bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Global Competition
Authors: Gerber David 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis book examines the relationship between law and economic globalization. It focuses on national and international efforts to protect the competitive process, exploring the critically important relationships between those two domains and the way the resulting system shapes economic activity in all parts of the world. The laws, institutions, and principles of the international domain increasingly influence national competition law development, and national competition law experience provides both the lenses through which decision makers view transnational competition issues and the incentive structures that generate their competition law decisions. The analysis examines the ideas, institutions, and people that provide the legal framework for global competition; how they evolved, how they operate today, and the forces that are likely to influence their future development. US anti-trust experience has long been at the center of this global governance picture, but European competition law experience is also rich, varied, and potentially of great value for future competition law development. China, Japan, Korea, and newer players in Latin America and Africa will also play a key role in this future, and the analysis pays close attention to them as well. On the basis of this analysis, the book analyzes current global competition law proposals and outlines a strategy that utilizes these discussions, but more specifically addresses global economic development needs. This strategy may be developed within the institutional framework of the WTO, but it may also be pursued independently.
Law, Competition, and Global Markets
Authors: Gerber David J. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis introductory chapter identifies the fundamental tension in global economic development: competition can produce enormous economic benefits everywhere, but its benefits are distributed unevenly, and it can also cause harm. An effective global competition law regime can protect this productive process and enhance its benefits, and it can also reduce its potential for harm. This requires a global strategy that takes into account the needs of all participants in global markets — not merely those in developed countries — and embeds competition in society. Constructing such a regime calls for analysis of previous competition law experience on both national and international levels, especially the relationships between national and transnational competition law. This book provides this kind of analysis and relates it to the insights of economics and other social sciences. Together, these two elements provide a basis for developing an effective framework for global competition.
Global Competition Law: A Project Conceived and Abandoned
Authors: Gerber David J. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter analyzes transnational efforts to develop a global competition regime during the first half of the 20th century. It reveals that these early experiences were far richer and had far more influence on subsequent developments than is typically assumed. At the International Economic Conference in 1926 there was widespread international concern about the effects of private restraints on global competition, and there was broad support for multilateral agreement to combat these harms. Depression and war submerged the idea, but it acquired even more support after the Second World War, when it was included in the proposals for an International Trade Organization that was part of the post-war plans to create international economic organizations that could foster economic development and deter economic disruptions. The Cold War forced the US to abandon plans for the ITO, but competition law had now become well-known in many countries, and these early experiences would influence not only many national developments, but also European integration.
Sovereignty as a Solution: Extending the Reach of National Laws
Authors: Gerber David J. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractWhen the Cold War division of the world made a global competition law regime impossible, the US as the dominant economic and political power in the non-Communist world took responsibility for dealing with threats to transnational competition. Since then, US law and institutions have provided the basic rules of competition on transnational markets. This chapter analyzes the principles of international law that have been the basis for this regime and traces its evolution during the second half of the 20th century. This regime relies on national laws to provide competition rules, but few states have sufficient political and economic leverage to apply their laws outside their own territory, and this allows the US (and, to a lesser extent, the EU) to provide these conduct rules. Jurisdictional authority — and the interests, expectations and attitudes associated with it — remain the central component of the legal framework for global competition.
US Antitrust Law: Model and Lens
Authors: Gerber David J. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter explores US anti-trust law experience and its influence on thought, expectations, and interpretations of competition law around the world. US anti-trust law has been at the center of competition law development since the end of World War II, and it continues to play the central role in global competition law development. In particular, the centrality of neo-classical economics in US anti-trust law is a controversial and critically important issue for many. Countries everywhere have looked to US law in shaping their own competition law decisions. Moreover, it is the lens through which US officials, scholars, and practitioners have viewed competition law in other countries and on the global level, and this further enhances the need for others and for the US anti-trust community to understand that lens and its influence.
