bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Regulatory Cooperation, Social Security Coordination, and Participation in Union Programmes
Authors: Petit Christy Ann 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter examines the status of regulatory cooperation between the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) in financial services, the UK’s participation in EU programmes, and social security coordination. Those areas are essential in interdependent open economies and societies. Yet, they are only covered in a limited way in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). Instead, commitments or provisions are found in joint declarations, protocols or draft protocols, and refer to a future cooperation framework, like a memorandum of understanding which now established a framework for EU-UK Financial Services Regulatory Cooperation. If the developments observed in 2023, with the approval of the Windsor Framework and a more constructive EU-UK relationship, has enabled the parties to move away from the status quo in financial services and opened the UK’s access to EU programmes, there should be a strong commitment by both parties to ensure the continuity and stability of cooperation in such areas.
Subsidies Control and Enforcement
Authors: Biondi Andrea 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter assesses how effective subsidies control under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is in preserving a level playing field between the EU and the UK. It argues that in many respects subsidies regulation in the TCA goes further than what is usually required in international trade agreements by promoting regulation in ways that are the least damaging to competition. This is so if specific principles under which a subsidy can be considered as unlawful are taken into account. Further, the remedies available in cases of non-enforcement are particularly wide: from the state-to-state remedies, to private enforcement, to the possible use of rebalancing measures. The new domestic system of subsidies control adopted by the UK is also examined in terms of its compliance with TCA requirements.
The Regulatory State: Central Features
Authors: Craig Paul 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
The previous chapter revealed the proximate connection between regulation and the development of administrative law. Administrative law developed because of challenges to the application of regulatory legislation. The focus in this chapter shifts from the ‘vertical’ to the ‘horizontal’. There are three principal themes in the ensuing analysis. The discussion begins with consideration of central features of the legislative and political landscape that cut across particular subject matter areas. The second theme concerns the impact on the regulatory landscape of background theories of mercantilism, free trade, and utilitarianism. These were the principal economic theories prevalent during the period of study. There is analysis of mercantilist theory and its impact on the nature and incidence of regulatory activity, followed by analogous treatment of free trade and utilitarianism. The final part of the chapter deals with regulatory continuity and change in the 20th to 21st centuries.
Natural Justice
Authors: Craig Paul 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter deals with the historical development of natural justice from the early 17th century onwards. The story begins with the foundational case law concerning the right to a hearing, which is followed by discussion of its applicability and content. The focus then shifts to analysis of bias, with discussion of the doctrinal foundations, followed by consideration of the breadth of its application. The analysis thereafter is on the 20th century case law prior to the 1960s, which exhibited elements of continuity with the earlier case law, but also change, in the sense of limitations engrafted on natural justice that were not present in the earlier case law. The final section of the chapter examines the seminal decision in Ridge v Baldwin, which reconnected with the case law from the 17th to 19th centuries and struck down a number of the limitations imposed in the earlier part of the 20th century.
Reasonableness
Authors: Craig Paul 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
The previous chapter considered controls on discretion through delegation, fettering, and purpose. This chapter continues the story through the jurisprudence concerning reasonableness review. The discussion begins with such review in relation to individual decisions. The foundational case law establishing such review is explained, and so too is the relationship between reasonableness review and individual decisions, and reasonableness review and rulemaking. The focus in the subsequent sections shifts to reasonableness review in the context of rulemaking. There is a rich case law whereby the courts imposed reasonableness controls over rules broadly conceived rather than individual decisions. This occurred in three principal contexts. The courts required reasonableness of price where a corporation exercised de facto or de jure monopoly power pursuant to charter or statute; they conditioned the legitimacy of custom as a source of regulatory authority on proof of its reasonableness; and they subjected by-laws to review for reasonableness.
Third and Fourth Source Power
Authors: Craig Paul 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
The previous chapter focused on the prerogative. This chapter deals with sources of executive authority in addition to prerogative and statute. There is modern debate concerning a third source of executive power, with much valuable material directly on the topic and closely related thereto. There is, however, little by way of historical examination to determine the provenance of such ideas. This is more particularly surprising given that there is resort to historical concepts, such as corporation sole, with little attention to the origin and applicability of such ideas in the present context. The first half of this chapter explicates the historical material, the second half considers continuity and change in the 20th to 21st centuries. The ensuing analysis will, however, be facilitated by understanding central issues at the outset. They are enduring and endemic. They were present in the 16th and 21st centuries and are explained in the chapter.
