bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
D
efense
T
hreat
R
eduction
A
gency
Authors: Epstein Gerald , Sheer Jennifer L.O. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD) focal point for reducing the present threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and preparing for this threat in the future. DTRA's activities include anticipating future WMD threats, shaping the international environment to reduce current threats, deterring and defeating the use of WMD, and managing the consequences of a WMD event.
Delivery Methodologies
Authors: Pilch Richard F. , Masimova Nazrin 
Published: July 2011

AbstractThe delivery of a biological agent is generally based on whether it is contagious, such as the smallpox virus orYersinia pestis, or noncontagious such as botulinum toxin orBacillus anthracis. Contagious agents generally require a comparatively low‐tech delivery system that begins with the deliberate infection of a small group or even single individual, which then serves as a delivery device to spread the disease by secondary transmission. Non‐contagious agents, on the other hand, can be delivered using methods ranging from injection to the contamination of food or water to airborne dissemination. All of these methods are discussed.
D
epartment of
H
omeland
S
ecurity
Authors: Mitchell Jennifer , Joliat Jacqueline N. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which became operational in January 2003, has the mission of “leading the unified national effort to secure America; preventing and deterring terrorist attacks and protecting against and responding to threats and hazards to the nation; and securing our national borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade” (DHS 2009(e)). DHS guides the U.S.'s policies regarding the prevention of, response to, and management of catastrophic health incidents, including bioterrorism events. Through the Department's Office of Health Affairs (OHA) and Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T), DHS leads the nation's biodefense initiatives from research and development (R&D) to implementation. This entry provides a brief history of the Department's establishment and purpose, an overview of its important biological incident‐related policies and documents, and an overview of its current and projected biodefense and health preparedness initiatives.
D
ugway
P
roving
G
round
Authors: Glass Michael , Egan Jill 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
Dugway Proving Ground is the Department of Defense's (DoD) primary chemical and biological defense testing center. In addition to performing chemical and biological defensive testing, Dugway scientists conduct environmental characterization and remediation technology testing, battlefield smokes and obscurants and munitions testing, and reliability and survivability testing of all types of military equipment in a chemical or biological environment. Recently, the facility has taken on a larger role in homeland defense. Past, present, and future activities at Dugway Proving Ground are discussed.
E
dgewood
C
hemical
B
iological
C
enter,
A
berdeen
P
roving
G
round
Authors: Gutierrez David 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
This entry provides an overview of the history, current efforts, and future plans of the Edgewood Chemical Biological Center (ECBC) at Aberdeen Proving Ground. It covers ECBC's history from wartime defense and chemical weapons research to its current biodefense‐related activities. The article describes how ECBC supports military and federal defense efforts and highlights both new biological detection products, and biodefense products in development.
Epidemiology in Bioterrorism
Authors: Zerwekh Tyler , Waring Stephen 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The public health response to bioterrorism entails many distinct functions including surveillance and epidemiology, laboratory diagnosis, medical response, and interagency communications between stakeholders. This entry focuses on surveillance and epidemiology, which together aim to decrease morbidity and mortality through the early detection and rapid diagnosis of disease in a community. This response plays a pivotal role in episodes both related and unrelated to bioterrorism.
Alphaviruses, Including Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis Virus
Authors: Morse Stephen S. , Zilinskas Raymond A. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
Alphaviruses exist throughout the world and commonly cause natural encephalitis outbreaks among horses and humans. Generally, this disease is fatal in horses but only incapacitating in humans. Nevertheless, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEEV) was weaponized by the pre‐1992 Soviet and pre‐1969 United States biological warfare programs. Largely for this reason, alphaviruses are classified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as Category B threat agents, or of second highest priority with respect to public health and national security. However, their potential as biothreat agents remains unclear as it would be technically difficult to weaponize and disperse them.
Ethnic Weapons
Authors: Zilinskas Raymond A. , Carus W. Seth 
Published: July 2011

