bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Pentecostal Theology: Retrospect and Prospect
Authors: Stephenson Christopher A. 
Published: September 2011

AbstractDue to its vast geographic and numerical expansion, pentecostalism exhibits many of the contextual complexities of a global religious tradition. Therefore, the topic ‘pentecostal theology’ can easily succumb to death by a thousand qualifications. At the same time, there are concrete historical developments and sufficient theological commonalities that allow for a survey that does not underestimate the many variations of pentecostal theology. First, I trace the developments of the ‘three waves’ of pentecostalism. I briefly discuss some of their respective major figures and theological emphases. While the term ‘three waves’ has become a standard designation for recounting the phases of pentecostal history and theology, the rise of academic theology within first‐wave pentecostalism defies some of the schema’s categorizations. Therefore, I, second, trace this turn to academic theology. From their early creation of Bible schools to their more recent attainment of advanced training in religious studies, first‐wave pentecostals demonstrate an increasing interest in obtaining terminal theological training. Some of the most recent of these scholars are the first within first‐wave pentecostalism to take up systematic/constructive theology. While they have produced a significant amount of literature since the beginning of the 1990s, they have yet to receive extensive scholarly assessment. Therefore, I, third, introduce some major pentecostal systematic/constructive theologians.
Ethical Problems in New Religion Field Research
Authors: Dallam Marie W. 
Published: September 2011

AbstractScholars studying living religious communities confront myriad questions about all levels of appropriate social interaction, and fortunately some lessons from the disciplines of sociology and anthropology help us navigate the work. However, those engaging in research on New Religions may have added burdens, as the marginalized communities we study may be further complicated by factors such as exclusivity or defensiveness, among others. As we work to balance critical academic study with engagement that is sensitive to practitioners, we may find ourselves in murky ethical situations. This essay, the second of a two‐part series, discusses a range of unique ethical problems that those researching New Religions may confront, and for possible guidance it refers to specific examples faced by scholars in the past.
Ethical Design of New Religion Field Projects
Authors: Dallam Marie W. 
Published: September 2011

AbstractScholars studying living religious communities confront myriad questions about all levels of appropriate social interaction, and fortunately some lessons from the disciplines of sociology and anthropology help us navigate the work. However, those engaging in research on New Religions may have added burdens, as the marginalized communities we study may be further complicated by factors such as exclusivity or defensiveness, among others. As we work to balance critical academic study with engagement that is sensitive to practitioners, we may find ourselves in murky ethical situations. This essay, the first in a two‐part series, discusses a range of ethically charged problems that should be considered in the course of designing a sound research fieldwork project involving a New Religion. For guidance it refers to specific examples faced by scholars in the past.
The Lingering Effects of Our Past Experiences: The Sunk‐Cost Fallacy and the Inaction‐Inertia Effect
Authors: Tykocinski Orit E. , Ortmann Andreas 
Published: September 2011

AbstractThe effect of past experiences and actions in shaping current perceptions, emotions, decisions and goals is widely recognized in the psychological literature. When it comes to economic decisions, however, these influences are sometimes seen as impediments to rational decision‐making. In an attempt to explore the enduring consequences of the past, we present, compare, and discuss two familiar behavioral phenomena: The sunk‐cost effect, which refers to situations where continued actions are fueled by past investments, and the inaction‐inertia effect, in which continued inaction is triggered by the shadows of missed opportunities. Although one process elicits continued action and the other continued inaction, we show that there is a great deal of similarity in the psychological underpinnings of these effects, and argue that respecting sunk costs and avoiding actions that are associated with forgone opportunities are not necessarily unreasonable, or maladaptive behaviors.
Embodied Cultural Cognition: Situating the Study of Embodied Cognition in Socio‐Cultural Contexts
Authors: Leung Angela K.–y. , Qiu Lin , Ong Laysee , Tam Kim‐Pong 
Published: September 2011