Prerogative Writs
Authors: Craig Paul 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
The previous chapter considered the law relating to standing. It provides the natural foundation for consideration of the principal remedies used by individuals or groups when seeking redress against public bodies. This is familiar terrain, occupied by the prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, and also by injunction and declaration, which will be analysed in the next chapter. The familiarity is reassuring, but also misleading. The common assumption is that the prerogative writs have existed from time immemorial, subject to minor judicial amendment to meet changing societal needs. The writs have indeed existed for some considerable time, but the common assumption is, nonetheless, mistaken. The reality is that the courts played a major role in shaping and transforming the writs to render them fit for purpose and capable of addressing the remedial administrative law needs in the 17th century and thereafter.
Injunction, Declaration, Quo Warranto, and Habeas Corpus
Authors: Craig Paul 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
The focus now shifts to four other important remedies: injunction, declaration, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. The first two were general remedies, and the latter two were more specific, since they targeted particular wrongs. The injunction is the most under-appreciated of public law remedies. It was the remedy of choice for many who sought to prevent wrongdoing. The declaration only became a significant public law remedy at the beginning of the 20th century because of resistance from the courts. The information in the nature of quo warranto was an important remedy used to secure an office and was forged by an admixture of judicial and legislative initiative. Habeas corpus is in some respects the most famous and also the most complex when viewed from a historical perspective. The final section of the chapter considers continuity and change in the remedial architecture in the 20th to 21st centuries.
Focality, Analogy, and the Articulation of Concepts
Authors: Williams S. G. 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
How should analytical philosophy respond to the apparent failure of systematic conceptual analysis? This chapter is devoted to an Aristotelian response. An important step is furnished by the quasi-technical notion of elucidation, which reveals how concepts can be understood through other, coeval concepts, even if no analysis is forthcoming. But, like analysis, its deployment has been piecemeal. What is needed is a more systematic approach to analysing or elucidating concepts—articulating them—and to the uncovering of such articulations. This chapter aims to explore such an approach using the quintessentially Aristotelian notions of focality and analogy. Initially, it explains the role of analogy and analogical reasoning in discovering and articulating concepts. But its principal concern is focality—the notion that being F generally can sometimes be understood via a central conception of being F (the focus) along with other conceptions (satellites) to which it is suitably related. Although how to uncover focal notions is considered, much of the discussion concentrates on understanding focality itself, particularly how to formulate what counts as being suitably related. But even with that settled, the question emerges how unified a concept is when articulated in this way. It transpires that the focus and its satellites can sometimes constitute a loose unity, characterizable via the notion of loose identity. But what is loose identity? The chapter concludes by articulating identity generally as a loosely unified focal concept with strict identity as focus, and looser conceptions, characterizable via informal approximations to Leibniz’s Law, as satellites.
Life, Agency, and Value
Authors: Lennox James G. 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
Over a period of three decades, David Charles and Allan Gotthelf engaged in a productive dialogue over how best to understand Aristotle’s philosophical defence of natural teleology (or final causality). This chapter presents their respective views on this topic and identifies their key differences regarding the place of normativity and agency in Aristotle’s account of teleology. It concludes by looking at a number of recent philosophical defences of teleological explanation in the biological sciences and indicates that the disagreements on display in the dialogue between Charles and Gotthelf are present in these recent defences as well. It concludes by suggesting a way of resolving these disagreements.
Hypocritical Blame Is Unfitting
Authors: Achs Rachel 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
Philosophers disagree about what, if anything, is wrong with blaming hypocritically, but almost all treat the issue as a moral one: Either there is something morally wrong with hypocritical blame or there isn’t. This chapter argues that, although there are moral objections to blaming hypocritically, the first and foremost problem with hypocritical blame is that it’s unfitting. More specifically, it is an enabling condition on blame’s fittingness that the blaming subject be committed to the norm she blames a target person for violating. Because of a connection between fittingness and representational accuracy, recognizing this condition on blame’s fittingness in turn has interesting upshots—both for theorizing about the ethics of hypocrisy and for understanding the significance of blame itself.
