bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Autonomy
Authors: Griffin James 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
According to the personhood account, human rights are protections of our normative agency. Normative agency has stages. The first stage is autonomy, which consists in our assessing options and thereby forming a conception of a worthwhile life. To form and then to pursue that conception, we need various kinds of support: life itself of course, a certain level of health, certain physical and mental capacities, a certain amount of education, and so on. These are referred to as ‘minimum provision’. These are not enough for agency if others then stop us; we must also be free to pursue that conception. This is called ‘liberty’. All human rights will then come under one or other of these three overarching headings: autonomy, welfare, and liberty. And those three can be seen as constituting a trio of highest-level human rights. This chapter discusses the distinction between autonomy and liberty, the value of autonomy, the content of the right to autonomy, and autonomy and free will.
Analysis, Description, and the A Priori?
Authors: Blackburn Simon 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter is an expanded version of a review of Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics that the author wrote for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy. It attempts to sketch the essence of Jackson's approach to metaphysics and ethics, and to indicate some of the places where it is surprising and, inevitably, controversial. It focuses on the ‘analytic descriptivism’, or the ‘a priori passage principle’ that Jackson stands by, generating ‘the view that for each true statement concerning our world, there is a statement in physical terms that a priori entails that statement’ (Jackson 2003).
Serious Metaphysics: Frank Jackson's Defense of Conceptual Analysis
Authors: Lycan William G. 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
According to Stich and Weinberg, Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics is, by a long shot, the most sophisticated defence of the use of conceptual analysis in philosophy that has ever been offered. The author agrees but the book is also very difficult. This chapter explores the book's three main chapters, trying to clarify its basic notions and its argument, and taking issue where the author sees fit.
Jackson's Classical Model of Meaning
Authors: Schroeter Laura , Bigelow John 
Published: May 2010

AbstractJackson often writes as if his account of public language meanings in terms of descriptivist conventions were just plain common sense. How else are we to explain how different speakers manage to communicate using a public language? And how else can we explain how individuals arrive at confident judgments about the reference of their words in hypothetical scenarios? This chapter shows just how controversial the psychological assumptions behind Jackson's semantic theory really are. First, it explains how Jackson's theory goes well beyond the commonsense platitudes he cites in its defence. Second, it sketches an alternative explanation of those platitudes, the improvisation model of meaning, which seems psychologically more realistic. The chapter concludes that the psychological picture presupposed by Jackson's semantic theory stands in need of a more substantial defence than he has so far offered.
Jackson's Change of Mind: Representationalism, a Priorism and the Knowledge Argument
Authors: Van Gulick Robert 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
Few arguments in the recent philosophy of mind have generated as much discussion or controversy as Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument (KA), and none has had a more surprising history. Having offered the KA in 1983 and ably defended it for fifteen years against a wide variety of objections, Jackson did an about-face in 1998 and disavowed it. His rejection of the argument is essentially coupled with the acceptance of another controversial if widely held view, namely the Representational Theory of Consciousness or at least of Conscious Sensory Experience (RTS), which he regards as the sole means to defeat the KA and avoid the cognitive illusion that generates its intuitive appeal. This chapter begins by briefly reviewing objections to the KA. It considers where, if anywhere, Jackson's own present critical view fits in the logical geography of options. It then turns to the question of whether the RTS is in fact either necessary or sufficient for refuting the KA.
The ‘Actual’ in Actualism
Authors: Driver Julia 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
The work of Frank Jackson has been important to at least two central debates in consequentialist ethical theory: (1) between possibilism and actualism and (2) between objective consequentialism and expectabilism (or a variety of subjective consequentialism). Suppose that we define the right action as that action which maximizes the good. Some writers, such as Michael Slote, have argued that this straightforward criterion is underdetermined. Are we to maximize ‘actual’ good or ‘expected’ good? That is the debate between the objective consequentialist and the subjective consequentialist. There is also the issue of whether or not the agent who is deliberating considers what would be best given what will happen as opposed to what could or can happen. That is the debate between the actualist and the possibilist in determining relevant options for the moral agent to consider in deliberation. This chapter explores differing answers to both of these questions, and then explores one strategy for answering both — a strategy which has been very much influenced by the work of Frank Jackson. Though the author agrees with Jackson on actualism, it disagrees with him on expectabilism. It is argued that the definition of ‘right action’ is clear and not at all underdetermined — the right action just is the action that maximizes the good, the actual good. But what is often confusing is that the semantics of right is confused with an issue in the epistemology of right — that is the issue of determining how we are to go about doing the best that we can properly.
