bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Palaeoneurology of language: Grounds for scepticism
Authors: Whitcombe Elizabeth 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWilkins & Wakefield's identification of anatomical features in the Koobi Fora endocast, which may be thought to carry some functional significance in relation to organization for language, raises fundamental problems of method: attention is drawn to some limitations of the evidence, of endocasts and of the neuroanatomical map used to interpret them.
Is consciousness of perception really separable from perception?
Authors: Farah Martha J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAlthough not the main point of his target article, Block defends the view that perception and awareness of perception could be functions of different brain systems. I will argue that the available data do not support this view, and that Block's defense of the view rests on problematic eonstruals of the “executive system” and of the components of information-processing models.
The three attentional networks and the two hemispheric mechanisms
Authors: Fidelman Uri 
Published: February 2010

AbstractA methodological problem may distort the implications derived from the metabolism scans of the brain, but Posner & Raichle may have found neural networks which underlie the analytical and synthetical hemispheric data processing mechanism. This methodological problem is that a large regional consumption of energy, detected by the PET technique, is not necessarily related to more data processing. It may be related to the inefficiency of the neural system at this region.
Brain imaging the psychoses
Authors: Frith C. D. , Dolan R. J. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe approach adopted by Posner & Raichle in this book, with its strong emphasis on the cognitive level of description, is ideally suited to the study of psychotic illnesses. However, their discussion of depression and schizophrenia is based on a very small number of studies and involves ad hoc arguments derived largely from neuroanatomy. Their conclusions are almost certainly wrong.
Tracking brain functions in space and time
Authors: Hari Riitta 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe authors ofImages of mindhave been highly successful in unravelling the neural basis of complex brain functions. Their emphasis on top-down processingin experimental neuroscience is especially important and, it is hoped, influential. Tracking brain activation accurately botli in space and in time would benefit from studiesofindividual subjects without relying on grand average data.
Multiple scales of brain-mind interactions
Authors: Ingber Lester 
Published: February 2010

AbstractPosner & Raichle'sImages of mindis an excellent educational book and very well written. Some flaws as a scientific publication are: (a) the accuracy of the linear subtraction method used in PET is subject to scrutiny by further research at finer spatial-temporal resolutions; (b) lack of accuracy of the experimental paradigm used for EEG complementary studies.
Looking for images of memory
Authors: Kapur Narinder 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThis is an excellent book but it lacks a detailed presentation and formulation of images of memory. Positron emission tomography (PET) findings sometimes raise more enigmatic questions than they answer, with differences between studies and differences with established lesion evidence. Perhaps the book could have been more critical in its analysis of these enigmas, covering more of the basic issues and assumptions underlying PET research.
When is it sensible to use PET to study brain function?
Authors: O'Mara Shane M. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractPosner & Raichle's book is a superbly presented and wellwritten overview of a fast-developing and important field in contemporary neuroscience. It suffers from being an overview, however, because it does not go into sufficient detail or depth in many of the issues that it raises. It also neglects many other important areas of current research, for example, technical advances in other areas, learning and memory, and lesion analysis of brain function.
How to understand beliefs
Authors: Gopnik Alison 
Published: February 2010

