bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Difficulties inherent in the restoration of dynamically reactive brain systems
Authors: Stanfield Brent B. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe responses displayed by an injured or diseased nervous system are complex. Some of the responses may effect a functional reorganization of the affected neural circuitry. Strategies aimed at the restoration of function, whether or not these involve transplantation, need to recognize the innate reactive capacity of the nervous system to damage. More successful strategies will probably incorporate, rather than ignore, the adaptive responses of the compromised neural systems.
Self-control: Beyond commitment
Authors: Rachlin Howard 
Published: February 2010

AbstractSelf-control, so important in the theory and practice of psychology, has usually been understood introspectively. This target article adopts a behavioral view of the self (as an abstract class of behavioral actions) and of self-control (as an abstract behavioral pattern dominating a particular act) according to which the development of self-control is a molar/molecular conflict in the development of behavioral patterns. This subsumes the more typical view of self-control as a now/later conflict in which an act of self-control is a choice of a larger but later reinforcer over a smaller but sooner reinforcer. If at some future time the smaller-sooner reinforcer will be more valuable than the larger-later reinforcer, self-control may be achieved through a commitment to the largerlater reinforcer prior to that point. According to some, there is a progressive internalization of commitment in the development of self-control. This presents theoretical and empirical problems. In two experiments – one with pigeons choosing between smallersooner and larger-later reinforcers, the other with adult humans choosing between short-term particular and long-term abstract reinforcers – temporal patterning of choices increased self-control.
Patterns yes, agency no
Authors: Baum William M. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractContrary to his own perspective, Rachlin introduces a ghostly inner cost to explain the persistence of behavioral patterns and agency to explain their origins. Both inconsistencies can be set straight by taking account of history and a context larger than the pattern itself. Persistence is explained by stimulus control, if one assumes that defection from a pattern has stimulus properties and is punished. The origins of patterns are understood as an outcome of selection in the larger context of cultural or biological evolution.
Internal commitment and efficient habit formation
Authors: Frank Robert H. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractRachlin's attack on the internal commitment model rests on the demonstrably false claim that self-punishment does not exist. He is correct that habits are an effective device for solving self-control problems, but his additional claim that they are the only such device makes it hard to explain how good habits develop in the first place. Someone with a self-control problem would always choose the spuriously attractive reward, which, over time, would create bad habits.
Choice between long- and short-term interests: Beyond self-control
Authors: Green Leonard , Myerson Joel 
Published: February 2010

