bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Chapter 4 Globalization and Invasive Alien Species: Trade, Pests, and Pathogens
Authors: Perrings Charles , Fenichel Eli , Kinzig Ann 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThe risk posed by an introduced species depends on a number of factors, some of which are within the control of regulatory authorities and some of which are not. It is a product of the probability that imports will introduce new species and the expected damage done by those species. Among the risk factors taken as exogenous by the regulatory authorities are the invasiveness of the species itself (whether it is a generalist or a specialist, its plasticity, and so on), the bioclimatic similarity between the trading partners, the volume and composition of trade, and the vulnerability of the host (economic and ecological) system. The sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures taken by the exporter may or may not be taken as exogenous. These together determine both the likelihood that a unit of trade will introduce species of different types and the expected damage if a particular species (or class of species) is introduced. This chapter focuses on the nature of the SPS response to the invasive species risks of international trade, and the effect this has on the dispersion of species. More particularly, it asks what determines current country-level decisions to mitigate the risks of species introductions or to adapt to the consequences of establishment and spread, and how these are reflected in the dispersion data.
Chapter 6 Habitats and Land Use as Determinants of Plant Invasions in the Temperate Zone of Europe
Authors: Pyšek Petr , Chytrý Milan , Jarošík Vojtĕch 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter reviews studies dealing with invasions in habitats and, by using an extensive dataset from the Czech Republic, demonstrates differences between the level of invasion (defined as the actual representation of alien species) and invasibility (defined as the inherent vulnerability of habitats to invasion). Individual habitats are classified according to these two measures, and the relative importance of factors that determine both the level of invasion and invisibility is explored. Two traditional groups of European aliens are considered in the analyses, distinguished on the basis of residence time: archaeophytes (arrived before 1500 AD, mainly from the Middle East and Mediterranean), and neophytes (arrived after 1500 AD, mainly from North America and Asia). Finally, the potential for application of the knowledge of invasion in individual habitats is discussed, and possibilities of using it in risk assessment outlined.
Chapter 12 The Impact of Invasive Alien Species on Ecosystem Services and Human Well‐being
Authors: Pejchar Liba , Mooney Harold 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter reviews the literature to understand the significance of making decisions about the prevention and/or control of invasive alien species (IAS) that ignore impacts on ecosystem services. It reports damage costs associated with IAS in monetary terms. The costs presented for various provisioning, regulating, and cultural services may be roughly comparable since most of the literature mostly clusters around the early 2000s. Whether damage costs of any magnitude will change the way IAS is managed will naturally depend on the benefits of the activities that lead to the introduction and spread of each species. Identifying potential damage costs and estimating their magnitude is a positive first step towards properly accounting for the full impact of IAS.
Chapter 13 Current and Future Consequences of Invasion by Alien Species: A Case Study from South Africa
Authors: Wilgen B.W. van , Richardson D.M. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter reviews what is known about those invasive alien species that impact on the terrestrial, freshwater, and marine ecosystems of South Africa. It briefly reviews the pathways by which these species have arrived, how these pathways have changed over time, and how many have become invasive. It then considers the current levels of understanding with respect to impacts, both ecological and economic. This is followed by an account of the prognosis for the growth in these impacts should current trends continue.
Chapter 15 Prevention: Designing and Implementing National Policy and Management Programs to Reduce the Risks from Invasive Species
Authors: Keller Reuben P. , Lodge David M. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter describes and critically evaluates the ‘state-of-the-art’ for national policy and management efforts designed to prevent the arrival of invasive species. Preventing the introduction of invasive species will almost always be less costly than managing and adapting to species once they arrive. Although this is widely recognized by biologists and economists, only a handful of countries have embraced this approach in their policies for environmental invaders. As nations work to meet their obligations under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), it is likely that the number of countries with programs for preventing invasive species will grow.
Love, Friendship, and the Self
Authors: Helm Bennett W. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractRecent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are self-determining and autonomous, where these are understood to be capacities we exercise most fully on our own, apart from others, whose influence on us tends to undermine that autonomy. This book argues that we must reject a strongly individualistic conception of persons if we are to make sense of significant interpersonal relationships and the importance they can have in our lives. It presents a new account of love as intimate identification and of friendship as a kind of plural agency, in each case grounding and analyzing these notions in terms of interpersonal emotions. At the centre of this account is an analysis of how our emotional connectedness with others is essential to our very capacities for autonomy and self-determination: we are rational and autonomous only because of and through our inherently social nature. By focusing on the role that relationships of love and friendship have, both in the initial formation of our selves and in the on-going development and maturation of adult persons, the book significantly alters our understanding of persons and the kind of psychology we persons have as moral and social beings.