AbstractAn ethic weapon is one that will cause high morbidity and/or mortality rates among a targeted human population that can be individuated on the basis of ethnic or racial characteristics while causing little or no damage to other populations. Although some analysts have postulated that it is possible for weapons scientists to develop such weapons, it is our opinion that at this time, such weapons are unfeasible because they would be insufficiently specific to preferentially strike any ethnic or racial population. However, as science learns more about the human genome, the probability that biological agents can be designed to target genetic or biological markers specific to population sets increases.
Fatality Management
Authors: McGowan Dennis 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
Mass fatality management is a component of bioterrorism defense that has traditionally been relegated to low priority status if considered at all. However, proper post‐mortem infection control, human remains decontamination, and safe disposal measures are necessary to ensure that outbreaks are effectively controlled. A hypothetical mass fatality scenario is reviewed, with appropriate management steps delineated along the timeline.
Food and Drug Administration
Authors: Vandegrift Serina N. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration plays a vital and multi‐faceted role in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threat agent adverse health consequence mitigation and management by: 1) facilitating the development and availability of medical countermeasures; 2) protecting the safety and security of regulated medical products; 3) enhancing overall emergency preparedness and response capabilities; 4) implementing comprehensive food security strategies; and 5) ensuring the safety and security of Agency assets.
Human Immunodeficiency Virus
Authors: Staff Monterey WMD‐Terrorism Database , Sheer Jennifer L.O. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
When human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) first appeared in large numbers in the 1980s, the Soviet Union alleged that the virus had been created at Fort Detrick, Maryland as part of the United States' biological weapons program. While this allegation was determined to be untrue, there have been cases of intentional infection and threatened use of HIV as a biological weapon; however, there are several characteristics and variables that suggest HIV would be a poor choice for a bioterrorist attack.
Influenza
Authors: Pouliot Yannick , Sheer Jennifer L.O. 
Published: July 2011

AbstractInfluenza (“flu”) is caused by a highly infective respiratory virus that is a major cause of morbidity and mortality worldwide, due to both annual epidemics and more rare pandemics. At this time, influenza virus seems an unlikely choice for a bioweapons attack; however, modern genetic techniques have increased the likelihood of the creation of novel strains of the virus with the result that nefarious engineering of influenza can occur.
Intelligence Collection and Analysis
Authors: Egan Jill 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
To address the biological capabilities of terrorist groups, the Intelligence Community collects and analyzes information on terrorist abilities to acquire and produce biological agents, as well as information on what delivery mechanisms could be used to distribute these agents. The Intelligence Community is comprised of several different agencies and departments, all of which contribute to the collection and analysis of bioterrorism and biological warfare activities throughout the world. Three main components that currently provide focused attention on the bioterrorist threat are CIA's Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the National Counterproliferation Center.
I
srael
Authors: Goldberg David H. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
Over the years, the State of Israel has been compelled to develop well organized and coordinated military and public health systems for dealing with the immediate aftermath of conventional megaterrorist attacks. For most of its existence it has also lived under the threat of a concrete threat of chemical and biological attack from several of its neighbors. This entry examines developments in the four critical areas of Israel's bioterrorism strategy: response/consequence management, defense, prevention, and biosecurity. It concludes that Israel's bioterrorism defense strategy must, by necessity, remain in a seemingly constant state of transition, needing always to remain one‐step ahead of terror groups and terror‐sponsoring states that remain unconditionally committed to the Jewish state's destruction, with biological weapons if such can be acquired and deployed.
M
innesota
P
atriots
C
ouncil
Authors: Pate Jason , Miller Jacqueline E. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
In 1995, four Minnesota men were the first to be tried and convicted under the United States Anti‐terrorism Act of 1989. Douglas Baker, Leroy Wheeler, Dennis Henderson, and Richard Olrich acquired ricin as part of an alleged plot to kill local deputy sheriffs.
The four men were members of a radical tax‐protesting militia named the Minnesota Patriots Council.
Minutemen: A Case Study
Authors: Staff Monterey WMD‐Terrorism Database , Sheer Jennifer L. O. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The Minutemen, a 1960's right‐wing California militia group, to defend the United Sates against what it believed to be an inevitable communist takeover. Its founder, Robert DePugh, made numerous threats to use chemical and biological weapons to further his goals, there is no evidence any such weapons were ever acquired.
N
ato and Bioterrorism Defense
Authors: Cellino Andrea 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a relative newcomer to the field of Bioterrorism Defense. Only after September 11, 2001 did the Alliance launch specific initiatives to address terrorism. Before this event, NATO did address the threat of biological attacks as part of the Cold War, focusing on aggression from the former Soviet Union.
This entry discusses the goals of NATO in the past and in the present. The Alliance established a Weapons of Mass Destruction center at NATO Headquarters in 2000. NATO'S Defence Ministers decided in 2002 to enhance Alliance forces' ability to defend against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC). A multinational Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Battalion—designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the release of any CBRN agent—was declared “fully operational” at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004. It has since been succeeded by a Combined Joined CBRN Defense Task Force.
Initiatives adopted in Prague include: a disease surveillance system; a CBRN event response team, a prototype deployable NBC analytical laboratory; a NATO biological and chemical Defence stockpile, and a virtual training center.
P
alestine
L
iberation
O
rganization
Authors: Silverbrook Julie 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is a Palestinian‐based group dedicated to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The U.S. State Department no longer considers the PLO as a foreign terrorist organization, but the PLO continued to fund and support terrorist activities up until the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004.
Pharmaceutical Industry
Authors: Poupard James A. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries play an important role in providing anti‐infective drugs, vaccines, and biologicals (products such as immunomodulators, interferons, and monoclonal antibodies). The biologicals are often produced in facilities similar to vaccine production lines since they are usually derived from tissue cultures or modified organisms. Research, development, and production programs initiated by the pharmaceutical industry will play a key role in providing new therapeutic agents for use against bioterrorist attacks. The industry will be an important element in determining future policies in regard to bioterrorism.
P
ine
B
luff
A
rsenal
Authors: Egan Jill 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The Pine Bluff Arsenal historically served as a site for chemical and biological warfare (CBW) agent production, associated munitions filling, and storage. Today the facility still remains a storage site for a portion of the US legacy CW stockpile until all agents and munitions are destroyed under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The biological warfare (BW) production facility at Pine Bluff was converted in 1972, renamed the National Center for Toxicological Research (NCTR), and currently houses research for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). In 2001, Congress supported the Arsenal Support Program Initiative to help maintain the viability of army arsenals. This allows arsenals to enter in cooperative partnerships with private companies. Programs at Pine Bluff teach emergency responders how to choose, operate, and maintain, their radiological, chemical, and biological response equipment.
Plague (Yersinia Pestis)
Authors: Popov Serguei 
Published: July 2011

