bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Kant's Practical Justification of Freedom
Authors: Allison Henry E. 
Published: September 2012

AbstractAfter providing a brief account of what Kant understands by a practical justification and the various types of it found in his writings, the essay examines the ways in which Kant attempts to provide a practical justification of freedom in various texts, chiefly the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. Its main focus is on the tension between Kant's attempt in the former work to ground the necessity of presupposing freedom in our conception of ourselves as rational agents, independently of any specifically moral considerations, and his view in the latter that, “[H]ad not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we should never consider ourselves justified in assuming such a thing as freedom” (KpV 5: 4n). The tension is resolved by linking the former with freedom as spontaneity and the latter with freedom as autonomy.
Is theCritique of Judgment“Post‐Critical”?
Authors: Allison Henry E. 
Published: September 2012

AbstractThis essay contains a response to Burkhard Tuschling's thesis that already in the third Critique Kant abandoned his original “critical” view in favor of a “speculative” approach that anticipated later forms of idealism. Against this, it is maintained that, while it is true that this work contains a significant development of Kant's previous thought, it involves a deepening rather than an abandonment of “critical” principles. More specifically, it is argued that Kant's account of the principle of “logical” or “formal” purposiveness develops a line of thought that was already in place in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic in the first Critique. Finally, in support of the “critical” nature of Kant's position in the third Critique, his conception of an intuitive intellect is contrasted with that of the young Hegel.
TheCritique of Judgmentas a “True Apology” for Leibniz
Authors: Allison Henry E. 
Published: September 2012

AbstractThis essay argues that Kant's ironical remark in his response to Eberhard that “the Critique of Pure Reason might well be the true apology for Leibniz” is applicable (without irony) to the third Critique. Appealing to the principle of the purposiveness of nature, it shows that this principle provides the basis for a “critical” restatement of the line of argument that Leibniz formulated against Locke in his New Essays on Human Understanding. Common to both thinkers is the necessity of presupposing a harmony between the order of nature and the cognitive requirements of the human understanding, according to which observable similarities reflect the inner organization of nature. The difference is that for Leibniz the justification for this presupposition is metaphysical, namely, a pre‐established harmony, whereas for Kant it is “critical” involving the subjective principle of the purposiveness of nature.
The Gulf between Nature and Freedom and Nature's Guarantee of Perpetual Peace
Authors: Allison Henry E. 
Published: September 2012

AbstractThis essay examines the relation between Kant's Toward Perpetual Peace and the nature–freedom problem posed in the third Critique. The problem concerns the “immense gulf,” which separates the supersensible from appearances and which seems to stand in the way of their influencing one another (KU 5: 175). According to Kant, this gulf arises because the ends set by the “laws of freedom” (various aspects of the highest good) ought to be realized in the sensible world, even though this world is governed by mechanistic laws that are indifferent to these ends. After spelling out Kant's approach to the problem and its connection with his conception of the reflective power of judgment, this analysis is applied to Kant's account of how human nature may, apart from any moral considerations, be thought to lead to the institution of republican forms of government and perpetual peace.
Kant's Conception ofAufklärung
Authors: Allison Henry E. 
Published: September 2012

AbstractThis essay analyzes Kant's conception of enlightenment. It argues that, contrary to the view of Mendelssohn and many of his contemporaries, for whom enlightenment consists in the acquisition of basic truths regarding the human condition, Kant viewed it in more negative and practical terms as the escape from a condition of “Unmündigkeit,” understood as an incapacity to think for oneself. As such, enlightenment involves the will as well as the intellect. This connection of enlightenment with the will is affirmed in Kant's controversial claim that this condition is self‐incurred and therefore imputable, but it has been criticized in both Kant's time and our own. Kant is defended against this criticism by suggesting a comparison with Dostoevsky's “Grand Inquisitor.” It is further argued that Kant's conception provides the basis for a response to Gadamer's critique of enlightenment as a “prejudice against prejudice,” which denies the importance of tradition.
The Contradiction (i): The Problem
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: September 2012

AbstractThe chapter gives some background on the mathematical achievements of Cantor and Dedekind, and describes how Russell aimed to show that all mathematics can be derived from a purely logical starting point (logicism). But it also describes Russell’s discovery of what he always called ‘the contradiction’, which we call ‘Russell’s paradox’, which presented a serious obstacle to that derivation. It gives Russell’s first reactions, namely the early theory of types sketched in 1903, the ‘zigzag’ theory, and the theory of limitation of size. The last is compared with the set theory of Zermelo-Fraenkel that is common nowadays.
On Denoting
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: September 2012

