bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
17 Speed and Tragedy in Cocteau and Sophocles
Authors: Kirkland Sean D. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
In this chapter, Kirkland suggests that Antigone does indeed undergo the recognition and reversal Aristotle requires of great tragic figures, not with respect to her end or aim, but with respect to the speed of her action in the play. First, he looks briefly at Cocteau's fast‐paced ‘contraction’ of Sophocles' original, finding speed highlighted as the tragic itself. Next he turns to Sophocles, finding that Antigone's praxis exhibits no hesitation and no true decision. Instead, she is presented from the outset as already having covered the distance from beginning to end. The well‐known Choral Ode to Human Beings then indicates that this infinite speed (distance divided by no time at all) is characteristic of the hubris of human action as such. In closing, Kirkland suggests that this tragic speed is disrupted only in Antigone's final scene, as her hesitation, her slowness indicates a subtle moment of reversal and recognition.
18 Politicizing Antigone
Authors: Fischer‐Lichte Erika 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Three different productions of Antigone are investigated with regard to the way in which the aesthetic of each performance was related to its political context: (1) the Tieck/ Mendelssohn production in Potsdam in 1841, one year after Friedrich Wilhelm IV ascended to the throne and ushered in a new era in Prussia; (2) Karlheinz Stroux's production in Berlin in 1940, the second year of World War II, and (3) Christoph Nel's production in Frankfurt upon Main in 1978, taking place at the time of the trial against the terrorist Red Army Faction in Stuttgart‐Stammheim, the suicide of the defendants in prison, and their funeral. It is argued that in all three cases it was the special relationship between stage and auditorium that brought about the politicization of the performances in their distinctive contexts, not so much because of a specific reading of the tragedy they conveyed, but primarily due to their particular aesthetic.
19 From Ancient Greek Drama to Argentina's ‘Dirty War’; Antígona Furiosa: On Bodies and the State
Authors: Nelli María Florencia 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Griselda Gambaro's play Antígona Furiosa was written and staged after Gambaro's exile as a consequence of Argentina's so‐called ‘Dirty War’ in the mid‐1970s. This chapter discusses Gambaro's play, taking into account some of Giorgio Agamben's thoughts in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998) and The State of Exception (2005). Concepts such as ‘state of exception’, ‘inclusion of the exclusion’, ‘threshold’, and ‘living dead man’, as well as the figure of the camp are approached, illustrated, and fully explored by Antígona Furiosa in so far as they are at the heart of the structure of all major modern totalitarian states, of which the Argentinean ‘Proceso’ with its thousands of desaparecidos is just a new example. This chapter seeks to examine those notions not only as they are represented in the script of the play but essentially as they are reflected in the design of the performance space.
20 Revolutionary Muse: Fémi Òsófisan's Tègònni: An African Antigone
Authors: Weyenberg Astrid Van 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter discusses a reworking of Antigone by Nigerian playwright Fémi Òsófisan: Tègònni: An African Antigone (1994). Focusing on the politics of adaptation, Van Weyenberg considers Òsófisan's decision to draw on Sophocles within the context of Nigeria, and analyses Antigone's representative value within her ‘new’ surroundings. The emphasis then shifts to the (meta)theatrical aesthetics that characterizes Antigone's cultural translocation and to the related political implications for Antigone's status as a Western canonical figure. In viewing Òsófisan's adaptation as a work of ‘canonical counter‐discourse’, Van Weyenberg argues that it is not so much the canonical text itself at which Òsófisan's attention is directed, but rather the Eurocentric tradition that has claimed Antigone, and Greek tragedy in general, as its point of origin. Òsófisan's metatheatrical translocation of Antigone to Nigeria allows him to effectively demand shared ownership: Antigone no longer exclusively belongs to Europe.