Competition Law in Europe: Market, Community, and Integration
Authors: Gerber David J. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter outlines European national experience as well as the evolution and dynamics of competition law in the European Union. European competition law experience is particularly important for two reasons. One is that European national competition law systems have developed under circumstances that have often been similar to those faced in many countries that seek to develop competition law in the 21st century. The other reason is that for decades, European national competition laws have developed within the context of European integration, and this national—transnational experience highlights key issues in the development of competition law for global markets. The European model of competition law features a central role for administrative decision making and an emphasis on combating the use of private economic power to restrict competition. Over the last decade, some elements of the European model have moved toward the US view of competition law.
Convergence as Strategy: Scope and Limits
Authors: Gerber David J. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter looks analytically at the dynamics of economic globalization, and the economic and political contexts to which any transnational competition law strategy must respond. These dynamics feature interplays between national and transnational interests, objectives, institutions and ideas. National borders remain the key factor in this interplay. The chapter then examines convergence as a strategy for global competition law development; the idea that increases in similarities among competition law systems throughout the world are likely and that they will significantly improve the jurisdictional regime. The analysis identifies the potential of convergence, but also reveals its weaknesses and limitations. It concludes that meaningful and effective convergence over broad areas of competition law is less likely than some assume and that by itself, convergence is not an adequate response to the challenges of protecting global competition and securing widespread national support for it.
Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths
Authors: MacFarlane John 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
Many philosophers have supposed that if possible worlds overlap and branch (as opposed to having qualitatively identical pasts and then ‘diverging’), our common-sense talk about the future is deeply misguided. Some of them plump for common sense, others for branching. This chapter argues that the dilemma is a false one. It is possible to develop a semantics for tense and the historical modalities that vindicate common-sense talk about the future, actuality, and historical possibility, even if there is branching. However, this can only be done in a semantic framework that relativizes truth to contexts of assessment.
Epistemic Modals and Correct Disagreement
Authors: Dietz Richard 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
Epistemic modals are devices for marking the epistemic possibility/necessity of an underlying proposition. For example, an utterance of ‘It might be raining now in Sydney’ is true just in case the proposition that it is raining in Sydney at the utterance time is possible in view of what is known in the relevant epistemic situation; or so the standard truth-conditional approach to epistemic modals suggests. According to relativists about epistemic modals, the epistemic situation that is relevant to the truth-valuation of a given epistemic modal statement may vary with occasions of its assessment. This chapter shows that the standard relativist account of epistemic modals is wrong, not only in letter but also in spirit. Furthermore, it is suggested that a puzzle which has been invoked in support of relativism about epistemic modals can be dissolved in non-relativist terms.
Faultless or Disagreement
Authors: Iacona Andrea 
Published: May 2010

AbstractAmong the various motivations that may lead to the idea that truth is relative in some non-conventional sense, one is that the idea helps explain how there can be ‘faultless disagreements’, that is, situations in which a person A judges that p, a person B judges that not-p, but neither A nor B is at fault. The line of argument goes as follows. It seems that there are faultless disagreements. For example, A and B may disagree on culinary matters without either A or B being at fault. But standard semantics has no room for such a case, so there is something wrong with standard semantics. The best way to amend it is to add a new parameter that is relevant to the truth or falsity of what A and B judge, presumably, something related to personal taste. This chapter shows that this line of FN:1 argument is flawed. It is true that standard semantics has no room for faultless disagreements. But there is nothing wrong with this, for it should not be assumed that such disagreements exist.
Equity issues: going beyond CBA and ICER
Authors: Olsen Jan Abel 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter discusses distributive implications of some parameters inside the economic evaluation formulae, as well as some priority-relevant issues that lie outside these formulae. It argues that an economic evaluation should always be complemented by a description of the equity implications of the programme. For this purpose an ‘equity checklist’ is proposed. Exercises and suggested readings are included at the end of the chapter.
The Folk Theory of Colours and the Causes of Colour Experience
Authors: Menzies Peter 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThe subject of colour has long fascinated Frank Jackson. Perhaps one reason that colours have fascinated Jackson is that they represent a striking instance of what he has called a ‘location problem’. This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 sketches Jackson's solution to ‘the location problem for colours’. Section 3 argues that Jackson's attempted resolution of the clash between the two axioms of the folk theory fails because of its inconsistency with other firm folk intuitions about colours. In Section 4, after agreeing with Jackson that the folk theory entails both axioms, it is argued that these axioms imply a conception of colours as simple, non-physical, intrinsic properties of objects. Section 5 takes up the issue of why Jackson rejects this primitivist conception of colours and the easy solution it provides to the apparent clash between his two basic axioms. Section 6 examines the exclusion assumption and its role in his argument for the conclusion that colours must be physical properties. Section 7 outlines a conception of causation according to which non-physical properties as well as physical properties can both cause colour experience in ways that do not compete with each other and do not exclude each other.
Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth
Authors: Horgan Terry , Timmons Mark 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
In chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ and ‘analytical descriptivism’. This chapter argues that this metaethical position, referred to as ‘analytical moral functionalism’, is untenable. It does this by applying a generic thought-experimental deconstructive recipe that has been used against other views that posit moral properties and identify them with certain natural properties — a recipe that is applicable to virtually any metaphysically naturalist version of moral realism. The recipe deploys a scenario called Moral Twin Earth.
Consequentialism and the Nearest and Dearest Objection
Authors: Smith Michael 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter suggests that the nearest and dearest objection is best understood as attempting to show that consequentialism is, in Parfit terms, ‘indirectly collectively self-defeating’. The concern is that if significant numbers of us act to maximize neutral value we will end up living lives which are not worth living — not worth living because we will have given up precisely those projects that make our lives worth living. Consequentialism is thus indirectly collectively self-defeating: adhering to the injunction to act so as to maximize neutral value is likely to render us all worse off.
Conditionals, Truth, and Assertion
Authors: Edgington Dorothy 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent is crucial to understanding indicative conditionals. However, unlike Jackson, it denies that the truth value of an indicative conditional is given by the corresponding material conditional. To begin with are the difficulties that embedded conditionals (i.e. conditionals which have conditional antecedents and/or consequents) present to Jackson. Jackson is aware that embedded conditionals present problems to his approach, and argues that ‘If A then (if B then C)’ is regarded by English users as interchangeable with ‘If (A and B) then C’. Since the latter contains no embedded conditionals, the problem is avoided. However, the proposed solution fails to generalize in satisfactory ways to connectives like ‘but’ and ‘even’. In addition, Jackson's approach to conditionals is restricted to conditionals used to make assertions, and does not readily generalize to conditionals used in other kinds of speech acts. The response to the difficulties with taking the material conditional as giving the truth conditions for the indicative conditional is not to seek an alternative, more satisfactory account of the truth conditions of indicative conditionals; rather, the chapter endorses the ‘no truth conditions’ position originally proposed by Ernest Adams.
Conditionals: A Debate with Jackson
Authors: Priest Graham 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter presents a number of concerns about Jackson's approach to conditionals. The first section discusses the view defended by Frank Jackson in his book Conditionals; it describes his account and notes some of its shortcomings. There are good reasons for doing this. Views of the kind defended there are, if not orthodox, still very common. And Jackson defends the view in, arguably, its most cogent form. The second section sketches a rather different account, which avoids these shortcomings. It proposes a general framework for an account of conditionals, one that leaves plenty of parameters to be adjusted for fine tuning.
Organisms and the Unity of Science
Authors: Guyer Paul 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
There is tension between Kant's hopes for the unity of science and his argument in a number of works that the life is incompatible with the principle of inertia, thus that organisms cannot be integrated into physics. This chapter argues that Kant was trying to resolve this tension in his incomplete Opus postumum by extending his transcendental idealist solution to the problem of human freedom, according to which human actions are causally determined as phenomena although free as noumena, to organisms, which would thus be conceived of from two points of view: as both causally determined, as required by the principle of inertia, but also purposive, which is purportedly incompatible with that principle.
Kant's Deductions of the Principles of Right
Authors: Guyer Paul 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter argues against a number of recent claims that Kant's ‘universal principle of right’ in his political and juridical philosophy is supposed to be independent of the fundamental assumptions of his moral philosophy. It argues rather that the universal principle of right, which requires that everyone be granted the maximum freedom of external action compatible with a like freedom for everyone else, is supposed to be derived from the absolute value of freedom in general, which is also the foundation of the fundamental principle of morality. This is so even though there are specific ways in which, for Kant, the principles of right are ‘analytic’ rather than ‘synthetic’; specifically they do not prescribe specific ends that are also duties, as ethical principles do.
