bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
5 Lacan's Antigone
Authors: Eagleton Terry 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter concerns what Lacan calls the Real and its relationship with the inner truth of Antigone. Like God, the sublime, alcohol, and the unconscious, the Real is Janus‐faced, with both a creative and a destructive dimension. Negatively speaking, it signifies the jouissance which the death drive persuades us to derive from the process of our own dismemberment. In effect, Lacan remarks of Antigone that she has been declaring from the outset ‘I am dead and desire death’—and tragedy, one might add, is above all the art‐form that investigates the problematic relation of humanity to its own mortality, and thus in Heideggerian style to its own essential being. But there is also a positive aspect of the Real—a way of plugging into this lethal drive which can carry us beyond the fudges of the so‐called symbolic order, the domain of conventional morality, law and social consensus, into some far‐flung outpost of being where one is in a sense both alive and dead, and where one manifests the kind of purity or integrity of selfhood which Lacan so admires in Antigone. The avatars of the Real are those who stay faithful against all the moral and political odds to the desire which makes them what they are—which is to say, in Lacanian terms, to the lack which makes them what they are, and therefore—since this lack prefigures the absolute absence which is death—to their own morality.
11 Between Myth and History: The Tragedy of Antigone
Authors: Irigaray Luce 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter explores the Antigone myth and its unveiling in history from the context of sexual difference. Sexual difference is the most basic and universal difference, starting from which we can reach a global democratic community and culture respectful of all our other differences. Antigone's respect for the unwritten laws—the laws of human nature and the gods—reveals her respect for living beings and the cosmic order. She sees Polynices as the ‘son of my mother’. To Antigone humanity is comprised of man and of woman and she respects this sexual difference just as she respects her brother as a brother and her duty to him as a sister before her marriage to Haemon. Antigone fights not solely for her brother's burial but also to maintain the cosmic harmony. She tries to maintain a delicate balance between the gods of the underworld, her world, and Zeus. Life is the supreme value for Antigone. She only asks to live, to be. Creon breaks the cosmic harmony. He does not take female sexual identity into consideration. Creon can be viewed as a eunuch due to his lack of differentiation from the maternal world. Irigaray questions how the maternal world that asserts itself as patriarchy has been established in an arbitrary way. She believes that the maternal world should not begin with function but with sexual difference. A woman is first and foremost a woman before she is a mother. A feminine order can help men provide for differentiation (not repression) and growth of identity.
15 Reclaiming Femininity: Antigone's ‘Choice’ in Art and Art History
Authors: Meyer Martina 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Feminist responses to Antigone's choice to rebel against masculine authority have largely refocused the text as a discourse of gender difference in order to expose patriarchy's victimization of women. This chapter, while acknowledging feminine defiance as a crucial aspect of the text's internal contradictions, equally recognizes that Antigone's performance of the burial rites situates her firmly within paternalistic constructions of femininity. In classical art, contemporary (roughly) with Sophocles' play, defiance becomes invisible: only the traditional feminine role is portrayed. A long visual tradition follows from the classical one, always casting the ancient heroine in this same, typically feminine role, and this tradition serves as a perfect example of the modern feminist critique of the history of images, in which women are robbed of their agency. Such endemic aversion to the depiction of overt defiance is, it is proposed, symptomatic of the broader cultural response to the play's revelation of two discrete, but mutually dependent feminine constructs: one demands Antigone's submission to a patriarchal definition of femininity that would require her to relinquish her autonomous perception of her feminine role, and the other involves her wilful conformance to that self‐generated identity. Meyer proposes in this chapter to demonstrate that by politicizing Antigone in the most conservative fashion, images reinforce patriarchal gender and kinship hierarchies, implying a perception of the dangers of what the author interprets here as expressions of ‘excess’ femininity, and underlining the need for continuing oppression in the interests of masculine political systems and social stability.
Macroscopic Superpositions, Decoherent Histories, and the Emergence of Hydrodynamic Behaviour
Authors: Halliwell Jonathan 
Published: September 2010

AbstractMacroscopic systems are described most completely by local densities (particle number, momentum, and energy) yet the superposition states of such physical variables, indicated by the Everett interpretation, are not observed. In order to explain this, it is argued that histories of local number, momentum, and energy density are approximately decoherent when coarse-grained over sufficiently large volumes. Decoherence arises directly from the proximity of these variables to exactly conserved quantities (which are exactly decoherent), and not from environmentally induced decoherence. This chapter discusses the approach to local equilibrium and the subsequent emergence of hydrodynamic equations for the local densities. The results are general but the chapter focuses on a chain of oscillators as a specific example in which explicit calculations may be carried out. It discusses the relationships between environmentally-induced and conservation-induced decoherence, and presents a unified view of these two mechanisms.