Abstract

Yersinia pestis
is classified by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as a Category A agent, of highest priority in terms of public health and national security. Its high degree of infectivity and potential for person‐to‐person transmission have led to its development as a weapon agent by numerous state‐level biological warfare programs in the past. The disease exists in three principle forms, bubonic, septicemic, and pneumonic plague. Pneumonic plague, the most likely manifestation of deliberate exposure, is the most rapidly progressive and frequently causes fatal pneumonia if not immediately treated. Coughing by victims of pneumonic plague releases airborne droplets that can spread the pathogen to other individuals, compounding the potential impact of this form of the disease.
P
olisario
Authors: Nelson Gail H. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Saquia el Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) composed of Western Sahara (Saharawis) tribesmen claim independence from Morocco under agreements made between France, Spain, and Morocco in 1900, 1904, and 1912; and ongoing United Nations arbitration including a 2001 agreement for autonomy and a subsequent referendum to be held governing independence. Meanwhile, the Polisario will pursue independence for Western Sahara and resume the insurgency against Morocco if protracted international arbitration fails. The Polisario is not seeking Weapons of Mass Destruction including bioterrorism to achieve its political ends. There are no indications that the Polisario will adopt other than conventional means to wage their liberation campaign.
Prion Diseases
Authors: Zilinskas Raymond A. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
Prion stands for “proteinaceous infectious particle.” Prion diseases are infectious diseases of the brain that can occur in both animals and humans. It causes slow degeneration of the central nervous system, inevitably leading to death. Prion diseases are transmissible between animal species. While prion disease is given a different name according to the species it affects, the general term “Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy” encompasses all prion diseases. This article discusses prion pathogens and diagnostic methods for their detection.
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy prions are one of the 80 select agents requiring special attention under the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002. However, it is questionable whether anyone would use prions as biological weapons agents due to the fact that they have very long incubation times and their efficient dispersal cannot be guaranteed.
Psychological and Social Sequelae of Bioterrorism
Authors: Ackerman Gary 
Published: July 2011

AbstractBy definition, one of the core objectives of terrorism is to impact a broader population than the immediate victims of attack by causing fear, anxiety, and social disruption. Bioterrorism in particular encompasses several features that can serve to amplify these effects; indeed, this is one of the very reasons why terrorists might find this form of attack attractive. The psychological casualties of any terrorism incident involving unconventional weapons are also likely to outnumber the physical casualties, which could complicate response efforts. Even a small‐scale bioterrorist event with limited direct casualties will likely impact millions, as seen during the 2001 “anthrax mail attacks.” Therefore, one cannot overlook the psychological and social consequences of a bioterrorist event in any discussion about preparation or defense against bioterrorism.
R
epublic of
T
exas: A Case Study
Authors: Staff Monterey WMD‐Terrorism Database , Zilinskas Raymond A. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
In July 1998, Johnnie Wise, Jack Abbott Grebe, Jr., and Oliver Dean Emigh, all members of the separatist militia The Republic of Texas, were arrested in Wise's home in Olmito, Texas and charged with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction. The Republic of Texas believes that Texas was not properly annexed in 1845 and is therefore not a part of the United States. The trio belongs to a splinter faction and the Republic of Texas issued a statement denouncing any connection to the trio.
RISE: A Case Study
Authors: Carus W. Seth 
Published: July 2011

