bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Non-Traditional Models of Armed Conflict
Authors: Lubell Noam 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter addresses the question of whether the reference to a transnational ‘war on terror’ is merely rhetoric or in fact covers a situation which can be defined as armed conflict. This is followed by an analysis of whether non-traditional situations demonstrate a need to consider new categories of armed conflict. The chapter also examines the source and scope of the applicable rules of humanitarian law for armed conflicts that defy easy categorisation.
Extraterritorial Applicability of Human Rights Law
Authors: Lubell Noam 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter provides detailed analysis of the question of whether states are bound by human rights law when acting outside their borders. The background and objective of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are examined, as is the concept of jurisdiction in the context of human rights treaties and cases of human rights bodies. The different types of actions by a state are examined in this context, including acts of diplomatic and consular agents, detention, and authority or control outside formally acknowledged detention facilities. The chapter raises the possibility of a contextual approach to obligations, and of non treaty-based extraterritorial human rights obligations.
Concurrent Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law
Authors: Lubell Noam 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This chapter examines the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law in the context of extraterritorial force against non-state actors. The concurrent applicability of the two legal frameworks is established, and obstacles to parallel applicability in practice are examined. The two frameworks are compared on the issues of rules on use of force, in particular in the resort to lethal force.
The Value Problem for Knowledge
Authors: Pritchard Duncan 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter introduces the value problem for knowledge and distinguishes various forms of this problem. It shows that one such form of the problem — the swamping problem — poses a difficulty for a certain conception of epistemic value which is termed epistemic value T-monism. Various responses to this problem are canvassed. It is argued that the putative final value of knowledge is important to assessing the value problem, since if knowledge is indeed finally valuable then all the different forms of the value problem, including the swamping problem, are thereby seemingly resolved.
Anti‐Luck Virtue Epistemology
Authors: Pritchard Duncan 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter canvasses two master intuitions about knowledge: the ability intuition and the anti-luck intuition. It argues that a robust anti-luck epistemology, which takes the anti-luck intuition as central, cannot accommodate the ability intuition, and that a robust virtue epistemology which takes the ability intuition as central cannot accommodate the anti-luck intuition. It is suggested that the proper moral to be extracted from this impasse is that we need an anti-luck virtue epistemology — a theory of knowledge which incorporates two separate epistemic conditions designed to accommodate each of the two master intuitions about knowledge. Such a view can accommodate a range of key examples of interest to epistemologists. A genealogical diagnosis of the structure of knowledge is offered which supports this proposal. Anti-luck virtue epistemology can adequately respond to those versions of the value problem for knowledge which do not trade on the intuition that knowledge is finally valuable.
Knowledge in Recent Epistemology: Some Problems
Authors: Millar Alan 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that there is a tension — the central tension — between the assumption that knowledge admits of reductive conceptual analysis along traditional lines and the roles that knowledge and thinking about knowledge plays in our lives. While an analysis of knowledge should reflect the logical role of the concept, the prospects for providing a reductive analysis that meets this desideratum are dim. The chapter explores two further clusters of problems for the traditional ways of theorising about knowledge: the problem of making sense of how strong evidence must be for justification that satisfies the justification requirement for knowledge; and the problem of making sense of a justification requirement for some modes of knowledge. It explains why the discussion has placed such emphasis on concepts and conceptual enquiry. It indicates the way forward is indicated and outlines the construction of an epistemology that avoids the problems.
Knowledge and Justification
Authors: Haddock Adrian 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter sketches an account of visual knowledge according to which the justification involved in knowledge not merely guarantees the truth of the belief which knowledge involves, but guarantees that this belief is knowledgeable. It is argued that unlike the dominant alternatives, this account stays in tune with our pre-theoretical conception of knowledge and enables us to make sense of its value. Two potential problems for the account are presented: first, that it is vulnerable to the Argument from Illusion; secondly, that it generates a devastating regress. The first problem is despatched, but the second — more serious — problem is postponed until the next chapter.
Forfeiture in England and Wales
Authors: Houston R. A. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
In England the crown gave the proceeds of forfeiture to its almoner for charitable distribution. Almoners dealt constructively with survivors, recreating community from the disorder left by a sudden death and imposing settlements on survivors, sometimes using powerful central courts like Star Chamber; they also negotiated, adjudicated, and mediated in pursuit of agreed local resolutions. However, the fragmented jurisdictional structure of England meant that subordinate lay lords could also have an interest in suicides, and the problems of competing lordship are assessed. Local social relations are explored, showing how lords and people interacted at a local level. The law and practice of ‘deodand’, the forfeiture of objects that caused death, and the changing nature of coroners' verdicts are examined; a new interpretation proposed of why they changed from felo de se to non compos mentis. The conclusion explains why intervention in suicide was especially necessary between 1500 and 1700.
Burial Practices
Authors: Houston R. A. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Some suicides were denied normal Christian burial. In separate sections dealing with England and Scotland this chapter explains the laws on burial and the reasons why some suicides were given profane burial. In England this could mean interment at a crossroads with a stake through the heart without any religious rites, though this was a local practice not a national one, and only selectively enforced against those poorly integrated into communities. The simplicity of Calvinist burial rituals means that the treatment of suicides in Scotland was less remarkable, except for their being excluded from the community of Christians. Scots did not stake the bodies of suicides.
Corporal Punishment
Authors: Houston R. A. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Across Europe the early modern period saw a creative period in punishment. Culprits were created, suicides among them. This chapter looks mostly at Scotland, showing how Roman law influenced the use of distinctive ‘corporal’ sanctions against suicides: the dragging and gibbeting of their bodies. These punishments were both judicial and ‘popular’ or extra‐judicial, their co‐existence highlighting important aspects of how communities made law in early modern Europe. Changing ideas of the body are shown in attitudes towards the anatomical dissection of the bodies of suicides and executed criminals. A section on northern England shows that punishments there resembled those of Scotland in focusing on public shame; the cultural and legal reasons for this are explored, as is the decline of corporal punishments after c.1650.
Conclusion to Part 1
Authors: Houston R. A. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
This short chapter summarizes what punishing the dead and their survivors tells us about the nature of early modern punishment: it was retributive rather than rehabilitative. Showing the clear differences between legal rules and practice, it stresses how selectively any punishment was visited on suicides and relates this to legal systems where reputation was paramount. Both English and Scottish people tried to help reform attempted suicides, offering pastoral and communal support for the suicidal. English courts became more not less likely to prosecute attempts in the nineteenth century, but Scots jurists seem never to have been concerned with attempted suicides.
Newspapers and Public Opinion: Neutralizing Suicide?
Authors: Houston R. A. 
Published: September 2010

