bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Chapter 10 Exploring the Immigrant Experience through Self-Silencing Theory and the Full-Frame Approach: The Case of Caribbean Immigrant Women in Canada and the United States
Authors: Ali Alisha 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter discusses the role of self-silencing theory in conceptualizing the experiences of women who have immigrated to Canada and the U.S. from the Caribbean. The author presents an integration of self-silencing theory and the full frame approach (a theoretical orientation that frames women's experiences through the consideration of factors such as personal history, social history, and ethnicity). Using this integrated theoretical framework, the chapter describes the experiences of Caribbean immigrant women by drawing upon data collected through a series of focus groups. These data demonstrate that self-silencing theory and the full frame approach can together inform our understanding of the social isolation and disconnection that are common for new immigrants, as well as the diminished self-worth that can be precipitated by encounters with racism.
Chapter 14 Sociopolitical, Gender, and Cultural Factors in the Conceptualization and Treatment of Depression among Haitian Women
Authors: Nicolas Guerda , Hirsch Bridget , Beltrame Clelia 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter describes various social factors in the lives of Haitian women that intersect with the experience of depression. It presents an overview of socio-political influences on the health and well-being of Haitian women, as well as an examination of various health-related beliefs and practices that shape the ways in which their physical and emotional problems are understood. The chapter traces the history of Haitian culture with a particular emphasis on the roles of women in social and political movements. Gender emerges as a complex and evolving variable in the lives of Haitians, especially within the context of women's participation in grassroots organizations and the movement toward democratization. Besides tracing the history and impact of social movements in Haiti, the chapter also uses the Multicultural Competency Model to demonstrate the association between culture and depression for Haitian women.
Philosophical Perspectives on Art
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis book presents a series of chapters devoted to two of the most fundamental topics in the philosophy of art: the distinctive character of artworks and what is involved in understanding them as art. In Part I, a wide range of questions about the nature and definition of art are considered. Can art be defined, and if so, which definitions are the most plausible? Do we make and consume art because there are evolutionary advantages to doing so? Has art completed the mission that guided its earlier historical development, and if so, what is to become of it now? Should architecture be classified as an art form? Part II turns to the interpretation and appreciation of art. What is the target and purpose of the critic's interpretation? Is interpretation primarily directed at uncovering artists' intended meanings? Can apparently contradictory interpretations of a given piece both be true? Are interpretative evaluations entailed by descriptions of a work's aesthetic and artistic characteristics? In addition to providing answers to these and other questions in aesthetics, there is consideration of the nature and content of metaphor, and the relation between the expressive qualities of a work of art and the emotions of its creator.
Essential Distinctions for Art Theorists
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThere are many approaches to theorizing about or defining art. To the extent that art is part of human nature, its essence cannot be purely nominal. The project of definition is concerned primarily with classification and description. That of theorizing is concerned more widely with art's significance, value, and point. Anti-essentialists' rejection of the project of definition has been popular and no one definition is free from problems, but there has been progress and convergence in recent years on the idea that a successful definition must be disjunctive, must include mention of art's function (if only in relation to the earliest works), must recognize the relevance of the maker's intentions (to account for the art-status of extra-artworld art-failures), and must acknowledge the role of artworld institutions (to account for the art-status of appropriated or unintended artworks).
Functional and Procedural Definitions of Art
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter explores two approaches to the definition of art. Functional definitions usually argue that art has the defining purpose of rewarding an aesthetic interest. Procedural or institutional definitions, by contrast, hold that something is art if and only if it is created within an informal institution, an artworld, with roles or practices allowing suitably placed members to confer the status. Functionalists doubt the art-standing of some avant-garde art, hold that art is an essentially evaluative concept, and insist that an adequate definition must account for art's importance, whereas proceduralists disagree. In their exchanges, the two sides tend to be the question against each other.
Aesthetic Judgments, Artworks, and Functional Beauty
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter provides an analysis of the role played by consideration of an item's functions when it is judged aesthetically. The account applies also to artworks, some of which serve extrinsic functions and others of which have the function of being contemplated for their own sake alone. It is argued that aesthetic judgments do not fit the Kantian model either of judgments of free beauty or of dependent beauty, given how these two came to be described in the early 20th century.