Robbery—Sentencing Children and Young People Guideline—effective from 1 June 2017
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter details the youth-specific sentencing guidelines for robbery. In a case where a child or young person has offended for the first time and has pleaded guilty to committing an offence which is on the cusp of the custody threshold, the Youth Offending Team should be encouraged to convene a youth offender panel prior to sentence where the child or young person is asked to attend before a panel and agree an intensive contract. The court determines the length of the order but a Referral Order Panel determines the requirements of the order. If a custodial sentence is imposed, the court must state its reasons for being satisfied that the offence is so serious that no other sanction would be appropriate. Where a custodial sentence is unavoidable, the length of custody imposed must be the shortest commensurate with the seriousness of the offence.
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter highlights the UN Convention on Human Rights of the Child 1989. The United Kingdom is a signatory to this Convention although it is not part of domestic law. The standards established in the Convention have been increasingly accepted as relevant to decisions regarding the rights of children and young persons under the European Convention on Human Rights. The United Nations has also adopted detailed standards for children and young persons involved in the youth justice system. These are contained in the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the administration of juvenile justice 1985 (‘The Beijing Rules’); the UN Rules for the protection of juveniles deprived of their liberty 1990 (‘The Havana Rules’); and the UN guidelines for the administration of juvenile delinquency 1990 (‘The Riyadh Guidelines’). Although not binding in the United Kingdom, they form part of the international standards that would be relevant to considering any human rights question relating to a child or young person.
Welfare Principle
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter explains the principle of the welfare of the child or young person. The introduction of the principal aim of the youth justice system did not lead to any lessening in importance of the welfare principle, which is set out in the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 44. CYPA 1933, s 44 provides that ‘every court in dealing with a child or young person who is brought before it, either as an offender or otherwise, shall have regard to the welfare of the child or young person’. There is no statutory definition of ‘welfare’ but assistance can be found in the Sentencing Children and Young People — Overarching Principles definitive guideline, para 1.12. Ultimately, in making any decision involving a child or young person, the court will have regard to the principal aim and the welfare principle. The welfare principle, for example, is not only relevant to a sentencing decision but is also relevant when considering bail.
Bail
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter explores the provisions for bail of youth defendants. Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 37(1), depriving a child of their liberty during criminal proceedings should be a measure of last resort. To that end, there are rules applicable only to defendants under the age of 18 and extra resources are devoted to supporting defendants on bail. The Bail Act 1976 applies to youth defendants but there are a number of differences which generally narrow the scope of the statutory grounds for refusing bail. In addition, if bail is refused, there is a presumption that the remand will be to local authority accommodation; further criteria must be satisfied before a remand in custody is made. The main practical difference between applying for bail for a youth as opposed to an adult is the significant role played by the Youth Offending Team. The chapter then considers the right to bail; conditional bail; electronic monitoring requirements; bail supervision and support; parental surety; and breach of bail conditions.
Custody Time Limits
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter addresses how the Prosecution of Offences (Custody Time Limits) Regulations 1987 set time limits during which the defendant can be in the custody of a court awaiting the start of their trial. Custody time limits apply to any youth defendant, whether remanded to local authority accommodation or youth detention accommodation. Custody time limits start at the end of the first day of remand and expire at midnight on the last day. A time limit expiring on a Saturday, Sunday, bank holiday, or on Christmas Day or Good Friday will be treated as having expired on the next preceding day which is not one of those days. Meanwhile, defendants who abscond from prison, or who have been released on bail following expiry of a custody time limit, but are then remanded following a breach of bail, do not enjoy the protections offered by custody time limits. The chapter then considers the extension of custody time limits.
