bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Introduction
Authors: Madden Dempsey Michelle 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This introductory chapter explains the context in which the author of this book became intrigued by the moral questions raised by domestic-violence prosecution and the tools employed in this book to explore such questions. It unpacks some underlying assumptions which animate the book's approach to this topic and explains the book's methodology of feminist practical reasoning. Importantly, this chapter sets out the central question that motivates the investigation undertaken in this book: What should public prosecutors do when victims withdraw their support for the prosecution of domestic violence cases? Finally, the chapter provides an analysis of different types of victim withdrawal from prosecutions and provides a brief introduction to the debates surrounding so-called ‘victimless’ prosecution of domestic violence.
Wrong Turns on the Way to an Answer
Authors: Madden Dempsey Michelle 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter examines and rejects two ways of answering the question: What should public prosecutors do when victims withdraw their support for the prosecution of domestic-violence cases? The first answer claims that prosecutors should simply do whatever the law requires of them. This answer is inadequate insofar as it assumes a degree of ruliness in prosecutorial decision-making which is inconsistent both with the principle of opportunity, and insofar as it rests on a mistaken assumption that legal rules provide fully determined answers to legal questions. A slightly more promising answer to the above question draws upon the framework provided by the distinction between the public and private spheres. While this approach is significantly more promising than the first, it too proves inadequate due to the public/private dichotomy's tendency to obscure rather than illuminate the very values upon which it is grounded.
Domestic-violence Prosecution: Justification and Effectiveness
Authors: Madden Dempsey Michelle 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter returns to the question which motivates the book's investigation: What should public prosecutors do when victims withdraw their support for the prosecution of domestic-violence cases? In answering this question, the chapter ties together the analyses and arguments set forth in Part II of the book with the account of domestic violence and patriarchy set forth thus far in Part III. Specifically, it argues that within the realm of justifiable (permissible) prosecutorial action, public prosecutors should respond in a way that constitutes the effective prosecution of domestic violence. In practical terms, the chapter seeks to demonstrate why it is important for prosecutors to make a distinction between cases of domestic violence in its strong sense and weak sense and to act on the reasons generated by this distinction.
Victims and Prosecutions
Authors: Madden Dempsey Michelle 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter considers the rights and duties of domestic-violence victims with respect to participating in the prosecution of domestic-violence cases. First, it revisits and expands upon the distinction briefly sketched in Chapter 5 between ‘reasons to do it yourself’ and ‘reasons to help someone else do it’ in order to identify the kinds of reasons which might ground a better understanding of the rights and duties of victims in the context of criminal prosecutions. Second, it considers the nature and scope of victims' rights to participate in domestic-violence prosecutions. Third, it considers whether victims ever have a duty to participate in domestic-violence prosecutions. Finally, the chapter argues that prosecutorial enforcement of this duty through legal mechanisms such as subpoena enforcement and contempt of court is unlikely ever to be justified, and even where justified, is self-defeating to the project of feminist prosecution defended in this book.
Between Authority and Interpretation
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This book develops ideas on some of the central questions in practical philosophy: legal, political, and moral. It provides an overview of the author's work on jurisprudence and the nature of law in the context of broader questions in the philosophy of practical reason. The book opens with a discussion of methodological issues, focusing on understanding the nature of jurisprudence, asking how the nature of law can be explained, and how the success of a legal theory can be established. The book then addresses central questions on the nature of law, its relation to morality, the nature and justification of authority, and the nature of legal reasoning. It explains how legitimate law, while being a branch of applied morality, is also a relatively autonomous system, which has the potential to bridge moral differences among its subjects. The book offers responses to some critical reactions to the author's theory of authority, adumbrating and modifying the theory to meet some of them. The final part of the book brings together for the first time the author's work on the nature of interpretation in law and the humanities. It includes a new chapter explaining interpretive pluralism and the possibility of interpretive innovation.
On the Nature of Law
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter begins with a discussion of the universality of the theses of the general theory of law. It argues that all successful legal theories are parochial; that success can be obtained only through being parochial. It then focuses on the consequences of parochialism, law as the authoritative voice of a political community, and the instrumental and the non-instrumental views of law. The chapter also discusses the connection between authority and interpretation. First, it discusses the way in which the connection between law and authority leads to a dual interest in the study of law: an interest in the process leading to the authoritative laying down or endorsement of a standard, and an interest in how the fact that a standard has authoritatively been laid down affects its standing. Second, it considers consider the main way in which the fact that law is authoritative affects its interpretation. Finally, it considers the way in which the authoritative nature of law makes interpretation central to legal reasoning.