AbstractThe chapter outlines Russell’s early theory of denoting in 1903, and the reasons why it should be abandoned. The new theory of 1905 contains objections to the rival views of definite descriptions due to Meinong and to Frege, and these are endorsed. (But there is no full discussion of what Russell saw as his main argument, using the example of ‘Gray’s Elegy’.) Russell’s new theory does solve the puzzles that he mentions, at least for definite descriptions, but since the puzzles seem to apply also to names the solution is only partial at this stage. In this article Russell was concerned with our ordinary language, which leaves him open to the kind of objections raised by Strawson (1950). But in later developments he moves from language to thought, and then to a supposedly ‘perfect’ language.
Acquaintance
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: September 2012

AbstractRussell invokes acquaintance with particular objects, with universals, and (tentatively) with the concepts of logic, in each case as the explanation of our understanding of propositions. The first does appear to be needed, for definite descriptions cannot account for all reference to particular objects, and ‘direct reference’ is therefore required. But Russell himself later came to recognise that acquaintance with universals was not required, and the same surely applies to the concepts of logic. As for particulars, Russell supposed that one could be acquainted only with one’s own sense-data; one refers to these by using a ‘logical proper name’, e.g. the demonstrative ‘this’. He failed to see Kaplan’s point, that in common use this word is accompanied by a demonstration, which associates it with what Frege might call a ‘sense’, i.e. a ‘mode of presentation’. But, to use Kripke’s language, this ‘sense’ merely ‘fixes the reference’, and does not ‘give the meaning’. Once this point is seen, one can resist Russell’s claim that only sense-data can be objects of ‘direct reference’.
Knowledge and its Foundations
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: September 2012

AbstractRussell thinks of knowledge in terms of justification, perhaps because that is also how the sceptic thinks, and this leads quite naturally to a foundationalist theory. Among the foundations Russell counts our knowledge of deductive and inductive methods of reasoning, of a priori connections between universals, and of the properties and relations of one’s present sense-data. In pursuit of the last, he came gradually to see that it is difficult to separate the sense-datum, as what is given, from the various interpretations that we ourselves add to it. He always did think of our sense-data as providing us with what he called ‘hard data’, though it is difficult to see any way in which our knowledge of our sense-data is somehow ‘more secure’ than our knowledge of physical objects.
Logical Constructions (ii): Minds
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: September 2012

AbstractRussell initially rejected neutral monism, but later came to accept a version of it, aiming to construct both matter and minds from the same ‘neutral’ stuff. This neutral stuff was sensibilia (or, as they became, events of sensing), except that minds also have an extra ingredient, namely events of imaging. The idea is that a mind may be identified with the class of all those events of sensing and imaging which occur in it. Russell explains that two such events occur in the same mind when there are experiences of temporal relations between them, but he also adds connecting links of ‘mnemic causation’. To obtain the right results one must invoke merely possible experiences and causation, and this is awkward. Russell tries to account for beliefs, desires, and other mental states (including being conscious of something), all in terms of sensings and imagings, but these analyses are highly questionable.
Propositions
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: September 2012

AbstractRussell began with a realist theory of propositions: they exist quite independently of anyone’s thought, and their ingredients are ‘in the world’. But when he saw how quantification over all propositions leads to paradox, he embraced the opposite theory that there are no such things as propositions. There are judgments, but in a judgment the judger is multiply related to the various ingredients of the fact that makes his judgment either true or false. This theory is proposed in 1910 and 1912, and was to have been further elaborated in a book that he was working on in 1913, but which he discontinued because of criticisms from the young Wittgenstein. In 1919 he proposed a new theory, according to which a proposition is an arrangement of symbols – either words or images – in a mind. So its ingredients are now mental items, and not what those items stand for.
Universals
Authors: Bostock David 
Published: September 2012

AbstractRussell argued in 1912 that particulars exist, as well as universals. In fact he recanted this argument much later, in 1940, and the recantation shows how weak that argument actually is. He always believed in universals (for what seem to be quite inadequate reasons), but there is a question over how this relates to his acceptance of propositional functions. The best solution seems to be that simple propositional functions correspond to universals, but others are merely arrangements of symbols, as also are the propositions that they are abstracted from. (But one may well ask whether this provides enough propositional functions, for the reduction of mathematics to logic apparently requires an uncountable infinity of them.)
Early loanwords from Latin and Greek
Authors: Miller D. Gary 
Published: September 2012

