bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
TRIPS and the Right to Health
Authors: Joseph Sarah 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
This chapter examines the impact of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) on the right to health, particularly the debate regarding the impact of global patent rules on the prices of essential medicines. It also addresses the arguments for and against patent regimes in the drug field. The TRIPS agreement has probably given rise to the most vociferous human rights criticisms of the WTO, especially with regard to its impact on the right to food and the right to health. It is possible that TRIPS in fact allows sufficient flexibility to permit States to comply with their obligations regarding the right to health, but it makes that task more difficult, particularly for poorer States. Furthermore, the traditional justifications for global patent protection are challengeable. The development rationale for global IP protection is highly suspect, especially given that Northern States did not respect such rights during their own paths to development. Specific concerns beyond high prices arise with regard to the pharmaceutical industry, such as an innovation deficit and queries about the real cost to the private sector of pharmaceutical R&D. Despite challenges to the desirability of global patent protection under TRIPS, explicit recognition of important TRIPS flexibilities in the Doha Declaration and the 2003 waiver, the trend in current regional and bilateral trade negotiations is, unfortunately, to drive up standards of IP protection. A rollback of TRIPS for many developing States (not only LDCs) would be a preferable policy trajectory.
WTO Reform, the Doha Round, and Other Free Trade Initiatives
Authors: Joseph Sarah 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
This chapter summarizes potential WTO reforms in light of the human rights deficiencies within, or that are likely to be prompted by, WTO rules and processes, which are identified in Chapters 3 to 7. These proposals are evaluated, and then compared with current proposals on the table during the Doha round. Finally, the phenomenon of bilateral and other free trade agreements outside the auspices of the WTO, focusing on the example of European Partnership Agreements, is discussed.
Conclusion
Authors: Joseph Sarah 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
This chapter begins with a summary of discussions in the preceding chapters. It then discusses free trade fundamentalism, the purported ‘neatness’ of free trade rules, global free trade, and the current imbalance in international governance. It is argued that from a human rights point of view, there are problems with both the WTO's processes and some of its substantive rules. Regarding the latter, problems arise with regard to their interpretation and their chilling effect in the absence of authoritative interpretation. The WTO's mission of promoting free trade and intellectual property rights should take more account of countervailing rights beyond those of foreign traders and intellectual property rights holders, the marked differences between States, and problems within the agricultural arena. Clearly, this book ultimately calls for major changes to the thinking which currently dominates the WTO.
Sensibility Saved
Authors: Prinz Jesse J. 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter presents and defends an emotionist theory known as sensibility theory. It argues that sensibility theories can explain some central folk intuitions about the nature of morality. However, sensibility theories face a number of serious objections. In the second part of this chapter, ten objections that can be found in the literature are discussed. It is argued that a properly formulated sensibility theory has resources to overcome each of these. Sensibility theory offers one way of accommodating the evidence that moral judgement is affect-laden. This is one of its main advantages, but it is not the only approach that ties moral judgements to emotions. Emotivism, for example, can boast the same. To motivate the adoption of sensibility theory, we need to show that it has other advantages. One attraction is that sensibility theory accommodates the evidence used to support moral intuitionism without taking on any of the baggage.
Dining with Cannibals
Authors: Prinz Jesse J. 
Published: October 2011

AbstractMoral variation is explored in this chapter even though some moral philosophers argue that variation has been exaggerated. Alternative opinion from other philosophers is that variations in moral values do not imply variation in moral facts as there can be one true morality despite different moral convictions. This chapter argues that moral relativism is a result of the sensibility theory which is dubbed constructive sentimentalism and although the link between sentimentalist theories and relativism has been observed, the implication has not been studied much by sentimental theorists. This chapter also explores the objections faced by relativism and addresses the concern that moral relativism results in political indifference. Relativism is explained as a coherent doctrine supported by anthropology and which could lead people to reconsider some moral convictions.
The Genealogy of Morals
Authors: Prinz Jesse J. 
Published: October 2011

