bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Administrative State: Contract
Authors: Craig Paul 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
The previous chapter considered the way the administration discharged legislative objectives through individualized decision-making and rulemaking. This chapter continues this story through analysis of the way in which contract was used to effectuate statutory goals. The discussion begins with the political and organizational dimension of contracts made for public goods and services, and five principal contexts in which such contracts were made are distinguished. The discussion then shifts to the legal and practical dimension of public contracts. There is analysis of key issues, including the authority to contract, the capacity to contract, formation, agency, legality, interpretation, remedy, and the Crown. The final section of the chapter considers continuity and change in the 20th to 21st centuries. There is continuity with respect to Treasury influence over departmental contracting. There is change, as evidenced by the prevalence of standard form contracts, by the impact of EU rules and by increased centralized control over local contracting.
Proportionability and Proportionality
Authors: Craig Paul 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter sheds historical light on the role played by the concept of proportionality in UK law. The United Kingdom had a concept akin to that of proportionality, from the late 16th century onwards. The precise appellation varied, with terms such as proportionability, proportionable, and disproportionate found in the legislation and case law. It was not a formal three-part test of the modern kind, but the older concept shared a common theme with its more modern offspring, which is the proscription of excessive regulatory burdens. The story begins with the role played by proportionability in the context of individual decisions, its judicial application as a free-standing principle of judicial review, and as a principle of statutory interpretation to ensure that regulatory legislation would, whenever possible, not impose excessive burdens on individuals. The focus then shifts to proportionability in the context of rulemaking and legislation.
Standing
Authors: Craig Paul 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
The present chapter is concerned with locus standi, which is directed to who can invoke the courts’ jurisdiction in a claim for judicial review. The discussion begins with standing as conceptual gateway. This is followed by analysis of standing between the mid-16th to the end of the 19th centuries, when individuals sought to use the prerogative writs or certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. There was considerable diversity within the case law, concerning both the applicable test for a particular writ and as between them. These differences reflected and embodied divergent views as to the role that the individual should play within public law. These considerations were also evident in the standing rules applicable for injunctive relief. The focus thereafter is, as with other chapters, on continuity and change in the 20th to 21st centuries. In this context, there is a divide between the pre-1977 period and the years thereafter.
Antisthenes on Definition
Authors: Malink Marko 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
In Metaphysics H.3, Aristotle discusses a difficulty raised by Antisthenes and his followers concerning the possibility of definition. The difficulty led the Antistheneans to conclude that it is impossible to define what a thing is (1043b23–32). While this passage is one of the major sources on the thought of Antisthenes, it poses a number of interpretive problems. It is, as Myles Burnyeat puts it, an ‘obscure passage … which lacks an agreed interpretation’. This chapter argues that, contrary to what is often thought, the difficulty derives from an argument to the effect that any attempt at defining what a thing is leads to an infinite regress of definitions. More specifically, it argues that the Antisthenean argument is based on a compositional conception of definition according to which the definition of a thing must mention the constituents of which the thing is composed. This account allows us to gain a better understanding of what the Antisthenean difficulty was, and why Aristotle chooses to address it in his discussion of hylomorphism in Metaphysics H.3.
Predicative Hylomorphism in Metaphysics Z
Authors: Louise Gill Mary 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
In Metaphysics Z Aristotle analyses the relation between matter and form using what this chapter calls predicative hylomorphism, according to which form is predicated of matter as a persisting and definite subject. The chapter contends that Metaphysics Z.1–16 are aporetic: these chapters set out various criteria for substantiality and in so doing reveal that nothing can jointly satisfy all the criteria and so succeed as primary substance. Aristotle’s treatment of matter as a subject and as a continuant through change undermines the substantiality of even Aristotle’s most promising candidate, substantial form. The chapter ends by gesturing towards a second unsuccessful attempt to solve the problem of substance in Z.17 and H.1–5, and finally towards a third and more satisfactory way to solve the problem in H.6 and Θ. The third scheme uses a different conception of matter and its relation to form, which the author calls genus-differentia hylomorphism. On this version of hylomorphism, the matter that constitutes the complex is an indefinite determinable which form differentiates into a definite individual thing, a primary substance.
