bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Chapter 17 Eating Disorders and Self-Silencing: A Function-Focused Approach to Treatment
Authors: Geller Josie , Srikameswaran Suja , Cassin Stephanie 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter examines self-silencing and loss of voice in women's experiences of eating disorders. The authors put forward a model that links etiological perspectives, self-silencing, and eating disorder behaviors, arguing that a critical function of eating disorder behaviors is communication and management of emotions and that these behaviors reinforce and perpetuate the self-silencing schema through a negative feedback loop. The model is based on a series of studies in Canada with clinical samples of adolescents and adult women with anorexia and/or bulimia compared with various types of control groups.[Q2] The authors suggest that women who feel unable to express an authentic self through words may use their bodies as a means of communicating emotional distress. The authors describe treatment strategies and suggest that the most effective interventions engage women in collaborative nonhierarchical relationships that focus on readiness for change and that address the functions of the eating disorder.
Chapter 18 Self-Silencing and the Risk of Heart Disease and Death in Women: The Framingham Offspring Study
Authors: Eaker Elaine D. , Kelly-Hayes Margaret 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter presents data from the Framingham Offspring Study where data were collected on 3682 men and women who were followed for 10 years to document the occurrence of heart disease or death. This study included a measure of self-silencing that asked participants how they dealt with conflict with their spouse. After adjusting for the standard risk factors, the data revealed that women who self-silenced during conflict with their spouse, compared with women who did not, had four times the risk of dying over the 10 years of follow-up. The authors examine this finding and discuss the damaging effects of not engaging with one’s spouse during conflict. The chapter also discusses the importance of future research investigating the many possible health-related consequences of self-silencing.
Introduction
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis book brings together sixteen chapters on the related topics of art's definition and its critical interpretation. Theories held on these subjects within contemporary Anglo-American analytic aesthetics are critically reviewed and developed. Among other themes, this involves consideration of art's origins, its functions, the nature of beauty and of aesthetic properties, and the goals of, and constraints on, our attempts to understand and appreciate art. While the focus is mainly abstract and theoretical, concrete topics such as architecture's credentials as an art form and the nature of metaphor, are also covered.
The Cluster Theory of Art
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractBerys Gaut has defended a cluster account of art, according to which no one property is necessary for something's being art, and various different combinations of properties from a fairly long list can each be sufficient for something's being art. He proposes this view as a superior form of anti-essentialism, but this chapter argues that the cluster theory is not inherently anti-essentialist in conception. It generates a disjunctive catalogue of sufficient conditions that, because it is exhaustive, allows for a necessary condition; viz., that something is art only if it satisfies at least one of the disjuncts on the list. The result may be long and messy, but no less a definition on that account.
Non‐Western Art and Art's Definition
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractWithout much discussion, most philosophers of art have confined their attention to Western fine art. There is good reason, however, to think that art is pan-cultural and ancient, and frequently encountered claims — for instance that non-Western cultures lack the concepts needed to make art — are unconvincing. Theories that define art recursively in terms of some relation between present art and past art, implicitly make art-status relative to an artworld or art tradition, because it is only against such a background that the relation is achieved. As a result, such definitions are at best incomplete, because no account is offered of what makes an artworld an ARTworld.
First Art and Art's Definition
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractTo be complete, theories that define art recursively in terms of some relation between present art and past art must provide an account of the first artworks, since these had no predecessors. The accounts that have been offered are largely unsuccessful. If first art can be identified as such by people who are unaware of the cultural context in which it was produced, this is likely to be because of the prominence it gives to aesthetic properties universally recognizable as such. Though art is not to be defined in terms of its aesthetic qualities, and contemporary art can eschew these altogether, it is probably an historical necessity that art begins with works that focus on achieving aesthetic excellence.
True Interpretations
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractMonroe C. Beardsley holds that literary interpretations can be assessed for truth and that conflicting interpretations cannot both be true. By contrast, Joseph Margolis argues for the compatibility of conflicting interpretations by denying they can be assessed for truth. Both assume that if any interpretation of a work can be true, then only one interpretation of it can be true. That assumption is rejected here. This chapter is interested in discovering the meanings that can be put upon a work and argues that it can be true that many meanings are sustained by it.
