bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The ‘défense républicaine’: Some Remarks about the Specificity of French Republicanism
Authors: Spitz Jean-Fabien 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter argues that, as a political regime fighting for its consolidation, the French republic — in the immediate aftermath of one of the deepest crises it went through, (the Dreyfus case) — tried to articulate a political philosophy of its own that clearly distanced itself from authoritarian and illiberal features. This political philosophy stresses that modern freedom requires some material and social equality as a precondition and, in this aspect, it has an undeniable republican flavour. But the main point is that it also tries to demonstrate that such a combination of civil freedom and equality in material conditions is the kind of social and political regulation which is required by industrializing modern societies, so that the republic is clearly a proposition for the future and a form of open society, not a ‘closed community’ marred with archaism and nostalgia for tradition, brotherhood, and narrow patriotism.
French Republicanism and the European Union
Authors: Lacroix Justine , Magnette Paul 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter analyses the development of a French substantial body of thought, which questions and challenges the underlying foundations of the European project. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section demonstrates that contemporary criticism against the European integration process develops a line of thought first outlined in France in the late 1970s on the theme of the ‘dissolving effect’ of human rights. The second section shows that European construction is seen by these authors as the advanced stage of a more global process of political dilution. The final section contrasts this strand of thought with the so-called ‘cosmopolitan’ approach to the European integration process. The cosmopolitan school of thought does not conceive European law as the end of politics but rather as a privileged vector furthering the promotion of the republican idea within and without Nation States.
Introduction
Authors: Tansey Oisín 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This introductory chapter sets out the theoretical and empirical context for the book and outlines the overall argument. It situates the book within two literatures — those relating to statebuilding and those relating to democratization — and highlights the ways in which the book will make a contribution to both. It sets out the core arguments of the book, and places the subject of book within its historical context, highlighting the history of international administration of territory. The chapter also outlines the methodological approach taken, which involves a comparison of three cases and the use of the process tracing method in each.
UNTAET in East Timor
Authors: Tansey Oisín 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter analyses the process of democratic regime-building in East Timor, concentrating in particular on the period of administration by UNTAET between 1999 and 2002. Using documentary and elite interview data, it traces the influence of the UN administration in East Timor and highlights the particular form of interaction between domestic and international actors. Although distinct tensions emerged between international and domestic actors, the transition process in East Timor entailed little serious political deadlock between international and domestic actors, and thus entailed limited imposition on the part of the international administrators. The parties combined to bring about a largely consensual and pacted political transition.
UNMIK in Kosovo
Authors: Tansey Oisín 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
Kosovo came under international administration in 1999 by a UN civilian mission, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). This chapter explores the ways in which the UNMIK mission has played a critical role in promoting and shaping democratization in Kosovo, and identifies the mechanisms of influence used by the international mission in a range of political arenas. It demonstrates that the mode of transition in Kosovo has entailed a combination of a joint international and domestic pact on the democratic project, as international and domestic actors have frequently worked together to guide political development. However, while UNMIK has worked closely with local actors on the political transition, it has also regularly felt the need to rely both on the use of conditionality and, at times, the imposition of political decisions against the wishes of domestic actors. Overshadowing all developments in Kosovo has been its complicated status issue, which continues to present obstacles to democratic consolidation.
Prosecuting Domestic Violence
Authors: Madden Dempsey Michelle 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
What should public prosecutors do when victims withdraw support for domestic violence prosecutions? This book defends the claim that (within the realm of justified/permissible action) prosecutors should respond effectively; which is to say that ceteris paribus domestic-violence prosecutors should respond as feminists. This claim is intended as a provocative formulation of the proposition that domestic violence prosecutors should act for reasons generated by the value of reconstituting their states (and communities) as less patriarchal. In defending this claim, the book first sets out a general theory of prosecutorial practical reasoning and then considers the prosecution of domestic-violence offences in particular. Along the way, it provides an original account of the nature of prosecutorial action, the values that can be realized through such action, and the relationship between these values and the practical reasoning of criminal prosecutors. Moreover, it provides analyses of two key concepts — domestic violence and patriarchy — and explains the relevance of the latter to a proper understanding of the former. Putting these insights to work in answering the question stated above, this book provides an account of what prosecutors would be justified in doing in such cases and what prosecutors should do in order to be effective as domestic violence prosecutors. Later chapters apply this general framework in addressing the rights and duties of domestic violence victims to participate in criminal prosecutions and responding to some general objections that might be raised against envisioning the role of domestic-violence-prosecutor-as-feminist.