Matter-Involving Form and Hypothetical Necessity in Aristotle’s De Anima
Authors: Johansen T. K. 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
David Charles has argued that, according to Aristotle, a psychological state such as anger is an ‘inextricably psycho-physical phenomenon because it has a matter-involving (inextricably psycho-physical) form’. Agreeing with this claim, this chapter asks how one should further explicate the involvement of matter. For Charles the involvement demands an explicit mention of the specific matter of the psychological state in the definition of its form. So matter plays a role in defining the form itself, as nose, for example, occurs in the definition of snubness. The alternative Johansen explores is that the specific matter is not present in but follows from the definition of the form. In that case the definition of form is not like that of snubness in explicitly mentioning matter. Nor, however, is it like the mathematician’s account of concavity, which has no implications as to its material realization. Rather, the formal definition of a psychological state may imply a certain material realization by hypothetical necessity. Johansen develops this suggestion and considers its strength against certain objections raised by David Charles.
Reflections on Aristotle’s Modal Ontology
Authors: Chiba Kei 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter investigates the roles of Aristotle’s two newly coined ontological technical terms, entelecheia (‘completeness’) and energeia (‘at-workness’), and their connections with three traditional terms he inherited: dunamis (‘potentiality’), ergon (‘work’), and logos (‘account’). Through an analysis of passages in Metaphysics and De Anima, it argues that Aristotle introduces ‘completeness’ to refer to the substance of a thing—that is, the form (e.g., soul)—so that ‘form’, which signifies the causally basic unifying entity, and ‘completeness’, which signifies the governing mode of being one qua being, are employed in parallel in two contexts. In one, the form is identified and captured by means of a unified logos (account) called ‘definition’ that refers to completeness as a mode of being of ‘substance according to the account (ousia kata ton logon)’. In the other, the form is described as ‘substance as being at-work (tēn hōs energeian ousian)’, inherent in the relevant matter, which is not separate from the form in terms of work but is identified as potentiality in terms of account. It is argued, thus, that completeness is found in two contexts as (1) the governing mode of being of the form as a logos, in virtue of which (2) the agent, who is being in virtue of completeness, is at work by holding its governing mode for a certain duration of time.
Aristotle: Processes and Continuants
Authors: Coope Ursula 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter discusses David Charles’ view that an Aristotelian kinēsis (or process) is, in certain important respects, like a continuant. It focuses on two claims Charles makes about Aristotelian kinēsis: that a kinēsis has ‘modal depth’ (i.e., a particular kinēsis could have developed differently from how it did in fact develop) and that a kinēsis can itself be the proper subject of change. The second of these claims seems inconsistent with Aristotle’s own remarks in Physics 5.2 and Categories 5. The chapter argues that it is possible to distinguish two different accounts of kinēsis in Aristotle’s work. On one account, defended in Physics 5–6, a kinēsis is explanatorily posterior to its temporal parts. On this account, a kinēsis lacks modal depth and cannot be the proper subject of change (hence, Aristotle’s claims in Physics 5.2). On the other account, implied by Aristotle’s remarks in Physics 8, a kinēsis is explanatorily prior to its temporal parts. The chapter argues that such an account allows for the possibility that a kinēsis could have modal depth and even that a kinēsis could be the subject of change. This second account suggests the interesting possibility that a kinēsis might be a kind of entity that differs from an enduring substance in having temporal parts, but is like an enduring substance in having modal depth and in being itself a possible subject of change.
Irreplaceable Value
Authors: Bradford Gwen 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
If the Mona Lisa, the Sistine Chapel, the sarcophagus of Tutankhamun, or the Sword of Goujian were destroyed, nothing could replace them. New works of art that are even more impressive may be created, which may replenish the value in the world in quantity, but they would not fully replace the loss. Works of art and historical artifacts have irreplaceable value. But just what is irreplaceable value? This chapter presents perhaps the first analysis. Irreplaceable value is a matter of intrinsic value in virtue of unreinstantiable good-making properties, which give rise to reasons to preserve and protect.
Aggregating Personal Value
Authors: Frugé Christopher 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
A person possesses value from various components of wellbeing, but they also have overall wellbeing from the combined value of those components. Most ethicists assume that there is an objectively unique way that wellbeing from components aggregates into overall wellbeing. However, I argue that aggregation is subjective. Thus, the manner in which wellbeing aggregates depends on what sort of aggregation a person values. I defend this view for three reasons. First, it secures naturalism about aggregate wellbeing. Since someone’s overall wellbeing is distinct from the value they receive from various goods and bads, then it requires a distinct explanation, which can be supplied naturalistically by positing dependence on aggregative attitudes. Second, subjectivism about aggregation secures resonance about aggregate wellbeing in that the manner in which overall value is produced is sensitive to the cares and concerns of the subject. Third, the view accommodates the variability of aggregation across different creatures, since different creatures value aggregation differently. I end with some implications for the significance of death.
