bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Dividend Surprises Inferred from Option and Stock Prices
Authors: BAE‐YOSEF SASSON , SARIG ODED H. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTThis paper introduces a new method to measure the unexpected component of dividend announcements. While measures used previously were based on various arbitrary models of dividend expectations, our suggested method compares the reaction of stock and option prices to dividend announcements. Our measure is compared to commonly used model‐based measures, to a Box‐Jenkins time‐series‐based measure, and to a Value‐Line Investor Survey‐based measure of dividend surprises. The new measure is more highly correlated with the market's reaction to the announcements than are alternative measures of dividend surprises. The new measure is also shown to be insensitive to the extent to which the options used to identify unexpected dividend announcements are in‐ or out‐of‐the‐money.
An Empirical Analysis of Illegal Insider Trading
Authors: MEULBROEK LISA K. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTWhether insider trading affects stock prices is central to both the current debate over whether insider trading is harmful or pervasive, and to the broader public policy issue of how best to regulate securities markets. Using previously unexplored data on illegal insider trading from the Securities and Exchange Commission, this paper finds that the stock market detects the possibility of informed trading and impounds this information into the stock price. Specifically, the abnormal return on an insider trading day averages 3%, and almost half of the pre‐announcement stock price run‐up observed before takeovers occurs on insider trading days. Both the amount traded by the insider and additional trade‐specific characteristics lead to the market's recognition of the informed trading.
Managers' Trading Around Stock Repurchases
Authors: LEE D. SCOTT , MIKKELSON WAYNE H. , PARTCH M. MEGAN 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTWe analyze personal open market trades by managers around stock repurchases by tender offer. With the exception of Dutch auction offers, managers trade their firm's shares prior to repurchase announcements as though repurchases convey favorable inside information to outsiders. Prior to fixed price repurchase offers that do not follow takeover‐related events, managers increase their buying and reduce their selling of their firm's shares. Prior to repurchases that follow takeover‐related events, only a decrease in selling is found. No abnormal trading precedes Dutch auction repurchase offers.
Additional Evidence on Integration in the Canadian Stock Market
Authors: MITTOO USHA R. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTThis paper reexamines the integration of the Canadian and U.S. stock markets in the 1977–86 period that is relatively free from capital controls. The study employs both the CAPM and the APT frameworks. Under both models, the evidence is consistent with segmentation in the 1977–81 subperiod, but supports integration in the 1982–86 subperiod. Using the APT framework, we also find that the Canadian stocks interlisted on the U.S. exchanges and NASDAQ are priced in an integrated market and segmentation is predominant for the non‐interlisted Canadian stocks.
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
Authors: JENSEN MICHAEL C. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTSince 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increasing average (but decreasing marginal) productivity of labor, reduced growth rates of labor income, excess capacity, and the requirement for downsizing and exit. The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit. The next several decades pose a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.
Measuring Asset Values for Cash Settlement in Derivative Markets: Hedonic Repeated Measures Indices and Perpetual Futures
Authors: SHILLER ROBERT J. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTTwo proposals are made that may facilitate the creation of derivative market instruments, such as futures contracts, cash settled based on economic indices. The first proposal concerns index number construction: indices based on infrequent measurements of nonstandardized items may control for quality change by using a hedonic repeated measures method, an index number construction method that follows individual assets or subjects through time and also takes account of measured quality variables. The second proposal is to establish markets for perpetual claims on cash flows matching indices of dividends or rents. Such markets may help us to measure the prices of the assets generating these dividends or rents even when the underlying asset prices are difficult or impossible to observe directly. A perpetual futures contract is proposed that would cash settle every day in terms of both the change in the futures price and the dividend or rent index for that day.
