bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Historical Theory
Authors: Skinner Andrew Stewart 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
Adam Smith's interest in social history found a number of precedents and parallels on the Continent. It is interesting to note that, as Quaestor for the University Library, Smith made purchases including the works of Giannonne, Daniel, and Brosse, and that he owned copies of works by Fénelon, Fontenelle, Rollin, Raynal, Mably, Duclos, and Chastellux, to name a few. Such writers are associated with something of a revolution in historical writing. Smith's own work on the history of civil society is particularly noteworthy, and is among the first subjects that he appears to have addressed. Even if we exclude the Edinburgh Lectures, it is now well known, from the account supplied by John Millar, that the third part of Smith's lecture course delivered from the Moral Philosophy chair had been concerned with ‘that branch of morality which relates to justice’. Smith managed to isolate four distinct modes of subsistence to which there corresponded four types of social structure: the stages of hunting, pasturage, farming, and commerce.
Shared and Collective Responsibility
Authors: LUCAS J. R. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
The shareability of reasons makes it possible to share responsibility, and this chapter considers the ways we can be responsible for actions taken by another, either on our instructions or on our advice, or because we were in some sense accomplices before or after the act. Collective responsibility can extend a long way, far further than is comfortable. We often find ourselves feeling responsible for what our ancestors, compatriots, or co-religionists have done, and seek some means of dissociating ourselves and disavowing actions taken by members of our group.
Doing and Deserving
Authors: LUCAS J. R. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
Having construed punishments as tangible tokens of disapprobation, this chapter elucidates rewards as tangible tokens of esteem. It distinguishes desert, which is concerned with what an agent has done, from merit, which is concerned with what he is. It argues against John Rawls' contention that desert ought not to be a basis for distributing good things. Desert is not the only basis, but it is the pre-eminent one, which, in default of good reason to the contrary, we ought to adopt. It is particularly appropriate for distributing the fruits of co-operative endeavour, and where these accrue unevenly, a monetary transfer enables the score to be made even.
Money
Authors: LUCAS J. R. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
Money raises many questions about its responsible use, and these are laid out in this chapter. The fact that money obtains its value by conferring choice affects our understanding of its moral properties. In so far as it increases the individual's range of choice, it is a good thing, and equally it is good in extending our opportunities of concerting our actions in cases where the benefit would, in the absence of monetary transfers, accrue unevenly or to some partners not at all. But it also increases the burden of responsibility on the individual, who cannot disclaim many obligations on the score of not being able to discharge them.
Responsibility in Personal Relations
Authors: LUCAS J. R. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
The concept of responsibility has less application to the intimate world of personal relationships, in which first-personal rather than omni-personal reasoning is paramount, but irresponsibility can be deeply corrosive, particularly in matters of sexual morality and family obligation. This chapter discusses these together with issues of loyalty to the group, and reaches unfashionable conclusions, being much harder on permissiveness than advanced thinkers of the present age, and softer on homosexuality than would be approved by popular sentiment.
Beyond Responsibility
Authors: LUCAS J. R. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
This chapter moves beyond responsibility to a discussion of identification with and acceptance by other human beings and God, and offers a rethinking of the Atonement. It argues that responsibility comes out as an important but limited concept, and an important but limited virtue. It plays an important part in our interchanges with one another, especially our more distant ones. It underlies many of the concepts and institutions of social and political life, and we need to further greater responsibility in politics and business generally. Even as we move into the more intimate realms of personal relations and religion it remains important—there is no virtue in irresponsibility among friends or before God—but it is not all-important. In those realms what we do is not the prime manifestation of what we are, and what we are is more important than just what we succeed in doing.
The Model
Authors: McCall Storrs 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter attempts to show a model of the universe that can illuminate, perhaps even resolve, some difficult philosophical problems, such as the problems of the direction and flow of time; what causation consists of; the nature of scientific laws; the interpretation of quantum mechanics; objective probability; counterfactuals and related conditionals; the identity of individuals across possible worlds; essential properties; and lastly the nature of practical reason and decision, and the problem of free will. The universe tree can be regarded as a huge cosmic entity, depending neither for its existence nor for its nature upon being cognized by a conscious intelligence. Although on many of its branches, and at its first branch point, conscious intelligences presently do exist, there is no guarantee that this will always be the case.