AbstractIn the real world, there are choices between large, delayed, punctate rewards and small, more immediate rewards as well as choices between patterns and acts. A common element in these situations is the choice between long- and short-term interests. Key issues for future research appear to be how acts are restructured into larger patterns of behavior, and whether, as Rachlin implies, pattern perception is the cause of pattern generation.
The extended psychological present
Authors: Hineline Philip N. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractPortraying psychological process as extended over time in multiply overlapping scales is a conceptual advance that can be understood as analogous to our understanding of spatial relationships. There may be a residual contradiction, however, when Rachlin invokes “cost” in ways that seem to imply earlier conceptions. The roles of superimposed or conditionally related stimuli also remain to be addressed.
My behavior made me do it: The uncaused cause of teleological behaviorism
Authors: Hughes Jordan , Churchland Patricia S. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractToward a neurobiologically grounded approach to explaining self-control we discuss the case of a patient with a bilateral lesion in frontal ventromedial cortex. Patients with such lesions display a marked deficit in social decision making. Compared with an account that examines the causal antecedents of self-control, Rachlin's behaviorist approach seems lacking in explanatory strength.
Form, function, and self-control
Authors: Logue A. W. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe target article's definition of self-control as a highly valued behavior pattern containing a less preferred element is consistent with other functionalist explanations of behavior. This definition falls within the more traditional definition of self-control as the choice of a larger, more delayed reinforcer over a smaller, less delayed reinforcer, and can provide new insights concerning our understanding of self-control.
The behavior of self-control
Authors: Plaud Joseph J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractRachlin's view of self-control as a sequence or chain of behaviors is contrasted with traditional behavioral analyses of self-control which emphasize a simplistic interpretation of the hyperbolic function relating small-sooner (SS) and larger-later (LL) reinforcers to specific behaviors. The validity of Rachlin's teleological analysis is examined in relation to the acquisition and steady-state performance of self-control behaviors. Central to an analysis of self-control is the functional difference between behavior under the control of SS and LL reinforcers, because SS-reinforced behavior is more complex due to temporal parameters.
Self-control: Acts of free will
Authors: Schirillo James A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractRachlin overlooks that free will determineswhenand inwhatdirection acts that appear impulsive will occur. Because behavioral patterns continuously evolve, animals are not guaranteed when they will, or how to, maximize larger-later reinforcements. An animal therefore uses self-control to emit free acts to vary behavioral patterns to optimize larger-later rewards.
Distinguishing between acts and patterns
Authors: Shimoff Eliot 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe costliness of disrupting a pattern may not be a useful criterion for distinguishing between acts and patterns; there are instances in which omitted components of patterns are hard to detect (e.g., typographical errors), or in which distortions are easily introduced (e.g., slurred words in a trite phrase). Are there behavioral criteria for distinguishing between acts and patterns?
Alternatives to radical behaviorism
Authors: Smith Terry L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractOperant psychologists are looking for alternatives to radical behaviorism. Rachlin offers teleological behaviorism, but it may pose as many difficulties as radical behaviorism. There is, however, a less drastic way to defend Rachlin's thesis of “order in the relationship between organisms and environment.” It portrays operant principles as relating distal efficient causes to behavioral effects.
Brains evolution and neurolinguistic preconditions
Authors: Wilkins Wendy K. , Wakefield Jennie 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThis target article presents a plausible evolutionary scenario for the emergence of the neural preconditions for language in the hominid lineage. In pleistocene primate lineages there was a paired evolutionary expansion of frontal and parietal neocortex (through certain well-documented adaptive changes associated with manipulative behaviors) resulting, in ancestral hominids, in an incipient Broca's region and in a configurationally unique junction of the parietal, occipital, and temporal lobes of the brain (the POT). On our view, the development of the POT in our ancestors resulted in the neuroanatomical substrate consistent with the ability for representations in modality-neutral association cortex and, as a result of structure-imposing interaction with Broca's area, the hierarchically structured “conceptual structure.” Evidence from paleoneurology and comparative primate neuroanatomy is used to argue thatHomo habilis(2.5–2 million years ago) was the first hominid to have the appropriate gross neuroanatomical configuration to support conceptual structure. We thus suggest that the neural preconditions for language are met inH. habilis. Finally, we advocate a theory of language acquisition that uses conceptual structure as input to the learning procedures, thus bridging the gap between it and language.
A case for auditory temporal processing as an evolutionary precursor to speech processing and language function
Authors: Fitch Roslyn Holly , Tallal Paula 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWilkins & Wakefield suggest that changes in the hominid brain made it uniquely “preadaptive” for language, yet no precursor functions served as adaptive substrates to the emergence of language. We present contrary evidence that the ability to discriminate and process rapid and complex auditory information is a cross-species function subserving communication processes including, but not limited to, human speech perception. We suggest that auditory temporal processing served as an evolutionary precursor to speech processing and consequent language development in humans.
Human language: Are nonhuman precursors lacking?
Authors: Hauser Marc D. , Wolfea Nathan D. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractContra Wilkins & Wakefield, we argue that an evolutionarily inspired approach to language must consider different facets of language (i.e., more than syntax and semantics), and must explore the possibility of nonhuman precursors. Several examples are discussed, illustrating the power of the comparative approach in illuminating our understanding of language evolution.
Coming of age in Olduvai and the Zaire rain forest
Authors: Leiber Justin 
Published: February 2010

AbstractProbablyHomo habilisis two species not one; similarly for Pan troglodytes. Although amenable to training, in naturePan paniscusmay be a “specialized insular dwarf.” Language is uniquely human, but symbolic behavior and intelligence are widespread among animals with little respect for phylogenetic closeness toHomo sapiens.
The hominid tool-language connection: Some missing evolutionary links?
Authors: Maryanski A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThis commentary criticizes Wilkins & Wakefield's thesis that the neurological precursors of language provide a cognitive Rubicon to linguistically divide human from nonhuman primates. A causal model of their theory is presented, followed by a discussion of the relationship between brain expansion and tool use, Broca's area and the parietaloccipital-temporal junction (POT).
Bartering old stone tools: When did communicative ability and conceptual structure begin to interact?
Authors: Walker Stephen F. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWilkins & Wakefield are clearly right to separate linguistic capacity from communicative ability, if only because other animal species have one without the other. But I question the abruptness of the demarcation they make between a period when hominids evolved enriched conceptual representation for other reasons entirely, and a subsequent later stage when language use became an adaptation.
Issues and nonissues in the origins of language
Authors: Wilkins Wendy K. , Wakefield Jennie 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThis response clarifies the nature of reappropriation and the definition of language. It explicates the relationship between neural systems and language and between homology and evolutionary gradualism. Through a review of ape capacities in the realms of language and tool use, it distinguishes human language acquisition from nonhuman learning. Finally, it suggests the appropriate sorts of evidence on which to base further evolutionary arguments relevant to the origins of language.
Phenomenal fallacies and conflations
Authors: Harman Gilbert 
Published: February 2010

