bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Towards a More Comprehensive Approach: Strengthening Anti-Corruption and Anti-Collusion Systems, Dealing with Systemic Corruption and the Contribution of Multi-Level Governance
Authors: Anderson Robert D , Jones Alison , Kovacic William E 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
This chapter considers why, even in countries with comprehensive public procurement, anti-corruption, and competition law systems in place, corrupt practices and supplier collusion may continue to occur. Further, it considers how such systems may be bolstered to address shortcomings, or limitations, and to help these laws to achieve their objectives. It stresses the need for possible refinements in the design, application, and enforcement of the three areas of law, but also the need for a joined-up and coordinated approach to the laws in this sphere. If the three areas of law become more closely united around a unified public procurement strategy, they stand a better chance of achieving their objectives and good results for citizens. It acknowledges that in certain jurisdictions, especially those where corruption is widespread or ‘systemic’, a broader set of reforms may be required to fight corruption, to change norms, and to promote procompetitive procurement. It also considers other laws which might be required to fight corruption and collusion successfully, and how effective pressure for those reforms might be achieved, whether as a result of domestic, international, or European Union (EU) initiatives.
Corruption and Supplier Collusion under the Waterline? Combatting Risks to Public Procurement in the United Kingdom
Authors: Anderson Robert D , Jones Alison , Kovacic William E 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
Every year, the UK Government spends billions of pounds purchasing goods, and works and services that are vital to growth, development, health, and social welfare. This chapter concludes that despite overhauls of the public procurement, anti-corruption, and competition laws, additional measures are required to protect the integrity of the procurement processes in England and Wales. It proposes improving the distinct regimes and uniting them around a cohesive strategy. It thus advocates policy coordination and enhancements as the UK seeks to further develop its own policies and institutions, post‐Brexit, and to grapple with the demands that recent crises have placed on public purchasing and the public purse.
Addressing Democratic Backsliding and Increasing Corruption and Supplier Collusion Risks in Hungary and Poland: The Impact of EU Membership
Authors: Anderson Robert D , Jones Alison , Kovacic William E 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
This chapter examines how illiberal changes, both in the political system and the economy, by populist governments in Hungary and Poland have been increasing the risk of corruption and collusion in public procurement processes in those countries. It notes that these developments have significant consequences not only for Hungary and Poland, but also for the EU both generally, in terms of their impact on EU law and fundamental values, and specifically in relation to its finances. It thus considers what additional roles EU law can play in reducing, mitigating, or reversing these risks. It offers several recommendations of a legal-systemic and more practical nature. The chapter recognizes that although many steps taken by the EU to date have failed to deliver meaningful change, the EU does possess a powerful toolkit which, if fully utilized, provides the means to challenge individual cases of suspected corruption and collusion in Hungary and Poland (and other Member States), and systematic and serious violations of EU law through legal actions and financial mechanisms. It also makes proposals designed to better protect EU funds from misuse in national public procurement processes, including through closer cooperation between EU and national agencies, more proactive, real-time monitoring of relevant processes, the use of integrity pacts, and the further development of the EU’s early detection and exclusion, and remedies systems.
Public Interest Considerations in US Merger Control
Authors: Kokkoris Ioannis 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
The book offers a detailed description of the institutional context, legislation, and the respective competition and public interest approach in assessing concentrations. The book dissects the dynamics of these competition and non-competition considerations. It further examines whether the application of these considerations enhances the effectiveness and decision-making of the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of Transportation, the Office of the Comptroller General, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Surface Transportation Board, and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The analysis will focus on the composition, legislation, and the relevant public interest considerations that each regulatory authority takes into account, the respective decision-making process, and will present some seminal cases that illustrate not only the enforcement approach of each regulatory authority but also the possibility for discrepancy between the competition law-based assessment and the national security or public interest-based assessment.The book argues that US merger control assessment is at times convoluted because of the application of distinct considerations by the various competition and regulatory bodies. It also illustrates how the application of a competition law-based assessment, on the one hand, and the public interest-based assessment, on the other, increases the chances of having contradictory decisions. Distilling all these considerations, the book suggests that the application of the varying shades of the public interest standard can result in a complex and inefficient merger review process and recommends some ways to address these inefficiencies. The book suggests that this concurrent jurisdiction of antitrust federal agencies and other governmental authorities runs the risk of mitigating efficiency, transparency, and predictability that should govern merger control.