Abstract
Newspapers flourished in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, apparently turning suicide into a mundane fact. In reality, newspapers seldom reported local suicides and then in negative ways. By close analysis of the wording and content of provincial newspapers from Scotland and northern England, this chapter exposes how reporting used the suicides of women and the lower classes to draw attention to social problems. The press located it in urban and industrial communities, extending sympathy only to women whose frailties rendered them victims; in this they followed classical literary stereotypes. Far from normalizing suicide, newspapers used it to delineate the moral community of their male, middle‐ and upper‐class readers. The chapter exposes the differences between provincial and London reporting, as well as between the Scottish and English newspapers. It relates reporting to ideas of sympathy in the Enlightenment.
Chapter 6 From Deregulation to Flexicurity? The Makeover of the OECD Jobs Strategy
Authors: Jacobsson Kerstin , Noaksson Niklas 
Published: September 2010

AbstractChapter 6 deals with the labor market policy of the OECD and compares its Jobs Study from 1994 with the re‐assessed Jobs Strategy of 2006. The initial Jobs Study recommended a single policy package which was based on a deregulation framework in many respects. The re‐assessed strategy, in contrast, recognizes two equally legitimate paths: the liberal Anglo‐Saxon path and the Social‐Democratic Nordic path. The framework of one‐size‐fits‐all has been abandoned, and it is emphasized that countries make different political choices based on values that need to be taken into account when designing policy reform. The policy message has undergone considerable changes – yet, in both cases, the OECD has argued that its policy recommendations are evidence‐based. Why have such different conclusions been reached? In order to understand the policy course changes the chapter considers both organizational relationships within the OECD and its relationship to its surrounding world. It argues, inter alia, that the ‘expert organization’ has become more pragmatic, increasingly taking into account the countries' abilities and willingness to implement recommendations.
Chapter 10 Learning, Forgetting, Rediscovering: Producing the OECD's “New” Family Policy1
Authors: Mahon Rianne 
Published: September 2010