AbstractIn this response various possible objections to the critique of first-person-authority in Gopnik (1993), are considered. The heart of all three objections is that “beliefs” and other notions of commonsense psychology should not be construed as attempts to describe the functional character of our minds. Rather, they are 1) an evolutionarily determined technique for dealing with our conspecifics (Bogdan) or 2) the result of interpretation (Van Brakel) or 3) self-constitutive entities which exist only when we have the concept of their existence (Greve and Buchner). While the word belief might be construed in all these ways, they do not correspond either to the construals of our commonsense psychology or of a scientific psychology.
Calcium/calmodulin-sensitive adenylyl cyclase as an example of a molecular associative integrator
Authors: Abrams Thomas W. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractEvidence suggests that the Ca2+/calmodulin-sensitive adenylyl cyclase may play a key role in neural plasticity and learning inAplysia, Drosophila, and mammals. This dually-regulated enzyme has been proposed as a possible site of stimulus convergence during associative learning. This commentary discusses the evidence that is required to demonstrate that a protein in a second messenger cascade actually functions as a molecular site of associative integration. It also addresses the issue of how a dually-regulated protein could contribute to the temporal pairing requirements of classical conditioning: that relationship between stimuli display both temporal contiguity and predictability.
Reduced cytoplasmic calcium concentration may be both necessary and sufficient for photoreceptor light adaptation
Authors: Matthews H. R. , Fain G. L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractLight adaptation is modulated almost exclusively by changes in intracellular Ca2+concentration, and other Ca2+-independent mechanisms are likely to play only a minor role. Changes in Ca2+imay be not only necessary for light adaptation to take place but sufficient to cause it.
Nuclear magnetic resonance studies on the structure and function of rhodopsin
Authors: Smith Steven O. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractMagic angle spinning (MAS) NMR methods provide a means of obtaining high resolution structural data on rhodopsin and its photoin termediates. Current work has focused on the structure of the retinal chromophore and its interactions with surrounding protein charges. The recent development of MAS NMR methods for measuring internuclear distances with a resolution of ∼0.2 will complement diffraction methods for addressing key mechanistic questions.
Evidence that the type I adenylyl cyclase may be important for neuroplasticity: Mutant mice deficient in the gene for type I adenylyl cyclase show altered behavior and LTP
Authors: Xia Zhengui , Storm Daniel R. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe regulatory properties of the neurospecific, type I adenylyl cyclase and its distribution within brain have suggested that this enzyme may be important for neuroplasticity. To address this issue, the murine, Ca2+-stimulated adenylyl cyclase (type I), was inactivated by targeted mutagenesis. Ca2+-stimulated adenylyl cyclase activity was reduced 40% to 60% in the hippocampus, neocortex, and cerebellum. Long term potentiation in the CA1 region of the hippocampus from mutants was perturbed relative to controls. Both the initial slope and maxim um extent of changes in synaptic response were reduced. Although mutant mice learned to find a hidden platform normally in the Morris water task, they did not display a preference for the region where the platform had been when it was removed. The behavioral phenotype of these mice is very similar to that exhibited by mice which have been surgically lesioned in the hippocampus. These results indicate that disruption of the gene for the type I adenylyl cyclase produces changes in spatial memory and indicate that the cAMP signal transduction pathway may play an important role for synaptic plasticity.
The sociobiology of sociopathy: An integrated evolutionary model
Authors: Mealey Linda 
Published: February 2010

AbstractSociopaths are “outstanding” members of society in two senses: politically, they draw our attention because of the inordinate amount of crime they commit, and psychologically, they hold our fascination because most ofus cannot fathom the cold, detached way they repeatedly harm and manipulate others. Proximate explanations from behavior genetics, child development, personality theory, learning theory, and social psychology describe a complex interaction of genetic and physiological risk factors with demographic and micro environmental variables that predispose a portion of the population to chronic antisocial behavior. More recent, evolutionary and game theoretic models have tried to present an ultimate explanation of sociopathy as the expression of a frequency-dependent life strategy which is selected, in dynamic equilibrium, in response to certain varying environmental circumstances. This paper tries to integrate the proximate, developmental models with the ultimate, evolutionary ones, suggesting that two developmentally different etiologies of sociopathy emerge from two different evolutionary mechanisms. Social strategies for minimizing the incidence of sociopathic behavior in modern society should consider the two different etiologies and the factors that contribute to them.
Continua outperform dichotomies
Authors: Baldwin John D. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractMealey's data do not support her dichotomous model of primary and secondary sociopathy; this data supports the view that there is a continuum of degrees of sociopathy, from zero to the maximal manifestation. There are multitudes of factors that can contribute to sociopathy – from both genetic and environmental sources – and the countless different mixes of them can produce multiple degrees and variations of sociopathic behavior.
A neuropsychology of deception and self-deception
Authors: Drake Roger A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAs more criminals are imprisoned, other individuals change their behavior to replace them, as predicted by the “floating niche” theory of strategic behavior. The physiological correlates of sociopathy suggest that research in cognitive neuroscience can lead toward a solution. Promising pathways include building upon current knowledge of self-deceit, the independence of positive and negative emotions, the lateralization of risk and caution, and the conditions promoting prosocial behavior.
Sociobiology, sociopathy, and social policy
Authors: Machalek Richard 
Published: February 2010

AbstractEvolutionary analysis suggests that policies based on deterrence may cope effectively with primary sociopathy if the threat of punishment fits the crime in the cost/benefit calculus of the sociopath, not that of the public. On the other hand, policies designed to offset serious disadvantage in social competition may help inhibit the development of secondary sociopathy, rather than deter its expression.
Is the distinction between primary and secondary sociopaths a matter of degree, secondary traits, or nature vs. nurture?
Authors: Zuckerman Marvin 
Published: February 2010

