bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
FOSS 248-P2 OIL SPILL – A CASE STUDY
Authors: Hutley Tedd , Martinez Myola , Dix Mark 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
At 1205, on December 30, 2003, the Foss Maritime tank barge 248-P2 spilled nearly 6,000 gallons of bunker fuel oil during a loading operation at the Chevron-Point Wells facility in Shoreline, Washington. Approximately 4,637 gallons was discharged into Puget Sound. Upon notification, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Marine Safety Office (MSO) Puget Sound, Washington Department of Ecology (DOE), and Foss Maritime launched an aggressive response, mobilizing numerous spill response personnel and nearly every major piece of spill response equipment in the Northwest. In less than 24 hours of the spill, nearly all the oil had moved ashore impacting only two miles of shoreline. The most heavily impacted area belonged to the Suquamish Indian Tribe, which included a highly sensitive and culturally significant saltwater marsh. A representative for the Suquamish Tribe quickly joined the Unified Command. Operational success can be linked to the frequent training and exercising of the responding agencies, preplanned geographic response plans, and use of incident command system. Despite the successes, weather and tides proved to be the leading contributor to the four-month shoreline clean up operation. Lessons learned identify response strong points in addition to areas needing improvement.
THE FOSS BARGE 248-P2 OIL SPILL: A CHALLENGE IN SPILL MANAGEMENT
Authors: O'Brien Paul S. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
On December 30, 2003, a 4620 gallon spill of heavy oil occurred from the tank barge FOSS 248-P2 as it was loading bunker fuel at the Chevron Point Wells oil storage facility at Shoreline (Seattle), Washington. Under the Northwest Area Contingency Plan (NWACP), a unified command made up of a responsible party Incident Commander (IC) from Foss Maritime, a federal on-scene coordinator (OSC) from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), a state OSC from the Washington Department of Ecology, a tribal OSC from the Suquamish Tribe and a local OSC from the Kitsap County Department of Emergency Management (KDEM) formed to manage the spill. A large on-water response force was mobilized but the oil quickly impacted an important environmentally sensitive marsh and beaches owned by both the Suquamish Tribe and the State of Washington. Commercial and recreational shellfish beds, beach sediments, a pristine marsh and high use public beaches were all affected by the spill. A significant four-month cleanup effort occurred on the beaches and marsh to remove the oil. Operational cleanup endpoints were established for the beaches and marsh. Shellfish and sediment sampling and monitoring plans were developed jointly by agency and tribal workgroups. The Suquamish Tribe was placed in the lead for conducting beach surveys under a long term monitoring plan approved by the unified command. The five members of the unified command faced major challenges during the spill due to overlapping federal, state, local and tribal jurisdictions, land ownership disputes, political consequences, cleanup/operational problems, shellfish and sediment contamination concerns, public outreach issues and the inexperience of several agencies involved. This paper will explore the unique challenges faced by the unified command in responding to the spill.
CHALLENGES OF OIL SPILL RESPONSE IN EGYPTIAN COASTAL ZONE OVERLOOKING THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE RED SEA*
Authors: Bashat H. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The rapid growth of economic development in Egypt over the last few decades has led to numerous offshore projects, expanding maritime facilities and a vast spread of coastal tourist developments. However, adequate capacity building of existing national oil spill response facilities did not complement such growth. This has resulted in an imbalance between the degree of environmental exposure and level of preparedness to respond to potential oil and chemical spills that may occur along these highly sensitive coastal areas and to the marine environment of Egypt. Both the Red Sea and Mediterranean coasts of Egypt support thriving ecosystems and a substantial tourist industry centered around golden beaches, crystalline waters, and a plethora of plant and animal species that exist nowhere else on earth. At the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula Ras Mohammad National Park alone shelters over 130 species of coral and 116 species of fish. Only a few kilometers away, the Gulf of Suez is one of the worlds busiest industrial shipping routes. More than 117 million tons of oil pass through Egyptian waters each year and cross Egypt's main land through the SUMED pipeline from Ain Sukhna terminal (at the head of the Gulf of Suez) to Sidi Krir terminal on the Mediterranean. Another 28 to 30 million tons of oil go through the Suez Canal directly and there is a 15000-ship movement every year in Egypt.
The Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA) has updated a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCP), prepared in 1986 by the petroleum sector, in 1998. The NOSCP is the national framework for action in the event of an oil pollution incident. Updating, the NOSCP was just the beginning and not the end of the road. Challenges to take forward necessary action at all response levels to ensure efficiency of application of the NOSCP are enormous. Over the last few years concerned parties and stakeholders conducted several investigations and assessment to identify critical areas of concern and high exposure. Many assessment reports have identified gaps and addressed required measures needed to enhance bridging those gaps and restore the required balance between exposure and preparedness to recover from this situation.
This paper considers the present status of the imbalance between environmental exposure and oil spill response preparedness along Egyptian coastline, describes current status of the NOSCP and the recovery measures taken to improve the situation and ensure credible response to potential major spills.
MANAGEMENT OF OPERATIONAL INFORMATION IN A MAJOR OIL SPILL. THE ERIKA AND PRESTIGE EXPERIENCES
Authors: Gouriou Vincent , Quintin Karen , Cabon Rozenn , Legrand Sébastien 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
In 1999–2000, the response operations to the exceptional Erika pollution (400 km of coastline affected, totalling 400 000 man days of work until summer 2002, 260 000 t of oily waste) highlighted the importance of a daily archiving of operations data and swift exploitation of that information. Satisfactory performance was achieved as regards the map production of overall activity and results, but no real time maps and diagrams, accurate enough to be used as decision aids, could be produced.
When the Prestige incident occurred, in 2003, Cedre proposed to the coordinating authorities in charge of coastline response in France (Civil Defence Zones) to install computerised networks in their Headquarters in order to collect and exploit data about quantity and origin of manpower involved in real time, the amount and characteristics of collected waste, the different techniques, material and products used on response sites. Thanks to this initiative, head response authorities had graphical summaries on their desks daily, synthesis maps weekly, and a complete, fully updated visual situation for each key meeting with the Central authorities, in which budgetary needs for the weeks to come were discussed.
The handling of data exploitation was managed according to the necessity of transmitting the information quickly to decision makers in a crisis context. We first had to send data in a hurry daily or weekly: they were diffused in an approximate and simplified way to enable a quick analysis of the information. Afterwards more time could be taken to complete and validate the information to allow a more detailed exploitation work. They can now be considered in retrospect.
The quick transmission, processing and communication of the information helped avoid some inappropriate responses like excessive waste collection for example (a situation which we had to face during the Erika response phase).
The Prestige experience proved once again the strength and significance of illustrations (graphics or maps) especially in an emergency situation as sensitive as this one: they carry much more power of conviction for decision makers and the public than pages of complex explanations.
ESTIMATING LNG SPREADING ON WATER1
Authors: Fingas Merv , Lehr William J. , Simecek-Beatty Debra 
Published: January 2013

In order to meet the growing demands for energy, plans are currently being made to construct several new liquefied natural gas (LNG) off-load terminals in North America. While LNG provides a relatively clean source of fuel, increased shipment means increased potential for accidental releases. Governmental agencies have recognized the safety concerns about such a possible spill event and have recommended the proactive and preemptive addressing of such concerns.
Several recent studies have examined the likely thermal and other hazards from an LNG vessel accident. One possible threat from such an incident is a pool fire, which could be quite large since the volume of a single tank on an LNG vessel can contain as much as 25,000 m of liquefied gas. In general, there is agreement in the literature on the pool fire geometry, burn regression rate, and thermal emissive power of the fire but less concurrence on possible tank leak rate or surface spread rate on water.
The authors review the existing approaches to this latter phenomenon for unconfined spills. Comparison of model predictions with limited experimental data is also discussed
For low wave conditions, two methods, one by Fay and the other by Weber, have been the most widely used in past models, sometimes with modifications that are discussed in the paper. Similarly, two alternative algorithms have recently been suggested for high wave conditions. The authors review the merits of these two approaches, the expected consequences from each approach, and finally compare them to widely used oil spill spreading formulas under energetic wave conditions.
