bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
On Today's Two‐Worlds Interpretation: Knowledge and True Belief in Plato
Authors: Butler Travis 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis paper presents arguments against two crucial elements of recent versions of the Two‐Worlds interpretation of Plato. I argue first that in addition to knowledge of the forms, Plato allows beliefs about them as well. Then I argue that Plato sees knowledge as a state in which the subject is conscious of information about the forms. Thus, the infallibility of knowledge must be understood in a way that is consistent with its being informational. Finally, I argue that my conclusions about knowledge do not preclude the possibility that cognition of forms has a direct, nonrepresentational aspect.
Working Passions: Emotions and Creative Engagement with Value
Authors: Hurley Elisa A. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIt is now a commonplace that emotions are not mere sensations but, rather, conceptually contentful states. In trying to expand on this insight, however, most theoretical approaches to emotions neglect central intuitions about what emotions are like. We therefore need a methodological shift in our thinking about emotions away from the standard accounts' attempts to reduce them to other mental states and toward an exploration of the distinctive work emotions do. I show that emotions' distinctive function is to engage us with both objective and personal values. Attention to emotions' work reveals that it is precisely their “unruliness” that allows them to play meaningful roles in our lives.
Eternal Recurrence and the Categorical Imperative
Authors: Kain Philip J. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThe question has been raised whether Nietzsche intends eternal recurrence to be like a categorical imperative. The obvious objection to understanding eternal recurrence as like a categorical imperative is that for a categorical imperative to make any sense, for moral obligation to make any sense, it must be possible for individuals to change themselves. And Nietzsche denies that individuals can change themselves. Magnus thinks the determinism “implicit in the doctine of the eternal recurrence of the same renders any imperative impotent…. How can one will what must happen in any case?” At the other end of the spectrum, those who do hold that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative, for their part, tend to ignore or deny the determinism involved in eternal recurrence. This article explores the extent to which it can be claimed that eternal recurrence is like a categorical imperative without downplaying Nietzsche's dterminism.
The Land Ethic, Moral Development, and Ecological Rationality
Authors: Starkey Charles 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThere has been significant debate over both the imiplications and the merit of Leopold's land ethic. I consider the two most prominent objections and a resolution to them. One of these objections is that, far from being an alternative to an “economic” or cost‐benefit perspective on environmental issues, Leopold's land ethic merely broadens the range of economic considerations to be used in addressing such issues. The other objection is that the land ethic is a form of “environmental fascism” because it subordinates the welfare of humans to the good of the ecological whole. I argue that these objections are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of his theory by advocates and detractors alike. The land ethic is centrally a psychological theory of moral development and ecological rationality that advocates a shift in the way that environmental problems are conceptualized and approached.
The Temporality of Life: Merleau‐Ponty, Bergson, and the Immemorial Past
Authors: Al‐Saji Alia 
Published: March 2010

AbstractBorrowing conceptual tools from Bergson, this essay asks after the shift in the temporality of life from Merleau‐Ponty's Phénoménologie de la perception to his later works. Although the Phénoménologie conceives life in terms of the field of presence of bodily action, later texts point to a life of invisible and immemorial dimensionality. By reconsidering Bergson, but also thereby revising his reading of Husserl, Merleau‐Ponty develops a nonserial theory of time in the later works, one that acknowledges the verticality and irreducibility of the past. Life in the flesh relies on unconsciousness or forgetting, on an invisibility that structures its passage.
Consciousness in Spinoza's Philosophy of Mind
Authors: Martin Christopher 
Published: March 2010

AbstractSpinoza's philosophy of mind is thought to lack a serious account of consciousness. In this essay I argue that Spinoza's doctrine of ideas of ideas has been wrongly construed, and that once righted it provides the foundation for an account. I then draw out the finer details of Spinoza's account of consciousness, doing my best to defend its plausibility along the way. My view is in response to a proposal by Edwin Curley and the serious objection leveled against it by Margaret Wilson and Jonathan Bennett.
Process Reliabilism, Virtue Reliabilism, and the Value of Knowledge
Authors: McBrayer Justin P. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThe value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is cognitively more valuable than mere true belief. If an account of the nature of knowledge is unable to solve the value problem for knowledge, this provides a pro tanto reason to reject that account. Recent literature argues that process reliabilism is unable to solve the value problem because it succumbs to an objection known as the swamping objection. Virtue reliabilism (i.e., agent reliabilism), on the other hand, is able to solve the value problem because it can avoid the swamping objection. I argue that virtue reliabilism escapes the swamping objection only by employing what I call an entailment strategy. Furthermore, since an entailment strategy is open to the process reliabilist (in two different forms), I argue that the process reliabilist is also able to escape the swamping objection and thereby solve the value problem for knowledge.
What's Done Here—Explaining Behavior in Terms of Customs and Norms
Authors: Jones Todd 
Published: March 2010

