bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Prerogatives of Government
Authors: Loughlin Martin 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter examines the origins of modern government's power of potentia. It argues that this governmental power of potentia initially operated by exploiting the residue of lordship and feudal rights contained within the modern idea of rulership. These feudal and regal rights collectively made up the prerogative powers of the ruler and although in the course of modernization the exercise of these prerogative powers of the king were restricted by constitutional arrangements, these limitations were never entirely comprehensive. With the growth in the responsibilities of modern governments, then, these prerogative powers were exploited. By examining the nature and continuing influence of prerogative powers in modern government, the chapter reveals the ambiguous character of power relations within modern constitutional settlements.
Disordered Appetites: Addiction, Compulsion, and Dependence
Authors: Watson Gary 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter develops a conception of addiction as an acquired appetite. On this account, addictions are continuous with our general vulnerabilities as appetitive creatures; vulnerabilities to various sorts of practical irrationalities of judgment and intention in the face of the ‘temptations’ of food, sex, and drink. Like other appetites, addictions can diminish our autonomy to various degrees. In extreme cases, we speak of compulsion, but this is not usefully understood as the operation of literally irresistible desires. Compulsion is best construed not as a literally irresistible force, but as a phenomenon in which our agency is both compromised and complicit. This susceptibility is not necessarily to be regretted, for much of what we value is deeply shaped by it. Addictions are to be deplored, when they are, not just because of their effects on our autonomy but because of the unworthiness of addictive attachments.
Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme
Authors: Watson Gary 
Published: September 2010

AbstractStrawson attempts to defuse the debate about determinism, understanding our moral practices, in which we demand good will and respect from one another, as constitutive of the conditions for moral responsibility. Scepticism about responsibility would call into question this fundamental form of human concern. Holding one another responsible does not derive from metaphysical commitments but simply expresses our natural concerns as moral beings. Strawson shows that our blaming or reactive attitudes, which express these demands, can be explained in these terms. However, his appealing view fails to explain clearly why we exempt certain individuals who are capable of hostile and disrespectful attitudes towards others. This leaves Strawson's expressivism vulnerable to the libertarian challenge that what exempts these individuals is their incapacity to do otherwise. This chapter suggests strategies for a Strawsonian theory of exemption.
Two Faces of Responsibility
Authors: Watson Gary 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter distinguishes two perspectives implicated in our ordinary conception of responsibility, each of which reflects distinct but overlapping ethical interests. The most basic perspective is attributability, in which actions are imputable to individuals as exercises of their agency. The attitudes expressed in such behaviour are subject to assessment in ethical terms. The significance of attributable behaviour is not its causal relation to the ‘deep self’ but that it expresses what the agent stands for in this activity. This ‘face’ of responsibility is of central importance in human life but by itself fails to explain the normative relation of interpersonal accountability. This leaves an opening for a kind of scepticism that is independent of the validity of attributability. This distinction helps to make sense of our ambivalence towards vicious individuals with horrendous upbringings and to clarify apparent asymmetries between praise and blame.
Reasons and Responsibility
Authors: Watson Gary 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIt is an ancient idea that our capacity as responsible agents has chiefly to do with our capacities as rational creatures. This chapter is a critical study of the development of this idea in John Fischer and Mark Ravizza's Responsibility and Control. Fischer and Ravizza understand the relevant rational capacity as the possession of ‘mechanisms’ that are responsive in specified ways to moral and other practical reasons. Agents are morally responsible for what they do when their actions issue from such mechanisms for which the agents have taken responsibility (and thus ‘own’). Among other things, the chapter raises concerns about the capacity of this theory to distinguish addictions/compulsions and manipulations from actions under the agent's control; about whether the historical features of the theory are in tension with compatibilism; and about the connection between accountability to others and responsibility as the authors conceive of it.
2 The Pragmatic Fallacy
Authors: Kalderon Mark Eli 
Published: September 2010

AbstractNoncognitivism, in its primary sense, is a claim about moral acceptance. However, as standardly developed, it is a part of a syndrome of ideas that include negative and positive claims about moral semantics. Standard noncognitivists are nonfactualists in that they deny that the content of a moral sentence is a moral proposition. Standard noncognitivists are expressivists in that they claim that the content of a moral sentence is its use to express a noncognitive attitude. Standard noncognitivism faces serious difficulties. In its most transparently noncognitivist form, an atomistic reduction of moral content to the expression of noncognitive attitudes, it faces an unanswerable dilemma. In a form that avoids this, the position is deprived of the means of demonstrating its nonfactualist and hence noncognitivist standing. This chapter examines these difficulties.
