bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
REFORM OF THE DEPOSIT INSURANCE SYSTEM: AN APPRAISAL OF THE FHLBB AND FDIC STUDIES
Authors: CAMPBELL TIM S. , HORVITZ PAUL M. 
Published: January 2010

This paper presents an appraisal of the studies of the deposit insurance system submitted to Congress by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board in compliance with the Garn‐St. German legislation of 1982. The purpose of these studies was to assess the current structure of the deposit insurance system in light of the changes in the regulation of depository institutions mandated in recent legislationMany observers of the financial system believe that, as a result of recent regulatory changes, the deposit insurance agencies do not have sufficient power to control risk‐taking of insured institutions. These two reports present an assessment of mechanism which could be used to limit the risk of the deposit insurance agenciesThe emphasis in both reports is on ways in which the amount of market discipline applied to insured institutions could be increased. Both reports identify essentially three ways in which this might be accomplished. First, risk‐adjusted deposit insurance prices might be employed. Second, the volume of uninsured creditors might be increased, either through changes in limits of insurance coverage or through imposition of requirements for use of subordinated debt. Third, the current public deposit insurance system might be partially supplanted by one that is private. This paper evaluates the merits of each of these proposals and compares the positions taken by the FHLBB and the FDIC on the issues
WHAT PRICE THEORY CAN—AND CANNOT—DO FOR ANTITRUST
Authors: DEWEY DONALD 
Published: January 2010

This paper examines the methodology and policy recommendations of Judge Robert Bork's writing on antitrust. It accepts as valid his premise that conventional price theory is the only appropriate organon for evaluating the welfare impact of an antitrust rule. However, it holds that in the analysis of cartels and mergers, Bork does not realize the full implications of his approach.Of the many prohibitions which antitrust law now contains, Bork wants to retain only two‐the prohibition of cartels and of large horizontal mergers. Even these two, however, cannot be maintained on pure price theory grounds. According to price theory, if price or merger agreements are inefficient, and i f entry and exit are free, then these agreements‐like other inefficient practices‐will be eroded by entry. Consistently applied, then, price the0 y provides no support for antitrust laws.A lack of support on price theory grounds does not imply that antitrust laws are unjustified. Most practices prohibited by anti‐trust law have closesubstitutes. Consequently, the law probably inflicts no great harm on economic efjiciency. Moreover, repeal of these laws could result in state‐owned monopolies or economic planning, both of which would be far worse for economic efficiency.
GENERAL AND PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY IN BORK'S ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
Authors: FINK RICHARD H. 
Published: January 2010

In applying economic theory to evaluate antitrust laws, Judge Robert Bork explicitly favors a partial equilibrium over a general equilibrium approach. He believes the general model assumes away too many real‐world aspects to be usefully employed as a criterion by which to judge real‐world laws.However, Bork's partial equilibrium replacement, the Oliver Williamson trade‐off model, implicitly contains many of the same assumptions as general equilibrium theory. Equilibrium prices in all industries, an absence of external effects, and well‐defined demand curves are assumptions of both general equilibrium theory and the Williamson trade‐off model. If one theory is judged inadequate because of these assumptions, so should the other.Bork's analysis is more consistent with market process theory than with his own partial equilibrium approach. Market process theory assumes neither the absence of externalities, nor the presence of well‐defined demand and equilibrium prices in all industries.
WHAT ARE EMPLOYERS DOING TO CREATE A COMPETITIVE MARKET FOR HEALTH CARE IN THE TWIN CITIES?
Authors: FELDMAN ROGER , JENSEN GAIL , DOWD BRYAN 
Published: January 2010

Employers' willingness to control costs is a critical aspect of pro‐competition strategies for the health‐care market. Here, we present some of the first quantitative evidence of what employers do to control health‐care costs. Our sample is 44 large private and public employers in Minnesota.We develop a theoretical model in which the employer chooses cost‐control “innovations”—along with wages, fringe benefits, and labor‐force size—to maximize profits. The role of innovations is to reduce unit costs of offering fringe benefits.Our data are from a 1982 survey. Eighty percent of the surveyed employers, representing nearly 200,000 employees, responded. Most respondents offer both indemnity insurance plans and health‐maintenance organizations (HMOs). Many firms and individual health‐insurance plans conduct cost‐control activities, but less than half of the firms which offer HMOs have adopted level‐dollar premium contributions for their family health‐insurance policies. Few plans have increased their coinsurance and deductible requirements in the past five years.We use probit equations to estimate the probability that a firm or a health plan will adopt cost‐control activities. Our analysis suggests that many firms may soon make major plan‐design changes to control health‐care costs, although they have not yet done so.
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFICIENCY: SOME LESSONS FROM THE PAST
Authors: JR. THOMAS R. OVERSTREET , FISHER ALAN A. 
Published: January 2010

