bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The proposal and realization on more exact modeling of COIL performance
Authors: Li Shouxian , Shu Xiaojian , Du Yanyi , Su Hua , Li Yan , Yu Zhen 
Published: April 2013

AbstractThe chemical oxygen–iodine laser (COIL) is the shortest-wavelength high-power chemical laser that has been demonstrated. The characteristics, such as good atmospheric propagation, short wavelength and excellent transmission through optical fibers, make the COIL a good candidate for high-power laser application. To model the complete COIL lasing interaction, a three-dimensional formulation of the fluid dynamics, species continuity and radiation transport equations is necessary. The computational effort to calculate the flow field over the entire nozzle bank with a grid fine enough to resolve the injection holes is so large as to preclude doing the calculation. The approach to modeling chemical lasers then has been to reduce the complexity of the model to correspond to the available computational capability, adding details as computing power increased. The modeling of lasing in the COIL medium is proposed, which is coupling with the effects induced by transverse injection of secondary gases, non-equilibrium chemical reactions, nozzle tail flow and boundary layer. The coupled steady solutions of the fluid dynamics and optics in a COIL complex three-dimensional cavity flow field are obtained following the proposal. The modeling results show that these effects have some influence on the lasing properties. A feasible methodology and a theoretical tool are offered to predict the beam quality for large-scale COIL devices.
Development of high-power laser coatings
Authors: Qi Hongji , Zhu Meipin , Fang Ming , Shao Shuying , Wei Chaoyang , Yi Kui , Shao Jianda 
Published: April 2013

AbstractLaser resistance and stress-free mirrors, windows, polarizers, and beam splitters up to $400~\mathrm{mm} \times 400~\mathrm{mm} $ are required for the construction of the series SG facilities. In order to improve the coating quality, a program has been in place for the last ten years. For the small-aperture pick-off mirror, the laser-induced damage threshold (LIDT) is above $60~\mathrm{J} / {\mathrm{cm} }^{2} $ (1064 nm, 3 ns), and the reflected wavefront is less than $\lambda / 4~(\lambda = 633~\mathrm{nm} )$. The Brewster-angle polarizing beam splitter ($\Phi 50\times 10~\mathrm{mm} $) shows the best LIDT result, up to $29. 8~\mathrm{J} ~{\mathrm{cm} }^{- 2} $ (1064 nm, 10 ns) for a p-polarized wave in the 2012 damage competition of the XLIV Annual Boulder Damage Symposium. For the larger-aperture mirror and polarizer, the LIDT is above $23~\mathrm{J} ~{\mathrm{cm} }^{- 2} $ (1064 nm, 3 ns) and $14~\mathrm{J} ~{\mathrm{cm} }^{- 2} $ (1064 nm, 3 ns), respectively. The reflected wavefront is less than $\lambda / 3~(\lambda = 633~\mathrm{nm} )$ at the used angle.
‘The British boss is gone and will never return’: Communist takeovers of British companies in Shanghai (1949–1954)
Authors: HOWLETT JONATHAN J. 
Published: April 2013

AbstractIn May 1949 the Chinese Communist Party seized Shanghai. Rather than being elated at the prospect of harnessing the economic power of China's largest city to complete the revolution, the Communists approached it cautiously. How would the Chinese Communist Party set about transforming this free-wheeling port city with a ‘semi-colonial’ past into an orderly and socialist city? How would it balance ideology and pragmatism in reshaping Shanghai? This paper uses the takeover of two British companies as case studies to explore these issues at the ground level. It is argued that the means by which these companies were transformed tell us much about the Party and its state-building policies. When cadres entered foreign companies, their priority was not radical change and anti-imperialism, but rather fostering a sense of stability and unity to avoid disrupting production. Their gradual approach was due in large part to the Party's awareness of its own limited skills, resources and manpower, but also to its leaders and cadres recognizing that before they could remake Shanghai anew they had first to deal with the material and human legacies of the past.
Shari'at and Muslim community in colonial Punjab, 1865–1885
Authors: IVERMEE ROBERT 
Published: April 2013