AbstractEmbodiment research has demonstrated that cognition is grounded in bodily interactions with the environment and that abstract concepts are tied to the body’s sensory and motor systems. Building upon this embodiment perspective and advancing our understanding, we discuss the extension of embodied cultural cognition. We propose that some associations between bodily experiences and abstract concepts are not randomly formed; rather, the development of such associations is situated in a socio‐cultural context, informed by cultural imperatives, values, and habits. We draw evidence supporting this view of embodied cultural cognition in body–mind linkages manifested in construal of emotions, time perception, person perception, social power, and moral reasoning. To further extend this research avenue that synthesizes the studies of embodied cognition and culture, we also suggest potential future research directions inspired by this view. This embodied cultural cognition account is useful in understanding and organizing accumulating discoveries of cultural variations in embodiments; it also highlights the social situatedness of embodied cognition and is, therefore, highly compatible with theorizing and research in social and cultural psychology.
Human Psychological Autonomy: Reflections on the Debates about its Understanding in Modern Psychology
Authors: Chirkov Valery I. 
Published: September 2011

AbstractThis article addresses the centuries old but recently revived topic of human autonomy and its relation to people’s functioning: physiological, psychological, and socio‐cultural. It provides a review of current debates about status, nature, and perspectives of studying autonomy, agency, free will and self‐determination in neuro‐ and cognitive sciences, motivation, personality and cultural psychology. This review starts with the theoretical definitions of the concepts and differentiatespersonal, intrapsychic,andmotivational autonomyas well asbehavioral freedom; delineates the distinction betweenautonomousandcontrolledforms of humanagency;and relates all these concepts to the notion of human happiness and optimal functioning. It supports the idea of the universality of psychological autonomy as a fundamental capability of human species and argues that this capability is a real natural power that does not contradict the principle of determinism. Special attention is paid to the debates about the role culture plays in enabling and regulating human autonomy. The idea of dialectical relations between culture and human autonomy is presented and defended.
Hindsight Bias: A Primer for Motivational Researchers
Authors: Pezzo Mark V. 
Published: September 2011

AbstractThirty‐five years since the publication ofFischhoff’s (1975)seminal article, we continue to be fascinated by the hindsight bias. Like a well‐developed character in a novel, the bias has something for everyone. Its basic tenet – that things seem less surprising in hindsight than they should – is instantly recognizable as a common human flaw. It is robust, often difficult to reduce, and appeals to researchers with a wide range of interests including history, business, law, medicine, and of course, psychology. This interest stems from the belief that failure to be surprised by an event prevents us from learning from it, and will likely cause us to judge others unfairly for not having been able to foresee it. But just how bad is it? Although guided by a cold cognitive mechanism that ‘creeps up’ on us, hindsight bias is complex, seemingly strengthened, and yet also reduced by self‐serving motives. In this article, I introduce the reader to the basic designs used to study the bias, key cognitive and motivational mechanisms, the major controversies, and some unstudied questions that I hope will guide future research.
Canine reference intervals for the Sysmex XT‐2000iV hematology analyzer
Authors: Bourgès‐Abella Nathalie , Geffré Anne , Concordet Didier , Braun Jean‐Pierre , Trumel Catherine 
Published: September 2011