The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter considers the problem of authority and examines moderately critical claims. Section I begins by explaining some background methodological points. Section II briefly restates the service conception and the way it deals with the problem of authority. Section III develops the service conception and elaborates some of its implications by dealing with a series of only loosely connected questions and doubts to which it is open. Section IV examines in general terms the argument that authority, at any rate political authority, presupposes a special link, missing in the service conception, between government and the governed. Section V considers the possibility that such a link is forged by consent, whereas section VI comments on the possibility that the link is constituted by identification with or membership of the political community (or some other group).
Mood and Music
Authors: Kivy Peter 
Published: May 2009

AbstractChapter 3 showed how musical formalism came into full flower in Hanslick's ‘little book’ along with the denial that absolute music could, or, therefore was meant to, arouse or ‘represent’ so-called ‘garden-variety emotions’. It was also shown how this denial of the emotive connection drew an immediate reply from Ambros, to the effect that the loss of emotion could be made up for by the substitution of ‘mood’. This move on Ambros's part presaged a similar move in contemporary philosophy. This chapter explores that move in one of its contemporary manifestations.
Persona Non Grata
Authors: Kivy Peter 
Published: May 2009

AbstractLiterary interpreters of the absolute music canon tend to fall into two distinct groups. Those who throw caution to the winds and impute to pure instrumental music narratives in startling detail, even to the extent of naming names; and those of a more circumspect disposition, who put narrations to the music that are vague or sketchy enough to slip by without striking the average music lover as wildly implausible or ‘off the wall’. The most popular and most frequently resorted to artifice, for those narrative interpreters of the more moderate stripe, to underwrite their readings of the absolute music canon, is a shadowy figure that has become known as the musical ‘persona’. This character is the subject of this chapter.
The Failure of Formalism and the Failure of its Foes
Authors: Kivy Peter 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThis chapter explores the possibility of the kinds of narrative interpretation put on absolute music by Robinson, Maus, and Newcomb being offered as attempts to provide an explanation for the interest and pleasure that we take in absolute music. It argues that if they are so offered, they fail in their purpose. But one thing those failed answers to the failure of formalism have right, if indeed they were so intended: formalism's defenders have failed to give an adequate explanation for the deep interest and pleasure that absolute music, in the Western canon, provides to its devotees — interest and pleasure to such a degree that it emboldens them to put the masterpieces of the canon alongside those masterpieces of the great poets, novelists, painters, and sculptors, from antiquity to the present.
Musical Morality
Authors: Kivy Peter 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThis chapter examines the moral claims of absolute music. It argues that absolute music shares with many other human activities the propensity to produce, in human beings, a kind of ecstasy that might seem appropriate to describe as character-enhancing, consciousness-raising and, therefore, in some vague, perhaps attenuated sense, morally improving, while it lasts. However, being just one of many such activities, absolute music seems to lose that special, magical connection to morality that goes back, one suspects, to its Pythagorean and Orphic roots.
Right Action for Virtue Ethics
Authors: Russell Daniel C. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThis chapter explores the basic shape of virtue ethical approaches to right action and develops a framework for assessing them for adequacy without begging any questions against them. It focuses on two main issues: whether we should take seriously the idea that the virtues have anything to do with rightness, and the role of consequences and outcomes in a virtue ethical theory of action. It also develops an account of what conditions are necessary and sufficient for an account of right action to count as a kind of virtue ethics.
Right Action and Virtuous Motives
Authors: Russell Daniel C. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractIn his recent book Morals from Motives, Michael Slote defends what he calls “agent-based virtue ethics”. This view consists of two theses: one about the nature of rightness and one about the nature of virtuousness. The thesis about rightness is that a right action is right solely on account of the virtuous motivations that produced it. The thesis about virtuousness is that, on the one hand, actions become virtuous only on account of the virtuousness expressed by the agent in doing the action, and on the other that the virtuousness of an agent and an agent's motives is a “fundamental” notion and not grounded in anything else. Although most critiques of Slote's view have focused on his thesis about rightness, this chapter focuses instead on Slote's thesis about virtuousness. In particular, it rejects Slote's view that deliberation and phronesis are redundant if one really is virtuous, and argues instead that virtuous persons need to deliberate so as to find virtuous actions. The chapter also argues that making the virtuousness of agents fundamental in Slote's sense raises several perilous problems for agent-based virtue ethics. Phronesis is necessary for virtue on the grounds that virtuous persons are so on account of their appropriate responsiveness to reasons to act virtuously.
