bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Embedded Autonomy and the “Way-Station Self”
Authors: Battin Margaret P. , Francis Leslie P. , Jacobson Jay A. , Smith Charles B. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractTraditional liberal paradigms in bioethics have rested on a misleading picture of the self as a separate individual. This chapter develops a biologicized picture of the self as a “way station”: so to speak, a launching pad and breeding ground of biological organisms, some pathological and many benign, that are transmitted from one human individual to another. Understanding people as way-station selves embedded in a web of infectious disease requires rethinking some of the most basic concepts of bioethics: autonomy, the harm principle, and responsibility, among others. The autonomous agent cannot be seen as an isolated individual, but must be viewed as acting in biological relationships with others. The harm principle's basic idea that intervention is permissible only to prevent people from harming each other must be reshaped by the recognition that there is no easy way to separate actions that harm only the individual him/herself from actions that affect others. Responsibility must be rethought in light of the biological reality that people may infect others unknowingly, and may never know the sources of the infections they contract. Although people may be more or less aware of their susceptibility to infectious disease, there is always a sense in which each person stands in unknown relationships of potential contagion to others.
The Multiple Perspectives of thePatient as Victim and VectorView
Authors: Battin Margaret P. , Francis Leslie P. , Jacobson Jay A. , Smith Charles B. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThis chapter presents the full exposition of the PVV view: that ethical problems in infectious disease should be analyzed, and clinical practices, research agendas, and public policies developed, which always take into account the possibility that a person with communicable infectious disease is both victim and vector. The PVV view works on three levels. First is ordinary life in which people are more or less aware of their actual circumstances of illness, health, and risk. Second is the population-wide view, in which patterns of disease, special risks for sub-populations, and progress or failure with respect to the overall burden of infectious disease can be observed. Third is the view of the “way-station self,” who is always in some sense at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. This third perspective is a naturalized version of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance: a thought-experiment that asks what choices and practices people would want with respect to infectious disease in light of the reality that they are always at unknown and unknowable risk of disease. These perspectives are difficult to hold in view at the same time, but each is essential to analysis of the ethical issues raised by infectious disease.
Vertical Transmission of Infectious Diseases and Genetic Disorders
Authors: Battin Margaret P. , Francis Leslie P. , Jacobson Jay A. , Smith Charles B. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractInfectious diseases and genetic conditions are both transmitted “vertically” from a pregnant woman to the child she bears. Most U.S. states require routine screening of women for syphilis during pregnancy, and cases of congenital syphilis now number less than about 400 per year. In contrast, although a blood test can diagnose up to 90% of cystic fibrosis carriers and affected individuals, no states require premarital or prenatal screening for CF. These two vertically transmitted disorders are similar in potential incidence, detectability, and the absence of curative treatments after vertical transmission occurs. Past and present screening policies for syphilis can be characterized as preconception, prenatal, paternalistic, state mandated, universal, with presumed consent for tests and treatment, widely practiced, and effective. Screening policies for cystic fibrosis can, in contrast, be characterized as prenatal, postnatal, selective, and voluntary—except, most recently, for newborn testing. While differences between these policies may rest partly on historical or other factors, the chapter argues that there are moral differences, too. Recent emphasis on individual rights and choice may be more important in explaining different strategies than the fact that one type of vertical transmission is infectious and the other is genetic. Neither is “exceptional”; rather, both the historical and the ethical explanations of difference relate to other factors, particularly ready access to treatment and the availability of methods for preventing transmission.
Should Rapid Tests for Hiv Infection Now Be Mandatory During Pregnancy or In Labor?
Authors: Battin Margaret P. , Francis Leslie P. , Jacobson Jay A. , Smith Charles B. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractSince testing for HIV became possible in 1985, the testing of pregnant women has been primarily voluntary, “opt-in,” but there have been repeated predictions that with the development of more reliable testing and more effective therapy, testing should become routine with “opt-out” provisions, or even mandatory. This chapter asks—in the light of new technologies for rapid testing such as OraQuick and the capacity to reduce maternal/fetal transmission rates to less than 2%—whether that time is now. Illustrating the argument with cases from the United States, Kenya, Peru, and an undocumented Mexican worker in the United States, this chapter shows that when testing is accompanied by assured multi-drug continuing treatment for HIV for the mother, the argument for mandatory testing of pregnant women is strong, but that it is problematic where testing is accompanied by adverse events such as spousal abuse, or by inadequate intrapartum or followup treatment—the latter a circumstance common where aggressive AIDS testing programs are being introduced in many areas of the world. The difference is not a “double standard,” but reflects the presence of conflicts between the health interests of the mother and the fetus—conflicts that would be abrogated by the assurance of therapy. In light of these conflicts where they still occur, as in much of the world, careful processes of informed consent are appropriate, rather than mandatory or “opt-out” testing.
