bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Hebbian paradigm reintegrated: Local reverberations as internal representations
Authors: Amit Daniel J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe neurophysiological evidence from the Miyashita group's experiments on monkeys as well as cognitive experience common to us all suggests that local neuronal spike rate distributions might persist in the absence of their eliciting stimulus. In Hebb's cell-assembly theory, learning dynamics stabilize such self-maintaining reverberations. Quasi-quantitive modeling of the experimental data on internal representations in association-cortex modules identifies the reverberations (delay spike activity) as the internal code (representation). This leads to cognitive and neurophysiological predictions, many following directly from the language used to describe the activity in the experimental delay period, others from the details of how the model captures the properties of the internal representations.
The Hebbian paradigm reintegrated: Local reverberations as internal representations
Authors: Freeman Walter J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractRecurrent excitation is experimentally well documented in cortical populations. It provides for intracortical excitatory biases that linearize negative feedback interactions and induce macroscopic state transitions during perception. The concept of the local neighborhood should be expanded to spatial patterns as the basis for perception, in which large areas of cortex are bound into cooperative behavior with near-silent columns as important as active columns revealed by unit recording.
Additional tests of Amit's attractor neural networks
Authors: Hoffman Ralph E. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractFurther tests of Amit's model are indicated. One strategy is to use the apparent coding sparseness of the model to make predictions about coding sparseness in Miyashita's network. A second approach is to use memory overload to induce false positive responses in modules and biological systems. In closing, the importance of temporal coding and timing requirements in developing biologically plausible attractor networks is mentioned.
Another ANN model for the Miyashita experiments
Authors: Morita Masahiko 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe Miyashita experiments are very interesting and the results should be examined from a viewpoint of attractor dynamics. Amit's target article shows a path toward realistic modeling by artificial neural networks (ANN), but it is not necessarily the only one. I introduce another model that can explain a substantial part of the empirical observations and makes an interesting prediction. This model consists of such units that have nonmonotonic input-output characteristics with local inhibition neurons.
Local or transcortical assemblies? Some evidence from cognitive neuroscience
Authors: Pulvermüller Friedemann , Preissl Hubert 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAmit defines cell assemblies aslocal cortical neuron populationswith strong internal connections. However, Hebb himself proposed that cell assemblies are distributed over different cortical areas (nonlocal ortranscortical assemblies). We review evidence from cognitive neuroscience and neuropsychology supporting the assumption that cell assemblies are transcortical.
How to decide whether a neural representation is a cognitive concept?
Authors: Raijmakers Maartje E. J. , Molenaar Peter C. M. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractA distinction should be made between the formation of stimulus-driven associations and cognitive concepts. To test the learning mode of a neural network, we propose a simple and classic input-output test: the discrimination shift task. Feed-forward PDP models appear to form stimulus-driven associations. A Hopfield network should be extended to apply the test.
Reverberations of Hebbian thinking
Authors: Rauschecker Josef P. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractCortical reverberations may induce synaptic changes that underlie developmental plasticity as well as long-term memory. They may be especially important for the consolidation of synaptic changes. Reverberations in cortical networks should have particular significance during development, when large numbers of new representations are formed. This includes the formation of representations across different sensory modalities.
Association and computation with cell assemblies
Authors: der van Velde Frank 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe cell assembly is an important concept for cognitive psychology. Cognitive processing will to a large extent depend on the relations that can exist between different assemblies. A potential relation between assemblies can already be seen in the occurrence of (classical) conditioning. However, the resulting associations between assemblies only produce behavioristic processing or so-called regular computation. Higher-level cognitive abilities most likely result from nonregular computation. I discuss the possibility of this form of computation in terms of cell assemblies.
Empirical and theoretical active memory: The proper context
Authors: Amit Daniel J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe context of the target article is delimited again, underlining the intended locationof the argument in the bottomup hierarchy of brain study. The central message is that collective delay activity distributions (reverberations) in cortical modules extend the role of a spike (a potentialinformation carrier across long distances) to an active memory of structured, learned information that can be carried across long time intervals. Moreover, the population code of the reverberations makes them readable down the cortical processing stream. Most of the critical comments are then interpreted and addressed in relation to misreading of the proper context. The price for the limitation of the context (in cognitive, behavioral, and computational terms) is compared with the advantages of a clear, direct contact with experiment on the one hand and with a well controlled body of modeling and analysis on the other.
Consciousness, memory, and the hippocampal system: What kind of connections can we make?
Authors: Eichenbaum Howard , Cohen Neal J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractGray's account is remarkable in its depth and scope but too little attention is paid to poor correspondences with the literature on hippocampal/subicular damage, the theta rhythm, and novelty detection. An alternative account, focusing on hippocampal involvement in organizing memories in a way that makes them accessible to conscious recollection but not in access to consciousness per se, avoids each of these limitations.
Context and consciousness
Authors: Ellard Colin G. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe commentary argues (1) that we cannot be sure that human consciousness has survival value and (2) that in order to understand the origins and, perhaps, the function of consciousness, we should examine the behavioural and neural precursors to consciousness in nonhumans. An example is given of research on the role of context in decisions regarding fleeing from probable predators in the Mongolian gerbil.
Correlating mind and body
Authors: Lioyd-Jones T. J. , Donnelly N. , Weekes B. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractGray's integration of the different levels of description and explanation in his theory is problematic: (1) The introduction of consciousness into his theorising consists of the mind-brain identity assumption, which tells us nothing new. (2) There need not be correlations between levels of description. (3) Gray's account does not extend beyond “brute” correlation. Integration must be achieved in a principled, mutually constraining way.
Reticular-thalamic activation of the cortex generates conscious contents
Authors: Newman James 
Published: February 2010

