La crise du pouvoir en U.R.S.S. (1988-juillet 1991)
Authors: Zaleski Eugène 
Published: December 2010

The crisis of authority in the U.S.S.R. (1988 - July 1991).
After a preliminary reference to the ideological options open to Mikhail Gorbachev, initiator of the break-up of Stalinism, and the mistrust which be inspires, both among some of his opponents as well as among right-wing conservatives, the author considers the recent evolution of the Soviet Union, from the monopoly of Party rule to the difficult birth of a pluralistic regime.
He first raises the question of the Party's attitude to perestroika. Article 6 of the Constitution of 1977, which aknowledges the leading role of the Party, was reluctantly annulled by Gorbachev, but annuled it was, thus leaving the way open for pluralism. Condemnation of factionalism within the body of the Party has not prevented the emergence of various "tendencies" (particularly the democratic Platform and the marxist Platform) which find official expression. Similarly, political and social groupings, independent of authority, began to proliferate : from groupings moved by a common principle, for example tne Safeguarding of the national heritage, or the defense of the environment, they rapidly became popular fronts, lending the system a de facto pluralism which would only later enjoy a de jure existence.
This spontaneous development took shape first of all in the Baltic countries, and then with increasing momentum spread to all the republics. In parallel with this, the communist Party leadership initiated a reform of the political system, which found expression in the semi-free elections of March 1989, marked by the defeat of various party and State notables. This was the beginning of a multi-party system, there having been two major opposing tendencies during the campaign for the regional elections in the spring of 1990 : the democratic Russia bloc (liberal) and the patriotic Russian bloc (conservative), surrounded by a multiplicity of organizations of the most diverse and constantly evolving tendencies. The charge levelled against them is that they have no autonomous ideas or initiative, and have only one single programme : mass rejection of the Party apparatus. Some observers are of the opinion that a deep schism will develop within the CPSU, and that this will give rise to a real multi-party system. The first stage of this development has just begun, with the movement for democratic reforms, which was launched in July 1991 by frontline reformers.
The other major problem which arises is that of the preservation or the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The authority of the Center is in question, and already six republics have decided to leave the union, proclaiming their sovereignty loud and long (the three Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia and Moldavia). But although the right of scission is officially acknowledged, its implementation is a vast battleground (see the law of 3rd April 1990). The upsurge of centrifugal forces has led the republics, one after the other,
to proclame their sovereignty (primacy of republican laws over federal laws, economic autonomy, ownership of the soil and mineral deposits, etc.) or their outright indépendance. Autonomous Republics and territories followed suit, opposing the authorities of the republics to which they belonged. Inter-ethnic conflict broke out all over.
The dispute over federal authority led to a "way over laws", setting the Centre at odd with republics resolved to insist on recognition of their rights (ownership of all the ressources found on their territory, freedom to exploit these resources, etc.). In this context, the question of finance and the budget had pride of place, together with that of material and technological supplies. The entire supply system was disorganized, with the republics refusing to carry out the orders of the State, or to deliver consumers' goods outside of their frontiers, in order to avoid a worsening of their own shortages. The Soviet government tried to combat the supply problems, at least in part, by setting up commodity markets. A series of economic programms was worked out, including V. Pavlov's anti-crisis plan (April 1991) which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, but it is not entirely clear how the economic responsabilities will be apportioned among the Central authorities, the republics and the lower-rank administrative bodies, and what will be the share of the state and private sectors. Also, it is not known how he proposes to overcome the present crisis, and how long this will take.
Another major source of discord is the army and the police. The republics demand the right to raise armed forces, and to assume the responsability for maintaning order within their territory. Certain of them, who have been the victims of attacks by the special forces of the Ministry of Interior, the OMON, have organized militias and defense groups, wich are virtually republican armies in embryo.
In the end, there was an overriding necessity for redefining the Union, and the first version of the new Union Treaty was adopted by referendum on the 17th March 1991. A slightly modified version of it was published on the 19th June, but neither the one nor the other gives a very clear idea of the respective areas of competence and the common areas of competence of the Centre and the constituent republics of the Union (and still less of the fate in store for secessionist republics). On the other hand, one can be sure that the Treaty will be the source of innumerable controversies and disputes, especially on the particularly explosive issue of the budget, taxation and the distribution of ressources. In the final part, the author ventures some thoughts on the future. He sets perestroika in the continuing context of the history of the Russian empire, recalling that the demands made (individual freedoms and democracy, self-determination and decolonization) were already those of the protagonists of the Russian democratic revolution of February-March 1917, which was "taken over" by the Bolshevik coup d'Etat. Now that the empire has fallen victim to its contradictions and weaknesses, and finally disintegrated, what will take its place ? The cure prescribed by the Union Treaty seems ill-adapted to the task, and several outcomes are possible : a resolute commitment to the way of democracy and decolonization, a return to an authoritarian régime but one establishing a market economy, the option of passivity while waiting for a solution "which will come of itself, or a return to thorough-going, tough dictatorship accompanied by a blood bath. If Gorbachev does not once more take his courage in both hands, and proceeds to decolonize the empire, however slow and piecemeal the process, others will do it for him. And in that case, we may fear the worst.