bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Microfoundations and the Ontology of Macroeconomics
Authors: Hoover Kevin D. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
The typical concerns of macroeconomics—such as national output, employment and unemployment, inflation, interest rates, and the balance of payments—are among the oldest in economics, having been dominant among the problems addressed by both the mercantilists and classical economists, such as David Hume, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, as well as even earlier writers. These concerns co-existed with ones that are now regarded as characteristically microeconomic, such as the theory of prices exemplified in the labor theory of value of the classical economists or the theory of marginal utility of the early neoclassical economists. Questions about the relationship between these two groups of concerns could hardly be articulated until a categorical distinction between macroeconomics and microeconomics had been drawn. This article asks whether there is a successful ontology of macroeconomics. It also discusses the implications that this ontology has for practical macroeconomics.
Causality, Invariance, and Policy
Authors: Cartwright Nancy 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article explains the puzzling methodology of an important econometric study of health and status. It notes the widespread use of invariance in both economic and philosophical studies of causality to guarantee that causal knowledge can be used to predict the effects of manipulations. It argues that the kind of invariance seen widely in economic methodology succeeds at this job whereas a standard kind of invariance now popular in philosophy cannot. It questions the special role of causal knowledge with respect to predictions about the effects of manipulations once the importance of adding on invariance is recognized. It also draws the despairing conclusion that both causation and invariance are poor tools for predicting the outcomes of policy and technology and to pose the challenge.
Subjective Measures of Well‐Being: Philosophical Perspectives
Authors: Angner Erik 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
The goal of this article is to explore some fundamental assumptions underlying subjective measures of well-being, as compared to more traditional economic measures. Its main thesis is that psychologists and economists have sharply different philosophical commitments, a fact that is seldom made explicit. Although it is perfectly reasonable for social and behavioral scientists to be wary of spending too much time thinking about the philosophical foundations of their enterprise, there are moments when it is eminently useful to do so. In this case, this article maintains, there is good reason to attend to these foundations, since they are directly relevant to the assessment of the various measures. A better grasp of fundamental commitments, this article argues, goes a long way toward explaining why psychologists' and economists' efforts to measure welfare or well-being are so different, and why there is relatively little fruitful communication and collaboration across fields.
Facts and Values in Modern Economics
Authors: Dasgupta Partha 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This chapter offers an account of the contemporary economist's model of human agency in a market setting and of the ways in which individual choices are related to collective behavior in the market place. It also sketches the ways in which the model has been adapted to accommodate decision making in non-market environments. It builds on the model to offer an account of the ethical foundations of modern economics. Although welfare economics is thought to be insensitive to the language of rights, this article shows that contemporary economists have incorporated rights in their ethics. It describes the way ideas of human rights and human goods can be and have been subsumed by economists under an overarching notion of human well-being. Furthermore, it draws a distinction between the “constituents” and “determinants” of well-being. Whereas ethicists are temperamentally drawn to the constituents, economists study the determinants.
Introduction
Authors: Moser Paul K. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
Epistemology, characterized broadly, is an account of knowledge. Within the discipline of philosophy, epistemology is the study of the nature of knowledge and justification. Epistemologists have distinguished some species of knowledge, including: propositional knowledge (that something is so), nonpropositional knowledge of something (for instance, knowledge by acquaintance, or by direct awareness), empirical (a posteriori) propositional knowledge, nonempirical (a priori) propositional knowledge, and knowledge of how to do something. Recent epistemology has included controversies over distinctions between such species, for example, over the relations between some of these species and the viability of some of these species. This article gives a brief account of some of the best work in contemporary epistemology by leading epistemologists. It shows that this diversity in work hides a deeper rational unity.
Conditions and Analyses of Knowing
Authors: Shope Robert K. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article examines the essential conditions of propositional knowledge. It focuses on the conditions that must be satisfied for a person to have knowledge, specifically knowledge that something is so. Traditionally, knowledge has been analyzed in terms of justified true belief. This article first addresses philosophers' disagreements concerning the truth and belief conditions. After introducing the justification condition, it presents counterexamples (specifically Gettier-type counterexamples) challenging the standard analysis of knowledge. These challenges have provoked several attempts to replace or to supplement the justification condition for knowledge. This article presents and assesses several of these, including early causal theories, the nonaccidentality requirement, reliable process and conditional analyses, the reliable-indicator analysis, the conclusive reasons analysis, defeasibility analyses, analyses in terms of cognitive or intellectual virtues, and Plantinga's proper functionalism.
Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology
Authors: Foley Richard 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
The core subject matters of epistemology are the concept of knowledge and a cluster of normative concepts applying to beliefs, a cluster that includes rational, reasonable, justified, and warranted belief. This article reflects on these central topics and aims to distinguish such concepts in a general theory. Epistemologists have searched for that which constitutes knowledge when added to true belief. This article suggests that rationality and justification are not linked to knowledge by necessity. It proceeds to offer a general schema for rationality. This schema enables a distinction between “rationality” and “rationality all things considered.” This article proposes how these concepts can work together in a system that “provides the necessary materials for an approach to epistemology that is clarifying, theoretically respectable, and relevant to one's actual life.”
Skepticism
Authors: Klein Peter D. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article divides philosophical skepticism into two basic forms. The “Academic Skeptic” proposes that one cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions. The “Pyrrhonian Skeptic,” on the other hand, refrains from opining about whether one can have knowledge. This article outlines two arguments for Academic Skepticism: a “Cartesian-style” argument based on the claim that knowledge entails the elimination of all doubt; and a “Closure Principle–style” argument based on the claim that if x entails y and S has justification for x, then S has justification for y. It turns to contextualism and outlines the background of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, pointing out that the Pyrrhonist withholds assent concerning one's knowledge-bearing status because reason cannot provide an adequate basis for assent. It assesses three possible patterns of reasoning (foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism), and concludes that the Pyrrhonist view, that reason cannot resolve matters concerning the nonevident, is vindicated.
Embodiment and Epistemology
Authors: Antony Louise 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article considers a kind of “Cartesian epistemology” according to which, so far as knowing goes, knowers could be completely disembodied, that is, pure Cartesian egos. Cartesian epistemology thus attributes little, if any, cognitive significance to a knower's embodiment. This article examines a number of recent challenges to Cartesian epistemology. It focuses on feminist epistemology. But while feminist philosophers have been the most visible and vocal critics of Cartesian epistemology, they are not the only ones. Psychologists like Richard Nisbett and empirically minded analytic philosophers like Stephen Stich have also raised objections, and this article talks about these as well. While all of these critics tend to position themselves as radical opponents of “mainstream” epistemology, this article intends to show that the criticisms they make are consonant with a number of mainstream developments, particularly externalism and naturalized epistemology.
Epistemology and Ethics
Authors: Lemos Noah 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article suggests that moral epistemology is mainly concerned with “whether and how one can have knowledge or justified belief” about moral issues. It presents and replies to several problems that arise in this connection. It addresses arguments for ethical skepticism, the view that one cannot have moral knowledge or justified belief. Assuming that one can have moral knowledge, this article considers how the moral epistemologist and moral philosopher should begin their account of this knowledge. It favors a particularist approach whereby the instances of moral knowledge are given and used to formulate criteria for moral knowledge. It relates this approach to concerns about the nature of the epistemic justification of moral beliefs as dealt with by foundationalists and coherentists. Finally, this article concludes by responding to arguments against particularist approaches in moral epistemology.
Epistemology in Philosophy of Religion
Authors: Quinn Philip L. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article focuses on the central problem of religious epistemology for monotheistic religions. It is divided into two main sections. The first section discusses arguments for God's existence. It explores what epistemic conditions such arguments would have to satisfy to be successful and whether any arguments satisfy those conditions. The second section examines the claims of Reformed Epistemology about belief in God. It assesses Alvin Plantinga's claim that belief in God is for many theists properly basic, that is, has positive epistemic status even when it is not based on arguments or any other kind of propositional evidence. This article distinguishes two versions of this claim. According to the first, theistic belief is properly basic with respect to justification or rationality. According to the second version, theistic belief is properly basic with respect to warrant.
The Science of Research and the Search for Molecular Mechanisms of Cognitive Functions
Authors: Silva Alcino J. , Bickle John 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article considers research methodologies relevant to the search for molecular mechanisms of cognitive functions. It proposes a new general framework for understanding contemporary science called the science of research (SR). It discusses two scientific puzzles concerning the neurobiology of cognitive functions and some recently noticed inefficiencies in institutionalized science across the board. It suggests that both of these puzzle can be addressed by the SR framework for discovering and testing hypotheses about science. It also discusses the so-called positive and negative alteration and describes Koch's postulates, John Stuart Mill's methods, and reductionism in actual scientific practice.