AbstractTerms like “norm,” “custom,” “convention,” “tradition,” and “culture” are used throughout social science, and throughout everyday conversation, to describe certain types of behaviors. Yet it is not very clear what people mean by them. In this paper, I try to make clearer what is meant by these terms and what makes the behavior they describe possible.
Kanian Freedom and the Problem of Luck
Authors: Lemos John 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis article provides a brief explanation of Robert Kane's indeterministic, event‐causal libertarian theory of freedom and responsibility. It is noted that a number of authors have criticized libertarian theories, such as Kane's, by presenting the problem of luck. After noting how Kane has tried to answer this problem in his recent writings, the author goes on to explain Ishtiyaque Haji's recent version of the luck argument. The author considers three possible Kanian replies to Haji's luck argument and argues that the third reply can adequately answer the luck objection. It is also noted that the third reply requires making some significant alterations to Kane's theory that would also help him resolve certain problems with his views about responsibility for character.
Who's Afraid of Phenomenological Disputes?
Authors: Siewert Charles 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThere are general aspects of mental life it is reasonable to believe do not vary even when subjects vary in their first‐person judgments about them. Such lack of introspective agreement gives rise to “phenomenological disputes.” These include disputes over how to describe the perspectival character of perception, the phenomenal character of perceptual recognition and conceptual thought, and the relation between consciousness and self‐consciousness. Some suppose that when we encounter such disputes we have no choice but to abandon first‐person reflection in philosophy of mind in favor of a third‐person methodology. Such reaction is unwarranted. A reasoned assessment of phenomenological disputes that relies on first‐person reflection is explained, illustrated, and advocated.
How Can We Discover the Contents of Experience?
Authors: Siegel Susanna 
Published: March 2010

AbstractHow can we discover the contents of experience? I argue that neither introspection alone nor naturalistic theories of experience content are sufficient to discover these contents. I propose another method of discovery: the method of phenomenal contrast. I defend the method against skeptics who doubt that the contents of experience can be discovered, and I explain how the method may be employed even if one denies that experiences have contents.
Sensing, Perceiving, and Thinking: On the Method of Phenomenal Contrast
Authors: Tolliver Joseph Thomas 
Published: March 2010

AbstractI apply the Method of Phenomenal Contrast to examples involving aesthetic experience and sensory illusion. While the method can provide reasons to prefer one form of content hypothesis over others, it may be of no help in answering substantive questions about the nature and structure of such content. I suggest that successful application of the method can leave us with a difficult question. Why would a sensory system have the function of representing a property that it cannot detect?
Phenomenological Reduction, Epochē, and the Speech of Socrates in the Symposium
Authors: McGuirk James 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThe point of the present article is to investigate whether the key conceptions of epochē and reduction as found in Husserl's phenomenology can be brought to bear in a fruitful rereading of the speech of Socrates in Plato's Symposium.1 In pursuit of this goal, I will begin by revisiting the traditional reading of this speech in terms of a scala amoris in which the erotic subject is guided from attachment to a series of inferior objects to the Beautiful and Good itself such that the value of all preceding attachments is suspended. The critique that this approach to love instrumentalizes all but the transcendent Good is one that is found both within and without the text. In opposition to this reading, however, I will suggest that Husserl's notions of epochē and reduction enable us to read the speech not as an instrumentalizing scala but in terms of a reflective distance in which our immersion in and with the erotic object is suspended so that we might reappropriate the real meaning of erotic engagement. According to this reading, Plato does not negate the particular or lower forms of eros but reinscribes them with a value derived from their position in relation to the ultimate. The suspension of the lower forms, then, is not final but is merely employed in order to let what occurs in erotic engagement show itself.
Hard Determinism, Humeanism, and Virtue Ethics
Authors: Vilhauer Ben 
Published: March 2010

AbstractHard determinists hold that we never have alternative possibilities of action—that we only can do what we actually do. This means that if hard determinists accept the “ought implies can” principle, they must accept that it is never the case that we ought to do anything we do not do. In other words, they must reject the view that there can be “ought”‐based moral reasons to do things we do not do. Hard determinists who wish to accommodate moral reasons to do things we do not do can instead appeal to Humean moral reasons that are based on desires to be virtuous. Moral reasons grounded on desires to be virtuous do not depend on our being able to act on those reasons in the way that “ought”‐based moral reasons do.
Descartes' Dualism and Contemporary Dualism
Authors: Wee Cecilia , Pelczar Michael 
Published: March 2010