Background: The laser‐based Sysmex XT‐2000iV hematology analyzer is increasingly used in veterinary clinical pathology laboratories, and instrument‐specific reference intervals for dogs are not available.Objective: The purpose of this study was to establish canine hematologic reference intervals according to International Federation of Clinical Chemistry and Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute guidelines using the Sysmex XT‐2000iV hematology analyzer.Methods: Blood samples from 132 healthy purebred dogs from France, selected to represent the most prevalent canine breeds in France, were analyzed. Blood smears were scored for platelet (PLT) aggregates. Reference intervals were established using the nonparametric method. PLT and RBC counts obtained by impedance and optical methods were compared. Effects of sex and age on reference intervals were determined.Results: The correlation between impedance (I) and optical (O) measurements of RBC and PLT counts was excellent (Pearson r=.99 and .98, respectively); however, there were significant differences between the 2 methods (Student's paired t‐test, P<.0001). Differences between sexes were not significant except for HCT, PLT‐I, and PLT‐O. WBC, lymphocyte, and neutrophil counts decreased significantly with age (ANOVA, P<.05). Median eosinophil counts were higher in Brittany Spaniels (1.87 × 109/L), Rottweilers (1.41 × 109/L), and German Shepherd dogs (1.38 × 109/L) than in the overall population (0.9 × 109/L). PLT aggregates were responsible for lower PLT counts by the impedance, but not the optical, method.Conclusion: Reference intervals for hematologic analytes and indices were determined under controlled preanalytical and analytical conditions for a well‐characterized population of dogs according to international recommendations.
Canine differential leukocyte counting with the CellaVision DM96Vision, Sysmex XT‐2000iV, and Advia 2120 hematology analyzers and a manual method
Authors: Tvedten Harold W. , Lilliehöök Inger E. 
Published: September 2011

Background: For differential leukocyte counts, automated blood smear evaluation systems have been too slow or inaccurate to replace or supplement the manual differential count. The CellaVision DM96Vision (DM96V), a new instrument, is an automated image analysis system that is rapid and accurate enough to be used for enumerating human leukocytes and may be useful for analysis of canine blood.Objectives: The aims of this study were to evaluate the performance of the DM96V in differential counting of canine leukocytes, to compare its performance with that of other methods, and to analyze interoperator variability.Methods: Four methods of determining the leukocyte differential count of 108 canine blood samples were compared based on agreement, precision, and errors as well as relative performance. Differential counts were obtained using the DM96V, the manual method, and automated methods performed by the Advia 2120 and Sysmex XT‐2000iV.Results: All leukocyte types were detected by the DM96V and the manual method, and all 4 methods had similar mean and median results in most cases. The automated methods were more precise than either the DM96V or manual method when comparing identification of a single type of leukocyte, especially neutrophils and lymphocytes. However, precision of the automated methods was only fair for monocytes, and the Advia and Sysmex failed to identify basophils. The Advia reported fewer monocytes and eosinophils than did the other methods. Significantly fewer lymphocytes were identified by the manual method than by the Sysmex, Advia, and DM96V. The DM96V occasionally presented duplicate images of the same neutrophils.Conclusions: The CellaVision DM96V is a satisfactory system for facilitating canine differential leukocyte counting. The DM96V differential count was more similar to the manual count than to automated counts, which were more precise but had errors and omissions in detecting some types of leukocytes.
Thermal and impact histories of reheated group IVA, IVB, and ungrouped iron meteorites and their parent asteroids
Authors: YANG J. , GOLDSTEIN J. I. , SCOTT E. R. D. , MICHAEL J. R. , KOTULA P. G. , PHAM T. , McCOY T. J. 
Published: September 2011

