bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Vertebrate pesticide risk assessment by indigenous communities in New Zealand
Authors: OGILVIE Shaun C. , ATARIA James M. , WAIWAI James , DOHERTY James , MILLER Aroha , ROSS James G. , EASON Charles T. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIn New Zealand, the vertebrate pesticide sodium fluoroacetate (Compound 1080) is aerially applied in baits for control of the brush‐tailed possum Trichosurus vulpecula (Kerr, 1792). Maori, the indigenous people of New Zealand, have raised concerns about 1080 impacts on culturally‐important species. Here, we outline two steps taken to help Maori assess 1080 risk. First, field research was undertaken to determine if naturally‐occurring plants utilized by a Maori community for food and medicine would take up 1080 from baits. Single baits were placed at the base of individual plants of two species, pikopiko (Asplenium bulbiferum) and karamuramu (Coprosma robusta). Plants were sampled at various times up to 56 days, and samples were analyzed for 1080 content. No 1080 was detected in any of the pikopiko samples, whereas 1080 was detected in karamuramu, at a maximum concentration of 5 ppb after seven days, and 2.5 ppb after 14 days. This concentration decreased to 0 at 28 days, indicating that 1080 was not persistent. The results of the present study suggest there is negligible risk of humans being poisoned by consuming plants that have taken up 1080 from baits. To allay community concerns that minute concentrations of 1080 might influence the medicinal properties of plants, it is suggested that a withholding period of 30 days after 1080 control operations could be adopted. Second, after further consultation we undertook a review of the scientific literature relating to 1080 impacts on additional non‐target species of cultural importance to Maori. The information was presented on an interactive foodweb database that allowed the collection and presentation of a large volume of complex information about 1080 in a holistic and pictorial fashion. This database was presented to many Maori communities throughout New Zealand, and feedback was overwhelmingly positive. The database is likely to play a key role in informing these communities about 1080, and is seen as an important new tool to help these communities make their own risk assessments.
Teaching Language Categories and Learning About Language Categories from Teaching
Authors: Yamahashi Sachiko 
Published: March 2010

AbstractFamiliar category terms, such as ‘noun’, ‘verb’, and ‘adjective’, are usually used in language classes. However, the application of these labels in the target language is not necessarily intuitive. English learners of Japanese often have problems with: (i) ‘deverbal nouns’, problems that stem from the ‘noun–verb’ distinction, and (ii) ‘adjectives’, which are divided into two types unlike English ‘adjectives’. This article builds on these examples toward an analysis of Japanese involving four categories defined by the intersection of the nominative case and tense markers. The moral is that a language could be learned more accurately and readily if categories were based on such salient distinctions in the target language.
Helicobacter pylori and its role in vocal folds' minimal lesions
Authors: Tiba Medhat , Fawaz Samia , Osman Hala 
Published: March 2010

