bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The evolutionary psychology of men's coercive sexuality
Authors: Thornhill Randy , Thornhill Nancy Wilmsen 
Published: May 2011

AbstractPsychological adaptation underlies all human behavior. Thus, sexual coercion by men could either arise from a rape-specific psychological adaptation or it could be a side-effect of a more general psychological adaptation not directly related to rape. Determining the specific environmental cues that men's brains have been designed by selection to process may help us decide which these rival explanations is correct. We examine six testable predictions against existing data: (1) Both coercive and noncoercive will be associated with high levels of sexual arousal and performance in men. (2) Achieving physical control of a sexually unwilling woman will be sexually arousing to men. (3) Young men will be more sexually coercive than older men. (4) Men of low socioeconomic status will likewise be more sexually coercive. (5) A man's motivation to use sexual coercion will be influenced by its effects on social image. (6) Even in long-term relationships men will be motivated to use coercion when their mates show a lack of interest in resistance to sex because these are interpreted as signs of sexual infidelity. Current data support all six predictions and are hence consistent with the rape-specific hypothesis, but this does not eliminate the side-effect hypothesis, which is likewise compatible with the findings, as well as with the further evidence that forced matings increased the fitness of ancestral males during human evolution. We suggest some research that may help decide between the two hypotheses.
The nature of nurture: Genetic influence on “environmental” measures
Authors: Plomin Robert , Bergeman C. S. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractEvidence for genetic influence on environmental measures will emerge in quantitative genetic analyses if genetically influenced characteristics of individuals are assessed by these environmental measures. Recent twin and adoption studies indicate substantial genetic influence when measures of the environment are treated as phenotypes in genetic analyses. Genetic influence has been documented for measures as diverse as videotaped observations of parental behavior toward their children, ratings by parents and children of their family environment, and ratings of peer groups, social support, and life events. Evidence for genetic influence on environmental measures includes some of the most widely used measures of environment – the Home Observation for Measurement of the Environment, the Family Environment Scales, and the Social Readjustment Rating Scale of life events, for example. The goal of this article is to document and discuss these findings and to elicit commentary that might help to shape the course of research on this topic, which has far-reaching implications for the behavioral and brain sciences.
Précis of From neuropsychology to mental structure
Authors: Shallice Tim 
Published: May 2011

AbstractNeuropsychological results are increasingly cited in cognitive theories although their methodology has been severely criticised. The book argues for an eclectic approach but particularly stresses the use of single-case studies. A range of potential artifacts exists when inferences are made from such studies to the organisation of normal function – for example, resource differences among tasks, premorbid individual differences, and reorganisation of function. The use of “strong” and “classical” dissociations minimises potential artifacts. The theoretical convergence between findings from fields where cognitive neuropsychology is well developed and those from the normal literature strongly suggests that the potential artifacts are not critical. The fields examined in detail in this respect are short-term memory, reading, writing, the organisation of input and output speech systems, and visual perception. Functional dissociation data suggest that not only are input systems organised modularly, but so are central systems. This conclusion is supported by findings on impairment of knowledge, visual attention, supervisory functions, memory, and consciousness.
Is human cognition adaptive?
Authors: Anderson John R. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractCan the output of human cognition be predicted from the assumption that it is an optimal response to the information-processing demands of the environment? A methodology called rational analysis is described for deriving predictions about cognitive phenomena using optimization assumptions. The predictions flow from the statistical structure of the environment and not the assumed structure of the mind. Bayesian inference is used, assuming that people start with a weak prior model of the world which they integrate with experience to develop stronger models of specific aspects of the world. Cognitive performance maximizes the difference between the expected gain and cost of mental effort. (1) Memory performance can be predicted on the assumption that retrieval seeks a maximal trade-off between the probability of finding the relevant memories and the effort required to do so; in (2) categorization performance there is a similar trade-off between accuracy in predicting object features and the cost of hypothesis formation; in (3) casual inference the trade-off is between accuracy in predicting future events and the cost of hypothesis formation; and in (4) problem solving it is between the probability of achieving goals and the cost of both external and mental problem-solving search. The implemention of these rational prescriptions in neurally plausible architecture is also discussed.
Language acquisition in the absence of experience
Authors: Crain Stephen 
Published: May 2011