Can the World be Only Wavefunction?
Authors: Maudlin Tim 
Published: September 2010

AbstractA common understanding of both the many-worlds theory and the original version of the GRW theory holds that they are ontologically monistic, postulating only the existence of the wavefunction and nothing else. Sometimes an appeal to Occam's razor is used to promote this as a boon for these theories. But without more detailed argumentation, it is hard to see how such an austere ontology can make comprehensible contact with the experimental facts that inspired the development of quantum theory in the first place, or indeed with our whole pre-theoretical picture of the physical world.
A Metaphysician Looks at the Everett Interpretation
Authors: Hawthorne John 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter compares the relation of emergent branching structure to the quantum state to the fundamental ontology with philosophically more familiar examples of emergence — of ordinary objects, in relation to classical atomism, and of mental properties or attributes, in relation to material bodies. It is argued that there remain ‘explanatory gaps’ in all such cases, and that these are likely to be particularly acute in the case of the Everett interpretation.
Quantum Jumps, Born's Rule, and Objective Reality
Authors: Hubert Zurek Wojciech 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter describes three insights into the transition from quantum to classical that are based on the recognition of the role of the environment. It starts with a minimalist derivation of preferred sets of states. This breaking of the unitary symmetry of the Hilbert space yields — without the usual tools of decoherence — quantum jumps and pointer states consistent with those obtained via einselection. Pointer states obtained this way dene events without appealing to Born's rule for probabilities, which can be now derived from envariance-symmetry of entangled quantum states. With probabilities at hand one can analyze information flows in the course of decoherence. They explain how classical reality can arise from the quantum substrate by accounting for the objective existence of the einselected states of quantum systems through the redundancy of pointer state records in their environment — through quantum Darwinism. Taken together, and in the right order, these three advances (which fit well within Everett's relative states framework, but do not require ‘many worlds’ per se) extend the existential interpretation of quantum theory.
De Broglie–Bohm Pilot‐Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?
Authors: Valentini Antony 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter replies to claims that the pilot-wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm is really a many-worlds theory with a superfluous configuration appended to one of the worlds. Assuming that pilot-wave theory does contain an ontological pilot wave (a complex-valued field in configuration space), the chapter shows that such claims arise from not interpreting pilot-wave theory on its own terms. Specifically, the theory has its own (‘subquantum’) theory of measurement, and in general describes a ‘non-equilibrium’ state that violates the Born rule. Furthermore, in realistic models of the classical limit, one does not obtain localised pieces of an ontological pilot wave following alternative macroscopic trajectories: from a de Broglie–Bohm viewpoint, alternative trajectories are merely mathematical and not ontological. Thus, from the perspective of pilot-wave theory itself, many worlds is an illusion. It is further argued that, even leaving pilot-wave theory aside, the theory of many worlds is rooted in the intrinsically unlikely assumption that quantum measurements should be modelled on classical measurements, and is therefore unlikely to be true.
Reply to Valentini, ‘De Broglie–Bohm Pilot‐Wave Theory: Many Worlds in Denial?’
Authors: Brown Harvey 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
The reality of the patterns in the wave-function representing different worlds is not like that of locality and the uncertainty relations, which hold only for the equilibrium distribution. Nor, in the light of the Deutsch–Wallace representation theorem for the Born rule, is the appeal to non-equilibrium probability distributions as the ground for the distinction between pilot-wave theory and many-worlds theory well-motivated. Finally, Valentini's counter-claim, that the latter is motivated by eigenvalue realism, ignores the need to give an account of macroscopic superpositions.
Definition and Division in Plato'sSophist
Authors: Brown Lesley 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter investigates the so-called method of division, purportedly used in the dialogue Sophist to give the essence of the sophist, i.e., of the sophistic art or expertise. The dialogue's enigma is that it offers not one but seven different definitions, all of them satirical or whimsical, and each purporting to be the account of what sophistry is. The chapter rejects readings on which each of these ‘definitions’, or just the final one — the sophist as a producer of images — is meant seriously as an account of what sophistry is. It argues that the initial assumption — that there is a definable expertise (technē) of sophistry — is one Plato can hardly have shared, given his criteria for what counts as a technē. The chapter concludes that in the Sophist Plato shows both how close sophistry and true philosophy are, and also how they differ — all this without intending the reader to assume that the method of division has revealed any essence of sophistry, since there can be no such thing.