AbstractThe main phonological changes from Latin to Vulgar Latin / Romance and from early Germanic to Old English are outlined in order to devise criteria for dating prehistoric borrowings. This is followed by a discussion of about 40 Old English words from Greek and some 90 from Latin. While this is a small number compared to the 600–700 Old English words from Latin and Greek, the words in this chapter are sufficiently important culturally as to survive into Modern English, and have some phonological or other property that permits dating. Reborrowings feature prominently in the history of the words in this chapter.
The Kaiserchronik
Authors: Matthews Alastair 
Published: September 2012

Abstract
This book presents a narratological analysis of the Kaiserchronik, or chronicle of the emperors, an account of the Roman and Holy Roman emperors from the foundation of Rome to the run-up to the Second Crusade that was remarkably popular in medieval Germany. Previous research has concentrated on the structure and sources of the work and emphasized its role as a Christian narrative of history, but this study shows that the Kaiserchronik does not simply illustrate a didactic religious message: it also provides an example of how techniques of story-telling in the vernacular were developed and explored in twelfth-century Germany. Four aspects of narrative are described (time and space, motivation, perspective, and narrative strands), each of which is examined with reference to the story of a particular emperor (Constantine the Great, Charlemagne, Otto the Great, and Henry IV). Rather than dogmatically imposing a single analytical framework on the Kaiserchronik, the book takes account of the fact that modern theory cannot always be applied directly to works from premodern periods: it draws critically on, and where necessary refines, a variety of approaches, including those of Gérard Genette, Boris Uspensky, and Eberhard Lämmert. Throughout the book, the narrative techniques described are contextualized by means of comparisons with other texts in both Middle High German and Latin, so that the place of the Kaiserchronik as a literary narrative in the twelfth century becomes clear.
Introduction
Authors: Matthews Alastair 
Published: September 2012

Abstract
This chapter introduces the Kaiserchronik and summarizes what is known about the origins of the work, which is generally associated with the Regensburg of the mid-twelfth century. On the basis of manuscript transmission and the critical literature, it is suggested that an analysis of narrative technique will allow what Walter Haug called the ‘literary side’ of the Kaiserchronik to be described in more detail. With the help of an analysis of the prologue, the Kaiserchronik is then contextualized in relation to Latin historiography, vernacular religious literature, and the new Middle High German narratives of the later twelfth century, showing that a broader range of narrative techniques are at stake than the preoccupation with questions of fictionality and structure in modern theory and criticism would suggest.
Time, Place, and Space: Constantine the Great
Authors: Matthews Alastair 
Published: September 2012

Abstract
This chapter investigates how the temporal and spatial world of the narrative is configured in the episode about Constantine the Great in the Kaiserchronik. The chapter describes how medieval texts engaged with time, place, and space, as well as how modern theorists have approached them. It then shows that time in this episode of the Kaiserchronik is presented as something that characters experience and think about, in contrast to other vernacular versions of Constantine's conversion experience such as Priester Konrad's sermon. The chapter also demonstrates with reference to Constantinople that concepts of place and movement define this episode of the Kaiserchronik, which lacks the detailed depiction of city spaces found in several other medieval texts such as the Mirabilia Romae.
Motivation: Charlemagne
Authors: Matthews Alastair 
Published: September 2012

Abstract
This chapter describes how events are caused and explained in the episode about Charlemagne in the Kaiserchronik, showing that they do not happen merely because they illustrate God's will or the consequences of immoral behaviour: intentionality also affects the course of the action. To demonstrate this, the chapter draws on and refines the theoretical framework of Matías Martínez and Michael Scheffel after explaining its origins in the work of Clemens Lugowski. The roles of God and the narrator in the causal and rhetorical structures of this episode of the Kaiserchronik are analysed in detail; the chapter concludes by considering the role of Charlemagne in passages from the Trierer Aegidius and the Rolandslied as examples of other ways in which motivation could operate in twelfth-century vernacular narrative.
Conclusion
Authors: Matthews Alastair 
Published: September 2012

Abstract
The conclusion draws together the findings about individual Kaiserchronik episodes obtained in the book, arguing that the chronicle's narrative technique is at least as important as its religious-didactic function. To reinforce the argument, four subsequent Middle High German works that feature figures encountered in the Kaiserchronik are considered—Konrad von Würzburg's Silvester and Schwanritter, Rudolf von Ems's Der guote Gêrhart, and the anonymous Kreuzfahrt des Landgrafen Ludwigs des Frommen. Finally, the chapter suggests that the various aspects of narrative technique described in the book converge in the concept of the literary character in the Kaiserchronik.
State Sovereignty is Not Withering Away: A Few Lessons for the Future
Authors: Alvarez José E. 
Published: September 2012