AbstractA fundamental goal of linguistic theory is to explain how natural languages are acquired. This paper describes some recent findings on how learners acquire syntactic knowledge for which there is little, if any, decisive evidence from the environment. The first section presents several general observations about language acquisition that linguistic theory has tried to explain and discusses the thesis that certain linguistic properties are innate because they appear universally and in the absence of corresponding experience. A third diagnostic for innateness, early emergence, is the focus of the second section of the paper, in which linguistic theory is tested against recent experimental evidence on children's acquisition of syntax.
Is human information processing conscious?
Authors: Velmans Max 
Published: May 2011

AbstractInvestigations of the function of consciousness in human information processing have focused mainly on two questions: (1) Where does consciousness enter into the information processing sequence, and (2) how does conscious processing differ from preconscious and unconscious processing? Input analysis is thought to be initially “preconscious” and “pre-attentive” - fast, involuntary, and automatic. This is followed by “conscious,” “focal-attentive” analysis, which is relatively slow, voluntary, and flexible. It is thought that simple, familiar stimuli can be identified preconsciously, but conscious processing is needed to identify complex, novel stimuli. Conscious processing has also been thought to be necessary for choice, learning and memory, and the organization of complex, novel responses, particularly those requiring planning, reflection, or creativity.The present target article reviews evidence that consciousness performs none of these functions. Consciousness nearly alwaysresultsfrom focal-attentive processing (as a form of output) but does not itselfenter intothis or any other form of human information processing. This suggests that the term “conscious process” needs reexamination. Consciousnessappearsto be necessary in a variety of tasks because they require focal-attentive processing; if consciousness is absent, focal-attentive processing is absent. From afirst-person perspective, however, conscious statesarecausally effective. First-person accounts arecomplementaryto third-person accounts. Although they can be translated into third-person accounts, they cannot be reduced to them.
From an animal's point of view: Motivation, fitness, and animal welfare
Authors: Dawkins Marian Stamp 
Published: May 2011

AbstractTo study animal welfare empirically we need an objective basis for deciding when an animal is suffering. Suffering includes a wide range ofunpleasant emotional states such as fear, boredom, pain, and hunger. Suffering has evolved as a mechanism for avoiding sources ofdanger and threats to fitness. Captive animals often suffer in situations in which they are prevented from doing something that they are highly motivated to do. The “price” an animal is prepared to pay to attain or to escape a situation is an index ofhow the animal “feels” about that situation. Withholding conditions or commodities for which an animal shows “inelastic demand” (i.e., for which it continues to work despite increasing costs) is very likely to cause suffering. In designing environments for animals in zoos, farms, and laboratories, priority should be given to features for which animals show inelastic demand. The care ofanimals can thereby be based on an objective, animal-centered assessment of their needs.
Are species intelligent?
Authors: Schull Jonathan 
Published: May 2011

AbstractPlant and animal species are information-processing entities of such complexity, integration, and adaptive competence that it may be scientifically fruitful to consider them intelligent. The possibility arises from the analogy between learning (in organisms) and evolution (in species), and from recent developments in evolutionary science, psychology and cognitive science. Species are now described as spatiotemporally localized individuals in an expanded hierarchy of biological entities. Intentional and cognitive abilities are now ascribed to animal, human, and artificial intelligence systems that process information adaptively, and that manifest problem-solving abilities. The structural and functional similarities between such systems and species are extensive, although they “are usually obscured by population-genetic metaphors that have nonetheless contributed much to our understanding of evolution.In this target article, I use Sewall Wright's notion of the “adaptive landscape” to compare the performances of evolving species to those of intelligent organisms. With regard to their adaptive achievements and the kinds of processes by which they are achieved, biological species compare very favorably to intelligent animals by virtue of interactions between populations and their environments, between ontogeny and phylogeny, and between natural, interdemic, organic, and species selection. Addressing the question of whether species are intelligent could help to refine our ideas about species, evolution, and intelligence, and could open new lines of empirical and theoretical inquiry in many disciplines.
Insensitivity of the analysis of variance to heredity-environment interaction
Authors: Wahlsten Douglas 
Published: May 2011

AbstractIt makes sense to attribute a definite percentage of variation in some measure of behavior to variation in heredity only if the effects of heredity and environment are truly additive. Additivity is often tested by examining the interaction effect in a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) or its equivalent multiple regression model. If this effect is not statistically significant at the α = 0.05 level, it is common practice in certain fields (e.g., human behavior genetics) to conclude that the two factors really are additive and then to use linear models, which assume additivity. Comparing several simple models of nonadditive, interactive relationships between heredity and environment, however, reveals that ANOVA often fails to detect nonadditivity because it has much less power in tests of interaction than in tests of main effects. Likewise, the sample sizes needed to detect real interactions are substantially greater than those needed to detect main effects. Data transformations that reduce interaction effects also change drastically the properties ofthe causal model and may conceal theoretically interesting and practically useful relationships. If the goal ofpartitioning variance among mutually exclusive causes and calculating “heritability” coefficients is abandoned, interactive relationships can be examined more seriously and can enhance our understanding of the ways living things develop.
The role of attention in auditory information processing as revealed by event-related potentials and other brain measures of cognitive function
Authors: Näätänen Risto 
Published: May 2011

