bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Revamping the Restriction Strategy
Authors: Tennant Neil 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter continues the anti-realist's quest for a principled way to avoid Fitch's paradox. It proposes that the Cartesian restriction on the anti-realist's knowability principle ‘φ, therefore ◇Kφ’ should be formulated as a consistency requirement not on the premise φ of an application of the rule, but rather on the set of assumptions on which the relevant occurrence of φ depends. It is stressed, by reference to illustrative proofs, how important it is to have proofs in normal form before applying the proposed restriction. A similar restriction is proposed for the converse inference, the so-called Rule of Factiveness ‘◇Kφ therefore φ’. The proposed restriction appears to block another Fitch-style derivation that uses the KK-thesis in order to get around the Cartesian restriction on applications of the knowability principle.
On Keeping Blue Swans and Unknowable Facts at Bay: A Case Study on Fitch's Paradox
Authors: Brogaard Berit 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter develops a Fitch-like paradox for strong modal fictionalism. It argues that the most promising strategy to avoid paradox is to reject the claim that modal claims are to be analyzed in terms of the contents of the fiction of possible worlds. It is hoped that by looking at the parallel case of modal fictionalism light can be shed on the threat posed by Fitch's paradox to semantic anti-realism.
Performance and Paradox
Authors: Hand Michael 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThe knowability paradox, or Fitch's paradox, is thought to threaten semantical (Dummettian) antirealism. This chapter suggests that the lesson of the paradox concerns the theoretical location at which to impose the antirealist's ‘epistemic’ constraints on truth, i.e., on the ‘central notion’ of the antirealist's meaning theory. In particular, the knowability principle — that every truth is knowable — is not a successful way of capturing the antirealistic insight that truth is epistemically conditioned.
Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch‐Style Reasoning
Authors: Kelp Christoph , Pritchard Duncan 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter looks at one — perhaps the only — theoretical view to which, on the face of it, the knowability principle is of central importance. It then considers two deflationary responses to Fitch's argument on behalf of defenders of this view. A ‘deflationary’ response to the argument refers to a proposal which proceeds by weakening, on a principled basis, one of the principles essentially employed by that argument. The motivation for this strategy is this: ceteris paribus, if one can accommodate the considerations which prompt adoption of a certain principle by advancing a version of that principle which is (perhaps only slightly) logically weaker, then one ought to do so. If one can further show that the Fitch argument is blocked once the weaker ‘deflated’ version of the principle is adopted, then one will have succeeded in offering a deflationary response to the argument. The first deflationary response that we will consider proceeds by weakening the factivity principle for knowledge. It is argued that this strategy does not stand up to closer inspection. Nevertheless, there are good grounds for holding that the second deflationary response considered — which rejects the principle of knowability in favour of a weaker principle — is effective at resolving the problem posed by Fitch's argument.
Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all at once)
Authors: Restall Greg 
Published: September 2010

AbstractAccording to the ‘knowability thesis’, every truth is knowable. Fitch's paradox refutes the knowability thesis by showing that if we are not omniscient, then not only are some truths not known, but there are some truths that are not knowable. This chapter proposes a weakening of the knowability thesis (called the ‘conjunctive knowability thesis’) to the effect that for every truth p there is a collection of truths such that (i) each of them is knowable and (ii) their conjunction is equivalent to p. It shows that the conjunctive knowability thesis avoids triviality arguments against it, and that it fares very differently depending on another thesis connecting knowledge and possibility. If there are two propositions, inconsistent with one another, but both knowable, then the conjunctive knowability thesis is trivially true. On the other hand, if knowability entails truth, the conjunctive knowability thesis is coherent, but only if the logic of possibility is weak.
The Importance and Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms
Authors: Charlier Christopher , Valceschini Egizio 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an attempt to estimate a monetary value for environmental or public health degradation. In a regulatory context, it should be seen as a complementary tool to risk assessment for the purposes of public decision-making. CBA should, therefore, be particularly relevant in the governance of modern biotechnology. GMOs, however, provide a ‘textbook case’ of the complexity which results from any attempt to conduct CBA in relation to innovation, this being a function of their novelty, the ethical concerns which they raise, their economic importance, the danger of potentially irreversible effects on biodiversity, the absence of scientific unanimity in risk assessment, and consumer fear. This chapter underlines the importance of CBA in the regulation of GMOs and highlights the specific difficulties with which such analysis is confronted. It argues that these difficulties should not be considered as a reason to dispense with economic evaluation.