AbstractChapter 10 deals with the family policy of the OECD. International organizations like the OECD have come to play an increasingly important role in coordinating policy responses. While much of the OECD's advice may have contributed to the construction of a neoliberal world order, neoliberal solutions are not the only ones on offer; nor has neoliberalism managed to eliminate alternative, more egalitarian conceptions. Since the mid‐1990s, the discourses of some international organizations, including the OECD, have come to include elements of what might be called ‘inclusive liberalism’. This chapter focuses in this chapter on one policy area where the turn from neoliberalism is clearly evident — the OECD's generation and dissemination of a new family policy designed to meet the cluster of needs associated with the emergence of the adult earner family.
Chapter 12 The Activities of the OECD in International Migration: How to Become a Relevant Actor in an Emerging Policy Field
Authors: Teltemann Janna 
Published: September 2010

AbstractChapter 12 is concerned with OECD activities related to migration. As experiences and challenges linked to international movements vary considerably across member countries, the activities of the OECD have to meet diverse demands. Originally, migration was a topic for the OECD as a tool to tackle labor shortages. More recently, the impact of migration on development, and therefore its importance for cooperation with non‐member economies, has increased, and new coherent policies are needed to exploit this potential. The lack of appropriate integration policies in the past has created considerable social problems in several countries and a growing need for in‐depth analyses and monitoring of migration trends. This chapter argues that data provision and fundamental analyses are the organization's key capacities in the field of international migration. Because migration is a highly contested and complex policy issue, the OECD's role in this field might ideally be that of the ‘trustworthy truth‐teller’.
The Moral Worth of Retribution
Authors: Moore Michael 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues for a kind of ‘equal protection’ for retributive justice amongst the kinds of justice. Other forms of justice – distributive, corrective, natural right, promissory – have respected places within our pantheon of plausible theories of legal institutions. The question put is why retributive justice has in modern times been so discriminated against. A variety of explanations are considered; the emotional nature of retributive judgments is ultimately singled out. That emotional nature is given extended treatment, along Nietzschean lines. Despite the conceded force of many of the Nietzschean objections to the emotional basis for retributive judgments, a virtuous emotional base for retributive judgments is argued to lie in feelings of guilt.
The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing
Authors: Moore Michael 
Published: September 2010

AbstractA fundamental division within the theory of responsibility is between those who think that causation of a harm attempted or culpably risks increases blameworthiness, and those who think it does not. This is the issue commonly called ‘moral luck.’ The chapter first seeks to recast the problem, finding it to be ill-cast as a problem of luck. It then defends the view that causation of a harm matters to overall blameworthiness. It does so after rejecting all extent arguments for this conclusion in the existing literature, arguing not just that they are bad but that they are hopeless. The defense offered in the chapter is first put in foundationalist justificatory mode and then in non-foundationalist justificatory mode.
Causation, Rights-Violations, and Wrongdoing
Authors: Moore Michael 
Published: September 2010

AbstractIf causing matters to degrees of blameworthiness, as was argued in chapter 5 that it does, then some idea of what causation is needs to be developed. This chapter is preliminary to a later book, Causation and Responsibility, on this topic. The chapter focuses on the discriminating power of the causal relation and on what theories of the causal relation are adequate in light of such apparent power. Sceptical and counterfactual theories are singled out for criticism in this dimension. Theories about the nature of the things related by the causal relation are also subjected to this test of adequacy. The idea that events are the only causal relata is rejected, while the idea that states (but not objects) is accepted. A variety of more promising theories of the causal relation are briefly considered.
Prima Facie Moral Culpability
Authors: Moore Michael 
Published: September 2010

AbstractOverall blameworthiness is seen as a function of two moral properties, wrongdoing and culpability. This chapter and the four next succeeding all deal with culpability. Prima facie moral culpability is prima facie only in the sense that considerations of excuse are temporarily excluded. The chapter gives an overview of possible gradations in degrees of culpability depending on whether a given harm was: desired for its own sake; intended as a means to something else that was desired for its own sake; believed with certainty to follow on one’s actions; believed to some substantial degree of risk to follow on one’s action; unreasonably risked even if not desired, intended, or unaccompanied by any level of predictive belief. These states of intention, desire, belief, and unreasonable risk, constitute the various degrees of prima facie culpability with which a given wrong can be done.
Causation and the Excuses
Authors: Moore Michael 
Published: September 2010