AbstractGray hypothesizes that the contents of consciousness correspond to the outputs of a subicular (hippocampal/temporal lobe) comparator that compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. I argue that Gray has identified a key contributing system to conscious awareness, but that his model is inadequate for explaining how conscious contents are generated in the brain. An alternative model is offered.
Consciousness beyond the comparator
Authors: Shames Victor A. , Hubbard Timothy L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractGray's comparator model fails to provide an adequate explanation of consciousness for two reasons. First, it is based on a narrow definition of consciousness that excludes basic phenomenology and active functions of consciousness. Second, match/mismatch decisions can be made without producing an experience of consciousness. The model thus violates the sufficiency criterion.
Consciousness does not seem to be linked to a single neural mechanism
Authors: Umiltà Carlo , Zorzi Marco 
Published: February 2010

AbstractOn the basis of neuropsychological evidence, it is clear that attention should be given a role in any model (or conjecture) of consciousness. What is known about the many instances of dissociation between explicit and implicit knowledge after brain damage suggests that conscious experience might not be linked to a restricted area of the brain. Even if it were true that there is a single brain area devoted to consciousness, the subicular area would seem to be an unlikely possibility.
Consciousness and its (dis)contents
Authors: Gray Jeffrey A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe first claim in the target article was that there is as yet no transparent, causal account of the relations between consciousness and brain-and-behaviour. That claim remains firm. The second claim was that the contents of consciousness consist, psychologically, of the outputs of a comparator system; the third consisted of a description of the brain mechanisms proposed to instantiate the comparator. In order to defend these claims against criticism, it has been necessary to clarify the distinction between consciousness-as-such and the contents of consciousness, to widen the description of the neural machinery instantiating the comparator system, and to clarify the relationship between the contents of consciousness in the here-and-now and episodic memory.
The lambda model is only one piece in the motor control puzzle
Authors: Dean Jeffrey 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe lambda model provides a physiologically grounded terminology for describing muscle function and emphasizes the important influence of environmental and reflex-mediated effects on final states. However, lambda itself is only a convenient point on the length-tension curve; its importance should not be overemphasized. Ascribing movement to changes in a lambda-based frame of reference is generally valid, but it leaves unanswered a number of questions concerning mechanisms.
Natural unconstrained movements obey rules different from constrained elementary movements
Authors: Desmurget Michel , Rossetti Yves , Prablanc Claude 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe concept of a conservative control strategy minimizing the number of degrees of freedom used is criticised with reference to 3-D simple reaching and grasping experiments. The vector error in a redundant system would not be the prime controlled variable, but rather the posture for reaching, as exemplified by nearly straight displacements in joint space as opposed to curved ones in task space.
Is λ an appropriate control variable for locomotion?
Authors: Hamm Thomas M. , Han Zong-Sheng 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe lambda model predicts that the command received by each motor nucleus during locomotion is specific for the joint at which its muscle acts and is independent of external conditions. However, investigation of the commands received by motor nuclei during fictive locomotion and of the sensitivity of these commands to feedback from the limb during locomotion indicates that neither condition is satisfied.
The unobservability of central commands: Why testing hypotheses is so difficult
Authors: Hodgson Antony 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe experiments Feldman and Levin suggest do not definitively test their proposed solution to the problem of selecting muscle activations. Their test of the movement directions that elicit EMG activity can be interpreted without regard to the form of the central commands, and their fast elbow flexion test is based on a forward computation that obscures the insensitivity of the predicted trajectory to the details of the putative commands.
Can the λ model benefit from understanding human adaptation in weightlessness(and vice versa)?
Authors: McDonald P. Vernon 
Published: February 2010

