bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Rule and Representation: The ‘Libertine’ Case of Queen Christina
Authors: Wiseman Susan 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter explores the relationship between women and politics from the vantage point of representation. It examines writings which draw on one figure who, for those who saw or heard of her, put women, politics, and philosophy together in unpredictable ways. In this chapter, the questions that arise when women and liberty are put on the same frame are explored in the languages of diplomacy, satire, and utopia. Queen Christina left her own views on the world in, among other forms, memoirs, maxims, and an assessment of Alexander the Great, whom she described as ‘an object worthy heroick emulation.’ Representation of Christina indicates the way in which circumstances remodel theory, iconography, and stereotype. Writing on her shows some of the tensions experienced by writers in the gendering of politics.
Martyrdom in a Merchant World: Elizabeth Jekyll and Mary Love
Authors: Wiseman Susan 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter looks at the remembering and forgetting of the particular circumstances of politics, and at the part the writing and transmission of women's biographical texts played in the making of memory. It explores the genealogy of a particular event from 1651, the trial for treason of the Presbyterian Christopher Love, as it was recorded in the narratives of two women, Elizabeth Jekyll and Mary Love. The author argues that these texts, which circulated after the Restoration, indicate that we need to re-evaluate the place of narrative produced by women in building Restoration nonconformist culture. The process of political memorialisation and amnesia which Jekyll's and Love's manuscripts facilitated was complicated and is discussed in three stages: the ‘event,’ the women's narratives, and their Restoration editing and significance. At each stage, the ‘meanings’ of the event are changed.
Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence
Authors: LEITER BRIAN 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter sets out the basic contours of the author's revisionary treatment of Realism. It argues that we can reconstruct the Realists as arguing for their ‘empirical’ approach to the theory of adjudication as motivated by considerations analogous to those Quine invoked for naturalizing epistemology.
Legal Realism and Legal Positivism Reconsidered
Authors: LEITER BRIAN 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter challenges two widespread views about the relationship between the jurisprudential theories known as ‘Legal Realism’ and ‘Legal Positivism’. The first is that the two doctrines are essentially incompatible or opposed at the philosophical or conceptual level. The second is that Legal Realism is a jurisprudential joke, a tissue of philosophical confusions — confusions that the 20th century's leading Positivist, H. L. A. Hart, exposed more than thirty years ago in the famous Chapter VII (‘Formalism and Rule-Skepticism’) of The Concept of Law. The two views are connected in the following way: Hart, on this picture, sealed the tomb of Realism as a serious legal theory, and in so doing gave credence to the idea that Realism and Positivism were opposed doctrines. The chapter contests both these views through a careful re-examination of Hart's influential critique.
Legal Realism, Hard Positivism, and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis
Authors: LEITER BRIAN 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
The Realist arguments for the indeterminacy of legal reasoning depend on a ‘Hard Positivist’ (or Razian) conception of legal validity (according to which the criteria of validity in any legal system must themselves be source-based). This chapter surveys the traditional ‘conceptual’ arguments for and against the Razian theory of law, generally defending the Razian position. It concludes, however, by raising doubts about this whole way of proceeding in jurisprudence, suggesting, with a nod to Quine, that perhaps even questions about the nature of law itself might be settled by the results of the empirical sciences.
Moral Facts and Best Explanations
Authors: LEITER BRIAN 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter takes on the views of philosophers (like David Brink, Geoffrey Sayre–McCord, and Nicholas Sturgeon) who accept the premises of the location problem, but think morality earns its place in a world so conceived. It argues, against them, that there is no reason to think moral facts are part of the best causal explanation of experience.
Objectivity, Morality, and Adjudication
Authors: LEITER BRIAN 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter considers the views of two philosophers — Ronald Dworkin and John McDowell — who repudiate the premise of the location problem, namely, that causal efficacy is always the mark of the real. From the standpoint of legal philosophy, Dworkin's response is particularly significant, since his theory of law and adjudication makes a party's legal rights turn on the answer to moral questions: if those answers are not ‘objective’, then Dworkin's theory is a license for extraordinary judicial discretion. It shows that Dworkin has no good arguments against taking the location problem seriously, and that his and McDowell's alternative account of the objectivity of morality is both empty and entails counter-intuitive conclusions.