Causation and Laws of Nature
Authors: McCall Storrs 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter focuses on the notion of cause in scientific philosophy and discusses David Hume's doctrine of ideas. Instead of finding the original of the idea of efficacy, power, or necessary connection in the world, Hume found it not in an impression of sensation but in an impression of reflection. The idea of necessary connection derives from the easy transition that the mind makes from the idea of the cause to that of the effect, after it has experienced the constant conjunction of the corresponding impressions. If the world is looked upon as a single four-dimensional course of events, or for that matter as a three-dimensional state of affairs with only one successor-state, then Hume's conclusion seems justified.
Emerson: Perfectionism, Idiosyncrasy, Justice
Authors: Mulhall Stephen 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter examines Cavell's views on Emerson, seeing him as the founder of the mode of thinking which Thoreau exemplifies. Cavell identifies Emerson as proposing a practice of philosophical reading as a means of overcoming sceptical despair — an essentially Romantic practice in which recounting criteria forms the central part of a more general attempt to allow oneself to be read by words and the world, and thereby restore their life in all its relative autonomy.
Subjective Conceptions
Authors: Denham A. E. 
Published: October 2011

AbstractGenuine moral judgements might be only available to someone possessed of moral competence, and moral competence requires, at a minimum, that one be susceptible to a specific kind of moral experience — the experience of others' concerns and interests as valuable. That experience, in turn, requires that one be able to conceive of others' purposes as from their subjective point of view, a conception which features some of the affective and motivational phenomenology which they themselves enjoy. This chapter examines subjectivity and its relationship to idiosyncracy, how imagination contributes to one's ability to conceive adequately of others' perspectival experiences including their sentiments, and how the subjective imagination contributes to one's other-person ascriptions of experience.
Chapter 1
Authors: Hallaq Wael B. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
No concept can be formed except by means of definition, as goes the first point by the logicians. First, this asserts that there is no doubt that the onus of proofs rests with him who negates, just at it rests with him who affirms. Second, it may be argued that what is intended by ‘definition’ is the definiendum itself. Third, all the communities of scholars and advocates of religious doctrines, craftsmen, and professionals know the things they need to know, and verify what they encounter in the sciences, and the professions without speaking of definitions. Another point is that people until this very day are not known to have definitions which accord with their principles. These are the four main points in addition to others which are explored in this chapter.
Varieties ofde reThought
Authors: Bach Kent 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThe previous chapter proposed a way of schematizing the general form of de re thought and characterized the de re representations and relations associated with each of the three kinds of de re thought: perception-based, memory-based, and communication-based. This chapter takes up the last two cases in more detail. They are interesting in their own right and will also serve to clarify the author's account. The discussion of them will include some concrete illustrations of why the insights underlying the causal theory of names properly belong to the theory of singular thought. At the end of the chapter, in order to highlight certain of the distinctive features of the author's, this is compared with the approach taken by Evans, which might seem at first glance to be similar. The underlying difference arises from the distinction between identifying an object and merely thinking of one, and it is argued that the identity of the object of a de re thought does not depend on one's belief about its identity.
Definite Descriptions II: The Referential/Attributive Distinction
Authors: Bach Kent 
Published: October 2011

AbstractIf Russell's theory of descriptions concerned their use and not just their meaning, it could account only for attributive uses of complete definite descriptions, where what is asserted is a uniqueness proposition. But it is not a theory of their use, contrary to what the various objections to it implicitly assume. In the course of defending it against these objections, it was shown how it could be supplemented with a pragmatic account of referential uses. This chapter develops that account in detail, but not before examining how Donnellan formulated the referential/attributive distinction originally.
The Lost Theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia
Authors: Vallance J. T. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
An ancient doctor who advocated the therapeutic benefits of wine and passive exercise was bound to be successful. However, Asclepiades of Bithynia did far more than reform much of traditional Hippocratic therapeutic practice; he devised an extraordinary physical theory which he used to explain all biological phenomena in uniformly simple terms. His work laid the theoretical basis for the anti-theoretical medical sect called Methodism. For his trouble he was despised by his intellectual progeny and, more importantly perhaps, by Galen. None of his work survives intact, but copious ancient testimonia relating to him allow us to reconstruct many details of the theory. His ideas offer us a fascinating glimpse of how Hellenistic philosophy and medicine interacted, and provide an introduction to one of the most intriguing doctrinal disputes in Greek science.
Void?