Nominal Definition in Aristotle
Authors: Modrak Deborah 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThe challenge for the interpreter addressing Aristotle's conception of nominal definition is to discover whether Aristotle has a comprehensive theory of definition that is broad enough to cover both real definition and linguistic definition. This chapter examines the analysis of definition in Posterior Analytics II and in Metaphysics VII, and the account of universals in Posterior Analytics II 19 and Metaphysics I 1 in order to sharpen the challenge. For instance, the strong unity requirement on a definition of essence in Metaphysics VII seems too restrictive to be met by a linguistic definition or even by a demonstrative definition of a natural kind. Aristotle's final position on a comprehensive theory of definition (it is argued) is that the closer a nominal definition approximates a scientific definition, the stronger its claim to be a proper definition becomes. His position is then contrasted with Chrysippus' conception of definition.
Biosand Explanatory Unity in Aristotle's Biology
Authors: Lennox James G. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter discusses an issue raised in David Charles' Meaning and Essence in Aristotle, Chapter 12: can the intimate relationship between definition and explanation that Aristotle defends in the Posterior Analytics be maintained in a scientific study of animals in the face of their complex natures? It is argued that the concept of bios (way of life) plays a critical role in this respect, accounting for why different animals have the particular constellation of parts and activities they have. By looking at the central role this concept plays both in the organization of biological information in the History of Animals and in the explanation of animal differentiation in the Parts of Animals, the chapter argues that an animal's way of life is that defining feature which explains the coordinated differentiation of its parts and activities into a functional unity.
Essence and Cause in Plotinus' Ennead VI.7 [38] 2: An Outline of Some Problems
Authors: Schiaparelli Annamaria 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
The concepts of essence and cause are widely discussed in philosophy: they are central themes of the philosophical speculation in Antiquity as well as nowadays. In Antiquity, the concept of definition was closely connected to that of essence: at least from Aristotle onwards, it was generally assumed that the definition indicates or expresses the essence. However, these concepts are highly problematic. Furthermore, when one tries to analyse the relation between essence and cause, the task becomes even more challenging. This chapter focuses on some aspects of the concepts of essence and cause as they are presented in Plotinus' Ennead VI.7 [38] 2. In particular, the influence of Aristotle's viewpoint on Plotinus' discussion is analysed. For this reason, some Aristotelian texts are also presented. It brings evidence in support of the view that Plotinus is interested in applying part of the Aristotelian conceptual apparatus in his analysis on the causality of Forms.
IBE, GMR, and Metaphysical Projects
Authors: Shalkowski Scott A. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractDavid Lewis defends Genuine Modal Realism (GMR) by way of an inference to the best explanation (IBE); reasons of theoretical utility are taken as markers of truth. Warrant for thinking that IBE is reliable depends on the availability of access to the relevant matters that is independent of the various uses of IBE. Domains permitting no such independent access are domains over which we can have no confidence that instances of IBE are reliable. Genuine Modal Realism's plurality of worlds is one such domain. The wider implication is that IBE is not reliable for adjudicating metaphysical disputes.
Modal Commitments
Authors: Divers John 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter has three principal aims. Firstly, to promote interest in the question of the function, or utility, of judgements of modality (showing what it is that we presently lack in this regard, and defending the legitimacy of the question). Secondly, to endorse an alternative to orthodox contemporary methodology, advocating that we prioritize the question of function in modal philosophy (identifying exactly which modal judgements play a useful role, and constraining the accumulation of philosophically substantial commitments to the accommodation of those judgements). Thirdly, to consider among our modal judgements exactly which are the proper and exact source of various different kinds of substantial philosophical commitments in ontology, epistemology, and elsewhere. An illustration is offered, in the de dicto case, of how minimal a philosophical theory of modality might be if constructed properly, and carefully, according to functional methodology.
Demonstrative Reference, the Relational View of Experience, and the Proximality Principle
Authors: Campbell John 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThe relational view of conscious perceptual experience is the view that conscious perceptual experience is a relation between perceiver and objects and properties perceived. A perceiver experiencing a yellow lemon stands in a relation to the lemon and its yellowness. The relational view grounds our knowledge of reference because, in using demonstratives to refer to perceived objects, perceivers know which objects they perceptually attend to for they stand in relations to those very objects. This chapter defends the relational view of experience against a charge by Burge that it is incompatible with a principle, the Proximality Principle, that, according to Burge, vision science rests upon. The multi‐pronged defense proposes that Burge's attack proves too much, excising the distinction between seeing and hallucinating and diminishing the importance of attention and perceptual conscious experience to knowledge of demonstrative reference.