AbstractPhilosophers are more interested in normative questions rather than descriptive questions such as the origins of moral values. Questioning where our values come from is seen as irrelevant and those making the inquiry are accused of committing genetic fallacy. This chapter reconsiders the assumptions centering on the argument that normative theories are designed to encompass present-day intuitions. Investigating the origin of values can be done through the genealogical method, as shown in this chapter, that supports the idea of moral convictions being the product of social history through justifying examples of Friedrich Nietzsche's historical analyses. The chapter also examines whether it can be used to support skepticism on current moral values and compares it to Nietzsche's overstated usage of genealogy.
Against Evangelism in Academic Criminology: For Criminology as a Scientific Art
Authors: Carlen Pat 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter argues that because academic criminology is a scientific art, it is unfortunate that three of the most exciting perspectives in criminology today — those academy-based criminologies which have variously self-branded as ‘critical’, ‘cultural’, or ‘public’ — at times reveal evangelistic tendencies that pose a threat to their capacity for the open debate that each of them espouses. Other brandname academic criminologies have, over the years, been frequently endangered by the same tendencies but, because of the promise and dangers inherent in their twin allegiances to both academic criminology and criminology politics, and also because of the desirability of such socio-political commitments, if criminology as a scientific art is to have any social significance, it is important that the evangelistic strains in critical, cultural, and public criminologies should be confronted. They are the least desirable and potentially most self-damaging, aspects of the best of contemporary academic criminology.
Putting Crime Back on the Criminological Agenda
Authors: Zedner Lucia 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter examines the relative decline of criminological concern with crime and takes issue with claims that criminology should relinquish crime in favour of other organizing concepts such as ‘conflict’, ‘dispute’, or ‘harm’. It argues that crime needs to be put firmly back on to the criminological agenda by making questions of criminalization as much a focus of criminological as of legal enquiry. It considers what criminology can contribute to criminalization debates and, no less importantly, what criminology has to learn from criminal law.
Criminology and Government: Some Reflections on Recent Developments in England
Authors: Newburn Tim 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter is divided into five parts. The first part explores the changing social and cultural context in which criminological research is conducted and penal policy made. It then turns to the changing governmental context, including the reform of the civil service and the rise of so-called ‘evidence-based policy-making’. Criminological research, of course, has itself not been static and the third section offers a brief sketch of developments in criminological scholarship outside government. The fourth section looks at the changing nature of criminological research within government and, in particular, at the location and nature of research within the Home Office. The chapter concludes with some reflections on what the future might hold in relation to the changing nature of the relationship between government and criminological research.
The Past Histories of Molecules
Authors: Callender Craig 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter unfolds a central philosophical problem of statistical mechanics. This problem lies in a clash between the Static Probabilities offered by statistical mechanics and the Dynamic Probabilities provided by classical or quantum mechanics. The chapter looks at the Boltzmann and Gibbs approaches in statistical mechanics and construes some of the great controversies in the field — for instance the Reversibility Paradox — as instances of this conflict. It furthermore argues that a response to this conflict is a critical choice that shapes one's understanding of statistical mechanics itself, namely, whether it is to be conceived as a special or fundamental science. The chapter details some of the pitfalls of the latter ‘globalist’ position and seeks defensible ground for a kind of ‘localist’ alternative.
Probabilistic Modeling in Physics
Authors: Beisbart Claus 
Published: October 2011

AbstractHow can probabilistic models from physics represent a target, and how can one understand the probabilities that figure in such models? The aim of this chapter is to answer these questions by analyzing random models of Brownian motion and point process models of the galaxy distribution as examples. This chapter defends the view that such models represent because we may learn from them by setting our degrees of belief following the probabilities suggested by the model. This account is not incompatible with an objectivist view of the pertinent probabilities, but stock objectivist interpretations, e.g., frequentism or Lewis’ Humean account of probabilities have problems to provide a suitable objectivist methodology for statistical inference from data. This point is made by contrasting Bayesian statistics with error statistics.
Quantum Probabilities: An Information‐Theoretic Interpretation
Authors: Bub Jeffrey 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter develops a realist information-theoretic interpretation of the nonclassical features of quantum probabilities. To make plain these nonclassical features, quantum games are analyzed in which a ‘no-signaling’ constraint has to be satisfied. It is further shown how the Lüders Rule may be seen as an instruction how to update probabilities following some measurement. As conditionalization following this rule leads to inevitable losses of information, it is argued that quantum theory implies new constraints on information. A parallel is drawn to the Special Theory of Relativity: The geometric structure of Hilbert spaces imposes new, but objective probabilistic constraints on correlations between events, just as the geometric structure of Minkowski space in special relativity imposes new spatio-temporal kinematic constraints on events.
Can the World Beshown to be Indeterministic after all?
Authors: Wüthrich Christian 
Published: October 2011