Authors: Vallance J. T. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
It was suggested that terms such as corpuscula and so on refer to the same fragile particles. This chapter argues that the fragility of Asclepiades’ corpuscles was something which set them apart from the indivisible atoms of Democritus and Epicurus. In the best modern account, Harig argues that Asclepiades was indeed a void theorist and by this time in antiquity, void came in many guises, often in highly sophisticated forms. In fact, calling them all ‘void’ is rather misleading, especially given the degree of involvement of prominent void antagonists in the debate. On the other hand, this kind of void is physically passive and has no power, but it gives the atoms their crucial room to move and Epicurus positively affirmed its existence.
Asclepiades?
Authors: Vallance J. T. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
The Asclepiadean corpuscular hypothesis can be seen for what it was. It was not Epicurean as to the extent that it stands in a tradition of ‘monistic theories’, the theory might broadly be termed ‘atomistic’, but this misrepresents it seriously. It was not Heraclidean either though this may come as a big surprise to those scholars who have assumed that Asclepiades is a transparent source for the Heraclidean theory. The corpuscular hypothesis of Asclepiades marks a notable attempt at pairing down the multiplicity of explanations of physiological and pathological phenomena. Not only does this type of activity lie in a well-attested Hippocratic tradition, but in one whose importance in the development of Hellenistic medicine seems often to be overlooked.
Introduction
Authors: Cohen L. Jonathan 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
This book tries to show that, if forensic proof in Anglo-American courts is analysed in terms of the mathematical calculus of chance, the anomalies and paradoxes which are generated are too numerous and too serious for intellectual comfort. It also describes a differently structured concept of probability in a degree of detail that enables its merits and demerits to be appropriately evaluated. The general aim establishes the rationality of the concept and the depth of its entrenchment in human culture. In addition, it demonstrates that the non-Pascalian concept of probability can indeed perform the forensic tasks for which any Pascalian concept seems illsuited and that the non-Pascalian concept has some important uses even outside the somewhat stylized institutional framework of legal proceedings. Furthermore, to avoid accusations of word-play, it needs to show too that the title of this non-Pascalian concept to be called a concept of probability is quite a strong one.
The Difficulty about Proof beyond Reasonable Doubt
Authors: Cohen L. Jonathan 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
This chapter presents an elaboration on the difficulty about proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is more inclined to hold that a particular conclusion falls short of certainty because there is a particular, specifiable reason for doubting it, than to hold that it is reasonable to doubt the conclusion because it falls short of certainty. Hence a scale of mathematical probability is used for assessing proof beyond reasonable doubt. What is needed instead is a list of all the points that have to be established in relation to each element in the crime. Not that a high statistical probability is necessarily useless; but it must enter into a proof as a fact from which to argue rather than as a measure of the extent to which a conclusion has been established, and its relevance must also be separately established.
Dispositions
Authors: Cohen L. Jonathan 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
This chapter first provides some difficulties in current truth-functional analyses of dispositions. The truth-functional analysis of dispositional statements encounters difficulties that neither Quine's nor Carnap's proposal overcomes. Every dispositional statement encapsulates a statement about an inductive, not a mathematical probability. But statements about inductive support or inductive probability are open to both a nominalist and a realist interpretation. The difference between an Austinian and a Blackstonian interpretation of legal reasoning from precedent is analogous, but adopting an anti-realist position on one such issue does not necessarily commit a philosopher to adopting this position on another, analogous issue. The nominalist interpretation is not superior on grounds of ontological economy, because it involves a principle of plenitude. But it has greater epistemological coherence. So the analysis of dispositions in terms of inductive probabilities does not necessitate any retreat from anti-realism.
Divine Commands and Moral Autonomy
Authors: Quinn Philip L. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
It has become fashionable to try to prove the impossibility of there being a God. More recently, James Rachels has offered a moral argument intended to show that there could not be a being worthy of worship. What Rachels attempts to establish is that obedience to divine commands would require giving up the role of moral autonomy. If this were so, it would destroy the prospects for a defensible divine command theory of morality. This chapter examines the position Rachels is arguing for. It shows that Rachel's attempt to prove that no being could be a fitting object of worship rests on a false premise and its, therefore, unsound. This chapter also shows that the genuine philosophical perplexity which motivates Rachels's argument can be dispelled without too much difficulty.
