bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Optical characterisation of organosilane-modified nanocrystalline diamond films
Authors: Kozak Halyna , Remes Zdenek , Kromka Alexander , Ledinsky Martin 
Published: November 2010

AbstractWe report on an optical characterisation of nanocrystalline diamond films photochemically functionalised with the organosilane-coupling agent, N 1-(3-(trimethoxysilyl)propyl)hexane-1,6-diamine (alternative names: N-(6-aminohexyl)aminopropyl-trimethoxysilane, (3-(6-aminohexylamino)propyl) trimetoxysilane, AHAPS). The presence and homogeneity of the organosilane layers were detected by fluorescence microscopy and infrared reflectance-absorbance spectroscopy. The results indicated that a homogeneous surface coverage with organosilane layers was achieved on diamond surfaces which were modified either by hydrogen or by oxygen plasma treatment. The functionalised nanocrystalline diamonds present a promising solution in future biosensor applications.
Les réformes économiques en Europe de l'Est : dix ans après
Authors: Lavigne Marie 
Published: November 2010

Economie Reforms in Eastern Europe: Ten Years Later.
The socialist countries of Europe now have ten years of economic reforms behind them. The general purpose of these reforms has been to combine the execution of plans whith some features of a market economy. The most conspicuous, although somewhat misleading, indication of this trend is the revival of the profit concept. These «new economic mechanisms» raise the question of the equilibrium among three sets of ideas: centralization - decentralization, planning - economic policy, efficiency - profitability.
The first question is: who :will benefit certain decision-making power is transferred from the center to the periphery, or from the top to the bottom? Will it be the individual enterprise or an intermediate level (e.g. industrial associations, vertically grouped enterprises of the «kombinat» type, or major enterprises) ? The reply to this question sheds light not only on the structure of the economic administration but also on the nature of the socialist market. The more concentrated an industry, the nearer it approaches an oligopolistic type of market, with the advantages, but also the dangers inherent in monopolistic power if enterprises' independence is pushed too far.
These risks are more or less important according to the answer given to the second question: what is exactly retained now from the prior compulsory planning system? When there are many plan target indicators which restrain the autonomy of production units, reform is partially halted. An enterprise, which is theoretically concerned with the successful realization of the plan, is not free to organize its resources and do market research. If, on the other hand, the indirect regulators of economic policy are primarily used, in a situation where there is a scarcity of producers' and consumers' goods, there is a risk of open (and not only repressed as in the preceding case) inflation, of either internal or external origin, that must be countered by more vigourous measures, such measures being inevitably interpreted as a set-back of the reform.
The third question concerns the clash between the general interest which calls for efficient management according to criteria to be defined, and the individual interest of the enterprise and its workers which implies a maximization of profits, provided the incentives are strong enough. But efficiency is not necessarily equated with profitability.
A comparative study of the present (1974) state of the reforms in four socialist countries (USSR, East Germany, Hungary and Poland) may provide answers which, suprisingly, are not so different as it would seem.
Réorganisations administratives ou réformes du système
Authors: Zaleski Eugène 
Published: November 2010

Economie Reforms versus Reorganization of Centralized Management.
The term «reform» being equivocal, it can signify changes brought about through the use of administrative power or fundamental ones which modify the system itself. The former approach is favored by Marie Lavigne, although she also discusses some of the attemps made to modify the system. The author's preference for improving central planning brings her to a favorable evaluation of the concentration of power in the USSR, Poland and the G.D.R. as a means of revitalizing the Economic Reforms and to criticism of the market techniques employed in Hungary. Eugène Zaleski differs with Marie Lavigne on this point and believes that the "Hungarian experiment proves in itself that firms' activities can be controlled through the use of fiscal and other economic instruments without the intervention of central power.
Marie Lavigne adopts the same reasoning with regard to inflation in the East European countries. The Soviet Union, Poland and the G.D.R. attempt to contain inflation through imperative central planning while Hungary uses market controls. The success with which inflation is checked in these countries is only relative, but Marie Lavigne's use of the official price index as a success indicator is hardly conclusive in the reporter's opinion. On the contrary, Hungary in its attempt to curb inflation through the use of economic mechanisms confirms the viability of market socialism.
In the socialist context, the aim for efficiency should reduce the firm's autonomy and the aim for justice should restrain the profit motivation according to Marie Lavigne. Profit should not, therefore be the dynamic force of a socialist economy. From the administration's point of view, Marie Lavigne has little difficulty pointing out the insufficiencies of profit, but the solution she proposes — management's identification with «socialist ambition» and with society at large — is utopie. Profit has, moreover, been officially recognized in the East as one of the chief success indicators and the limitations placed on it as an indicator in Hungary, in no way refute its utility or that of market socialism.
Négociation de groupe et participation en Pologne
Authors: Matejko Alexander 
Published: November 2010

