bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Golden Rule and a Theory of Moral Reasoning
Authors: Carson Thomas L. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter develops a theory of moral reasoning in the form of rationality conditions for moral judgments. The chapter argues that moral judges must be: 1) consistent, 2) adequately informed by knowledge of relevant facts (this requires vividly understanding relevant considerations, including the feelings of others), and 3) able to reason properly and have properly functioning cognitive abilities. The chapter argues that requirements of consistency commit us to the following version of the golden rule: “If I think it would be morally permissible for someone to do a certain act to another person, then I must not object to someone doing the same act to me (or someone I love) in relevantly similar circumstances.” The chapter answers several well-known objections to the golden rule and illustrate how it can be applied to cases.
The Partial Overlap/Convergence of Reasonable Views
Authors: Carson Thomas L. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThe rationality and consistency tests defended in Chapter 6 can be used to discredit and rule out certain moral principles and moral judgments and, thus, indirectly establish the truth of certain other moral judgments and moral principles. This chapter argues that there is a large overlap or convergence in the moral judgments about lying and deception of people whose judgments satisfy rationality/consistency requirements. The moral principles and moral judgments about lying and deception that survive rationality and consistency tests support a moral presumption against harmful lying and deception that is at least as strong as that endorsed by (welfare maximizing versions of) act-utilitarianism. Moral principles and moral judgments that claim or imply that lying or deception is permissible in cases in which it harms others and the harm it causes outweighs the benefits it produces fail rationality/consistency tests. In addition, the view that lying and/or deception are always wrong no matter what does not survive consistency and rationality tests.
Deception and Withholding Information in Sales
Authors: Carson Thomas L. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThe chapter argues that salespeople have prima facie duties to: (1) warn customers of potential hazards; (2) refrain from lying and deception; (3) fully and honestly answer questions about what they are selling (insofar as their knowledge and time constraints permit); and (4) refrain from steering customers toward purchases they have reason to think will be harmful to customers. The chapter defend this theory by appeal to the version of golden rule and the strong presumption against harmful lying and deception established in Chapters 6 and 7. The chapter also analyzes cases of deception and withholding information in sales. This chapter gives the book's most detailed application of the golden rule to particular cases.
Honesty, Professionals, and the Vulnerability of the Public
Authors: Carson Thomas L. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractOften, professionals are in a position to advance their own financial interests by means of lying and deception, e.g., lying to a client to manipulate her into purchasing unneeded services. This creates very serious ethical problems because clients often have no way to assess the truth of what professionals tell them. We are at the mercy of professionals and need to rely on their honesty. This chapter presents examples that illustrate this important and wide‐spread phenomenon and argue that the financial benefits professionals often derive from deception create systemic conflicts of interest. Professionals should adhere to a strong presumption against lying and deception in their dealings with their clients. In addition, all, or almost all, professionals have a duty to warn others of potential health and safety hazards and refrain from steering clients/customers toward decisions they have reason to think will be harmful to them. Professionals who work on the understanding that they are acting as fiduciaries (or quasi‐fiduciaries) for the benefit of their clients/employers are obligated to do much more than this. They must be candid and provide salient information that clients/employers need. Those who have fiduciary duties to others have extensive positive duties to provide information to others – they must do more than refrain from lying and deception. Perhaps the most fully developed account of the obligation of individuals to provide information is found in the principle of informed consent in medicine. The chapter explains this principle and ask how far it can or should be extended to other professions. The chapter argues that informed consent is a good model for professionals who are hired and paid by their clients and have fiduciary duties to act for the benefit of their clients, but not for professionals who do not have fiduciary duties to their clients/customers.
A Minimalist theory of feature structure
Authors: Adger David 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter gives an explicit Minimalist theory of feature structure based on the ideas that (i) Merge is the sole source of structure embedding, (ii) lexical items are composed of features. It follows that features cannot themselves involve structure embedding, contrary to what is assumed in HPSG, LFG, FUG. This is the No Complex Values hypothesis. I show how it restricts the range of analyses available for selectional phenomena.
Features and computational semantics
Authors: Copestake Ann , Flickinger Dan 
Published: September 2010

AbstractApproaches to compositional semantics for broad‐coverage computational grammars must be compatible with resource and processing limitations. This affects the feature architecture, in particular the interaction between the use of features in syntax and morphology and their potential semantic interpretation. We discuss these issues with respect to the DELPH‐IN grammars, using English morphological plurals as an example.