AbstractParameters of the lambda model seem tightly linked to certain characteristics of human performance influenced by weightlessness. This commentary suggests that there is a valuable opportunity to probe the lambda model using the changed environment experienced during space flight. The likely benefits are a better model and a better understanding ofthe consequences of weightlessness for human performance.
Let us accept a “controlled trade-off” model of motor control
Authors: Partridge Lloyd D. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe trade-off between force and length of muscle as adjusted by neural signals is a critical fact in the dynamics of motor control. Whether we call it “length-tension effect,” “feedback-like,” “invariant condition,” or “spring-like” is unimportant. We must not let semantics or details of representation obscure the basic physics of effects introduced by this trade-off in muscle.
Levers to generate movement
Authors: Windhorst U. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe following questions are discussed: (1) Who determines the nature of “control variables”? (2) Is the “positional monopoly” healthy? (3) Does a descending command alter reflex threshold alone without eoncomitantly altering stiffness? (4) How does the CNS deal with history-dependent effects? (5) Should we abandon the idea that the CNS controls classical Newtonian variables such as muscle length?
How far should we extend the equilibrium point (lambda) hypothesis?
Authors: Winters Jack M. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractA key feature of the lambda model is the hypothesis of a local spring-like muscle-reflex system defined by a central control variable that has units of position. This is intriguing, especially for a study of postural stability in large-scale systems, but it has limited direct application to skilled everyday movements. If movement is considered as a goal-directed, neuro-optimization problem, however, theavailabilityof lambda-like peripheral models (vs. conventional musculoskeletal models) deserves exploration.
The λ model for motor control: More than meets the eye
Authors: Levin Mindy F. , Feldman Anatol G. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractUnderstanding of the λ model has greatly increased in recent years as evidenced by most of the commentaries. Some commentators underscored the potential of the model to integrate aspects of different sensorimotor systems in the production of movement. Other commentators focused on not-yet-fully-developed parts of the model. A few persisted in misunderstanding some of its basic concepts, and on these grounds they reject it. In responding to commentaries we continue to elaborate on some fundamental points of the model, especially control variables, the idea of movement production by shifting the positional frame of reference and the hypothesis of biomechanical correspondence in motor control. We also continue to develop our ideas on the intrinsic generation of the frame of reference associated with external space and utilized for the control of arm movement and locomotion. The dynamic principles underlying the model are discussed in light of the dynamical systems approach.
Consciousness and timing
Authors: Salter David 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThis commentary addresses three distinctions: the relationship of conscious to unconscious processes, whether these processes are single or multiple, and the distinction between vehicle and content. Also considered are questions of the relationship between multiple drafts to consciousness, the oneness of phenomenal perception as an illusion, the role of consciousness in the redrafting process, and finally the update frequency for attentional revision.
Cognitive algebra versus representativeness heuristic
Authors: Anderson Norman H. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractCognitive algebra strongly disproved the representativeness heuristic almost before it was published; and therewith it also disproved the base rate fallacy. Cognitive algebra provides a theoretical foundation for judgment-decision theory through its joint solution to the two fundamental problems – true measurement of subjective values, and cognitive rules for integration of multiple determinants.
The purpose of experiments: Ecological validity versus comparing hypotheses
Authors: Dawes Robyn M. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAs illustrated by research Koehler himself cites (Dawes et al. 1993), the purpose of experiments is to choose between contrasting explanations of past observations – rather than to seek statistical generalizations about the prevalence of effects. True external validity results not from sampling various problems that are representative of “real world” decision making, but from reproducing an effect in the laboratory with minimal contamination (including from real world factors).
Base rates, stereotypes, and judgmental accuracy
Authors: Funder David C. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe base rate literature has an opposite twin in the social psychological literature on stereotypes, which concludes that people use their preexisting beliefs about probabilistic category attributes too much, rather than not enough. This ironic discrepancy arises because beliefs about category attributes enhance accuracy when the beliefs are accurate and diminish accuracy when they are not. To determine the accuracy of base rate/stereotype beliefs requires research that addresses specific content.
Why do frequency formats improve Bayesian reasoning? Cognitive algorithms work on information, which needs representation
Authors: Gigerenzer Gerd 
Published: February 2010