Narrative and the Knowledge of Persons
Authors: Stump Eleonore 
Published: September 2010

AbstractOn the basis of recent research in developmental psychology and neurobiology, this chapter explains the nature of the knowledge of persons and the second-person experience that enables the knowledge of persons. It examines some contemporary work on autism, joint attention, imitation, including neonatal abilities for imitation, social cognition, and other topics related to the knowledge of persons and second-personal experience. It argues for a role of narratives in communicating the knowledge of persons, and it shows the way in which this discussion can be extended into theology. It suggests that some of the central insights of Levinas and Buber had to do with the knowledge of persons and second-personal experience between God and human persons, as they understood it.
The Nature of Love
Authors: Stump Eleonore 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter explores the nature of love. It begins by considering contemporary theories of love, including the responsiveness theory, the volitional theory associated with the work of Harry Frankfurt, and Niko Kolodny's relational account. It then gives a detailed discussion of Aquinas's account of love. It argues that Aquinas is right to think of love as requiring two mutually governing desires, one for the good of the beloved and one for union with the beloved. The chapter develops this account in connection with the offices of love, the character of friendship, and the special cases of self-love and the love of God. It concludes with the application of Aquinas's account of love to the nature of forgiveness.
Willed Loneliness
Authors: Stump Eleonore 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that closeness, union, and love come in two modes: ordinary and strenuous. To make this case, it examines the analogy of two notions of freedom of the will, the ordinary and the strenuous (of the sort associated with the work of Harry Frankfurt). In order to make sense of this distinction among kinds of freedom, it is helpful first to make a distinction between two notions of the true self, a metaphysical and a psychological sense. The psychological sense depends on the metaphysical sense; in its turn, it undergirds and explains the strenuous notion of freedom. It also helps to explain the strenuous senses of closeness, union, and love; it also elucidates the way in which moral wrongdoing fragments the self. On this basis, the chapter then considers the nature of shame and the distinction between guilt and shame. It shows that both guilt and shame can produce a kind of willed loneliness.
Other‐Worldly Redemption
Authors: Stump Eleonore 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter considers the way in which human moral wrongdoing fragments the psyche of the wrongdoer. It examines the theological doctrine of original sin and argues against attempts to show that a human tendency to moral wrongdoing, of the sort postulated by the doctrine of original sin, is incompatible with the existence of a perfectly good, omniscient, omnipotent God. It then presents the remedies for the human proclivity to moral wrongdoing as Aquinas sees them. These consist in the processes of justification and sanctification. The chapter argues that each of these processes requires a certain kind of passivity and surrender on the part of the person engaged in the process. Contrary to Harry Frankfurt's position that passivity is inimical to the true self and to human flourishing, it is argued that some significant goods for human beings, including the love of friendship, are impossible without some reciprocal passivity.
The Story of Job: Suffering and the Second‐Personal
Authors: Stump Eleonore 
Published: September 2010

AbstractJob is an exemplar of an innocent person who suffers involuntarily. This chapter focuses on the biblical story of Job and gives a detailed philosophical examination of many parts of the story. Its aim is to illuminate the picture the story gives us of God's reasons for allowing Job's suffering, when we are attuned to the second-person character of the narrative, in all its complexity. The nested stories the book contains regarding relations between creatures and God present God's providence operating in a fractal way, to deal with each of God's creatures as an end in himself, even while interweaving all the individual stories into one larger narrative.
The Story of Mary of Bethany: Heartbrokenness and Shame
Authors: Stump Eleonore 
Published: September 2010

AbstractMary of Bethany is an exemplar of a person who suffers shame and heartbreak, if the story of the raising of Lazarus, in which she and her sister Martha figure largely, is understood in a certain way. This chapter examines the problem of suffering in connection with shame, desires of the heart, and heartbreak. It concentrates on the narrative of the anointing of Jesus by Mary of Bethany in the Gospel of John, and on the narrative of the anointing of Jesus by an anonymous sinful woman in the Gospel of Luke. It also discusses methodological issues in connection with philosophical examination of Gospel narratives. It shows the way in which, in the narratives, suffering is redeemed in second-personal relationship.
Can Truth Out?
Authors: Burgess John 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIt is rather discouraging that forty years have passed since Frederic Fitch first propounded his paradox of knowability without philosophers having achieved agreement on a solution. As a general rule, when modal phenomena prove puzzling, it is a good idea to look at the corresponding temporal phenomena. This chapter examines not the knowability principle that whatever is true can be known, but rather the discovery principle that whatever is true will be known.