AbstractIs the world deterministic and can we ever know whether it is or is not so? This chapter critically evaluates recent results that bear on these issues, and points out the relation to probabilities. While results from classical physics are neither fully relevant nor conclusive, quantum mechanics is often assumed to establish indeterminism beyond doubt. However, whether the quantum world is indeterministic crucially depends on how the measurement problem is solved. There are both deterministic and indeterministic contenders in this field, some of them empirically equivalent to another one. This is shown using the deterministic Bohm theory and Nelsonsion mechanics, which is indeterministic. Two arguments that purport to establish indeterminism and that rely on Gleason's theorem and on Conway and Kochen's recent Free Will Theorem are shown to be wanting.
Action's Most Ultimate End
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

AbstractWhat is the role of eudaimonia in Aristotle's ethics and of beatitudo in Aquinas's ethics? None of the basic goods can count as fully satisfying. But can the whole set of them somehow count as that? Aquinas holds that in this life we are oriented by a less than fully satisfying beatitudo, which he calls imperfecta beatitudo and says (in his main account) consists in the workings of moral virtue. His other account holds that it consists in contemplation. But what is to be made of his thesis that beatitudo perfecta consists in the vision of God? It must be taken with his thesis that perfect beatitude (fulfilment, flourishing) includes friendship with human neighbours in the heavenly household. And with his thesis that it is a matter of sharing in God's creative, practical understanding, and thus is a kind of extending of practical reason's operations in this life's engagements with the complex of intelligible human goods. More like playing in an orchestra than gazing at a scene.
Legal Reasoning as Practical Reason
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

AbstractUnderstanding morality and understanding legal, especially judicial, reasoning each require attention to the distinctions between reason and feelings, and between making and doing. In clarifying these, this chapter considers the denial of objective goods by ‘Critical Legal Studies’; the confusion induced by ‘game’ or ‘decision’ or ‘rational choice’ theory's technological understanding of rational choice; and Ronald Dworkin's exaggeration of the determinacy of affirmative moral obligations and oversight of the incommensurability between moral and other kinds of criteria for judgment and choice. Legal system and reasoning exists in a tension between the moral or existential order and the technical order (the third and fourth of the four kinds of order and intellectual discipline). Understanding incommensurability also grounds the acknowledgement of exceptionless moral norms (‘absolutes’) that give legal reasoning its backbone.
‘Public Reason’ and Moral Debate
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter provides a close study and critique of Rawls's conception of public reason. ‘Public reason’ can summarily convey four sound elements of classical political thought as found in Aquinas, but as used by Rawls it is confused, arbitrary, and unreasonably restrictive of both discourse and deliberation. A fundamental confusion between the normative and the predictive-descriptive is revealed by its equivocal phrase ‘can reasonably be expected to endorse’. In so far as Political Liberalism rests on A Theory of Justice it suffers from the earlier book's unreasonable assumption of ignorance of value and consequently fallacious fundamental argumentation from what would be chosen or rejected in the ‘Original Position’. The concern to avoid bias and violations of the Golden Rule is sound, as is the principle of reciprocity. But Rawls's application of the principle in relation to unborn persons, like his follower Jeffrey Reiman's more radical application and the doctrine in Roe v Wade, exalts private power over public reason. An endnote lists uses of the phrase from Milton and Hobbes to Rousseau and Jefferson.
Reason, Passions, and Free Speech
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter presents a 1967 essay, cited in the US Supreme Court's lasting settlement of obscenity law in 1973, and it explores the applicability of the classic and Humean distinctions between reason and passions to the demarcation of the ‘speech’ protected by constitutional ‘freedom of speech’. It traces the development of obscenity law; the place of reason in Madison's Federalist papers; the idea of aesthetic distance developed by Geoffrey Bullough, Suzanne Langer, and Peter Strawson; and the course of Supreme Court doctrine from 1942 to 1966. The 1973 citation is shown, in the endnote, to have been an empty success.
Intention in Direct Discrimination
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
The UK Supreme Court's holding about ‘direct’ discrimination in the JFS case (2009) is critiqued in this chapter for its failure to identify and reject the error in the House of Lords' decision in James v Eastleigh (1990). Acting ‘on the grounds of’ X means that X enters into the acting person's or body's deliberation in such a way as to affect that person's selection of means and/or ends. The English judiciary do not see the basic structure of practical reasoning, intending, deciding, and acting whole as it is seen in Aristotle's and Aquinas's demonstration that ends are almost all means and means almost all ends. Ends and means are then both grounds for acting. Side effects, even when ‘intrinsic’, are not. These matters remain relevant under the Equality Act 2010's new definition of ‘direct discrimination’.
Organic Unity, Brain Life, and Our Beginning
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
This chapter is about a thesis, proposed by Michael Lockwood and some Catholic theologians, that a human life does not begin until the brain has formed and matured to a sufficient degree. The thesis is presented as counterpart to or symmetrical with a thesis about brain death. But the proper criterion is integrated organic functioning, and this precedes ‘brain life’, even if subsequently such integration is a function of the brain. Conception is a radically new beginning, and Lockwood's attempts to obscure this verbally are illuminating. Beneath his arguments is a dualism which is self-refuting.
Brain Death and Peter Singer
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