Kant's System of Nature and Freedom
Authors: Guyer Paul 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
The chapters in the first part of this book explore Kant's conception of the systematicity of concepts and laws as the ultimate goals of natural science, explore the implications of Kant's account of our experience of organisms for the goal of a unified science, and examine Kant's attempt to prove the existence of an ether as the condition of the possibility of experience of the physical world. The second group of chapters explore Kant's conception of a systematic union of persons as ends in themselves and of their particular ends as the object of morality, and examine his conception of the systems of political and ethical duties necessary to achieve such an end. The third group of chapters examine Kant's attempt to unify the systems of nature and freedom through a radical transformation of traditional teleology.
Reason and Reflective Judgment: Kant on the Significance of Systematicity
Authors: Guyer Paul 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter argues that Kant's reassignment of the regulative principles of scientific inquiry from the faculty of reason (in the Critique of Pure Reason) to the faculty of reflective judgment (in the Critique of the Power of Judgment) reflects his recognition that systematicity is a necessary condition for scientific knowledge, not a desideratum additional to scientific knowledge, even though it remains, as in the first Critique, a regulative ideal.
Kant on the Systematicity of Nature:Two Puzzles
Authors: Guyer Paul 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter argues that, particularly in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant treats the postulation of the systematicity of nature as a ‘transcendental’ and not merely ‘logical’ principle because he has come to regard systematicity not just as a heuristic assumption for the easier discovery of empirical laws of nature, but as the basis for the assumption of the necessary truth of such laws. It also explores the tension between Kant's posit of necessity for laws of nature and the requirement of apparent contingency for the experience of beauty, even though both are supposed to be products of reflective judgment.
Purpose in Nature: What is Living and What is Dead in Kant's Teleology?
Authors: Guyer Paul 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter argues that the necessity of Kant's regulative but still teleological approach to the investigation of organic nature has been put in question by subsequent developments in biological science, but that his vision of nature as the arena for the realization of human morality suggests valuable moral constraints on the human treatment of our natural environment.
The EC Common Fisheries Policy
Authors: Churchill Robin , Owen Daniel 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is one of the longest established and more controversial of the common policies of the EC. It deals principally with the management of fishery resources, relations between the EC and third States in fisheries matters, the marketing of and trade in fishery products, financial assistance to the fisheries sector, and aquaculture. However, the CFP is not just a matter for those with an economic interest in fisheries. It also raises many issues of more general concern, such as the capacity of the EC and its member states to manage important natural resources sustainably, the impact of fishing on the wider marine environment, and relations between developed and developing states. This book addresses the CFP from a legal perspective. It provides a detailed account of the very large body of EC law comprising the CFP, and draws on the European Commission's associated documents to aid interpretation and add context. As a result, the book will be of value to anyone wanting knowledge of the law of the CFP. Although not addressing the Commission's 2009 Green Paper on reform of the CFP, the book should provide a reference point against which to view the reform of parts of the CFP that is anticipated to take place over the next few years.
The scope of the Common Fisheries Policy
Authors: Churchill Robin R. , Owen Daniel 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter addresses the scope of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) from three angles. After a brief introduction, it looks at the species and products covered by the CFP, known as the ‘material scope’. Then it considers the CFP's geographical scope, i.e., the land and maritime areas to which the CFP applies. Thirdly, it addresses the ‘personal scope’ of the CFP, meaning the various entities to which the CFP applies. Although the chapter focuses on the EC Treaty, it also considers the potential effects of the Treaty of Lisbon on the CFP's material and geographical scope.
Public expenditure in the fisheries sector
Authors: Churchill Robin R. , Owen Daniel 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter addresses public expenditure in the fisheries sector. It deals first with two EC financial instruments: the European Fisheries Fund (EFF) and Regulation 861/2006. The latter is complementary in purpose to the EFF and is sometimes referred to as ‘the second fisheries instrument’, i.e., second to the EFF. The EFF and Regulation 861/2006 are not the only sources of EC funding for the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). A further important source is the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF). The EAGF funds the market intervention system (i.e., permanent withdrawal, ‘carry-over’, ‘private storage’, and the ‘compensatory allowance’ for tuna producers) as well as providing some other funding to producer organizations. Some other Community financial instruments provide support in connection with fisheries, albeit not under the CFP. After dealing with the EFF and Regulation 861/2006, the chapter moves on to consider State aid, i.e., aid granted by Member States to the fishing industry other than in conjunction with funds from any EC financial instrument.
