yet, they all employed seemingly mechanical reasoning that conceals their real considerations and motivations. Rather than purporting to divine the intrinsic purpose of the statute, whether that be found in the text, history, or purpose of a statutory or case-based rule, judges should acknowledge and embrace their role as cooperative legislators. They should articulate what they believe to be the opposing interests and policies and then candidly spell out, for a legal and wider audience, why they personally think that the statute or case-based rule should effectively be amended in the way that the judges have chosen. This book is an argument for judicial transparency, which requires that judges reveal their thoughts and motivations—their ultimate reasons. This is necessary to enhance the persuasiveness and efficacy of judicial precedents, to foster democratic legitimacy, and to permit political accountability.
Introduction
Authors: Hamans Camiel , Hock Hans Henrich 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
Since the nineteenth century, findings of historical linguistics have been used for shedding light on the past and, in this connection, also in national identity building. This has created tensions between pre-scientific, romantic narratives and the mainstream academic views on linguistic prehistory. As in general studies of history, linguistic pasts tend to be interpreted to prove that one’s own group is closest to the linguistic ancestor or indigenous to their area. Somewhat surprisingly, not only laypeople but even academic “maverick” linguists sometimes propagate pseudolinguistic views seemingly tailored to support popular ideas about a glorious national past. This chapter analyzes three such cases and the reasons behind the misuse of data, methods, and terminology.
Ideology and recent attacks on historical-comparative methodology
Authors: Hock Hans Henrich 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
Recent years have witnessed several attempts to question comparative-historical linguistics, its methods, and its findings. These attempts, in turn, are being snapped up by adherents of ideological movements who have an interest in discrediting historical linguistics. I focus on two recent attempts of this sort. One is Berlant 2008, who questions the neogrammarian doctrine of regular sound change. The second is Marcantonio (e.g. 2010), who attacks the entire methodology of historical-comparative linguistics. The claims of both writers are embraced by “indigenist” groups whose goal it is to argue that the “Aryans” (i.e. speakers of Indo-Aryan languages) did not come from the outside but are indigenous to India, and that this gives Hindus special rights. I demonstrate that neither of these attacks on historical linguistics stands up under close scrutiny. This finding, in turn, deprives the indigenist agenda of one of its “scholarly” foundations.
Indo-European linguistic paleontology and ideology
Authors: Hock Hans Henrich 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
The interaction between historical linguistics and ideology can be twofold. On one hand, historical linguistic findings may be seized upon—or rejected—by ideologically motivated movements; on the other, they may themselves be influenced by (overt or covert) biases or ideological motivations. This chapter examines issues in Indo-European linguistic paleontology that have implications for both types of reactions and concludes that historical linguists must exercise caution, lest they unwittingly support ideologically motivated agendas or get carried away by their own agendas. The chapter shows that early attempts to locate the Indo-European homeland in Europe are based on selective interpretation of linguistic paleontological evidence. A more likely interpretation of linguistic paleontological and archaeological evidence, based on the domestication of horses and the use of two-wheeled horse-drawn battle chariots, supports a spread from an area in or near the Eurasian Steppes, around the fourth millennium bc. This interpretation is questioned from two sides. Indian nationalists reject it because it conflicts with their view that the “Aryans” were indigenous in India. Publications by Atkinson and Gray (e.g. 2006ab,) argue that the homeland was Anatolia, around 6000 bc, and reject the reconstruction of PIE words for ‘horse’ and ‘wheel/chariot.’ The chapter examines these and other proposals and demonstrates that a Steppe origin of Indo-European in the fourth millenium bc best accounts for the available evidence.
Historical linguistics and the Macedonia name issue
Authors: Joseph Brian D. 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
The use of the toponym Macedonia by Greeks in Greece and by Slavs in the Republic of North Macedonia has been at the heart of a bitter international dispute between the two nations for nearly three decades. This issue has been the subject of much political wrangling and social concern on both sides, but it also has a historical linguistic dimension to it, pertaining to the evaluation of how the use of the toponym is supported or not by the relationship between the ancient Macedonian language and Ancient Greek. An examination of this linguistic side to the dispute reveals that well-known and well-supported principles of historical linguistics have often been ignored in assessments of the position of the languages relative to one another, with practitioners in some instances being motivated seemingly more by political ideology than by good science.