21 Performing Antigone in the Twenty‐First Century
Authors: Wilmer S. E. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter examines some productions in the late twentieth century (Fugard's The Island, Gambaro's Antígona Furiosa, and Glowacki's Antigone in New York) that have employed Antigone as a kind of homo sacer, and then applies this analogy in a more detailed discussion of Seamus Heaney's version of The Burial at Thebes at the Abbey Theatre in Dublin in 2004. Heaney's version was inspired by President Bush's ‘war on terror’ and the detention and ‘rendition’ of suspected terrorists in prisons beyond legal redress. The language deployed in the play echoed statements made by President Bush and evoked his administration's unwarranted invasion of Iraq and torture of prisoners. By comparing recent versions of Antigone that represent her as homo sacer, subjected to a liminal state between life and death, the chapter demonstrates how the ‘state of exception’ theorized by Georgio Agamben has become normalized in the twenty‐first century. It draws parallels between the ‘exceptional’ actions of governments such as the Bush administration and the Argentinian dictatorship, making up the laws as they go along, removing people from their homes and environment, and incarcerating or disposing of them outside the polis, outside the reach of their friends and families. Moreover, it shows that Western governments are taking advantage of the ‘war on terror’ to develop new methods of social control (such as increased security measures by the US Department of Homeland Security and other agencies, including more intensive customs inspections, omnipresent CCTV cameras, heightened threat alerts, etc.) that deprive citizens of their civil rights. By applying Agamben's notions of ‘homo sacer’ and ‘state of exception’ to these adaptations, as well as Slavoj Žižek's and Judith Butler's comments on recent political developments, it demonstrates the claim that Antigone makes on behalf of the disenfranchised of the world.
Chance in the Everett Interpretation
Authors: Saunders Simon 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThe concept of objective probability — chance — has three distinctive features: chances are measured by statistics, but only with high chance, increasing with the number of trials involved; when the chances of the outcomes of a chance process are known, even in the context of a single trial, then one's subjective probabilities — credences — in those outcomes should be set equal to those chances; and finally, chance processes involve uncertainty as to the outcomes of those processes. The second of these features is established for ratios in the squared norms of branches by the Born-rule theorem, proved in Chapter 8. This chapter shows that the first and third hold for those same quantities. All three characteristics of chance thus apply to branching in the Everett interpretation. In consequence, branching processes should be identified with chance processes, and ratios in the squared norms with chances.
A Fair Deal for Everettians
Authors: Papineau David 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThose who criticize the Everett interpretation on the grounds that it makes no sense of probability apply a double-standard, for no other physical theory of probability does any better in explaining probability or in deriving its link with decision theory. In fact, others do worse, for in any one world theory it is a mystery as to why, given that only a single outcome of a chance process occurs, we should nevertheless act so as to maximize expected utilities, which involves all possible outcomes of a chance process. This difficulty does not apply to the Everett interpretation, in which all outcomes happen.
How to Prove the Born Rule
Authors: Wallace David 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter develops the decision-theoretic approach to quantum probability, originally proposed by David Deutsch, into a mathematically rigorous proof of the Born rule in (Everett interpreted) quantum mechanics. It sketches the argument informally, then proves it formally, and lastly considers a number of proposed ‘counter-examples’ to show exactly which premises of the argument they violate.