Abstract
This chapter offers a response to a 1998 paper by Peter Singer and it focuses on discussion in 1979 by Grisez and Boyle of the theoretical, factual, and operational definition or criteria of death. That discussion is a model of conceptual (philosophical) clarification, and was mangled in Singer's account of it. But against their factual and operational conclusions linking brain death with loss of integrated organic functioning (the ‘theoretical’ definition of death), the chapter adduces work by Alan Shewmon giving clinical grounds for doubting the necessity or invariable reality of that link. Along the way, dualism of the kind embraced by Jeff McMahan is critiqued, as is Singer's ethic. A last-minute endnote cites Grisez's recent reply to Shewmon.
War and Peace in the Natural Law Tradition
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter surveys the history and merits of just war theory: its account of peace and pacific intention in war; its requirements of motive and intention, and relativising of distinctions between grounds for war and intention in going to war; its account of justifying grounds for going to war, and the emergence of a purely defensive justification; its approach to the side effects of going to war; its differing accounts of the moral limits on the conduct of war; its approach to the prospect of defeat, massacre, and unlimited injustice (extremity); its connections with the problem of forcible resistance to political authority; and its attitude to pacifism and ‘non-violent resistance’. Key figures such as Aquinas, Vitoria, Suarez, and Grotius are compared and critiqued, as well as some more recent authorities.
On Hart's Ways: Law as Reason and as Fact
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

AbstractHart's early philosophical work on deciding and intending, like his later work on self-reference and on intention and his decisively important concept of the internal point of view, opened jurisprudence up to a full recognition that law has its reality not only as fact but also as reasons for action. But as MacCormick showed, Hart's distinction between internal and external points of view was imprecise, and the roots of this failure can be seen in the early work on deliberation, with its Hobbesian, Humean, and Kantian misunderstandings of practical reason which are mirrored in The Concept of Law. The chapter analyses the kinds of reason for compliance that the law offers its subjects, and the extent to which these were and were not noticed in that book. After a brief comment on more recent positivism, the chapter concludes with a close examination of the elements of moral scepticism that Hart sought, with incomplete success, to keep from affecting the results of his legal-philosophical work.
Analogical Reasoning in Law
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter offers a comment on Scott Brewer's major study of legal argument by analogy which resulted, it seems, in some substantial revisions to that study, so that it now brings out the importance of what Charles Sanders Peirce called abduction, that is, insight into a mass of items or data. The exemplary cases from 19th-century American law adduced by Brewer to illustrate analogical reasoning are shown, on inspection, to be concerned with the merits of alternative rules or principles, rather than with some other kind of similarity between (kinds of) situations. Analogy-warranting rules or principles, discovered or arrived at by abduction, make comparison of ‘source’ cases with ‘target’ cases redundant.
Adjudication and Legal Change
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter is a comment on Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln (1998) grapples with the question how far adjudication differs from legislation even when the court is overruling long-standing precedents long taken to have established a common law rule, now abrogated. This is considered in the context of the question whether the parties' reliance on the now abrogated rule was a mistake of fact or of law; against legal ‘Realism’, it should be regarded as a mistake of law, not of prediction (fact). The ‘declaratory theory of law’ mocked by Austin does not make a historical but rather a normative claim, about judges' duty to differentiate judicial authority and reasoning from that of legislatures. An endnote considers responses to the case that approach more closely Dworkin's one right answer thesis.
Revolutions and Continuity of Law
Authors: Finnis John 
Published: October 2011

AbstractThis chapter is written in the context of judicial appeals to legal theory in the wake of coups d'état or revolutions in the Commonwealth. It considers whether every illegal or unconstitutional act amounts to a change in the constitution and the identity of the legal order, and whether there can be change in that identity otherwise than by violation of some rule. It looks at the problem of coups d'état both in English statute law and in Kelsen and Ross and finally in Hart and Raz, noting the atemporal character of Hart's rule of recognition. The problem of when rules ‘cease to exist’ in considered in the light of law about the effects of repeal of statutes, and of fundamental ‘principle of continuity’. Consideration of whether the legal system is a set of rules (or other normative standards) of persons and institutions leads into more general reflections on method in jurisprudence, and (drawing on Voegelin) the dependence of legal theory on history to identify its subject matter (the group that has law).