bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Efficacy of anticoagulant‐free alternative bait products against house mice (Mus musculus) and brown rats (Rattus norvegicus)
Authors: SCHMOLZ Erik 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThe attractiveness and efficacy of four anonymous anticoagulant‐free alternative rodenticides (active ingredients cellulose or plaster) were tested on wild strain groups of house mice (Mus musculus Linnaeus) and brown rats (Rattus norvegicus Berkenhout) in laboratory choice and no‐choice experiments. In no‐choice tests, the rodenticide product was offered ad libitum to the animals for 21 days (mice) and 10 days (rats), respectively. In choice tests, the rodenticide product and non‐poisoned food were offered for 28 days (mice) and 14 days (rats). Two products with cellulose (C1 and C2) as the active ingredient were tested against both mice and rats. In two no‐choice tests with mice, all animals died within 14 days (C1) and 21 days (C2); in a third no‐choice test, 11% (2/18) of mice survived (C1: 21 days). In all three tests, numerous incidents of cannibalism were observed. The attractiveness of cellulose baits was tested for one product (C1) in three trials against normal food pellets. In all trials, bait consumption was low and all mice survived (15–34 days). Two no‐choice trials with cellulose baits (C1) were conducted on groups of Rattus norvegicus; 11 of 12 rats survived the bait feeding period and no cannibalism or sign of aggression between conspecifics was observed. Two plaster‐based (CaSO4·0.5H2O) products (P1 and P2) were tested against both mice and rats; in no‐choice tests, only one mouse (n= 20) and no rats (n= 8) were killed, although the baits proved to be attractive for rats and mice in choice tests. The results of these experiments suggest that neither cellulose‐based nor plaster‐based rodenticides are suitable agents for the control of Mus musculus and Rattus norvegicus.
Semantic Underspecification
Authors: Egg Markus 
Published: March 2010

AbstractSemantic underspecification is a technique to capture several readings of an ambiguous expression in one single representation by deliberately omitting the differences between the readings in the representation. First, underspecification formalisms will be presented to introduce underspecification in general and to outline important properties of these formalisms that allow their classification into subgroups. After expounding the kinds of ambiguity to which underspecification can be applied, the article then presents various motivations for the use of underspecification, and shows how underspecified semantic representations can be further processed.
Impact of pulmonary tuberculosis on menstrual pattern and fertility
Authors: Hassan Wafaa Ali , Darwish Atef Mohamad 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIntroduction and Study Objective:  The association between pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) and female reproductive health problems is not well addressed. This study was done at Assiut University and Woman's Health University Hospitals to estimate the effect of pulmonary TB on menstrual patterns and fertility of women in childbearing age.Patients and Methods:  This study composed of 429 women with pulmonary TB of childbearing age (study group) and 100 age‐matched healthy women (control group). A detailed medical history was obtained, and a clinical examination, routine investigations of pulmonary TB and transvaginal ultrasonography (TVS) were performed for all cases. Hysterosalpingography, combined laparoscopy and hysteroscopy were done for infertile women whenever indicated.Results:  Menstrual abnormalities were reported in 66% of women in the study group. Secondary amenorrhea (112 cases, 26.5%, P < 0.001) and hypomenorrhea (86 cases, 20%, P < 0.001) were significantly higher in the study group than controls (2% and 3%, respectively). TVS diagnosed functional ovarian cysts in 85 patients in the study group (19.8%). After completing anti‐tuberculosis treatment, 76% of women with menstrual abnormalities (162/213) resumed normal menstrual cycles. Among the 68 cases who sought fertility within 1 year after completion of treatment, TB peritubal and fine intrauterine adhesions were confirmed by laparoscopy and hysteroscopy in two and one infertile woman, respectively (0.7% of study group).Conclusions:  TB had marked reversible effect on the menstrual cycle but minimal association with genital TB and infertility. Pretreatment counseling of pulmonary TB women should include information on these reversible changes. Persistence of menstrual abnormalities or presence of infertility after completion of treatment should stimulate investigation for the possibility of genital tract involvement.Please cite this paper as: Hassan WA and Darwish AM. Impact of pulmonary tuberculosis on menstrual pattern and fertility. The Clinical Respiratory Journal 2010; 4: 157–161.