AbstractThis paper argues that concerns for the government appointment of qazis, officers for the administration of Muslim law, and the greater application of shari'at critically shaped Muslim community formation in later nineteenth century Punjab. Between 1865 and 1885, Punjabi Muslim elites attested the necessity of qazis being appointed by government and Muslim law being administered in the colonial judicial system. With the support of Gottlieb Leitner, registrar of the Punjab University College, Muslim parties used the emergent associations of Punjab civil society, including the Anjuman-i-Punjab (Lahore) and Anjuman-i-Islam (Lahore), to assert the indispensability of religious law. In doing so, they challenged the Anglo-Indian decision to prioritize customary law in the Punjab and advanced the religious group as the basic social unit of Punjab society. In Punjab public spaces, the relevance of Islam was proclaimed, challenging the professed Anglo-Indian distinction between private and public, religious and secular spheres. However, demands for qazi appointment and the administration of shari'at problematize well-rehearsed arguments about the relationships between family, community, state and religion in colonial Punjab. Only through an enquiry into the two decades after 1865 may later political campaigns for the application of shari'at be understood.
Reciprocal effects of stable and temporary components of neuroticism and affective disorders: results of a longitudinal cohort study
Authors: Spinhoven P. , Penelo E. , de Rooij M. , Penninx B. W. , Ormel J. 
Published: April 2013

BackgroundCross-sectional studies show that neuroticism is strongly associated with affective disorders. We investigated whether neuroticism and affective disorders mutually reinforce each other over time, setting off a potential downward spiral.MethodA total of 2981 adults aged 18–65 years, consisting of healthy controls, persons with a prior history of affective disorders and persons with a current affective disorder were assessed at baseline (T1) and 2 (T2) and 4 years (T3) later. At each wave, affective disorders according to DSM-IV criteria were assessed with the Composite Interview Diagnostic Instrument (CIDI) version 2.1 and neuroticism with the Neuroticism–Extraversion–Openness Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI).ResultsUsing structural equation models the association of distress disorders (i.e. dysthymia, depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder) and fear disorders (i.e. social anxiety disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia without panic) with neuroticism could be attributed to three components: (a) a strong correlation of the stable components of distress and fear disorders with the stable trait component of neuroticism; (b) a modest contemporaneous association of change in distress and fear disorders with change in neuroticism; (c) a small to modest delayed effect of change in distress and fear disorders on change in neuroticism. Moreover, neuroticism scores in participants newly affected at T2 but remitted at T3 did not differ from their pre-morbid scores at T1.ConclusionsOur results do not support a positive feedback cycle of changes in psychopathology and changes in neuroticism. In the context of a relative stability of neuroticism and affective disorders, only modest contemporaneous and small to modest delayed effects of psychopathology on neuroticism were observed.
The Urban Plan ofVenta Icenorumand its Relationship with the Boudican Revolt
Authors: Bowden William 
Published: April 2013

AbstractThe idea that the town ofVenta Icenorum(Caistor-by-Norwich) was laid out in the early Flavian period, as part of the Roman reaction to the Boudican revolt, has become canonical in literature on Roman Britain. Drawing on the results of recent excavations, this paper re-evaluates the evidence relating to the establishment of the street grid and questions the idea that the town reflects a coherent act of urban planning. It concludes by arguing that previous interpretations of the site within a ‘Boudican’ paradigm are fundamentally flawed.
The Man Who Mistook his Handlung for a Tat: Hegel on Oedipus and Other Tragic Thebans
Authors: Sandis Constantine 
Published: April 2013