The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
Authors: Hamans Camiel 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter describes the fight for linguistic minority rights in Europe. The essentialist conception of language and nation, which has become common since German Romanticism and which has been an important driver of nineteenth-century nationalism in Europe, appears to be one of the most important factors in downplaying non-national languages. Also the influence of the French Revolutionary ideas about equal rights on the promotion of the national language diminished the prestige of non-national languages. Consequently, the emphasis on the national language led to resistance among speakers of minority languages in several parts of Europe. The European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages is an attempt to overcome the language conflicts and to give rights to speakers of non-national languages. In the second part of this contribution the Charter and its working is discussed. Examples of language discussions are presented from the Netherlands, France, Hungary (especially the position of Roma speakers), and Georgia.
Seeing and Not-Seeing
Authors: Antognazza Maria Rosa 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
Chapter 2 shows how this ancient epistemological consensus bridges medieval and early modern philosophy, both rationalist and empiricist. For Thomas Aquinas, ‘what is known is seen, and what is believed is not seen’. Sense-perception is a cognitive mode characterized by the presence of the object of cognition to the cognizer which is directly moved by this presence. The senses afford a discursive cognition, restricted to particulars and achieved without concepts, which Aquinas calls aestimativa in non-rational beings and cogitativa in rational beings. Some other cognitive modes build on this ‘clear sight’: understanding (intelligere), knowing (scire), and knowledge (scientia). By contrast, belief is a cognitive mode which requires conceptual thought but from which ‘clear sight’ is lacking (2.1.1). Unlike the Platonic doxa, this position does not disparage belief. All these cognitive modes qualify as ‘thinking with assent’ (2.1.2). Descartes also conceives knowledge as an immediate mental apprehension involving the irreducible presence of the object of cognition to the cognizer (2.2.1), which is fully expressed as ‘evidence’ (from the Latin ex-videre) (2.2.2–3). Locke also frames the distinction between knowledge and belief as the difference between directly perceiving and not directly perceiving (in his case, the connection between ideas: 2.3.1). Leibniz adds an analysis of degrees of knowledge (2.3.2). In our knowledge, we normally grasp only some aspects of fully determinate objects of cognition. We are unable to distinctly enumerate all the predicates which can be attributed with truth to the object of cognition. But although we do not know everything about the object, what we do know is perfectly known.
The Gap between Mind and World
Authors: Antognazza Maria Rosa 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
Chapter 3 discusses the gap between mind and world which characterizes ancient and early modern Scepticism, particularly the moderate variety which allows the holding of beliefs as long as they make no claim to certainty (3.1.1). Ancient Sceptics of this kind typically accept the Platonic distinction between reality and appearance but, unlike Plato, hold that we have access only to appearances. This is the fundamental dividing line in epistemology: between those who affirm and those who deny a primitive cognitive contact between cognoscens and cognitum. The next sceptical move is the conflation of two things which ought to remain distinct: infallibility and certainty. The fact that cognitive contact between mind and world is subject to error does not imply that there is no such contact (3.1.2). Hume also sharply distinguishes belief from knowledge but follows the ancient Sceptics in concluding that, due to the fallibility of our reason, we achieve only a probability, which has ‘the same nature’ as belief (3.2.1). Reid rejects the sceptical consequences of conceiving ideas as intermediaries between mind and world (3.2.2), but is more open to Scepticism than he might have preferred (3.2.3). Once cognition has been reduced, de facto, to belief and probability, it may seem that the only way to avoid Scepticism is to redefine knowledge as a special kind of belief. This is precisely what (J)TB+ theories of knowledge have tried and (now according to many) failed to do. This recurrent failure is rooted in their being, ultimately, the offspring of Scepticism.
Non-Sceptical Philosophy of Cognition
Authors: Antognazza Maria Rosa 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter argues that the main battleline in the history of epistemology is not (as Pasnau learnedly argues) the vertical line drawn between the unattainable pre-Cartesian epistemic ideal of absolute certainty and the post-Cartesian conception of knowledge as (J)TB+ sanctioned by Humean scepticism (5.1.1). It is the horizontal line, running throughout the entire history of Western philosophy, between those who affirm a natural mental state in which there is a sui generis contact between mind and reality, and those who reject such a natural mental state (5.1.2). This book argues that the battle against scepticism is won at the beginning by observing that human beings share with other animals capable of sense perception a natural, primitive, effective contact between cognizer and cognized which imperfectly and gradually apprehends those features of the environment accessible to that particular kind of perceiving being. Higher forms of cognition can then be evaluated in a framework which does not start by assuming a gap (5.2). This proposal sets the bar for knowledge high (5.3.1). To the charge that this bar is set too high, one response is to stress the social dimension of knowledge, which counts as known by the community things known by an individual or group. Another is to stress the crucial contribution of belief as a cognitive mode, irreducibly different from knowledge as a distinct, essential, complementary, and generally successful way to engage cognitively with the world. Individual adult cognition is a closely knit fabric of knowledge and of belief with different degrees of justification (5.3.2).