Influence Costs and Capital Structure
Authors: BAGWELL LAURIE SIMON , ZECHNER JOSEF 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTThis paper analyzes the role of capital structure in the presence of intrafirm influence activities. The hierarchical structure of large organizations inevitably generates attempts by members to influence the distributive consequences of organizational decisions. In corporations, for example, top management can reallocate or eliminate quasi rents earned by their employees, while at the same time, they must rely on these employees to provide them with information vital to their decision making. This creates the opportunity for lower level managers to influence top management's discretionary decisions. As a result, divisional managers may attempt to inflate the corporate perception of their relative contributions to the firm, or to take actions that make the elimination of their rents more costly for the firm. This incentive to influence is especially acute when managers fear losing their jobs, for example in the event of a divestiture.Since the firm's capital structure can affect future divestiture decisions, it can be chosen to reduce or increase the divisional managers' incentives to influence top management's decisions. The control of influence activities arises at the expense of restrictions on future divestiture decisions. Hence, there emerges an optimal capital structure that trades off the costs of influence activities against the costs of making poor divestiture decisions. The findings suggest that capital structure can also be chosen to control influence activities that arise under less extreme motivations.We identify several key factors that determine the optimal capital structure: the top management's prior assessment of the likelihood that it will be optimal to divest a specific division; the costs of influence activities to the firm and to the divisional managers; and the difference in the valuation of the division's assets in the current firm and under alternative uses.
Price Formation and Equilibrium Liquidity in Fragmented and Centralized Markets
Authors: BIAIS BRUNO 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTThis paper compares centralized and fragmented markets, such as floor and telephone markets. Risk‐averse agents compete for one market order. In centralized markets, these agents are market makers or limit order traders. They are assumed to observe the quotes of their competitors. In fragmented markets they are dealers. They can only assess the positions of their competitors. We analyze differences in bidding strategies reflecting differences in market structures. The equilibrium number of dealers is shown to be increasing in the frequency of trades and the volatility of the value of the asset. The expected spread is shown to be equal in both markets, ceteris paribus. But the spread is more volatile in centralized than in fragmented markets.
The Value of Bank Durability: Borrowers as Bank Stakeholders
Authors: SLOVIN MYRON B. , SUSHKA MARIE E. , POLONCHEK JOHN A. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTWe examine the value of bank durability to borrowing firms. The analysis is based on theoretical models of the asset services view of intermediation which imply that private information and associated relationship‐specific activities are intrinsic to bank lending. We analyze share price effects on firms with lending relationships with Continental Illinois Bank during its de facto failure and subsequent FDIC rescue. We find the bank's impending insolvency had negative effects and the FDIC rescue positive effects on client firm share prices. We conclude that borrowers incur significant costs in response to unanticipated reductions in bank durability and thus are bank stakeholders.
The Valuation Effects of Warrant Extensions
Authors: HOWE JOHN S. , WEI PEIHWANG 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTIn this paper, we examine the warrant price and stock price reactions to the announcement of warrant life extensions. As predicted by option‐pricing theory, warrant prices increase in response to an extension. Our principal finding is that the stocks of firms making the extension announcements experience positive abnormal returns on average. We interpret the evidence as supportive of an anticipation hypothesis in which the market perceives the decision to extend the warrants' expiration date as a favorable indication for the stock price before the subsequent expiration.
CEO Compensation in Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis
Authors: GILSON STUART C. , VETSUYPENS MICHAEL R. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTThis paper studies senior management compensation policy in 77 publicly traded firms that filed for bankruptcy or privately restructured their debt during 1981 to 1987. Almost one‐third of all CEOs are replaced, and those who keep their jobs often experience large salary and bonus reductions. Newly appointed CEOs with ties to previous management are typically paid 35% less than the CEOs they replace. In contrast, outside replacement CEOs are typically paid 36% more than their predecessors, and are often compensated with stock options. On average, CEO wealth is significantly related to shareholder wealth after firms renegotiate their debt contracts. However, managers' compensation is sometimes explicitly tied to the value of creditors' claims.
Market Discounts and Shareholder Gains for Placing Equity Privately
Authors: HERTZEL MICHAEL , SMITH RICHARD L. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTDespite selling at substantial discounts, private placements of equity are associated with positive abnormal returns. We find evidence that discounts reflect information costs borne by private investors and abnormal returns reflect favorable information about firm value. Results are consistent with the role of private placements as a solution to the Myers and Majluf underinvestment problem and with the use of private placements to signal undervaluation. We also find some evidence of anticipated monitoring benefits from private sales of equity. For the smaller firms that comprise our sample, information effects appear to be relatively more important than ownership effects.