Introduction
Authors: Helm Bennett W. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis introductory chapter begins by defining the meaning of the terms ‘love’ and ‘friendship’ followed by a discussion of the importance of a philosophical account of love and friendship. It divides the most prominent accounts of love into three basic types (love as union, as robust concern, and as valuing), showing how each implicitly presupposes the egocentric conception of personal concerns or the cognitive-conative divide. It is ultimately these presuppositions that lead the union and robust concern accounts to an unsatisfactory account of the kind of intimacy that love involves. Accounts of love that accept the cognitive-conative divide, including accounts of love as valuing, force us to choose — unacceptably’ between rejecting the idea that love can be justified for better or worse reasons and rejecting the idea that our loves are central to who we are and so are partly a matter for self-determination. Finally, the chapter examines the nature of friendship and social action, arguing that alternative accounts of friendship are unable to make sense of the distinctively social relationship that it is because they implicitly presuppose the individualistic conception of autonomy, for it is only by giving up on this presupposition that we can make sense of the kind of social shared activity and shared lives that are possible within friendship. An overview of the subsequent chapters is presented.
Values: Loving Oneself
Authors: Helm Bennett W. 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that an account of valuing should be modeled on the account of caring provided: valuing (the evaluative attitude) and values (the relevant kind of import) are constituted by a projectible, rational pattern of felt evaluations and evaluative judgments. The difference between values and cares lies in the distinctive kind of felt evaluations and evaluative judgments at issue in each. In particular, valuing is constituted by a pattern of emotions like pride and shame, for it is these emotions that serve to identify one with their objects, thereby making sense of the intuitive ‘depth’ of values. Establishing this thesis will require providing an account not merely of pride and shame but also of the more general kind of which these are instances, such that a projectible pattern of felt evaluations of this kind is intelligible as constitutive of values.
The Possibility of Partial Definition
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThe chapter rebuts arguments against the view that partial definition for predicates is impossible, in the sense of partial definition in which it leads to sentences that cannot correctly be characterized as true, or as not true. Next, it gives a positive account of how partially-defined predicates might arise. After context sensitivity is added to the model, the resulting predicates are compared to, and contrasted with, vague predicates in natural language. A strategy is suggested for treating apparent penumbral truths of concern to theories of vagueness, and for explaining why instances of some logical laws seem transparently to be true (when according to these theories, they are, in fact, undefined); whereas instances of other logical laws lack the appearance of undeniable truth.
Vagueness and Second‐Level Indeterminacy
Authors: Eklund Matti 
Published: May 2010

AbstractMany theorists of vagueness take vagueness to be bound up with indeterminacy in a way that conflicts with classical logic and bivalence. Others, epistemicists like Timothy Williamson, hold that the only indeterminacy bound up with vagueness is epistemic — vagueness is just bound up with a certain kind of ignorance — and that vagueness does not conflict with classical logic and bivalence. Both types of view face well-known problems. This chapter presents a view on vagueness that sidesteps them. Let a sentence be first-level indeterminate if there are acceptable assignments of semantic values under which it lacks a classical, determinate truth-value; and let a sentence be second-level indeterminate if it has different truth-values under different assignments of semantic values. What this chapter proposes is that vagueness is primarily bound up with second-level indeterminacy, rather than first-level indeterminacy. In the course of defending this proposal, the chapter compares it to supervaluationism, which superficially can appear similar.
Vagueness as Indeterminacy
Authors: Weatherson Brian 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that a term is vague if it is indeterminate. As a special case of this, it argues that a predicate is vague if it has borderline cases. This was until recently the standard account of vagueness, but it has become quickly unpopular. A common objection has been that indeterminate terms with clearly demarcated boundaries of indeterminacy are not vague, and that it is better to identify vagueness in predicates with some kind of Sorites-sensitivity. Proposals of how to do this have been offered by Matti Eklund, Patrick Greenough, and Nicholas J. J. Smith. The chapter argues that this was a step backwards for several reasons. Some vague predicates are not Sorites-sensitive. And non-predicates are not Sorites-sensitive, although they can be vague. Moreover, if we have an epistemic understanding of the Sorites, then we will end up classifying some non-vague terms as vague, unless we assume that speakers know much more about the metaphysics underlying their language than they actually do.