Group Bargaining and Participation in Poland.
In order to understand the current state of bargaining between various large social groups in present day Poland it is not enough to be acquainted with the mechanism of the Soviet style communism. The local historical tradition also explains a lot. It is necessary to always remember that Poland is one of the few countries in Europe in which the gentry used to be very numerous and at the same time particularly influential. Poland constituted for centuries a gentry commonwealth in which not only kings were elected, but where even the powerful aristocratic circles were dependent to a large extent on the support of the lower and the middle gentry. It is therefore quite understandable that the Polish national ideology even now is still under a strong influence of the values and social patterns originated by the gentry and afterwards cultivated by the intelligentsia. There is a long tradition of deep socio-cultural divisions between various strata, widespread elitist inclinations, devotion to popular national myths, selectivity of societal contacts, a warm attitude towards friends and guests, but a distance or even prejudice towards strangers, a reserved attitude toward formal authorities.
The democratization of the whole Polish present day system becomes a very tempting solution. However, it seems almost impossible to reconcile the authori- tiarian political system, based on a single ideology and one Party rule, with the local self-government and freedom of collective initiative. Any new organizational project oriented towards stimulation of entrepreneurship and public will becomes effectively challenged sooner or later by the totalitarian aspects of the whole system. In several cases local democracy just does not work because nobody really bothers to confront the blueprint with the reality. Originators of a particular project are just too happy with the product of their imagination and therefore neglect to attend to how it works in social practice. The elected or nominated représentants haves vested interests in gaining as much power as possible without bothering with the common will. People at the bottom of the hierarchy keep quiet because they fear that things will turn worse.
Recherche scientifique et humanisme
Authors: Saint-Marc Michèle 
Published: November 2010

Après un rappel des définitions de la science, l'auteur insiste sur les caractères de la Recherche Scientifique qui en font toute la difficulté et aussi tout l'intérêt. Le marginalisme de la Recherche par rapport à la Science officielle résulte de la mise en contestation tactique des principes apparemment les plus assis de la Science officielle dans le but de mieux approcher la vérité. Il en résulte de nombreuses difficultés.
Tout d'abord au niveau des personnes, le chercheur étant le vérificateur parfois dénonciateur des théories admises par tous, sa situation n'est pas confortable. Ennemi de ceux qu'il dénonce, peu entouré car seul avec son équipe dans la voie vers une «vérité plus vraie», il est un homme intellectuellement souvent isolé. Il doit cependant avoir le courage de s'auto-critiquer et de s'auto-réformer.
Sur le plan financier, le chercheur est aussi dépendant qu'il est isolé sur le plan intellectuel. L'expérimentation de ses théories, la publication de ses résultats sous son propre nom, dépendent souvent de ceux mêmes qu'il conteste intellectuellement. En effet, mis à part le secteur privé où ce sont les perspectives de profit qui servent de critère de financement, les commissions qui distribuent le financement des recherches et statuent sur la carrière des chercheurs, sont composées, à part quelques représentants des chercheurs, de représentants de la science officielle.
Ces problèmes sont communs à tous les pays, collectivistes ou capitalistes. Partout, le chercheur doit pour faire progresser la science, lutter contre lui-même pour éviter l'autosatisfaction et contre le conservatisme naturel officiel. De grande rigueur intellectuelle, courageux pour s'imposer, scrupuleux, inventif, le chercheur est un travailleur d'élite.
L'auteur cherche ensuite à dépasser le clivage classique entre sciences exactes et sciences humaines qui ferait des secondes un produit de luxe subalterne. L'essor actuel des sciences humaines est, au contraire, le signe d'une promotion de la personne humaine bien utile dans des sociétés qui s'interrogent sur la finalité de la croissance économique.
Les relations commerciales soviétiques et l'évolution politique en U.R.S.S
Authors: Hardt John P. 
Published: November 2010

L'amélioration des résultats économiques est, après la sécurité, la préoccupation essentielle des dirigeants soviétiques. L'évolution des techniques et une stimulation accrue au niveau de la consommation constituent, semble-t-il, deux moyens d'assurer un développement économique aussi bien quantitatif que qualitatif.
Les relations commerciales et les transferts de technologie occidentale sont probablement les solutions choisies de préférence pour stimuler l'activité économique. La réorientation de l'allocation des ressources rares, détournées du domaine militaire et d'autres programmes prioritaires, et la réforme du système de planification et de gestion ne rencontrent pas la même faveur auprès des autorités soviétiques. Dans cet article, on veut démontrer que le commerce extérieur est sans doute insuffisant pour répondre aux besoins économiques croissants. Il est évident que l'importation d'équipements et de techniques occidentaux très perfectionnés vont renforcer les pressions favorables à un changement de la politique d'allocation des ressources et à des réformes économiques dans certains secteurs bien définis.
Les dirigeants soviétiques, confrontés au coût politique d'une refonte de l'allocation des ressources et d'une réforme du système de contrôle de l'économie, peuvent choisir de ne pas tirer le maximum d'avantages des transferts de technologie. Dans une situation de crises économiques périodiques, motivant une transformation de l'économie, les dirigeants soviétiques semblent vouloir rester pragmatiques en cherchant à minimiser les coûts politiques et maximiser les avantages économiques que leur ouvre la technologie occidentale pour atteindre des objectifs élevés dans les secteurs économiques prioritaires.
La praxiologie de Kotarbinski et son application à l'économie
Authors: Piotrowski Marian L. 
Published: November 2010