Macroeconomic Influences and the Variability of the Commodity Futures Basis
Authors: BAILEY WARREN , CHAN K. C. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTWe provide evidence that the spread between commodity spot and futures prices (the basis) reflects the macroeconomic risks common to all asset markets. The basis of many commodities is correlated with the stock index dividend yield and corporate bond quality spread. Explanatory power is related to exposure to macroeconomic fluctuations: about 40 percent of the variation in the basis of a portfolio of commodities with high business cycle sensitivity is explained by the stock and bond yields. Further diagnostics indicate that these associations are largely due to the presence of risk premiums, rather than spot price forecasts, in the basis.
Empirical Testing of Real Option‐Pricing Models
Authors: QUIGG LAURA 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTThis research is the first to examine the empirical predictions of a real option‐pricing model using a large sample of market prices. We find empirical support for a model that incorporates the option to wait to develop land. The option model has explanatory power for predicting transactions prices over and above the intrinsic value. Market prices reflect a premium for the option to wait to invest that has a mean value of 6% in our sample. We also estimate implied standard deviations for individual commercial property prices ranging from 18 to 28% per year.
Predictable Stock Returns: The Role of Small Sample Bias
Authors: NELSON CHARLES R. , KIM MYUNG J. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTPredictive regressions are subject to two small sample biases: the coefficient estimate is biased if the predictor is endogenous, and asymptotic standard errors in the case of overlapping periods are biased downward. Both biases work in the direction of making t‐ratios too large so that standard inference may indicate predictability even if none is present. Using annual returns since 1872 and monthly returns since 1927 we estimate empirical distributions by randomizing residuals in the VAR representation of the variables. The estimated biases are large enough to affect inference in practice, and should be accounted for when studying predictability.
A Reexamination of Traditional Hypotheses about the Term Structure: A Comment
Authors: MCCULLOCH J. HUSTON 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTAn example of a continuous time economy is given whose general equilibrium term structure of interest rates obeys the Expectations Hypothesis for continuously compounded interest rates and returns, contradicting the 1981 claim by Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross that such an economy is mathematically impossible. This example does not generate exploitable arbitrage opportunities of the type Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross claim must arise. The “Logarithmic Expectations Hypothesis,” as we call it, it therefore an acceptable benchmark from which to measure term premia in continuous time term structure modeling.
Stock Price Volatility, Ordinary Dividends, and Other Cash Flows to Shareholders
Authors: ACKERT LUCY F. , SMITH BRIAN F. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTThis paper shows that the results of variance‐bound tests depend on how cash distributions to shareholders are measured. As in prior studies, we find apparent evidence of excess volatility when a narrow definition of cash flow (dividends only) is applied. However, we are unable to reject the hypothesis of market efficiency when the cash flow measure also includes share repurchases and takeover distributions in addition to ordinary cash dividends.
The Reverse LBO Decision and Firm Performance: Theory and Evidence
Authors: DEGEORGE FRANÇOIS , ZECKHAUSER RICHARD 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTWe investigate the transition from private to public ownership of companies that had previously been subject to leveraged buyouts (LBOs). We show that the information asymmetry problem firms face when they go to public markets for equity, as well as behavioral and debt overhang effects, will produce a pattern in which superior performance before an offering should be expected, with disappointing performance subsequently. We find empirical evidence of this phenomenon by studying 62 reverse LBOs that went public between 1983 and 1987. The market appears to anticipate this pattern.
Sensitivity of Multivariate Tests of the Capital Asset‐Pricing Model to the Return Measurement Interval
Authors: HANDA PUNEET , KOTHARI S. P. , WASLEY CHARLES 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTThe capital asset‐pricing model's (CAPM) primary empirical implication is a positively sloped linear relation between a security's expected rate of return and its relative risk (beta). Recent research indicates that inferences about the risk‐return relation are sensitive to the choice of the return measurement interval. We perform multivariate tests of the Sharpe‐Lintner CAPM using monthly and annual returns on market‐value‐ranked portfolios. The CAPM is rejected using monthly returns, a result consistent with previous research. In contrast, we fail to reject the CAPM when annual holding period returns are used.
The Trades of Market Makers: An Empirical Analysis of NYSE Specialists
Authors: HASBROUCK JOEL , SOFIANOS GEORGE 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTThis paper presents a transaction‐level empirical analysis of the trading activities of New York Stock Exchange specialists. The main findings of the analysis are the following. Adjustment lags in inventories vary across stocks, and are in some cases as long as one or two months. Decomposition of specialist trading profits by trading horizon shows that the principal source of these profits is short term. An analysis of the dynamic relations among inventories, signed order flow, and quote changes suggests that trades in which the specialist participates have a higher immediate impact on the quotes than trades with no specialist participation.
Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and Financing Policies
Authors: FROOT KENNETH A. , SCHARFSTEIN DAVID S. , STEIN JEREMY C. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTThis paper develops a general framework for analyzing corporate risk management policies. We begin by observing that if external sources of finance are more costly to corporations than internally generated funds, there will typically be a benefit to hedging: hedging adds value to the extent that it helps ensure that a corporation has sufficient internal funds available to take advantage of attractive investment opportunities. We then argue that this simple observation has wide ranging implications for the design of risk management strategies. We delineate how these strategies should depend on such factors as shocks to investment and financing opportunities. We also discuss exchange rate hedging strategies for multinationals, as well as strategies involving “nonlinear” instruments like options.
Jump Diffusion Option Valuation in Discrete Time
Authors: AMIN KAUSHIK I. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTWe develop a simple, discrete time model to value options when the underlying process follows a jump diffusion process. Multivariate jumps are superimposed on the binomial model of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) to obtain a model with a limiting jump diffusion process. This model incorporates the early exercise feature of American options as well as arbitrary jump distributions. It yields an efficient computational procedure that can be implemented in practice. As an application of the model, we illustrate some characteristics of the early exercise boundary of American options with certain types of jump distributions.
Accounting for Forward Rates in Markets for Foreign Currency
Authors: BACKUS DAVID K. , GREGORY ALLAN W. , TELMER CHRIS I. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTForward and spot exchange rates between major currencies imply large standard deviations of both predictable returns from currency speculation and of the equilibrium price measure (the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution). Representative agent theory with time‐additive preferences cannot account for either of these properties. We show that the theory does considerably better along these dimensions when the representative agent's preferences exhibit habit persistence, but that the theory fails to reproduce some of the other properties of the dataâ€”in particular, the strong autocorrelation of forward premiums.
The Impact of Large Portfolio Insurers on Asset Prices
Authors: DONALDSON R. GLEN , UHLIG HARALD 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTWe develop a simple model in which the presence of portfolio insurers in a market of risk‐averse traders leads to multiple equilibria for the pricing of financial assets and can cause an increase in volatility, including insurance‐induced price drops. We demonstrate, however, that centralized portfolio insurance firms may actually reduce, not increase, volatility, even if the existence of these firms increases the total amount of funds under insurance.
Why Option Prices Lag Stock Prices: A Trading‐based Explanation
Authors: CHAN KALOK , CHUNG Y. PETER , JOHNSON HERB 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTWhile many studies find that option prices lead stock prices, Stephan and Whaley (1990) find that stocks lead options. We find no evidence that options, even deep out‐of‐the‐money options, lead stocks. After confirming Stephan and Whaley's results, we show their results can be explained as spurious leads induced by infrequent trading of options. We show that the stock lead disappears when the average of the bid and ask prices is used instead of transaction prices. Hence, we find no evidence of arbitrage opportunities associated with the stock lead.
Is a Bond Rating Downgrade Bad News, Good News, or No News for Stockholders?
Authors: GOH JEREMY C. , EDERINGTON LOUIS H. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTWe examine the reaction of common stock returns to bond rating changes. While recent studies find a significant negative stock response to downgrades, we argue that this reaction should not be expected for all downgrades because: (1) some rating changes are anticipated by market participants and (2) downgrades because of an anticipated move to transfer wealth from bondholders to stockholders should be good news for stockholders. We find that downgrades associated with deteriorating financial prospects convey new negative information to the capital market, but that downgrades due to changes in firms' leverage do not.
Moral Hazard and the Portfolio Management Problem
Authors: STOUGHTON NEAL M. 
Published: April 2012

ABSTRACTThis paper investigates the significance of nonlinear contracts on the incentive for portfolio managers to collect information. In addition, the manager must be motivated to disclose this information truthfully. We analyze three contracting regimes: (1) first‐best where effort is observable, (2) linear with unobservable effort, and (3) the optimal contract within the Bhattacharya‐Pfleiderer quadratic class. We find that the linear contract leads to a serious lack of effort expenditure by the manager. This underinvestment problem can be successfully overcome through the use of quadratic contracts. These contracts are shown to be asymptotically optimal for very risk‐tolerant principals.