bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Giant fibrovascular polyp of the hypopharynx: per-oral endoscopic removal
Authors: Ozdemir S , Gorgulu O , Selcuk T , Akbas Y , Sayar C , Sayar H 
Published: May 2011

AbstractObjective:We report an extremely rare case of giant fibrovascular polyp of the hypopharynx.Method:We present a 49-year-old man who had increasing difficulty swallowing, advanced respiratory distress and weight loss, as well as a hypopharyngeal mass protruding from his mouth.Results:Diagnosis was confirmed by endoscopic examination and computed tomography. A tracheostomy was required due to laryngeal obstruction by the regurgitated mass. The giant polyp was removed via per-oral endoscopic excision under general anaesthesia.Conclusion:Fibrovascular polyps occur most commonly in the cervical oesophagus, and are extremely rare in the hypopharynx. They can grow to a very large size over several years. We discuss the symptoms, diagnosis and surgical treatment techniques for upper aerodigestive tract fibrovascular polyps, in the light of the literature.
‘It's Something You Just Have to Ignore’: Understanding and Addressing Contemporary Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans Safety Beyond Hate Crime Paradigms
Authors: BROWNE KATH , BAKSHI LEELA , LIM JASON 
Published: May 2011

AbstractIn common with the experiences of many other groups – and despite changing legal landscapes and increasing recognition within social policy of different groups’ needs – LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans) people continue to face discrimination and abuse, and improving safety continues to be a key touchstone for policy makers and practitioners engaging with LGBT lives. Based on evidence from Count Me In Too, an LGBT participatory research project in Brighton & Hove, UK, the paper challenges approaches to dealing with LGBT safety that narrowly focus on reporting within a hate crime paradigm, and recognises the shift towards multi-agency approaches to LGBT safety. Our evidence shows that many LGBT people differentially recognise or do not recognise abuse, instead ‘normalising’ much of the abuse they experience in order to carry on with day-to-day life. By focusing on the effects of abuse and how it is dealt with by individuals and communities, rather than focusing on what constitutes abuse, we show the importance of addressing LGBT safety in ways that move beyond questions of criminal justice and the reporting of hate crime. We argue for a broader social policy framework that uses multi-agency approaches to community safety for those who experience abuse on the basis of their sexual and/or gender identities, which should attend to how safety services may provide more appropriate contexts of care and support, and which should build upon relevant knowledges within LGBT communities. Fostering solidarities among LGBT people may also empower them to work towards broader social transformation.
Homeostasis and drinking
Authors: Toates F. M. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractDrinking and thirst-motivated behaviour have traditionally been explained in terms of the rather simple concept of homeostasis. A homeostatic mechanism readily accounts for responses to acute changes in body-fluid levels. However, there are other factors regulating intake, for example, cues associated with eating, which interact with the time elapsed since last drinking and the availability of water. Future dehydration is avoided by behavioural hysteresis; a sudden reduction in fluid needs is not matched by an equivalent reduction in fluid intake. Another factor not explicable by traditional homeostasis is that, in general, drinking cannot be suppressed by water infusion. Nor are there rigid target values for body-fluid levels independent of the cost of obtaining water; when water is hard to get, a relatively low body fluid level is maintained, thus minimizing loss. On the basis of the results conflicting with traditional homeostatic theory, this paper tentatively suggests certain modifications toward a more realistic model of fluid ingestion.
The conditioning model of neurosis
Authors: Eysenck H. J. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractThe long-term persistence of neurotic symptoms, such as anxiety, poses difficult problems for any psychological theory. An attempt is made to revive the Watson-Mowrer conditioning theory and to avoid the many criticisms directed against it in the past. It is suggested that recent research has produced changes in learning theory that can be used to render this possible. In the first place, the doctrine of equipotentiality has been shown to be wrong, and some such concept as Seligman's “preparedness” is required, that is the notion that certain CS are biologically prepared to be more readily connected with anxiety responses than others. In the second place, the law of extinction has to be amended, and the law of incubation or enhancement added, according to which the exposure of the CS-only may, under certain specified conditions, have the effect of increasing the strength of the CR, rather than reducing it. The major conditions favouring incubation are (1) Pavlovian B conditioning, that is a type of conditioning in which the CR is a drive; (2) a strong UCS, and (3) short exposure of the CS-only.