AbstractPsychopathy has as its central traits socialization, sensation seeking, and impulsivity. These are combined in a supertrait: Impulsive Unsocialized Sensation Seeking (ImpUSS). Secondary types are defined by combinations of ImpUSS and neuroticism or sociability. All broad personality traits have both genetic and environmental determination, and therefore different etiologies (primary as genetic, secondary as environmental) for primary and secondary sociopathy are unlikely.
Token-identity, consciousness, and the connection principle
Authors: Schröder Jürgen 
Published: February 2010

AbstractSearle's (1990) argument for the “Connection Principle” seems to rest on a confusion between ontological and epistemological claims. The potential consciousness of a mental state does not yield the same effect as does its actual consciousness, namely, the preservation of aspectual shape. Searle's distinction between the consciousness of an intentional object and that of a mental state, which is meant to counter the objection that deep unconscious rules cease to be deep once they become conscious, fails to do its appointed task.
The functional meaning of reverberations for sensoric and contextual encoding
Authors: Klimesch Wolfgang 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAmit argues that the local neuronal spike rate that persists (reverberating) in the absence of the eliciting stimulus represents the code of the eliciting stimulus. Based on the general argument that the inferred functional meaning of reverberation depends in part on the type of representational assumptions, reverberations may only be important for the encoding of contextual information.
The contents of consciousness: A neuropsychological conjecture
Authors: Gray Jeffrey A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractDrawing on previous models of anxiety, intermediate memory, the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, and goal-directed behaviour, a neuropsychological hypothesis is proposed for the generation of the contents of consciousness. It is suggested that these correspond to the outputs of a comparator that, on a moment-by-moment basis, compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. An outline is given of the information-processing functions of the comparator system and of the neural systems which mediate them. The hypothesis appears to be able to account for a number of key features of the contents of consciousness. However, it is argued that neitherthis nor any existing comparable hypothesis is yet able to explain why the brain should generate conscious experience of any kind at all.
Possible roles for a predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory and imitative learning
Authors: Dennis Simon , Humphreys Michael 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThis commentary is divided into two parts. The first considers a possible role for Gray's predictor plus comparator mechanism in human episodic recognition memory. It draws on the computational specifications of recognition outlined in Humphreys et al. (1994) to demonstrate how the logically necessary components of recognition tasks might be mapped onto the mechanism. The second part demonstrates how the mechanism outlined by Gray might be implicated in a form of imitative learning suitable for the acquisition of complex tasks.
Perspective, reflection, transparent explanation, and other minds
Authors: Hurley S. L. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractPerspective and reflection (whether involving conceptual or nonconceptual content) have each been considered in some way basic to phenomenal consciousness. Each has possible evolutionary value, though neither seems sufficient for consciousness. Consider an account of consciousness in terms of the combination of perspective and reflection, its relationship to the problem of other minds, and its capacity to inherit evolutionary explanation from its components.
Information synthesis in cortical areas as an important link in brain mechanisms of mind
Authors: Ivanitsky Alexei M. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractTo explore the mechanism of sensation correlations between EP (evoked potential) component amplitude and signal detection indices (d' and criterion) were studied. The time of sensation coincided with the peak latency of those EP components that showed a correlation with both indices. The components presumably reflected information synthesis in projection cortical neurons. A mechanism providing the synthesis process is proposed.
Septohippocampal comparator: Consciousness generator or attention feedback loop?
Authors: Kinsbourne Marcel 
Published: February 2010

AbstractAs Gray insists, his comparator model proposes a brute correlation only – of consciousness with septohippocampal output. I suggest that the comparator straddles a feedback loop that boosts the activation ofnovelrepresentations, thus helping them feature in present or recollected experience. Such a role in organizing conscious contents would transcend correlation and help explain how consciousness emerges from brain function.
The limits of neurophysiological models of consciousness
Authors: Velmans Max 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThis commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other thirdperson perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.
Is the multi-joint pointing movement model applicable to equilibrium control during upper trunk movements?
Authors: Alexandrov Alexey , Frolov Alexander , Massion Jean 
Published: February 2010

