bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Is the lifetime of light-stimulated cGMP phosphodiesterase regulated by recoverin through its regulation of rhodopsin phosphorylation?
Authors: Yamazaki Akio 
Published: February 2010

AbstractIn the current model of visual transduction, the lifetime of active cGMP phosphodiesterase depends upon the period of its interaction with GTP-bound transducin. If recoverin regulates the lifetime of light-activated cGMP phosphodiesterase through inhibition of rhodopsin phosphorylation, rhodopsin should directly interact with cGMP phosphodiesterase and/or GTP-bound transducin complexed with cGMP phosphodiesterase. Is this true?
How many light adaptation mechanisms are there?
Authors: Bownds M. Deric , Arshavsky Vadim Y. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe generally positive response to our target article indicates that most of the commentators accept our contention that light adaptation consists of multiple and possibly redundant mechanisms. The commentaries fall into three general categories. The first deals with putative mechanisms that we chose not to emphasize. The second is a more extended discussion of the role of calcium in adaptation. Finally, additional aspects of cGMP involvement in adaptation are considered. We discuss each of these points in turn.
Recoverin, a calcium-binding protein in photoreceptors
Authors: Hurley James B. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractRecoverin is a Ca2+-binding protein found primarily in vertebrate photoreceptors. The proposed physiological function of recoverin is based on the finding that recoverin inhibits light-stimulated phosphorylation of rhodopsin. Recoverin interacts with rod outer segment membranes in a Ca2+-dependent manner. This interaction requires N-terminal acylation of recoverin. Four types of fatty acids have been detected on the N-terminus of recoverin, but the functional significance of this heterogeneous acylation is not yet clear.
Testing Mealey's model: The need to demonstrate an ESS and to establish the role of testosterone
Authors: Archer John 
Published: February 2010

AbstractTwo specific aspects of Mealey's model are questioned: (1) the application of the concept of Evolutionarily Stable Strategy to all alternative strategies, including those that involve reduced lifetime reproductive success; and (2) the evidence for the dual role of testosterone, which is based mainly on studies of a modulating effect on aggression.
Group differences ≢ individual differences
Authors: Bergeman C. S. , Seroczynski A. D. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractMealey's etiological distinction between primary and secondary sociopathy blurs the delineation between individual and group differences. She uses physiological evidence to support her claim of genetic influences, neglecting variability within social classes, frequency of delinquent behavior in upper and middle classes (measured by self-report), and discontinuity of criminal behavior across the life span. Finally, Mealey's proposals for differential intervention fall short of a future agenda, which should tailor to individual needs, not social classes.
The role of emotion in sociopathy: Contradictions and unanswered questions
Authors: Eisenberg Nancy 
Published: February 2010

AbstractEmotion is critical in Mealey's conceptual arguments. However, several of her assertions about the role of emotion in sociopathy are problematic. Questions are raised regarding the link between lack of anxiety and low levels of secondary emotions such as love and sympathy, the argument that sociopaths are low in anxiety but high in neuroticism, and the designation of anxiety as a secondary emotion.
The epigenesis of sociopathy
Authors: Figueredo Aurelio José 
Published: February 2010

AbstractMealey distinguishes two types of sociopathy: (1) “primary,” or obligate, and (2) “secondary,” or facultative. Either sociopathy evolved twice, or one form is derived from the other, e.g., through: (1) genetic assimilation generating polymorphism in the relative strength of biases favoring the development of otherwise facultative strategies, or (2) independently heritable but strategically relevant characteristics biasing the optimal selection of facultative strategies.
Implications of an evolutionary biopsychosocial model
Authors: Holcomb Harmon R. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractMealey's work has several interesting implications: It refutes the charge that sociobiology paints a cynical portrait of human nature and adopts a one-sided reductionism; it exemplifies a general theoretical scheme for constructing evolutionary biopsychosocial models of human behavior; and it has the practical effect of promoting and informing early intervention in children at risk for psychopathic disorder.
Al Capone, discrete morphs, and complex dynamic systems
Authors: Kenrick Douglas T. , Brown Stephanie 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWe consider four mechanisms by which apparent discontinuities in the distribution of antisociality could arise: (1) executive genes or hormonal systems, (2) multiplicative interactions of predisposing factors, (3) environmental tracking into a limited number of social roles, and (4) cross-generational gene—environment interactions. A more explicit consideration of complex self-organizing dynamic systems may help us understand the maintenance of antisocial subpopulations.
“Genetics” and DNA polymorphisms
Authors: Plomin Robert 
Published: February 2010

AbstractFour questions are raised about Mealey's genetic argument: (1) Where is the evidence that secondary sociopathy is less heritable than primary sociopathy? (2) What is the genetic correlation between the two types of sociopathy? (3) How does genotype-environment interaction relate? (4) How strong are the links between our evolutionary past and current heritability?
Emotions and sociopathy
Authors: Plutchik Robert 
Published: February 2010