Tennant's Troubles
Authors: Williamson Timothy 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIn The Taming of the True (1997), Neil Tennant objects to the specific intuitionistic anti-realist response to Fitch envisaged by the author, and proposes his own alternative responses, still of a broadly intuitionistic anti-realist kind. In response (2000b), the author argued that both Tennant's objections and his alternatives fail, and that the result illustrates a more general point: that moderate forms of anti-realism tend to be the least stable. Tennant replied at length (2001a). For some time the author thought that the problems with his 2001 reply were sufficiently evident to make any further response from me unnecessary. Later experience has taught him otherwise. This chapter shows that Tennant's reply fails completely to meet the difficulties raised in 2000. Since his reply engages with many details of that paper (2000b), while missing the relevance of some of the most crucial ones, the most efficient course is to rehearse the arguments of that paper, interspersing them with discussion of Tennant's objections as they arise. Thus the present chapter constitutes a self-standing critique of Tennant's treatment of the Fitch paradox that properly includes its predecessor.
Introduction
Authors: Cardwell Michael 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This introductory chapter outlines the extent to which GM crops are grown throughout the globe, together with the arguments advanced in their favour. It also outlines differing approaches to regulation, with certain countries favouring precaution and others treating GM food as substantially equivalent to conventional food. There is suggestion that several regulatory regimes (including that of the European Union) contain internal contradictions. An overview of the fifteen chapters in the book is presented.
Genetically Modified Organisms and Risk
Authors: Morrow Karen 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter considers the concept of risk as it applies to the regulation of GMOs. In so doing, it examines the oftentimes problematic, yet still dominant, hybrid scientific and political character of risk regulation in the arena of agricultural biotechnology and its legal ramifications. The dominance of technocracy and difficulties of constructing viable inter-disciplinary dialogue are also discussed. Further, the chapter considers the problems experienced in attempting to invoke greater public participation as a regulatory response to engaging with and determining acceptable levels of risk, something that is increasingly viewed as a contested concept. A central point of discussion is the role of law in dealing with the disputes that inevitably arise in so controversial a field.
The European Union Regulatory Regime for Genetically Modified Organisms and its Integration into Community Food Law and Policy
Authors: Friant-Perrot Marine 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
The European Union has now put in place an extensive regime for the regulation of GMOs and this chapter provides an overview of that regime. In particular, it maps out the legislation which governs: the contained use of GMOs, the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment and their placing on the market, GM food and feed, and traceability and labelling. At a broader level, it also assesses the extent to which these specific measures have been integrated into wider European Union policy on food law. It focuses their interaction with the Food Law Regulation, the role of the precautionary principle, and the provision of information for consumers and civil society.
Coexistence of Genetically Modified, Conventional, and Organic Crops in the European Union: The Community Framework
Authors: Grossman Margaret Rosso 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Increased global cultivation of GM crops raises concerns about the coexistence of GM varieties with conventional and organic crops. In the European Union, where few GM crops are grown, GM content that exceeds strict regulatory thresholds triggers requirements for labelling and traceability. Successful coexistence measures can minimize GM presence and avoid those labelling and traceability requirements. Though the European Union does not impose standards for coexistence, a 2003 Commission Recommendation lays down guidelines for Member State strategies and best practices. Member States have enacted (or will enact) coexistence measures, including education, notification, and on-farm practices. Significant issues related to coexistence include limits on GM content in seeds, the effects of GMOs on organic production, the legality of GM-free areas in the European Union, and liability for damage caused by commingling of GM and other crops.
Coexistence of Genetically Modified, Conventional, and Organic Crops in the European Union: National Implementation
Authors: Bodiguel Luc , Cardwell Michael , García Ana Carretero , Vitti Domenico 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Within the framework imposed at European Union level, Member States have taken advantage of the considerable discretion which they are accorded when implementing coexistence measures at national level. This divergence is examined by reference to four Member States: France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. While there may be important similarities in approach (for example, in all four Member States the choice has been taken to regulate by legislative means), there are also notable differences. In France, the emphasis is on freedom of cropping, with the result that actions seeking to impose GM-free zones, whether initiated by organic producers or local authorities, have met with little success. In Italy, until recently, there has been a legislative impasse by reason of a battle for competence between the state and the regions. In Spain, a draft Royal Decree has been promulgated, but it remains to be implemented, and several of its measures have already proved controversial. In the United Kingdom, the devolved administrations of Scotland and Wales have shown marked hostility to GMOs, while, more generally, the slow pace of legislative progress may be attributed to the absence of immediate intent to proceed to commercialization of GM crops.