A General Theory of Domination and Justice
Authors: Lovett Frank 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIn all societies, past and present, many persons and groups have been subject to domination. Properly understood, domination is a great evil, the suffering of which ought to be minimized as far as possible. Surprisingly, however, political and social theorists have failed to provide a detailed analysis of the concept of domination in general. This study aims to redress this lacuna. It argues first that domination should be understood as a condition experienced by persons or groups to the extent that they are dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them; this is termed the “arbitrary power conception” of domination. Second, it argues that we should regard it as wrong to perpetrate or permit unnecessary domination and, thus, that as a matter of justice the political and social institutions and practices of any society should be organized so as to minimize avoidable domination; this is termed “justice as minimizing domination (JMD),” a conception of social justice that connects with more familiar civic republican accounts of freedom as nondomination. In developing these arguments, this study employs a variety of methodological techniques — including conceptual analysis, formal modeling, social theory, and moral philosophy; existing accounts of dependency, power, social convention, and so on are clarified, expanded, or revised along the way. While of special interest to contemporary civic republicans, this study should appeal to a broad audience with diverse methodological and substantive interests.
Arbitrariness and Social Conventions
Authors: Lovett Frank 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter considers and rejects hegemony and other form‐based conceptions of domination. It defends instead an arbitrary power conception, according to which one person or group experienced domination to the extent that it is dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields arbitrary power over them. The idea of arbitrariness is analyzed with the aid of a discussion of social conventions. Democratic and other substantive interpretations of arbitrariness are rejected in favor of a procedural interpretation.
A General Theory of Clarity and Distinctness
Authors: Smith Kurt 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIn this chapter a general theory of clarity and distinctness is developed, as it is found in one of the earliest of Descartes's writings, the Rules. Here, the chapter explains that the systematic schema of simple natures, which are the elements of our ideas, is what Descartes calls an enumeration. This, the chapter discovers, is an ancestor to what today is called a logical partition. The method is shown to have utilized equivalence relations, which Descartes calls common notions. It is the Cartesian method of analysis.
The General Theory Continued
Authors: Smith Kurt 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIn this chapter the general theory of clarity and distinctness is further developed. The chapter explains how Descartes's method of analysis (for establishing the schema of clear and distinct ideas) looks to be an ancestor to the sort of constructional system developed by Rudolph Carnap in his Aufbau. Here, the chapter finally arrives at a rigorous statement of the systematic Cartesian concepts of clarity and distinctness, and how these connect to Descartes's concepts of intuition, deduction, and enumeration.
Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Metaphor
Authors: Smith Kurt 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter looks specifically at Leibniz's conception of mathematical structure—an ideal structure underlying the very possibility of the actual world. Both his early and late views are considered. The chapter shows how it is that Leibniz employed mathematics as a metaphor aimed at explicating his metaphysical views. The metaphysical concepts of unity and harmony, for example, are made clearer by looking at how Leibniz conceived them via the mathematical concepts of function and determinant.
Empirical Ideality, Reality, and Matter
Authors: Smith Kurt 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter explores the sense in which Descartes took matter to be empirically real. This requires the chapter to look at the Sixth Meditation proof for the existence of bodies. Here, the chapter carefully studies Descartes's formal‐objective reality distinction and his material‐objective distinction. Within this discussion, two competing interpretations are examined: the traditional representationalist reading and a relatively new direct realist reading.
Empirical Reality and Intelligible Matter
Authors: Smith Kurt 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIn this chapter another new interpretation of Descartes is examined, a view which argues that Descartes took there to be only one body, known as res extensa, to exist independent of mind. This is contrasted with the earlier, traditional reading, which reads Descartes as holding that bodies (plural) exist independent of mind. It is argued that these interpretations are in the end not in competition, but rather track different strains of thought in Descartes concerning the reality of matter. The ‘many bodies’ view is read as tracking Descartes's thinking that matter is empirically real, the ‘one body’ view as tracking his thinking that matter is either transcendentally ideal or transcendentally real.
Transcendental Matter
Authors: Smith Kurt 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIn this chapter two possible transcendental readings of Descartes's view on matter are examined. Here, the sense in which matter was taken by Descartes to be the condition underlying the conceivability of empirically real bodies is established. What is more, it is shown how this conception of matter (as an underlying condition of conceivability) applies to mathematical objects, such as numbers and geometrical figures. Appended to this chapter is the final word: ‘Tying Up the Loose Ends—Closing Remarks.’ In this last section, the chapter reflects on the seventeenth‐century answer to the question, ‘Why matter?’, posed at the beginning of the book.