One World Versus Many: The Inadequacy of Everettian Accounts of Evolution, Probability, and Scientific Confirmation
Authors: Kent Adrian 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThere is a compelling intellectual case for exploring whether purely unitary quantum theory defines a sensible and scientifically adequate theory, as Everett originally proposed. Many different and incompatible attempts to define a coherent Everettian quantum theory have been made over the past fifty years. However, no known version of the theory (unadorned by extra ad hoc postulates) can account for the appearance of probabilities and explain why the theory it was meant to replace — Copenhagen quantum theory — appears to be confirmed, or more generally why our evolutionary history appears to be Born-rule typical. This chapter reviews some ingenious and interesting recent attempts in this direction by Wallace, Greaves–Myrvold, and others, and explains why they don't work. An account of one-world randomness, which appears scientifically satisfactory, and has no many-worlds analogue, is proposed. A fundamental obstacle to confirming many-worlds theories is illustrated by considering some toy many-worlds models. These models show that branch weights can exist without having any role in either rational decision-making or theory confirmation, and also that the latter two roles are logically separate. Wallace's proposed decision theoretic axioms for rational agents in a multiverse and claimed derivation of the Born rule are examined. It is argued that Wallace's strategy of axiomatizing a mathematically precise decision theory within a fuzzy Everettian quasiclassical ontology is incoherent. Moreover, Wallace's axioms are not constitutive of rationality either in Everettian quantum theory or in theories in which branchings and branch weights are precisely defined. In both cases, there exist coherent rational strategies that violate some of the axioms.
Rabid Dogma? Comments on Bub and Pitowsky
Authors: Timpson Christopher 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThe proposed interpretation, if it is to count as realism, must say more about the evolution of the state while the argument that more about its dynamics oughtn't to be said (given the no-broadcasting principle) is suggested to be unsound. Nor are the alleged dogmas of quantum mechanics dogmas — on the contrary, the fact that measurements cannot count as primitives is a consequence of realism, not a presupposition of it. And the parallel with special relativity cuts both ways: the dynamical explanations for the length contractions and time dilations demanded by Lorentz in special relativity must indeed be forthcoming, as Einstein later acknowledged. Finally, there is little in the proposed interpretation that is specifically information-theoretic.
The Principal Principle and Probability in the Many‐Worlds Interpretation
Authors: Schack Rüdiger 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIn the decision-theoretic approach to the many worlds interpretation due to Deutsch and Wallace, probabilities are taken to be Bayesian degrees of belief. Their connection to the quantum mechanical wavefunction, derived from a set of decision-theoretic axioms, can be regarded as a quantum version of Lewis's principal principle. This chapter shows that applying the principal principle in quantum mechanics is problematical because it is impossible to give precise criteria for what constitutes a repeated quantum-mechanical trial. This difficulty is resolved in a full quantum Bayesian theory where quantum states, as well as probabilities, are interpreted as expressing an agent's degrees of belief, rather than corresponding to objective properties of physical systems. A similar resolution exists in the many worlds interpretation; this resolution, however, raises a new question for the latter.
Carried Away in the Euthyphro
Authors: Judson Lindsay 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter discusses Socrates' refutation of Euthyphro's definition of piety as what is all the gods love (Euthyphro 9e1-11b5), which begins with the famous question, ‘is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved?’ It considers what light the argument sheds on Plato's conception of definition, and advances a new interpretation of the argument as a robust reductio of Euthyphro's definition. It argues that despite Plato's obvious commitment to the elaboration of very general structures in the refutation, these general structures do not provide all the resources needed to make the argument to go through, but that considerations specific to the subject matter of the argument (the gods' love of the pious) make the argument much more powerful than is generally thought.
Explanation and Essence in Plato's Phaedo
Authors: Politis Vasilis 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter makes several proposals concerning Plato's discussion in Phaedo (95e f.), where causes or explanations are said to be or be based on forms or essences. It states that Plato's argument involves not a contentious notion of a Platonic form but only the notion of essence in the sense of the correct answer to a question of the type ‘What is’, with which we are familiar from earlier in this dialogue, from Plato's earlier dialogues. Second, the chapter suggests, Plato's argument does not rely on a presupposed notion of essence but rather serves to establish the need for such a notion in the context of explanation. Third, it contends, Plato's argument does not rely on the principle ‘like-explains/causes-like’ but rather on the requirement that explanations must be uniform, which Plato spells out independently of that principle. Fourth, the chapter argues, in Plato's account of explanation, which involves basic essences, physical or material components of things can be genuinely part of explanations. Finally, Plato's argument is to be understood as conducted according to a general method of argument and inquiry. This method of argument and inquiry consists in first articulating a particular aporia about explanation in general, and then arguing that a particular account of explanation is both necessary and sufficient to resolve this aporia. The aporia is that, on the one hand, no proposed explanation is genuinely explanatory unless it is uniform; but, on the other hand, no currently proposed explanations, be they everyday or the scientific ones favoured by the natural philosophers, are uniform or begin to indicate how the uniformity-requirement is to be satisfied in the explanations that we propose.