Genetically Modified Organisms in Africa: Regulating a Threat or an Opportunity?
Authors: Birhanu Fikremarkos Merso 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Modern biotechnology has promised much for agriculture, and these promises are certainly attractive in the case of Africa. Importantly, a number of countries in the continent continue to grapple with food insecurity and starvation. But it remains controversial whether modern biotechnology, in its current state, can overcome these unique challenges. For reasons such as biosafety and fear of loss of export markets, Africa has remained largely ambivalent towards GM crops, and the regulatory regimes governing biosafety in several countries largely restrict their development. While recognizing some of the hurdles which modern biotechnology must clear before it can deliver its promises, this chapter argues that the continent stands to benefit from promoting the development and safe use of GM crops. It further argues that African countries should invest heavily in research and development, with a view to owning the technology and ensuring relevance to their circumstances. This should be the guiding objective of biosafety regulation in Africa.
The Stoics on Matter and Prime Matter
Authors: Gourinat Jean‐Baptiste 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter contends that Stoics are materialists if, and only if, their theory fulfils the two following conditions: (1) their system must be materialistic monism; and (2) the ‘inferior reality’ must account for the ‘superior reality’, according to the formula that encapsulates Auguste Comte's theory of materialism. It is precisely the case that the Stoics have two principles, god and matter, and this seems to settle the question. However, the issue is more complicated than that, since the two principles are corporeal. Stoic theory of matter seems to be a disguised monism, i.e. a kind of materialism. Matter (as the ‘inferior reality’) accounts for god (as the ‘superior reality’), since god appears to be engendered by matter, which is the only ultimate principle. It is argued that the Stoic doctrine of matter is a reinterpretation of the doctrine of matter or ‘receptacle’ in Plato's Timaeus and of Aristotle's theory of matter. If read like this, the Stoic theory of matter does not appear as materialistic, but nor is it dualist; it is not materialist in the sense that things are not explained by the movements and combination of passive matter, but it is not dualist in the sense that both principles are bodies.
Does Cosmic Nature Matter?
Authors: Boeri Marcelo D. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter is divided into two main parts: the first one (sections 2-3) deals with some textual arguments intending to show that some assumptions of what is referred to as ‘the heterodox view’ are wrong. The second part (sections 4-5) focuses on what probably is the most problematic point of the cosmological ethics of the Stoics: how the particular tenets of Stoic ethics are related to cosmic nature or, in other words, how some ethical tenets can be somehow connected with our knowledge of cosmic nature.
Stoic Philosophical Theology and Graeco‐Roman Religion
Authors: Algra Keimpe 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter examines some aspects of the philosophical attitude of the Stoics, early as well as later, vis- à-vis traditional religion. It first addresses some preliminary issues, such as the epistemological basis of Stoic philosophical theology (section 2), and the Stoic view or views of the development of human civilization (sections 3 and 4). In the course of this discussion, the chapter mainly deals with the Stoic attitude towards myth. Whereas some aspects of this attitude — in particular the Stoic practice of etymologization and allegorizing readings — have been given considerable attention in recent scholarly literature, this does not apply to the subject of sections 5 and 6, where the Stoics' attitude towards various aspects of traditional cult is considered. Conclusions are drawn in section 7.
The Property Dualism Argument
Authors: White Stephen L. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractContemporary physicalists, materialists, and naturalists generally hold two theses: that mental states such as pains are identical to physical states of the brain, and that these identities are a posteriori. The property dualism argument raises a problem for such mental-physical identities. Suppose that pains are identical with c-fiber firings. That the identity is a posteriori means that a subject could be perfectly rational in believing what would be naturally expressed by saying ‘I am in pain’ and what would be naturally expressed by saying ‘My c-fibers are not firing’. There is, however, a pervasive ambiguity in the literature as to what is meant by ‘mode of presentation’ — whether it is representational, something on the side of our language, beliefs, or conceptual scheme, or something on the side of the world, something represented. This chapter argues that the assumption that we have a meaningful vocabulary of mentalistic terms such as ‘pain’ entails that there are modes of presentation of both kinds — concepts and the properties that give those concepts their content. And the properties that give such concepts content are thin. Thus, they confer no empirically discoverable nature on the objects that instantiate them. It concludes that there must be some irreducibly mentalistic properties — properties not identical to any physical properties — and that this is a consequence of the assumptions made by the proponents of a posteriori mental-physical identities themselves.The alternative is ‘local eliminativism’. This view is unstable — it collapses into straightforward eliminativism regarding the mental, which is incompatible with the qualia realism of the proponents of a posteriori mental-physical identities.