Aim of the Youth Justice System
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter describes the aim of the youth justice system. The legislation relating to children and young persons is contained in many different statutes and is unlikely to be fully codified in the near future. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 defined the youth justice system and set up some of its current structure. The CDA 1998, s 42(1) provides that ‘youth justice system’ means the system of criminal justice in so far as it relates to children and young persons. According to the CDA 1998, s 37, the aim of the youth justice system is ‘to prevent offending by children and young persons’. Ultimately, the Sentencing Council’s Sentencing Children and Young People — Overarching Principles definitive guideline is essential reading for all those who work in the youth court or who deal with youths in any other criminal court.
European Convention on Human Rights
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter explores the European Convention on Human Rights, which is embodied in domestic legislation through the Human Rights Act 1998. The most relevant principles applicable to the youth justice system include Article 3 on protection from inhuman degrading treatment; Article 5 on guarantee of the right to liberty and the security of the person; Article 6 on guarantee of due process; and Article 8 on right to privacy and family life. The guarantees of Article 6 apply with equal force to juveniles as they do to adults. The European Court of Human Rights rules on Convention Rights when domestic remedies are exhausted. Ultimately, the position of children and young people in relation to Article 6 is important in consideration of issues concerning effective participation by children in the criminal process.
Allocation and Sending Proceedings
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter describes the allocation and sending proceedings. The Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, s 24 establishes a presumption that youth defendants will be dealt with summarily for any indictable offence. A youth defendant will only appear in the Crown Court for trial when charged with homicide; when charged with a firearms offence subject to a mandatory minimum sentence; when charged with a ‘grave crime’; when charged with certain terrorism offences; when notice has been given in a serious or complex fraud; when a notice has been given in a child case; when charged with a specified offence and it is considered that the criteria for imposing a sentence of extended detention are met (dangerous offender); and when charged with an adult offender who has been sent to the Crown Court. Save where allocation to the Crown Court is mandatory (homicide and firearms cases), it is only rarely that a youth court should send a child or young person to the Crown Court for trial, because of the interrelationship between the allocation provisions and the general power to commit for sentence. The youth court is best designed to meet the specific needs of children and young persons.
Constitution of the Youth Court
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter focuses on the constitution of the youth court, which is provided for under the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 45. Magistrates and District Judges sitting in the youth court will have received specialist training and must be authorized to sit. Magistrates will usually sit as a bench of three justices but hearings can be dealt with by two justices. Meanwhile, a District Judge (Magistrates’ Courts) can sit alone. The latest rules made under s 45 are the Justice of the Peace Rules. Requirements for training and authorization to sit in the youth court are found in rules 19 and 30. In addition, the previous requirement that a youth court bench should include at least one man and at least one woman no longer applies.
Presence of Defendant in Court
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter describes the provisions for the presence of the defendant in court. If a defendant has been remanded on bail to attend court, their presence is mandatory unless and until it is excused by the court. Where a defendant on bail fails to appear, a warrant can be issued for their arrest. If a defendant has been summonsed, they may be absent but represented by a legal representative. This would be unusual in the youth court. The provisions of s 17A of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 require the plea to an either-way allegation faced by an adult to be entered personally by the defendant. The court observed that failure to do so nullified any proceedings as it went to jurisdiction. The wording of s 24A of the MCA 1980 in relation to plea for a youth defendant is very similar. The defendant, rather than a legal representative, should indicate the plea when an allocation decision is to be made.
Restricted Access to the Youth Court
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter focuses on the restricted access to the youth court. Indeed, the youth court is not a public court to which the public has free access. The Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 47 provides for the procedure in juvenile courts. According to CYPA 1933, s 47, ‘youth courts shall sit as often as may be necessary for the purpose of exercising any jurisdiction conferred on them by or under this or any other Act’. Importantly, ‘no person shall be present at any sitting of a youth court except members and officers of the court; parties to the case before the court, their legal representatives, and witnesses and other persons directly concerned in that case; bona fide representatives of newspapers or news agencies; and such other persons as the court may specially authorise to be present’.