Situations and Broad‐Based Dispositions
Authors: Russell Daniel C. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractPhilosophical psychologists have told us that “situationism” is bad news for virtue ethics and virtue theory more generally. Situationism is a research paradigm in social psychology that holds that situational variables have an impact on behavior that tells against disposition-based explanations of behavior. Some philosophical psychologists have argued that since there is little evidence for psychological dispositions, and since virtue theory as such is a normative theory about such dispositions, therefore virtue theory as such is empirically misguided. And since virtue ethics presupposes some theory of the virtues, virtue ethics is empirically misguided, too, and therefore of little practical value to creatures like us. This chapter begins a sustained argument that while situationism is plausible; it is not bad news for virtue theory provided that virtues are understood as forms of responsiveness to reasons. While situationism is bad news for “dispositions” of a certain type, virtues need not and indeed should not be understood as dispositions of this type. The chapter closely examines the contrast between situationism and the more traditional research program it means to replace, namely dispositionism. It then reviews situationism as motivating a positive alternative in personality theory and some positive evidence in favor of that alternative.
Unjust Enrichment: Nearer to Tort than Contract
Authors: Smith Stephen A 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter argues that unjust enrichments are structurally closer to torts than contracts. As is true of torts and damages (but not contracts and contractual obligations), the relationship between unjust enrichments and restitution is normative rather than logical. The duty to make restitution, like the duty to pay damages, is logically distinct from the event that, as a matter of law, gives rise to it. Further, the normative structures of the unjust enrichment/restitution and tort/damages relationships are similar: although an unjust enrichment is not a wrong, it is, like a wrong, a problem, and the restitutionary duty to which it gives rise is, like the duty to pay damages, a duty to remedy that problem. The structure of the unjust enrichment/restitution relationship explains, inter alia, why courts never award damages for failing to make restitution (namely because the relevant duty is, like the duty to pay damages, a duty to make things right, not a duty not to commit a wrong). It also explains why Peter Birks' thesis that all unjust enrichments are unjust because they lack a legal basis is controversial.
Two Kinds of Enrichment
Authors: Chambers Robert 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter argues that there are two different kinds of enrichment: pecuniary value and assignable rights. While most enrichments are valuable rights, enrichment can consist of value without rights or rights without value. When enrichment is an assignable right, its value is irrelevant to the claim for restitution. It has been assumed that there are two different kinds of restitution, either of the enrichment itself or its value in money. However, if there are two kinds of enrichment, then there is really only one kind of restitution, which always consists of giving up the actual enrichment received, which is either value or rights. The difficulty is not in deciding which kind of restitution is available, but in deciding which kind of unjust enrichment has occurred. This problem affects mistaken payments and failure of consideration in particular. Also, if change of position is concerned with disenrichment, then what counts as a relevant change of position will depend on whether the enrichment is value or rights.
Value, Property, and Unjust Enrichment: Trusts of Traceable Proceeds
Authors: Penner James 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter begins with an analysis of the concept of value, and claims that it is incoherent to say that to own property is to own the value of it, for value is realised by the actions of the owner; it is not something an owner possesses. It therefore follows that value can neither be exchanged or transferred, and any theory which attempts to explain unjust enrichment using the idea of a defective transfer or exchange of value is misconceived. Turning to trusts of traceable proceeds, the chapter proposes and defends a theory of tracing which relies upon treating an interest in a fund as a particular kind of property interest. The consequences of this analysis are then considered, in particular its consequences for our understanding of the nature of the trust obligation, remedies against third parties in cases of breach of trust, and the nature of resulting trusts. Perhaps the most provocative claim is that, on the correct understanding of restitutionary principles, the typical remedy against a innocent volunteer recipient of trust property would be a personal remedy, and not a proprietary one, which not only reverses the traditional received wisdom, but undermines the claims of restitution theorists seeking to justify trusts of traceable proceeds on unjust enrichment reasoning.
Unconscionable Enrichment?