AbstractExcuses are seen as what are needed to move from prima facie culpability, to actual culpability. Excuses give the conditions under which an otherwise culpable choice is not blameworthy (either at all, or to a lesser degree). The nature of excuses, the kinds of excuses there are, and the nature of a theory of them, constitute the topics preliminarily explored in this chapter. A causal theory of excuse is elaborated at length, including the facets of such a theory that make it tempting to some. The causal theory is then rejected both on the ground that it does not fit established categories of excuse, and on the ground that it is morally implausible. The combination of such a theory of excuse with determinism is considered at length.
Mental Illness and Responsibility
Authors: Moore Michael 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThe insanity defence is the criminal law’s most self-conscious home for its otherwise presupposed theory of the person. This point is only seen, however, by stripping away centuries of legal doctrine about the insanity defence that purports to cabin the defence to situations of excusable ignorance, mistake, compulsion, lack of free will, lack of intention, etc. The defence rather deals with a fundamental attribute of both personhood and moral agency, which is rationality. A sketch of the nature of rationality is given in terms of practical reason.
An Overview of The Criminal Law’s Theory of The Person
Authors: Moore Michael 
Published: September 2010

AbstractOnce one sees that criminal law presuppose that those subject to it must at least be rational agents, the subject of the previous chapter, the question arises as to what other fundamental attributes the law might suppose persons to have. The chapter explores a number of such features: autonomy (in four different senses), emotionality, unified character, unified consciousness, and Intentionality. Some further features are often assumed to be presupposed about persons by the law, namely freedom of the will, mind-stuff existing outside the natural world, souls, and the like; but these are rejected as legal presuppositions about persons and moral agency.
Act and Crime
Authors: Moore Michael S. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThis book seeks illumination of three aspects of Anglo-American criminal law by the philosophy of action. These are, first, the general requirement that an accused perform some voluntary act before he can be convicted of crime; second, that that voluntary act have the properties marking it as one of the kinds of acts prohibited by statute, what lawyers call the ‘actus reus’ of crimes; and third, the double jeopardy requirement that no one should be prosecuted or punished more than once for doing but one act instantiating but one offence. These three requirements are seen as part of the ‘general part’ of the criminal law, the part that applies to all crimes and that gives the criminal law a unified structure. As such they aid both the efficient drafting of a criminal code by the legislature and the application/interpretation of criminal codes by courts. The theory of action defended in the book – and from which illumination of the criminal law is sought – in a version of the family of theories known as causal theories of action. The thesis is that actions are those bodily movements caused by volitions when those volitions have those movements as their object, and nothing else. The criminal law's voluntary act requirement is then seen as the requirement that there be such an act. Omissions, states a person is in, thoughts, and involuntary bodily movements such as reflex reactions, are not acts by such a causal theory. The criminal law's actus reus requirement is seen as the requirement that a voluntary act must possess those causal or other properties definitive of the types of action prohibited by a criminal code. And the criminal law's double jeopardy requirements is seen as a conjunctive requirement: first, that no one be punished for the same kind of action, where the identity of act-types is governed by the kinds of acts morality makes wrong; unless the actor did that act more than once, where the identity of act-tokens is governed by the theory of action defended throughout the book. The philosophy of action illuminates the criminal law in these three ways because of certain moral theses, which the book also defends; that criminal liability both does and should track moral responsibility; that moral responsibility exists principally for what we do rather than for who we are, what we think, or what we fail to prevent; that actions causing harms are more blameworthy than actions that only risk or attempt such harms; and that punishment should be in proposition to the number and degree of wrong(s) done.
Introduction
Authors: Moore Michael S. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThere are six problems that threaten to make the criminal law unwieldy and complex: (1) that acts as such have no common nature; (2) that the types of acts criminal law prohibits are as diverse as the thousands of verbs of action that describe them; (3) that where and when a criminal act occurs varies with each kind of act; (4) that the mental state requirements are as diverse as are the types of actions such mental states are about; (5) that there is no general solution to the overlapping statutes problem (where more than one statute is violated by a single act); and (6) that there is no general solution to the unit of offense problem (where more than one act violates a single statute). The doctrines of voluntary act, actus reus, and double jeopardy all exist to provide general solutions to these worries. Various scepticisms about the coherence of these three doctrines are discussed.
The Orthodox View of the Act Requirement and Its Normative Defence
Authors: Moore Michael S. 
Published: September 2010

AbstractThe orthodox view of the act requirement is that it requires that there be a willed bodily movement. Excluded by the requirement are omissions, states of mind, emotions, bad character, status, and involuntary bodily movements. The act requirement is seen as justified on moral grounds, not on utilitarian grounds. The moral ground is that our moral obligations are concerned more with what we do, and not what we fail to prevent or who we are (these last being the proper subjects of the virtues); and that punishment should only be for failures of obligation, not for failures of virtue.