Aristotle on Essence and Defining‐Phrase in his Dialectic
Authors: Chiba Kei 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter clarifies the meaning and role of ‘to ti ên einai’ (‘the what it was to be’) and its account called ‘horos’, which is translated as ‘defining-phrase’, in Aristotle's dialectic. It distinguishes the theory of dialectic — an attempt to systematize and improve on the Socratic method of dialogue on the basis of ‘the method of formal (logikôs) argument’ — from its practice, which is described using a different adverb ‘dialectically’ (dialektikôs). The chapter suggests that defining-phrase (horos) is a sub-component of the proposition which is used to express a definition. The phrase ‘the what it was to be’ (to ti ên einai) is designed to capture the ideal answer which Socrates was seeking for in his ‘What is F?’ question. Aristotle's distinctive phrase emerges from his reformulation of the Socratic ‘What is F?’ question in a context in which the interlocutor had overlooked what Socrates sought. The question ‘What was then it for F itself to be F?’, in using the past tense, reminds the interlocutor that he has overlooked the thing F itself in his initial answer, offering, for instance, only an example of F.
The Ancient Commentators on Concept Formation
Authors: Sorabji Richard 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
How did the ancient commentators understand Aristotle's account of concept formation in Posterior Analytics 2.19? They focus on his re-statement at 100a14. They do not agree with the interpretation in this chapter of his first statement at 100a3ff (but then neither do many contemporaries). The chapter considers the commentators' views on these texts in which they saw perception as passing on information about universals to be worked on by reason, imagination (surprisingly), or nous, understood as one or more of the three kinds of intellect that they detect in On the Soul 3.5. Their view preserves Aristotle's wish to offer an empirical alternative to Plato's account of concept formation as recollection of concepts known before birth. They differ on whether Aristotle's account can be squared with Plato's. Some went to the length of saying that Aristotle believed in Plato's recollected concepts; some said that Neoplatonists should believe in both types of concept; some that Aristotle was simply wrong to postulate concepts based on perception. Certainly, they thought that empirically based concepts could not be processed and improved, unless one had recollected concepts to guide one. This chapter investigates these disagreements and their bases in conflicting views of the role of perception and intellect.
Galen's Aristotelian Definitions
Authors: Hood Jane 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter discusses the Galen's attempts to incorporate Aristotelian definitional theory within his own, Stoic, views of language and definition. He thus tries to combine an Aristotelian search for the essence with the Stoic notion of ennoia, a term linked to language use. Definition is important for Galen not only as a philosopher, but also as a medical expert. He urges doctors not to waste time on defining everything, itself likened to a disease, ‘definitionitis’. However, he claims that definitions are crucial when they can be used as tools to help the doctor heal.
Sceptical Enquiry
Authors: Fine Gail 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
In PH 2.1-10, Sextus considers a paradox of sceptical inquiry, according to which sceptics can't inquire. He explains how sceptics can inquire, and argues that it's the dogmatists who can't inquire. This chapter explores the paradox of sceptical inquiry, along with Sextus' defense of the sceptic's ability to inquiry. It also considers Sextus' challenge to the possibility of dogmatic — especially Stoic — inquiry.