Predictors of age at onset of tobacco and cannabis use in Danish adolescents
Authors: Wium‐Andersen Ida Kim , Wium‐Andersen Marie Kim , Becker Ulrik , Thomsen Simon Francis 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIntroduction:  Early onset of tobacco and cannabis use predicts later substance abuse and risk behaviour and has large health consequences.Objectives:  The aim of this study was to examine risk factors for the age at onset of smoking and cannabis use among a group of Danish children between 7 years and 18 years of age.Methods:  Four hundred and eighty randomly selected children and their parents participated in a study about the prevalence of asthma. The study included questions about alcohol, tobacco and cannabis use. The children were interviewed face‐to‐face while the parents answered a questionnaire.Results:  The age at onset of daily smoking was significantly associated with the adolescents' tendency to binge drink [hazard ratio 4.78, 95% confidence interval (CI) (1.85–12.34), P = 0.001) and to use hard drugs [hazard ratio 2.81, 95% CI (1.03–7.78), P = 0.047], whereas the age at onset of cannabis use was significantly associated with binge drinking [hazard ratio 3.29, 95% CI (1.51–7.20), P = 0.003] and cigarette smoking [hazard ratio 2.51, 95% CI (1.26–5.00), P = 0.009]. There were no significant effect of the parents' smoking and alcohol habits, their socioeconomic or marital status on the adolescent' age at onset of smoking or cannabis.Conclusion:  This study shows a close connection between adolescent tobacco and cannabis use and alcohol habits. Knowledge of this is important when planning future prevention strategies.Please cite this paper as: Wium‐Andersen IK, Wium‐Andersen MK, Becker U and Thomsen SF. Predictors of age at onset of tobacco and cannabis use in Danish adolescents. Clin Respir J 2010; 4: 162–167.
The One and Only Argument for Radical Millianism
Authors: Deutsch Max 
Published: March 2010

AbstractRadical Millianism agrees with less radical varieties in claiming that ordinary proper names lack “descriptive senses” and that the semantic content of such a name is just its referent but differs from less radical varieties of Millianism in claiming that any pair of sentences differing only in the exchange of coreferential names cannot differ in truth‐value. This is what makes Radical Millianism radical. The view is surprisingly popular these days, and it is popular despite the fact that, until very recently, there was not a single argument for it. Theodore Sider and David Braun (2006) have tried to provide the missing argument, but, I argue, their attempt fails. I conclude that we (still) have no reason to be Radical Millians.
Whose Metaphysics of Presence? Heidegger's Interpretation of Energeia and Dunamis in Aristotle
Authors: Gonzalez Francisco J. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIn the recently published 1924 course, Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, Martin Heidegger offers a detailed interpretation of Aristotle's definition of kinesis in the Physics. This interpretation identifies entelecheia with what is finished and present‐at‐an‐end and energeia with being‐at‐work toward this end. In arguing against this interpretation, the present paper attempts to show that Aristotle interpreted being from the perspective of praxis rather than poiesis and therefore did not identify it with static presence. The paper also challenges later variations of Heidegger's interpretation, in particular his account of dunamis in the 1931 course on Metaphysics Theta, which insists that its mode of being is presence‐at‐hand. By arguing that this reading too is untenable, the paper concludes that Aristotle's metaphysics is not a metaphysics of presence and that his texts instead point toward a possibility of metaphysics ignored by the attempts of Heidegger and others to overcome it.