Law and Objectivity
Authors: LEITER BRIAN 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter surveys the whole landscape of issues about the objectivity of law (and, relatedly, morality). Metaphysical objectivity concerns the extent to which the existence and character of some class of entities depends on the states of mind of persons (i.e., their knowledge, judgment, belief, perception, or response). Epistemological objectivity concerns the extent to which we are capable of achieving knowledge about those things that are metaphysically objective. Many philosophers working in the Anglo-American traditions also worry about semantic objectivity, that is, about whether or not the propositions in some realm of discourse (physics, psychology, ethics, law, etc.) can be evaluated in terms of their truth or falsity. For a discourse to be semantically objective, and for the statements in the discourse to be true, then the things referred to by the terms of that discourse (i.e., quarks, desires, justice, legal facts) must be metaphysically objective.
Introduction
Authors: SHELTON DINAH 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This book reviews the jurisprudence of international tribunals that have jurisdiction and competence to afford remedies to individuals whose human rights have been violated. It also looks at the comparative law of remedies, especially as reflected in national judicial decisions based on international human rights law. The problems of systematic abuse and developing appropriate responses to it are discussed, with particular reference to the work of the United Nations. The book's central concern is with the relationship between victims and the state causing injury, as well as with the powers and functions of the various international and national tribunals that hear human rights cases. The aim is to propose a theoretical foundation for human rights remedies, together with standards and principles on which future remedies may be based.
Declaratory Judgments
Authors: SHELTON DINAH 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
From the perspective of a defendant state, a declaratory judgment is the least intrusive remedy that a tribunal can afford the victim of a human rights violation. If the state concerned is committed to the rule of law, a declaratory judgment still should be effective to end the violation and prevent similar breaches in the future. In fact, for states committed to upholding a treaty and fulfilling in good faith their obligations, the adjudication itself may be of greatest significance. Generally, however, a declaratory judgment will not in and of itself be an adequate remedy. Nor should it be used to deter unsympathetic victims from seeking a remedy by denying them redress. It is the beginning, rather than the end, of remedies.
Punitive or Exemplary Damages
Authors: SHELTON DINAH 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
Most human rights tribunals have either a textual or inherent basis for enhancing damage awards to deter and punish wrongdoing. Fundamentally, the question of punitive or exemplary damages is one of utility. Several justifications can be given for their use: punishment, deterrence, preservation of the peace, inducement for private law enforcement, or compensation for otherwise uncompensated losses and payment of costs and fees. In cases of consistent non-prosecution of individual perpetrators, monetary awards may be indicated in order to express disapproval of the actions of the government, and to repair the full dignitary losses sustained by private individuals. The purpose is to reprove a state for its conduct and deter it from similar actions in the future.
Reparations for Historical Injustices
Authors: SHELTON DINAH 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
Like modern mass violations of human rights, historical injustices are generally seen as targeting entire groups, either disfavoured minorities or foreign populations. While the barriers to reparations are significant, historical events are the subject of a growing number of legal and/or political claims by groups seeking redress. The proliferation of such demands may represent a global tribute to the strength of human rights doctrine and its moral claim on the international community or the fact that success induces emulation. The notion of reparations is close to the current idea of restorative justice as a potentially transformative social action. Legislatures may be better suited to determine reparations: they are not bound by precedent and legal doctrine, but can fashion equitable remedies. Remedies thus become part of a healing process that may avoid the creation of future historical injustices.
4 Binding Precedents and Internal Jurisprudential Hierarchy
Authors: Mettraux Guénaél 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
In a span of ten years, the law of the ad hoc tribunals created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda has moved forth with leaps and bounds. The judges have clarified the jurisprudential hierarchy that prevails within the tribunals and specified the extent to which decisions of a trial chamber may be said to be binding upon another. The appeals chamber, although not legally bound to follow its own decisions, has recognised that the need for certainty, stability, and predictability in criminal law required that it should follow them in principle, but that it could depart from them ‘for cogent reasons in the interests of justice’. Every chamber’s duty to ascertain that a crime or a form of liability charged in the indictment is both provided for under the statute and that it existed at the relevant time under customary international law.
6 Chapeau Elements of War Crimes
Authors: Mettraux Guénaél 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
A war crime may be defined as a serious violation of the laws or customs of war which entails individual criminal responsibility under international law. From the point of view of the ad hoc tribunals created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, only those war crimes that are stipulated in the statute (expressly or implicitly) may be prosecuted. Furthermore, in order to prosecute those crimes successfully under the statute, the prosecution must establish in relation to each one of them, that at the time when these acts were committed there existed a state of armed conflict in the relevant area and that the acts of the accused were sufficiently connected to that conflict and that the offence allegedly committed constituted a serious infringement of a rule of international humanitarian law that entailed his or her individual criminal responsibility under international law at that time.