Abstract– The microstructures of six reheated iron meteorites—two IVA irons, Maria Elena (1935), Fuzzy Creek; one IVB iron, Ternera; and three ungrouped irons, Hammond, Babb’s Mill (Blake’s Iron), and Babb’s Mill (Troost’s Iron)—were characterized using scanning and transmission electron microscopy, electron‐probe microanalysis, and electron backscatter diffraction techniques to determine their thermal and shock history and that of their parent asteroids. Maria Elena and Hammond were heated below approximately 700–750 °C, so that kamacite was recrystallized and taenite was exsolved in kamacite and was spheroidized in plessite. Both meteorites retained a record of the original Widmanstätten pattern. The other four, which show no trace of their original microstructure, were heated above 600–700 °C and recrystallized to form 10–20 μm wide homogeneous taenite grains. On cooling, kamacite formed on taenite grain boundaries with their close‐packed planes aligned. Formation of homogeneous 20 μm wide taenite grains with diverse orientations would have required as long as approximately 800 yr at 600 °C or approximately 1 h at 1300 °C. All six irons contain approximately 5–10 μm wide taenite grains with internal microprecipitates of kamacite and nanometer‐scale M‐shaped Ni profiles that reach approximately 40% Ni indicating cooling over 100–10,000 yr. Un‐decomposed high‐Ni martensite (α2) in taenite—the first occurrence in irons—appears to be a characteristic of strongly reheated irons. From our studies and published work, we identified four progressive stages of shock and reheating in IVA irons using these criteria: cloudy taenite, M‐shaped Ni profiles in taenite, Neumann twin lamellae, martensite, shock‐hatched kamacite, recrystallization, microprecipitates of taenite, and shock‐melted troilite. Maria Elena and Fuzzy Creek represent stages 3 and 4, respectively. Although not all reheated irons contain evidence for shock, it was probably the main cause of reheating. Cooling over years rather than hours precludes shock during the impacts that exposed the irons to cosmic rays. If the reheated irons that we studied are representative, the IVA irons may have been shocked soon after they cooled below 200 °C at 4.5 Gyr in an impact that created a rubblepile asteroid with fragments from diverse depths. The primary cooling rates of the IVA irons and the proposed early history are remarkably consistent with the Pb‐Pb ages of troilite inclusions in two IVA irons including the oldest known differentiated meteorite (Blichert‐Toft et al. 2010).
EMPATHY AS A MORAL CONCEPT: COMMENTS ON JOHN DEIGH'S “EMPATHY, JUSTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE”
Authors: SCHAPIRO TAMAR 
Published: September 2011

abstractIn these brief comments, I explore some ambiguities concerning John Deigh's notion of empathy in relation to morality and justice. First, does Deigh conceive of empathy as a morally neutral capacity that can be used for good or bad purposes or, rather, as a capacity that presupposes a moral orientation? I look to his previous work and find evidence supporting both readings. I suggest that the right way to understand empathy is as a moral notion. Empathy is the product of an activity—the activity of empathizing. This activity in turn presupposes a certain moral orientation: one that involves placing a certain kind of value on others. I then ask whether Deigh equates empathy with the sense of justice. I do not believe he does, but still he does not say much about the relation between them. I suggest that while the two are not the same, and while there can be tension between them, they ultimately stem from the same basic moral orientation, one that at least vaguely resembles the morality of cooperation.
PSYCHOPATHY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE MORAL/CONVENTIONAL DISTINCTION
Authors: SHOEMAKER DAVID W. 
Published: September 2011

abstractIn this paper, I attempt to show that the moral/conventional distinction simply cannot bear the sort of weight many theorists have placed on it for determining the moral and criminal responsibility of psychopaths. After revealing the fractured nature of the distinction, I go on to suggest how one aspect of it may remain relevant—in a way that has previously been unappreciated—to discussions of the responsibility of psychopaths. In particular, after offering an alternative explanation of the available data on psychopaths and their judgments of various sorts of norm transgressions, I put forward a hybrid theory of their responsibility, suggesting how they might be criminally responsible, while nevertheless failing to meet the conditions for an important arena of moral responsibility.
THE SELVES AND THE SHOEMAKER: PSYCHOPATHS, MORAL JUDGMENT, AND RESPONSIBILITY
Authors: FINLAY STEPHEN 
Published: September 2011

abstractDavid Shoemaker argues from (a) psychopaths' emotional deficiency, to (b) their insensitivity to moral reasons, to (c) their lack of moral responsibility. This response observes three important ambiguities in his argument, involving the interpretation of (1) psychopaths' emotional deficit, (2) their insensitivity to reasons, and (3) their moral judgments. Resolving these ambiguities presents Shoemaker with a dilemma: his argument either equivocates or it is falsified by the empirical evidence. I then propose an alternative perspective on psychopaths' moral and criminal responsibility.
EMPATHY, APPROVAL, AND DISAPPROVAL INMORAL SENTIMENTALISM
Authors: D'ARMS JUSTIN 
Published: September 2011