AbstractAfter drawing a distinction between two kinds of dualism—numerical dualism (defined in terms of identity) and modal dualism (defined in terms of supervenience)—we argue that Descartes is a numerical dualist, but not a modal dualist. Since most contemporary dualists advocate modal dualism, the relation of Descartes' views to the contemporary philosophy of mind are more complex than is commonly assumed.
The Varieties of Instrumental Rationality
Authors: Ellis Stephen 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIt is a mistake to think that instrumental rationality fixes a single standard for judging or describing actions. While there is a core conception of instrumental rationality, we appeal to different elaborations of that conception for different purposes. An action can be instrumentally rational in some sense(s) but not in others. As we learn more about behavior, it is possible to add useful elaborations of the core conception of instrumental rationality. In this paper, I propose a new elaboration based on Frederic Schick's work on understandings.
Situating Time in the Leibnizian Hierarchy of Beings
Authors: Lloyd Rebecca J. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractLeibniz's widely influential account of time provides a significant puzzle for those seeking to locate this account within his hierarchical ontology. Leibniz follows his scholastic predecessors in supposing that there are different grades of being, with substances being the most real and all other things possessing their reality via their relationships to substance. Following this picture, Leibniz suggests that phenomenal bodies only possess the being that they derive from the substances (i.e., monads) that ground them. Some would argue that time likewise only possesses its being based on the bodies that it relates. Contrary to this suggestion (i.e., that time is twice removed from substances), I will argue that time is derived directly from rational souls. Thus, I will argue that time is on an ontological par with the phenomenal world of bodies.
Kant's Quasi‐Transcendental Argument for a Necessary and Universal Evil Propensity in Human Nature
Authors: Palmquist Stephen R. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIn Part One of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, Kant repeatedly refers to a “proof” that human nature has a necessary and universal “evil propensity,” but he provides only obscure hints at its location. Interpreters have failed to identify such an argument in Part One. After examining relevant passages, summarizing recent attempts to reconstruct the argument, and explaining why these do not meet Kant's stated needs, I argue that the elusive proof must have a transcendental form (called quasi‐transcendental because Kant never uses “transcendental” in Religion). With deceptive simplicity, the section titles of Part One, viewed as components in an architechtonic system of religion, constitute steps in just such a proof.
That “Ought” Does Not Imply “Right”: Why It Matters for Virtue Ethics
Authors: Russell Daniel C. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractVirtue ethicists sometimes say that a right action is what a virtuous person would do, characteristically, in the circumstances. But some have objected recently that right action cannot be defined as what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances because there are circumstances in which a right action is possible but in which no virtuous person would be found. This objection moves from the premise that a given person ought to do an action that no virtuous person would do, to the conclusion that the action is a right action. I demon‐strate that virtue ethicists distinguish “ought” from “right” and reject the assumption that “ought” implies “right.” I then show how their rejection of that assumption blocks this “right but not virtuous” objection. I conclude by showing how the thesis that “ought” does not imply “right” can clarify a further dispute in virtue ethics regarding whether “ought” implies “can.”
Hegel and Gadamer on Bildung
Authors: Odenstedt Anders 
Published: March 2010

AbstractHegel argues that Bildung (cultivation or education) involves an ability to reflect on one's habitual beliefs in a detached, uncommitted way. According to Hegel, the educated (gebildete) individual is able to consider a manifold of standpoints on a given issue through awareness of the historical and cultural variability of beliefs. Hans‐Georg Gadamer invokes Hegel's account of Bildung in arguing that historical study permits current presuppositions (Vorurteile) to become reflected through the awareness of cognitive plurality and change that such study brings about. The paper mainly tries to show three things: (i) that Hegel is a source of inspiration for Gadamer in this regard but that there are also important differences between their accounts of Bildung; (ii) that these accounts are not unambiguous; and (iii) that Gadamer, in particular, makes somewhat elusive claims on the power of Bildung.
On Post‐Heideggerean Difference: Derrida and Deleuze
Authors: Barber Daniel Colucciello 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis paper takes up the Heideggerean question of difference. I argue that while Heidegger raises this question, his response to the question remains ambiguous and that this ambiguity pivots around the question of time. The bulk of the paper then looks at how Derrida and Deleuze respectively attempt to advance beyond Heidegger's ambiguity regarding the questions of difference and time. Derrida is able to demonstrate the manner in which time—as delay—is constitutive of any attempt to think difference. I argue, however, that his innovative articulation of “différance” maintains an extrinsic rather than intrinsic relation to difference in‐itself. To achieve an intrinsic relation, it is necessary to turn to the work of Deleuze, particularly to his discussion of “nonsense” and “singularity.”
In Defense of the Ideal of a Life Plan
Authors: Mintoff Joe 
Published: March 2010