From Nature to Morality: Kant's New Argument in the ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment’
Authors: Guyer Paul 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter argues that the ‘Critique of Teleological Judgment’ in the Critique of the Power of Judgment complements Kant's earlier argument, on practical grounds, that the possibility of the highest good requires postulating the harmony of the laws of nature and the moral law with a new argument that an expectation of the systematicity of nature as a whole (that follows from our experience of organisms) requires the identification of a final end for the system of nature, which can only be the realization of human freedom in accordance with the moral law. Kant thus argues that our experience of nature as well as the demands of morality leads us to a conception of the harmony between nature and morality.
The international framework of fisheries management
Authors: Churchill Robin R. , Owen Daniel 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter discusses what is meant by, and what is involved in, fisheries management. Topics covered include the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Compliance Agreement, FAO's Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and International Plans of Action, regional fisheries management organizations, and importing environmental issues into fisheries management.
Fisheries management in Community waters
Authors: Churchill Robin R. , Owen Daniel 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter examines the legal regime governing the management of fisheries in Community waters, i.e., those waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of EC Member States. An initial issue is the question of how far the competence to adopt management measures for Community waters falls within the competence of the EC, and how far within the competence of Member States. It considers in turn total allowable catches (TACs) and quotas, effort management, technical measures, Member States' delegated powers, access to fishing grounds, the nationality of fishing vessels, enforcement, and capacity adjustment. It also discusses fishing by Third State vessels in Community waters, and the reform of the EC system of fisheries management.
The common organization of the markets in fishery products
Authors: Churchill Robin R. , Owen Daniel 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter addresses the common organization of the markets in fishery products. After an introduction to its legal basis and objectives, it considers the subject matter of the common organization of the markets. It then proceeds through the various areas covered by the common organization — including common marketing standards, consumer information, producer organizations, interbranch organizations, and prices and intervention — and ends with a section on enforcement and some conclusions.
Aquaculture
Authors: Churchill Robin R. , Owen Daniel 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter discusses matters in respect of which aquaculture may require regulation. These include: (a) requiring authorization for the establishment and operation of an aquaculture installation; (b) preventing and controlling disease in aquaculture installations; (c) regulating possible pollution damage to, or resulting from, aquaculture; (d) controlling the use of alien or genetically modified species in aquaculture; (e) marketing and trade; (f) tuna farming; and (g) public financial assistance for aquaculture.
Testimony and Trustworthiness
Authors: Lehrer Keith 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter discusses the relationship between testimony, trustworthiness, and reliability. Simply believing the testimony of another, as Reid notes, is a natural inclination. However, a person must evaluate the trustworthiness of others in order to evaluate their testimony and decide whether one is justified in accepting it. Without such evaluation, testimony fails to convert to knowledge. However, there is a problem about the evaluation of trustworthiness of others. Such evaluation depends on accepting that one is trustworthy in evaluating others. But one's evaluation of the trustworthiness of oneself is conditioned on the testimony of others concerning one's very trustworthiness. The way out of the difficulty is to see, contrary to Schmitt's interpretation of Lehrer, that trustworthiness does not entail reliability, and to appreciate the virtue of an explanatory loop of trustworthiness in justification and knowledge.
Testimonial Justification and Transindividual Reasons
Authors: Schmitt Frederick F. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter defends the view that testimonially justified belief is social in the sense that in some cases it depends on the testifier's possessing good reasons for the belief. It is clearly too strong to say that one is justified in believing a proposition on the basis of the testimony of a testifier T only if T has good reason to believe the proposition. For one might be justified in believing it on T's testimony because one mistakenly though justifiably believes that T has good reason to believe it. Despite this, this chapter defends qualified social claims about testimonially justified belief. Two contrary views of testimonial justification are considered and briefly criticized: Tyler Burge's account of a priori prima facie entitlement to believe putative assertions we seem to understand, and David Owens' view that testimonial justification depends on the epistemic responsibility of the testifier. The chapter closes with two questions about the implications of the social claims for the basing relation.