bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Childhood exposure to sexual abuse and partnership outcomes at age 30
Authors: Friesen M. D. , Woodward L. J. , Horwood L. J. , Fergusson D. M. 
Published: August 2009

BackgroundIn this study, 30-year longitudinal data from the Christchurch Health and Development Study (CHDS) were used to examine the associations between childhood exposure to sexual abuse and intimate relationship outcomes at age 30. In addition, a broad range of early childhood and family confounding factors were tested, and the role of intervening factors from adolescence was explored.MethodThe investigation analyzed data from a birth cohort of over 900 New Zealand adults studied to the age of 30. At ages 18 and 21 cohort members reported on any exposure to sexual abuse prior to age 16. This information, along with prospective data gathered in childhood and adolescence, was used to predict partnership outcomes at age 30.ResultsAfter adjustment for early childhood and family factors, exposure to more severe forms of childhood sexual abuse (CSA) was associated with earlier and more frequent cohabitation, higher rates of perpetrated interpartner violence (IPV), and early parenthood, lower relationship satisfaction and investment. Several factors from adolescence partially or fully mediated these associations, notably a history of early consensual sexual intercourse, higher number of sexual partnerships, substance abuse problems, and self-esteem. After adjustment for intervening factors, exposure to CSA remained significantly associated with IPV.ConclusionsThe findings support a causal chain process, whereby early childhood and family factors place some individuals at risk for CSA. The extent of CSA exposure is related to adolescent risk taking, which in turn leads to early and more frequent cohabitation, risk of IPV, and lower relationship satisfaction and investment.
Parties and the Common Good
Authors: Adler Mortimer 
Published: August 2009

This paper has a twofold intention.The first is to discuss the problem of political parties, — their justification and status, — in a society which requires political democracy as the set of political institutions appropriate for the government of men living under modern social and economic conditions. (By these modern conditions I mean such things as the economic forms of production and distribution in the industrial era; the organization of labor in relation to economic enterprise; the intensity and extensity of communication among men living in geographical separation and, consequently, the physical enlargement of the civic association; the approximation to universal education; the spread of literacy, etc.) There are two points to be noted here:(1) That modern society is or tends toward a democracy in its physical and economic conditions, whether in a given instance its political forms are outwardly democratic, as in France, England and the United States, or anti-democratic, as in Italy, Germany and Russia.(a) Not only does Russia publicize its claim to being democratic and make constitutional efforts in that direction which are, of course, at once vitiated by the persistence of its totalitarian regime; but even Germany and Italy give an appearance of democracy, — though they abominate the thought and word, — an appearance which is a reverse and distorted image. Thus, by the pressure of propaganda and the exercise of brutal force, the rulers of Germany and Italy try to make it appear that they have a mandate from the people for their policies.
Leo XIII: “The Diplomat Pope”
Authors: Ward James E. 
Published: August 2009

THE election of Leo XIII on February 20, 1878, made a deep and rather favorable impression on the French statesman, Léon Gambetta. Quite inadvertently, he recorded it for posterity when, on the very day of Leo's election, he wrote to his mistress:They have elected a new pope, the elegant and refined Cardinal Pecci, bishop of Perugia. … This Italian, more diplomat than priest, has overcome all the intrigues of the Jesuits and the foreign clergy; he is pope, and the name of Leo XIII which he has taken seems to me to be a most favorable omen. I hail this occasion so full of promise.
Politics and Men of Learning in England, 1540–1640
Authors: Fitzsimons Matthew A. 
Published: August 2009

The antiquary, professed collector of the manuscripts and records of the past, is popularly ranked with the harmless butterfly-collector. Lytton Strachey characterized him as an “amiable muddler,” and Alexander Pope pilloried his dreary obscurantism.But who is he in closet close y-pentOf sober face, with learned dust besprent?Right well mine eyes arede the myster wightOn parchment scraps y-fed and Wormius hight.To future ages may thy dulness lastAs thou preservst the dulness of the past.There dim in clouds, the poring scholiasts mark,Wits who, like owls, see only in the dark,A lumber-house of books in every head,For ever reading, never to be read.These opinions are peculiarly shortsighted, for antiquarianism, the collection and study of old records, has been neither obscure nor harmless in its consequences. Hans Kohn and Carlton Hayes have made clear the considerable part played by antiquaries in stimulating a consciousness of nationalism, the most powerful public emotion of modern times.
On Contemporary Nihilism
Authors: Gurwitsch Aron 
Published: August 2009