Ellen Dissanayake's Evolutionary Aesthetic
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractIn a series of books, Ellen Dissanayake has developed a subtle, complex account in which art is seen as an evolutionary adaptation. We use it to make ourselves and our environments special and, more generally, to cement familial and social bonds. Dissanayake attempts to argue for the biological relevance of aesthetic quality over the merely agreeable and, hence, to establish the evolutionary importance of art over kitsch; but because she emphasizes art's pre-symbolic biological origins, she cannot give the semantic complexity and cognitive achievements of great art their due. And her theory does not differentiate art from many other socially beneficial practices that work in similar ways.
Probably Not the Last Word on the End of Art
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractArthur Danto has argued that art's historical mission was to make possible the formulation of a philosophically perspicuous question about its own nature. When this was achieved in the 1960s, art entered its post-historical phase, during which anything could become art. But this view seems to ignore non-Western art traditions; it overlooks the fact that, even if all styles and possibilities are now available, it remains the case that the self-conscious use of outdated styles prevents them from ‘saying’ what they did formerly. It also invites the question asking what is to distinguish the claim that art's primary task was to embark on a history that would eventually reveal its own essence from an alternative view maintaining that, having shrugged off its historical burden, art is at last free to be genuinely itself.
Is Architecture an Art?
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractAre the buildings designed by architects artworks? If so, are they the artworks of their architects? If so, is architecture an art form? In reviewing these queries, this chapter explores differences between buildings and such items as ships, drains, bridges, dams, and gardens. It considers also if an artwork building should be regarded as a singular or multiple artwork, and how this is affected by its site specificity and cultural location. And it considers whether, if they are multiple, architectural artworks are for performance.
Interpreting Contextualities
Authors: Davies Stephen 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter contrasts a model for literary interpretation that is ‘readerly’ in being restrained and backward-looking, with one that is ‘writerly’ in being creative and forward-looking. The first pays homage to the efforts of the work's creator, and the second shows respect for the meanings the work presents to the critic's contemporary audience. Despite appearances to the contrary, the first theory is no less capable than the second of accounting for actual critical practice. Adjudicating between them involves considering whether the creation and appreciation of literature answers primarily to an interest in works alone or to works as the product of human authors. The second option is more plausible and can be consistent with the widely held view that literary works admit of multiple interpretations.
Globalization and Competition Law: Conflict, Uncertainty, and the Promise of Convergence
Authors: Gerber David J. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter examines developments since the fall of the Soviet Union. During this period, competition law has again become a major focus of attention on both the international and national levels. The number of states with competition laws has increased, as has the intensity of enforcement in many of them. This has generated increasing conflict, uncertainties and compliance costs; and, as a result, proposals for some form of global competition law cooperation have again become prominent and controversial. These problems have led to growing awareness of the limitations of the jurisdiction-based regime, but they have not yet led to fundamental changes in the jurisdictional system. The chapter examines these limitations and responses to them, including efforts to introduce competition law into the WTO and the creation of institutions and arrangements such as the International Competition Network that are designed to foster convergence among competition law systems.
Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals
Authors: Predelli Stefano , Stojanovic Isidora 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter aims at defending semantic relativism from a general methodological viewpoint. In the classic non-relativistic approach, the parameters relevant for the interpretation of indexical expressions coincide with the parameters involved in the definition of truth. It is argued that this identification is grounded on an illicit confusion between genuinely semantic (and hence logical) considerations on the one hand, and issues pertaining to the use of language on the other. Certain characteristic semantic consequences of relativism are then taken into consideration, and are contrasted with the logical outcomes of the classic, non-relativistic treatment of indexical languages.
Margins for Error in Context
Authors: Bonnay Denis , Egré Paul 
Published: May 2010

AbstractWilliamson's margin for error semantics for knowledge implies that knowledge cannot systematically imply knowledge of one's knowledge. Each new iteration of knowledge requires what is known to remain true in worlds that are further and further away from the initial context of evaluation, including worlds where the proposition can no longer be true. In previous work, it was argued that this tension can be solved by means of a richer, two-dimensional semantics for knowledge, called Centered Semantics. This chapter shows that Centered Semantics can be translated into a standard semantics with actuality operators. It discusses the contextualist implications of the semantics, in particular, regarding the knowledge a subject might have of her margins of error.