Sorensen on Vagueness and Contradiction
Authors: Edgington Dorothy 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter discusses some themes from Roy Sorensen's book Vagueness and Contradiction. While agreeing with Sorensen that the major premise in a Sorites argument must be false, it rejects the consequences that Sorensen draws from this: that vague predicates have sharp boundaries, and that the phenomenon is to be explained in terms of ‘truthmaker gaps’. It is argued that ‘gappy’ theories of a variety of kinds, including McGee and McLaughlin's theory, misrepresent the phenomenon of vagueness. Further, some of the problems Sorensen raises disappear on a degree-theoretic approach to vagueness.
Vagaries about Vagueness
Authors: Salmon Nathan 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter distinguishes two approaches to vagueness. The vagueness-in-language approach sees the world as exact, and all vagueness as inherent in our means of representing the world. By contrast, the vagueness-in-the-world approach sees the world itself as fuzzy, in the sense that for some things and some attributes of things, there is allegedly no fact of the matter whether those things possess or lack those attributes. The former approach is criticized on several grounds. The vagueness-in-language approach is either incoherent or collapses into vagueness-in-the-world. A recent objection to direct-reference theory, based upon the criticized approach, is shown to be fundamentally mistaken.
Agnosticism and Vagueness
Authors: Rosenkranz Sven 
Published: May 2010

AbstractEpistemicism incorporates the thesis that vague discourse is governed by classical logic and bivalence. This classicist thesis has implications for the theory of reference. A natural response to the Sorites is that the classicist thesis should be rejected unless it is shown how those theoretical commitments can be redeemed. If this cannot be shown directly by appeal to the mechanisms of reference determination, epistemicism can only hope to be warranted indirectly by elimination of alternatives. Failure to achieve the former invites agnosticism about the existence of sharp boundaries. If such an agnosticism yields a coherent account of borderline cases and sustains a non-classical solution to the Sorites, this will also imply failure to achieve the latter. But then agnosticism about sharp boundaries is vindicated and epistemicism must be rejected. This chapter argues for this conclusion by devising an agnostic account of vagueness and by showing that epistemicism fails on both counts.
This Magic Moment: Horwich on the Boundaries of Vague Terms
Authors: Field Hartry 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues that the counter-intuitive aspects of the epistemic theory of vagueness run deeper than is sometimes appreciated, and that Horwich's variant of epistemicism does not help with them. It considers the suggestion that we escape the problems with the epistemic theory by weakening the law of excluded middle as applied to vague language. It argues that standard ‘fuzzy logics’ are ultimately of no help with vagueness because they generate operators that draw sharp lines. But there are alternative ‘fuzzy logics’ that avoid these problems. Moreover, there are intuitive connections between the semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of vagueness, and the fuzzy logics that avoid sharp lines seem to be just the ones that are compatible with making True() equivalent to p even in face of the semantic paradoxes. This chapter tentatively recommends treating vagueness and the semantic paradoxes together, using the same non-classical logic for both.
The Sorites, Linguistic Preconceptions, and the Dual Picture of Vagueness
Authors: Gómez‐Torrente Mario 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter postulates that the extension of a degree adjective is fixed by implicitly accepted non-analytic reference-fixing principles (‘preconceptions’) that combine appeals to paradigmatic cases with generic principles designed to expand the extension of the adjective beyond the paradigmatic range. In regular occasions of use, the paradigm and generic preconceptions are jointly satisfied and determine the existence of an extension/anti-extension pair dividing the adjective's comparison class into two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive subclasses. Sorites paradoxical occasions of use are irregular occasions of use in which the paradigm and generic preconceptions are not jointly satisfied. In them, the relevant degree adjective lacks an extension, and utterances of sentences containing it appearing in Sorites arguments do not have truth conditions. The chapter also postulates a probable psychology of paradigm intuitions, used in a psychological explanation of the preference for solutions of the Sorites paradox on which paradigm preconceptions retain their intuitive truth-values.
Hold the Context Fixed—Vagueness Still Remains
Authors: Åkerman Jonas , Greenough Patrick 
Published: May 2010

AbstractContextualism about vagueness is the view that vagueness consists in a particular species of context-sensitivity, and that accommodating this fact will yield a plausible solution to the Sorites paradox. As many commentators have noted, this view faces the following objection: if the context is held fixed, vagueness still remains, therefore vagueness is not a species of context-sensitivity. This chapter sketches two replies to this objection, which result in two very different kinds of contextualism.
Saying More (or Less) Than One Thing
Authors: Iacona Andrea 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter is based on the idea that there is an important sense in which the things we say may involve a degree of specificity that goes beyond what we have in mind when we say them. In that sense, the things we say are interpretations of the sentences we use that are sufficiently specific for the purpose of ascribing truth or falsity to those sentences. This chapter explains how the relation between logic and natural language can be elucidated on the basis of this idea, and shows how some fundamental issues concerning vagueness can be handled accordingly.