AbstractBackground:  Chronic laryngitis and/or vocal fold minimal lesions (VFMLs) are common associations with gastro esophageal reflux disease. Helicobacter pylori (HP) is a Gram‐negative spiral organism accused of being a common cause of gastritis, gastroesophageal reflux disease and peptic ulcer. HP has been recently isolated from tonsils, adenoids, sinus and middle ear mucosa in patients with chronic sinusitis or chronic middle ear effusion.Objective:  The objective of this study is to assess the presence of HP in VFMLs.Methods:  The study included 14 patients with VFMLs [six cases with vocal fold polyps and four cases with vocal fold nodules, and four cases with posterior granulomas; one of them associated with right vocal fold (VF) nodule]; all underwent carbon‐13 urea breath test, esophago‐gastro‐duodenoscopy with gastric biopsy and direct laryngoscopy with microlaryngosurgery to extract the VF lesions. Biopsies were subjected for two tests: detection of the 23S ribosomal RNA gene of HP by real‐time polymerase chain reaction (RT‐PCR) and immunohistochemical reactions (IHC).Results:  HP was detected by RT‐PCR in 10 of 14 patients with VFML; HP was also detected by IHC in the same number of VFML and gastric mucosa specimens.Conclusion:  HP is a common finding in cases of VFML; its eradication should be considered when dealing with a patient with VFML.Please cite this paper as: Tiba M, Fawaz S and Osman H. Helicobacter pylori and its role in vocal folds' minimal lesions. Clin Respir J 2010; 4: 237–240.
Charting the Road of Inquiry: Deleuze's Humean Pragmatics and the Challenge of Badiou
Authors: Bell Jeffrey 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis essay responds to Badiou's charge that Deleuze fails to set forth a philosophy that is “beyond Gategorical oppositions.” It is argued that this criticism of Deleuze is founded upon a misreading of the Deleuzean distinction between the virtual and the actual, a reading that carries forward Badiou's misreading of Spinoza and, hence, of Deleuze's Spinozism. With this corrected, we show how the virtual‐actual distinction operates within the experimental philosophy, or pragmatics, that Deleuze, and later Deleuze and Guattari, sets forth. It is this pragmatics that is precisely the philosophy of difference that is beyond categorical oppositions. Through a comparison of Deleuzean pragmatics with the work of Hume and Peirce, we are able to respond to Badiou's further criticism that Deleuze's philosophy fails to understand the conditions for creativity in thought and culture. This criticism is itself resolved once one corrects for Badiou's misreading of Deleuze's virtual‐actual distinction.
Plato on a Mistake about Pleasure
Authors: Erginel Mehmet M. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractPlato argues in Republic IX that people are often mistaken about their own pleasures and pains. One of the mistakes he focuses on is judging that an experience of ours is pleasant when, in fact, it is not. The view that such a mistake is possible is an unpopular one, and scholars have generally been dismissive of Plato's position. Thus Urmson argues not only that this position is deeply flawed, but also that it results from a confusion on Plato's part. In this paper, I show that Urmson's criticism is misguided. I then defend Plato against the idea that it is impossible for someone to make the mistake in question. In doing so, I bring out details in Plato's text and show that his account of the phenomenology involved in making this mistake is far more sophisticated than has so far been recognized.
Logic as a Universal Medium or Logic as a Calculus? Husserl and the Presuppositions of “the Ultimate Presupposition of Twentieth Century Philosophy”
Authors: Hartimo Mirja 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis paper discusses Jean van Heijenoort's (1967) and Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka's (1986, 1997) distinction between logic as a universal language and logic as a calculus, and its applicability to Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Although it is argued that Husserl's phenomenology shares characteristics with both sides, his view of logic is closer to the model‐theoretical, logic‐as‐calculus view. However, Husserl's philosophy as transcendental philosophy is closer to the universalist view. This paper suggests that Husserl's position shows that holding a model‐theoretical view of logic does not necessarily imply a calculus view about the relations between language and the world. The situation calls for reflection about the distinction: It will be suggested that the applicability of the van Heijenoort and the Hintikkas distinction either has to be restricted to a particular philosopher's views about logic, in which case no implications about his or her more general philosophical views should be inferred from it; or the distinction turns into a question of whether our human predicament is inescapable or whether it is possible, presumably by means of model theory, to obtain neutral answers to philosophical questions. Thus the distinction ultimately turns into a question about the correct method for doing philosophy.
The Euthyphro Argument (9d–11b)
Authors: O'Sullivan Brendan 
Published: March 2010

AbstractA sizable literature exists concerning the structure of Socrates' argument at Euthyphro 9d–11b. Although there is some dispute, a substitutional reading has emerged as a leading interpretation. However, some rear‐guard maneuvers are in order to defend this reading against its competitors. In this paper, I articulate a substitutional reading and argue that it is invalid on two counts: one, Socrates oversteps the logic of his reductio ad absurdum, and two, he illicitly substitutes coreferring expressions in explanatory contexts. Next, I defend the substitutional reading by (1) rebutting its leading contender, Sharvy's formal causation interpretation, and (2) showing how a similar substitutional argument is made in the Protagoras.
Meaning‐Theories and the Principle of Humanity
Authors: Whiting Daniel 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIn this paper, I briefly outline the notion of a truth‐conditional meaning‐theory and introduce two prominent problems it faces. The “extensionality problem” arises because not all correct specifications of truth‐conditions are meaning‐giving. The “explanatory problem” concerns the extent to which truth‐conditional meaning‐theories can contribute to the task of clarifying the nature of linguistic meaning. The “principle of humanity” is supposed to resolve both issues simultaneously. I argue that it fails to do so.
Groupthink versus The Wisdom of Crowds: The Social Epistemology of Deliberation and Dissent
Authors: Solomon Miriam 
Published: March 2010