The Lower Bounds of Cognition: What Do Spinal Cords Reveal?
Authors: Allen Colin , Grau James W. , Meagher Mary W. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article examines the role of the spinal cords in cognition. It reviews animal science research that challenges the view that behavioral responses to sensory stimuli that do not involve brain mediation are fixed, automatic, and non-cognitive in nature. This research has shown the spinal cord to be a flexible and interesting learning system in its own right. This article discusses the consequences of these findings for philosophical understanding of the relationship between learning, cognition, and even consciousness. The article also explains the relevant concepts of instrumental conditioning and antinociception and conditioned antinociception.
Learning, Neuroscience, and the Return of Behaviorism
Authors: Machamer Peter K. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article attempts to answer questions concerning the relation of neuroscience to behaviorism. It explains the meaning of behaviorism and investigates whether all scientific experiments in learning and memory are designed according to repetition, classical conditioning, and stimulus-response-reward (SRR) paradigms. It also examines whether reward leaning and classical conditioning can be generalized in a way that allows explanations of all forms of memory encoding and learning that animals and humans accomplish.
fMRI: A Modern Cerebrascope? The Case of Pain
Authors: Hardcastle Valerie Gray , Stewart C. Matthew 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article examines the application of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in neuroscience, particularly in the imaging of pain. It provides a brief primer on functional magnetic imaging techniques and describes pain processing and pain inhibiting systems. It discusses experiments where fMRI has illustrated what has gone wrong in the pain network's response to stimuli and suggests that imaging studies of pain have a crucial role to play in diagnosing pain disorders as well as advancing a theoretical framework for explaining them. It also offers suggestions for how to improve fMRI experiments and their theoretical implications.
The Role of Neurobiology in Differentiating the Senses
Authors: Keeley Brian L. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article looks at the role of neurobiology in explaining the distinction among the senses. It presents the Aristotelian account of the senses and presents the view that that psychological facts alone are sufficient to account for the different senses, or at least that organ criterion is far less important than some have argued. It discusses Johannes Müller's nineteenth-century neurophysiological characterization of the senses and its application to the defense of the neurobiological criterion.
Levels, Individual Variation, and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology
Authors: Aizawa Ken , Gillett Carl 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article examines massive multiple realization (MMR) in the context of neurobiology. It highlights the differences in the conception of multiple realization and its methodological implications by researchers in the philosophy of psychology and those in the philosophy of neuroscience. It discusses neurobiological findings about MMR and shows that there is plausibly important individual variation at every physiologically significant level of organization in the nervous system. It explores philosophical concerns about the MMR hypothesis and proposes a framework for realization and multiple realization.
Logicism in the Twenty‐first Century
Authors: Hale Bob , Wright Crispin 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThis article focuses on issues which neo-Fregeanism must address, even if the scope of its leading claims is restricted to elementary arithmetic. Many of these concern the capacity of abstraction principles—centrally, but not only, Hume's Principle itself—to discharge the implicitly definitional role in which the neo-Fregean casts them, and thereby to subserve a satisfactory apriorist epistemology for (at least part of) mathematics. Others concern the other main assumption that undergirds the specifically logicist aspect of the neo-Fregean project (and equally, of course, Frege's original project): that the logic to which abstraction principles are to be adjoined may legitimately be taken to include higher-order—at the very least, second-order—logic without compromise of the epistemological purposes of the project.
Formalism
Authors: Detlefsen Michael 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
Viewed properly, formalism is not a single viewpoint concerning the nature of mathematics. Rather, it is a family of related viewpoints sharing a common framework—a framework that has five key elements. Among these is its revision of the traditional classification of the mathematical sciences. From ancient times onward, the dominant view of mathematics was that it was divided into different sciences. Principal among these were a science of magnitude (geometry) and a science of multitude (arithmetic). Traditionally, this division of mathematics was augmented by an ordering of the two parts in terms of their relative basicness and which was to be taken as the more paradigmatically mathematical. Here it was geometry that was given the priority. The formalist outlook typically rejected this traditional ordering of the mathematical sciences. Indeed, from the latter half of the nineteenth century onward, it typically reversed it. This reversal is the first component of the formalist framework.