Brain mechanisms for offense, defense, and submission
Authors: Adams David B. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractA preliminary attempt is made to analyze the intraspecific aggressive behavior of mammals in terms of specific neural circuitry. The results of stimulation, lesion, and recording studies of aggressive behavior in cats and rats are reviewed and analyzed in terms of three hypothetical motivational systems: offense, defense, and submission. A critical distinction, derived from ethological theory, is made between motivating stimuli that simultaneously activate functional groupings of motor patterning mechanisms, and releasing and directing stimuli that are necessary for the activation of discrete motor patterning mechanisms. It is suggested that motivating stimuli activate pathways that converge upon sets of homogeneous neurons, called motivational mechanisms, whose activity determines the motivational state of the animal.A defense motivational mechanism is hypothesized to be located in the midbrain central gray. In addition to tactile, auditory, and visual inputs from the paleospinothalamic tract, lateral lemniscus, and (perhaps) from the pretectum, it may receive inputs from a major forebrain pathway whose functional significance is not yet understood.A submission motivational mechanism is also thought to be located in the central gray. In addition to inputs for defense, it is thought to receive a necessary input from a “consociate (social familiarity cue) modulator” located in the ventromedial hypothalamus, which can switch behavior from defense to submission. The location of the hypothetical offense motivational mechanism is not known, although the pathways by which it is activated are traced in some detail.Brain mechanisms of aggression in primitive mammals and in primates are apparently similar to those in rats and cats.
On the demystification of mental imagery
Authors: Kosslyn Stephen M. , Pinker Steven , Smith George E. , Shwartz Steven P. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractWhat might a theory of mental imagery look like, and how might one begin formulating such a theory? These are the central questions addressed in the present paper. The first section outlines the general research direction taken here and provides an overview of the empirical foundations of our theory of image representation and processing. Four issues are considered in succession, and the relevant results of experiments are presented and discussed. The second section begins with a discussion of the proper form for a cognitive theory, and the distinction between a theory and a model is developed. Following this, the present theory and computer simulation model are introduced. This theory specifies the nature of the internal representations (data structures) and the processes that operate on them when one generates, inspects, or transforms mental images. In the third, concluding, section we consider three very different kinds of objections to the present research program, one hinging on the possibility of experimental artifacts in the data, and the others turning on metatheoretical commitments about the form of a cognitive theory. Finally, we discuss how one ought best to evaluate theories and models of the sort developed here.
Twenty years of haunting eidetic imagery: where's the ghost?
Authors: Haber Ralph Norman 
Published: May 2011

AbstractThis paper is a theoretical analysis of eidetic imagery, based upon the author's ten-year study of elementary-school-aged children. The presence of eidetic imagery is inferred from reports of persisting visual images of stimuli when they are no longer in view. According to the criteria for differentiating eidetic images from afterimages, eidetic images should occur even when saccadic eye movements are made during exposure to the stimulus; it should be possible to make saccadic eye movements while one is reporting the image without the image also moving; the image should last long, and it should be positive. The criteria for differentiating eidetic images from nonvisual memorial representations include: reports of seeing an image projected onto a surface in space, the consistent use of present tense when reporting images as opposed to past tense when reporting from nonvisual memory, and the ability to superimpose two images and report the composite image.Eidetic images are only available to a small percentage of children 6–12 years old, and are virtually nonexistent in adults. However, extensive research has failed to demonstrate consistent correlates between the presence of eidetic imagery and any cognitive, intellectual, neurological, or emotional measure. The negative correlation between eidetic imagery and age has prompted hypotheses to explain eidetic imagery as a developmentally less mature memorial representation, which is gradually replaced by more abstract representations as the child acquires abstract thought, reading, and more advanced cognitive abilities. The evidence in the present review casts doubt on this hypothesis on numerous grounds: an extensive longitudinal study over the entire span of elementary school years found that eidetic abilities remain remarkably stable; there is no correlation between eidetic imagery and abstract thinking or reading performance; there is no higher incidence in preschool ages, among retarded or brain-injured subjects, or among illiterate subjects in crosscultural studies.It is concluded that we should not abandon work on eidetic imagery or simply force it into a preconceived mold of what memory must be, but rather, expand work on the phenomenological indicators of perception and memory.
The reliability of peer review for manuscript and grant submissions: A cross-disciplinary investigation
Authors: Cicchetti Domenic V. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractThe reliability of peer review of scientific documents and the evaluative criteria scientists use to judge the work of their peers are critically reexamined with special attention to the consistently low levels of reliability that have been reported. Referees of grant proposals agree much more about what isunworthyof support than about what does have scientific value. In the case of manuscript submissions this seems to depend on whether a discipline (or subfield) is general and diffuse (e.g., cross-disciplinary physics, general fields of medicine, cultural anthropology, social psychology) or specific and focused (e.g., nuclear physics, medical specialty areas, physical anthropology, and behavioral neuroscience). In the former there is also much more agreement on rejection than acceptance, but in the latter both the wide differential in manuscript rejection rates and the high correlation between referee recommendations and editorial decisions suggests that reviewers and editors agree more on acceptance than on rejection. Several suggestions are made for improving the reliability and quality of peer review. Further research is needed, especially in the physical sciences.