AbstractTrust in the practice of rational deliberation is widespread and largely unquestioned. This paper uses recent work from business contexts to challenge the view that rational deliberation in a group improves decisions. Pressure to reach consensus can, in fact, lead to phenomena such as groupthink and to suppression of relevant data. Aggregation of individual decisions, rather than deliberation to a consensus, surprisingly, can produce better decisions than those of either group deliberation or individual expert judgment. I argue that dissent is epistemically valuable, not because of the discussion it can provoke (Mill's and Longino's view about the benefit of dissent), but because dissenting positions often are associated with particular data or insights that would be lost in consensus formation. Social epistemologists can usefully pay attention to various methods of aggregation of individual opinion for their effectiveness at realizing epistemic goals.
Socially Naturalized Norms of Epistemic Rationality: Aggregation and Deliberation
Authors: Wylie Alison 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIn response to those who see rational deliberation as a source of epistemic norms and a model for well‐functioning scientific inquiry, Solomon cites evidence that aggregative techniques often yield better results; deliberative processes are vulnerable to biasing mechanisms that impoverish the epistemic resources on which group judgments are based. I argue that aggregative techniques are similarly vulnerable and illustrate this in terms of the impact of gender schemas on both individual and collective judgment. A consistently externalist and socially naturalized approach calls for symmetrical treatment of these strategies for capitalizing on what groups know.
Kantian Lessons about Mind, Meaning, and Rationality*
Authors: Brandom Robert 
Published: March 2010

AbstractKant's innovative normative characterization of what one is doing in judging is appealed to as the basis of a story about how he moves from an inferential to a representational characterization of the contents of judgment. His normative notion of freedom and his demarcation of the normative in terms of autonomy are connected to his account of the status of modal concepts.
Group Agency and Supervenience
Authors: List Christian , Pettit Philip 
Published: March 2010

AbstractCan groups be rational agents over and above their individual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this capacity must “supervene” on the group members' contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members' individual judgments on that proposition. Rather, it must be a function of their individual sets of judgments across many propositions. So knowing what the group members individually think about some proposition does not generally tell us how the group collectively adjudicates that proposition: the supervenience relation must be “setwise,” not “proposition‐wise.” Our account preserves the individualistic view that group agency is nothing mysterious but also suggests that a group agent may hold judgments that are not directly continuous with its members' corresponding individual judgments.
The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality
Authors: Goldberg Sanford C. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractMany people agree that a proper epistemological treatment of testimonial knowledge will regard testimonial warrant — the total truth‐conducive support enjoyed by a belief grounded on a piece of testimony — as socially diffuse, in the sense that it is not something that supervenes on the proper functionality of the hearer's cognitive resources together with the reasons she has for accepting the testimony. After arguing for such a view, I go on to identify a challenge many people think flows from an acknowledgment of the social diffusion of warrant. In particular, such an acknowledgment appears to preclude a happy account of the rationality of testimony‐based belief. After identifying the nature of this challenge and the various positions that one can take on it, I develop a response according to which rationality itself (like warrant) is socially diffuse.
Epistemic Risk and Community Policing:
Authors: Mathiesen Kay 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIn his paper “The Social Diffusion of Warrant and Rationality,” Sanford Goldberg argues that relying on testimony makes the warrant for our beliefs “socially diffuse” and that this diminishes our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Thus, according to Goldberg, rationality itself is socially diffuse. I argue that while testimonial warrant may be socially diffuse (because it depends on the warrants of other epistemic agents) this feature has no special link to our capacity to rationally police our beliefs. Nevertheless, I endorse Goldberg's claim about rationality and I propose that a Foley‐style account of rationality might help to better articulate Goldberg's proposal.
How to Collaborate: Procedural Knowledge in the Cooperative Development of Science
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis paper argues that collaboration in scientific and other fields requires a substantial amount of procedural knowledge about how to collaborate. It discusses how scientists collaborate, how they learn to collaborate, and why they collaborate. Knowledge how does not always reduce to knowledge that, and collaboration has many purposes besides the pursuit of power and resources. The relative scarcity of philosophical collaborations can be overcome by more naturalistic approaches to philosophy and by philosophers learning how to collaborate.
Yielding Actuality: Trust and Reason in Gillian Rose's Vision of Community
Authors: Lathangue Robin 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis article explores the conviction that the durability of communities is contingent, at least in part, on the conception of reason in play. It proposes that prospects for building and sustaining community are enhanced to the degree that rationalistic theories of rationality are rejected. The resulting equivocation in the processes of rule‐making, moral thinking, analysis, and critique, while problematic, will be preferable to the alternative and caricatured approaches premised on a strong division between reason and its so‐called others. This desirable equivocation involves an analysis of the role of trust in human relations and a revised conception of reason developed by philosopher and social critic Gillian Rose (1947–1995). Through an analysis of Rose's commentary on the folk legend of Camelot and the phenomenology of friendship, this article tries to show how relations constrained by alterity can be transformed.
Socrates and Superiority
Authors: Hanna Nathan 
Published: March 2010