Kotarbinski's Praxiology and its Application to Economies.
The works carried on over a period of fifty years in the field of praxiology (or efficient practice) by the Polish philospher and logician Tadeusz Kotarbinski are brought to our attention in this article. Practical Essays and The Theory of Efficient Action are examined in the light of the possible application of praxiological standards and estimations in the field of Economics and national planning.
The term "praxiology" first appeared in 1897 in an article by Alfred Espinas, entitled "The Origins of Technology" and was later developed by von Mises, Oskar Lange, Raymond Aron, etc. In spite of this, the concept of praxiology (or the study of human behavior in given conditions) has remained somewhat obscure.
For some time praxiological methods were employed in the West in developed countries as a means of evaluating results in different fields of activity, namely Economics. Kotarbinski considered Praxiology as a general methodological approach and as such, applicable in evaluating economic activity. He applied the f «lowing aphorisms to this type of application: "Between two actions of identical value under given conditions, the most economical is the least costly; for two actions incurring identical expenditures, the most economical is the most productive". He also established a distinction between cost economy and productivity, to be considered as two aspects of the dynamics of Economics.
' In short Kotarbinski's praxiology attempts to discover the abstract rule for efficient action. He considered that in its application, the scope of Economics is more limited than that of Praxiology in that it seeks to create conditions where the most rational methods will be used to satisfy material needs, whereas Praxiology has vaster ambitions. From this it follows that specifically economic evaluations can result from general praxiological evaluations and that praxiological standards are applicable to economic decisions.
According to Kotarbinski, the general function of praxiological standards, values and categories is: (1) to clarify concepts, (2) to apply the logical norm to a given situation and (3) to justify mutual propositions between two scientific spheres (in the case in point, Praxiology and Economics). Efficiency standards according to Kotarbinski are linked to the objective and subjective probability of attaining a given goal. Finally, the author recalls that the standards for efficient planning are: (1) applicability or pertinence to the problem, (2) practicability, (3) economy, (4) precision, (5) unification, (6) continuity, (7) flexibility and (8) rationality.
Secteur privé ou secteur de l'économie individuelle
Authors: Ehrlich S. 
Published: November 2010

L'auteur soulève le problème des services à la population organisés dans le cadre d'unités appartenant aux différents secteurs de l'économie: étatique, coopératif et « privé ». Ce dernier terme a longtemps conservé une connotation péjorative qui, pour l'auteur, n'est plus fondée à l'heure actuelle.
Le secteur de l'économie individuelle occupe une place importante en Pologne puisqu'il regroupe des millions de paysans, quelque 370 000 artisans et un nombre difficile à évaluer d'arboriculteurs, de chauffeurs, de commerçants, de restaurateurs, etc. Pour Ehrlich, il devient absolument injustifié de maintenir ce secteur en marge de l'économie socialiste en fonction du seul critère de la propriété des moyens de production.
L'auteur défend la petite industrie dont l'abandon au profit des entreprises géantes a été néfaste, notamment dans le domaine des services (éloignement du consommateur, mauvaise estimation de ses besoins, etc.). Il recommande une stabilisation et un développement des secteurs coopératif et individuel ainsi qu'une décentralisation des décisions économiques justifiée par le caractère local de la petite production et des services. Il prône également une extension des différentes formes d'aide de l'Etat (matériaux, crédits, information sur les progrès techniques en ce domaine, etc.) de manière à permettre un développement du secteur individuel, intégré dans l'ensemble de l'économie socialiste. , -,
La politique intérieure et les institutions chinoises après la IVe Assemblée populaire nationale
Authors: Tche-hao Tsien 
Published: November 2010