Fictional Singular Imaginings
Authors: García‐Carpintero Manuel 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIn a series of papers, Robin Jeshion has developed an ‘acquaintanceless' account of singular thoughts. Her account of singular thoughts is a psychological one, rejecting any epistemic constraint. Having singular thoughts is a matter of deploying ‘mental files' or ‘dossiers' that play a significant role in the cognitive life of the individual. This chapter elaborates an alternative account that preserves acquaintance, and focuses on aspects of the semantics of fictional reference and discourse. It addresses the behaviour of intuitively empty referential expressions, proper names, indexicals, and referentially used descriptions, mostly in two specific and related sorts of cases: the use of those expressions in speech acts by the creator of the fiction and critical discourse of fictions aimed at getting its content right. The chapter concludes that a certain epistemic, acquaintance‐based account of singular thoughts provides an intuitively satisfactory analysis of those two types of cases.
9 Pollution across Chinese Provinces
Authors: Yap Co Catherine , Kong Fanying , Lin Shuanglin 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter revisits the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis using 1987–95 data for Chinese provinces for six pollutants. A comparison of off-sample (1996–2004) predicted and actual emissions show that industrial COD per capita discharge rates have leveled off; however, actual industrial waste water and industrial dust per capita discharge rates in 1996–2004 were higher than the predictions. And, contrary to the predictions of the estimated income-emission regression model, actual industrial waste water emissions increase with income. Auxiliary regressions show that conditional on income, northern provinces have lower industrial waste water pollution; non-coastal and provinces with smaller secondary industry shares have lower industrial pollution; provinces with smaller SOEs shares have lower industrial COD pollution; and, commitment to control industrial dust pollution is correlated with local governments' budget balance.
Lying and Deception
Authors: Carson Thomas L. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis book addresses questions in ethical theory and practical questions about lying, deception, and information disclosure in public affairs, business and professional ethics, and personal relationships. Part I is a conceptual map for the rest of the book. It proposes an analysis of the concepts of lying and deception and related concepts such as withholding information, “keeping someone in the dark,” and “half-truths.” Part II addresses questions in ethical theory. The book examines the implications of Kant's theory, act-utilitarianism, Ross's theory, and rule-consequentialism for moral questions about lying and deception. The book argues that Kant's absolutism about lying is untenable and that his moral theory doesn't commit him to being an absolutist. It also argues that the standard debates about lying and deception between act-utilitarians and their critics are inconclusive because they rest on appeals to disputed intuitions. The book defends a version of the golden rule and a theory of moral reasoning. The book's theory implies that there is a moral presumption against lying and deception that cause harm — a presumption that is at least as strong as that endorsed by act-utilitarianism. The book uses this theory to justify its claims about the issues it addresses in Part III: deception and withholding information in sales, deception in advertising, bluffing and deception in negotiations, the duty of professionals to inform their clients, lying and deception by leaders as a pretext for fighting wars (or avoiding wars), lying and deception about history (with special attention to the Holocaust), and cases of distorting the historical record by telling half truths. The book concludes with a qualified defense of the view that honesty is a virtue.
Deception and Related Concepts
Authors: Carson Thomas L. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractDeception can be defined roughly as intentionally causing someone to have false beliefs, but this definition needs to be qualified to deal with certain cases, including the following. I intentionally cause you to believe statement X and X is false, but I neither believe that X is true nor believe that X is false. The chapter also discuss several other cases that may require modifications of this definition and formulate several revised versions of the definition; the chapter counts cases in which people intentionally cause others to persist in false beliefs as cases of deception. There are two main differences between lying and deception. First, unlike “lying,” “deception” implies success. An act must actually cause someone to have false beliefs in order to count as a case of deception. Intentional false statements need not succeed in deceiving others in order to count as lies. Second, although a lie must be a false statement, deception need not involve making a false statement; true statements can be deceptive, and many forms of deception do not involve making statements of any sort. Thus, many instances of deception do not constitute lying. The chapter also explains the relationship between deception and the notions of withholding information, concealing information, “keeping someone in the dark,” “spin,” and “half‐truths,” and the chapter analyzes the relationship between lying, deception, and bullshit. Harry Frankfurt, to the contrary, suggests bullshit does not require the intent to deceive and bullshit can constitute lying. The chapter also argues that Frankfurt's famous claim that bullshitters, qua bullshitters, are unlike liars in that they are unconcerned with the truth (unconcerned with knowing “how things are”) is mistaken. As Frankfurt claims that unconcern with the truth is the essence of bullshit, this shows that his analysis of bullshit is mistaken.