Relativism in Interpretation
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractJoseph Margolis argues that literary interpretations allow of contrary and conflicting interpretations that can be equally plausible. In doing so, he opts for a relativistic multivalent logic allowing for truth-like contradictions. Against this view, it is argued that an interpretation is true just in case the work can be read meaningfully as it proposes; that is, can be read in a manner making the work as coherent as possible while respecting its identity, and so on. ‘ The work is p’ is true if ‘the work can be read as p’ is true. Judged this way, it can be true that a given work can be interpreted as p and also true that a given work can be interpreted as not-p.
Replies to Arguments Suggesting that Critics' Strong Evaluations could not be Soundly Deduced
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter reviews and rejects arguments offered in support of the opinion that the reasons offered in favour of strong aesthetic evaluations (‘this work is good’) cannot be sufficiently strong logically to entail their truth. In summary the arguments are: there is an unbridgeable gap between facts and values; evaluations are disguised ‘ought’ statements that could not follow from ‘is’ statements; criticism is concerned with conveying perceptually based experiences of the work rather than beliefs about it; there can be no general rules of artistic value because we value works of art for what makes each unique; the creativity of artists transcends the possibility of rules concerning art in general; and generalizations about the dependence of aesthetic value on the occurrence of any given set of aesthetic properties are always defeasible. None of these positions succeed in showing that reasoning in aesthetics has a distinctive, non-deductive character.
Truth‐Values and Metaphors
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that metaphors rely solely on the literal meanings of the terms they use. They do not possess or generate meanings that transcend their literal meanings and they do not express special, metaphoric truths that are at odds with their literal truth-values. The death of a metaphor occurs when it takes on a predictable, public use. Metaphors operate by expressing a knowingly entertained thought, not via assertion. The metaphor expresses rather than describes an experience. Because the metaphor is not used assertorically, its truth-value ceases to be important.
Globalization, Development, and ‘Other Players’: Widening the Lens
Authors: Gerber David J. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractCompetition law was of limited importance in most parts of the world outside the US and Europe until the 1990s. Since then, however, it has developed rapidly virtually everywhere, as many countries have introduced competition laws for the first time and others have intensified enforcement and implementation efforts. This chapter focuses on countries in which competition law is either relatively new or little-developed. These countries will be central to global competition law development, because the success of any global competition law strategy will depend on their support. The chapter reviews with varying levels of intensity the competition law experiences of Japan, Korea, China, Canada, and Australia in their own right, and it identifies patterns in Latin America and Africa. In each case, it views national experience in its global context. A main theme is the evolving relationships between national and international domains of competition law.
Reconceiving Competition Law for Global Markets: Agreements, Commitments, and Pathways
Authors: Gerber David J. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter examines multilateral agreement as a strategy for developing competition law on the global level. It identifies the potential for multilateral agreement, outlines the forms such agreement might take, and dissects the issues that will influence support of a multilateral strategy. The analysis emphasizes the need to adapt any multilateral agreement to the specific needs of competition law development rather than to follow pre-existing forms or subject it to pre-existing institutional procedures. Time and flexibility are likely to be critically important in fashioning an effective strategy, because they allow the obligations of states and the relationships among states to be adapted to the process of economic development. An effective strategy will call for active support from all types of participants in the global economy. The chapter then sketches a conception of multilateral agreement called a ‘commitment pathway’, which is specifically designed to take these factors into account.
Global Competition and Law: Trajectories and Promises
Authors: Gerber David J. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter ties together the preceding sections of the book. It takes a longer and broader view of the trajectories of national competition law experience and analyzes how they have been intertwined with transnational competition law developments. These interrelationships shape the dynamics of global competition law development and, in order to be effective, any competition law regime for global markets must be based on them. The chapter evaluates the promise of global competition law development and the obstacles to creating a more effective legal framework for global economic relations. It concludes that the early 21st century represents a major point of transition in economic and political relations, and thus a ‘constitutional moment’ in which competition law can contribute to meeting human needs and enriching economic and political opportunities around the world.
Introduction: Motivations for Relativism
Authors: Kölbel Max 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis introductory chapter provides a systematic overview of the issue of contemporary truth-relativism. It first outlines the standard approach to semantics, modifications of which have been demanded. Then it looks at one of the cases, matters of taste, and examines what the motivations for modifying standard semantics are. The chapter then outlines the parallel reasoning in some of the other cases, among them: epistemic modals, knowledge attributions, moral values, and future contingents. Finally, it gives a brief overview over the contributions to the volume.