Authors: Saprai Prince 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter claims that unconscionability and its cognate exploitation offer a plausible account of the duty to make restitution particularly in the context of undue influence and unconscionable dealing. It begins by claiming that the application criteria of the undue influence and unconscionable dealing doctrines, judicial language, and the facts and outcomes of these cases support the view that restitution is awarded to prevent exploitation or unfair advantage taking. It is claimed that unjust enrichment theory, which is rooted in defective consent, cannot explain the fact that in many of these cases the promisor (or transferor) did consent. In reply to the objection that no ‘actively’ exploitative behaviour is involved in some of these cases, the chapter claims that exploitation has a ‘passive’ form which involves the retention of benefits in circumstances where the promisee becomes aware that their receipt of them was unfair. This leads to the chapter's most provocative claim, that a ‘defendant-sided’ analysis is available for unjust enrichment's core case, the mistaken payment. The chapter concludes by considering the consequences of this analysis for substantive fairness, change of position, corrective justice theory and the morality of the duty to make restitution.
Generating linkage mapping files from Affymetrix SNP chip data
Authors: Bahlo M. , Bromhead C. J. 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
Summary: LINKDATAGEN is a perl tool that generates linkage mapping input files for five different linkage mapping tools using data from all 11 HAPMAP Phase III populations. It provides rudimentary error checks and is easily amended for personal linkage mapping preferences.
Availabilitiy and Implementation: LINKDATAGEN is available from http://bioinf.wehi.edu.au/software/linkdatagen/ with accompanying annotation files, reference manual and test dataset.
Contact: bahlo@wehi.edu.au
First Report of Choke Disease Caused by Epichloë typhina on Orchardgrass (Dactylis glomerata) in China
Authors: Li C. J. , Wang Z. F. , Chen N. , Nan Z. B. 
Published: May 2009

Orchardgrass or cocksfoot (Dactylis glomerata L.) has been widely cultivated as a forage crop in many provinces of China (1). It is also a native perennial forage grass, which grows at the edge of forests, shrubs, and mountainous grasslands in Xinjiang and Sichuan (2). In September of 2007, signs of choke disease on orchardgrass were observed in a native grassland under birch woodland near Altai City, Xinjiang, China. Stromata, which formed on culms of diseased grass, enclosing the inflorescence and leaf sheath, were 4.5 to 5.5 mm long, smooth or wrinkled, white and later becoming yellowish or yellow, tuberculate, dry, and covered with perithecia. Inflorescences surrounded by fungal stromata were choked and failed to mature, thus restricting seed production. Pure cultures were obtained by directly scraping stromata from the surface and incubating it on antibiotic potato dextrose agar (PDA). The colonies were cottony, white on the upper surface, and white to yellow on the reverse. The growth rate was 13 to 21 mm per week at 25°C on PDA. Conidia were hyaline, lunate to reniform, and measured 4.1 ± 0.5 × 2.2 ± 0.5 μm. They accumulated in small globose heads at the tips of conidiogenous cells and were produced singly on conidiophores of 13 to 33 μm long and 2.7 to 4.1 μm wide at the base. Internal transcribed spacer (ITS) sequence by BLAST search had 99% similarity with an Epichloë typhina isolate of orchardgrass in Spain (GenBank Accession No. AM262420.1). Cultural characteristics, microscopic examination, and phylogenetic analysis showed that this choke disease on D. glomerata was caused by the fungus E. typhina (Pers.) Tul. & C. Tul. as described by White (4). To our knowledge, this is the first report of E. typhina causing choke disease on orchardgrass in China. The pathogen has been identified in France, England, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States (3,4) with the same symptoms as those reported here. In 1997, choke disease was found in 70% of the fields in the Willamette Valley of Oregon, with disease incidences ranging from 0.05 to 28%. It was predicted to increase and spread under the prevailing climatic conditions (3). This new disease report is to provide observational and diagnostic information to help with recognition and prevention of disease spread in orchardgrass cultivation regions of China. References: (1) X. R. Chao et al. Shandong Agric. Sci. 1:7, 2005. (2) S. X. Jia, ed. China Forage Plant Flora. China Agriculture Press, Beijing, 1987. (3) W. F. Pfender and S. C. Alderman. Plant Dis. 83:754, 1999. (4) J. W. White. Mycologia 85:444, 1993.