bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Coexistence of Genetically Modified and Non-genetically Modified Agriculture in Canada: A Courtroom Drama
Authors: Glenn Jane Matthews 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Canada approved GM canola for unconfined release in 1995, but it did so without open and informed debate about the problems of coexistence of GM and non-GM agriculture, and without a regulatory structure to adequate addressing them. They are, therefore, being dealt with by the courts. This chapter first discusses what this entails for affected farmers in the well-known cases of Monsanto v Schmeiser and Hoffman v Monsanto. It then explores the possibility of bringing an action against the government for negligence in regulating and controlling GM technology, particularly in failing to provide adequately for the coexistence of GM and non-GM agriculture. Several class actions relating to BSE currently before the Canadian courts are presented as examples.
The EC—Biotech Decision: Another Missed Opportunity?
Authors: McMahon Joseph 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter examines the interpretation and application by the Panel of the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures through an analysis of the decision in EC – Biotech. It places the Panel decision in the context of the evolving jurisprudence on the SPS Agreement by looking at its interpretation of the concept of a measure, the role of risk assessment, and the transparency provisions. It concludes that the ‘simple-minded’ decision of the Panel missed the opportunity to reconcile the demands of science with the other factors that must be taken into account in any assessment of risk. As a result, it ignored the complexities arising from divergent national regulation in the area of GMOs.
Conclusion
Authors: Bodiguel Luc 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This concluding chapter broadens the debate, extending beyond legal analysis of individual regulations in order to question the role and concept of law in the arena of GMOs. At a general level, it raises two questions: first, whether it is possible, or indeed desirable, to move away from the binary view that GM crops are either ‘a good’ or ‘a bad’; and secondly, how ethics and morality can be built into regimes that are primarily based upon science. The destruction of GM crops is observed to be an excellent forum for investigation of the vexed issue of civil disobedience, and there is inquiry whether such acts of destruction may be characterized as a legitimate source of law and, more widely, into the utility of civil disobedience to democracy.
How Industrious can Zeus be?
Authors: Bénatouïl Thomas 
Published: September 2010

AbstractA central question concerning Stoic divine providence is its nature and scope. What kind of action is it? And which entities are affected by it? This chapter focuses on the latter issue. Sources hostile to the Stoics often report the industriousness of their god, i.e. his ceaseless activity upon absolutely everything there is in the cosmos. But is the Stoic god really industrious in this sense? Is not this feature of his an exaggeration resulting from biased critics, whose ultimate purpose is to ridicule Stoic theology? In fact, five possible qualifications could be envisaged: (1) during the ordered phase of the cosmos, god is not always active insofar as his intervention is limited to cosmogony and zoogony; (2) at the end of the ordered phase, god is not active either, inasmuch as he does not act upon anything during the conflagration; (3) god's agency is limited to the celestial region of the cosmos and only affects the earth in a secondary, indirect way; (4) god is not equally benevolent towards all individuals, some of whom are neglected by him, which implies that his action is not evenly distributed throughout the cosmos; and (5) there are petty affairs that are unworthy of god's attention, a fact that would in itself justify a limitation of his cosmic activity. It is argued that none of these qualifications is really envisaged by the Stoics themselves. As is proved by evidence independent from the sources hostile to Stoicism, god's activity is not limited in any of these five senses. The chapter also provides a detailed analysis of what kind of action Stoic providence is.
Delegating Rights Protection
Authors: Erdos David 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This book explores bill of rights outcomes in four countries — Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom — whose development exhibits an interesting combination of both commonality and difference. Whilst sharing a core ‘Westminster’ political set‐up, more recent experiences display striking diversity. Comparative analysis of some thirty‐six democracies demonstrates that the historic lack of a bill of rights in Westminster countries is best explained by, firstly, the absence of a clear political transition and, secondly, by their strong British constitutional heritage. Detailed chapters then explore recent developments. In all the countries, postmaterialist socio‐economic change has resulted in a growing emphasis on legal formalization, codified civil liberties, and social equality. Pressure for a bill of rights has therefore increased. Nevertheless, by enhancing judicial power, bills of rights conflict with the prima facie positional interests of the political elite. Given this, change in this area has also required a political trigger which provides an immediate rationale for change. Alongside social forces, the nature of this trigger determines both the strength and substance of the bill of rights enacted. The statutory Canadian Bill of Rights Act (CBORA 1960), New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBOR 1990), and the Human Rights Act (UK) (HRA 1998) were prompted politically by a relatively weak and backward‐looking ‘aversive’ reaction against perceived abuses of power under the previous administration. Meanwhile, the fully constitutional Canadian Charter (1982) had its political origins in a stronger, more self‐interested, and prospective need to find a new unifying institution to counter the destabilizing, centripetal power of the Québécois nationalist movement. Finally, the absence of any relevant political trigger explains the failure of national bill of rights initiatives in Australia. The conclusionary section of the book argues that this Postmaterialist Trigger Thesis (PTT) explanation of change can also explain the origins of bills of rights in other internally stable, advanced democracies, notably the Israeli Basic Laws on human rights (1992).