Ontology I
Authors: Antognazza Maria Rosa 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
Revisiting another strand of the ancient–medieval tradition, an ontology of cognition is proposed consisting of objects (Chapter 8), acts, and faculties (Chapter 9). All really existing, mind-independent things, it is claimed, are fully determinate individuals. Cognition begins with these individuals via sense-perception. This first cognitive contact and most basic type of knowledge is both pre-conceptual and pre-propositional (8.1.1). A higher capacity is then needed to abstract from individual sensible objects what can be attributed to a plurality of individuals. This intellectual cognition of really existing, extra-mental things is therefore construed as a process of progressive determination of what is first apprehended in an indeterminate way by the senses. This process, however, can never fully exhaust the richness of fully determinate individuals. Therefore, although senses and intellect latch onto reality, they do not stretch to a perfectly adequate or complete knowledge of any of the concrete individuals which really exist (8.1.2). Section 8.2 then turns to ideal and imaginary objects, regarded as abstract entities without extra-mental existence. These objects are treated here as logical possibilities whose natures are either necessary or contingent. Because these natures constitute the relatum of an intentional relation, it is not necessary either to abandon the relationality of intentionality or to introduce relations without a relatum. The final section (8.3) considers the objects of cognition in two ways: either as they are in themselves—that is, according to their formal reality (extra-mental, ideal, imaginary)—or insofar as they are cognized (which is regarded as a mode of being of objects themselves).
Ontology II
Authors: Antognazza Maria Rosa 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
After distinguishing the three main types of mental acts characterizing developed human cognition—apprehension, judgement, and reasoning (9.1.1–2)—this chapter develops an ontology which regards mental acts as immanent actions (that is, as actions which do not produce something distinct from, or external to, the agent) that ground the relation of the cognitive subject to what is knowable or perceptible (9.1.3). This means that cognition can be understood as having the nature of a relation between mind and world, thereby providing the basis of the immensely influential Aristotelian account of truth in terms of conformity of mind to reality or correspondence between mind and reality. Ontological truth, a non-mental element, a property of things, is distinguished from logical truth in its older sense, as a property of thought to conform to how things are (9.1.4). Faculties are then presented (9.2.1) as potentialities of a specific kind: they are abilities, capacities, or powers to actively do certainly things (rather than mere dispositions). Their ontological status (9.2.2) is that of natural properties or qualities of the mind in which the nature of the mind is manifested. Faculties therefore have an aspect both of actuality (as principles of operation actually present in a cognitive subject) and of potentiality (since they are powers which are not always exercised: 9.2.3). The cognitive model proposed by this book is also built on a philosophical anthropology in which these cognitive powers are complemented by conative powers (9.2.4), which play crucial, distinct, but fundamentally integrated roles (a point further developed in Chapter 11).
Belief and Will
Authors: Antognazza Maria Rosa 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter considers the relationship between belief and will. Is belief voluntary or involuntary? If involuntary, how can we have moral responsibility for our beliefs? The answers proposed hinge on the distinction between assent and belief. Assent, an implicit mental ‘yes’, is an on/off state distinct from states (like belief) which have degrees. Believing is the more specific mental state or act in which assent is not compelled by the presence of the object itself (as in knowledge), but is moved by reasons extrinsic to the object of cognition. Depending on the strength of these reasons, there will be lower or higher degrees of belief. On this basis, a threefold account is proposed (11.1.1–3): (1) belief is a spontaneous (involuntary) response to epistemic reasons; (2) notwithstanding the spontaneity of belief, the will has a key role to play in determining assent; (3) acknowledging this volitional role does not amount to doxastic voluntarism. A ‘doxastic family’ is then proposed, which includes belief and other mental states which entail but do not reduce to belief (11.2.1). A shift from an ethics of belief to an ethics of assent is then recommended (11.2.2). While this account of cognition narrows the domain of individual knowledge by expanding that of belief, it also reassigns a province wrongly attributed to belief to the more general category of assent. Thinking with assent is therefore a complex mental phenomenon which involves involuntary elements (knowing and believing) as well as legitimate volitional (appetitive, conative) elements without thereby implying doxastic voluntarism.