Resale price maintenance (RPM) has had a history similar to that of a religious war, with the legal status shifting as the various sects have had more or less influence over the courts and the political arenas. Both the RPM and anti‐RPM missionaries have overstated their cases.In theory, RPM can have both procompetitive and anticompetitive effects. Unfortunately, most of the dispute has been theoretical (theological); both sides have provided minimal empirical support for their theological conclusions. The empirical evidence, though sketchy, shows both procompetitive and anticompetitive instances of RPM. In particular, history warns that strongly organized interest groups tend to use the political process to enforce abuses of a distributional restraint that theoretically might otherwise have primarily procompetitive effects.The theoretical and empirical record does not support either per se legality or illegality for RPM in all instances. In some situations, such as for small firms in unconcentrated wholesale and retail markets and for new entrants, the probability of anticompetitive effects is negligible. In other situations, the evidentiary burden of demonstrating either the likelihood of anticompetitive effects, or of their absence, would be practically insurmountable in a litigation context. Rule‐of‐reason litigation, then, also seems to be an unwise policy choice.On balance, considering the economic, political, and legal constraints, we recommend continuing the current per se illegal standard, but with exceptions for clearly defined instances in which the probability of anticompetitive effects is minimal.
COMPETITION IN CONTROLLED AND UNCONTROLLED GASOLINE MARKETS
Authors: HONEYCUTT T. CRAWFORD 
Published: January 2010

During the decade ending in 1981, more than 100,000 gasoline dealers exited the industry. This tremendous decline gave rise to numerous allegations that the major oil companies were engaged in anticompetitive activity designed to eliminate their dealers. This paper examines the legislative responses to these allegations, discusses some current economic issues, reviews changes in gasoline marketing before and after decontrol, and evaluates empirically the impact of these events on competition.The primary conclusions of the paper are (1) that these changes in gasoline marketing have resulted from competitive responses to changing market conditions, (2) that most statutes proposed to aid dealers in fact make their demise more likely, (3) that dealers' share of sales has stabilized after decontrol, and (4) that divorcement tends to increase market concentration significantly.
MONETARY TARGETING IN WEST GERMANY, HOLLAND, AND SWITZERLAND
Authors: BOMHOFF EDUARD J. 
Published: January 2010

Links between fluctuations in domestic money supplies and subsequent fluctuations in rates of real output have been less visible in Western Europe than in the United States. This paper discusses some of the causes and investigates the stability of the demand for money in West Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland. In all three countries, temporary changes in short‐term interest rates temporarily affect the demand for money. These temporary changes in the demand for money are reflected in temporary blips in the monetary statistics, as agents substitute among various monetary assets.The hypothesis that aggregate demand responds only to longer‐lasting changes in interest rates is tested by a two‐step procedure. First, the official data on European money supplies are corrected for temporary disturbances caused by temporary changes in domestic interest rates. Second, changes in real activity are regressed on a measure of monetary stimulus, which takes into account the correction for temporary disturbances. This two‐step procedure avoids some of the bias present in ordinary estimates of the demand‐for‐money function. The results show that the links between changes in money and subsequent changes in output are somewhat more tenuous in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland than in the U.S. but significant effects do exist. These effects are more easily documented when corrected time series for the European money supplies are used.
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE
Authors: LEHMAN JAMES , WILLETT THOMAS D. 
Published: January 2010

This paper argues that the issues raised by the industrial policy debate are as much political as they are economic. There is every reason to believe that, without substantial reform of political institutions, efforts to administer a rational new industrial policy would soon degenerate into the type of inconsistent morass of special‐interest‐generated policies which industrial policy advocates rightfully criticize as our de facto set of industrial policies.This important political dimension has been overlooked by many industrial policy advocates. An important exception is Robert Reich, who has proposed a new centralized industrial policy agency in hopes that the battle of conflicting interests would promote greater aggregate efficiency. We argue that on theoretical grounds, however, such centralization might either increase or decrease efficiency. The competition of the military services under the Defense Department gives us a close analogue for study. Unfortunately, however, our review of efficiency in defense policy suggests that this would be a very poor model on which to base a broader industrial policy. To promote substantial increases in defense and industrial policy efficiency appears to require that much more fundamental institutional reforms be considered.
INTERSTATE BANKING AND ANTITRUST LAWS: HISTORY OF PUBLIC POLICIES TO PROMOTE BANKING COMPETITION
Authors: SHULL BERNARD 
Published: January 2010