AbstractTwo aspects of the target article, (1) the extension of the equilibrium point theory to multi-joint movements, and (2) the consequence that the EMG pattern is not directly controlled by the central nervous system (CNS), are discussed in light of the experiments on upper trunk bending in humans. The principle component kinematic analysis and the analysis of the EMG data, obtained under microgravity and additional loading conditions, support the application of Feldman and Levin's for multi-joint pointing movement to equilibrium control during upper trunk movement.
Moving models of motion forward: Explication and a new concept
Authors: Fikes Thomas G. , Townsend James T. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractWe affirm the dynamical systems approach taken by Feldman and Levin, but argue that a more mathematically rigorous and standard exposition of the model according to dynamical systems theory would greatly increase readability and testability. Such an explication would also have heuristic value, suggesting new variations of the model. We present one such variant, a new solution to the redundancy problem.
The case of the missing CVs: Multi-joint primitives
Authors: Giszter Simon 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe search for simplifying principles in motor control motivates the target article. One method that the CNS uses to simplify the task of controlling a limb's mechanical properties is absent from the article. Evidence from multi-joint, force-field measurements and from kinematics that points to the existence of multi-joint primitives as control variables is discussed.
Twisted pairs: Does the motor system really care about joint configurations?
Authors: Haggard Patrick , Miall Chris , Stein John 
Published: February 2010

AbstractExtrapersonal frames of reference for aimed movements are representationally convenient. They may, however, carry associated costs when the movement is executed in terms of the complex coordination of multiple joints they require. Studies that have measured both fingertip and joint paths suggest the motor systems may seek a compromise between simplicity of extrapersonal spatial representation and computational simplicity of multi-joint execution.
Frameworks on shifting sands
Authors: lngvaldsen R. , Whiting H.T.A. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractFeldman and Levin present a model for movement control in which the system is said to seek equilibrium points, active movement being produced by shifting frames of reference in space. It is argued that whatever merit this model might have is limited to an understanding of “the how” and not “the why” we move. In this way the authors seem to be forced into a dualistic position leaving the upper level of the proposed control hierarchy “floating.”
Spatial frames for motor control would be commensurate with spatial frames for vision and proprioception, but what about control of energy flows?
Authors: Pagano Christopher C. , Bingham Geoffrey P. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe model identifies a spatial coordinate frame within which the sensorimotor apparatus produces movement. Its spatial nature simplifies its coupling with spatial reference frames used concurrently by vision and proprioception. While the positional reference frame addresses the performance of spatial tasks, it seems to have little to say about movements involving energy expenditure as the principle component of the task.
The λ model: Can it walk?
Authors: Patla Aftab E. 
Published: February 2010

AbstractGeneration of swing phase limb trajectory over obstacles during locomotion should be a reasonable test for the λ model proposed by Feldman and Levin. The observed features such as lack of simple amplitude scaling of endpoint (toe) trajectories for different obstacle heights, complex shaped toe velocity profiles, and exploitation of passive intersegmental dynamics to control limb elevation cannot be adequately explained by the λ model.
The need for a theory of evidential weight
Authors: Cohen L. Jonathan 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThere is a familiar risk of antinomy if fromxisEand p(xisH/xisE) =rit is permissible to infer p(xisH) =r, and what Carnap (1950) called “The requirement of total evidence” will not prevent such antinomies satisfactorily. What is needed instead is a properly developed theory of evidential weight.
Throwing out the baby with the bathwater? Let's not overstate the overselling of the base rate fallacy
Authors: Thomsen Cynthia J. , Borgida Eugene 
Published: February 2010

AbstractKoehler's summary and critique of research on the base rate fallacy is cogent and persuasive. However, he may have overstated the case, and his suggestions for future research may be too restrictive. We agree that methodological approaches to this topic should be broadened, but we argue that experimental laboratory research and the Bayesian normative standard are useful and should not be abandoned.
Can children with autism integrate first and third person representations?
Authors: Baron-Cohen Simon 
Published: February 2010

AbstractBarresi & Moore contrast two theories of autism: (1) in autism there is a general inability to integrate first and third person information (of any kind), and (2) in autism there is a specific inability to represent an agent's perceptual or volitional mental state being about another agents mental state. Two lines of experimental evidence suggest that the first of these is too broad, favoring instead the more specific “theory of mind” account.
Development of social emotions and constructive agents
Authors: Ze'ev Aaron Ben , Oatley Keith 
Published: February 2010

AbstractThe psychology of emotions illuminates the questions of intentional capacities raised by Barresi & Moore (B&M). Complex emotions require the development of a sense of self and are based on social comparisons between mainly imagined objects. The fourth level in B&M's framework requires something like a constructive agent rather than a mental agent.
On the dangers of oversimulation
Authors: Csibra Gergely , Gergely György 
Published: February 2010

AbstractBarresi & Moore fail to provide a satisfactory account for the development of social understanding because of (1) their ambiguous characterization of the relationship between the intentional schema and shared intentional activities, (2) their underestimation of the representational capacities of infants, and (3) their overreliance on the simulationist assumption that understanding others is tantamount to sharing their experience.