9 Postmaterialist forces and political triggers
Authors: Erdos David 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This conclusionary chapter explores the implications of the Postmaterialist Trigger Thesis (PTT) of bill of rights institutionalization beyond the four Westminster democracies from whose experience it was developed. The first half of the chapter examines the wider direct applicability of the PTT, arguing that it should fit other instances of deliberate bill of rights institutionalization in internally stable, advanced democracies. The genesis of the Israeli Basic Laws on human rights (1992) is explored as an exemplar case. The second part considers the broader relevance of the PTT. It argues that the PTT's focus on the importance of political triggers in stable, advanced democratic settings importantly mirrors the emphasis on political transition within less‐stable settings. Finally, the book explores the postmaterialist conceptions of rights and bills of rights arguing that, in contrast to classic liberalism, these conceptions are not based on a presumption of State non‐interference. In fact, such conceptions have encouraged a reorientation of human rights so as to accommodate and, on occasion, even require State action. At the extreme, and despite their very different long‐term historical origins, postmaterialist bills of rights may become co‐opted into the State‐directed audit and risk management explosion which has become a hallmark of advanced industrialized democracy.
1 Antigone's Political Legacies: Abjection in Defiance of Mourning
Authors: Chanter Tina 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Heidegger and Lacan both emphasize the uncanny, monstrous aspects of Antigone, who must be expelled from the polis, and yet who plays a liminal role in which she is the excluded yet facilitating other. In Žižek's Lacanian reading, Antigone is regarded as ‘proto‐totalitarian’. By contrast, the tradition of political, dramatic appropriations of Antigone, including five Irish versions since the 1980s, among them Seamus Heaney's The Burial at Thebes—which is the focus here—establish Antigone as a freedom fighter. A critique of Lacan's reading of Antigone is provided which, the argument goes, fetishizes the character of Antigone. In contrast to the abstract gesture that is content to construe Antigone as a figure of excess, as if she merely marked the limits of the articulate, her continual renaissance is read as a genealogy of that which is figured as abject by dominant narratives by each new political staging of Antigone's rebirth.
6 Psychoanalysing Antigone
Authors: Griffith Mark 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter tries both to take stock of the current state of psychoanalytic criticism of Greek tragedy in general, and to focus on Antigone in particular as an especially puzzling but rewarding case study. The chapter begins by briefly outlining the particular problems and questions raised by the character Antigone as a psychological ‘case’. Then, some of the goals, procedures, liabilities, and potential payoff of psychoanalytic criticism of literature in general and Greek stage drama in particular are surveyed, before a closer examination of Sophocles' text with the help of some of these procedures, in the hope of teasing out some answers to the questions raised and revealing more clearly the psychological dynamics of this disturbing and influential play.
8 Antigone, Antigone: Lacan and the Structure of the Law
Authors: Kahane Ahuvia 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter considers the structure of ethical action in Sophocles' Antigone in the context of Lacan's key comments on the play and on the ethics of psychoanalysis, and with special attention to some recent criticism of Lacan by Judith Butler. The chapter attempts to re‐phrase the ‘economy’ of Antigone's choice, her absolute commitment to her brother's precedence, as well as questions of kinship, in terms of temporality and especially with regard to the brother's singular unrepeatability. Understanding Lacan's fundamental approach to the question of time (‘logical time’, ‘anticipatory certitude’, etc.) and to the questions of topology, as well as some of their underpinnings in science and philosophy can, the chapter argues, help us redefine, not only Antigone's action, and thus also the action of the play Antigone, but also to see the claims of her commitment and the general structure of ethical action more clearly.
9 Sophocles' Antigone and the Democratic Voice
Authors: Fletcher Judith 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter analyses the performative status of Creon's interdiction against the burial of Polyneices by tracing its trajectory throughout the play. It argues that although the interdiction seems to have institutional force, it is in reality a deformed speech act, since Creon does not possess the authority to make law. An Athenian audience of citizens would recognize that the democratic voice, necessary for the creation of law, has been silenced. Antigone offers a contesting speech when she announces that she will bury her brother; in her exchange with Creon she functions as an exemplar of democratic free speech. Antigone, however, does not possess the authority to say that she will bury her brother since this was not a role performed by women in fifth‐century Athens. Nonetheless she activates a shadow democracy whose critique of the interdiction in the streets of Thebes resembles the informal discursive processes of the Athenian legislature.