Abstract
The Westphalian system of nation-states remains the system that we have. State sovereignty, though not unfettered, is not withering away. States have pooled, shared, delimited, or delegated away some of their powers through treaties, but they but can always take back powers that they have previously negotiated away. Now nations are reasserting their ‘sovereignty’ vis-à-vis foreign investors through changes to their national laws or their treaties. Three lessons can be drawn for the future. To the extent there are choices to be made between global regulation and sovereign control, the outcome may not reflect a progress narrative but a historical dialectic that periodically swings back and forth as international norms encounter resistance at the national level, thereby triggering re-evaluation and modification of the international regime or its rules. All international regimes, no matter how well constructed, ultimately rely on states to implement them at the domestic level; how that implementation occurs is subject to considerable state discretion; and much can occur to an international regime as its rules are translated for domestic consumption or application. We need to remain vigilant when it comes to the North/South dimensions of international regimes and reactions to them.
The Possible Contribution of International Civil Society to the Protection of Human Rights
Authors: Palma Mauro 
Published: September 2012

Abstract
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have benefited from the new opportunities offered by information and communication technologies to increase their visibility and consequently their presence in areas and countries that in the past were more objects of analysis than places of active presence, of direct membership of people living in them. We are plunged into a global cultural flow that conveys not just information but also ideas, representations of the world, languages, and images. The role of civil society is to bring this immersion to life as a factor for overall growth in the cultural construction of a community. Two suggestions are made: full and free access to the network and the construction through it of a diff used knowledge drawing on the experiences of individuals and associations and organizations; and emphasis on cooperation among NGOs, to overcome the risk of duplication or of competition, through the initiation of joint programmes aimed at raising social awareness and building common practices to monitor the actions of governments in the protection of rights.
Can Legality Trump Effectiveness in Today's International Law?
Authors: Zappalà Salvatore 
Published: September 2012

Abstract
Traditionally the principle of effectiveness represented a cornerstone of international law. Its role has been twofold. Firstly, it has been based on specific provisions of international law which require factual elements to be taken into account for legal consequences to arise. Secondly, tthe factual dimension has been a broader distinctive trait of the international legal system as a whole. It follows that effectiveness has permeated the structure of international law and influenced it in its entirety by systematically connecting the world of law to its ability to display effects in the world of facts and vice versa. However, the aspiration of international law to impose itself as a legal system and the emergence of universal values which cannot be derogated from have inevitably entailed increasing limitations on effectiveness. There are three case scenarios. There are cases in which facts can produce legal effects as provided for by specific rules of international law, in line with the traditional function of effectiveness. There are areas in which some of the new universal values that have emerged in the international community are of such importance as to bar any effect to factual situations in conflict with them (e.g., no foreign occupation can deprive peoples of their right to self-determination; no ethnic cleansing policy can be condoned; no government can be recognized if it is established on the basis of principles of apartheid and racial discrimination). There are other cases in which the question is more doubtful since conflicting universal values may be at issue — a sort of grey area in which effects can materialize only where certain conditions are met.
The Future of International Investment Law and Arbitration
Authors: Reisman W. Michael 
Published: September 2012

Abstract
International agreements and their dispute-resolution mechanisms have assumed a role in establishing the minimum standards for the governance of foreign investment by host states and supervising and implementing them. There are now some 2,800 bilateral investment treaties, most of which allow the qualifying investor itself, acting without the intervention or permission of its state of nationality, to invoke an international tribunal to review host state action, in terms of, inter alia, whether it has constituted ‘fair and equitable’ treatment. This is a procedural change with far-reaching substantive implications which make international investment law unique in international law. To respond to current stresses within the legal arrangements now collectively referred to as international investment law, five alternative futures are delineated: global integration (more and more direct foreign investment would be made worldwide, on the basis of economic rather than political considerations; in addition, there would be more decisions by international investment tribunals with respect to the quality of governance within states which hosted foreign investment); regional and sub-regional integration; recrudescence of protectionism and mercantilism; revival of the New International Economic Order system; and continuation of the present heterogeneous system. It is argued that in the future the first option is the most desirable, for its promise of enhanced production and the efficient use of the resources of our planet and the resulting interdependence which, one hopes, will act as a restraint on the use of violence.