Domestic Policy and Chinese Institutions since the Fourth Popular National Assembly.
This study is a follow-up of two articles by the same author on domestic policy and Chinese institutions since the Cultural Revolution and the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party published in the Revue de l'Est (1973, N°. 4, pp 81-126 and 1974, N°. 4, pp. 5-30).
The new constitution voted by the Fourth Popular National Assembly, endorses the basic principles set forth at the inception of the Chinese Republic in 1949, and which were reaffirmed during the Cultural Revolution. The Popular Chinese Republic, grounded on precepts of Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-toung, is defined as "a socialist state dictated by the proletariat, directed by the working class and based on the alliance or workers and peasants". The state must practice "democratic centralism and uphold the regional autonomy of ethnic minorities". In the New constitution, mention is equally made of certain slogans used during "the big leap ahead" (1958) and during the Cultural Revolution, as well as the present ideological struggle against Lin Piao and Confucius.
In application of the policy of simplified administration, the number of persons employed in state organizations has been reduced. The constitution itself was reduced from 106 articles to 30. As a result the institutions are only briefly described and only the basic essentials of powers and functions is enumerated. However, the author assures us, this in no way indicates that the former have been diminished.
On the whole the institutions differ little from those set forth in the Constitution of 1954. The Popular National Assembly, the Council of State Affairs and the local popular assemblies and their revolutionary committees remain in place.
The most noteworthy changes are the suppression of the post of President of the Republic and the introduction of the party in the constitutional text. Party direction of all organisms, real but occult since 1949, is henceforth "constitutional". The new constitution further legalizes certain institutions created since 1954, such as popular rural communes (started in 1958) and revolutionary committees which grew out of the Cultural Revolution.
State organs, named or elected must "incarnate a Trinity" of aged, mature and young persons.
Theoretically the Army has no administrative functions. Placed under the command of the President of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, the Army while remaining a combat corps, must also be a work and production corps.
According to the author, an effort has been made to institutionalize and legalize the Chinese society without making it rigid in the aim of combating the ever-present menace of revisionism.
L'adaptation des structures aux objectifs dans l'administration française
Authors: Dupuis Georges 
Published: November 2010

Adapting Structures to Objectives in the French Administration.
In the report "Adapting Structures to Objectives", the author first examines the different factors governing the coexistence of administrative structures and the convergence of action.
He points out that the administrative apparatus is marked by a constant tendency toward inadaptation to its own workings. Three processes illustrate these dysfunctions and the efforts made to correct them:
1) The result of aggregations is an excessive authority exercised at a higher level or by a less specialized sector.
2) Collaborations do not impair the autonomy of collectivities, of négociations, of consultations or of contracts. 3) Finally, annexations lead to the simple disappearance of certain functions of coordinating organisms, to the profit of the coordinator.
Y a-t-il une classe dirigeante en U.R.S.S. ?
Authors: Nove Alec 
Published: November 2010

Dans cet article polémique, l'auteur fixe son attention sur un thème qu'il formule de la manière suivante : « étant donné qu'il existe une strate, une classe ou une élite dirigeante, pourquoi s'est-elle assurée une position aussi dominante et comment qualifier cette couche de la population, une société ainsi constituée ? » Ce dernier point est essentiel ici.
La société soviétique, où pratiquement tous les moyens de production sont propriété d'Etat, est dominée par un parti qui choisit et emploie les cadres. Les personnes occupant un poste de haut niveau figurent sur la nomenklatura. Elles représentent l'Establishment. On peut dire qu'il s'agit d'une hiérarchie centralement dirigée et faire entrer la société soviétique dans le moule d' «un service civil et militaire général». Que sont les couches supérieures d'une telle société et quel nom leur donner ?
Cette uni-hiérarchie s'est instaurée pour des raisons qui tiennent à l'histoire, à l'économie, à la sociologie et à la psychologie. Mais l'analyse «de classe» marxiste peut-elle s'appliquer à un tel système? Si non, quelle méthode faut-il utiliser? Selon M. Nove, «il pourrait s'agir d'un phénomène totalement neuf du point de vue qualitatif, pour l'analyse duquel nos catégories habituelles (qu'elles dérivent de Marx ou de Parsons) nécessiteraient de substantielles modifications ».
Théorie des droits de la propriété et allocation des ressources rares dans le système socialiste autogestionnaire
Authors: Dumas André 
Published: November 2010

The Theory of Property Rights and Allocation of Rare Resources in the Socialist Self-Management System.
Legislation governing property rights in the socialist self-management system is such that it affects the manner in which workers choose to dispose of their share of the profits incumbent from the firm's profit sharing fund. A worker prefers to receive his share of the profits in the form of personal remuneration, eventually depositing it in his bank account, rather than to participate in the firm's collective investments.
It seems, however, that central authority, invested with the interests of the society at large, can to a certain degree keep this tendency in check through the use of politico-economic instruments, such as monetary and fiscal policies.
Results show that the institutional environment of economic activity affects the behavior of the parties concerned when the latter are seeking to maximize the benefits obtainable within the existing institutional structures, in so far as the mechanisms controlling economic power can be regulated.
It may therefore be affirmed that an analysis of economic systems should include the policy governing property rights. Starting from a unique concept it is possible to understand and explain the real functioning of economic systems based on political and social differences.