bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Formal Problems About Knowledge
Authors: Sorensen Roy A. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article examines epistemological issues that have logical aspects. It considers the epistemology of proof with the help of the knower's paradox. One solution to this paradox is that knowledge is not closed under deduction. This article reviews the broader history of this maneuver along with the relevant-alternatives model of knowledge. This model assumes that “know” is an absolute term like “flat.” This article also argues that epistemic absolute terms differ from extensional absolute terms by virtue of their sensitivity to the completeness of the alternatives. This asymmetry undermines recent claims that there is a structural parallel between the supervaluational and epistemicist theories of vagueness. Finally, this article suggests that the ability of logical demonstration to produce knowledge has been overestimated.
Lessons for Cognitive Science from Neurogenomics
Authors: Rosenberg Alex 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis article discusses the lessons from neurogenomics that are applicable to cognitive science. It argues that the work of some leading cognitive scientists who employed the resources of neurogenomics has already provided strong grounds to be pessimistic about the representations to which a computational theory of mind is committed, and to be optimistic about the syntactic character of processes of thinking and reasoning in the brain. It also discusses research findings concerning how the brain recalls memories and the storage of explicit memories.
The Embedded Neuron, the Enactive Field?
Authors: Chirimuuta Mazviita , Gold Ian 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article examines the concept of the receptive field (RF) of visual neurons. It introduces the concept of visual RFs by discussing the classical picture of primary visual cortex (V1) physiology and discusses the psychophysics and computational vision of contrast discrimination to place the visual neurophysiology in context. It evaluates some recent data which questioned the classical conception of the RF and considers some options available for absorbing these data into visual theory.
Neurocomputational Models: Theory, Application, Philosophical Consequences
Authors: Eliasmith Chris 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article describes the neural engineering framework (NEF), a systematic approach to studying neural systems that has collected and extended a set of consistent methods that are highly general. The NEF draws heavily on past work in theoretical neuroscience, integrating work on neural coding, population representation, and neural dynamics to enable the construction of large-scale biologically plausible neural simulations. It is based on the principles that neural representations defined by a combination of nonlinear encoding and optimal linear decoding and that neural dynamics are characterized by considering neural representations as control theoretic state variables.
Inference to the Best Decision
Authors: Churchland Patricia Smith 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article examines the concept of the so-called inference to the best decision in relation to neurobiology. It explains that the idea of inference to the best decision, often referred to by philosophers as abduction, is also known as in experimental psychology as case-based reasoning. The article discusses the tension that has developed between the sanctity of the “ought/is” dogma and what is known about the neurobiology of social behavior and suggests that the cognitive process that we loosely call inference to the best decision is a solution to this tension. It also expresses optimism that psychology and neuroscience will eventually uncover at least the general principles concerning how neural networks perform these functions and that the two domains of explaining and deciding will have much in common.
Philosophy of Mathematics and Its Logic: Introduction
Authors: Shapiro Stewart 
Published: September 2009

AbstractMathematics plays an important role in virtually every scientific effort, no matter what part of the world it is aimed at. There is scarcely a natural or a social science that does not have substantial mathematics prerequisites. The burden on any complete philosophy of mathematics is to show how mathematics is applied to the material world, and to show how the methodology of mathematics (whatever it may be) fits into the methodology of the sciences (whatever it may be). In addition to its role in science, mathematics itself seems to be a knowledge-gathering activity. The philosophy of mathematics is, at least in part, a branch of epistemology. However, mathematics is at least prima facie different from other epistemic endeavors.
A Priority and Application: Philosophy of Mathematics in the Modern Period
Authors: Shabel Lisa 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
The state of modern mathematical practice called for a modern philosopher of mathematics to answer two interrelated questions. Given that mathematical ontology includes quantifiable empirical objects, how to explain the paradigmatic features of pure mathematical reasoning: universality, certainty, necessity. And, without giving up the special status of pure mathematical reasoning, how to explain the ability of pure mathematics to come into contact with and describe the empirically accessible natural world. The first question comes to a demand for apriority: a viable philosophical account of early modern mathematics must explain the apriority of mathematical reasoning. The second question comes to a demand for applicability: a viable philosophical account of early modern mathematics must explain the applicability of mathematical reasoning. This article begins by providing a brief account of a relevant aspect of early modern mathematical practice, in order to situate philosophers in their historical and mathematical context.