AbstractQuestions are raised about several issues discussed by Mealey: (1) the nature of the distinction between primary and secondary sociopaths, (2) some difficulties with a general arousal theory of criminality, and (3) the possible role of countervailing forces in the development of sociopathy. An important area that calls for attention is the patterning of different specific emotions in the lives of sociopaths as compared to other groups.
Psychopathy is a nonarbitrary class
Authors: Quinsey Vernon L. , Lalumière Martin L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractRecent evidence that psychopathy is a nonarbitrary population, such that the trait may be categorical rather than continuous, is consistent with Mealey's distinction between primary and secondary psychopaths. Thus, there are likely to be at least two routes to criminality, and psychopathic and nonpsychopathic criminals are likely to respond differently to interventions.
Psychopathy and violence: Arousal, temperament, birth complications, maternal rejection, and prefrontal dysfunction
Authors: Raine Adrian 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe key questions arising from Mealey's analysis are: Do environmental factors such as early maternal rejection also contribute to the emotional deficits observed in psychopaths? Are there psychophysiological protective factors for antisocial behavior that have clinical implications? Does a disinhibited temperament and low arousal predispose to primary psychopathy? Would primary or secondary psychopaths be most characterized by prefrontal dysfunction?
Primary sociopathy (psychopathy) is a type, secondary is not
Authors: Mealey Linda 
Published: February 2010

AbstractRecent studies lend support to the two-pathway model of the evolution of sociopathy with evidence that: 1) psychopathy (primary sociopathy) is a discrete type and 2) in general, sociopaths have relatively high levels of reproductive success. Hare's Psychopathy Checklist may provide a start for the revision of terminology that will be necessary to distinguish between primary and secondary trajectories.
The ontology of aspectual shape
Authors: Kurthen Martin , Linke Detlef B. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractSearle (1990) argues that unconscious intrinsic intentional states must be accessible to consciousness because (1) all intrinsic intentional states have aspectual shape, the “ontology” of which cannot be explained in a third-person (e.g., neurophysiological) vocabulary, and (2) ontologically, unconscious mental states are neurophysiological processes. This argument confuses three senses of “ontology,” namely, factuality, individuative properties, and phenomenological presence.
Where the adventure is
Authors: Bienenstock Elie , Geman Stuart 
Published: February 2010

AbstractInterpreting the Miyashita et al. experiments in terms of a cellassembly representation does not adequately explain the performance of Miyashita's monkeys on novel stimuli. We will argue that the latter observations point to acompositionalrepresentation and suggest a dynamics involving rapid and reversible binding of distinct activity patterns.
Reverberation reconsidered: On the path to cognitive theory
Authors: Chown Eric 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAmit's work addresses a critical issue in cognitive science: the structure of neural representations. The use of Hebbian cell assemblies is a positive step, and we now need to consider its role in a larger cognitive theory. When considering the dynamics of a system built out of attractors, a more limited version of reverberation becomes necessary.
Mathematics of Hebbian attractors
Authors: Hirsch Morris W. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe concept of an attractor in a mathematical dynamical system is reviewed. Emphasis is placed on the distinction between a cell assembly, the corresponding attractor, and the attractor dynamics. The biological significance of these entities is discussed, especially the question of whether the representation of the stimulus requires the full attractor dynamics, or merely the cell assembly as a set of reverberating neurons. Comparison is made to Freeman's study of dynamic patterns in olfaction.
Distributed cell assemblies and detailed cell models
Authors: Lansner Anders , Fransén Erik 
Published: February 2010

AbstractHebbian cell-assembly theory and attractor networks are good starting points for modeling cortical processing. Detailed cell models can be useful in understanding the dynamics of attractor networks. Cell assemblies are likely to be distributed, with the cortical column as the local processing unit. Synaptic memory may be dominant in all but the first couple of seconds.
How do local reverberations achieve global integration?
Authors: Wright J. J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAmit's Hebbian model risks being overexplanatory, since it does not depend on specific physiological modelling of cortical ANNs, but concentrates on those phenomena which are modelled by a large class of ANNs. While offering a strong demonstration of the presence of Hebb's “cell assemblies,” it does not offer an equal account of Hebb's “phase sequence” concept.
Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia
Authors: Crider Andrew 
Published: February 2010

AbstractSegmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia reflects a loss of the normal Gestalt organization and contextualization of perception. Grays model explains such segmentalization in terms of septohippocampal dysfunction, which is consistent with known neuropsychological impairment in schizophrenia. However, other considerations suggest that everyday perception and its failure in schizophrenia also involve prefrontal executive mechanisms, which are only minimally elaborated by Gray.
Hunting for consciousness in the brain: What is (the name of) the game?
Authors: Díaz José-Luis 
Published: February 2010