Implementing the Community Environmental Liability Directive: Genetically Modified Organisms and the Problem of Unknown Risk
Authors: Rodgers Christopher 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter assesses the role for environmental liability in the context of the GMOs, with emphasis on the provisions of the Community Environmental Liability Directive. It commences with discussion of the role of liability regimes more generally (adopting Coasean analysis) and compares and contrasts the Environmental Liability Directive with the Lugano Convention. The application of the Environmental Liability Directive is then considered in detail, with particular attention devoted to: the definition of environmental damage, the basis of liability (whether strict or grounded upon fault), the use of the administrative liability model, and risk allocation and insurance. The chapter concludes that the Community regime has serious limitations. Not least, its territorial application is largely restricted to the Natura 2000 network of protected wildlife sites, where GM crop cultivation is in practice unlikely to occur.
Genetically Modified Organisms in MERCOSUR
Authors: Gilli Rosario Silva 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter begins by providing an outline of the process of integration which is currently being undertaken by the members of MERCOSUR, with specific reference to the legal order which governs such integration. As a further preliminary matter, it considers the extent to which the members of MERCOSUR have embraced the GM revolution, with Argentina being revealed as the most enthusiastic. The various national regimes regulating GMOs are then discussed in detail, identifying common characteristics and differences. In all cases national regimes are found to be based upon pre-existing rules governing seeds and crops, although specific regimes are also being developed. However, only in Brazil has a major statute been enacted for the purposes of governing GMOs. More generally, the chapter looks to whether there is a realistic possibility of enacting a harmonized regime for GMOs across all the members of MERCOSUR and, in this context, it identifies recent initiatives.
Genetically Modified Crops and Food in the United States: The Federal Regulatory Framework, State Measures, and Liability in Tort
Authors: Grossman Margaret Rosso 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
GM crops and their products in the United States are regulated the USDA, EPA, and FDA under policy articulated in the 1986 Coordinated Framework — a complex system of laws, regulations, policy statements, and guidance documents governs agency decisions. The Plant Protection Act, the Federal Insecticide, Rodenticide, and Pesticide Act, and the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act are the most important statutes. Coordinated decision-making by the agencies focuses on safety of new GM varieties for agriculture and the environment and for consumption as food and feed. Some states regulate use of GMOs, support GM technology, or impose other requirements. State tort law will resolve claims of damage from GMOs, but few cases have been decided.
The Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms and International Law: A Call for Generality
Authors: French Duncan 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Much has been written on the legal implications of the international regulation of GMOs. This chapter does not reproduce this discussion, but rather considers how general rules of international law, together with more general trends in related legal and policy fields, are likely to prove increasingly apposite in the ongoing debate over how to manage and govern GM activity. In particular, it considers two specific issues: first, the role of treaty interpretation in promoting synergies and reconciling apparently conflicting primary rules; and, secondly, the utility of the concept of sustainable development in determining a balanced framework for the inclusion of socio-economic considerations within GM decision-making processes, as permitted under the Cartagena Protocol. The chapter concludes that an approach which concentrates solely on the regulatory detail will invariably ignore the importance of general international law in regulating such an issue.
Chain of Causes
Authors: Meyer Susan Sauvé 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
As the chain of causes present throughout the cosmos, fate is the instrument by which the Stoic god exerts its providential activity. In fact, the Stoic god is often identified with fate understood as the chain of causes. This chapter focuses on how this chain of causes is to be understood. The metaphor of a chain of causes is often used nowadays by causal theorists. But it is argued that the Stoic usage of this metaphor differs greatly from the modern one. Stoic causes are typically simultaneous with their effects (even the so-called ‘antecedent’ causes are), and causation is not a relation between events, but between bodies. In Stoic theory, causal relations are best construed as the production by a body A of a certain effect on a body B. To take a classic example: the scalpel is cause to the flesh of the effect being cut. This conception of cause is reflected in what the Stoics mean by the chain of causes in terms of which they define fate. It is a complex system of reciprocal influence between all the bodies that exist in the cosmos.
Against Materialism
Authors: BonJour Laurence 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that there are no compelling arguments in favor of, and very powerful, seemingly unanswerable objections to, materialism in the philosophy of mind. The arguments for materialism that appeal to (a) the ‘principle’ of causal closure and (b) the doctrine of naturalism are argued to rest entirely on undefended assumptions. The central objection that materialist views fail to offer any account of conscious states that explains their experienced character is then developed with reference to both the familiar problem of qualitative content (using Frank Jackson's example of Mary, the color-experience-deprived neurophysiologist) and the problem of conscious intentional content. It is argued that none of the available responses to the Mary example are successful; and further that an entirely parallel argument can be made about conscious intentional content. The negative conclusion is that materialist views are false, but that no positive account of conscious content is presently available.