In Defence of the Divine Command Conception
Authors: Quinn Philip L. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
Through the ages people have worried about the relationship between religion and morality. Most modern philosophers subscribe to some version of the thesis that morality is autonomous and they reject the claim that what is ethically right or wrong depends upon the command or choice of God. It is often said that divine command theories of ethics are preposterous or obviously untenable. This chapter challenges the conventional wisdom about these matters. It argues that philosophers have not succeeded in refuting certain divine command theories and are not justified in rejecting them. It also explains the divine command theory of ethics and what consequences it should have. This chapter also considers a number of objections to such theories and tries to show that none of them serves to refute all of the theories under discussion.
Divine Commands and the Logic of Requirement
Authors: Quinn Philip L. 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
This chapter proposes to examine a theory that is logically adequate for dealing with conflicting requirements. It also shows how it can be extended so that it is a divine command theory and argues that this theory too can be successfully defended against the standard philosophical requirements. This chapter begins by discussing ethical principles modeled on a system of general principles, called the ‘the logic of requirement’. It then discusses how this theory deals with conflicts between ordinary moral requirements and those imposed by a divine command.
Class
Authors: Bealer George 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter argues that set theory — unlike the theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs) — is not rooted in natural logic but is instead born of certain confusions about natural logic. It shows that everything that set theory can do can be done equally well by the theory of PRPs. It concludes that there is no good logical or pragmatic reason for set theory. This shows that entities grounded in natural logic namely, ordinary aggregates and their properties, may permanently take over the functions that were served on an ad hoc basis by the artificial abstract aggregates of set theory.
Processional Prelude: Nocturne for the‘Son of the Gods’
Authors: Harris H. S. 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThe new nineteenth century found Hegel resolved to go to the University of Jena and carve a place for himself, if he could, as a philosopher. After 1800, he always remained a ‘Son of the Gods’ – one who did not speak easily in the tongues of men. The tension between his formal commitment as a supporter of Schelling's system and the natural evolution of his own concerns and problems – expressed in what he called ‘System’ before he went to Jena – was a source of difficulty and uncertainty for Hegel himself in these years. If no one understood him at this stage, it was at least partly because he did not yet fully understand himself. This chapter describes Hegel as a protégé of Schelling, a doctor of philosophy, a critical journalist, an extraordinary professor, and a private man.
The Philosophy of Spirit in 1804
Authors: Harris H. S. 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThe first two sections of this chapter describe the concept and the evolution of consciousness. The finite organism brings the hidden unity to light because it is knowingly alive. But it is also consciously finite; and the infinite process against which it has emerged is broken up into a field and a sequence of finite parts by its awareness. As a real process in the world, the spirit embraces all rational consciousness. The third section deals with language, tool, and patrimony. The fourth section discusses the struggle for recognition, and life in the Volk. The last section explores the concept of the Absolute Spirit.
The Logic and Metaphysics of 1804/5
Authors: Harris H. S. 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter describes Hegel's logic and metaphysics of 1804 and 1805. The first section comments on the approach to Hegel's logic. The second section explores the logic of understanding or ‘simple connection’. The third section examines the concept of the ‘bad infinite’. The fourth section describes the relations between substance, cause, and reciprocity. The fifth section deals with concept, judgement, and syllogism. The sixth section defines logical and metaphysical cognition. The last section explores Hegel's ideas of the Self, World, and Supreme Being.
Explaining Scenes
Authors: Jardine Nicholas 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter explains the ways in which a shift of scene may be brought about by changes in presuppositions and methodological commitments. It proposes the important role of local and tacit methods, practices, and techniques in determining of scenes of inquiry, and examines the problems of access imposed for historians. It first considers the existential, explanatory, and categorical presuppositions as determinants of scenes of inquiry. Then, it examines methodological commitments that affect different perceptions of relevance. The last section pays attention to the problems of access to local beliefs, commitments, and practices faced by the historians in explaining the formation, maintenance, and dissolution of scenes of inquiry.
The Sociological Challenge
Authors: Jardine Nicholas 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter considers other strategies for the legitimation of methods and beliefs whose prevalence and effectiveness cast doubt on the primacy of calibration against precedents and standards as arbitrator of methods and practices in the sciences. It looks at recent findings in the sociology and social history of the sciences that suggest that effective methods in securing consensuses in the sciences are generally neither calibrated nor such that they would survive genuine attempts at calibration. The chapter first considers a direct attack on the prevalence of genuine calibration. Then it looks into two sociological approaches to the study of closure of debate in the sciences: interest theory and network theory. Both theories entail major roles in the formation of consensus in the sciences for strategies of appeal to literary and aesthetic sensibilities.