Secure Accommodation Application (Children Act 1989, s 25)
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter discusses the power of a local authority to apply to a court for permission to place a looked after child into secure accommodation for restricting their liberty under the Children Act 1989, s 25. It emphasizes how a child being looked after by a local authority in England or Wales may not be placed or kept in accommodation in England or Scotland provided for the purpose of restricting liberty. It also highlights the duty of a court to determine whether any relevant criteria for keeping a child in secure accommodation are satisfied. The chapter looks at applications for secure accommodation orders that are normally made to the family court and an application for civil legal aid. It includes the application for a secure accommodation order made to a youth court or adult magistrates’ court, which is governed by Part III of the Magistrates’ Court Rules.
Separation of Youth Defendants from Adult Defendants
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter describes the arrangements made for preventing a child or young person in the custody of authorities from associating with an adult who is charged with any offence. It explains that the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s 31 is meant to prevent the moral risks of contact between young persons and adult defendants. It also points out that s 31 does not oblige the use of separate court buildings or entirely separate custody areas in one court building but arrangements must be in place to ensure that young persons at court are prevented from interacting with adult defendants. The chapter details how s 31 ensures that young persons and adults are not afforded the opportunity to speak or socialize by sharing a cell or by associating outside the cell. It looks at arrangements that address transitory contact or physical proximity that give rise to risks of contact or interaction.
Special Measures for Defendants
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter explores the wide and flexible powers of the court to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial, which includes a fair opportunity to give the best evidence. It reviews some statutory provisions that have been introduced to assist defendants through the amendment of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 and the Criminal Procedure Rules. It also emphasizes the availability of special measures to a defendant through the use of live link and the use of an intermediary. The chapter covers the inherent common law powers of the court in choosing how to regulate a criminal trial. It considers the Divisional Court, which identified an inherent jurisdiction to direct that the accused be assisted by an intermediary in giving their evidence.
Age of Offender
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter highlights the powers of the court on sentence that depend upon the age of the offender. It explains that the relevant age is the defendant’s age on the date of conviction and the date on which they plead guilty or are found guilty. It also talks about an offender that crosses a significant age threshold between the date of the commission of the offence and the date of conviction. The chapter considers the sentence that the defendant would receive if they had been sentenced at the date of the commission of the offence as the starting point for the court when an offender reaches a certain age. It describes occasions when an increase in the age of a child or young person will result in the maximum sentence on the date of the finding of guilt.
Bind Over
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter emphasizes how any person before the court can be bound over. It explores the common law powers of the court to do a bind over of its own motion as a measure of preventive justice where the person’s conduct amounts to a breach of the peace involving violence. It also reviews MCA 1980, s 115, which provides a magistrates’ court with the power to bind over to keep the peace or be of good behaviour following a complaint. The chapter details how a bind over can only be made by consent and the court should give the person who may be subject to the bind over the opportunity to make representations. It talks about refusal to consent that can result in committal to prison in the case of an adult but there is no such power for a youth.
Previous Convictions
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter focuses on the consideration of the court of the seriousness of an offence committed by an offender who has one or more relevant previous convictions. It emphasizes how the court must treat each relevant previous conviction as an aggravating factor, particularly the nature of the offence to which the relevant previous conviction relates and its relevance to the current offence and the time that has elapsed since the relevant previous conviction. It also explains how the court treats a relevant previous conviction as an aggravating factor by stating in open court that the offence is so aggravated. The chapter discusses a sentence that follows re-offending, which does not need to be more severe than the previous sentence as there had been a previous conviction. It mentions the absence of previous convictions that may affect the sentencing powers of the court.
The Scaled Approach
Authors: Ashford Mark , Branston Gareth , Redhouse Naomi 
Published: May 2024

Abstract
This chapter introduces the Scaled Approach, which is a tiered approach to interventions in order to reduce the likelihood of re-offending and risk of serious harm. It details how the YOT will assess the young person using the standardized assessment tool AssetPlus under the Scaled Approach. It also highlights the initial assessment that will calculate the risk of re-offending and will consider the risk of serious harm likely to be involved in further offending. The chapter mentions the Sentencing Children and Young People – Overarching Principles that determine the nature and extent of the requirements that the court should consider in the likelihood of the child or young person re-offending and in the risk of the child or young person causing serious harm. It explores the requirement of a YOT to supervise orders in line with the Scaled Approach model.