Prosecutors: What They Are and What They Do
Authors: Madden Dempsey Michelle 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter outlines an account of prosecutors and prosecutorial action, providing a rough basis for understanding what we consider when we consider prosecutors and prosecution, by attempting to identify the rationally salient features of this role and practice. The account provided herein is grounded in the simple observation that whatever else they may be, prosecutors are people. Of course, however, prosecutors also stand in a particular type of legal role, and this role affects the moral reasons that apply to prosecutors qua prosecutors. From these starting points, this chapter attempts to explain and defend the following claims: (1) that prosecutors are people who act in the role of legal prosecutorial official on behalf of the state and (potentially) their communities; and (2) that prosecutorial actions are actions that prosecutors take qua prosecutors, consisting of both prosecutorial pursuit actions and prosecutorial non-pursuit actions.
Prosecutorial Action and Value
Authors: Madden Dempsey Michelle 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter identifies various ways in which prosecutorial actions might relate to value and elaborates five kinds of value that prosecutorial action may have: (1) consequential value, the value prosecutorial action may have in virtue of its actual or expected consequences, and four kinds of intrinsic value; (2) telic value, the value prosecutorial action may have insofar as it attempts to secure valuable consequences, even when those consequences are neither expected nor actually realized; (3) expressive value, the value prosecutorial action may have insofar as it denounces wrongdoing or exonerates the blameless; (4) retributive value, the value prosecutorial action may have insofar as it imposes suffering upon wrongdoers commensurate to their wrongdoing; and (5) constitutive value, the value prosecutorial actions may have insofar as they are constitutive of valuable character traits in the prosecutor's state and/or community.
Reasons for Prosecutors
Authors: Madden Dempsey Michelle 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter reflects upon the issue of prosecutorial practical reason. This issue is approached somewhat indirectly, building upon the account of prosecutorial action and value developed in the two preceding chapters, and introducing a thesis regarding the relationship between action, value, and reason. According to this thesis (the normal correspondence thesis) if a person can realize a value through her action, then normally she will have a reason to act so as to realize that value. If the thesis is true, then the reasons that apply to prosecutorial action are potentially as numerous as the values that prosecutorial actions can realize. Further, this chapter introduces an important distinction between ‘reasons to do it yourself’ and ‘reasons to help someone else do it’, and explains why this distinction is key to understanding both the practical reasons that apply to prosecutors and the value of maintaining the prosecutorial role.
Patriarchy
Authors: Madden Dempsey Michelle 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter offers an account of patriarchy, understood here as a wrongful structural inequality against which feminism is concerned to act. By providing an account of what being patriarchal means, it seeks to illuminate by contrast what it means to be feminist, and thus to clarify the book's overarching thesis that ceteris paribus domestic-violence prosecutors should be feminists. After setting its discussion within the context of intersectionality discourse, the chapter proceeds to unpack the wrongness of patriarchy in terms of its tendency to limit systematically women's access to options that are critical to the success of their lives. This tendency is elaborated by way of a tripartite analysis in which it is claimed that patriarchy may consist in sex discrimination (denying valuable options to women based on misconceptions), sexism (denying valuable options based on a failure to value women), and/or misogyny (malicious securing disvalue for women).
Conclusion
Authors: Madden Dempsey Michelle 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This concluding chapter addresses broad questions regarding the use of prosecution (and criminal law more generally) to address violence against women. Along the way, it addresses the critique that the criminal law is too ‘blunt an instrument’ to address problems such as domestic violence adequately, and the possibility that feminist prosecutorial action may spark a backlash. The claim defended throughout this book (and reinforced through the arguments of this chapter) is that we do not need to reject criminal prosecution as a viable part of the feminist struggle against domestic violence and patriarchy more generally. Rather, there is good reason to believe that feminist engagement with the criminal justice system is a potentially valuable path to the creation of a more feminist state, a more feminist community, and the end of domestic violence as we know it.
About Morality and the Nature of Law
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter explores the connection between law and morality. It argues that the denial of necessary connections between law and morality cannot be sustained. However, many of the claims of specific necessary connections between law and morality made by legal theorists are mistaken. The chapter contends that while there are necessary connections between morality and how the law is, the more significant necessary connections relate to the evaluative perspective which informs our thinking of how the law ought to be, rather than how it is.