The US Merger Control Regime
Authors: Kokkoris Ioannis 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
Chapter 1 provides a detailed description of the merger control framework in the United States. It discusses the role of the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice and shows how merger guidelines have been used to complete the enforcement framework. The chapter outlines the difficulties merging parties face in dealing with the various enforcement agencies and discusses the reasons why a significant number of transactions are settled. The chapter suggests that there are two closely intertwined realities. The first is that the interaction with the antitrust enforcers is at times complex. The second is that a merger assessment process that incorporates antitrust enforcers and regulatory agencies, applying competition and non-competition rules, becomes ever more complex for the parties, as well as the legal and business community.
National Security Assessment
Authors: Kokkoris Ioannis 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
Chapter 2 discusses the application of a national security standard in merger review. It argues that even if this concept is not well-defined, it is commonly used to shape regulations seeking to address concerns arising from foreign investment. The chapter shows how the scope of this national security assessment continuously expands, which leads to a significant expansion of the number of transactions filed for review. The chapter further illustrates that the national security assessment may represent an effective tool to respond to global economic and geopolitical tensions. It cautions that a greater level of transparency of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) rationale for its decisions would improve the assessment process. This chapter focuses on the national security concerns in assessing mergers and acquisition transactions, showing a spectrum of the CFIUS’ decisions in diverse industries including telecommunications, food, financial services, defence industry, and technology. The CFIUS’ enforcement record and trend in assessing national security concerns illustrates the US government’s determination to safeguard US industries from risks to US national security raised by acquisitions of US domestic assets by foreign acquirers.
Public Interest Assessment and the Surface Transportation Board (STB)
Authors: Kokkoris Ioannis 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
This chapter discusses the overlap in the jurisdictions of the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and the Surface Transportation Board (STB) on mergers and acquisition (M&A) transactions. The chapter discusses the relevant legislation for the railroad industry and the composition and process before the STB. It also discusses the enforcement record of the STB and the assessment of the public interest test in assessing M&A transactions in the sector, trying to identify areas of convergence and divergence with the FTC/DOJ. The chapter focuses on the consolidation in the railroad industry to exemplify the tensions created by this concurrent jurisdiction. The chapter claims that the public interest standard has been used to promote railway consolidation and to protect the industry from other forms of competition. It further notes that the competition concerns expressed by the antitrust authorities have repeatedly been ignored. The analysis of some seminal cases shows that the benefits of such consolidation as alleged by the merging parties usually go uncontested and that the courts are deferential to the decisions made by the regulator. The chapter concludes that the public interest standard has put the protection of competition in the railway sector at the discretion of the regulator.
Merger Control Regimes Around the World
Authors: Kokkoris Ioannis 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
This chapter introduces the intricate landscape of global merger control, providing an in-depth exploration of both substantive and procedural aspects across various jurisdictions. It illustrates the prevailing regulatory models, focusing on their historical development, underlying goals, and procedures. Substantively, the analysis discusses elements such as the market definition, the theories of harm (and the respective tests), the treatment of efficiencies, and ancillary restraints. On the procedural front, the chapter reviews a mosaic of different practices, from notification requirements and pre-merger discussions, to review timelines and remedies. Based on this analysis, the chapter acknowledges the need for greater consistency in both substance and procedure, to limit the burden imposed on business players in the form of larger costs and reduced certainty. On the other hand, the chapter suggests that the ongoing shift towards industrial policy is unlikely to lead to harmonization, but rather will enhance discrepancies even in industries that don’t necessarily raise national security concerns.
Merger Control as Industrial Policy
Authors: Kokkoris Ioannis 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
The international business landscape is changing, while governments grapple with global economic forces and local societal aspirations. This chapter presents the resurgence of protectionism, and how merger control measures align business interests with national strategic goals. The chapter examines the influence of geopolitical tensions on the merger control landscape. It then explores the expanding scope of sectors susceptible to national security concerns and the strengthening of assessment regimes in the EU, the US, China, and Japan. The chapter examines the justification for government intervention and investigates whether and under what conditions competition policy might be the proper tool for the job. Further, it looks at the role that public interest considerations play in different merger control regimes, focusing on the increasing relevance of national security. Finally, the chapter underscores the challenges of balancing broader goals within the framework of competition law, including the risk of discretionary decision-making and cross-border disparities.