Apparent Hyper‐raising in Brazilian Portuguese: Agreement with Topics across a Finite CP
Authors: Martins Ana Maria , Nunes Jairo 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that constructions that apparently involve hyper‐raising with resumption in Brazilian Portuguese actually result from A‐movement of an embedded topic. This chapter accounts for the mixed A/A′‐properties of the matrix subject of these constructions and provides independent evidence for Chomksy's (2001) version of the Phase Impenetrability Condition.
Nested Interrogatives and the Locus ofWh
Authors: Preminger Omer 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter discusses the behavior of certain wh‐island‐violating (but felicitous) constructions in Hebrew, which exhibit two interesting characteristics: superiority effects, and a sensitivity to the distinction between short vs. long wh‐movement. This chapter proposes an analysis based on the assumption that in Hebrew, the relevant wh‐feature resides on a head lower than C0, but CP is still equipped with a single specifier position that can be utilized for successive‐cyclic wh‐movement. The proposal is supported by the existence of independent cases of A′‐movement to a position below the overt complementizer in Hebrew.
The Possibility of Self-Defence Against Non-State Actors
Authors: Lubell Noam 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter analyses the question of whether self-defence as understood in international law, encompasses the possibility of using extraterritorial force against armed groups abroad. It examines the prohibition on the use of force, and whether the concept of ‘armed attack’ as appears in the rules of self-defence, includes attacks by non-state actors. The chapter also analyses the impact on this issue caused by the potential links between the non-state actor and the state in which the group is located.
Measures Taken Outside the Self-Defence Framework
Authors: Lubell Noam 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter questions whether extraterritorial use of force against non-state actors might, in certain conditions, not be a breach of international law, even if taken outside the framework of self-defence. The concepts of countermeasures, necessity, hot pursuit, and piracy are examined. In addition, there is an analysis of the possibility of alternative paradigms or interpretations that might be claimed to allow for use of force other than in self-defence, such as ‘extraterritorial law enforcement’.
Force Against Non-State Actors as Armed Conflict
Authors: Lubell Noam 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter begins the examination of whether international humanitarian law is an appropriate legal framework that can be applied to extraterritorial force against non-state actors. This includes both the possibilities of such measures being categorised as international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. The notion of non-international conflicts as including extra-territorial circumstances is considered, as are the criteria for determination of such conflicts, including threshold of violence and identification of the parties to the conflict.
The Principal Practices and Primarily Affected Rights
Authors: Lubell Noam 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter examines the human rights primarily affected by extraterritorial force against non-state actors. Extraterritorial forcible measures used by states against individuals often include state agents (acting outside their own sovereign territory) being responsible for one or more of: lethal or potentially lethal force, ill-treatment of persons in their custody, abduction, and deprivation of liberty. These are examined in turn, as is the possibility of restricting or derogating from these rights.
Concluding Chapter
Authors: Lubell Noam 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter utilises the analysis conducted throughout the book, and applies it in the context of two cases. The first is the conflict between Israel and the Hezbollah in the summer of 2006. The second is the targeted killings conducted by the US in Yemen and Pakistan. The rules of the ius ad bellum are examined, as are the rules regulating the use of force, whether human rights law or international humanitarian law. The chapter concludes with a summary of the analysis and identification of the challenges yet to be resolved.
The Nature and Value of Knowledge
Authors: Pritchard Duncan , Millar Alan , Haddock Adrian 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
The three parts of the book comprise three distinct investigations under a common theme: enquiry into inter-relationships between issues about the nature of knowledge and issues about the value of knowledge. The first investigation provides an analysis of problems concerning the value of knowledge and a critical examination of responses to these by virtue epistemologists. The book finds virtue-theoretic accounts wanting and argues that there is a cognitive state — understanding — which is similar to, but different from knowledge, and which has final value. In the second investigation the book presents accounts of perceptual knowledge, knowledge from indicator phenomena, and knowledge from testimony, in each of which recognitional abilities feature prominently. Consideration of these abilities, the book claims, enables us to reach a better understanding of knowledge and its value. The third investigation focuses on the relationship between perceptual knowledge and knowledge of our own intentional actions. The book argues for an account of knowledge and justification to which a certain kind of second-order knowledge is central and applies this both to perceptual knowledge, and knowledge of our own intentional actions, with a view to explaining ways in which knowledge is of value.