Introduction to Part I
Authors: Antognazza Maria Rosa 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
Part I of this book is dedicated to challenging the crude history of philosophy underlying the Gettier paradigm which has dominated Anglo-American epistemology for over half a century. A careful survey of ancient, medieval, early modern, and modern epistemology reveals that the allegedly ‘standard’ or ‘traditional’ analysis of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) is in fact neither standard nor traditional. On the contrary: it is difficult to find major philosophers for thousands of years who framed the problem of knowledge and belief in these terms. Moreover, what the main philosophical movements and authors did say about human cognition through the ages is typically strikingly at odds with this so-called ‘standard’ analysis. According to the genuinely traditional views reviewed in this section, knowing and believing are distinct in kind in the strong sense that they are mutually exclusive mental states: the same cognitive subject cannot, simultaneously and in the same respect, be in a state of both knowing and believing the same thing. Knowing is not ‘the best kind of believing’, nor is believing to be understood derivatively from knowing as ‘knowledge minus something’. In brief, in modern parlance, these traditional views propose a disjunctivist account of knowing and believing: either one is in a mental state of knowing or one is in a mental state of believing. Knowing does not entail believing because knowing and believing are mental states which are different in nature.
Introduction to Part II
Authors: Antognazza Maria Rosa 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
After an historically well-attested account of cognition has been reclaimed in Part I, Part II reframes contemporary debates in the light of this account. The objective is not to provide detailed criticisms of present-day rival proposals but to outline an alternative by revisiting and renewing historical insights which deserve to be recovered. If (as argued in Part I) knowing is a primitive cognitive contact of a cognizer with an object of cognition, then the natural starting point for a thoroughgoing analysis of knowledge (in Chapter 6) is an account of how we arrive, in the first place, at the distinction between ‘subject’ and ‘object’. Chapter 7 then focuses on intentionality itself, that is, on the nature of the contact between subject and object. It explores and commends a tradition which construes intentionality as intrinsically relational. Attention then turns to the ontology of cognition, that is, to an investigation of which kind of entities are involved in cognition. These chapters revisit a prominent strand of the ancient–medieval tradition which explains this ontology in terms of objects (Chapter 8), acts, and faculties (Chapter 9). The phenomenology and ontology outlined in Chapters 6 to 9, provide the basis for answering the questions addressed by the concluding chapter of Part II (Chapter 10), namely, what is the object of knowledge and what is the object of belief.
Introduction to Part III
Authors: Antognazza Maria Rosa 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
Part III is devoted to an exploration of belief and the doxastic family of cognate mental states, with particular attention, in the last two chapters, to the specific case of religious belief. Chapter 11 tackles the relationship between belief and will. Here the vexed questions of whether belief is voluntary or involuntary, and, if it is involuntary, how we can bear moral responsibility for our beliefs are addressed by deploying the distinction between assent and belief proposed above. Chapter 12 defends the view that testimony does not, on its own, produce individual knowledge, although it can, and often does, lead to individual knowledge. A modified global reductionism is proposed to answer the question of when and how testimony provides sufficient justification for belief. Chapter 13 explores two illuminating historical accounts of significant members of the doxastic family: Kant’s taxonomy of belief subsumed under the broader category of ‘assenting’ (Fürwahrhalten) and Aquinas’s account of faith in both its secular and its religious expressions. After criticizing two influential approaches to religious epistemology—the Reformed Epistemology of Alvin Plantinga (Chapter 14) and William Alston’s epistemology of religious experience (Chapter 15)—an alternative framework for religious epistemology is developed by applying the model of cognition defended in this book.
General Conclusion
Authors: Antognazza Maria Rosa 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This book offers an account of knowledge and belief, rooted in tradition, but differing greatly from most present-day views. This account distinguishes two fundamentally distinct modes of cognition. The most primitive is a family of mental states characterized by ‘seeing’ or ‘grasping’, which we can designate as ‘knowledge’. The other is a family in which the object is not directly seen or grasped, and which we can designate as ‘belief’. Since believing lacks the direct perception of the object of cognition which characterizes knowing, knowledge cannot be a species of belief. However, if assent is distinguished from belief, both knowledge and belief can be regarded as ‘thinking with assent’. After Part I documents the persistence of this framework throughout the history of Western philosophy, Part II investigates the phenomenology and ontology of cognition. It construes individual knowledge as paradigmatically first-person, in which cognitive and conative/appetitive aspects play complementary roles. The ancient–medieval tradition is reproposed to explain the ontology of cognition in terms of objects, acts, and faculties, without the need for representational content. Because this proposal sets the bar for individual knowledge very high, Part III stresses the indispensable contribution of belief to human cognition. Belief extends our cognitive grip on reality when we are unable to know, tracking truth remarkably successfully when its own standards are properly applied. This framework helps avoid key problems besetting recent epistemology. Notably, when applied to religious epistemology, it avoids both foundationalism and fideism by maintaining the distinctive epistemological status of knowledge and yet taking religious faith seriously.