AbstractIn contrast to traditional research on base-rate neglect, an ecologically-oriented research program would analyze the correspondence between cognitive algorithms and the nature of information in the environment. Bayesian computations turn out to be simpler when information is represented in frequency formats as opposed to the probability formats used in previous research. Frequency formats often enable even uninstructed subjects to perform Bayesian reasoning.
The base rate controversy: Is the glass half-full or half-empty?
Authors: Keren Gideon , Thijs Lambert J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractSetting the two hypotheses of complete neglect and full use of base rates against each other is inappropriate. The proper question concerns the degree to which base rates are used (or neglected), and under what conditions. We outline alternative approaches and recommend regression analysis. Koehler's conclusion that we have been oversold on the base rate fallacy seems to be premature.
“Normal” is not the issue: It is “effective” goal attainment that counts
Authors: Carr J. H. , Shepherd R. B. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAdaptive motor patterns that emerge after a neuromusculoskeletal lesion reflect not only the primary lesion, but also the dynamic characteristics of the musculoskeletal linkage and environment in which the action is performed. Although these patterns may be optimal, they may also be ineffective as goal-directed actions; effectiveness may only be regained if training addresses primary deficits and ensures practice without gross biomechanical adaptations.
What are “normal movements” inanypopulation?
Authors: Masters R. S. W. , Polman R. C. J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractIt is the contention of Latash & Anson (L&A) that in atypical populations, such as those with cognitive, central neurological, or peripheral disorders, the central nervous system (CNS) is capable of producing more effective, though often less “normal,” movement patterns ifleft to its own devices. It is the aim of this commentary to extend their argument to other populations by pointing out the many parallels with development of movement patterns in sport.
How functional are atypical motor patterns?
Authors: Scholz John P. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractLatash & Anson are commended for pointing out that investigators of atypical motor performance have too often failed to recognize the adaptive nature of many atypical movement characteristics. However, the authors' assumption that atypical motor patterns can be considered “normal” and, by implication, that it is futile to attempt to teach different patterns to patients that may be more functional, is criticized.
Generic mechanisms of coordination in special populations
Authors: Treffner Paul J. , Kelso J. A. Scott 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWe show that left-handers can be considered as a “special” population. We indicate that the asymmetries in performance exhibited by left-handers are due to a basic asymmetry in the underlying coordination dynamics that constrains bimanual coordination. In contrast to the claims of Latash & Anson, we argue that considerable knowledge has been gained regarding the essential equations of motion that govern biological coordination.
Language and its role in understanding intentional relations: Research tool or mechanism of development?
Authors: Budwig Nancy , Bamberg Michael 
Published: February 2010

AbstractIn our commentary we elaborate on Barresi & Moore's use of language as a tool. In particular, we highlight the importance of cognitive linguistic research with its emphasis on the relation between morpnosyntax and intentional schemes. We also speculate about how language itself might play a role in children's integration of first and third person knowledge.
Rhesus monkeys are radical behaviorists
Authors: Gallup Gordon G. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe data reviewed in Barresi & Moore's treatment of social understanding is recast in terms of a model of social intelligence that was advanced some time ago (Gallup 1982). When it comes to their analysis of the behavior of other individuals, most primates (and humans younger than 18 months of age) appear to function as radical behaviorists, whereas chimpanzees and older infants show evidence of becoming primitive cognitive psychologists.
First person representations need a methodology based on simulation or theory
Authors: Gordon Robert M. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAlthough their thesis is generally sound, Barresi & Moore give insufficient attention to the need for a methodology, whether simulation based or theory-based, for choosing among alternative possible matches of first person and third person information. This choice must be sensitive to contextual information, including past behavior. Moreover, apart from simulation or theory, first person information would not help predict future behavior.
Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?
Authors: Slater Carol 
Published: February 2010

AbstractBarresi & Moore's account predicts that infants deprived of visual input will be delayed in achieving social understanding, a hypothesis that receives some support from studies of language use. by blind children. It is proposed that recently developed false belief and appearance/reality tasks be used to explore this issue further. Three possibly distracting conceptual issues are also discussed.
On Neanderthal speech and human evolution
Authors: Lieberman Philip 
Published: February 2010

AbstractLoring Brace's assertion that “Neanderthals were just as capable of articulate speech as we are” reflects ignorance of speech anatomy and physiology. Metrical analyses of hyoid bone morphology cannot predict supralaryngeal vocal tract (SVT) shape. Houghton's (1993) “modern” Neanderthal SVT reconstruction yields an impossible creature who had a larynx positioned in his chest. The reconstructed modem SVTs of early fossil Homo sapiens indicate brains that can regulate speech, consistent with Merlin Donalds timetable for the evolution of language.