AbstractA “fallacy” is something like the sense-datum fallacy, involving a logically invalid argument. A “conflation” is something like Block's conflation of the (alleged) raw feel of an experience with what it is like to have the experience. Trivially, a self is conscious of something only if it accesses it. Substantive issues concern the nature of the conscious self and the nature of access.
On distinguishing phenomenal consciousness from the representational functions of mind
Authors: Katz Leonard D. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractOne can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind.
What is an agent that it experiences P-consciousness? And what is P-consciousness that it moves an agent?
Authors: Shepard Roger N. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractIf phenomenal consciousness is distinct from the computationally based access-consciousness that controls overt behavior, how can I tell which things (other than myself) enjoy phenomenal consciousness? And if phenomenal consciousness 'plays no role in controlling overt behavior, how do human bodies come to write target articles arguing for the existence of phenomenal consciousness?
Preparedness and phobias: Specific evolved associations or a generalized expectancy bias?
Authors: Davey Graham C. L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractMost phobias are focussed on a small number of fear-inducing stimuli (e.g., snakes, spiders). A review of the evidence supporting biological and cognitive explanations of this uneven distribution of phobias suggests that the readiness with which such stimuli become associated with aversive outcomes arises from biases in the processing of information about threatening stimuli rather than from phylogenetically based associative predispositions or “biological preparedness.” This cognitive bias, consisting of a heightened expectation of aversive outcomes following fear-relevant stimuli, generates and maintains robust learned associations between them. Some of the features of such stimuli which determine this expectancy bias are estimates of how dangerous they are, the semiotic similarity between them and their aversive outcomes, and the degree of prior fear they elicit. Ontogenetic and cultural factors influence these features of fear-relevant stimuli and are hence important in determining expectancy bias. The available evidence does not exclude the possibility that both expectancy biases and specific evolved predispositions coexist, but the former can explain a number of important findings that the latter cannot.
Heredity × environment or developmental interactions?
Authors: Delprato Dennis J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThis commentary acknowledges the importance of Davey's biocognitive approach to the uneven distribution of fears on the basis of its contribution to a human model for understanding fear. An integrated heredity-environment and developmental transactional approach based on field/system theory is recommended in place of the mechanistic heredity × environment interactionism that Davey uses to explain behavioral ontogeny.
Rule-governed and contingency-governed fears
Authors: Fantino Edmund , Goldshmidt Jay 
Published: February 2010

AbstractBehavioral research suggests that rule-governed behavior should be less sensitive to environmental changes and thus more resistant to extinction (disconfirmation) than contingency-governed behavior. The opposite is implied in Davey's discussion of ontogenetic and phylogenetic contributions to fear development. The generality of the behavioral findings and their apparent inconsistency with the present article should be further explored with more sensitive research paradigms.
Biologically primed acquisition of aversions and association of expected stimulus pairs: Two different forms of learning
Authors: Hamm Alfons 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe present commentary emphasizes that the acquisition of fear always involves complex changes in several quasi-independent response systems. Stimulus-specific electrodermal response differentiation as well as the bias to overestimate the belongingness of certain stimulus pairs mainly indicates cognitive processes of selective orienting and attention. Emotion, however, also involves the activation of subcortical motivational circuits. Why certain stimuli acquire rapid access to these basic motivational systems is not explained by the expectancy bias model.
Enhanced processing of threatening stimuli: The case of face recognition
Authors: Mealey Linda 
Published: February 2010

AbstractBecause of their evolutionary importance, threat-detection mechanisms are likely to exist at a variety of levels. A recent study of face recognition suggests that novel stimuli receive enhanced processing when presented as fear-related. This suggests the existence of a complex, context-dependent threat-detection mechanism that can adaptively respond to spatiotemporally varying and unique environmental features.
Expectancy bias as sole or partial account of selective associations?
Authors: Mineka Susan , Cook Michael 
Published: February 2010