At The present time, reason is not held in any too great esteem; “rationalism” is deprecated in most intellectual circles. “To believe in reason” is to be behind the times, to give evidence of a mode of thinking that is out of date, out of contact with what today is called “progress.”The “belief in reason” is now replaced by all sorts of psychological and sociological sciences: the psychology of the unconscious, of the subconscious, of behavior, of suppressed desires and conditioned reflexes. The variety of sociologies is no less disconcerting—not should we forget the sociological psychologies and the psychological sociologies. Formerly man was considered to be an animal rationale, a rational being; now he has become simply a vital being, not further qualified. Since man lives in community with his fellows, it was formerly the practice to inquire into the structure and organization which society ought to have in order to correspond to the rational and human nature of its members. But today no such question is raised; it is taken for granted that man, as a social animal, must adjust himself to his environment or suffer the consequence to his well-being and his happiness. It is no longer a question of whether one may or one should adjust oneself to certain social conditions: it is now only a question of what is the most effective means or technique of adjustment.
Hegel and Nationalism
Authors: Avineri Shlomo 
Published: August 2009

Hegelwas a resident of Jena when the Battle of Jena, a shattering defeat for Prussia, took place. On October 13, 1806, the day on which the French entered the town and deployed for the engagement fought the next day, Hegel wrote to his friend Niethammer:As I wrote to you earlier, all of us here wish the French victory and success. The Prussians are suffering the defeats they deserve… This morning I saw the Emperor Napoleon, that World Soul (diese Weltseele), riding through the town to a parade. It's a marvelous feeling to see such a personality dominating the entire world from horseback … He is capable of doing anything. How wonderful he is!Three months later, in a letter to another friend, Zelmann, Hegel summed up the historical lesson of the Battle of Jena: “There is no better proof than the events occurring before our eyes, that culture is triumphing over barbarism and the intellect over spirit-less mind.”
The Political Thought of Bernanos
Authors: Molnar Thomas 
Published: August 2009

To includein the same sentence the name of Bernanos and the term “political” or “politics” suggests an initial difficulty. Nothing was farther from his impatient and burning temperament than the meticulousness of the news analyst, or the specialist's careful dissection of the political animal. His domain was, rather, the philosopher's insight and intuition, the social critic's scorn and wrath, and the prophet's prediction of doom. He stated about himself:People say that Bernanos is never pleased about anything or anyone. When the righteous were wishing success to the crusade of our good neighbour, Señor Franco, he wroteLes Grands Cimetiéres sous la lune, and defended himself as being above all democratic. Now [1947] that all righteous are each more democratic than the other, he still proclaims himself Catholic, and no more democratic than before. A peculiar fellow, that Bemanos.
The Jacobin Phrenzy: The Menace of Monarchy, Plutocracy, and Anglophilia, 1789–1798
Authors: Smelser Marshall 
Published: August 2009

InTheFolkloreof our national past the Federalist Period is often thought of as a golden age of demigods, who were almost infallible. The noisy dissent from the program of the Federalist administrations has been regarded as only a temporary deviation from the true American tradition.The most frequently read accounts of the period — especially in college textbooks and other short works of synthesis — have generally tended to reduce the political events of that age to a chapter in the history of the “Age of Reason” and have thereby done some damage to our understanding. Casual readers of the story of this age seem to finish their reading with a mental summary in which the emphasis is on the intellect and logic — in short, on reason. An excellent example of this image as it occurs in the lore of even the learned is a recent comment on Senator J. William Fulbright by Senator Paul Douglas: “He's a child of the eighteenth century, a throwback to that age of enlightenment, trust in reason, temperate argument, and slightly aristocratic tendencies. That, I think, explains why he seems a little aloof, a little different from the rest.”
Asian-African Coalition and International Organization: Third Force or Collective Impotence?
Authors: Triska F. , Koch Howard E. 
Published: August 2009

WithinTheLast decade, the United Nations has undergone three modifications which, taken separately, are quite significant; together, they represent a true metagenesis of the Organization.The first modification paralleled a development which had occurred in the League of Nations: both organizations were designed to be led, if not controlled, by the powerful members permanently seated in the League's Council and the United Nations' Security Council. In both organizations, however, the less powerful member states, in spite of the constitutional provisions, have persisted in endeavoring to assert themselves and have sought in numbers a balance to, and — whenever feasible — a substitute for, the authority lodged with the few strongest nations. The ultimate acquisition of prestige by the Assembly of the League of Nations was their success.
Evolutionism and the Ontology of the Human Person: Critique of the Marxist Theory of the Emergence of Man
Authors: Crosby John F. 
Published: August 2009