Aretaic Appraisal and Practical Reasons
Authors: Mason Michelle 
Published: March 2010

AbstractWhen we criticize someone for being unjust, deceitful, or imprudent—or commend him as just, truthful, or wise—what is the content of our evaluation? On one way of thinking, evaluating agents in terms that employ aretaic concepts evaluates how they regulate their actions (and judgment‐sensitive attitudes) in light of the reasons that bear on them. On this virtue‐centered view of practical reasons appraisal, evaluations of agents in terms of ethical virtues (and vices) are, inter alia, evaluations of them as practical reasoners. Here I consider and respond to an objection that threatens to debunk the virtue‐centered view.
Social Epistemology, Theory of Evidence, and Intelligent Design: Deciding What to Teach
Authors: Goldman Alvin 
Published: March 2010

AbstractSocial epistemology is the normative theory of socioepistemic practices. Teaching is a socioepistemic practice, so educational practices belong on the agenda of social epistemology. A current question is whether intelligent design should be taught in biology classes. This paper focuses on the argument from “fairness” or “equal time.” The principal aim of education is knowledge transmission, but evidence renders it doubtful that giving intelligent design equal time would promote knowledge transmission. In making curricular decisions, boards of education should consult the experts. Are novices capable of identifying genuine experts? This social epistemological question is answered affirmatively.
Evolution and the Kantian Worldview
Authors: Risjord Mark 
Published: March 2010

AbstractNonhuman animals seem to make inferences and have mental representations. Brandom articulates a Kantian (and Hegelian) account of representation that seems to make nonhuman mental content impossible: animals are merely sentient, not sapient. His position is problematic because it makes it impossible to understand how our cognitive capacities evolved. This essay discusses experimental and ethological work on transitive inference. It argues that to fit such evidence within the Kantian framework, there must be degrees of normativity. This invites us to understand the distinction between sapience and sentience as endpoints of a continuum, not as a dichotomy.
Group Doxastic Rationality Need Not Supervene on Individual Rationality
Authors: Ross Don 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThere is a strong formal analogy between proposition‐wise supervenience of collective doxastic rationality on individual doxastic rationality and supervenience of social choice functions on individual choice functions. In light of this analogy, the basis for List and Pettit's impossibility theorems can fruitfully be compared with the basis for Arrow's. This helps to explain why List and Pettit can derive no impossibility theorem for set‐wise supervenience. However, there are empirical reasons for doubting that set‐wise supervenience of collective doxastic rationality on individual doxastic rationality is necessary; a systematic feedback relationship between the former and some individual behavioral dispositions is probably sufficient to dissolve mysteries about group agency. Group doxastic rationality need not supervene on individual rationality.
The Epistemic Costs and Benefits of Collaboration
Authors: Fallis Don 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIn “How to Collaborate,” Paul Thagard tries to explain why there is so much collaboration in science, and so little collaboration in philosophy, by giving an epistemic cost‐benefit analysis. In this paper, I argue that an adequate explanation requires a more fully developed epistemic value theory than Thagard utilizes. In addition, I offer an alternative to Thagard's explanation of the lack of collaboration in philosophy. He appeals to its lack of a tradition of collaboration and to the a priori nature of much philosophical research. I claim that philosophers rarely collaborate simply because they can usually get the benefits without paying the costs of actually collaborating.
The Role of Ontology in the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze
Authors: Hammer Taylor 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis essay discusses the role of being and ontology in the work of Gilles Deleuze. Starting from an examination of Alain Badiou's ontology and theory of the event, I discuss the possible opposition of being and the event in Deleuze's work. Though famous for his discussions of the univocity of being, Deleuze does discuss the event as that which is not being. Deleuze's theory of the event is similar to that of Badiou in that he considers the event to be extra‐ontological. The essay closes by considering the differences between Deleuze and Badiou on the subject of the event.