Throughout his work Hegel distinguishes between the notion of an act (Tun) from the standpoint of the agent (behaviour in so far as it relates to one's own foreknowledge, purpose, intention, and knowledge) and that of all other standpoints (e.g. legal, scientific, cultural, etc.). He terms the former Handlung (action) and the latter Tat (deed). This distinction should not be confused with the contemporary one between action and mere bodily movement. For one, both Handlung and Tat are aspects of conduct that results from the will, viz. Tun (LA 1160ff.). Moreover, Hegel's taxonomy is motivated purely by concerns relating to modes of perception. So whereas theorists such as Donald Davidson assert that all actions are events that are intentional under some description, Hegel reserves the term ‘action’ for those aspects of behaviour that are highlighted by a specific (albeit contested) set of agent-related descriptions. This is not an ontological category, since there are no such objects as actions-under-specific-descriptions (see Anscombe 1979).Sophocles's Theban Trilogy reveals the central role that these notions must play in any Hegelian understanding of tragic drama. Indeed the contrasts that matter most to Hegel's general take on both epic and tragic poetry are more closely related to the study of action than the standard theory attributed to Hegel would seem to allow. It is more fruitful, then, to incorporate Hegel's insights into such tragedies to the model of action employed by him than it is to try to make them fit whatever ‘theory’ of tragedy might appear to be hinted at in his Aesthetics.
Art and Ethical Life: The Social and Historical Background to Hegel's Reflections on Ancient and Modern Literature in the Mit- and Nachschriften of his Lectures on Aesthetics
Authors: James David 
Published: April 2013

In 1835, a few years after Hegel's death, one of his students, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, put together the first printed edition of the lectures on aesthetics, using Hegel's own lecture notes, which have mostly disappeared, and various student transcripts (Mit- and Nachschriften) of the lectures that Hegel gave on the philosophy of art in Berlin in 1820/21, 1823, 1826 and 1828/29. Hotho made some minor revisions to this edition in 1843 and in the following year. The revised edition of the lectures has until recently formed the basis of all subsequent editions of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics and, consequently, of most previous interpretations of his aesthetics. Hotho's edition of the lectures, however, has been shown to be highly problematic. To begin with, there are the various editorial interventions that Hotho made in order to give Hegel's lectures on aesthetics the systematic form he thought they lacked, while other interventions include various evaluative judgements concerning particular works of art and even some of Hotho's own ideas concerning art.As regards the systematic structure of Hotho's edition of Hegel's lectures on aesthetics, this edition divides the lectures into three main parts, whereas the available student transcripts of the lectures show that only the last series of lectures from 1828/29 were given such a three-part structure by Hegel himself.
Normativity and the Acquisition of the Categories
Authors: Callanan John J. 
Published: April 2013

It is quite common when explicating the nature of Kant's break with the preceding Early Modern tradition to cite his attitude towards the acquisition and deployment of concepts. It is claimed that Kant sought to distinguish two tasks that had become unfortunately intertwined and conflated — explaining how we come to acquire our concepts on the one hand and showing how we are justified in deploying them in judgement on the other. This conflation can be expressed in terms of a conflation of the natural and the normative, of descriptive and prescriptive questions. The topic of the conditions of concept-possession, i.e. how we have come to possess the concepts that we do, is an entirely psychological inquiry, involving ‘natural’ descriptive inquiries. The topic of concept-deployment, the story about how we use our concepts in veridical judgements about the world, is an entirely philosophical question, since it involves the question of how we ought to deploy those concepts in judgement. The fundamental distinction between the natural and the normative is drawn by Kant, it is claimed, in order to distinguish these two practices of acquisition and deployment.The manner in which this claim is expressed is through Kant's distinction between the question of fact (quaestio facti) and the question of right (quaestio juris). I want to claim that a proper understanding of this distinction doesn't support this notion of Kant's ‘normative turn’. In fact, the distinction is best understood within an interpretation whereby Kant is understood as continuing to endorse the Early Modern conviction that the provision of a concept's possession-conditions is sufficient to determine that concept's deployment-conditions, and that the task of the Transcendental Deduction is to determine the possession-conditions for the Categories.
Transformations of Transcendental Philosophy: Wolff, Kant, and Hegel
Authors: de Boer Karin 
Published: April 2013