OIL COMPOSITION AND PROPERTY DATABASE FOR OIL SPILL MODELING
Authors: Wang Zhendi , Hollebone B. , Weaver J. , Yang Chun , Fingas M. , Fieldhouse B. , Landriault M. , Gamble L. , Peng X. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
At the request of the US EPA Oil Program Center, the National Exposure Research Laboratory's Ecosystems Research Division (ERD) in Athens is developing an oil spill model that focuses on fate and transport of oil components under various response scenarios. A database of prototype oils for use in models is necessary. This multiple component composition data, however, is not typically available because of complexity of oil composition and the impossibility of immediate characterization in the event of a spill. Thus the creation of a database containing both physical property and chemical composition data for a number of common oils at various weathering percentages is highly desirable. The data set must be based upon fractionation of the oils into groups of compounds with similar structures and properties and further must reflect the changes to the oil over the course of the spill. Since 1984, the Emergencies Science and Technology Division (ESTD) of Environment Canada (EC) has developed a database on various physical and chemical properties of crude oils and petroleum products. Through many years endeavour, the database now contains information of hundreds of oils from all over the world. In 2002, funded by the US EPA and EC, the ESTD and ERD completed the cooperative project “Development of a Composition Database for Selected Multicomponent Oils,” to characterize ten prototype crude oils and refined petroleum products. The present work, Oil Composition and Property Database for Oil Spill Modeling, is a logical extension of the 2002 project. Nine new crude oils in common use and with potential to be spilled in the US waters were selected for inclusion in the model database. Comprehensive physical property measurement and chemical composition characterization have been performed for these oils at four weathered stages of each oil. This project provides the most complete and comprehensive database for the selected oils to date. The new composition data has been integrated into the existing US EPA and EC oil properties database. The results are made available to the public on the world wide web.
MAKING ICS WORK FOR YOU WHEN IT REALLY COUNTS! – HARD LESSONS LEARNED ON THE SHORES OF CALIFORNIA
Authors: Jochums Carl , Robberson William 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The moment an oil spill occurs, response speed is of the essence. Yet how often have you participated in the Incident Command System (ICS) at a spill and been frustrated with the speed or the coordination of the response? How often has a response been declared a success but getting there was so frustrating and exhausting that you've sworn you won't work that way anymore?
ICS is here to stay; yet how you can consistently make it work optimally for you and the response remains a challenge. This paper is based upon the premise that ICS enables the right information to be communicated to the right people, in the right format, at the right time. However, during most response debriefs, at the top of the “needs improvement” list you will find numerous references to the failure of information flow and communications. In this paper we share some of the hard lessons-learned in spill response along the California Coast, and ways in which some of the agencies involved today are proactively “preparing to communicate” within the Incident Command System.
We use case histories of past and recent spills and the California Spill of National Significance 2004 exercise to illustrate the communications and coordination problems inherent in most response Incident Command structures. A variety of issues are considered; from the evolutionary paths of most responses; to the numerous personalities and egos involved; to the wide array of expectations amongst participants and stakeholders; and the often unique and varied authorities and agendas that multiple agencies bring to a response.
We also suggest innovative ways in which the process of communications within the ICS is being augmented, enhanced, and set-up for success. We introduce concepts such as “data mining,” “embedded information specialists,” “fault-tolerant” communications mechanisms, “message mapping,” and “NEBA front-end loading”. A number of communications tools and concepts are described, that if implemented, will greatly improve multi-agency coordination and communications during a response, leading to a less stressful and more successful response outcome.
HOW WILL THE NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN AND THE NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AFFECT OIL SPILL RESPONSE IN THE UNITED STATES1
Authors: Plourde Kristy L. , Hight-Allen LaDonn , Matthews Denise L. , Smith Martin L. , Gafkjen CDR Jeff 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The United States faces a broad range of threats and hazards, both naturally occurring and manmade. Over the past few decades, efforts to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from these varied threats and hazards have evolved into a patchwork collection of special-purpose plans including the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). These plans govern U.S. policy toward hazardous materials releases and oil spill response. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), Management of Domestic Incidents, mandates the creation of a National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Plan (NRP) to provide a single, comprehensive national approach to incident management. The NRP is intended to integrate the various prevention, preparedness, response and recovery plans into an all-discipline, all-hazard approach. NIMS provides a standard Incident Command System (ICS) for Federal, State, local and tribal government to work together to prepare for and respond to incidents. NIMS ICS includes a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, technologies, multi-agency coordination systems, unified command, training, identification/management of resources, qualification/certification, and the collection, tracking and reporting of incident information and incident resources. Together, the NRP and NIMS provide a standardized framework to ensure that Federal, State, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations work in partnership to support domestic incident management regardless of cause, size, or complexity of the incident. How does this change what is being done in oil and hazardous materials response? The National Contingency Plan (NCP, 40 CFR 300) notes that “where practicable,” the framework for the response shall use ICS within a Unified Command (UC) system. OSHA regulations (29 CFR 1910.120) also require the use of ICS for emergency response. The response community (federal, state, local, and tribal governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations) has been using “ICS” in oil spill/HAZMAT response since the early 1990's in the United States. NIMS ICS will be used when responding to oil HAZMAT spills, however, there are differences in ICS implementation between responders in the response community and NIMS ICS will have stricter requirements to improve uniformity in application. These similarities and differences will be discussed at length in this paper.