In the preface to his doctoral dissertation Marx wrote: “Philosophy makes no secret of it. The proclamation of Prometheus, 'in a word I detest all the Gods,' is her own profession, her own slogan against all the gods of heaven and earth who do not recognize man's self-consciousness as the highest divinity. There shall be none other beside it.” Now this attitude of defying God goes hand in hand with an attitude toward the world: one who cannot endure the idea of God's sovereignty often resents even the “givenness” of things with specific natures. It is not just that he senses that they would lead him back to God, but also that they, each with its own inner logos which imposes itself on man, are themselves felt to belong to the detested gods. Such a man approaches these things to destroy their givenness, and to make new objects out of them which reflect himself and his powers, and depend on him. The Austrian art historian, Hans Sedlmayr, describes this attitude as follows:Dem Menschen, der sich ganz autonom proklamiert, muss es unertraeglich sein, Kreaturen zu begegnen, die offenbar nicht seine Geschoepfe sind. Es ist ein prometheischer und im Grund narzistischer Traum, sich durch Technik und naturfreie Kunst eine menschliche Umwelt zu bauen, in der man nichts und niemandem begegnet als den Schoepfungen des eigensten Menschengestes.
The First Liberal Democrat: Locke's Popular Government
Authors: Faulkner Robert 
Published: August 2009

This article discusses the democratic side of Locke's political thought, which is generally not appreciated. How is it that Lockean constitutionalism is also “popular government,” institutions, that is, but institutions considerably informed by a democratic spirit? The answer involves Locke's three characteristic innovations in institution-planning: “civil” government, a supreme “legislative” power coupled with a responsible executive, and,inter alia, a vigilant “majority”—a party or movement of the people with authority to elect to government and to rebel against any non-popular government. While Locke does raise up a powerful executive, he also makes it dependent as a rule on a rather democratic legislative. What Locke wishes to induce over time is something like parliamentary government, with the executive vested in a cabinet and the whole more or less responsible to the people in his sense, especially to a majority.To what extent are liberal democracies democratic? That question guides this reconsideration of the first and fundamental plan for liberal government, that of John Locke. I shall argue that Locke's plans are more democratic, and more radical too, than is generally believed. True, important parts of Locke's teaching correspond to undemocratic features with which we are now quite familiar. Liberal democracies have more or less capitalist economies in which wealth and big corporations are protected, they are moved not only by public opinion but also by liberal opinion-leaders of one stripe or another, they are governed not by the people in assembly but by constitutional governments.
Robert Dahl and the Right to Workplace Democracy
Authors: Mayer Robert 
Published: August 2009

Do employees possess a moral right to democratic voice at work? InA Preface To Economic Democracyand other writings over the past two decades, Robert Dahl has developed a neo-Kantian proof for the existence of such a right. Even if we accept the norm of distributive justice upon which Dahl founds his proof, voluntary subjection to authoritarian power in firms does not violate the legitimate entitlements of employees. While adult residents of territorial associations do possess a moral right to political equality, polities and firms are qualitatively different types of associations in which the entitlements of subjects are distinct. Subjection to power is acquired in different ways in the two kinds of associations, and this difference deprives employees—but not residents—of a right to democratic voice as a matter of moral desert.Throughout his career, Robert Dahl has been troubled by the different ways in which those who govern polities and firms are chosen in modern society. While democracy is the norm in the state, at least in the advanced industrial nations, authoritarianism prevails in the economy. Most employees are subject to managers they did not elect and to rules in which they had little or no say. They are subordinates, a role manifestly at odds with the ideal of the democratic citizen. Given the “contradictions between our commitment to the democratic ideal and the theory and practice of hierarchy in our daily lives,”
A Right to Workplace Democracy? Response to Robert Mayer
Authors: Dahl Robert 
Published: August 2009

The disagreements between Professor Mayer and me turn to some extent on legitimate differences in interpreting and understanding my intentions and text, and to a larger extent on differences in the ways we interpret and understand certain important economic and political aspects of the world in which we live.I believe my argument is more consequentialist than he understands it to be. The question is: consequences for what ends, goals, or values? Simplifying my discussion somewhat. I was concerned with three general types of consequences: consequences for economic effectiveness, for property rights, and for rights to a democratic process.As to property rights, though I expressed skepticism about applying the standard moral argument for property rights to business firms, my preferred solution, as Professor Mayer points out, does not entail a violation of basic rights to property, or, for that matter, existing property rights in business firms. It could simply“entail a shift ownership from stockholders to employees”(p. 113).As to economic effectiveness, I argued that employee-owned firms could be as effective in achieving such intermediate goods as investment, growth, and employment (p.120ff.). I argued further that they could be as efficient as American corporations at present in minimizing“the ratio of valued inputs to valued outputs”both in the narrow sense ordinarily employed by economists, for whom the outputs are those valued by consumers, and in a broader sense that would include outputs“we as producers value”(p. 130).
A Rejoinder to Robert Dahl
Authors: Mayer Robert 
Published: August 2009