Intuitionism and Philosophy
Authors: Posy Carl 
Published: September 2009

AbstractThe first part of this article shows some main points of Brouwer's mathematics and the philosophical doctrines that anchor it. It points out that Brouwer's special conception of human consciousness spawns his positive ontological and epistemic doctrines as well as his negative program. The second part focuses on intuitionistic logic: once again a brief picture of the technical field will precede the philosophical analyses—this time those of Heyting and Dummett—of formal intuitionistic logic and its role in intuitionism. The third part, however, aims to show that matters aren't (or needn't be) so bleak. It suggests, in particular, that putting all this in historical perspective will show intuitionism as technically less quixotic and philosophically more unified than it had initially seemed.
Quine and the Web of Belief
Authors: Resnik Michael D. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
This article focuses on Quine's positive views and their bearing on the philosophy of mathematics. It begins with his views concerning the relationship between scientific theories and experiential evidence (his holism), and relate these to his views on the evidence for the existence of objects (his criterion of ontological commitment, his naturalism, and his indispensability arguments). This sets the stage for discussing his theories concerning the genesis of our beliefs about objects (his postulationalism) and the nature of reference to objects (his ontological relativity). Quine's writings usually concerned theories and their objects generally, but they contain a powerful and systematic philosophy of mathematics, and the article aims to bring this into focus.
Nominalism Reconsidered
Authors: Rosen Gideon , Burgess John P. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
Nominalism is usually formulated as the thesis that only concrete entities exist or that no abstract entities exist. But where, as here, the interest is primarily in philosophy of mathematics, one can bypass the tangled question of how, exactly, the general abstract/concrete distinction is to be understood by taking nominalism simply as the thesis that there are no distinctively mathematical objects: no numbers, sets, functions, groups, and so on. As to the nature of such objects (if there are any), it can be said that it has come to be fairly widely agreed, under the influence of Frege and others, that they are very different both from paradigmatically physical objects (bricks, stones) and from paradigmatically mental ones (minds, ideas). Modern nominalism emerged in the 1930s as a response to the view of Frege and others that numbers, sets, functions, groups, and so on belong to a “third realm.”
Divine Power, Goodness, and Knowledge
Authors: Rowe William L. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
In the major religions of the West—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—the dominant theological tradition has long held that among the attributes constituting the nature of God are to be counted his unlimited power (omnipotence), perfect goodness, and unlimited knowledge (omniscience). Within this theological tradition stands the work of many influential theologians and philosophers such as Maimonides (1135–1204), Aquinas (1225–1274), and al-Ghazali (1059–1111), who have labored to explain how we should understand these fundamental aspects of the divine nature. This article aims both to explain these three attributes of the divine nature and to discuss some of the ideas the difficulties philosophers and theologians have suggested arise when one endeavours to conceive of a being possessing such extraordinary attributes. Before beginning this task, however, it should be noted that the attributes ascribed to God in the historically dominant theological tradition within the major Western religions are not characteristic of the entire history of thought about God in those religious traditions.
Divine Sovereignty and Aseity
Authors: Mann William E. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
Searching for a way to avoid the rude anthropomorphism of his contemporaries, the Presocratic philosopher Xenophanes said of God that “always he remains in the same state, in no way changing; nor is it fitting for him to go now here now there”; that “without effort, by the will of his mind he shakes everything”; that “he sees as a whole, he thinks as a whole, and he hears as a whole”. Xenophanes' pronouncements are the first recorded sallies into philosophical theology. Although he may have had the first word, he did not have the last: his descendants include Plato, Philo, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, Spinoza, and a host of others. Xenophanes emphasizes the differences between God and creatures. For many religious believers, however, it is the similarities that are most important. The God of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam is supposed to care for his creatures, know their innermost hopes and fears, respond to their prayers, strengthen them against adversity, share in their joy, console them in their sorrow and grief, judge their deficiencies, and forgive them their sins.
Cosmological and Design Arguments
Authors: Pruss Alexander R. , Gale Richard M. 
Published: September 2009

Abstract
Unlike the ontological argument, which appeals only to highly sophisticated philosophers who delight in highly abstract deductive reasoning, cosmological and design arguments figure prominently in the argumentative support that everyday working theists give for their faith. The reason for this broad pastoral appeal is that these arguments begin with commonplace facts about the world and then, by appeal to principles that look plausible, establish the existence of a being who, while not shown to have all of God's essential properties, properties that God must have to exist, is at least a close cousin of the God of traditional Western theism. This article begins with a preliminary botanization of these arguments, indicating their similarities and differences, and then discusses each of them separately, giving prominence to the many different forms they take. Each of the two arguments begins with a contingent existential fact.