Immunization and the Hpv Vaccine
Authors: Battin Margaret P. , Francis Leslie P. , Jacobson Jay A. , Smith Charles B. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThe human papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine has the potential to significantly reduce the incidence of cervical cancer in women who receive the vaccine before they are sexually active and thus become at risk of becoming infected with HPV. This chapter explores the debate over mandating that girls aged 11-12 years receive the (HPV) vaccine as a requirement for school entry. The religious and principled objections posed to mandatory immunization practices are reviewed in general as well as the unique issues related to the fact that HPV is a sexually transmitted disease; also examined are the justice issues raised by the fact that the HPV vaccine is too expensive to be available to the large populations of women in developing countries, yet other methods of cervical cancer detection and prevention are not available. The PVV view suggests that, as with other immunizations, an opt-out option should be maintained, but only for the most strongly held religious or other personal beliefs. Any decision maker—a competent adult, the parent of an infant or an adolescent, an adolescent along with the parent, or a policy maker—must take into account the consequences for both victims and vectors of decisions that are made about disease that can be controlled by immunization.
A Thought Experiment
Authors: Battin Margaret P. , Francis Leslie P. , Jacobson Jay A. , Smith Charles B. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThis chapter explores a thought-experiment imagining universal surveillance for all known communicable infectious disease, using rapid tests involving polymerase chain reactions and other methods that require twenty minutes or less for results, at airports. Imagine: as you check in at the departures desk, you supply a cheek swab or other sample that is automatically assayed by the time you reach the gate: if you're negative you can board the plane, if positive you're referred to the airport clinic or local hospital for immediate treatment. This thought experiment raises substantial issues of privacy, confidentiality, and other constraints; yet—especially if expanded to other places of public contact—appears to promise a real reduction in the transmission of infectious disease.
Behavioral Genetics: The Science of Antisocial Behavior
Authors: Baker Laura A. , Bezdjian Serena , Raine Adrian 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter discusses the methodologies and results of behavioral genetics studies, focusing on traits such as antisocial behavior, aggression, and behaviors associated with criminal conduct. It describes in detail the classic methods as well as more recent research designs of behavioral genetics studies, along with the various assumptions, strengths, and weaknesses of each approach. It surveys leading scientific research in antisocial personality disorder and explains the known biological and environmental contributions.
Genetics, Neuroscience, and Criminal Responsibility
Authors: Farahany Nita A. , Coleman, Jr. James E. 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter discusses practitioners' attempts to use behavioral genetics and neuroscience in U.S. criminal law cases, and explores the relationship between behavioral genetics, neuroscience, and criminal responsibility as it operates in the U.S. criminal justice system. It argues that irrespective of understanding the underlying contributions to human behavior, as a matter of criminal law theory, such evidence is unlikely to unhinge current assessments of criminal responsibility.
Addiction, Science, and Criminal Responsibility
Authors: Morse Stephen J. 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter has two simple underlying theses. The first is that it is impossible to understand the relation of any variable to criminal responsibility without having in place an account of criminal responsibility. The second is that discovery of genetic, neuroscientific, or any other physical or psychosocial cause of action raises no new issues concerning responsibility, and discovery of such causes does not per se create an excusing or mitigating condition for criminal conduct or any other type of behavior. The chapter begins in Part II with a brief description of the phenomenology of addiction, describing generally what is known about the behavioral aspects of addiction in addition to the basic criteria of craving, seeking, and using. Part III addresses the contrast between the legal and scientific images of behavior, using the disease concept of addiction, now fueled by discoveries of genetic predisposition and altered neural systems of reward, as prime examples of the contrast. Part IV offers a general model of criminal responsibility to guide the analysis of responsibility for addiction-related criminal behavior, offering the best positive account of the present system. Part V deals with persistent confusions about responsibility. Part VI describes those aspects of addiction, if any, for which persons might be held morally or legally responsible, concluding that only actions related to addiction are appropriate objects for ascribing criminal responsibility. Part VII addresses the causal role genetics and neural systems of reward play in explaining addiction. Finally, Part VIII considers individual and social responsibility for the addiction-related actions.
Genomics, Behavior, and Testimony at Criminal Trials
Authors: Bernet William , Alkhatib Anas 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter describes how testimony regarding behavioral genomics is currently used in legal settings and how it may be used in the future. It focuses on three ways in which a specific individual's genetic makeup may be relevant to his or her behavior. First, the person's genotype may exactly designate a psychiatric or medical diagnosis that clearly explains the person's abnormal behavior. Second, the person's genotype may support a psychiatric diagnosis that has been made on clinical grounds. Third, the person's genotype may help to explain his or her violent or criminal behavior.