Later Empiricism and Logical Positivism
Authors: Skorupski John 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
The empiricist approaches to mathematics discussed in this article belong to an era of philosophy which we can begin to see as a whole. It stretches from Kant's Critiques of the 1780s to the twentieth-century analytic movements which ended, broadly speaking, in the 1950s—in and largely as a result of the work of Quine. Seeing this period historically is by no means saying that its ideas are dead; it just helps in understanding the ideas. That applies to the two versions of empiricism that were most prominent in this late modern period: the radical empiricism of Mill and the “logical” empiricism associated with the Vienna Circle positivism of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Mill and the logical positivists shared the empiricist doctrine that no informative proposition is a priori.
Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics
Authors: Floyd Juliet 
Published: September 2009

AbstractLudwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) wrote as much on the philosophy of mathematics and logic as he did on any other topic, leaving at his death thousands of pages of manuscripts, typescripts, notebooks, and correspondence containing remarks on (among others) Brouwer, Cantor, Dedekind, Frege, Hilbert, Poincaré, Skolem, Ramsey, Russell, Gödel, and Turing. He published in his lifetime only a short review (1913) and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921), a work whose impact on subsequent analytic philosophy's preoccupation with characterizing the nature of logic was formative. Wittgenstein's reactions to the empiricistic reception of his early work in the Vienna Circle and in work of Russell and Ramsey led to further efforts to clarify and adapt his perspective, stimulated in significant part by developments in the foundations of mathematics of the 1920s and 1930s; these never issued in a second work, though he drafted and redrafted writings more or less continuously for the rest of his life.
The Logicism of Frege, Dedekind, and Russell
Authors: Demopoulos William , Clark Peter 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis article is organized around logicism's answers to the following questions: What is the basis for our knowledge of the infinity of the numbers? How is arithmetic applicable to reality? Why is reasoning by induction justified? Although there are, as is seen in this article, important differences, the common thread that runs through all three of the authors discussed in this article their opposition to the Kantian thesis that reflection on reasoning with mere concepts (i.e., without attention to intuitions formed a priori) can never succeed in providing satisfactory answers to these three questions. This description of the core of the view differs from more usual formulations which represent the opposition to Kant as an opposition to the contention that mathematics in general, and arithmetic in particular, are synthetic a priori rather than analytic.
Intuitionism in Mathematics
Authors: McCarty D. C. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
The extent to which practicing mathematicians of a conventional tendency are already intuitionists is reassuring. Today's mathematicians treat mathematical claims much as Brouwer once did: as independently meaningful efforts to record mathematical facts which are, when true, demonstrable from proofs rooted in basic assumptions or principles. Until they are proven, those assumptions rest upon intuitions: illuminating, at times fallible, insights into the dynamical behaviors of numbers, sets, functions, and operations on them.
Three Forms of Naturalism
Authors: Maddy Penelope 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article plans to sketch the outlines of the Quinean point of departure, then to describe how Burgess and this article differ from this, and from each other, especially on logic and mathematics. Though this discussion touches on the work of only these three among the many recent “naturalists,” the moral of the story must be that “naturalism,” even restricted to its Quinean and post-Quinean incarnations, is a more complex position, with more subtle variants, than is sometimes supposed.
Structuralism
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
The main types of mathematical structuralism that have been proposed and developed to the point of permitting systematic and instructive comparison are four: structuralism based on model theory, carried out formally in set theory (e.g., first- or second-order Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory), referred to as STS (for set-theoretic structuralism); the approach of philosophers such as Shapiro and Resnik of taking structures to be sui generis universals, patterns, or structures in an ante rem sense (explained in this article), referred to as SGS (for sui generis structuralism); an approach based on category and topos theory, proposed as an alternative to set theory as an overarching mathematical framework, referred to as CTS (for category-theoretic structuralism); and a kind of eliminative, quasi-nominalist structuralism employing modal logic, referred to as MS (for modal-structuralism). This article takes these up in turn, guided by few questions, with the aim of understanding their relative merits and the choices they present.
Logical Consequence From a Constructivist View
Authors: Prawitz Dag 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
In spite of the great advancement of logic in our time and the technical sophistication of disciplines such as model theory and proof theory, the concept of logical consequence—the most basic notion of logic—is still poorly understood. Basic intuitions are often in conflict with each other, and rather few attempts have been made to sort this out in a systematic fashion. This article critically reviews some of the attempts that have been made to articulate intuitions about logical consequence, but the review makes no claim to be comprehensive or to settle the issues. Most attention is given to how the notion of logical consequence may be developed from a constructivist point of view.