Incorporation by Law
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter addresses the question of how the law can be incorporated within morality and how the existence of the law can impinge on our moral rights and duties — a question (or questions) which is a central aspect of the broad question of the relation between law and morality. It casts doubts on the incorporation thesis, that is, the view that moral principles can become part of the law of the land by incorporation.
Reasoning with Rules
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter addresses the question: How can it be that rules are reasons when they do not point to a good in the action for which they are reason? This phenomenon is referred to as the opaqueness of rules. It focuses on one type of rule — rules which are man-made — and which require conduct unconditionally. It argues that what is true of them is true of other man-made rules, but may not be true of other reason-constituting rules.
Why Interpret?
Authors: Raz Joseph 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter on legal interpretation considers the question: Why is interpretation central to legal practices? After all not all normative practices assign interpretation such a central role. In this regard the law contrasts with morality. The reason for the contrast has to do with the status of sources in the law. There are no ‘moral sources’, while legal sources are central to the law. It argues that legal interpretation is primarily the interpretation not of the law, but of its sources. To understand why interpretation is central to legal practices requires understanding the role of sources in the law: the reasons for having them, and hence also the ways in which they should be treated. The chapter shows how reflections about these topics connect with some traditional jurisprudential puzzles, such as the relations between law and morality.
Antithetical Arts
Authors: Kivy Peter 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThis book constitutes a defence of musical formalism against those who would put literary interpretations on the absolute music canon. In Part I, the historical origins of both the literary interpretation of absolute music and musical formalism are laid out. In Part II, specific attempts to put literary interpretations on various works of the absolute music canon are examined and criticized. Finally, in Part III, the question is raised as to what the human significance of absolute music is, if it does not lie in its representational or narrative content. The answer is that, as yet, philosophy has no answer, and that the question should be considered an important one for philosophers of art to consider, and to try to answer without appeal to representational or narrative content.
Body and Soul
Authors: Kivy Peter 
Published: May 2009

AbstractEduard Hanslick's ‘little book’ (as he called it), Vom Musikalisch-Schönen, has become, in recent years, a text celebre among those philosophers who began, not too long ago, to interest themselves in the special problems that music might present to their subject. Standing alone as the inaugural work in the history of musical formalism as a philosophical position, Hanslick's little book has received close scrutiny in recent years by a number of aestheticians. But viewed it the light of Wilhelm August Ambros's ‘answer’ another ‘little book’, entitled Der Grenzen der Musik und Poesie: Eine Studie zur Aesthetik der Tonkunst, provides a better idea of its philosophical significance. In light of Ambros's critique of Hanslick, this chapter explores what Hanslick had to say.
Action and Agency
Authors: Kivy Peter 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThis chapter begins by stating the ‘problem’ of absolute music: what it is in or about absolute music that gives what appears, at least, to be the same kind of deep satisfaction that the other arts, the arts with content, give. The problem thus being stated, the unenlightened one would then be ready to hear that a proposed solution to the problem of absolute music, popular both in philosophical and music-theoretical circles, is to deny that absolute music does indeed want for literary content. But here the unenlightened one becomes puzzled. So how can the appeal of absolute music be explained by appeal to its narrative content? If it has narrative content, then it isn't absolute music? The simplicity of this disguises an insight worth pursuing, which the chapter does.
Practical Intelligence and the Virtues
Authors: Russell Daniel C. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractOne of the most important developments in modern moral philosophy is the resurgence of interest in the virtues. This book explores two important hopes for such an approach to moral thought: that starting from the virtues should cast light on what makes an action right, and that notions like character, virtue, and vice should yield a plausible picture of human psychology. The book argues that the key to each of these hopes is an understanding of the cognitive and deliberative skills involved in the virtues. If right action is defined in terms of acting generously or kindly, then these virtues must involve skills for determining what the kind or generous thing to do would be on a given occasion. The book also argues that understanding virtuous action as the intelligent pursuit of virtuous goals yields a promising picture of the psychology of virtue. On the whole, this book develops an Aristotelian account of the virtue of practical intelligence or phronesis — an excellence of deliberating and making choices — and argues that phronesis is a necessary part of every virtue. This emphasis on the roots of the virtues in the practical intellect contrasts with ambivalence about the practical intellect in much recent work on the virtues. This book also examines issues like the unity of the virtues, responsibility for character, and “the virtuous person”.