Abstract

In January 1972, the Chicago, Illinois police arrested two college students on the basis that the two were about to contaminate the Chicago water system with
Salmonella typhi
, the organism that causes typhoid fever. The two students, Steven Pera and Allen C. Schwander were students at Mayfair College. They had vague ecological concerns and this led them to organize a terror group which they called RISE.
Syndromic Surveillance
Authors: Zelicoff Alan P. , May Larissa S. 
Published: July 2011

AbstractThis entry examines a vital area of the nation's counterterrorism response: the use of timely electronic surveillance to detect groups of signs or symptoms that may be an early indicator of an infectious disease outbreak. Syndromic Surveillance is public health surveillance that emphasizes the use of near real time pre‐diagnostic data and statistical tools to detect and characterize unusual activity for further public health investigation. This approach can augment existing public health reporting infrastructure for classical “reportable disease” and laboratory‐based surveillance. In addition this approach can potentially strengthen routine public health systems.
Threat Reduction in the Former Soviet Union
Authors: Harrington Anne 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
Containing the proliferation of former Soviet biological weapons expertise and materials from Russia and Eurasia was a high priority nonproliferation objective shared by the United States, Russia, and other countries, particularly during the decade starting in the late 1990s. Various aspects of the U.S. efforts in this area have been reviewed independently by the U.S. General Accounting Office and the National Academy of Sciences and are generally viewed as successful. A number of objectives of the original programs have been accomplished and the reasons for continuing these efforts have evolved. Fewer of the Soviet scientists who worked on weapons projects still have productive work time ahead of them and more opportunities are now available in Russia to support their long‐term research and industrial activity. In recent years, Canada, the U.K., the U.S., and the EU have partnered on project planning as well as funding. This entry gives an overview of efforts to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons expertise, discusses countering bioterrorism as an element of engagement, attempts to secure and contain highly dangerous pathogens, and ways in which bio engagement efforts have evolved.
Toxins: Overview and General Principles
Authors: Poli Mark A. 
Published: July 2011

Abstract
The threat of bioterrorism or biological warfare by terrorist groups and rogue states is very real. While the threat needs to be continuously evaluated, the description of biological agents as “the ultimate terrorist weapon” is likely overstated, at least for toxins. The realistic number of potential weapons that utilize toxins is relatively low due to limitations stemming from potency, stability, and availability. Effective weaponization and dissemination are not trivial. Although gaps exist in our knowledge base, research programs are in place to address these needs.
Tularemia (Francisella Tularensis)
Authors: Dembek Zygmunt F. 
Published: July 2011

AbstractTularemia is a zoonosis, a disease of animals transmissible to humans, and is caused by the facultative intracellular bacteriumFrancisella tularensis. F. tularensisis considered a potential agent of biological warfare and bioterrorism and as such has been rated among the top 6 category A agents (see also “Category Agents A‐C”). Formerly,F. tularensiswas included among agents developed and used by state‐sponsored bioweapons programs.F. tularensisis one of the most infectious pathogenic bacteria known, requiring inoculation or inhalation of as few as 10 organisms to cause human infection. At present there are four recognized subspecies ofF. tularensis: tularensis, holarctica, mediasiatica, and novicida, although only tularensis and holoarctica consistently cause disease in humans. Complete identification of all the natural reservoirs ofF. tularensishas probably not yet occurred. Ongoing research continues to delineate the virulence mechanisms ofF. tularensis. In a bioterrorism scenario, respiratory tularemia (acquired through inhalation) is judged to be the greatest threat. Natural outbreaks of human respiratory type A or type B tularemia have repeatedly been recorded in farmers and landscape workers illustrating the potential of effectiveF. tularensistransmission by dry aerosols. The clinical expression of tularemia largely depends on the route of entrance of the infectious agent and the prognosis in tularemia is highly dependent on the causative subspecies ofF. tularensis. There is currently no licensed and widely available tularemia vaccine. Tularemia warrants antibiotic treatment and is not transmitted from person to person. Currently, there is renewed interest in tularemia and development of new diagnostics, prophylactics and therapies.