Kant's philosophy is generally known as transcendental philosophy or transcendental idealism, terms often thought to describe the inquiry into the subjective conditions of empirical knowledge carried out in the Critique of Pure Reason. On this conception of transcendental philosophy Kant is seen to pursue a project very different from both Wolffian metaphysics and Hegelian speculative science. This view is confirmed by scholars who compare Kant's conception of transcendental philosophy to the Scholastics' conception of ‘transcendentals’ such as unity, truth, and perfection. On their account, there remains a puzzling gap between, on the one hand, the scholastic conception of the most general determinations of all beings and, on the other hand, Kant's investigation into the conditions of possibility of experience.In this article I want to challenge this common view of Kant's transcendental philosophy for two reasons. The first reason concerns the question of how the Critique of Pure Reason itself should be read. I take the view that in the first Critique Kant's primary aim is to determine the conditions of synthetic a priori knowledge rather than to identify the a priori conditions of empirical knowledge. Since metaphysics was traditionally considered to be the discipline that possessed a priori knowledge of things, this view makes good sense of Kant's presentation of the Critique of Pure Reason as a work intended to transform metaphysics into a science. In this article I hope to clarify the nature of this transformation by determining the elements which Kant's transcendental philosophy has in common with Wolff's ontology, as well as the respects in which Kant turns against Wolff. I thus hope to solve some of the riddles posed by Kant's use of the term ‘transcendental philosophy’ in the Critique of Pure Reason.
Hegel on the Nature of Scepticism
Authors: Heidemann Dietmar H. 
Published: April 2013

In the Encyclopaedia Logic, Hegel states that ‘philosophy … contains the sceptical as a moment within itself — specifically as the dialectical moment’ (§81, Addition 2), and that ‘scepticism’ as ‘the dialectical moment itself is an essential one in the affirmative Science’ (§78). On the one hand, the connection between scepticism and dialectic is obvious. Hegel claims that scepticism is a problem that cannot be just removed from the philosophical agenda by knock-down anti-sceptical arguments. Scepticism intrinsically belongs to philosophical thinking; that is to say, it plays a constructive role in philosophical thinking. On the other hand, scepticism has to be construed as the view according to which we cannot know whether our beliefs are true, i.e., scepticism plays a destructive role in philosophy no matter what. It is particularly this role that clashes with Hegel's claim of having established a philosophical system of true cognition of the entirety of reality. In the following I argue that for Hegel the constructive and the destructive role of scepticism are reconcilable. I specifically argue that it is dialectic that makes both consistent since scepticism is a constitutive element of dialectic.In order to show in what sense scepticism is an intrinsic feature of dialectic I begin by sketching Hegel's early view of scepticism specifically with respect to logic and metaphysics. The young Hegel construes logic as a philosophical method of human cognition that inevitably results in ‘sceptical’ consequences in that it illustrates the finiteness of human understanding. By doing so, logic not only nullifies finite understanding but also introduces to metaphysics, i.e., the true philosophical science of the absolute.
Hegel's Contradictions
Authors: Palm Ralph 
Published: April 2013

Perhaps one of the most difficult passages in Hegel's Science of Logic is his treatment of contradiction. If each moment of Hegel's logic is understood to constitute a sort of proof and since contradiction itself is presented as a moment of the logic, then in what sense can one comprehend a proof of contradiction as such? It is difficult to formulate this in any way that does not sound fundamentally incoherent, since it is not just at odds with our ordinary way of thinking but also with the overwhelming majority of the Western philosophical tradition. The basic problem, essentially, is this: if Hegel's logic includes contradiction as one of its moments, then how is Hegel's entire philosophical project not simply incoherent?In the first part of this article, I will attempt to demonstrate one way in which Hegel's treatment of contradiction could in fact be considered coherent, through a close reading of the relevant passages. In this reading, I will particularly focus on the function of Hegel's dialectical concept of sublation (aufheben), and attempt to show (by example) how analysing Hegel's nuanced use of sublation can help us to work through some of his logic's complexities. The overall purpose here will be to present a systematic (as opposed to historical) exposition of Hegel's concept of contradiction and to illustrate the important role that this concept (as the contradiction of contradiction) plays in Hegel's logical method.
Logical Form and Ethical Content
Authors: Hahn Songsuk Susan 
Published: April 2013