abstractThis discussion explores the moral psychology and metaethics of Michael Slote'sMoral Sentimentalism. I argue that his account of empathy has an important lacuna, because the sense in which an empathizer feels the same feeling that his target feels requires explanation, and the most promising candidates are unavailable to Slote. I then argue that the (highly original) theory of moral approval and disapproval that Slote develops in his book is implausible, both phenomenologically and for the role it accords to empathy. Finally, I suggest that these problems in moral psychology undermine Slote's metaethical argument for identifying rightness and wrongness with agential warmth and coldness in action.
COMMENTS ON MICHAEL SLOTE'S MORAL SENTIMENTALISM
Authors: WATSON LORI 
Published: September 2011

abstractI present two challenges to the theory of moral sentimentalism that Michael Slote defends in his book. The first challenge aims to show that there are cases in which we empathize with an agent and yet judge her actions to be morally wrong. If such cases are plausible, then we have good reason to doubt Slote's claim that moral judgments are an affective attitude of warmth or chill and, thus, are purely sentiments. The second challenge is more of a suggestion. At the end of my paper, I suggest that perhaps one important role that empathy plays in our moral phenomenology is to mitigate the scope of our moral judgments. If this is right, it tells not only against Slote's account but against moral sentimentalist approaches more broadly.
IMAGINATION, EMPATHY, AND MORAL DELIBERATION: THE CASE OF IMAGINATIVE RESISTANCE
Authors: STUEBER KARSTEN R. 
Published: September 2011

abstractThis essay develops a new account of the phenomenon of imaginative resistance. Imaginative resistance is best conceived of as a limited phenomenon. It occurs when we try to engage imaginatively with different moral worlds that are insufficiently articulated so that they do not allow us either to quarantine our imaginative engagement from our normal moral attitudes or to agree with the expressed moral judgment from the perspective of moral deliberation. Imaginative resistance thus reveals the central epistemic importance that empathy plays for our understanding of rational agents in a context where we try to make sense of the moral appropriateness of their reasons for acting. Reflecting on the phenomenon of imaginative resistance allows us to recognize important features of the relationship between imaginative perspective taking and ordinary moral deliberation.
EMPATHY WITH ONE'S PAST
Authors: GOLDIE PETER 
Published: September 2011

abstractThis paper presents two ideas in connection with the notion of empathic access to one's past, where this notion is understood as consisting of memories of one's past from the inside, plus a fundamental sympathy for those remembered states. The first idea is that having empathic access is a necessary condition for one's personal identity and survival. I give reasons to reject this view, one such reason being that it in effect blocks off the possibility of profound personal progress through radical change. The second idea is that empathy with one's past should, as a matter of necessity, be modeled on empathy with another person. I reject this two‐state model, arguing for the alternative possibility of a one‐state model, according to which one's thoughts and memories of one's past can become infused with one's present thoughts about and attitudes toward one's past.
AGAINST EMPATHY
Authors: PRINZ JESSE 
Published: September 2011

abstractEmpathy can be characterized as a vicarious emotion that one person experiences when reflecting on the emotion of another. So characterized, empathy is sometimes regarded as a precondition on moral judgment. This seems to have been Hume's view. I review various ways in which empathy might be regarded as a precondition and argue against each of them: empathy is not a component, a necessary cause, a reliable epistemic guide, a foundation for justification, or the motivating force behind our moral judgments. In fact, empathy is prone to biases that render it potentially harmful. Another construct—concern—fares somewhat better, but it is also of limited use. I argue that, instead of empathy, moral judgments involve emotions such as anger, disgust, guilt, and admiration. These, not empathy, provide the sentimental foundation for morality.
THE SECRET CHAIN: A LIMITED DEFENSE OF SYMPATHY
Authors: DRIVER JULIA 
Published: September 2011

abstractThis paper responds to criticisms of sympathy‐based approaches to ethics made by Jesse Prinz, focusing on the criticism that emotions are too variable to form a basis for ethics. I draw on the idea, articulated by early sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Hume, that proper reliance on sympathy is subject to a corrective procedure in order, in part, to avoid the variability problem.