An evolutionary analysis of rules regulating human inbreeding and marriage
Authors: Thornhill Nancy Wilmsen 
Published: May 2011

AbstractEvolutionary theory predicts that humans should avoid incest because of the negative effects incest has on individual reproduction: production of defective offspring. Selection for the avoidance of close-kin mating has apparently resulted in a psychological mechanism that promotes voluntary incest avoidance. Most human societies are thought to have rules regulating incest. If incest is avoided, why are social rules constructed to regulate it? This target article suggests that incest rules do not exist primarily to regulate close-kin mating but to regulate inbreeding between more distant kin (especially cousin categories) and sexual relations between affinal relatives (often nonkin). Three evolutionary hypotheses about cousin marriage and affinal kin mating follow from this suggestion: (1) Rules regulating mating between affinal kin are means of paternity protection. Cousin marriage (inbreeding) is regulated because, if it occurs, it can concentrate wealth and power within families to the detriment of (2) the powerful positions of rulers in stratified societies and (3) the relatively equal social statuses of most men in egalitarian societies. Tests using the comparative method on a worldwide sample of 129 societies supported the three hypotheses. Two alternative anthropological hypotheses (derived from Freudian theory and alliance theory) failed to be supported.
Précis ofDarwin, sex and status: Biological approaches to mind and culture
Authors: Barkow Jerome H. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractDarwin, Sex and Statusargues that a human sociobiology that mistakes evolutionary theory for theories of psychology and culture is wrong, as are psychologies that could never have evolved or social sciences that posit impossible psychologies. Status develops theories of human self-awareness, cognition, and cultural capacity that are compatible with evolutionary theory. Recurring themes include: the importance of sexual selection in human evolution; our species' preoccupation with self-esteem and relative standing; the individual as an active strategist, regularly revising culturally provided information; and awareness as an impressionmanagement device. Culture is a somewhat structured information pool that itself evolves, often in ways that reduce the genetic fitness of its participants.
Ways of coloring: Comparative color vision as a case study for cognitive science
Authors: Thompson Evan , Palacios Adrian , Varela Francisco J. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractDifferent explanations of color vision favor different philosophical positions: Computational vision is more compatible with objectivism (the color is in the object), psychophysics and neurophysiology with subjectivism (the color is in the head). Comparative research suggests that an explanation of color must be both experientialist (unlike objectivism) and ecological (unlike subjectivism). Computational vision's emphasis on optimally “recovering” prespecified features of the environment (i.e., distal properties, independent of the sensory-motor capacities of the animal) is unsatisfactory. Conceiving of visual perception instead as the visual guidance of activity in an environment that is determined largely by that very activity suggests new directions for research.
Précis ofHow monkeys see the world
Authors: Cheney Dorothy L. , Seyfarth Robert M. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractOur book examines the mechanisms that underlie social behavior and communication in East African vervet monkeys. Our goal is to describe the sophistication of primate intelligence and to probe its limits. We suggest that vervets and other primates make good primatologists. They observe social interactions, recognize the relations that exist among others, and classify relationships into types. Monkeys also use sounds to represent features of their environment and compare different vocalizations according to their meaning. Monkeys may use abstract concepts and have motives, beliefs, and desires, however, their mental states are apparently not accessible: They do not know what they know. In addition, monkeys seem unable to attribute mental states to others: They lack a “theory of mind.” Their inability to. examine their own mental states or to attribute mental states to others severely constrains their ability to transmit information or to deceive one another. It also limits the extent to which their vocalizations can be called semantic. Finally, the skills that monkeys exhibit in social behavior are apparently domain specific. For reasons that are at present unclear, vervets exhibit adaptive specializations in social interactions that are not extended to their interactions with other species (although they should be).
Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain
Authors: Dennett Daniel C. , Kinsbourne Marcel 
Published: May 2011

AbstractWe compare the way two models of consciousness treat subjective timing. According to the standard “Cartesian Theater” model, there is a place in the brain where “it all comes together,” and the discriminations in all modalities are somehow put into registration and “presented” for subjective judgment. The timing of the events in this theater determines subjective order. According to the alternative “Multiple Drafts” model, discriminations are distributed in both space and time in the brain. These events do have temporal properties, but those properties do not determine subjective order because there is no single, definitive “stream of consciousness,” only a parallel stream of conflicting and continuously revised contents. Four puzzling phenomena that resist explanation by the Cartesian model are analyzed: (1) a gradual apparent motion phenomenon involving abrupt color change (Kolers & von Grünau 1976), (2) an illusion of an evenly spaced series of “hops” produced by two or more widely spaced series of taps delivered to the skin (Geldard & Sherrick's “cutaneous rabbit” [1972]), (3) backwards referral in time, and (4) subjective delay of consciousness of intention (both reported in this journal by LIbet 1985a; 1987; 1989a). The unexamined assumptions that have always made the Cartesian Theater so attractive are exposed and dismantled. The Multiple Drafts model provides a better account of the puzzling phenomena, avoiding the scientific and metaphysical extravagances of the Cartesian Theater: The temporal order of subjective events is a product of the brain's interpretational processes, not a direct reflection of events making up those processes.