Merely Possible Propositions
Authors: Stalnaker Robert 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that some propositions exist only contingently. Among the contingently existing propositions are ‘possible worlds’, which are understood as maximal consistent propositions. The chapter sketches a picture of propositions and possible worlds that tries to make sense of this thesis, and defends it against two closely related arguments (by Alvin Plantinga and Timothy Williamson) that aim to refute it. The thesis and the response to the arguments require a distinction between the claim that a proposition has the monadic property of truth and the claim that it is true of a given possible world; this distinction is explained and defended.
Is Timothy Williamson a Necessary Existent?
Authors: Efird David 
Published: September 2010

AbstractTimothy Williamson has offered an argument for the claim that, necessarily, he exists, that is, that he is a necessary existent. Though this argument has attracted a great deal of attention, a new argument is presented for the same conclusion which reveals a new way of denying the soundness of Williamson's argument, one which denies not only that it is necessary that he exists but also that there are any true necessities about Williamson at all. In conclusion, given that it is contingent that Williamson exists, nevertheless, a sense in which he is, after all, a necessary existent is distinguished: Williamson necessarily exists, though it is not necessary that he exists.
Permission and (So‐Called Epistemic) Possibility
Authors: Yablo Stephen 
Published: September 2010

AbstractDavid Lewis in ‘A Problem About Permission’ asks about the effect on context of permitting the previously forbidden. The set of permissible worlds expands, but how? One can ask in a similar vein about the effects of calling a circumstance possible which had previously been ruled out. This chapter proposes a unified rule. Permission to take the day off adds in world W if the reasons W was initially ruled out all imply taking the day off. W remains impermissible if the reasons it was initially ruled out include some that could still have obtained even if one had remained at work. Similarly, ‘It might rain’ adds a world to the context set if and only if was ruled out for rain-implying reasons. These rules turn out to have non-trivial effects even if the new possibility was not previously ruled out. This runs counter to Lewis, but is arguably the right result.
Possible Worlds and the NecessaryA Posteriori
Authors: Jackson Frank 
Published: September 2010

AbstractW. V. Quine's famous objection to essentialism has provoked two responses. The unfriendly response is that it conflates the de re and the de dicto. The friendly response does not dispute the point about conflation but argues that, behind Quine's argument, lies an important epistemological problem for essentialism. This chapter argues that the problem can be solved by looking at the issue through the lens of possible worlds approaches to modal questions. This serves as a preamble to addressing the corresponding issue for the necessary a posteriori. There is an important epistemological problem for the necessary a posteriori but the possible worlds approach to modal questions offers a solution to it. The solution turns out to be version of two-dimensionalism about the necessary a posteriori.
Conceivability and Apparent Possibility
Authors: Gregory Dominic 
Published: September 2010

AbstractWhy do we tend to ascribe possibility to what we can imagine? One strategy for answering that question involves the thought that, just as sensory episodes often involve its seeming to us as though the world is certain ways, so imaginings involve its seeming to us that what we have imagined is possible. This chapter argues that while some imaginings do feature appearances of possibility, very many others do not; and it explores the broader relevance of its conclusions for modal epistemology.
Intentionality without Exotica
Authors: Sainsbury R. M. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractExotic objects are objects that are nonexistent, nonactual, or nonconcrete. Some have posited such objects as a way to preserve and simplify their preferred semantic theories and to intentionality. This chapter is devoted to arguing that we do not need to countenance any exotic objects to do justice to intentionality or to the behavior of intensional verbs.
1 What Can Be Learned about the Economies of China and India from Purchasing Power Comparisons?
Authors: Heston Alan 
Published: September 2010

AbstractComparisons of India and China have been made for over fifty years. This chapter focuses on purchasing power estimates in China and India in the 2005 round of the UN International Comparison Program (ICP) that was coordinated by the World Bank, the Regional Banks and Economic Commissions. The 2005 ICP round provides estimates of purchasing power parities of currencies and real product per capita for 146 countries, and the results for China and India are discussed in the context of the size of these economies. It also provides insights into the prospects of future economic growth in China and India and also evaluates policy recommendations of others for these countries.