AbstractAristotle claims at Eudemian Ethics 1.2 that everyone who can live according to his own choice should adopt some goal for the good life, which he will keep in view in all his actions, for not to have done so is a sign of folly. This is an opinion shared by other ancients as well as some moderns. Others believe, however, that this view is false to the human condition, and provide a number of objections: (1) you can't plan love; (2) nor life's surprises; (3) planning a whole life is of no use since the world changes too much; (4) as do our values; and (5) planning a life is something only dreary people would do. The aim of this paper is to examine these objections, as part of a broader attempt to defend the relevance of a eudaimonistic approach to the question of how to live well.
Stalnaker on Mathematical Information
Authors: Nuffer Gerhard 
Published: March 2010

AbstractRobert Stalnaker has argued that mathematical information is information about the sentences and expressions of mathematics. I argue that this metalinguistic account is open to a variant of Alonzo Church's translation objection and that Stalnaker's attempt to get around this objection is not successful. If correct, this tells not only against Stalnaker's account of mathematical truths, but against any metalinguistic account of truths that are both necessary and informative.
On the Pragmatic Explanation of Concessive Knowledge Attributions
Authors: Benbaji Hagit 
Published: March 2010

AbstractOn Lewis's reading, fallibilism is the contradictory view that it is possible that S knows that p, even though S cannot eliminate some remote scenarios in which not‐p. The pragmatic strategy is to make the alleged contradiction a mere pragmatic implicature, which is explained by false conversational expectations. I argue that the pragmatic strategy fails.
Recognition, Attachment, and the Social Bases of Self‐Worth
Authors: Ferkany Matt 
Published: March 2010

AbstractRecognition theorists have often sought to justify calls for the recognition of identities or cultures on grounds that a culturally egalitarian societal environment is a crucial social basis of a sense of self‐worth. In doing so they have often drawn on noncognitivist social‐psychological theorizing. This paper argues that this theorizing does not support the recognition theorist's position. It is argued that attachment theory together with recent empirical evidence support a more attachment‐ focused and Rawlsian vision of self‐worth's social bases according to which secure parent‐child attachment, associational ties, equal basic rights and liberties, and economic and educational opportunities are what really matter.
Pedro's Significance
Authors: Woodard Christopher 
Published: March 2010

AbstractWilliams's famous story of Jim exemplifies a general class of dilemmas caused by recalcitrant agents. Like Williams himself, most commentators have focused on Jim and the idea that he has special responsibility for his actions. This paper shifts attention to Pedro, exploring his significance in the story and arguing that Jim has a reason not to shoot that depends on Pedro's best possible response. In so doing, it sketches a new approach to the general class of dilemmas posed by recalcitrant agents, drawing attention to the advantages of this approach and to the difficulties it faces and comparing it to rival views associated with Ross and Kamm.
The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis)
Authors: Balaguer Mark 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIt is argued here that the question of whether compatibilism is true is irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human decision‐making processes—for example, the question of whether or not humans have free will—except in a very trivial and metaphysically uninteresting way. In addition, it is argued that two other questions—namely, the conceptual‐analysis question of what free will is and the question that asks which kinds of freedom are required for moral responsibility—are also essentially irrelevant to metaphysical questions about the nature of human beings.
The Proper Structure of the Intellectual Virtues
Authors: Wright Sarah 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIf we adopt a virtue approach to epistemology, what form should the intellectual virtues take? In this paper, I argue that the proper structure of the intellectual virtues should be one that follows the tradition of internalism in epistemology. I begin by giving a general characterization of virtue epistemology and then define internalism within that framework. Arguing for internalism, I first consider the thought experiment of the new evil demon and show how externalist accounts of intellectual virtue, though constructed to accommodate our intuitions in such cases, cannot fully do so. I further argue that only adopting an internalist structure of the virtues will provide intellectual virtues that appropriately mirror the structure of the classical moral virtues. Finally, I argue that only an internalist structure of the virtues can explain why the intellectual virtues are valuable in themselves.
Two Kinds of Completeness and the Uses (and Abuses) of Exclusion Principles
Authors: Haug Matthew C. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractI argue that the completeness of physics is composed of two distinct claims. The first is the commonly made claim that, roughly, every physical event is completely causally determined by physical events. The second has rarely, if ever, been explicitly stated in the literature and is the claim that microphysics provides a complete inventory of the fundamental categories that constitute both the causal features and intrinsic nature of all the events that causally affect the physical universe. After showing that these claims are distinct, I argue that they can be used to solve a difficulty with existing responses to the exclusion problem—namely, that these existing responses also undermine the powerful causal argument for physicalism. Recognizing that there are two kinds of completeness opens up room for the nonreductive physicalist to solve the exclusion problem while also endorsing a modified, cogent causal argument for a kind of physicalism compatible with her position.