Perceptual Knowledge and Recognitional Abilities
Authors: Millar Alan 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter gives an account of perceptual knowledge in which perceptual-recognitional abilities are central. These abilities are nothing less than knowledge-acquisition abilities. They include abilities to tell of certain things from their appearances to some sensory modality that they are of some kind or have some property. Emphasis is placed on the following ideas: that perceptual-recognitional abilities are abilities with respect to favourable environments — ones in which the things in question have distinctive appearances; and that the notion of the exercise of such an ability is a success notion. Against this background a perspective on barn examples is given and the incorporated conception of abilities is contrasted with that which figures in the virtue-theoretic approach developed by Ernest Sosa. It is argued that reductive accounts of cognitive abilities do not reflect the order of our ordinary understanding of knowledge. Issues concerning justified belief, closure, and doxastic responsibility are explored.
Knowledge from Indicators
Authors: Millar Alan 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter develops an account of clinching evidence in relation to knowledge from indicators, such as knowing that it has rained recently from the wetness of outdoor surfaces. A standard way of understanding such cases, in terms of reliance on a covering generalization, is resisted. An alternative view is presented in terms of abilities to recognize the significance of the indicator phenomenon in question. These abilities are found to be closely analogous to perceptual-recognitional abilities as discussed in the previous chapter. An account is given of detached standing knowledge — standing knowledge of, e.g., geographical facts, on the part of subjects who have lost touch with the source of information from which they acquired the knowledge. It is argued that our recognitional abilities are informed by understandings but that not all the elements of these understandings have the status of knowledge; this is not taken to be problematic.
The Social Transmission of Knowledge
Authors: Millar Alan 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter argues that the goal of enquiry is reflective knowledge. Reflective knowledge is knowledge along with knowledge of how we know, or at least knowledge that we know. Recently discussed puzzlement about the value of knowledge is circumvented. The social transmission of knowledge is explored via a discussion of straightforward cases of testimony. An account of those cases is developed, drawing on the account of knowledge from indicators in the previous chapter but also invoking the idea that there is a practice of informing others by telling them things. A practice is taken to be a cluster of essentially rule-governed activities. It is argued that the account of practices does not suffice to explain the straightforward cases. We need to make sense of how we can recognize trustworthiness on the matter in hand.
Second‐Order Knowledge
Authors: Haddock Adrian 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that the regress of justifications can be satisfactorily avoided by seeing the second-order knowledge of the justification involved in visual knowledge as knowledge of a transparent fact, which constitutes an entitlement, but not a justification to the belief this second-order knowledge involves. The disjunctive conception of visual experience is employed to shed light on the idea of a transparent fact. This account can seem to be vulnerable to two powerful arguments: first, Williamson's argument against luminosity; and secondly, a version of McKinsey's argument against the idea of non-empirical knowledge of ‘broad’ mental states. It is suggested that the first argument does not affect the present account, and that the second argument can be avoided with the help of a distinction between the entitlements to, and the presuppositions of, the beliefs which knowledge involves. The upshot is an account of the second-order knowledge which visual knowledge involves as non-empirical knowledge, and hence as a species of privileged self-knowledge.
Punishing the Dead?
Authors: Houston R. A. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Suicide, that most personal of acts, has considerable public import. Drawing ideas from a range of disciplines including law, philosophy, social sciences and literary studies as well as history, this book offers comprehensive analyses of how suicide was seen by the living in pre‐modern Britain and how they dealt with its aftermath. Suicide was a crime which could incur financial and corporal penalties, yet attitudes were often humane and pragmatic.
Chapter 2 The OECD's Global Role: Agenda‐setting and Policy Diffusion
Authors: Ougaard Morten 
Published: September 2010

AbstractChapter 2 analyzes the OECD's roles in global governance. The organization is a network of trans‐governmental networks linking government bureaucracies in member and (increasingly also) non‐member states, emerging economies in particular. Its institutional advantages are its broad and select member‐ship, and its ability to work with practically all policy areas. In a highly variable and flexible in‐stitutional geometry, the OECD is the site for a range of governance activities pertaining to agenda setting, soft harmonization of national policies across multiple policy areas, and hard regulation in the form of conventions and other instruments where the OECD represents a forum for inter‐state decision making as well as policy implementation. Morten Ougaard argues that the OECD facilitates the development of joint responses to common challenges and consensus on broad contours of strategic direction setting in macro‐economic and other policy areas. It is a forum and force for soft and gradual political integration among members.