bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Mendelssohn As Organist: Performance Characteristics
Authors: Little Wm. A. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Mendelssohn's organ technique. Whether improvising or performing his own works, or the organ works of Bach, Mendelssohn amazed his audiences by the clarity and brilliance of his playing — even on instruments with the heaviest action. As Henry Gauntlett observed, “One thing which particularly struck our organists was the contrast between his massive effects and the lightness of his touch in rapid passages. The touch of the Christ Church [Newgate Street] organ was both deep and heavy, yet he threw off arpeggios as if he were at a piano.” The pianist, Otto Goldschmidt (1829-1907), one of Mendelssohn's pupils, also noted that “his mechanism was extremely subtle, and developed with the lightest of wrists (never from the arm). Though lightness of touch and a delicious pearliness of tone were prominent characteristics, yet his power in fortes was immense. ” According to Joseph Joachim, “his staccato was the most extraordinary thing possible for life and crispness”.
Mendelssohn's Organ Parts To Handel's Oratorios
Authors: Little Wm. A. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Mendelssohn's employment of the organ in performing Handel's oratorios. In Germany, Mendelssohn was the first to introduce the organ into performances of Handel's oratorios, and in doing so, particularly when those performances took place in a church, the ecclesiastical aura of the venue was inescapable. Moreover, it should be stressed that all performances of Handel's oratorios that Mendelssohn conducted after 1838 took place in churches, and it would have been pointless, as well as historically incorrect, for him not to utilize the organ. Once Mendelssohn began to incorporate the organ into the orchestral accompaniment of Handel's oratorios, the public rapidly came to expect the organ to play a major role in their production.
Six Sonatas For The Organ, (op. 65), 1844–1845
Authors: Little Wm. A. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter presents commentary on Mendelssohn's Organ Sonatas. Composed, compiled, culled, and revised over a period of some nine months, from 21 July 1844, to April/May 1845, Mendelssohn's Organ Sonatas are an amalgam of movements expressly written for his Coventry project, as well as movements that had lain dormant among his papers for years. Combining old with new, polyphonic with homophonic/monodic, and classic with romantic, the composer shaped this heterogeneous collection into six separate and distinct entities, each having its own tonal center of gravity. Ranging in length from two to four movements, the set lacks as a whole any single cohesive element that would endow it with an overarching unity. At least one critic has suggested that Mendelssohn, “permanently under pressure to produce, had no option but to assemble these various [small] pieces into a formally imbalanced structure.” The absence of a cohesive element linking these Sonatas together, however, has never proven to be a deterrent either to their popularity or their claim to a place in the classic canon for the instrument.
SHELXL
Authors: Müller Peter 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter introduces the crystal structure refinement program SHELXL, a program written and maintained by George M. Sheldrick. SHELXL is by far the most popular refinement program for small molecules and, together with CNS by Axel Brünger and Refmac by Garib Murshudov, it is one of the three most commonly used programs for the refinement of protein structures. The chapter describes the basic program organization of SHELXL as well as the input and output file structure. It also explains the concept of the connectivity table.
Pseudo-Symmetry
Authors: Müller Peter 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Having more than one molecule in the asymmetric unit occurs predominantly in space groups of low symmetry. In most of these cases, the independent molecules are not related by simple symmetry operators such as twofold axes, mirror planes, or inversion centres, but are different rotamers of the same molecule. This chapter deals with structures where there is in fact non-crystallographic symmetry present, relating two or more crystallographically independent molecules. Two cases are distinguished: true non-crystallographic symmetry (NCS), and global pseudo-symmetry. The latter especially can cause systematic errors which need to be addressed by the crystallographer. Two detailed examples, one for of each type of pseudo-symmetry, are given, one of which demonstrates that pseudo-symmetry can also occur within a single molecule.
Artefacts
Authors: Müller Peter 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Like every physical method, crystallography is affected by errors. However, there are two kinds of errors: unavoidable errors such as artefacts and avoidable errors. A good crystallographer knows how to manage avoidable errors, how to live with unavoidable errors and, most importantly, how to distinguish between the one from the other. This chapter is more about scientific work ethics than about structure refinement. Nothing can be done to overcome an artefact, but the words ‘this is an artefact’ should never be used as an excuse for sloppy workmanship or to explain the seemingly inexplicable. Examples for artefacts are shortened bond lengths due to libration or high electron density between the nuclei, inaccurately determined hydrogen positions, spurious features in the electron density map on special positions, and close to heavy atoms. One example structure is given that shows an interesting feature in the different Fourier synthesis.
Moral Testimony and Moral Disagreement
Authors: Hills Alison 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIf you want to have and to use moral understanding in a way that could result in morally worthy action, you must not place your trust in moral testimony, defer to moral experts, or suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements. This is significant for the epistemic rationality of responses to disagreement and to testimony, because one of the functions of beliefs about moral matters is to play a role in morally worthy action. If this were their only important function, it would not be epistemically rational to trust moral testimony or to suspend judgment in response to moral disagreements. However, the epistemic rationality of moral beliefs is more complex, because moral beliefs have another function: they play a role in morally right action too. Yet it is still typically not epistemically rational to suspend judgement in response to moral disagreements.
The Place of Truth in Epistemology
Authors: Sosa Ernest 
Published: September 2010