Hegel's empty formalism charge is taken, virtually without exception, as a serious objection to Kant's categorical imperative and a powerful refutation of his formalist ethics. The dominant interpretation is represented by Bradley, Paton, Mill, Korsgaard, Guyer, Wood, Schneewind, Sedgwick, more recently, Freyenhagen, and others. So far, the dominant interpretation has remained powerfully influential and virtually unchallenged.However, the dominant interpretation tends to take Hegel's empty formalism in isolation from other texts in the corpus, his holistic system, and dialectical method in general. What makes this non-contextualised approach problematic is that it ignores his remarks on formalism in other texts where his use of dialectical and sceptical method is more in evidence. Hegel's emptiness remarks span his entire career, from their appearance in Jena right up to the end of his career in Berlin. In Jena, his views on formal thinking in a logical sense developed alongside his views on formalism in ethics. Prima facie, the arguments bring together two subject matters that seem to have nothing to do with one another. This may explain why no one has given an interpretation that brings the two domains together. But it is worth noting that Kant himself brings logical considerations to bear on his conception of the moral principle. His distinction between the form of a moral principle and its empirical content recalls his characterisation of logical laws in the first Critique (B77-B78/A53-A54).
How biological is human history? Kant's use of biological concepts and its implications for history as moral anthropology
Authors: Vanhaute Liesbet 
Published: April 2013

This article concerns a specific shift in Kant's use of biological concepts in his theory of history. As I argue in the first section, biological concepts play an important role in Kant's early theory of history. However, in the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant explicitly separates history from biology: history and biology become fundamentally different forms of teleological explanation. In the second section, I examine Kant's reasons for the separation of history from biology. I conclude with a discussion of the moral implications of this modification in his historical writings.Kant's main concern in his philosophy of history is the intelligibility of history. How should history be understood, given the fact that it appears to be a mere amalgam of contingent human actions?The reason why historical facts are so confusing and unsystematic is that human behaviour is not fully determined by any particular factor. It is underdetermined by animal instinct, but it is not completely guided by principles of reason either. To address this randomness, philosophers of history must actively search for coherent structures. They must look for concepts and assumptions that help them to grasp the phenomena in a systematic way. Kant suggests that assuming a predisposition which unfolds throughout history is inevitable in this regard. A predisposition is understood as a natural tendency of the human species, which is initially hidden but manifests itself gradually and continually.
Self-Knowledge, Action and the Language of Confession in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit
Authors: Schlösser Ulrich 
Published: April 2013

This paper offers an outline of the central issue Hegel is concerned with in his discussion of spirit. The issue is: how can we possibly confirm our basic and comprehensive claims to validity? In the ‘Spirit’ section of the Phenomenology, Hegel focuses on what we nowadays would call ‘thick conceptions’. The corresponding claims to knowledge relate (a) to a general worldview and (b) to the objective norms embedded in this worldview. Furthermore, they also include (c) a claim to self-knowledge, which is correlated to both.Hegel suggests that if we want to validate these claims we should not look at merely given facts but at the actions performed on the basis of these claims — it's the deed that matters. But in making claims, we are also addressing others. The resulting questions are: How can they possibly recognise the action as a manifestation of the underlying principles? What follows for my self-knowledge if I accept that the judgement of others contributes to what the action really is and thus what it says about me?The first part of the paper explores the general framework underlying Hegel's discussion of spirit. The second part exemplifies Hegel's conception by referring to different cultural realisations of spirit put forward in the sixth chapter of his Phenomenology: the focus will be on Hegel's interpretation of Sophocles' tragedy, Antigone. In the brief, final part I would like to point to three features of Hegel's account of spirit that I take to be still worthy of consideration.