13 Autochthonous Antigone: Breaking Ground
Authors: Appel Liz 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter uses the trope of autochthony in order to consider Antigone as the figure for a radical kind of self‐authorization. Following Judith Butler, this chapter considers Antigone as the occupant of an unnamable and unrecognizable subject position. As such an impossible, even erased inhabitant (as simultaneous daughter‐sister to Oedipus), Antigone threatens the integrity of the symbolic system in which she is nonetheless enmeshed. As one who defies socially sanctioned forms of genealogy, Antigone exists both within and without known social structures; she seems to generate her own, unique genealogy. Finally, this chapter asserts that Antigone represents a problematic surplus, which the play struggles to contain; Antigone is considered as disruptive not only in familial, social, and political terms, but in representational terms as well. The trope of burial can thus be understood as a way for the play to manage the disruptive force that is Antigone.
16 Reading Antigone in Translation: Text, Paratext, Intertext
Authors: Roberts Deborah H. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter is concerned with the many translations of Antigone from 1900 to the present, and with some of the ways in which these diverse translations establish for the reader without Greek the normative Antigone against which more radically transformed Antigones will be seen. It investigates selected aspects of text, paratext, and intertext, exploring translators' variously and subtly transformative choices as conditioned by their approach to translation, their choice of form and level of diction, and their interpretation both of the play as a whole and of particular passages. The chapter concludes by noting several features in the most recent translations that tend to enable a reading that is more aware of the relation between original and translation and between translation and reader.
Many Worlds? An Introduction
Authors: Saunders Simon 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis introductory chapter summarizes the principal positive theses of the book (Section 1), namely, that the unitary evolution of the quantum state, for sufficiently large systems of particles in thermal environments, yields a multiplicity of branching structures (worlds) obeying approximately classical equations, a result that follows from decoherence theory with no special assumptions or additions to the quantum formalism; and that further, the branching of worlds has a natural interpretation in terms of probability, as quantified by the Born rule in terms of ratios of squared norms of branch amplitudes. In particular, an agent who knows the branching structures of the quantum state that will result from his actions is rationally compelled to order his preferences among actions by the expected utilities of those branching structures as defined by the Born rule. He is, moreover, entitled to view a branching process as involving uncertainty as to which branch he will find himself. But independent of the truth of these claims, the theory is still testable: an agent who does not know the branching structure of the state, and who is indeed undecided between a many-worlds and a one-world theory, is rationally bound to update her credences in such theories by conditionalisation on observed statistical evidence, just as she is bound to do in the case of conventional quantum mechanics. Section 2 summarizes some of the arguments and counter-arguments for these claims as developed in subsequent chapters. Section 3 provides some more mathematical and historical background to the Everett interpretation, including a brief introduction to the decoherent histories formalism.
Everett and Evidence
Authors: Greaves Hilary , Myrvold Wayne 
Published: September 2010

AbstractMuch of the evidence for quantum mechanics is statistical in nature. Relative frequency data summarizing the results of repeated experiments is compared to probabilities calculated from the theory; close agreement between the observed relative frequencies and calculated probabilities is taken as evidence in favour of the theory. The Everett interpretation, if it is to be a candidate for serious consideration, must be capable of doing justice to this sort of reasoning. Since, on the Everett interpretation, all outcomes with non-zero amplitude are actualized on different branches, it is not obvious that sense can be made of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments, and this poses a prima facie problem for statistical inference. It is incumbent on the Everettian either to make sense of ascribing probabilities to outcomes of experiments in the Everett interpretation, or to find a substitute on which the usual statistical analysis of experimental results continues to count as evidence for quantum mechanics, and, since it is the very evidence for quantum mechanics that is at stake, this must be done in a way that does not presuppose the correctness of Everettian quantum mechanics. This requires an account of theory confirmation that applies to branching-universe theories but does not presuppose the correctness of any such theory. This chapter supplies and defends such an account. The account has the consequence that statistical evidence can confirm a branching-universe theory such as Everettian quantum mechanics in the same way in which it can confirm a non-branching probabilistic theory.