Exchanges of this sort typically consist of each side claiming the other has misunderstood its own position. Keeping to this tradition, I will begin by arguing that Professor Dahl has misconstrued my critique of his proof. But toward the end I will do something different and suggest another argument advocates of workplace democracy could pursue that avoids the pitfalls of the parallel case.In his reply Professor Dahl ascribes to me a libertarian position which I explicitly reject. He says that I view consent to authoritarian rule at work as a freely made choice involving absolutely no coercion. But, Professor Dahl counters, this assumption is obviously false for most workers in our economy, who find themselves in a weak bargaining position for want of capital or valuable skills. They are not in a position to negotiate political equality at work, and so we cannot interpret their submission to employers as a valid act of consent. In my terminology, their subjection option is hollow and thus irrelevant to the parallel case upon which the proof rests. As Professor Dahl sees it, I am a kind of uncompassionate conservative, enjoying a privileged occupational life but unconcerned about the plight of those less fortunate than myself.But Professor Dahl can only arrive at this conclusion by ignoring the fourth section of my paper, on the exploitation objection. There I go even farther than he does in granting the hollowness of the subjection option.
Beyond the Nations: The Expansion of the Common Good in Catholic Social Thought
Authors: Barbieri William A 
Published: August 2009

In recent years it has become increasingly common to speak of the international or global common good. It remains unclear, however, what political content attaches to this expression, and how it relates to more traditional conceptions of the common good rooted in the context of thepolisor the nation-state. This article examines the ramifications of extending this time-honored concept to a transnational framework, focusing in particular on the evolving rhetoric of the political common good in Catholic social thought. The first part traces the emergence of the transnational common good in Catholic thinkers such as Maritain, Murray, and Messner, as well as in the encyclical tradition. The second part addresses, from the standpoint of political theory, problems of scope, structure, and application attending the expansion of the common good. The concluding section proposes a multilayered, heuristic interpretation of the common good organized around the notion of a “plurality of pluralisms.”When one speaks of the common good, it always makes sense to inquire: The common good of whom? How the common good is demarcated is a matter of no small moment for any claims that are made in its name. name. For these claims stumble as soon as it becomes clear that the good referred to is in fact shared by only some members of the assumed collectivity and not the rest; and they likewise falter if they are revealed to rest on an inappropriate delimitation of the collectivity at the expense of others who, for the purposes at hand, should rightfully be included.
Toward A Theory of Congressional-Executive Relations
Authors: Arnold Peri E. , Roos L. John 
Published: August 2009

The theme of the second Nixon administration appears to be “Save the Presidency.” It is clear that Mr. Nixon views his best defense against critics to be the claim of a constitutional imperative to defend his office. And, he continually reminds us, it is an obligation to defend not only the Presidency, but the strong Presidency.Mr. Nixon's attachment to the strong Presidency is more than a protective strategy. It grows out of American practice and recent theory. His language and themes are predictable within our political system. In American national politics, substantive issues and questions of institutional roles are continually entangled.
Author's Rejoinder
Authors: Tierney Brian 
Published: August 2009

I find myself in a difficult situation, beleaguered on all sides. According to Finnis, Aquinas derived a doctrine of natural rights from his teaching on natural law. According to Kries, echoing Fr. Fortin, the two ideas, natural rights and natural law, are radically opposed to one another. This leaves me with a hope that some readers, faced by these extremely opposed assertions, may find a note of sweet reasonableness, a sort of golden mean, in my own position, namely that Aquinas did not himself articulate a doctrine of natural rights, but that this doctrine was not inconsistent with his teaching on natural law. The two doctrines could coexist, as they did in some later neoscholastic writings.Let us consider first the criticisms of Finnis. My own position was set out succinctly in a previous work. “When Aquinas was writing unreflectively and following the common practice of his age, he did use the word ius in a subjective sense in phrases like ius dominii. … Yet it remains true that he developed no explicit doctrine of subjective rights or natural rights.” This still seems to me a correct judgment. Moreover it corresponds quite closely to Finnis's reading of Aquinas in his earlier book.
Joseph and the Politics of Memory
Authors: Cochran Clarke E. 
Published: August 2009

Intense ethnic conflicts bring to the surface important paradoxes about the function of memory in politics. The capacity to remember is vital for political success, but too much memory, or the wrong kind of memory, stokes the fires of revenge. Successful political action demands both the capacity to remember and the capacity to forget. How and when each comes into play is difficult to formulate conceptually. A classic text in which the politics of memory plays a central role elucidates these issues and suggests central political dimensions of remembering and forgetting. This essay uses the story of Joseph in the Hebrew Bible to explore the politics of memory and to suggest factors that produce constructive and destructive results. It examines two principal forms: prudential and mythic, the qualities of which differ importantly. It concludes with an account of a third form: memory as a step toward political reconciliation.The conundrum of memory: Healthier to remember? Surely it is best sometimes to forget–though not to forget Kosovo now. Eventual obliviousness may equally free all sides from the hereditary obligation to hate. ... What's happening there now amounts to a religious war between the future and the past. Beware: in that place, the past is a black hole.“ –Lance Morrow1