8 Other Serious Violations of the Laws or Customs of War: Underlying Offences
Authors: Mettraux Guénaél 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
The statutes of the ad hoc tribunals created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda expressly stipulate a number of specific violations of the laws or customs of war which may form the basis of a conviction if the chapeau elements mentioned in the preceding chapter, and the constitutive elements of the offence charged, are all proved. In addition, the ad hoc tribunals have sanctioned the recognition of a number of war crimes which, although not expressly mentioned in the statutes, were said to have been provided implicitly in the statutes and to have been recognised as crimes under international law at the relevant time. All of those underlying offences (listed or unlisted) seem to constitute war crimes whether committed in the context of an international armed conflict or in the context of an internal one. These underlying offences include plunder of public or private property and pillage, violence to life and person, collective punishment, taking of hostages, acts of terrorism, outrages upon personal dignity, torture, and slavery.
14 General or Chapeau Elements of Genocide
Authors: Mettraux Guénaél 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
With respect to genocide, Article 4 of the statute of the ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and Article 2 of the statute of the tribunal for Rwanda are identical in both form and substance. One element that must be met before a genocidal offence may be said to have been committed is that an individual possessed the required genocidal mens rea or, according to the appeals chamber and a number of trial chambers, where he knew of the principal’s genocidal intent. This chapter discusses the elements of the genocidal mens rea (including the intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, religious, or racial group, as such) and the factors which may be relevant to the determination that the accused possessed the necessary genocidal intent.
19 The Person of the Perpetrator: Who Can Commit an International Crime?
Authors: Mettraux Guénaél 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
In principle, anyone can commit a war crime, a crime against humanity, or a genocidal offence. Pursuant to Article 1 of both statutes of the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, the tribunals’ jurisdiction ratione personae is also determined by the gravity of the alleged violation of international humanitarian law. In principle, individuals may be indicted (and held criminally responsible if found guilty) regardless of their exact role in the commission of the crime as long as their contribution to the crime meets the above jurisdictional requirement of gravity and that it falls within one of the forms of criminal participation provided for in the statutes. The only relevant consideration to assign individual criminal responsibility is whether the accused, private individual, or state official, took part in one of the crimes covered by the statute, in one of the forms provided for in Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of the statute of the Rwanda tribunal or Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the statute of the Yugoslav tribunal.
24 War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
Authors: Mettraux Guénaél 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
Four elements distinguish war crimes from crimes against humanity. War crimes may only be committed during an armed conflict, whereas crimes against humanity can be committed both in times of war and of peace. Furthermore, a crime against humanity may be committed against nationals of any state, including that state’s own nationals, if the state takes part in the attack. Whereas crimes against humanity may only be committed against civilians, most war crimes may be committed against both civilians and enemy combatants. A crime against humanity must be committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack upon a civilian population; there is no such requirement for a war crime. An isolated act could qualify as a war crime, but not as a crime against humanity. Nearly all of the underlying offences which could qualify as crimes against humanity would also amount, all other conditions being met, to war crimes, but the converse is not necessarily true.
25 War Crimes and Genocide
Authors: Mettraux Guénaél 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
Both genocide and war crimes are regarded as serious violations of international humanitarian law. Just as with genocide, war crimes may, in principle, be committed by and against civilians and military alike. The law of genocide and the laws of war have very different origins, however, and both categories of crime cover essentially different protected interests. War crimes and genocide contain a number of elements which are not required by the other, the most obvious being that while war crimes, of their nature, may only be committed in times of war, genocide may be committed during war or peace. Under the prevailing test of cumulative convictions developed by a majority of the appeals chamber, an individual who has been charged with both war crimes and genocide for the same criminal conduct could be convicted for both categories of crimes.
28 Relevant Factors in Sentencing
Authors: Mettraux Guénaél 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
In addition to the general sentencing practice in the courts of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the trial chamber will take into account the gravity of the offence which it must punish and all other relevant circumstances pertaining to the conduct in question (whether mitigating or aggravating). Also, the court will give due regard to the time which the individual might already have spent in detention and the extent to which any penalty imposed upon him by another court for the same act has already been served. Within that general framework, the trial chamber possesses a large amount of discretion to decide upon a sentence appropriate to the crimes and the individual being sentenced. This chapter looks at three factors relevant to sentencing international crimes within the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia: gravity of the acts of the accused, mitigating and aggravating factors, the totality principle, and individualisation of sentences.