Testimony, Credulity, and Veracity
Authors: Audi Robert 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter concerns the nature of testimony, its relation to belief, justification, and knowledge, and its status as a source of all three. It argues that testimony-based beliefs are non-inferential and, in that special sense, psychologically basic. Some of those non-inferential beliefs also constitute basic knowledge. Testimony is not, however, a basic source of knowledge. It has a kind of dependence on perception that precludes this. Testimony is also a source of justification, though it is non-basic for justification as well as for knowledge; but the chapter indicates some ways in which its role in giving us justification differs from its role in giving us knowledge. These and other ideas are then developed in comparison with Thomas Reid's theory of testimony. The chapter finally shows how testimony differs from such basic sources of knowledge and justification as perception and reason, but is nonetheless essential for human knowledge as we know it.
Reid on the Credit of Human Testimony
Authors: Van Cleve James 
Published: May 2010

AbstractThis chapter explores the analogy proposed by Thomas Reid between testimony and sense perception. It begins by trying to arrive at a correct understanding of the two principles he identifies as fundamental to our acquiring information from others: the principles of veracity and credulity. Next, it investigates the similarities Reid finds between perception and testimony considered as mechanisms of belief formation. Finally, it investigates whether the analogy between perception and testimony can be extended from psychology into epistemology. In particular, it discusses whether beliefs based on testimony, like beliefs based on sense perception, may be regarded as epistemologically basic or foundational. It concludes that although Reid's answer is yes (testimonial fundamentalism), the correct answer is no (testimonial reductionism).
Truth, Thought, Reason
Authors: Burge Tyler 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This book is made up of an introductory chapter, ten historical/philosophical chapters on Frege, and four postscripts to the chapters. The topics are divided into the three areas of the book's title: (1) Frege's work on truth, which includes his revolutionary insights into linguistic and cognitive structure, into the nature of truth conditions, and into philosophical method in using logic to frame and clarify philosophical problems; (2) his work on cognition, which uses linguistic structure not as a focus but as a starting point; and (3) his defense and development of knowledge based on reason, principally knowledge in logic and mathematics.
Frege (1991)
Authors: BURGE TYLER 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This introductory chapter begins with a brief discussion of how Gottlob Frege's name and work remain unknown to the wider intellectual public. It then describes Frege's contributions to philosophy, including concentration on language in the expression of knowledge and a recognition of the power of logic to illuminate the structure of language and its contribution to the expression of knowledge. It shows how Frege's positivist successors used his innovations against a background of philosophical attitudes that Frege did not share. They differed with him, in absolutely fundamental ways, about both meaning and knowledge. The chapter make some more specific philosophical remarks about Frege's contributions, as discussed in these three parts: truth, structure, and method; sense and cognitive value; and rationalism.
The Concept of Truth in Frege's Program (1984)
Authors: BURGE TYLER 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter provides a brief overview of the role of Frege's concept of truth in his logicist program. It discusses the argument in Frege that gave rise to the Church–Gödel ‘slingshot’ argument: his own argument for the view that the denotation of a sentence is its truth-value. The chapter also discusses Frege's reason for taking the truth-value truth to be the logical object that he took it to be. It concludes with a rebuttal of Dummett's criticism of Frege's taking sentences to denote truth, and maintains that Frege motivated his view by reference to the role of truth in being an aim of judgment and assertion.
Frege on Truth (1986)
Authors: BURGE TYLER 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter shows that Frege's argument that sentences have truth values as their Bedeutungen (denotations) depends on his composition principle for denotation and on his view of the theoretically most important feature of sentences that functionally depends on their denotations. Frege's argument is contrasted with the Church–Gödel argument and with Russell's view of the semantical values of sentences. Frege's view that predicates are literally functional expressions, his account of the incompleteness (unsaturatedness) of predicate expressions, his attempt to clarify the notion of an extension of a concept, and his redundancy view of truth are discussed as grounds for his claim that truth values are literally logical objects. Frege's pragmatic view of theory-building is emphasized throughout. The chapter rebuts Dummett's claim that Frege's claim that truth values are denotations of sentences is an ‘almost unmitigated disaster’. In particular, Dummett's claim that Frege lost track of the distinction between sentences (which are the vehicles of assertion) and singular terms (which are not) in his logical theory is shown to be false, even of Frege's formal language. Although Frege's claims that predicates denote functions and that truth values are objects are rejected, these claims are much more pragmatically motivated and much less momentous than most commentary assumes. Frege's account of which logical objects the truth values are to be identified with is shown to be thoroughly motivated, and not merely a stipulation. Truth is the basic logical object in Frege's system.