AbstractI propose an alternative interpretation of the Crito. The arguments that are typically taken to be Socrates' primary arguments against escape are actually supplementary arguments that rely on what I call the Superiority Thesis, the thesis that the state and its citizens are members of a moral hierarchy where those below are tied by bonds of obligation to those above. I provide evidence that Socrates holds this thesis, demonstrate how it resolves a number of apparent difficulties, and show why my interpretation is preferable to competing interpretations.
Color, Externalism, and Switch Cases
Authors: Bain David 
Published: March 2010

AbstractI defend externalism about color experiences and color thoughts, which I argue color objectivism requires. Externalists face the following question: would a subject's wearing inverting lenses eventually change the color content of, for instance, those visual experiences the subject reports with “red”? From the work of Ned Block, David Velleman, Paul Boghossian, Michael Tye, and Fiona Macpherson, I extract problems facing those who answer “Yes” and problems facing those who answer “No.” I show how these problems can be overcome, leaving externalism available to the color objectivist.
Is Conceptual Atomism a Plausible Theory of Concepts?
Authors: Kwong Jack M. C. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractConceptual atomism is the view according to which most lexical concepts lack ‘internal’ or constituent structure. To date, it has not received much attention from philosophers and psychologists. A central reason is that it is thought to be an implausible theory of concepts, resulting in untenable implications. The main objective of this paper is to present conceptual atomism as a viable alternative, with a view to achieving two aims: the first, to characterize and to elucidate conceptual atomism; and the second, to dispel some misconceptions associated with it. My aim is to show that the prospect of conceptual atomism is a promising one.
Quine's Naturalized Epistemology and the Third Dogma of Empiricism
Authors: Sinclair Robert 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis essay reconsiders Davidson's critical attribution of the scheme‐content distinction to Quine's naturalized epistemology. It focuses on Davidson's complaint that the presence of this distinction leads Quine to mistakenly construe neural input as evidence. While committed to this distinction, Quine's epistemology does not attempt to locate a justificatory foundation in sensory experience and does not then equate neural intake with evidence. Quine's central epistemological task is an explanatory one that attempts to scientifically clarify the route from stimulus to science. Davidson's critical remarks wrongly assign concerns to Quine's view that it does not have and further obscures the status of his naturalized conception of epistemology.
Time for Change
Authors: Hales Steven D. , Johnson Timothy A. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractMetaphysical theories of change incorporate substantive commitments to theories of persistence. The two most prominent classes of such theories are endurantism and perdurantism. Defenders of endurancestyle accounts of change, such as Klein, Hinchliff, and Oderberg, do so through appeal to a priori intuitions about change. We argue that this methodology is understandable but mistaken—an adequate metaphysics of change must accommodate all experiences of change, not merely intuitions about a limited variety of cases. Once we examine additional experiences of change, particularly those in (special) relativistic circumstances, it becomes clear that only a perdurance account of change is adequate.
Personal Perspectives
Authors: Drummond John J. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis paper attempts to clarify how one might understand philosophy as necessarily involving both third‐person and first‐person perspectives. It argues, first, that philosophy must incorporate the first‐person perspective in order to provide an adequate account of consciousness and the prereflective awareness of the self and, second, in opposition to Dennett's hetero‐phenomenology that this incorporation is possible only within a transcendental perspective. The paper also attempts to meet the challenge of those who claim that the notion of the self — and along with it, the idea of first‐person perspective — is dependent upon a second‐person perspecive. It argues that the second‐person challenge depends upon a sense of “self” different from that at stake in the first‐person perspective operative in prereflective self‐awareness.
Subjectivity and the First‐Person Perspective
Authors: Zahavi Dan 
Published: March 2010

AbstractPhenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like rather straightforward interaction. The first issue concerns the question of whether the current focus on the first‐person perspective might have a negative side‐effect by giving us a slanted view of what subjectivity amounts to. The second issue concerns the question of whether superficial similarities in the descriptive findings might actually conceal some rather deep‐rooted differences in the systematic use these findings serve.
In What Sense Is Phenomenology Transcendental?
Authors: Thomasson Amie L. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractDan Zahavi raises doubts about the prospects for combining phenomenological and analytical approaches to the mind, based chiefly on the claim that phenomenology is a form of transcendental philosophy. I argue that there are two ways in which one might understand the claim that phenomenology is transcendental: (1) as the claim that the methods of phenomenology essentially involve addressing transcendental questions or making transcendental arguments, or (2) as the claim that phenomenology is committed to substantive theses of antirealism and the like, which are sometimes thought to follow from a transcendental approach. I argue that while (1) is appropriate, it in no way leads to conflicts with analytic work in philosophy of mind. Moreover, adopting this method and practicing phenomenology in no way commits us to claims of type (2) that might be thought to conflict with common assumptions in analytic philosophy of mind.