Genetic Predictions of Future Dangerousness: Is there a Blueprint for Violence?
Authors: Beecher-Monas Erica , Garcia-Rill Edgar 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter begins with a discussion and critique of the courts' use of future dangerousness predictions in sentencing and postsentence commitment proceedings for capital murderers and sex offenders and in community notification requirements for sex offenders. It then addresses the growth of knowledge about the biology of violence and sexual violence and questions whether such information could be incorporated into actuarial instruments that might more reliably form the basis for sentencing and postsentencing determinations. It examines the problems of predicting violence based on genetic information. The chapter concludes that the courts' insistence on future dangerousness predictions is ill conceived for both legal and scientific reasons.
The Scarlet Gene: Behavioral Genetics, Criminal Law, and Racial and Ethnic Stigma
Authors: Rothenberg Karen , Wang Alice 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter contains six parts. Part I summarizes the Genes on Trial program and introduces the issues raised by it. Part II explains why behavioral genetics research tends to focus on discrete and insular populations that overlap with socially constructed racial or ethnic groups. Part III locates behavioral genetics research on a spectrum spanning from single-gene disorders to complex behavioral traits, positing that the behavioral end of the spectrum carries the most potential for stigma. Part IV explores how the blame-shifting mechanisms of genetic reductionism and genetic determinism affect the individual, family, community, and society when genetics research focuses on criminal or antisocial behavior. Part V analyzes how racial and ethnic stigma arise from behavioral genetics research and perpetuate inequality. Part VI concludes by considering the ethical dilemmas that geneticists face when choosing who and what to study.
CHAPTER 1 David Kaplan: The Man at Work
Authors: Almog Joseph 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter presents an introduction to David Kaplan. Topics covered include the influence of Church, Carnap, and Montague, from whom Kaplan got the eye for elegant formal codifications; Kaplan's admiration and adoption of the work of the German logician Gottlob Frege as the ground philosophical framework; his most influential work, Demonstratives, which presented his pioneering account of “direct reference” and what is essentially a two‐stage theory of meaning; and his separation of semantics and modal metaphysics.
CHAPTER 2 David Kaplan: Formal Aspects of His Work
Authors: Anderson C. Anthony 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThis chapter focuses on David Kaplan's work where formal logic plays an explicit or strongly implicit role. Topics covered include David's dissertation, which is squarely in the Frege‐Church tradition but takes into account the then‐novel ideas of Carnap on modal logic; his isolation and clarification of the idea of a standard name of something; and the paradox of Knower. It is argued that Kaplan's philosophical work often has a formal system or its semantics either in front of or in back of the discussion. There is, however, none of the flaunting of symbols that one learns early on can be used to intimidate those who are quantificationally challenged. The formalism is used for what it is good for—to crystallize ideas and to test their consequences, which is the true method of analytic philosophy.
CHAPTER 4 Higher‐Order Senses
Authors: Parsons Terence 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter discusses old‐fashioned intensional logic, a topic that David Kaplan worked on a very long time ago, and one in which he is still interested. It considers the development of theories of truth and meaning for natural language, focusing on the problems created by nonextensional contexts, such as that‐clauses.
CHAPTER 6 The Lesson of Kaplan's Paradox about Possible World Semantics
Authors: Anderson C. Anthony 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
Kaplan has shown that possible world semantics cannot preserve the principle: (A) ∀p◊∀s (Qs ↔ p = s). He has urged that logic should be neutral on metaphysical questions, but this line seems very difficult to follow in general. The additional paradox does not directly turn on possible world semantics but is the Epimenides come back to haunt us. Kaplan proposes ramification to thwart the paradox and to preserve a ramified version of (A). This chapter argues a different course, which has some advantages over ramification.
CHAPTER 7 Possible Worlds Semantics and the Liar
Authors: Lindström Sten 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
This chapter discusses a paradox that, in Kaplan's view, threatens the use of possible worlds semantics as a model‐theoretic framework for intensional logic. Kaplan's paradox starts out from an intuitively reasonable principle referred to as the principle of plenitude. From this principle he derives a contradiction in what he calls naive possible world theory. Kaplan's metatheoretic argument can be restated in the modal object language as an intensional version of the Liar paradox.
CHAPTER 8 The Role of Variables
Authors: Fine Kit 
Published: May 2009

AbstractLogicians and philosophers generally suppose that we now possess a perfectly good understanding of how variables work in the symbolism of logic and mathematics. Given Frege's account of their syntactic role and Tarski's account of their semantic role, it would appear that nothing more of any significance need be said. However, this common view is mistaken. There are deep problems concerning the role of variables that have never been properly recognized, let alone solved, and once we attempt to solve them, we see that they have profound implications not only for our understanding of variables but also for our understanding of other forms of expression and for the general nature of semantics. This chapter explains what these problems are and how they are to be solved, and indicates the implications for the rest of semantics.