AbstractRobust theories concerning the connection between consciousness and brain function should derive not only from empirical evidence but also from a well grounded inind-body ontology. In the case of the comparator hypothesis, Gray develops his ideas relying extensively on empirical evidence, but he bounces irresolutely among logically incompatible metaphysical theses which, in turn, leads him to excessively skeptical conclusions concerning the naturalization of consciousness.
On seeking the mythical fountain of consciousness
Authors: Foss Jeffrey 
Published: February 2010

AbstractBecause consciousness has an organizational, or functional, center, Gray supposes that there must be a corresponding physical center in the brain. He proposes further that since this center generates consciousness, ablating it would eliminate consciousness, while leaving behavior intact. But the center of consciousness is simply the product of the functional linkages among sensory input, memory, inner speech, and so on, and behavior.
Psychopathology and the discontinuity of conscious experience
Authors: Hemsley David R. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractIt is accepted that “primary awareness” may emerge from the integration of two classes of information. It is unclear, however, why this cannot take place within the comparator rather than in conjunction with feedback to the perceptual systems. The model has plausibility in relation to the continuity of conscious experience in the normal waking state and may be extended to encompass certain aspects of the “sense of self” which are frequently disrupted in psychotic patients.
Mind – your head!
Authors: Ingvaldsen R. P. , Whiting H. T. A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractGray takes an information-processing paradigm as his departure point, invoking a comparator as part of the system. He concludes that consciousness is to be found “in” the comparator but is unable to point to how the comparison takes place. Thus, the comparator turns out not to be an entity arising out of brain research per se, but out of the logic of the paradigm. In this way, Gray both reinvents dualism and remains trapped in the language game of his own model – ending up dealing with the unknowable.
The homunculus at home
Authors: Smith J. David 
Published: February 2010

AbstractIn Gray's conjecture, mismatches in the subicular comparator (needing problem resolution) and matches (during appetitive approach) have equal prominence in consciousness. In rival cognitive views novelty and difficulty (i.e., information-processing mismatches) especially elicit more conscious modes of cognition and higher levels of self-regulation. The mismatch between Gray's conjecture and these views is discussed.
Don't leave the “un” off “consciousness”
Authors: Swerdlow Neal R. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractGray extrapolates from circuit models of psychopathology to propose neural substrates for the contents of consciousness. I raise three concerns: (1) knowledge of synaptic arrangements may be inadequate to fully support his model; (2) latent inhibition deficits in schizophrenia, a focus of this and related models, are complex and deserve replication; and (3) this conjecture omits discussion of the neuropsychological basis for the contents of the unconscious.
A few reasons why psychologlsts can adhere to Feldman and Levin's model
Authors: Bonnard Mireille , Pailhous Jean 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWe emphasize the relevance to cognitive psychology of Feldman and Levin's theoretical position. Traditional views of motor control have failed to clearly separate “production control” at the level of motor command, based on task-independent CV (control variables), from intentional “product control” based on task-dependent parameters. Because F&L's approach concentrates on the first process (trajectory formation), it can distinguish the product control stage.
Conservative or nonconservative control schemes
Authors: Corcos Daniel M. , Pfann Kerstin 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe conservative strategy proposed by the authors suggests a solution of the degrees-of-freedom problem of the controller. However, several simple motor control tasks cannot be explained by this strategy. A nonconservative strategy, in which more parameters of the control signal vary, can account for these simple motor tasks. However, the simplicity that distinguishes the proposed model from many others is lost.
Reciprocal and coactivation commands are not sufficient to describe muscle activation patterns
Authors: Gielen C. C. A. M. , van Bolhuis B. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractRecent results have shown that the relative activation of muscles is different for isometric contractions and for movements. These results exclude an explanation of muscle activation patterns by a combination ofreciprocal and coactivation commands. These results also indicate that joint stiffness is not uniquely determined and that it may be different for isometric contractions and movements.
Inverse kinematic problem: Solutions by pseudoinversion, inversion and no-inversion
Authors: Goodman Simon R. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractKinematic properties of reaching movements reflect constraints imposed on the joint angles. Contemporary models present solutions to the redundancy problem by a pseudoinverse procedure (Whitney 1969) or without any inversion (Berkenblit et al. 1986). Feldman & Levin suggest a procedure based on a regular inversion. These procedures are considered as an outcome of a more general approach.
Equilibrium-point control? Yes! Deterministic mechanisms of control? No!
Authors: Latash Mark L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe equilibrium-point hypothesis (the λ-model) is superior to all other models of single-joint control and provides deep insights into the mechanisms of control of multi-joint movements. Attempts at associating control variables with neurophysiological variables look confusing rather than promising. Probabilistic mechanisms may play an important role in movement generation in redundant systems.
What does body configuration in microgravity tell us about the contribution of intra- and extrapersonal frames of reference for motor control?
Authors: Lestienne F. , Ghafouri M. , Thullier F. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe authors report that the reorganization of body configuration during weightlessness is based on an intrapersonal frame of reference such as the configuration of the support surface and the position of the body's center of gravity. These results stress the importance of “knowledge” of the state of internal geometric structures, which cannot be directly signalled by specific receptors responsible for direct dialogue with the physical external world.
Command invariants and the frame of reference for human movement
Authors: Ostry David J. , Laboissière Rafael , Gribble Paul L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWe describe a solution to the redundancy problem related to that proposed in Feldman & Levin's target article. We suggest that the system may use a fixed mapping between commands organized at the level of degrees of freedom and commands to individual muscles. This proposal eliminates the need to maintain an explicit representation of musculoskeletalgeometry in planning movements.
Interneurons as backseat drivers and the elusive control variable
Authors: Nichols T. Richard 
Published: February 2010