Responding to Evil
Authors: Dauenhauer Bernard P. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIn this paper, I argue that moral and institutional evils, even though they are all contingent, are so pervasive and persistent that there is no practical way of responding to them that would lead eventually to the eradication of all of them. Instead, our practical task is to respond to these evils in ways that respect both the basic capabilities and their associated vulnerabilities that are constitutive of each human being. To do this most effectively, one should offer unconditional forgiveness to the perpetrators of evil. The attitude that can best underpin this forgiveness is one of a properly understood indefeasible hope, a hope that always insists that each person is of greater worth than whatever he or she does.
Externalism and Token‐Identity
Authors: Genova A. C. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis study has two goals. The first is to identify three desiderata required for a successful defense of a version of nonreductive physicalism: semantic externalism, token‐identity between mental and physical events, and nonrelational type‐individuation of physical states. In this context, the paper also presents a refutation of recent challenges to content‐externalism by those who attempt to resuscitate internalism by focusing on narrow content associated with the fundamental phenomenology, rather than the intentionality, of mental states. The second goal is to defend the token‐identity thesis from Tyler Burge's argument to the effect that token‐identity is incompatible with semantic externalism. An account is also offered as to why Burge's argument, albeit fallacious, might seem persuasive under a certain interpretation of possible worlds.
Derrida's Worldly Responsibility: The Opening between “Faith” and the “Sacred”
Authors: O'Connor Patrick 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis article will theorize how Derrida's deconstruction signifies a fundamental ontological alterity. We will examine the use of both the tropes of “sacred” and “faith” as tropes to express this possibility. We will articulate how deconstruction, as a development of phenomenology, provides a theoretical nexus where the alterity of things and persons may be thought. We will arrive at the paradoxical formulation of “ontological alterity” as a key moment in deconstructive thinking. Essentially we will argue that deconstruction offers the resources to think the relation between other person and things in the world as motivated by a firm radicalization of Heideggerean worldliness and Levinasian alterity.
The Meno's Metaphilosophical Examples
Authors: King Matthew 
Published: March 2010

AbstractI propose that an ill‐appreciated contrast between the examples Socrates gives Meno, to show him how he ought to philosophize, is the key to understanding the Meno. I contend that Socrates prefers his definitions of shape to his account of color because the former are concerned with what shape is, while the latter is concerned with how color comes to be. This contrast suggests that Plato intends an analogous contrast between the (properly philosophical) way of inquiry that leads to Socrates' definition of knowledge as “true belief tied down with an account” and the (not properly philosophical) way of inquiry that leads to Socrates' account of how knowledge comes to be, that is, the “theory of recollection.”
How Not to Refute Quine: Evaluating Kim's Alternatives to Naturalized Epistemology
Authors: Bayer Benjamin 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis paper offers an interpretation of Quine's naturalized epistemology through the lens of Jaegwon Kim's influential critique of the same. Kim argues that Quine forces a false choice between traditional deductivist foundationalism and naturalized epistemology and contends that there are viable alternative epistemological projects. However it is suggested that Quine would reject these alternatives by reference to the same fundamental principles (underdetermination, indeterminacy of translation, extensionalism) that led him to reject traditional epistemology and propose naturalism as an alternative. Given this interpretation of Quine, it is essential that a successful critic of naturalism also examine Quine's aforementioned principles. The divide between naturalist and nonnaturalist epistemology turns out to be defined by the divide between more fundamental naturalist and nonnaturalist approaches to semantics.
Objective Reasons
Authors: Pendlebury Michael 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIn order to establish that judgments about practical reasons can be objective, it is necessary to show that the applicable standards provide an adequate account of truth and error. This in turn requires that these standards yield an extensive set of substantive, publicly accessible judgments that are presumptively true. This output requirement is not satisfied by the standards of universalizability, consistency, coherence, and caution alone. But it is satisfied if we supplement them with the principle that desire is a source of minimal reasons. This principle is justified despite currently fashionable arguments against the claims of desire.