AbstractDavey reviews evidence purporting to distinguish between two accounts of selective associations – expectancy bias and evolved predispositions, although these hypotheses largely apply to different levels of causal analysis. Criticisms of primate studies in which subjects lack prior exposure to stimuli seem uncompelling. Expectancies may sometimes serve as proximal mediators in selective associations, but other factors, both proximate and ultimate, are clearly also involved.
Natural selection and fear regulation mechanisms
Authors: Nesse Randolph M. , Abelson James L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractExpectations can facilitate rapid fear conditioning and this may explain some phenomena that have been attributed to preparedness. However, preparedness remains the best explanation for some aspects of clinical phobias and the difficulty of creating fears of modern dangers. Rapid fear conditioning based on expectancy is not an alternative to an evolutionary explanation, but has, like preparedness, been shaped by natural selection.
Responses conditioned to fear-relevant stimuli survive extinction of the expectancy of the UCS
Authors: Schell Anne M. , Dawson Michael E. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractDavey suggests that increased resistance to extinction of CRs conditioned to fear-relevant stimuli may be due to more persistent expectancies of the UCS following these stimuli. However, this viewpoint is contradicted by existing empirical evidence that fear-relevant CRs survive an extinction trials series producing extinction of expectancies whereas CRs conditioned to non-fear-relevant CSs do not.
Is the human brain only responsive?
Authors: Kristeva-Feige Rumyana , Feige Bernd 
Published: February 2010

AbstractPosner & Raichle's (1994) book is a fascinating and readable account of the studies the authors have conducted on the localization of cognitive functions in the brain mainly using PET and EEC evoked potential methods. Our criticism concerns the underrepresentation of some imaging techniques (magnetoencephalography) and some forms of brain activity (spontaneous activity). Furthermore, the book leaves the reader with the impression that the brain only responds to external events.
Another far more ancient tongue
Authors: Bradshaw John 
Published: February 2010

AbstractLanguage started evolving early, before gesture; commonalities of generativity between language and praxis have been over-emphasized. Language did not drive hominid brain evolution, evolving multifactorially and interactively. More than communication, it permits a cognitive modelling of reality and hierarchical data management. As the interactive sum of various cognitive and linguistic systems, and of brain structures each semi-independently evolved, it is not part of a single, general-purpose cognitive processor, nor is it a separately-evolved quasi-independent module.
Neocortical size and language
Authors: Dunbar R. I. M. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractIn my target article, I argued (1) that the relationship between neocortical size and group size in primates implies that there is a cognitive limit on the size of human groups, and (2) that time constraints forced the evolution of language as a more efficient means of bonding the large groups that humans evolved. The doubts about these claims raised by these additional commentaries largely reflect misinterpretation of my original claims.
Two kinds of representational functionalism: Defusing the combinatorial explosion
Authors: Pust Joel 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAlvin Goldman (1993) presents three arguments against the psychological plausibility of representational functionalism (RF) as a theory of how subjects self-ascribe mental predicates. Goldman appears to construe RF as an account of attitude type self-ascription. His “combinatorial explosion” argument, however, proves devastating only to an implausible construal of RF as an account of attitude content self-ascription.
What are the mechanisms of photoreceptor adaptation?
Authors: Bownds M. Deric , Arshavsky Vadim Y. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThis article evaluates each of the reactions known to be involved in visual transduction as a potential site for the regulation of light adaptation. Extensive evidence suggests that calcium acts as a feedback messenger at several different points and recent work suggests a role for cGMP in regulating the primary excitatory pathway. A conclusion is that adaptation is likely to be regulated by multiple and redundant mechanisms. The goal of future experimentation will be to determine the relative importance of each of these.
Recoverin and Ca2+ in vertebrate phototransduction
Authors: Hurley James B. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractRecoverin is a 23 kDa Ca2+binding protein that has been detected primarily in vertebrate photoreceptors. The role of recoverin in phototransduction has been investigated using a variety of biochemical methods. Initial reports suggesting that recoverin regulates photoreceptor guanylyl cyclase have not been confirmed. Instead, recoverin appears to determine the lifetime of lightstimulated phosphodiesterase activity, perhaps by regulating rhodopsin phosphorylation. Retinal recoverin is heterogeneously fatty acylated at its ammo-terminus. The amino-terminal fatty acid appears to be involved in the interaction of recoverin with photoreceptor membranes.
Genetic and clinical heterogeneity in tapetal retinal dystrophies
Authors: Bergen A. A. B. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractLarge scale DNA-mutation screening in patients with hereditary retinal diseases greatly enhances our knowledge about retinal function and diseases. Scientists, clinicians, patients, and families involved with retinal disorders may directly benefit from these developments. However, certain aspects of this expanding knowledge, such as the correlation between genotype and phenotype, may be much more complicated than we expect at present.
Long term potentiation and CaM-sensitive adenylyl cyclase: Long-term prospects
Authors: Heideman Warren 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe type I CaM-sensitive adenylyl cyclase is in a position to integrate signals from multiple inputs, consistent with the requirements for mediating long term potentiation (LTP). Biochemical and genetic evidence supports the idea that this enzyme plays an important role inc LTP. However, more work is needed before we will be certain of the role that CaM-sensitive adenylyl cyclases play in LTP.