CHAPTER 12 Can Frege Pose Frege's Puzzle?
Authors: Glezakos Stavroula 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
Frege maintains that two name‐containing identity sentences, represented schematically as a = a and a = b, can both be made true by the same object's self‐identity but nonetheless differ in their epistemic profiles. According to Frege, sentences of the form a = a are knowable a priori and uninformative; those of the form a = b are often informative, and cannot always be known to be true a priori. Frege solves his puzzle by locating a source for this purported epistemic difference between the identity sentences: the distinct Sinne, or senses, expressed by the names that the sentences contain. Thus, Frege portrays himself as describing a puzzle that arises independently of any particular theoretical position regarding names, and then solving that puzzle with the theoretical apparatus of Sinn and Bedeutung. This chapter argues that Frege's presentation is problematic. If an attempt is made to characterize the epistemic status of true identity sentences without appeal to Frege's theoretical commitments, then what initially seemed puzzling, largely dissolves. It turns out that, in order to generate his puzzle, Frege must invoke that which he seeks to establish the necessity of: the theoretical account of Sinn.
3 A Feminist Ethics Response to the Skeptic
Authors: Superson Anita M. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThis chapter examines three responses to the action skeptic offered by care ethicists who reject self‐interest based contractarianism for reasons relating to its assumption of abstract individualism. The most promising retains the traditional picture of the skeptic, but offers an internalist reason for acting morally that necessarily connects a reason for acting in a caring way with acting from the motive of care. The chapter argues that since this motive cashes out under patriarchy in ways that recapitulate women's oppression, we should also reject this attempt to defeat the action skeptic. This chapter challenges the skeptic's endorsement of expected utility because it does not exclude deformed desires as irrational, and questions whether we need to defeat motive skepticism, and whether we need a fuller account of justification than expected utility allows that squares with a richer account of morality than self‐interest based contractarianism.
5 Self‐Interest versus Morality
Authors: Superson Anita M. 
Published: May 2009

AbstractThe traditional model of the skeptic dichotomizes morality with self‐interest, both in the theory of practical reason the skeptic is assumed to endorse and in the motives he believes it rational to have. But there are immoral acts other than self‐interested ones that are at least as much in opposition to morality, and we need to cover these for a successful defeat of skepticism. This chapter argues that privilege covers all these acts which have in common that the agent fails to respect the intrinsic value of another person. It defends an alternative model to that of expected utility, according to which the skeptic's view is that acting in ways that privilege oneself vis-à-vis morality is rationally required. On this broader model, defeating skepticism amounts to showing that it is rationally required, because consistent, to respect the humanity of others. We appeal to reasons of consistency rather than self‐interested reasons to defeat skepticism.
CHAPTER 2 Rank‐Dependent Utility
Authors: Abdellaoui Mohammed 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
Rank‐dependent utility (RDu) is among the most popular generalizations of the standard model of expected utility. It takes into account the main violations of expected utility (Allais paradox, Ellsberg paradox). Furthermore, the replacement of probabilities by decision weights allows us to capture what may be called “chance attitude” in addition to attitude towards outcomes. This chapter aims to bring into focus the main violations of expected utility that opened the way to rank‐dependent utility. Then, it presents the main preference conditions behind rankdependence. The chapter concludes with a few experimental results as regards the elicitation of cumulative prospect theory, the most compelling version of Rank‐dependent utility.
CHAPTER 5 The Normative Status of the Independence Principle
Authors: McClennen Edward F. 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
Some version or other of what is known as the “independence principle” plays a ubiquitous role in the axiomatic derivation of the normative version of expected‐utility theory. The various versions are identified, and the arguments for each are critiqued. The conclusion is that none of the arguments for this or that version of the independence principle are convincing, and thus that the expected‐utility theory, as a normative theory, is itself much less secure than most have taken it to be.
CHAPTER 12 Diversity
Authors: Nehring Klaus , Puppe Clemens 
Published: May 2009

Abstract
The chapter critically reviews the recent attempts to formalize the concept of diversity and its measurement. After discussing measures based on ordinal and on cardinal binary dissimilarity information, we review the multi‐attribute model as a benchmark model and show how several proposals in the literature can be obtained as special cases. We contrast the “absolute” conception of diversity embodied in the multi‐attribute model with the “relative“ conception of diversity used in much of the biological literature, and indicate how these two conceptions could be reconciled in a comprehensive model using sampling. The full development of such a model seems a worthwhile subject for future research.