Over the past several years, antitrust laws' significance as a public policy to promote competition in banking has diminished. Deregulation has intensified competition so much that it has made antitrust laws nonbinding constraints, even during a merger movement of extraordinary proportions. Deregulation and attenuating antitrust raise a question as to whether a distinctive competitive policy for commercial banks should exist as it has in the past.Two earlier policies are identified and reviewed in this paper: (1) free banking, which in several forms existed from the 1830s to the early 1930s, and (2) antitrust, which became relevant during the early 1960s. Experience under both policies illuminates the interaction between competition and regulation in banking. Such experience indicates that the effects of current competitive policy must be evaluated within the developing regulatory environment. Partially evaluating current policy within this context suggests that new charter requirements should be reformulated and that large bank mergers should be limited. So long as a distinctive regulatory system exists, a distinctive competitive policy for banks is needed.
THE INTERSTATE BANKING LANDSCAPE: LEGISLATIVE POLICIES AND RATIONALE
Authors: FRIEDER LARRY A. 
Published: January 2010

Expansion across state boundaries has been the dominant change in the structural landscape of banking. Forty‐one states and the District of Columbia now permit full‐service interstate banking. This paper reviews and analyzes these laws and their related provisions. Geographical liberalization is found to be mostly pro‐competitive.Regional reciprocity statutes dominated the interstate banking landscape until mid‐1985. Of the first 18 laws, 12 were regional. However, the regional approach peaked quickly, and most remaining states enacted nationwide laws—either immediate nationwide bills or regional bills that “trigger” to the nationwide level at a certain date. Presently, 27 of the 42 laws are nationwide. At least 9 states that initially selected regional laws are soon expected to switch to a nationwide approach.Regional banking compacts seemed inherently unstable and difficult to establish. Only the Southeast successfully established a stable regional banking zone. The location of control over the nation's banking assets is being restructured. In some states with well‐capitalized holding companies aggressively exploiting the new laws, banks have grown in size. Other states that were slow to pass legislation, or whose banks are in no financial position to make acquisitions, have lost rank.After a relatively short time, the federal government finally may legislate on the interstate banking issue. Pressure to do so would derive from the different banking structures and regions, problematic competitive dimensions, banks' supervision and regulation necessities, and eventual interstate branching proposals.
ARE THE TWIN DEFICITS REALLY RELATED?
Authors: MILLER STEPHEN M. , RUSSEK FRANK S. 
Published: January 2010

The emergence of record current‐account and fiscal deficits in the United States during the 1980s draws increasing attention to what has become known as the “twin deficit” problem. Conventional wisdom is that a shift to larger government deficits entails a decline in government saving and results in larger trade deficits, Persistently large trade deficits are troublesome because they imply a transfer of wealth to foreigners and possibly a reduction in future generations' living standards.This paper examines whether post‐World War II data for the United States reveal a long‐run secular relationship between the trade deficit and the fiscal deficit. The focus is on the secular relationship since that is the one most relevant to long‐run policy concerns. The authors employ three different statistical techniques: (i) a deterministic technique for separating the secular components from the cyclical components to derive secular measures of the twin deficits, (ii) a stochastic procedure to isolate the secular components, (Hi) cointegration analysis to test for a long‐run equilibrium relationship.The authors conclude that, based on the first two approaches, evidence of a positive secular relationship between the twin deficits exists only under flexible exchange rates. This relationship appears quite strong–that is, a $1 change in the fiscal deficit eventually leads to roughly a $1 change in the trade deficit. On the other hand, findings based on cointegration analysis indicate no long‐run equilibrium relationship between the twin deficits. This latter finding, however, may reflect a low power of the relevant statistical tests stemming from the shortness of the sample period.
CROSS‐CONTRACT CREDITING UNDER FERC ORDER 500
Authors: DeCANIO STEPHEN J. 
Published: January 2010

In remanding Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Order 436, the US. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did not require the FERC to issue a new policy on “take‐or‐pay” contracts between interstate pipelines and natural gas producers. The court asked only that the FERC meet the standard of “reasoned decision making.” FERC Order 500, in proposing the mechanism of cross‐contract crediting to reformulate take‐or‐pay contracts, went far beyond the court's decision.Take‐or‐pay contracts are but one component of an interrelated set of long‐run commitments by both pipelines and gas producers upstream and downstream. The FERC's abrogating take‐or‐pay contracts would reverberate beyond the immediate consequences for pipelines and producers. Implementing Order 500 would change the conditions under which gas producers explore, develop, and extract. It would influence the terms of future lease and royalty contracts with owners of mineral rights, and it would have adverse consequences for end users of gas. Evidence exists that promulgating Order 500 increased spot gas prices. Most take‐or‐pay problems have been resolved through voluntary renegotiation by the parties. Nullifying the remaining contracts through regulation will not accomplish the pro‐competitive goals that have guided the FERC's natural gas policy during the 1980s.
NUCLEAR TERRORISM: REACTOR SABOTAGE AND WEAPONS PROLIFERATION RISKS
Authors: LEVENTHAL PAUL L , HOENIG MILTON M. 
Published: January 2010