AbstractIt is proposed here that the spinal network of proprioceptive feedback from length and force receptors constitutes the mechanism underlying the coordination of activation thresholds for muscles acting about the same and neighboring joints. For the most part, these circuits come between motoneurons and supraspinal signals, invalidating the idea that the activation thresholds constitute control variables for the motor system.
Two joints are more than twice one joint
Authors: Smeets Jeroen B. J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAn alternative multi-joint extension to the lambda model is proposed. According to this extension, the activity of a muscle depends not only on the difference between lambda and length of that muscle, but also on the difference between lambda and length of other muscles. This 2-D extension can describe more neurophysiological experiments than the extension proposed in the target article.
Control parameters, equilibria, and coordination dynamics
Authors: Sternad Dagmar , Turvey M. T. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractImportant similarities exist between the dynamical concepts implicit in Feldman & Levin's extended λ model and those basic to a dynamical systems approach. We argue that careful application of the key concepts of control and order parameters, equilibria, and stability, can relate known facts of neuromuscular processes to the observables of functional, task-specific behavior.
Origins of origins of motor control
Authors: Thelen Esther 
Published: February 2010

AbstractExamination of infant spontaneous and goal-directed arm movements supports Feldman and Levin's hypothesis of a functional hierarchy. Early infant movements are dominated by biomechanical and dynamic factors without external frames of reference. Development involves not only learning to generate these frames of reference, but also protecting the higher-level goal of the movement from internal and external perturbations.
Biological variability and control of movements via δλ
Authors: Wright Charles E. , States Rebecca A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThree issues related to Feldman and Levin's treatment of biological variability are discussed. We question the usefulness of the indirect component of δλ. We suggest that trade-offs between speed and accuracy in aimed movements support identification of δλ, rather than λ, as a control variable. We take issue with the authors' proposal for resolving redundancy in multi-joint movements, given recent data.
The base rate fallacy reconsidered: Descriptive, normative, and methodological challenges
Authors: Koehler Jonathan J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWe have been oversold on the base rate fallacy in probabilistic judgment from an empirical, normative, and methodological standpoint. At the empirical level, a thorough examination of the base rate literature (including the famous lawyer–engineer problem) does not support the conventional wisdom that people routinely ignore base rates. Quite the contrary, the literature shows that base rates are almost always used and that their degree of use depends on task structure and representation. Specifically, base rates play a relatively larger role in tasks where base rates are implicitly learned or can be represented in frequentist terms. Base rates are also used more when they are reliable and relatively more diagnostic than available individuating information. At the normative level, the base rate fallacy should be rejected because few tasks map unambiguously into the narrow framework that is held up as the standard of good decision making. Mechanical applications of Bayes's theorem to identify performance errors are inappropriate when (1) key assumptions of the model are either unchecked or grossly violated, and (2) no attempt is made to identify the decision maker's goals, values, and task assumptions. Methodologically, the current approach is criticized for its failure to consider how the ambiguous, unreliable, and unstable base rates of the real world are and should be used. Where decision makers' assumptions and goals vary, and where performance criteria are complex, the traditional Bayesian standard is insufficient. Even where predictive accuracy is the goal in commonly defined problems, there may be situations (e.g., informationally redundant environments) in which base rates can be ignored with impunity. A more ecologically valid research program is called for. This program should emphasize the development of prescriptive theory in rich, realistic decision environments.
The implications of Koehler's approach for fact finding
Authors: Callen Craig R. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractKoehler's work will assist the effort to understand legal fact finding. It leaves two questions somewhat open: (i) the extent to which empirical research can measure correctness of fact-finding, a function that involves the resolution of normative questions and (ii) the standards judges should use in the absence of the research he advocates.