Relativism about Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts about the Very Idea
Authors: Wright Crispin 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThe setting of relativistic ideas about truth in the general style of semantic-theoretic apparatus pioneered by Lewis, Kaplan, and others has persuaded many that they should at least be taken seriously as competition in the space of explanatory linguistic theory, a type of view which, properly formulated, may offer an at least coherent — and indeed, in the view of some, a superior — account of certain salient linguistic data manifest in, for example, discourse about epistemic modals, knowledge, and about matters of taste and value, and may also offer the prospect of a coherent regimentation of the Aristotelian ‘Open Future’ (along with, perhaps, the Dummettian ‘anti-real’ past). This chapter enters a reminder of certain underlying, more purely philosophical issues about relativism — about its metaphysical coherence, its metasemantic obligations, and about the apparent limitations of the kind of local linguistic evidence which contemporary proponents have adduced in its favour — of which there is a risk that its apparent rehabilitation in rigorous semantic dress may encourage neglect.
Frege, Relativism and Faultless Disagreement
Authors: Rosenkranz Sven 
Published: May 2010

AbstractAllegedly, relativism can make sense of faultless disagreements, where A and B faultlessly disagree if A sincerely asserts P, B sincerely asserts ~P and yet neither assertion is incorrect. Such cases seem to abound in areas of evaluative discourse. The trouble with taking these appearances at face value is that P and ~P cannot both be true so that at least one of the speakers would seem at fault. To defuse this objection, relativists suggest conceiving of propositional truth as being relative to perspectives. Drawing on Fregean insights into the nature of assertion, this chapter argues that this manoeuvre will not work and that relativists are anyway hard-pressed to account for genuine disagreement. Discarding the idea of faultlessness, some positive suggestions are made of how relativists might recover a sense in which A and B genuinely disagree. One tentative conclusion is that moral relativism is the non-cognitivists' best bet.
Presuppositions of Commonality: An Indexical Relativist Account of Disagreement
Authors: López de Sa Dan 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter defends a version of the indexical contextualist form of moderate relativism: the attempt to endorse appearances of faultless disagreement within the framework in which a sentence at a context at the index of the context determines its appropriate truth-value. Many object that any such an indexical proposal would fail to account for intuitions of (genuine) disagreement as revealed in ordinary disputes in the domain. The defence from this objection exploits presuppositions of commonality to the effect that the addressee is relevantly like the speaker of the context.
Health and health care
Authors: Olsen Jan Abel 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter considers what are meant by health and health care, as well as what health care does for people. Health care consists of four branches of activities: cure, care, prevention, and rehabilitation. Whilst health care personnel normally provide cure, care, and rehabilitation, prevention may involve a range of interventions whose overriding objective is to prevent ill health and reduce the risks of dying — of which only a part would be provided by the health sector. A pragmatic definition of health care, then, is whatever happens to be classified as such in a national accounting system. In this way, we avoid a controversial classification into what might clearly be termed health care, and what might be referred to as cosmetics. Exercises and suggested readings are included at the end of the chapter.
Primary care
Authors: Olsen Jan Abel 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter examines payment schemes for general practitioners (GPs) or primary care physicians. These include fee for service, capitation, and salary. In their role as gatekeepers, GPs hold a unique position in the health care system. The only way in which patients can get access to hospitals and specialist care in many countries is following referral from a GP. Hence if GPs are permissive in making referrals, they put increased pressure on hospitals' resources. Much of the literature on GP remuneration has been concerned with efficiency in terms of value for money within primary care only. Activity-based remuneration systems appear to improve efficiency and are therefore preferred to salary systems in which doctors have no financial incentive to increase productivity. However, given the important role of GPs in the referral decisions and hence the cost consequences of their choices in secondary care, given also the use of pharmaceuticals and the costs of sick leave, any evaluation of the efficiency of a remuneration system must focus on the wider resource impact outside the GP practice. Exercises and suggested readings are included at the end of the chapter.