AbstractSuppose we think that knowledge is belief that is both true and derives from intellectual virtue. And if we also assume that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, then where does the value of knowledge in addition to truth come from? This chapter provides an answer to the value problem by arguing that truth is the only fundamental epistemic value (with qualifications for values as understanding that is not directly connected to knowledge.) It suggests that humans prefer their epistemic success to be attributable to their own doing. More specifically, there is a so-called ‘performance value’: that is, the kind value afforded to a belief performance which normally produces truth belief when operating in a suitable environment. Such performances can have this value even when the acquired belief is false. But the chief intellectual good involves getting the truth through the quality of one's performance.
How to be a Virtue Epistemologist
Authors: Hookway Christopher 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter points out that standard versions of virtue epistemology accept and are motivated by the same central problems in epistemology — such as analyzing the concepts of knowledge and justification, and addressing skeptical challenges — which motivate contemporary epistemology. The only significant difference is that virtue epistemology claims that the concepts of knowledge and justification must be analyzed in terms of virtues. What motivates virtue ethicists, however, is not what is motivating other ethicists. The contemporary census amongst ethicists has a different set of problems than the ones motivating virtue ethicists. Virtue epistemologists should mount a similar challenge to their contemporaries: instead of focusing on static states such as beliefs and evaluating whether or not they are justified, they should focus their efforts on evaluating and regulating the activities of inquiry and deliberation, and the role which virtues play in such evaluation and regulation.
Humility and Epistemic Goods
Authors: Roberts Robert C. , Wood W. Jay 
Published: September 2010

AbstractSome of the most interesting works in virtue ethics are the detailed, perceptive treatments of specific virtues and vices. This chapter aims to develop such work as it relates to intellectual virtues and vices. It begins by examining the virtue of intellectual humility. Its strategy is to situate humility in relation to its various opposing vices, which include vices like arrogance, vanity, conceit, egotism, grandiosity, pretentiousness, snobbishness, haughtiness, and self-complacency. From this list vanity and arrogance are focused on in particular. Humble persons are not distinguished from arrogant persons by being unaware of or unconcerned with entitlements; rather, they lack the arrogance that entails a specific kind of motivation called ‘ego-exalting potency’. Humble people are motivated by pure interests regarding entitlements given their ability to serve as means to some valuable purpose or project. The chapter ends by considering a wide variety of ways intellectual humility can promote the acquisition of epistemic goods.
Foundations of Public Law
Authors: Loughlin Martin 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis book offers an account of the formation of the discipline of public law with a view to identifying its essential character, explaining its particular modes of operation, and specifying its unique task. Public law is conceived broadly as a type of law that comes into existence as a consequence of the secularization, rationalization, and positivization of the medieval idea of fundamental law. Formed as a result of the changes that give birth to the modern state, public law establishes the authority and legitimacy of modern governmental ordering. Public law today is a universal phenomenon, but its origins are European. Part I of the book examines the conditions of its formation, showing how much the concept borrowed from the refined debates of medieval jurists. Part II then examines the nature of public law. Drawing on a line of juristic inquiry that developed from the late 16th to the early 19th centuries — extending from Bodin, Althusius, Lipsius, Grotius, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Pufendorf to the later works of Montesquieu, Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, Smith, and Hegel — it presents an account of public law as a special type of political reason. The remaining three parts unpack the core elements of this concept: state, constitution, and government. By explaining the way that these core elements of state, constitution, and government were shaped respectively by the technological, bourgeois, and disciplinary revolutions of the 16th–19th centuries, public law is revealed to be a subject of considerable ambiguity, complexity, and resilience.
Introduction: Rediscovering Public Law
Authors: Loughlin Martin 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis introductory chapter explains the nature of the concept of public law examined in this book. Public law is not conceived simply to be a subset of positive law: public law as distinct from private law. Public law is the modern expression of the medieval idea of fundamental law, the law that establishes the authority of government. The book is an inquiry into questions of ‘right’ relating to the conferral of authority and legitimacy on modern governmental ordering. This concept of public law is of European origin and is formed as the code of an autonomous public sphere that emerges as a consequence of modernity.
Medieval Origins
Authors: Loughlin Martin 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter examines the way the modern concept of public law evolved from a series of debates within medieval jurisprudence. In these debates theological and political questions were invariably intertwined and the main points of contention often arose from disputes concerning the governing arrangements of the Roman church. The struggles for authority between popes, emperors, and princes were variously expressed in the languages of law, whether divine law, Roman law, canon law, natural law, and common law. Public law acquires its basic grammar and vocabulary from this rich ideological battlefield.
The Architecture of Public Law
Authors: Loughlin Martin 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter considers the extent to which a common early-modern metaphor — that of envisioning collective association as a spatial arrangement with public law as its architectonic form — offers a solution. It explains that the architectural metaphor was associated with the medieval idea of fundamental law and argues that the modern logic of sovereignty makes the concept of fundamental law redundant: the architecture of constitutional law thus became subordinate to the sovereign will of the people. From the time of the drafting of the American Constitution, the architectural metaphor gradually came to be replaced by the immanent logic of ‘self-binding’; this yields the science of political right.
The New Architecture of Public Law
Authors: Loughlin Martin 
Published: September 2010