A Simple View of Consciousness
Authors: Pautz Adam 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues for primitivism about sensory consciousness. On primitivism, sensory consciousness cannot be fully reductively explained in physical or functional terms. The chapter's arguement for primitivism is not based on the usual a priori considerations, for instance the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap, or the thesis of revelation. Instead, the argument is based on a philosophical claim about the structure of consciousness together with an empirical claim about its physical basis.
Saving Appearances: A Dilemma for Physicalists
Authors: Siewert Charles 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter takes as its target ‘ambitious physicalism’: an approach that aims to provide an explanatory reduction of consciousness to a physical and functional base. The chapter uses a range of cases involving the phenomenon of ‘blindsight’ to argue for the reality of phenomenal appearances of such a kind that cannot be accounted for by the standard physicalist theories, whether eliminativist, functionalist, or representationalist. It argues that the physicalist faces a dilemma: either denying the reality of phenomenal appearances by trying to identify those appearances with something manifest and describable in non-phenomenal terms, or facing an unavoidable arbitrariness in deciding which hidden features should be assigned metaphysically necessary and constitutive status with respect to conscious phenomena. The chapter argues that the cost of abandoning ambitious, reductive physicalism is not high, since we can still study the systematic relations between phenomenal appearances and physical conditions. The persistent failure to find an ultimate explanation of the real ‘nature’ of consciousness does not threaten the explanatory completeness of science.
Epistemological Objections to Materialism
Authors: Koons Robert C. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that materialism is vulnerable to two kinds of epistemological objections: transcendental arguments, that show that materialism is incompatible with the very possibility of knowledge; and defeater arguments, that show that belief in materialism provides an effective defeaters to claims to knowledge. It constructs objections of these two kinds in three areas of epistemology: our knowledge of the laws of nature (and of scientific essences), our knowledge of the ontology of material objects, mathematical and logical knowledge. The chapter argues that these epistemological weaknesses place the materialist in a dialectically weak position in respect of ontological identity claims, since the materialist cannot know the causal powers or persistence conditions of material objects. It also argues that the materialist can provide no non-circular account of epistemic normativity. Anti-realist accounts of normativity are unavailable because normativity is already implicated in all intentionality. Moreover, materialists face a fatal dilemma in attempting to carry out an etiological reduction of teleological norms, since neither Humean nor anti-Humean accounts of causation yield defensible results.
Dualizing Materialism
Authors: Jubien Michael 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter suggests that if we take materialism simply to be the doctrine that human beings are entirely material entities, then a certain version of ‘property dualism’ is fully compatible with materialism and is indeed the most plausible account of the mental available. The latter claim is supported in part by an argument exploiting Jaegwon Kim's well-known conception of events as objects having properties at times. The argument concludes that ‘token-token’ identity theories are actually committed to ‘type-type’ identities. It is then argued from the perspective of conceptual analysis and linguistic competence that the relevant type identities are straightforwardly false. This argument is contrasted with familiar arguments from intentionality and conceivability and is held to be more fundamental. Arguments from obscurity and from mental causation against property dualism are addressed. Finally, it is suggested (following Russell) that causation is essentially a ‘folk’ concept playing no real role in the hard sciences, whose fundamental goal is instead the discovery of law-like connections between properties of material objects. When intuitively ‘mental’ properties are ultimately connected in law-like ways with intuitively ‘physical’ properties, the upshot will be a broadening of our conception of physical properties so that they will include those we may now consider intuitively to be mental in a sense incompatible with being physical. Thus, the dualism of property dualism would merely amount to a difference between types of physical properties.
Soul, Mind, and Brain
Authors: Leftow Brian 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter adumbrates a Thomistic, non-Cartesian version of dualism, defending the Thomistic theory from the familiar charge of inconsistency by showing how it is possible to assert simultaneously that the human being is a single, unitary substance, that the soul is the ‘form’ of the human body, and yet that the soul can exist without the body by virtue of being an immaterial particular. It demonstrates that a Thomistic ‘form’ need not be a mere state of a thing, like a shape: it may also be an immaterial particular, present in every part of a substance, that causes it be in a certain state (such as that of being alive). Aquinas's view of the embodied souls avoids being dualistic by denying that the human body is a separable substance in its own right. What combines with the soul to produce a substantial human thing is not one thing but a plurality. Moreover, the chapter explains that Aquinas's claim that human thought has no bodily ‘organ’ does not entail the natural independence of our cognitive functions from the physical condition of the brain. It does, however, imply that mental content cannot be fully and determinately encoded in the brain's physical condition. Finally, the chapter clarifies the sense in which the disembodied soul is not for Aquinas (unlike Descartes) a substance.