Early stages in a sensorimotor transformation
Authors: Flanders Martha , Tillery Stephen I. Helms , Soechting John F. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractWe present a model for several early stages of the sensorimotor transformations involved in targeted arm movement. In psychophysical experiments, human subjects pointed to the remembered locations of randomly placed targets in three-dimensional space. They made consistent errors in distance, and from these errors stages in the sensorimotor transformation were deduced. When subjects attempted to move the right index finger to a virtual target they consistently undershot the distance of the more distal targets. Other experiments indicated that the error was in the sensorimotor transformation rather than in the perception of distance. The error was most consistent when evaluated using a spherical coordinate system based at the right shoulder, indicating that the neural representation of target parameters is transformed from a retinocentric representation to a shoulder-centered representation. According to the model, the error in distance results from the neural implementation of a linear approximation in the algorithm to transform shoulder-centered target parameters into a set of arm orientations appropriate for placing the finger on the target. The transformation to final arm orientations places visually derived information into a frame of reference where it can readily be combined with kinesthetically derived information about initial arm orientations. The combination of these representations of initial and final arm orientations could give rise to the representation of movement direction recorded in the motor cortex by Georgopoulos and his colleagues. Later stages, such as the transformation from kinematic (position) to dynamic (force) parameters, or to levels of muscle activation, are beyond the scope of the present model.
Language, tools and brain: The ontogeny and phylogeny of hierarchically organized sequential behavior
Authors: Greenfield Patricia M. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractDuring the first two years of human life a common neural substrate (roughly Broca's area) underlies the hierarchical organization of elements in the development of speech as well as the capacity to combine objects manually, including tool use. Subsequent cortical differentiation, beginning at age two, creates distinct, relatively modularized capacities for linguistic grammar and more complex combination of objects. An evolutionary homologue of the neural substrate for language production and manual action is hypothesized to have provided a foundation for the evolution of language before the divergence of the hominids and the great apes. Support comes from the discovery of a Broca's area homologue and related neural circuits in contemporary primates. In addition, chimpanzees have an identical constraint on hierarchical complexity in both tool use and symbol combination. Their performance matches that of the two-year-old child who has not yet developed the neural circuits for complex grammar and complex manual combination of objects.
Natural language and natural selection
Authors: Pinker Steven , Bloom Paul 
Published: May 2011

AbstractMany people have argued that the evolution of the human language faculty cannot be explained by Darwinian natural selection. Chomsky and Gould have suggested that language may have evolved as the by-product of selection for other abilities or as a consequence of as-yet unknown laws of growth and form. Others have argued that a biological specialization for grammar is incompatible with every tenet of Darwinian theory – that it shows no genetic variation, could not exist in any intermediate forms, confers no selective advantage, and would require more evolutionary time and genomic space than is available. We examine these arguments and show that they depend on inaccurate assumptions about biology or language or both. Evolutionary theory offers clear criteria for when a trait should be attributed to natural selection: complex design for some function, and the absence of alternative processes capable of explaining such complexity. Human language meets these criteria: Grammar is a complex mechanism tailored to the transmission of propositional structures through a serial interface. Autonomous and arbitrary grammatical phenomena have been offered as counterexamples to the position that language is an adaptation, but this reasoning is unsound: Communication protocols depend on arbitrary conventions that are adaptive as long as they are shared. Consequently, language acquisition in the child should systematically differ from language evolution in the species, and attempts to analogize them are misleading. Reviewing other arguments and data, we conclude that there is every reason to believe that a specialization for grammar evolved by a conventional neo-Darwinian process.
A leaner nativist solution to the origin of concepts
Authors: Mandler Jean M. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractThere must be innate conceptual machinery, but perhaps not as much as Carey proposes. A single mechanism of Perceptual Meaning Analysis that simplifies spatiotemporal information into a small number of conceptual primitives may suffice. This approach avoids the complexities and ambiguities of interactions between separate dedicated analyzers and central concepts that Carey posits, giving learning a somewhat larger role in early concept formation.