AbstractModern governments have greatly expanded the range of their activities and now assume responsibility for furthering economic and social development, managing the economy, and providing for the welfare of their citizens. For the purpose of promoting security, liberty, and prosperity, government has acquired a large and sophisticated administrative apparatus. With this growth in administrative power, the efficacy of constitutional checks is placed in question. This chapter examines legal and institutional responses to the establishment of administrative regimes of government — such as the emergence of administrative law and the rise of agencies — and considers the implications of these developments for conceptualizing public law today.
Agency and Answerability
Authors: Watson Gary 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis volume collects most of the author's publications on human action since the 1970s. The essays collected here are concerned to answer the questions ‘What makes us agents?’ and ‘What makes us responsible to one another for how we live our lives?’ The author develops a unified account of human agency and responsibility in terms of our capacity for critical evaluation, or normative competence. We are agents because we have (and to the extent that we exercise) this capacity, and we are responsible to each other for our lives as reflections of our exercise of this capacity. The account is developed in these essays largely by considering possible sources of normative incapacity, such as compulsion, addiction, manipulation, childhood deprivation, and one's own desires. Many of these essays engage critically with contemporary accounts of free will, action, and moral responsibility.
Excusing Addiction
Authors: Watson Gary 
Published: September 2010

AbstractChapter 3 showed that we have good reason to believe that addiction impairs responsiveness to reasons and volitional control. This chapter considers whether this sort of impairment should ever legally excuse criminal behaviour. The law has understandably resisted such an excuse for evidentiary reasons, but also because addicts are thought to be responsible for their plights. In the end these reasons may be decisive, but it is important to a sound jurisprudence to articulate what is at stake. The chapter argues that the circumstances of the addict are often very like those who are subject to coercive threats, and that therefore much addictive behaviour can be likened to duress: the addictive agent is often subject to duressful ‘pressures’ that are not literally irresistible but which it would be unreasonable to expect anyone to tolerate. This makes a strong case for mitigation if not excuse.
Moral Fictionalism
Authors: Kalderon Mark Eli 
Published: September 2010

AbstractMoral realists maintain that morality has a distinctive subject matter. Specifically, realists maintain that moral discourse is representational, that moral sentences express moral propositions — propositions that attribute moral properties to things. Noncognitivists, in contrast, maintain that the realist imagery associated with morality is a fiction, a reification of our noncognitive attitudes. The thought that there is a distinctively moral subject matter is regarded as something to be debunked by philosophical reflection on the way moral discourse mediates and makes public our noncognitive attitudes. The realist fiction might be understood as a philosophical misconception of a discourse that is not fundamentally representational but whose intent is rather practical. There is, however, another way to understand the realist fiction. Perhaps the subject matter of morality is a fiction that stands in no need of debunking, but is rather the means by which our attitudes are conveyed. Perhaps moral sentences express moral propositions, just as the realist maintains, but in accepting a moral sentence competent speakers do not believe the moral proposition expressed but rather adopt the relevant non-cognitive attitudes. Noncognitivism, in its primary sense, is a claim about moral acceptance: the acceptance of a moral sentence is not moral belief but is some other attitude. Standardly, non-cognitivism has been linked to non-factualism — the claim that the content of a moral sentence does not consist in its expressing a moral proposition. Indeed, the terms ‘noncognitivism’ and ‘nonfactualism’ have been used interchangeably. But this misses an important possibility, since moral content may be representational but the acceptance of moral sentences might not be belief in the moral proposition expressed. This possibility constitutes a novel form of noncognitivism: moral fictionalism. Whereas nonfactualists seek to debunk the realist fiction of a moral subject matter, the moral fictionalist claims that that fiction stands in no need of debunking but is the means by which the noncognitive attitudes involved in moral acceptance are conveyed by moral utterance. Moral fictionalism is noncognitivism without a non-representational semantics.
Wandering in Darkness
Authors: Stump Eleonore 
Published: September 2010