7 The United Kingdom and the Human Rights Act (1998)
Authors: Erdos David 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter examines the socio‐politics of bill of rights debates and outcomes in the United Kingdom including, in particular, the origins of the Human Rights Act (HRA) (1998). Following a brief chronological overview, the first part of the chapter explores the forces which have fuelled the gradually increased background pressures for a bill of rights. Since the 1960s, a postmaterialist rights lobby of civil libertarians and social equality seekers not only emerged politically but came to advocate for a bill of rights. The United Kingdom's participation in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) also encouraged and shaped the domestic formalization of rights, particularly as instantiated in the HRA. The second part of the chapter explores the much more sporadic nature of elite political interest in a bill of rights. Focusing on the genesis of the HRA, it argues that this was politically triggered by Labour and the left's ‘aversive’ reaction against the perceived authoritarianism of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative Administration. The chapter closes with a brief consideration of the prospects of a fully indigenous British bill of rights designed either to complement or replace the HRA.
2 Naked Life; Arendt and the Exile at Colonus
Authors: Sjöholm Cecilia 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
The philosophical readings of Sophocles, from Hegel to Irigaray, have largely stuck to the tragedies as isolated plots, looking at Antigone or King Oedipus in their own right. Oedipus at Colonus, in turn, has rarely been made the object of a philosophical reading. And yet it presents to us a figure of high political significance: the refugee. What happens when we read Antigone with Oedipus at Colonus? As this chapter will argue, such a reading may well alter our view of Antigone from the way her character has been interpreted in the philosophical tradition, displacing the issues from being concerned with Antigone as a symbol of a feminine position in society, to placing the tragedy in relation to the question of the refugee. If we are to perform such a reading, we may resort to the work of Giorgio Agamben, and in particular, Hannah Arendt. Arendt does not perform a reading of Antigone, but as this chapter argues, Arendt's philosophy of the polis and of public space on the one hand, and her ideas on the position of the refugee, indicates a way of rereading Antigone with the latter work by Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus. Such a rereading points to an intrinsic relation between the notion of public space, and the question of ‘bare life’, a concept forwarded by Giorgio Agamben (inspired by Arendt). The characters of Antigone and Oedipus appear to unravel the exception and the foreclosure of the refugee in relation to political space. Rereading Antigone and Oedipus at Colonus through the philosophy of Arendt, we find that the tragedies are concerned with the emergence of a political community, and the laws conditioning the space of such a community. It may be the very exception of the refugee which, in the end, will serve to enforce the validity of such a space.
3 Biopolitics: Antigone's Claim
Authors: Žukauskaitė Audronė 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
The Lacanian philosopher Slavoj Žižek interprets Antigone as a figure driven by some pathological desire, being attached to the Other (Polyneices) without the mediation of symbolic rules and laws. In this sense, Antigone's decision to bury her brother is seen as an authoritarian or even totalitarian act. On the other hand, the same gesture, which is seen as pathological, can also be interpreted as an ethical act par excellence: Antigone's transgression is an ethical act, which intervenes into social reality and changes the very coordinates of what is perceived to be possible. These coordinates, it is argued, can't be explained either in terms of kinship, or in terms of the unconscious. The very idea of transgression acquires meaning only in a more general framework of the analysis of power relationships. But what kind of power relationships could we have in mind and what is Antigone's position in it? The Chorus describes Antigone as ‘inhuman’ and it is necessary to decide how to interpret this ‘inhumanness’. Lacan points out that inhuman ‘literally means something uncivilized, something raw’. It is precisely this ‘raw flesh’, this ‘inhumanness’, on which the chapter's interpretation is focused. Two thinkers, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, are very important in order to reconsider this ‘rawness’ of Antigone not as an insignificant feature, but, probably, as the main conflict of the tragedy. This ‘rawness’ or biological life of man, which Foucault made the main object of his research, appears to be not the ‘natural condition’ of human life, but a result of power relations. Agamben develops Foucault's ideas further, establishing a clear connection between what he calls ‘bare life’ and modern state power. The question, asked in the chapter, is this: are these theories of sovereign power relevant in interpreting the Sophoclean play? Can it be presupposed that the limit, for which Antigone stands, is ‘the trace of an alternate legality that haunts the conscious, public sphere as its scandalous future’ and that comes into existence in modern times?