How to Respond to Borderline Cases
Authors: López De Sa Dan 
Published: May 2010

AbstractSome philosophers seem to think that borderline cases provide further cases of apparent faultless disagreement. This chapter argues against such a suggestion. It contends that with respect to borderline cases, people typically do not respond by taking a view, in contrast to what is the case in genuine cases of apparent faultless disagreement. It shows that the claim of the chapter is indeed respected, and is accounted for by paradigm cases of semantic and epistemic views on the nature of vagueness. It is also argued that this claim turns out to be, initial appearances notwithstanding, compatible with other claims in the literature; to the effect that in appropriate circumstances, there are indeed, or there might well be, ‘macho’, admissible, forced, and hesitant responses to borderline cases.
Scope Confusions and Unsatisfiable Disjuncts: Two Problems for Supervaluationism
Authors: Graff Fara Delia 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter considers two problems for supervaluationist accounts of vagueness. First is that the best (canonical-supervaluationist) explanation of our inclination to accept Sorites premises attributes to us a tendency to confuse the scopes of a Truth operator with the existential quantifier. This explanation is shown to be incorrect as well as incomplete. Second, a well-known complaint against supervaluation semantics is that it allows for a disjunction to be true even though none of its disjuncts is in fact true. A new, related complaint is developed: supervaluation semantics allows for a disjunction to be true even though none of its disjuncts could be true.
Indeterminacy and Truth Value Gaps
Authors: Richard Mark 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter argues for the following theses. There are perfectly possible meanings (ones of a sort one would think are possessed by many vague predicates) which would necessitate a predicate's being gappy. Many arguments against the coherence of truth value gaps depend on a very narrow picture of saying, which ignores the possibility of such things as sui generis denial. Frege/Geach objections to things like sui generis denial dissolve once we observe that ‘not’ and other sentence compounding devices lead a double life, sometimes contributing to sense, sometimes to force. There is a simple compositional story about how (for instance) embedding a denial operator within a ‘force conditional’ makes if not A, then B fit to perform a sort of speech act which, when combined with B's denial, commits one to the aptness of asserting A. The trisection thesis — predicates trisect their domains into three groups, those they are true of, those they are false of, and the rest — is correct. The objection to the trisection thesis —that it is inconsistent with the idea that there are no sharp boundaries in a Sorites series — is not compelling: there is no conception of a ‘sharp boundary’ on which it's plausible, both that there are no sharp boundaries in a Sorites series, and that trisection involves the creation of sharp boundaries. Once we recognize that talk of indeterminacy is contrastive, we also recognize that higher order vagueness is not inconsistent with trisection. We also, once we think of indeterminacy as contrastive, come to see that indeterminacy itself is indeterminate: if it is indeterminate whether p, that indeterminacy itself is not something that is settled, but is itself indeterminate.
Demoting Higher‐Order Vagueness
Authors: Raffman Diana 
Published: May 2010

AbstractHigher-order vagueness is widely thought to be a feature of vague predicates that any adequate theory of vagueness must accommodate. It takes a variety of forms. Perhaps the most familiar is the supposed existence, or at least possibility, of higher-order borderline cases: borderline borderline cases, borderline borderline borderline cases, and so forth. A second form of higher-order vagueness, what this chapter calls ‘prescriptive’ higher-order vagueness, is thought to characterize complex predicates constructed from vague predicates by attaching operators having to do with the predicates' proper application. For example, the predicates ‘mandates application of old’ and ‘can competently be called old’ are prescriptively higher-order vague. Higher-order vagueness appears in other guises as well, but these two have been of particular interest to philosophers and are the target here. This chapter exposes some misconceptions about them, and shows that higher-order vagueness is less prevalent and less important theoretically than is usually supposed.
Sensory Hedonism about Happiness
Authors: Feldman Fred 
Published: May 2010

AbstractBentham, Mill, and Sidgwick say things that strongly suggest sensory hedonism about happiness. This is the view that a person's level of happiness is equal to the total amount of sensory pleasure he is feeling at that moment, minus the total amount of sensory pain he is feeling at that moment. Daniel Haybron presented a series of arguments against sensory hedonism about happiness. These arguments are explained and criticized. More successful arguments against sensory hedonism are then presented. One of these is based on the case of the New Mother. At the moment when she gives birth the New Mother (a) is experiencing very severe sensory pain (and no sensory pleasure) but at the same time (b) is profoundly happy. Thus, a person's level of happiness at a time cannot be identified with the net amount of sensory pleasure she is feeling at that time.