EU-Level Parental Antitrust Liability and the Crucial Issue of Its Legitimacy
Authors: Whelan Peter 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
In enforcing European Union (EU) competition law, the European Commission employs a unique and controversial doctrine of parental antitrust liability. Accordingly, it imposes fines on the parent company of an infringing subsidiary in cases where the parent exercises decisive influence over the subsidiary’s commercial policy. This chapter introduces the current debate in EU competition law on the EU-level doctrine of parental liability. It provides context to EU-level antitrust enforcement before outlining the main concerns in the literature with the current approach to parental liability for EU competition law violations. In particular, it explains the need to ensure legitimacy within the EU-level doctrine of parental liability.
‘Undertaking’ and Its Legal Implications
Authors: Whelan Peter 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
This chapter explains the general concept of an ‘undertaking’ as well as its relevant legal implications. It first focuses on the inherent nature of an ‘undertaking’, explaining in the process that an ‘undertaking’ is an economic rather than legal concept, and that a context-specific, functional approach exists regarding its identification. With this conceptual grounding established, it then details the resultant legal implication of the employment of such an economic concept in determining the scope of the EU antitrust provisions, an implication that has particular relevance to parent companies. Finally, it identifies how the economic concept of ‘undertaking’ inevitably engenders an imputation process for enforcement purposes when EU competition law has been violated, a process that provides the legal scope for the creation of the EU-level doctrine of parental antitrust liability.
The Specifics of the Doctrine: Imputing Antitrust Violations to Parent Companies
Authors: Whelan Peter 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
This chapter analyses how in practice the European Commission (the Commission) imputes the antitrust violation of the subsidiary to the parent company. It demonstrates that the central enquiry is whether the parent company has actually exercised decisive influence over the commercial policy (very broadly understood) of the subsidiary during the infringement period. It explains that the actual exercise of such influence can be presumed with a 100% shareholding on behalf of the parent and that, according to the EU Courts, that presumption is rebuttable, although the extent to which this actually happens in reality has caused many to question whether it can really be considered to be rebuttable in practice. It argues that, although the EU Courts have emphasised the importance of legal, economic, and organisational links when examining whether a subsidiary’s infringing conduct can be imputed to its parent, any analysis of those particular links can be understood as evaluating whether a parent company has (in an admittedly rather indirect manner) in fact exercised decisive influence over its subsidiary’s commercial policy. The test to be employed, in other words, is indeed a test involving proof of actual exercise of decisive influence—and not one merely of structural links—despite claims to the contrary in the literature.
The EU-Level Approach to Parental Liability and Its Interaction with Other Enforcement Policies and Doctrines
Authors: Whelan Peter 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
This book aims to identify and articulate the main practical enforcement implications of parental liability. The previous chapter examined the most important consequence for the parent company once it has been deemed to be responsible for the EU antitrust violation of its subsidiary: it examined the sanction—the antitrust fine—that is imposed upon that parent company by the European Commission (‘the Commission’). To provide a full account of the main practical enforcement implications of parental liability, however, one should also evaluate how the doctrine of parental antitrust liability interacts in practice with other important antitrust enforcement policies and doctrines. This chapter undertakes such an evaluation. It focuses on the operation of the Commission’s administrative leniency policy with respect to parental liability, as well as the implications for the doctrine of parental liability when successor liability becomes relevant in a competition law enforcement proceeding conducted at EU level.
Employing Deterrence Theory to Justify Parental Liability for Antitrust Violations
Authors: Whelan Peter 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
This chapter demonstrates how the theory of deterrence can rationalise in principle the imposition of parental antitrust liability. To do so, it first sets out the essentials of the relevant analytical framework. It details in turn: the ‘classic model’ of economic deterrence presented in the literature, including its two distinct variants that can be employed to set an optimal sanction; the most appropriate variant of economic deterrence theory for analysing how to achieve the deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour through antitrust enforcement; and the main inherent limitations of employing economic deterrence theory to justify parental liability for antitrust violations. With this framework established, the chapter then employs it to construct a robust argument that justifies, in principle, the imposition of parental liability to enforce antitrust law. That argument has three steps: first, one determines the size of the optimal antitrust fine on the basis of the unlawful gain variant of economic deterrence theory; second, one then employs this optimal fine to demonstrate that, due to a subsidiary’s inability to pay the optimal fine, a ‘deterrence gap’ will be created if one attempts to enforce competition law with sole reliance upon the imposition of fines upon the infringing subsidiary; and finally one demonstrates how the imposition of parental liability can help one to ‘fill’ the identified ‘deterrence gap’ to the benefit of the general deterrence of anticompetitive behaviour. By constructing such an argument, this chapter ensures that the essential groundwork is in place for the legitimacy-focused analyses conducted later in the book.