Two Dogmas About Quantum Mechanics
Authors: Bub Jeffrey , Pitowsky Itamar 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that the intractable part of the measurement problem — the ‘big’ measurement problem — is a pseudo-problem that depends for its legitimacy on the acceptance of two dogmas. The first dogma is John Bell's assertion that measurement should never be introduced as a primitive process in a fundamental mechanical theory like classical or quantum mechanics, but should always be open to a complete analysis, in principle, of how the individual outcomes come about dynamically. The second dogma is the view that the quantum state has an ontological significance analogous to the significance of the classical state as the ‘truthmaker’ for propositions about the occurrence and non-occurrence of events, i.e., that the quantum state is a representation of physical reality. The chapter shows how both dogmas can be rejected in a realist information-theoretic interpretation of quantum mechanics as an alternative to the Everett interpretation. The Everettian, too, regards the ‘big’ measurement problem as a pseudo-problem, because the Everettian rejects the assumption that measurements have definite outcomes, in the sense that one particular outcome, as opposed to other possible outcomes, actually occurs in a quantum measurement process. By contrast with the Everettians, the chapter accepts that measurements have definite outcomes. By contrast with the Bohmians and the GRW ‘collapse’ theorists who add structure to the theory and propose dynamical solutions to the ‘big’ measurement problem, we take the problem to arise from the failure to see the significance of Hilbert space as a new kinematic framework for the physics of an indeterministic universe, in the sense that Hilbert space imposes kinematic (i.e., pre-dynamic) objective probabilistic constraints on correlations between events.
Apart from Universes
Authors: Deutsch David 
Published: September 2010

AbstractA collection of classical universes — even if they interact — is still classical. For instance, it doesn't have entanglement; its elements don't have phases to their amplitudes; it doesn't have continuous motion of discrete observables. The multiverse is not classical: it consists of much more than universes. Research into what is there in addition has already been fruitful and promises to be more so. Progress in understanding the quantum world more deeply through such research is also the key to resolving the long-running scandal of the slow take-up of Everett's theory by physicists and philosophers.
The Stoics on Definitions
Authors: Crivelli Paolo 
Published: September 2010

AbstractDefinitions were very important for the Stoics, even though they hesitated as to where the theory of definition should be located within their system of philosophical disciplines: some (probably Chrysippus) placed it in the methodological subsection of the logical part, others in ethics, yet others in the subsection of dialectic relating to voice. The first of these locations focuses on the epistemological side of the theory of definitions. In particular, it is connected with two roles played by definitions: sharpening our conceptions in such a way that they are more successfully applied to or withheld from entities, and endowing our conceptions with a systematic structure that makes them suitable for instruction. The Stoics do not think that definitions reveal the essence of what is defined. As for the link with the Stoic theory of language and meaning, definitions are not linguistic expressions, but sayables of a special kind (distinct from statables).
Getting a Thing into a Thought
Authors: Bach Kent 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter surveys various approaches to the analysis of singular thought, including those of Russell and Frege, evaluating them by reference to their capacity to solve what has been called the puzzle about experience. According to this puzzle, we need an account of thought according to which we can explain how a particular perceptual experience is about the very particular object we perceive as opposed to a qualitatively identical object that merely could have been in its place. That is, we need an account of how thoughts are about their objects. This chapter advances a view of singular thought that solves the puzzle of experience and according to which the objects of thought must be determined relationally, derived ultimately from a percept of the object, but allowing for the retention of singular thought by memory and communication chains.
On Singularity
Authors: Taylor Kenneth A. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter offers an account of both the inner syntactic form of our thoughts about objects and the way in which those thoughts manage to make semantic content with and reference to outer objects. The central aim is to argue that without an account of the inner form of singular thoughts we will be at a loss to understand how singular thought manages to achieve semantic contact with objects. Questions about the “inner” form of thought about objects have occupied center stage in philosophers as diverse as Kant, Frege, Quine, and Brandom. But such questions have largely fallen off the radar screen in much contemporary theorizing about singular thought. This chapter sets out to refocus our energies and to show that by doing so, we can gain a new understanding of cognizing subjects manage to make semantic contact with a world of objects that are largely independent of thought.
We are Acquainted with Ordinary Things
Authors: Dickie Imogen 
Published: September 2010

AbstractTo be ‘acquainted’ with a thing is to be in a position to think about it in virtue of a perceptual link, and without the use of any conceptual or descriptive way of identifying it. There are old arguments for the claim that we cannot be acquainted with ordinary material things. This chapter uses recent empirical results about perception to show how these arguments can be overturned. The chapter has three parts. The first summarizes the relevant results, the second uses these results to construct an account of acquaintance with ordinary things, and the third turns this account against objections to such proposals from claims about the possibility of perception‐based error.