Sinning Against Frege (1979)
Authors: BURGE TYLER 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
Frege's claims about indexicals, and to a lesser extent proper names, makes it clear that his notion of sense is different from what is now ordinarily understood as linguistic meaning; both communal and idiolectic linguistic meaning. This difference derives from his interest in language as an expression of thought, not in the rules governing linguistic usage and linguistic understanding. A large number of authors and translators are criticized for assimilating Frege's notion of sense to linguistic meaning. Frege's views on names are shown to be capable of resisting some, but not all, of the criticisms leveled against them by Kripke and others. This chapter maintains that the right way to criticize Frege on proper names and indexicals is to criticize his theory of thought, not his understanding of natural language. The weakness in his theory of thought is that he takes all thought components to be eternal and independent of any occurrences in space and time for being the thought components that they are. Elements in thought that are occurrence-based are needed to account for certain de re propositional attitudes.
Frege on Sense and Linguistic Meaning (1990)
Authors: BURGE TYLER 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
While Frege's notion of sense fathered contemporary notions of linguistic meaning, key elements in Frege's conceptions have disappeared from view. Some of these elements are those brought out in ‘Sinning Against Frege’ (1979). Others derive from Frege's rationalism. This chapter discusses an interpretative puzzle. The puzzle centers on Frege's saying both that the most expert mathematicians may lack a sharp grasp of mathematical expressions and that such expressions nevertheless have a denotation (Bedeutung), hence a definite sense that determines a denotation. It is argued that for Frege, the cognitive value of a sense expressed by language is not exhausted by any type of linguistic meaning that is associated with actual linguistic usage or linguistic understanding, by an individual or a community. Frege believes that the sense of an expression can transcend what any actual user understands by the expression. Senses are partly individuated by rational structures, grounded in logical reality, that may not be completely understood by a thinker at any given time, but that help to individuate what it is to have a mind. The chapter discusses what Frege means by grasping or understanding a sense. Although Frege believed in a priori rational insight, he grounded it — much more clearly than his rationalist predecessors did — on the development of a true mathematical theory; and he conceived theory development with the pragmatism of a practicing mathematician. Frege's rationalism thus contrasts with traditional rationalism, and his conception of thought is distinguished from use-based conceptions. Both points are illuminated by the distinction between Fregean sense and linguistic meaning.
Frege on Knowing the Foundation (1998)
Authors: BURGE TYLER 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
In reasoning about justification of the basic principles of logic and mathematics, Frege combined a traditional Euclidean conception with a more modern pragmatic one. In thinking of the self-evidence of axioms — understood as true, natural, starting points for justification — he strictly distinguished self-evidence from obviousness. This chapter discusses Frege's notions of axiom, self-evidence, basic truth, certainty, unprovability, and proof structure. Frege's tendency to argue for his axioms is explained not as a justification for them, but as a way of articulating a proper understanding of them; an elaboration of their self-evidence. Frege's semantical exposition of axioms and rules of inference in The Basic Laws of Arithmetic is explained in the same way. Thus, the arguments and semantical expositions are not themselves justifications, for their conclusions are self-evident: they carry their evidence or justification in themselves. Frege's more modern, pragmatic strands centre in his contextualist views about sense, his view that applications and experience with theory provide a type of justification that is significant but secondary to proof, and his strong emphasis that obviousness is neither necessary nor sufficient for self-evidence or rational certainty. The inferences involved in theory building were for Frege integral to obtaining the understanding necessary to appreciate the self-evidence and rational certainty of the basic principles of logic and mathematics.
Frege on Apriority (2000)
Authors: BURGE TYLER 
Published: May 2010

Abstract
This chapter compares Frege's conception of apriority with those of Kant and Leibniz. The oddity (indeed, mistake) in Frege's explaining apriority in terms of derivation from general laws is explained and set in context. Frege's account is shown not to be equivalent with Kant's account of apriority in terms of independence of a justification from sense experience. Frege's attempt to show that his account is compatible with Kant's is criticized. Quite apart from its not explicitly mentioning sense experience, Frege's conception of apriority is not compatible with Kant's view that a singular capacity, pure intuition, underlies many a priori truths or cognitions; in fact, all synthetic a priori truths or cognitions. Frege takes the generality of a justification's (proof's) starting point as the essential kernel of apriority. Although Frege's conception is close to Leibniz's, it dispenses with Leibniz's heavy reliance on modality. Three areas of difficulty for Frege's conception of apriority are discussed: cogito judgments, judgments in geometry, and judgments in arithmetic. In each case, the idea that there is a priori truth or cognition whose justification has an ineliminably singular element is discussed. The problems raised by cogito judgments and judgments in arithmetic are taken to be serious threats to Frege's view that apriority is to be explained in terms of derivation from general propositions. The chapter article concludes by recommending the Kantian idea of fundamentally singular a priori cognition, without resting the idea on the Kantian notion of pure sensible intuition.