Introduction
Authors: Wainwright William J. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article traces the development of the philosophy of religion as a distinct field. The philosophy of religion was comparatively neglected by academic philosophers in the first half of the twentieth century. There were several reasons for this. One was the widespread conviction that the traditional “proofs” were bankrupt. Believers and nonbelievers alike were persuaded that Hume and Kant had clearly exposed their fatal weaknesses. Another was the demise of nineteenth-century idealism. The twentieth-century heirs of the German and Anglo-American idealists had many interesting things to say about God, immortality, and humanity's religious life. But their views increasingly fell on deaf ears as analytic philosophy replaced idealism as the dominant approach among English-speaking academics. After a half century of comparative neglect, analytic philosophers began to take an interest in religion in the 1950s.
Mysticism and Religious Experience
Authors: Gellman Jerome 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
In modern usage, “mysticism” refers to mystical experience and to practices, discourse, institutions, and traditions associated therewith. The term “mystical experience” enjoys a great variety of meanings, retaining some of that variety among philosophers. There is no choice but to stipulate meaning for the purposes of this article. A wide definition of “mystical experience” will be more in the spirit of how it figures in general culture, and a narrow definition will echo a meaning common among philosophers. In the wide sense, mystical experiences occur within the religious traditions of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Indian religions, Buddhism, and primal religions. In most of these traditions, the experiences are allegedly of a supersensory reality, such as God, Brahman, or, as in some Buddhist traditions, Nirvana.
Morality and Religion
Authors: Zagzebski Linda 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
One of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world is to find a moral discourse that can reach all the inhabitants of the earth, but one that preferably causes no violence to the conceptual frameworks of particular religions. If the concepts that are central to moral practice in the world's great religions cannot be thinned into a common set of concepts, the task is impossible. Or it may be impossible for some other reason, perhaps because it is impossible to get a common content to morality that is sufficient for the requirements for life in a pluralistic world. But it is a goal that should not be given up until its impossibility has been demonstrated. A given religion may find that some of its moral teachings are not feasible for interaction with the practitioners of other religions and it may have to revise or abandon them for interaction to be possible, but that is an issue that needs to be addressed within the framework of that religion.
Continental Philosophy of Religion
Authors: Westphal Merold 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
The term continental philosophy is not much used on the European continent. In the English-speaking world it is used to signify thinkers, texts, and traditions from the European continent, especially France and Germany, from German idealism to the present; and the work of Anglophone thinkers primarily engaged in the critical analysis and creative development of those thinkers, texts, and traditions. The term regularly implies a contrast with “analytic philosophy,” a widely used if not very precise name for the dominant form(s) of Anglo-American philosophy, whose provenance is, for the most part and not surprisingly, Anglo-American. There is no continental equivalent to the analytic philosophy of religion industry, with a large number of practitioners and a standard list of topics to be discussed. One will look in vain for much discussion of the proofs for the existence of God, the problem of evil as a counterproof, the divine attributes, the evidential value of religious experience, and so forth.
An Introduction to New Religions
Authors: Melton J. Gordon 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article addresses some issues concerning what is or is not a “new religion.” Some fuzziness at the boundaries of the field has grown out of its peculiar history, the field emerging as it did from the pre-1970 study of “cults.” A different approach to the problem was adopted by European scholars who until recently operated without the joint categories of “sect” and “cult” that were implicit in North America throughout the 20th century. In addition, the cult/anti-cult controversy has had a unique (and some would say distorting) role in shaping the academic discussions on new religions. The article integrates several lines of research and considers new religions to reach a definition of this field of study of fringy religious phenomena. In doing so, it suggests that the field of new religions studies are concerned with a groups of religious bodies/movements that, though they do not share any particular set of attributes, have been assigned to the fringe of the dominant religious culture and secondarily by elements within the secular culture, and hence are a set of religious groups/movements that exist in a relatively contested space within society as a whole.
Violence and New Religious Movements
Authors: Bromley David G. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
The episodes of new religious movement (NRM)-related violence in the mid-1990s that indirectly helped to establish new religions as a field of study also prompted NRM specialists to give greater attention to the issue of violence. This article examines a number of general models that have been developed since the mid-nineties, models that have moved in the direction of taking into account the dynamics between NRMs and the social agencies with which they interact, and the potential for violent acts from either side. It then outlines a number of theoretical and public policy issues that need to be addressed in the future.