The Personal Responsibility of the Parent Company for the Antitrust Violation of Its Subsidiary
Authors: Whelan Peter 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
To ensure fairness in (punitive) antitrust enforcement, a person should only be officially sanctioned for an antitrust violation when personally responsible for such a sanction. The EU-level doctrine of parental antitrust liability is controversial for this reason: a link is frequently made between the doctrine’s alleged disregard for the principle of personal responsibility and a potential lack of legitimacy in EU competition enforcement. In a book examining the legitimacy of the EU-level doctrine of parental liability, it is thus important that one robustly establishes the extent to which a parent company can be genuinely deemed to be ‘personally responsible’ for its subsidiary’s antitrust violation when the said doctrine is employed. The current chapter undertakes this task. It thus analyses the ‘personal responsibility’ of a parent company when its subsidiary violates competition law. There are three steps to this analysis. The first step articulates the concept and preconditions of ‘personal responsibility’, the second demonstrates that the parent company fulfils the identified preconditions, whilst the third step evaluates the extent to which personal responsibility can be found within the ‘offence’ committed by the parent company in the context of parental liability.
The EU-Level Doctrine of Parental Liability and the Presumption of Innocence
Authors: Whelan Peter 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
This chapter evaluates whether the 100% shareholding presumption complies fully with the right to be presumed innocent. First, the legal framework underpinning the said right is presented. It is noted that a prima facie interference with the presumption of innocence via a presumption can be justified if a legitimate aim exists and that legitimate aim survives a proportionality test. Second, it analyses whether a prima facie interference of the presumption of innocence occurs with the 100% shareholding presumption. Its argues that a solid case exists that the presumption interferes with the presumption of innocence. Third, in acknowledgement of the identified prima facie case of an interference with the presumption of innocence, it articulates the legitimate objective that the 100% shareholding presumption pursues, thereby overcoming the initial filter that is required for that presumption to pass a proportionality analysis. Fourth, the EU Courts’ stance on whether the 100% shareholding presumption is justifiable is examined. It is noted that the Courts condition the proportionality—and thus legal acceptability—of the said presumption on whether it can be rebutted by parent companies. Fifth, the specific issue of rebutability is examined. The chapter concludes that one can come to a reasonable, supportable conclusion that the 100% shareholding presumption is in fact irrebuttable, irrespective of claims to the contrary in the EU-level jurisprudence. Within the current legal terms of the debate, then, there is a case to be made that the presumption of innocence is unlawfully violated by the European Commission’s current practice.
Justifying in Principle the 100% Shareholding Presumption: An Alternative (Proportionality-Focused) Assessment
Authors: Whelan Peter 
Published: June 2024

Abstract
The previous chapter presented a supportable argument that the 100% shareholding presumption is irrebuttable, irrespective of contrary claims in EU-level jurisprudence. If this is accepted, then on the specific legal terms articulated by the EU Courts, the said presumption would violate the right to be presumed innocent and thus be illegitimate under this monograph’s fourth legitimacy criterion (‘legality’). The qualifier just employed—‘the specific terms articulated by the EU Courts’—is important. It is arguable that the EU Courts, whilst influenced by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), have gone further than the ECtHR’s position regarding presumptions, as for them rebutability is not one of many relevant—but not necessarily determinative—factors applicable to a proportionality test; instead, in EU law, rebutability is a determinative issue. If this argument is correct, then any prima facie interference with the presumption of innocence by the 100% shareholding presumption could be legally acceptable if the ECtHR approach to presumptions is fully adopted by the Courts. Two issues should thus be analysed to conclude this monograph’s fourth legitimacy criterion: (i) whether it is true that rebutability of a presumption is not determinative of its lawfulness under ECtHR jurisprudence; and (ii) if so, whether the 100% shareholding presumption would pass a proportionality test that does not require rebutability to be legally acceptable. These issues are examined in turn to see if, on an alternative reading of the legal rules on presumptions, the 100% shareholding may be acceptable under the criterion of legality.