AbstractThis article examines the role of attention and automaticity in auditory processing as revealed by event-related potential (ERP) research. An ERP component called themismatch negativity, generated by the brain's automatic response to changes in repetitive auditory input, reveals that physical features of auditory stimuli are fully processed whether or not they are attended. It also suggests that there exist precise neuronal representations of the physical features of recent auditory stimuli, perhaps the traces underlying acoustic sensory (“echoic”) memory. A mechanism of passive attention switching in response to changes in repetitive input is also implicated.Conscious perception of discrete acoustic stimuli might be mediated by some of the mechanisms underlying another ERP component (NI), one sensitive to stimulus onset and offset. Frequent passive attentional shifts might accountforthe effect cognitive psychologists describe as “the breakthrough of the unattended” (Broadbent 1982), that is, that even unattended stimuli may be semantically processed, without assuming automatic semantic processing or late selection in selective attention.Theprocessing negativitysupports the early-selection theory and may arise from a mechanism for selectively attending to stimuli defined by certain features. This stimulus selection occurs in the form ofa matching process in which each input is compared with the “attentional trace,” a voluntarily maintained representation of the task-relevant features of the stimulus to be attended. The attentional mechanism described might underlie the stimulus-set mode of attention proposed by Broadbent. Finally, a model of automatic and attentional processing in audition is proposed that is based mainly on the aforementioned ERP components and some other physiological measures.
Brain evolution inHomo:The “radiator” theory
Authors: Falk Dean 
Published: May 2011

AbstractThe “radiator” theory of brain evolution is proposed to account for “mosaic evolution” whereby brain size began to increase rapidly in the genusHomowell over a million yearsafterbipedalism had been selected for in early hominids. Because hydrostatic pressures differ across columns of fluid depending on orientation (posture), vascular systems of early bipeds became reoriented so that cranial blood flowed preferentially to the vertebral plexus instead of the internal jugular vein in response to gravity. The Hadar early hominids and robust australopithecines partly achieved this reorientation with a dramatically enlarged occipital/marginal sinus system. On the other hand, hominids in the gracile australopithecine throughHomolineage delivered blood to the vertebral plexus via a widespread network of veins that became more elaborate through time. Mastoid and parietal emissary veins are representatives of this network, and increases in their frequencies during hominid evolution are indicative of its development. Brain size increased with increased frequencies of mastoid and parietal emissary veins in the lineage leading to and includingHomo, but remained conservative in the robust australopithecine lineage that lacked the network of veins. The brain is an extremely heatsensitive organ and emissary veins in humans have been shown to cool the brain under conditions of hyperthermia. Thus, the network of veins in the lineage leading toHomoacted as a radiator that released a thermal constraint on brain size. The radiator theory is in keeping with the belief that basal gracile and basal robust australopithecines occupied distinct niches, with the former living in savanna mosaic habitats that were subject to hot temperatures and intense solar radiation during the day.
Consciousness, explanatory inversion, and cognitive science
Authors: Searle John R. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractCognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic intentionality except in terms of its accessibility to consciousness. I call this claim the “Connection Principle.” The argument for it proceeds in six steps. The essential point is that intrinsic intentionality has aspectual shape: Our mental representations represent the world under specific aspects, and these aspectual features are essential to a mental state's being the state that it is.Once we recognize the Connection Principle, we see that it is necessary to perform an inversion on the explanatory models of cognitive science, an inversion analogous to the one evolutionary biology imposes on preDarwinian animistic modes of explanation. In place of the original intentionalistic explanations we have a combination of hardware and functional explanations. This radically alters the structure of explanation, because instead of a mental representation (such as a rule) causing the pattern of behavior it represents (such as rule-governed behavior), there is a neurophysiological cause of a pattern (such as a pattern of behavior), and the pattern plays a functional role in the life of the organism. What we mistakenly thought were descriptions of underlying mental principles in, for example, theories of vision and language were in fact descriptions of functional aspects of systems, which will have to be explained by underlying neurophysiological mechanisms. In such cases, what looks like mentalistic psychology is sometimes better construed as speculative neurophysiology. The moral is that the big mistake in cognitive science is not the overestimation of the computer metaphor (though that is indeed a mistake) but the neglect of consciousness.
Précis of The Origin of Concepts
Authors: Carey Susan 
Published: May 2011