Schopenhauer on the Values of Aesthetic Experience
Authors: Vandenabeele Bart 
Published: March 2010

AbstractIn this essay, I argue that Schopenhauer's view of the aesthetic feelings of the beautiful and the sublime shows how a “dialectical” interpretation that homogenizes both aesthetic concepts and reduces the discrepancy between both to merely quantitative differences is flawed. My critical analysis reveals a number of important tensions in both Schopenhauer's own aesthetic theory—which does not ultimately succeed in “merging” Plato's and Kant's approaches—and the interpretation that unjustly reduces the value of aesthetic experience to a merely preliminary stage of ethical will‐less salvation.
Why Naturalize Consciousness?
Authors: Wright Wayne 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis paper examines the relevance of philosophical work on consciousness to its scientific study. Of particular concern is the debate over whether consciousness can be naturalized, which is typically taken to bear on the prospects for its scientific investigation. It is not at all clear that philosophers of consciousness have properly identified and evaluated the assumptions about scientific activity made by both naturalization and antinaturalization projects. I argue that there is good reason to think that some of the assumptions about physicalism and explanation made by the parties to the debate are open to serious doubt. Thus this paper is an invitation for those inquiring into whether consciousness can be naturalized to more carefully consider the expected payoff of such efforts.
The First‐Person: Participation in Argument and the Intentional Relationship
Authors: Barber Michael D. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThis paper supports Charles Siewert's criticism of those criticizing first‐person approaches because they disagree by arguing that such critics adopt a noncommittal, third‐person observer standpoint on the debates themselves before recommending only third‐person natural scientific approaches to mind and that they oversimplify when they portray philosophy as contentious and natural science as ruled by consensus. Further, a complete account of first‐person intentionality in terms of acts and their correlative objects in their temporal and bodily interrelationships make it possible to defend Siewert's theses: that thought is phenomenally conscious, that there is a phenomenal consciousness beyond sensing, that the Protean view that equates change in a shape's appearance with an apparent change in the shape of what appears is incorrect, and that Hume's two‐dimensional phenomenalism is mistaken.
Comments on Nicholas Georgalis's “First‐Person Methodologies: A View from Outside the Phenomenological Tradition”
Authors: Harvey Charles W. 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThree problems are raised for Nicholas Georgalis's recent work: (1) a problem with regard to the supposed noninferential knowledge of minimal content, (2) a problem with the “necessary condition” Georgalis stipulates for the legitimate application of a first‐person methodology to a science of the mind, and (3) a problem with regard to denying phenomenal content to intentional acts.
The Prereflective Cogito as Contaminated Opacity
Authors: Westphal Merold 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThe “I think” that accompanies all my intentional acts is the prereflective cogito. It can be declined in the nominative, genitive, dative, and accusative cases: nominative because I am given to myself as a subject, genitive because each experiential awareness is mine, dative because the content of each awareness is given to me, and accusative because even as subject I am always given to myself as the object of the look and address of another. But it is a mistake to think of consciousness as “pure” by virtue of the formality of this structure. Even at the transcendental level, consciousness is contaminated by contingency and particularly in ways that render it opaque to itself in its relation to nature, society, and God.
Comments on Merold Westphal: The Prereflective Cogito as Contaminated Opacity
Authors: Kaehler Klaus Erich 
Published: March 2010

AbstractThe intention of my comments is mainly to draw attention to a necessary distinction between that prereflective cogito of post‐metaphysical subjectivity that is analysed in Westphal's paper and the subject of the cogito that can be identified and verified as the very principle of modern philosophy from Descartes to Hegel, namely, as the subject of reason. This means first of all to step back from the conviction, taken as self‐evident, that the subject of reason — and thereby the truth claims of that entire philosophical epoch — are illusionary, that is, without any right of their own. Instead we should be ready to ask how it is brought about philosophically that the subject is “shattered,” “humiliated,” “declared forfeit,” etc. My thesis is that post‐metaphysical subjectivity with its contaminated opacity can be made understandable in principle out of the endogenous crisis of the fully developed “absolute” subject of reason, if this crisis is carried out and decided as the transformation of the subject from its absolute to its decentered status.