Moderate Relativism
Authors: Recanati François 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter discusses two classical objections to the view that the content of a tensed utterance is a ‘temporal proposition’, true relative to certain times and false relative to others. The first objection, due to Frege, is the objection from incompleteness. In response, it is argued that the (complete) content of a representation is distributed over its explicit content and the circumstance with respect to which that content is to be evaluated. As a result, the explicit content (lekton) need not be fully propositional; it may determine only relative truth-conditions. The second objection is due to Mark Richard, who claimed that temporal propositions cannot be the object of propositional attitudes such as belief. It is argued that that argument can be resisted if one distinguishes two aspects in a belief and, correlatively, two interpretations for a belief report. The last section of the chapter briefly discusses ‘faultless disagreement’.
Three Forms of Truth Relativism
Authors: Einheuser Iris 
Published: May 2010

AbstractSeveral authors have argued that a range of linguistic data calls for a relativization of propositional truth to contexts of assessment or, more generally, perspectives. This chapter defends the more orthodox view that the truth of a proposition depends only on what the world is like. It develops an account — factual relativism — on which what the world is like depends, in some respects, on a perspective. The resulting model, which allows for a natural account of faultless disagreement and of the evaluation of perspectival representations from different points of view, is applied both to discourse about taste and discourse involving epistemic modals. Finally, it is argued that a plausible propositional relativism is bound to reduce to either indexical or factual relativism.
Assertion, Belief and Disagreement: A Problem for Truth‐Relativism
Authors: Moruzzi Sebastiano 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that MacFarlane's truth-relativism faces two problems. First, it cannot explain the existence of disputes over assessment-sensitive propositions because it does not have a viable notion of disagreement. Second, it entails the idea that knowledge of the truth-relativist thesis in the context of a dispute is dialectically inhibiting: the truth relativist is committed to an ignorance theory, for the speakers who take part, to a dispute on matters of taste.
Content Relativism and Semantic Blindness
Authors: Cappelen Herman 
Published: May 2010

AbstractFor some relativists some of the time the evidence for their view presents a puzzling data pattern. On the one hand, there's evidence that the terms in question exhibit some kind of content stability across contexts. On the other hand, there's evidence that their contents vary from one context of use to another. The challenge is to reconcile these two sets of data. Truth-relativists claim that their theory can do so better than contextualism and invariantism. Truth-relativists, in effect, use an argument to the best explanation: they present data that they claim to be able to handle better than any competing theory. This chapter focuses on how semanticists should react to this allegedly puzzling data pattern. It argues that what generates the appearance of a puzzle is a mistaken assumption about the relationship between semantic content and speech act content (i.e., the relationship between semantic content and what speakers assert, say, and claim). When this mistaken assumption is corrected for, any semantics can deal with this data pattern. It doesn't cut either way with respect to the debate between the contextualist, the invariantist, and the truth-relativist.
Economics and efficiency
Authors: Olsen Jan Abel 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter introduces the ‘dismal science’ of economics to non-economists, and draws trained economists' attention to those parts of their discipline that are most relevant in the context of this book. It argues that the equilibrium point at which demand equals supply offers an attractive theoretical solution to ‘the grand economic problem’ of how much to produce in order to maximize welfare. The interaction between producers and consumers, each of them acting out of their own self-interest, brings about an optimal outcome where social welfare is maximized. The idea that an ‘invisible hand’ can bring about allocative efficiency has been immensely attractive to economists since the founding father of modern economics, Adam Smith (1723-1790), introduced this parable. However, the ‘invisible hand’ is troublesome in the real world, where a range of restrictive assumptions will have to be satisfied for the market to be the ideal system for achieving efficiency. Exercises and suggested readings are included at the end of the chapter.
Equality and fairness
Authors: Olsen Jan Abel 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter begins with an inquiry into altruism and redistribution. It then explores the issues of equality and fairness as applied to the distribution of health and health care. Altruism is seen through the eyes of ‘the individual as a consumer’, while equity is seen through the eyes of ‘the individual as a citizen’. Exercises and suggested readings are included at the end of the chapter.