The Enumeration Problem
Authors: Russell Daniel C. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThis chapter articulates a problem that virtue ethicists and their critics alike have almost entirely ignored, but which if unresolved would jeopardize the very possibility of virtue ethics. This problem stems from the conjunction of a necessary feature of virtue ethics and a commonplace one. The necessary feature is that virtue ethics understands right actions and virtuous persons in terms of the virtues, in the plural; and the commonplace is that virtue ethicists tend to be so open-handed about what “the virtues” are that on many theories there will be infinitely many of them. If right action is action in accordance with the virtues, and a virtuous person a person who has the virtues, but virtue ethics tells us that the virtues are infinitely many, then virtue ethics cannot say what right action is action in accordance with, or what it would be to be a virtuous person. This problem is called here the “enumeration problem”.
Magnificence, Generosity, and Subordination
Authors: Russell Daniel C. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractAristotle's introduction of “magnificence” — a virtue concerned with large-scale public spending — into his list of virtues raises a question pertinent to the enumeration problem: given the lack of cardinality in Aristotle's list, what principle if any could be given for recognizing magnificence as a primitive virtue, without also paving the way for infinitely many other primitive virtues? This chapter argues that, in light of the enumeration problem, a better way to handle a virtue like magnificence is to make it subordinate to a cardinal virtue, such as generosity. Magnificence therefore presents a ready opportunity to apply the account of cardinality developed in Chapter 6, viz. that virtues are to be individuated in terms of their respective forms of responsiveness to reasons, and that if one virtue is subordinate to another, then they are responsive to reasons of the same kind. The chapter argues that magnificence is a virtue, that reasons of magnificence are of the same kind as reasons of generosity, and that magnificence is subordinate to generosity in the sense of being a “specialization” of generosity.
Phronesis and the Unity of the Virtues
Authors: Russell Daniel C. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThe thesis that the virtues form a unity — in particular, that to have any virtue is to have them all — has struck many as hopelessly ambitious: isn't it obvious that people have some virtues and even the phronesis that goes with them, while nonetheless lacking other virtues? This chapter first considers whether the virtues conflict and whether the development of different virtues may be zero-sum, defending a negative answer in each case. It then defends the idea that what unifies the virtues is the phronesis they all share. Finally, it distinguishes between two interpretations of the unity thesis. The unity thesis is typically interpreted as holding that, for any agent, that agent can have phronesis only if that agent also has all the virtues. By contrast, the chapter interprets the unity thesis as holding that any theoretical model of phronesis must also be a model of all the virtues, and argues that, so interpreted, the unity thesis is true.
Responsibility for Character
Authors: Russell Daniel C. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractPhronesis involves self-construction that is responsive to reasons, so the question arises whether and how far humans are capable of self-construction. This chapter considers that question with respect in particular to the possibility of being responsible for one's character. It begins by contrasting compatibilist and incompatibilist views of responsibility for character, and then rejects the common incompatibilist view that genuine responsibility is so-called “ultimate responsibility”. In particular, the chapter rejects the incompatibilist view that responsibility for character is necessarily backward-looking, i.e., responsibility for how one's character came to be formed. Rather, it argues that a certain forward-looking aspect of practical reasoning about one's character (called “critical distance”) is both necessary and sufficient for responsibility for one's character.
Correctively Unjust Enrichment
Authors: Weinrib Ernest J 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
Unjust enrichment, understood as a defective transfer of value, gives rise to liability that instantiates corrective justice. As a characteristic of things of value (whether of objects or of labour), the value of the thing is an entitlement of the owner of the thing. But (as Hegel explains) value also has a set of characteristics (it is quantitative, intrinsically relational, and independent of the particularity of the owner) that allow the law to treat it in abstraction from the thing of value. Thus, the law can recognize a claim involving an unjust transfer of value even though the defendant's right to the thing of value is not in question. A transfer of value (‘enrichment at another's expense’) occurs when one transfers a thing of value without the reciprocal receipt of a thing of equivalent value. The question then arises whether such a transfer is ‘unjust’, that is, whether circumstances are present that create an obligation to retransfer the value. This obligation arises if the transferor has given the value without donative intent and if the value has been accepted by the transferee as non-donatively given; the transferee cannot keep for free what was given and received non-gratuitously. Incontrovertible benefit and change of position affect acceptance as an obligation-creating condition, not enrichment as an aspect of transfer. Accordingly, an unjust enrichment situates the parties correlatively as transferor and transferee of what was not transferred gratuitously, thereby conforming to corrective justice. In accordance with Kant's conception of an in personam right as a right to the causality of another's will, the claimant's right is not to the value as such, but to having the value retransferred. This is the right to which the defendant's duty to make restitution is correlative.