AbstractCan one hold consistently both that there is suffering in the world and that there is an omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good God? This book argues that one can. The opening section presents current research related to autism spectrum disorder to contend that some philosophical problems, including the problem of evil, are best considered with the help of narratives. Then the book investigates the moral psychology and value theory within which one typical medieval theodicy — that of Thomas Aquinas — is embedded. It also makes use of recent work in developmental psychology to illuminate these views. In the third section, the book presents detailed, innovative exegeses of the stories of Job, Samson, Abraham, and Mary of Bethany, each of which is exemplary of a different form of suffering. In the context of the interpretations of these stories and the previous examination of Aquinas's views, the book then argues that an extended Thomistic theodicy can constitute a consistent and cogent defence for the problem of suffering.
Narrative as a Means of Knowledge: Francis and Dominic
Authors: Stump Eleonore 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter presents an argument for the claim that there are things to know that cannot be known as well or at all apart from narratives. For this purposes, the chapter uses hagiographical stories of the lives of St. Francis and St. Dominic, so that Francis and Dominic can serve as types of different modes of knowledge and different modes of the transfer of knowledge. It argues that certain fundamental assumptions in contemporary epistemology need to be altered or supplemented in order to take account of the knowledge of persons. It extends the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge at issue to analogous cases of desire, emotion, and memory, among other things.
The Story of Samson: Self‐Destroying Evil
Authors: Stump Eleonore 
Published: September 2010

AbstractSamson is an exemplar of a person who suffers greatly but whose suffering stems from his own wrongdoing. This chapter examines the problem of suffering as regards not the victims of human evil but as regards the perpetrators of it, whose own lives are wrecked in consequence of the evil they do. It concentrates on the biblical story of Samson and gives a detailed philosophical examination of many parts of the story. In the process, the chapter also explores Milton's understanding of the story in his Samson Agonistes, as well as Sophocles's portrayal of an analogous case in his Oedipus at Colonus. The chapter shows that in the story what redeems Samson's suffering for him is the role of his suffering in bringing him into relationship with God.
What We Care about: The Desires of the Heart
Authors: Stump Eleonore 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter develops Aquinas's theodicy by considering the way in which the suffering stemming from the loss or deprivation of the desires of a person's heart can be defeated. It discusses the possibility — supported by one strand in the Christian tradition, deriving from John Cassian's thought, among other sources — that the desires of the heart are to be given up. It argues against this approach on the grounds that it is incompatible with the nature of love, of oneself or others. It develops Aquinas's theodicy to take account of suffering of this sort.
The Defense of the Defense: Suffering, Flourishing, and the Desires of the Heart
Authors: Stump Eleonore 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter finishes the defence of the defence that is the object of the book by considering possible objections to the developed Thomistic theodicy and the evidence by which it can be supported. In particular, it discusses some results from psychological research on human reactions to trauma, which can include adversarial growth or post-traumatic growth. With this defence of the defence, Aquinas's theodicy, developed in the context of biblical narratives and examined using the methodology argued for in the first section of the book, is complete as a defence against the argument from evil.
A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts
Authors: Fitch Frederic B. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter presents Fitch's seminal 1963 paper, which has been the logical fuel or foil for the literature on the knowability paradox. The paper provides a partial logical analysis of a few concepts that may be classified as value concepts or as concepts that are closely related to value concepts. Among the concepts considered are striving for, doing, believing, knowing, desiring, ability to do, obligation to do, and value for.
Actions That Make Us Know
Authors: Benthem Johan van 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter looks at the Paradox of the Knower in a dynamic-epistemic perspective where learning means changing the current epistemic model. The problematic Moore sentence driving the paradox turns out to be the typical ‘probe’ for investigating the sometimes surprising, but always useful, effects of successive assertions. Moreover, the multi-agent setting of epistemic logic places Verificationism in a richer interactive setting. This change in perspective trades the atmosphere of paradox and disaster for one of free exploration of dynamic typology of epistemic assertions, learning, and reachability, and many further surprising twists in the logic of communication.