Nuclear power plants and research reactors are vulnerable to acts of terrorism that could render safety systems inoperable and result in catastrophic releases of radioactivity. In addition, expanding civil commerce in weapon‐usable forms of plutonium and uranium and deploying tactical nuclear weapons in areas where terrorists are active increase the risk of terrorists' building or stealing nuclear weapons or, even more likely, carrying out a credible hoax.The United States and other advanced industrialized nations should be concerned about nuclear terrorism, the threat of which now is perceived as low. However, if terrorist groups become more determined, violent, and technologically advanced, as some experts anticipate, then the possibility of nuclear terrorism will likely increase with little warning. Nuclear terrorism, regardless of where it occurs, could have far‐reaching consequences for economic stability and world peace. Western Europe is a region of continuing concern due to its high level of “nuclearization”–that is, civil and military nuclear development–and the presence of sophisticated terrorist organizations operating across national boundaries.This paper reviews potential dangers and available remedies based on the report of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism, on policy and technical studies prepared for the Task Force, and on follow‐up research conducted by the Nuclear Control Institute, the Task Force's sponsoring organization.
CHANGES IN WATER ALLOCATION MECHANISMS FOR CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE
Authors: ZILBERMAN DAVID , MACDOUGALL NEAL , SHAH FARHED 
Published: January 2010

Existing institutions allocating water in California reflect prior appropriation water rights established when water was abundant. These allocation rules queue users and do not encourage water conservation. Increased water scarcity and growing valuation of water's environmental benefits are inducing a transition to water allocation mechanisms that increase water efficiency in agriculture. Transferable rights systems will lead to market‐like water allocation, induce farmers to adopt water conservation technology, and may not face strong objection from senior water rights holders. One must weigh the efficiency gains associated with transition from water rights to water markets against the transaction costs associated with installing facilities that enable water exchange and trading. Transition to water markets may preserve the agricultural sector's well‐being while allowing the transfer of some water outside of agriculture—in particular, for environmental benefit. The cost of policies proposed to reduce agricultural water supply while encouraging water trading are inversely related to the extent of trading allowed. The more farmers trade water, the less costly reducing water supply is to agriculture. Policies reducing water supply to Central Valley Project contractors and allowing trading only among these contractors are much more expensive than are policies encouraging trading among all agricultural water users in California.
PACIFIC RIM TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: HISTORICAL ENVIRONMENT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
Authors: Hou Jack W. , Ichimura Shinichi , Naya Seiji , Werin Lars , Young Leslie 
Published: January 2010

Pacific Asia is deep rooted in its cultural heritage and historical background, which have set the tone for regions success. These same factors also have created rather different trading practices, compared with those of the West — practices that are less transparent and full of hidden private trade barriers.Interdependence within the region suggests integration, but Pacific Asia has taken a course of non‐exclusive cooperation rather than following the exclusive course of the European Community (EC) and of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The latter two trade blocs threaten the continued success and development of Pacific Asia. Although the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) sends relief, fostering a cooperative rather than a retaliative Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization offers the most promise.
CRIMINAL PERCEPTIONS AND VIOLENT CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION
Authors: MYERS SAMUEL L. , CHUNG CHANJIN 
Published: January 2010

This paper explores the relationship between various measures of prior victimization and indicators of both the perceived victimization risk and fear of crime. Equations are specified and estimated both for the fear of crime/perception of risk and for prior victimization. Since prior victimizations are exogenous to the determination of the current assessment of risk or fear of crime, it is possible to isolate the independent effects of victimization and extraneous factors, like racial neighborhood composition, in a recursive model structure. The analysis also examines the contribution that individual victimization and extraneous factors make to the overall gap between average victimization rates and average indicators of fear.Prior victimization explains some of the rather enormous perception of future victimization, but a sizable gap between perceived risk and actual risk remains. Much of that gap appears to be related to proximity to nonwhites, a possible proxy for racial prejudices and beliefs that nonwhite neighborhoods contribute to heightened crime.