AbstractA theory of conceptual development must specify the innate representational primitives, must characterize the ways in which the initial state differs from the adult state, and must characterize the processes through which one is transformed into the other. The Origin of Concepts (henceforth TOOC) defends three theses. With respect to the initial state, the innate stock of primitives is not limited to sensory, perceptual, or sensorimotor representations; rather, there are also innate conceptual representations. With respect to developmental change, conceptual development consists of episodes of qualitative change, resulting in systems of representation that are more powerful than, and sometimes incommensurable with, those from which they are built. With respect to a learning mechanism that achieves conceptual discontinuity, I offer Quinian bootstrapping. TOOC concludes with a discussion of how an understanding of conceptual development constrains a theory of concepts.
The notion of incommensurability can be extended to the child's developing theories of mind as well
Authors: Kiss Szabolcs 
Published: May 2011

AbstractIn this commentary I argue that the notion of incommensurability can be extended to the child's developing theories of mind. I use Carey's concept of Quinian bootstrapping and show that this learning process can account for the acquisition of the semantics of mental terms. I suggest a distinction among three stages of acquisition and adopt the theory–theory of conceptual development.
Conceptual discontinuity involves recycling old processes in new domains
Authors: Landy David , Allen Colin , Anderson Michael L. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractWe dispute Carey's assumption that distinct core cognitive processes employ domain-specific input analyzers to construct proprietary representations. We give reasons to believe that conceptual systems co-opt core components for new domains. Domain boundaries, as well as boundaries between perceptual–motor and conceptual cognitive resources may be useful abstractions, but do not appear to reflect constraints respected by brains and cognitive systems.
Beyond the building blocks model
Authors: Margolis Eric , Laurence Stephen 
Published: May 2011

AbstractCarey rightly rejects the building blocks model of concept acquisition on the grounds that new primitive concepts can be learned via the process of bootstrapping. But new primitives can be learned by other acquisition processes that do not involve bootstrapping, and bootstrapping itself is not a unitary process. Nonetheless, the processes associated with bootstrapping provide important insights into conceptual change.
The prehistory of number concept
Authors: Overmann Karenleigh A. , Wynn Thomas , Coolidge Frederick L. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractCarey leaves unaddressed an important evolutionary puzzle: In the absence of a numeral list, how could a concept of natural number ever have arisen in the first place? Here we suggest that the initial development of natural number must have bootstrapped on a material culture scaffold of some sort, and illustrate how this might have occurred using strings of beads.
Acquiring a new concept is not explicable-by-content
Authors: Shea Nicholas 
Published: May 2011

AbstractCarey's book describes many cases in which children develop new concepts with expressive power that could not be constructed out of their input. How does she side-step Fodor's paradox of radical concept nativism? I suggest that it is by rejecting the tacit assumption that psychology can only explain concept acquisition when it occurs by rational inference or other transitions that are explicable-by-content.
Can multiple bootstrapping provide means of very early conceptual development?
Authors: Haman Maciej , Hernik Mikołaj 
Published: May 2011

AbstractCarey focuses her theory on initial knowledge and Quinian bootstrapping. We reflect on developmental mechanisms, which can operate in between. Whereas most of the research aims at delimitating early cognitive mechanisms, we point at the need for studying their integration and mutual bootstrapping. We illustrate this call by referring to a current debate on infants' use of featural representations.
Representation development, perceptual learning, and concept formation
Authors: McLaren I. P. L. , Wills Andy J. , Graham S. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractWe argue for an example of “core cognition” based on Diamond and Carey's (1986) work on expertise and recognition, which is not made use of in The Origin of Concepts. This mechanism for perceptual learning seems to have all the necessary characteristics in that it is innate, domain-specific (requires stimulus sets possessing a certain structure), and demonstrably affects categorisation in a way that strongly suggests it will influence concept formation as well.
Can Carey answer Quine?
Authors: Hill Christopher S. 
Published: May 2011

AbstractIn order to defend her claim that the concept object is biologically determined, Carey must answer Quine's gavagai argument, which purports to show that mastery of any concept with determinate reference presupposes a substantial repertoire of logical concepts. I maintain that the gavagai argument withstands the experimental data that Carey provides, but that it yields to an a priori argument.