The health environment
Authors: Olsen Jan Abel 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter discusses some key policy options for reducing the negative impacts of an unhealthy environment, as well as some challenges involved when attempting to reduce social causes of ill health. Physical and social environments represent the circumstances under which people live and to which they more or less have to adapt. Physical and social environments represent more structural constraints, while health-related lifestyle to a larger extent reflects choices based on individual preferences. Exercises and suggested readings are included at the end of the chapter.
Uncertainty and health insurance
Authors: Olsen Jan Abel 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter shows that there is a welfare gain from health insurance because people are risk averse with respect to the financial implications of the prospect of ill health. There are effectively two main types of asymmetric information related to health insurance: adverse selection, where the asymmetry occurs before the insurance contract is made; and moral hazard, where the asymmetry occurs after the contract is made. Two different bases are presented for pricing health insurance: individual rating and community rating. The arguments in favour of individual rating are: i) it offers consumers a choice of contracts; ii) people have financial incentives for healthy behaviour; and iii) there is no forced cross-subsidy, i.e. it is actuarially ‘fair’. The arguments against individual rating are: i) it involves adverse selection (market failure); ii) transaction costs are high due to false signalling of risks; and iii) access depends on income (‘unfair’). The simplest policy solution to adverse selection, high transaction costs, and unequal access is compulsory public insurance, to which we now turn. Exercises and suggested readings are included at the end of the chapter.
On Human Rights
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
What is a human right? How can we tell whether a proposed human right really is one? How do we establish the content of particular human rights, and how do we resolve conflicts between them? These are pressing questions for philosophers, political theorists, jurisprudents, international lawyers, and activists. This book offers answers in its investigation of human rights. The term ‘natural right’, in its modern sense of an entitlement that a person has, first appeared in the late Middle Ages. When during the 17th and 18th centuries the theological content of the idea was abandoned in stages, nothing was put in its place. The secularized notion that we were left with at the end of the Enlightenment is still our notion today: a right that we have simply in virtue of being human. During the 20th century, international law has contributed to settling the question of which rights are human rights, but its contribution has its limits. The notion of a human right that we have inherited suffers from no small indeterminateness of sense. The term has been left with so few criteria for determining when it is used correctly that we often have a plainly inadequate grasp on what is at issue. This book takes on the task of showing the way towards a determinate concept of human rights, based on their relation to the human status that we all share. The book works from certain paradigm cases, such as freedom of expression and freedom of worship, to more disputed cases such as welfare right — for instance the idea of a human right to health. The goal is a substantive account of human rights; an account with enough content to tell us whether proposed rights really are rights. The book emphasizes the practical as well as theoretical urgency of this goal: as the United Nations recognized in 1948 with its Universal Declaration, the idea of human rights has considerable power to improve the lot of humanity around the world.
Introduction
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This introductory chapter begins by presenting the rationale behind this book, namely the not uncommon belief that we do not yet have a clear enough idea of what human rights are. It contends that this belief needs more focus. It considers the developing notion of human rights running through this history or ‘historical notion’. It argues that human rights should be seen as protections of our normative agency. That is not a derivation of human rights from normative agency; it is a proposal based on a hunch that this way of remedying the indeterminateness of the term will best suit its role in ethics.
Human Rights: The Incomplete Idea
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
Use of the term ‘human rights’ began at the end of the 18th century, but gained wide currency only in the middle of the 20th century. Before the end of the 18th century, the talk was instead of ‘natural rights’. The two terms come from the same continuous tradition; they have largely the same extension, though different intensions. ‘Natural rights’ were generally seen as derived from ‘natural laws’. This chapter shows how it is altogether harder to say from what ‘human rights’ are supposed to be derived. It considers the state of the discourse of human rights today. It highlights the need for an account of ‘human rights’ with at least enough content to tell us, for any such proposed right, difficult borderline cases aside, whether it really is one and to what it is a right.
The Relativity and Ethnocentricity of Human Rights
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter begins with a discussion of ethical relativity. It then discusses the relativity of human rights and the problem of ethnocentricity. It considers John Rawls's views on tolerance between peoples, arguing that we should not follow Rawls's lead in commandeering the language of human rights to explain intervention. The language that he can provide is too indeterminate in sense to do so, and, once its sense is made more satisfactorily determinate, it will contain what is needed to justify the ampler list of human rights that, for so long, the tradition has championed.