Psychology and the New Religious Movements
Authors: Saliba John A. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article begins by contrasting psychology/psychiatry's traditional antagonism toward religion with the newer, more positive approach reflected in the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (1994). After a brief survey of relevant studies, it then explores the problems involved with psychological approaches to members of new religions through the example of studies of followers of Bhagwan Rajneesh. It concludes by outlining a series of unresolved issues regarding the psychology of new religious movement membership.
The Dynamics of Alternative Spirituality
Authors: Sutcliffe Steven J. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article argues that the role of “seeker” is crucial to the structural dynamics of “New Age” phenomena, helping to explain why a “New Age movement” is in practice a contradiction in terms: a conclusion borne out by the historical evidence. The article begins by examining the consensus view supporting the existence of a New Age movement. It then outlines the empirical field of collective behavior—the alternative networks of beliefs and practices—that is often conflated with the New Age movement but that in fact can be shown to have predated the “New Age” trope, and will outlive it. It provides three fieldwork sketches to help argue that these networks are made up of the practices, beliefs, and oral, face-to-face exchanges of numerous individual seekers, rather than a demarcatable movement. A model of seekership roles is constructed and applied to New Age networks. The sum is that the phenomena sometimes labeled “New Age,” far from being a movement, are better understood as the utilization of an emblem, and more recently the expression of an idiom, by a diffuse, burgeoning, boundary-collapsing collectivity of seekers practicing alternative spiritualities. The field thus comprises overlapping networks in time and space woven together by the crisscrossing trajectories, relationships, and exchanges of individual seekers. Thus, New Age is best understood not as a movement but as a diffuse collectivity: a cluster of seekers affiliated by choice—if at all—to a particular term in a wider culture of alternative spiritual practice.
New Religions in East Asia
Authors: Pye Michael 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article surveys East Asian new religions through a discussion of specific new religious movements (NRMs) in China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. Without diminishing the uniqueness of each culture, these countries share a common cultural heritage from China which makes their attitudes toward new religions different from those of the West. However, like their counterparts in the West, East Asian NRMs embody a bewildering variety of ideals and opposing tendencies.
Witches, Wiccans, and Neo-Pagans
Authors: Reid Síân Lee , Rabinovitch Shelley Tsivia 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
The study of the Neo-Pagan movement has also begun to emerge as a distinctive subfield within new religious movement (NRM) studies. This article surveys this area of study via a literature review of the primary books in the field. The survey leads into an analysis of the movement in terms of the ideas of three theorists of late modernity—Anthony Giddens, Michel Maffesoli, and Jürgen Habermas. These theorists are then brought to bear on a discussion of the issue of Neo-Pagan institutionalization, which is a hotly debated topic among movement participants.
Administrative Law
Authors: Rodriguez Daniel B. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
The central objective of administrative law is to reconcile two major aims: the successful exercise of regulatory power by the bureaucracy and the tethering of administrative agencies to the rule of law. The first goal is concerned fundamentally with regulatory governance; the second is concerned with legality. Administrative regulation through specialized agencies is a ubiquitous and rather permanent characteristic of modern policy making. These agencies wield enormous power and, although their respective architectures are arguably in tension with our bedrock constitutional principles of separation of powers and representative democracy, the administrative state seems rather entrenched. This article deals with administrative law and describes the leading effort to tie together the law and politics of administration through the use of positive political theory. It also discusses the dilemmas of regulatory administration and, therefore, of administrative law: delegation, discretion, fairness, and regulatory unreasonableness.
Legislation and Statutory Interpretation
Authors: Garrett Elizabeth 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
Much of the theoretical work done at the intersection of law and politics demands empirical underpinnings. Scholarship working to discern the signals sent by legislators in order to interpret unclear language consistently with the message that was sent by the enactors requires a sophisticated understanding of the legislative process—both generally and specifically as it pertains to that legislation. The study of statutory interpretation moved to the forefront of scholarly attention in the 1980s in large part because legal scholars began to use insights and methodologies from political science—most fruitfully, from public choice and other positive theories of politics. This article examines the interaction of positive theories of politics with the foundational theories of statutory interpretation, namely, intentionalism and purposivism. It discusses how political science has been used to challenge these theories and how it has sometimes provided a more nuanced and convincing version of interpretive techniques. The article also considers courts as interpreters and the institutional relationship between Congress and the judiciary.