PLANNING AND TRAINING FOR TIER 1 RESPONSE IS FUNDAMENTALTO EFFECTIVE RESPONSE AT ALL LEVELS1
Authors: Santner Richard 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The oil industry concept of tiered preparedness and response has long been established as a valuable model for developing an appropriate response structure, with capabilities commensurate with oil spill events and their associated consequences. A Tier 1 incident is typically referred to as an operational one occurring at or near a company's own facilities, as a consequence of its own activities. An individual company would typically provide resources to respond to this type of spill. The Tier 1 part is often seen as the smallest and thus the least significant and this Paper asks whether enough planning and training is done at this level.
Different oil industry activities encompassing exploration, production, shipping transportation, oil handling facilities and even pipelines, give rise to a varied and broad range of scenarios that call for different Tier 1 solutions. In any spill event, speed and efficiency of first response, and the awareness of the integrated tiered solution that ensures an appropriate call for additional resources when required, will make a significant difference to the effectiveness of the overall response. Thus we need to spend time and effort planning well and training at the Tier 1 level.
This Paper describes some of the possible Tier 1 scenarios that may be applied to the planning process and the key issues that need to be considered, to ensure Tier 1 capabilities are appropriate, effective and robust, and can be relied upon to support the tiered escalation of response.
THE SHARING OF THE FINANCIAL BURDEN BETWEEN THE SHIPPIING AND OIL INDUSTRIES UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COMPENSATION REGIMES
Authors: Nichols Joe , Morgan Miles 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The international regime on liability and compensation for oil pollution damage is based on international Conventions adopted under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). When the international compensation Conventions were first elaborated over thirty years ago in the aftermath of the Torrey Canyon incident, it was decided to establish a two-tier system whereby the economic consequences of marine oil spills from tankers should be shared between the shipping industry and those industries who either owned or received the cargoes transported by sea. Although the limits of liability and compensation under the Conventions have been revised from time to time, the concept of sharing has been maintained.
In 2004 the Secretariat of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds undertook a study of the costs of oil spills from tankers worldwide, except the United States, over the past 25 years. The purpose of the study was to examine the extent to which the economic consequences of oil spills had been shared by the shipping and oil sectors under the Conventions as envisaged when they were elaborated and under the voluntary industry schemes which coexisted and interacted with the Conventions for much of that time. The results of the study and their impact on any future revisions of the international Conventions, particularly as regards the sharing of the financial burden, are the subject of this paper.
RESPONSE CAPABILITY: CAN ECONOMICS JUSTIFY SUSTAINABILITY?1
Authors: Grau Sharon E. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
This paper explores the motivations for corporate engagement in environmentally sustainable behavior. Although there are several reasons for companies to apply environmentally sustainable business practices, the most enticing are economic. Like a pendulum, the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 responded to a full left swing of potential major disasters and brought the weight to the far right. These regulations established requirements for the response equipment/personnel needed in the event of a worst-case discharge. Also due to the significant efforts of established pollution prevention regulations, the past decade has seen a drastic drop in the number of spills and the amount of oil discharged.
The strides toward improvement are impressive, but the reduction in spills, seems to be leading toward regionalization of local response assets and elimination of excess duplication by not replacing unserviceable equipment. Effective responses are also a key part of environmental sustainability. The end result could be a very expensive response, which could be simply averted by retaining current levels of local response capability.
Understanding that the primary objective of any company is profit, environmental protection can provide one path toward financial reward. This includes, but is not limited to a “green” public image, which generally increases the consumer base and profits. The economic benefits of environmentally sound business practices, however, are not always initially apparent. Therefore, monetary gain may not always present sufficient motivation. In this case, proponents of environmental sustainability can cite social responsibility as cause, or look to the federal government for support and control.
In an effort to stop the swing of the pendulum between a major disaster and the inability to respond, companies should be encouraged to maintain response capabilities at their current levels and to recognize that a loss of local response resources could be both an environmental and financial nightmare.