Reporting Restrictions in Other Criminal Courts
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter discusses reporting restrictions in other criminal courts. In the adult magistrates’ court and Crown Court, the automatic reporting restrictions imposed by the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 49 do not apply. The court has a discretionary power to impose reporting restrictions in relation to those aged under 18 under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, s 45. This covers defendants and witnesses, including the alleged victim. There is also a power to restrict reporting of criminal proceedings for the lifetime of witnesses and victims under 18, if satisfied that the quality of their evidence or level of cooperation is likely to be diminished by fear or distress, but this power does not apply to defendants.
Criminal Behaviour Order
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter talks about the criminal behaviour order (CBO), which is an order that prohibits the offender from engaging in behaviour likely to cause harassment, alarm, or distress to any person. It outlines how a CBO can be made by a youth court, magistrates’ court, or Crown Court whenever an offender is convicted of any offence. It also cites Criminal Procedure Rules, r 31.3 that requires the prosecutor to give notice of the intention to apply for a CBO following a conviction. The chapter highlights the prosecution that must find out the views of the local youth offending team before applying for a CBO to be made if the offender is under the age of 18. It implies that a CBO must include and specify the period for which it has effect.
Committal for Sentence
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter describes cases that involved defendants aged under 18 that should ordinarily be sentenced in the youth court but allowed with a committal to the Crown Court for sentence following conviction. It discusses the application of committal powers to adults if a defendant attains 18 before the date of conviction. It also looks at DPP v South Tyneside Youth Court, whereby the court must ensure that the decision to retain a case for trial in the youth court does not prevent it deciding that committal for sentence is necessary. The chapter reviews the power of the Crown Court to deal with an offender under 18 by imposing a sentence of detention for a term of more than two years. It mentions the youth court or adult magistrates’ court that has the power to commit a youth defendant to the Crown Court for sentence.
Discharges (Absolute and Conditional)
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter cites sections 79 and 80 of the Sentencing Code, under which a court may discharge offenders absolutely or discharge them subject to the condition that they commit no offence during a certain period, if the court considers it inexpedient to inflict punishment. It also looks at the unavailability of an order for a conditional discharge for a person who has received two or more youth cautions and is convicted of an offence committed within two years since the last of the cautions. The chapter talks about a conviction for an offence for which the offender is discharged either absolutely or conditionally and will be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purpose of the proceedings. It highlights that a person who commits an offence during the life of a conditional discharge may be re-sentenced for the original offence.
Mentally Disordered Offenders
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter covers the provisions of Mental Health Act 1983, s 1, which affects the reception, care, and treatment of mentally disordered patients and the management of their property. It discusses the application of Sentencing Code, s 232 on an offender that is or appears to be suffering from a mental disorder. It also details how the court must obtain and consider a medical report before passing a sentence unless it considers that it is unnecessary to obtain one. The chapter considers a medical report as a report on an offender's mental condition that is made or submitted orally or in writing by a registered medical practitioner. It highlights the Sentencing Council’s definitive guideline, Sentencing Offenders with Mental Disorders, Developmental Disorders or Neurological Impairments, which applies only to offenders aged 18 or older.
Referral Order
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter talks about a referral order, which is an order that requires an offender to attend each of the meetings of a youth offender panel and by virtue of which the offender is required to comply with a programme of behaviour. It considers a referral order as the primary sentence for first-time offenders under the age of 18 who plead guilty. It also describes a referral order as unique in the criminal justice system as the sentencing court determines the length of the referral while the requirements of the order are subsequently determined by a youth offender panel. The chapter explains that a referral order is available where the court is a youth court or other magistrates’ court, the offender is aged under 18 when convicted, and the offence does not attract a sentence fixed by law. It outlines referral order conditions that apply where a court is dealing with a person aged under 18 at the date of conviction.
Remittal to Youth Court for Sentence
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter reviews Sentencing Code (SC), s 25, which provides for the power to remit to the offender’s local youth court for sentence. It looks at the application of SC, s 25 whenever a person aged under 18 is convicted by or before a court of an offence other than homicide. It also highlights the considerable practical benefit of the power of a youth court to remit to the youth offender’s local youth court. The chapter notes that the power to remit to a local youth court is not subject to the same preconditions as the power under s 28 to remit an adult offender to a different magistrates’ court. It talks about the youth court receiving the case under s 25 that may hear an application to vacate a guilty plea and proceed to try the defendant.