First Steps in an Account of Human Rights
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter sketches a proposed substantive account of human rights. It begins with a discussion of the two general ways for philosophy to supply a more substantive account of human rights: a top-down approach which starts with an overarching principle, or principles, or an authoritative decision procedure from which human rights can then be derived; and a bottom-up approach that starts with human rights as used in our actual social life by politicians, lawyers, social campaigners, as well as theorists of various sorts, and then sees what higher principles one must resort to in order to explain their moral weight, when one thinks they have it, and to resolve conflicts between them. It identifies two grounds for human rights: personhood and practicalities. The existence conditions for a human right would, then, be these.
When Human Rights Conflict
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter analyzes conflicts between human rights. Twelve major arguments are presented. Among these are: (i) we need to supply existence conditions for human rights; (ii) the existence conditions for human rights in particular will have to have some substantive evaluative elements, in order to express the value to be attached to human status; (iii) those substantive evaluative elements then impose material constraints on the content of human rights: for example, the personhood account says that human rights protect not just anything that we rationally desire or that benefits us, but rather our status as normative agents; (iv) normative agency can be divided into parts: namely, autonomy, minimum provision, and liberty; and (v) each part of normative agency can be threatened by other persons, and threatened to different degrees: one can lose a little, or a lot, of one's autonomy, material provision, or liberty.
Whose Rights?
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
Human infants are not normative agents. Neither are human foetuses, nor the severely mentally handicapped, nor sufferers from advanced dementia. This chapter addresses the following questions: Do none of these groups, then, have human rights? Do none of these groups at least have certain general moral rights simply in virtue of being human — only analogous to human rights, it may be, but for all practical purposes just as good?
My Rights: But Whose Duties?
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter addresses the question of who bears the duty correlative to a human right. It discusses primary duties correlative to a human right, defined as the duties with the same content as the related rights; and secondary duties — those more loosely connected to human rights. AIDS in Africa is used as an example to show further how hard it can sometimes be to identify the duty-ower.
Liberty
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
Personhood can be explained in terms of autonomy, liberty, and minimum provision. All more specific human rights can then be seen as falling under one or other of these three abstract headings. Under liberty, for example, fall several well-known freedoms, such as freedom of expression, of religion, of assembly, and so on. This chapter focuses on liberty in general — the high-level right.
Human Rights: Discrepancies Between Philosophy and International Law
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter works out the implications of the account for a selection of lower-level human rights. Topics discussed include the discrepancies between two lists of human rights — the one from the best philosophical account and the other from the most authoritative declarations in international law; the list of human rights emerging from the personhood account; civil and political rights, aims and status of international law; economic, social, and cultural rights; and the future of international lists of human rights.
Do Human Rights Require Democracy?
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter addresses the question of whether human rights require democracy. Human rights and democracy have grown up to meet quite different needs. Human rights grew up to protect what we see as constituting human dignity: the life, autonomy, and liberty of the individual. Democratic institutions grew up in our need for a decision procedure for groups — a procedure that is stable, manages transfer of power well, appropriate to a society whose members are more or less equal in power or worth, reconciles losers in social decisions to the basic structures of the society, and tends to promote the commonweal — that is, order, justice, security, and prosperity. Much more comes into democracy, both into the idea itself and into its major duties and functions, than can be got out of human rights. It is unsurprising that fairness should enter into what can count as a democracy, and also that the promotion of a large variety of social ends should enter into its major duties and functions. One cannot derive a requirement of fair political procedures from human rights alone, though one may be able to derive it from morality as a whole.
Physicalism, Conceptual Analysis, and Acts of Faith
Authors: Hornsby Jennifer 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
Frank Jackson and the author each take the other to hold a position in philosophy of mind that it is extremely difficult to sustain. This chapter tries to say something about how that can be. It seeks to demonstrate the sanity of Jackson's opponents and the fragility of his own position than to hold out for the truth of any particular doctrine. It wants to bring to the surface an assumption in ontology, which is seen as a crucial part of the grounding of Jackson's particular version of physicalism. Once it is appreciated that this assumption is contestable, Jackson's opponents may be seen in a different light from the one in which they appear in his writings. More generally, a connection will appear between the vast literature on physicalism as a topic in philosophy of mind and the equally vast literature on material constitution as a topic in metaphysics.