29 Other Available Penalty: Return of Property
Authors: Mettraux Guénaél 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
Articles 24 and 23, paragraph 3, of the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, respectively, provide that, in addition to imprisonment, a trial chamber may order the return of any property and proceeds acquired by criminal conduct to their rightful owners. Rule 105 (Restitution of Property) further provides that a trial chamber which finds an accused guilty of a crime and concludes from the evidence that unlawful taking of property by the accused was associated with it, shall make a specific finding to that effect in its judgment and shall order restitution of that property to its rightful owner. The practical difficulties involved in such a process appear to have deterred all trial chambers from any attempt to apply that provision.
Introduction: the Pedagogical Circle and the ‘Open Secret’
Authors: Bell Michael 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter introduces the central concern of the book: how to recognise and to think cogently about the limits of humanistic pedagogy. It does so by explaining two continuing motifs; the pedagogical circle is used by analogy with the hermeneutic circle. Whereas the hermeneutic circle suggests a possibly self-fulfilling process whereby interpretation is unwittingly governed by its necessary premises, the pedagogical circle sees a similarly closed logic in guided instruction, but now exacerbated by the factor of authority. The result of such instruction may be the ‘open secret’: a truth or recognition which, even as it is frankly imparted and is apparently understood, remains a secret because the listener does not yet possess the necessary experience. The remainder of the chapter provides an anticipatory summary of the argument, including the modern genesis of the Bildungsroman in the era of the philosophical tale and the novel of sentiment.
The Comedy of Educational Errors
Authors: Bell Michael 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter considers two novels written in the wake of Rousseau which, although they are not consciously answering him, subject the theme of pedagogical authority to an almost fatal irony. Moreover, both are highly self-conscious as fictions and their overt narrative manipulations stand in contrast to more naïve attempts by central characters within the text to exercise pedagogical authority. While Walter Shandy's misbegotten attempts to form his son are the mainspring of the action, Tristram Shandy is as much a realisation of the Tristra-paedia as a riposte to it. In Wieland, the failures of Hippias the Sophist to convert Agathon are darkly echoed in Plato's archetypal failure with Dionys, the young tyrant of Syracuse. In their chastening sense of pedagogical limitation both books celebrate a private sphere refuged from public history, a private sphere embodied in the book itself.
‘The Passion of Instruction’: D. H. Lawrence and Wholeness versus Bildung
Authors: Bell Michael 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter suggests that D. H. Lawrence is the most significant inheritor of the Nietzschean problematic of Bildung. Through a discussion mainly of Women in Love, the chapter brings out his similarities and differences with respect to both Nietzsche and Goethe. This novel, by attempting a radical and comprehensive critique of modern social man, focuses Lawrence' authentic impasse of readerly understanding. After it he developed a style of frankly personal quest novels in which his writerly authority was explicitly eccentric and beleaguered in the contemporary world. The difficulty of sharing understanding, which was to some extent a successful rhetorical feint in the earlier writers, has become a more literal impasse, and this was vividly confirmed by Lawrence's unpopularity in the ideologically dominated academy of the twentieth century's last three decades.
Tradition and Contextualization
Authors: FEARN DAVID 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the lack of critical attention to Bacchylides, making him among the most neglected of the archaic poets. It then examines Bacchylides fragment 5. It looks at two scholarly approaches that fail to address adequately the fragment in context, before developing a third line of approach. The chapter then discusses poetic tradition and patronage.
Homeric Fire, Aiginetan Glory, Panhellenic Reception: Bacchylides 13
Authors: FEARN DAVID 
Published: January 2010

Abstract
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first locates Bacchylides' poem within its Aiginetan context. The second shows how Bacchylides uses imagery and Homeric narrative to support Aiginetan aristocratic heritage. The poem celebrates the continuity of Aiginetan cultic heritage, through the exempla provided by Pytheas on the one hand, and Aias and Akhilleus on the other, and through the celebration of Homeric poetry itself as an Aiginetan national treasure. In the final section, the chapter sets against such pro-Aiginetan readings alternative receptions of the poem, implied by its panhellenic status and its incorporation, towards its close, of praise of Pytheas' Athenian trainer Menandros.