bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Cryoethics
Authors: Shaw David M. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Cryoethics is a new theme within bioethics (
see
bioethics
) concerned with the ethics of cryonic storage. Cryonics, which is also erroneously referred to as “cryogenic” technology, offers people the option of having their bodies or brain‐stems preserved at very low temperatures after death in order to be revived at some point in the future when technology is sufficiently advanced to enable reanimation, and possibly immortality. The main issues in cryoethics center around whether it is ethical to use this technology, and whether it is prudent to do so (
see
PRUDENCE
). While there are several prudential and ethical arguments against cryonic storage, there is only one argument in favor, but it is quite powerful: the possibility of cheating death for a few years, or even forever if technology advances enough in the time before revival (Shaw 2009).
Sartre, Jean‐Paul
Authors: Sherman David 
Published: January 2013

AbstractFollowing World War II, Jean‐Paul Sartre (1905–80) emerged as the leading existentialist philosopher in France (seeExistentialism), and he subsequently became one of the most important philosophers working in the Western Marxist tradition (seeMarx, Karl). Sartre was also a novelist and playwright, as well as the personification of the public intellectual. Ethical considerations pervaded Sartre's thought, but the ethical concerns raised in his existentialist works are not clearly reducible to the kinds of concerns raised by the standard ethical theories, and his Marxist works do not appear to raise any ethical concerns at all. Nevertheless, as is reflected in various unpublished writings, Sartre continued to raise ethical concerns after his turn toward Marxism, and the ethical concerns he raises throughout his oeuvre are often motivated by the kinds of concerns that motivate the standard ethical theories.
Free Riding
Authors: Cullity Garrett 
Published: January 2013

Abstract“Free riding,” used as a descriptive term, refers to taking a jointly produced benefit without contributing towards its production. Used as a term of criticism, it refers to the wrongful failure to contribute towards the joint production of benefits that one receives. On either usage, the central interest of moral philosophy in free riding is the same: to specify the conditions under which not contributing towards the joint production of benefits that one receives is wrong, and to explain why.
Nonviolence in Religions
Authors: Hahn Tapper Aaron J. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe twentieth century saw more human‐perpetrated death and destruction – violence – than any previous period in history. Simultaneously, it saw the rise and spread of new developments in the field of nonviolence, arguably a more powerful force. But since it was birthed, “nonviolence” has had numerous incarnations; it has not had any single meaning. Commonly used as a synonym for peace, this religio‐political notion is incredibly complex, having been associated with the following ideas, for example:ahimsa,satyagraha, truth, peace,salam,shalom, love, civil disobedience, pacifism, and passive resistance (seeLove; Civil Disobedience; Pacifism). This essay briefly examines how “nonviolence” is understood in the Hindu (seeHindu Ethics), Buddhist (seeBuddhist Ethics), Jain (seeJain Ethics), Jewish, Islamic (seeIslamic Ethics), and Christian (seeEarly Christian Ethics) religious traditions. Though there is no doubt that important figures such as the Dalai Lama (the spiritual leader of the Tibetan Buddhist community), Guru Nanak (the founder of Sikhism), and Confucius (the founder of Confucianism;seeConfucian Ethics), among others, should likewise be included in this essay, their approaches to nonviolence have been omitted for reasons unrelated to their supreme importance to this topic.
Ecological Restoration
Authors: Glazebrook Trish 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Ecological restoration is the practice of ecosystem management that alters an ecosystem, site, or area in order to return it to an earlier state. Restoration is most commonly intended to reestablish conditions at a site prior to a specific human intervention, especially resource extraction, by changing a degraded system's structure, function, diversity, and/or processes so that the system appears less disturbed and is self‐sustaining. Elements of an ecosystem usually managed during restoration include surface and groundwater, soil, rocks, and vegetation, although further biodiversity may also be included. Projects vary widely from removing an invasive species to reconstruction of an entire landscape.
James,William
Authors: Pihlström Sami 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWilliam James (1842–1910), one of the most important American philosophers and psychologists, was among the founders of the philosophical tradition ofpragmatism, emphasizing the intimate connection between philosophical (and generally intellectual) theory and reflection, on the one side, and human action and practices of life, on the other (James 1975 [1907], 1977a [1909];seePragmatic Ethics; Pragmatic Theory of Action; Praxis). James's psychological work (culminating in James 1981 [1890]) played a crucial role in the emergence of scientific psychology. His explorations of the psychological and philosophical dimensions of religious experience (James 1985 [1902]) have gained recognition across disciplinary boundaries. Trained as a medical scientist, James was an original thinker with an unusually broad scope, ranging from psychology and philosophy to religious studies and even psychical research.
Niebuhr, Reinhold
Authors: Lovin Robin W. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractReinhold Niebuhr (1892–1971) was a leading American theologian and political thinker. Born into a German–American family, Niebuhr grew up in Missouri and Illinois and followed his father into the Protestant ministry in the German Evangelical Synod, a denomination that is now part of the United Church of Christ. After serving as a pastor in Detroit for more than a decade, Niebuhr joined the faculty of Union Theological Seminary in New York in 1928. The racial tensions and labor unrest he had experienced in Detroit, together with the general deterioration of the global economic and political situation, led him to abandon the optimistic expectations of liberal Protestantism in favor of a more sober assessment of human possibilities known as “Christian realism.” Niebuhr's theological, historical, and cultural arguments for this realism proved highly persuasive to a generation seeking a plausible moral case for democracy during World War II and the Cold War that followed, and his sermons, lectures, and writing had wide influence not only among theologians and philosophers, but also among politicians, diplomats, and policymakers.
Buber, Martin
Authors: Wood Robert E. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractMartin Buber (1878–1965) was a Jewish philosopher who responded to the struggle between Haskalah or Jewish Enlightenment and Hasidism or Jewish mysticism by assimilating both. He developed a universal philosophy that was linked to the mysticism of the everyday promoted by Hasidism. His basic ethical orientation confronts both morality and religion: “Just as there is nothing that can hide from us the face of our fellow man so much as morality can, so there is nothing that can hide from us the face of God as religion can” (1961: 18). For Buber, morality and religion are intimately tied together.
Goodness, Varieties of
Authors: Österman Bernt 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
The term “good” is used in many different contexts, both as an adjective and as a noun. Goodness may be attributed to a wide range of different objects. Most philosophers seem to agree that it is possible to draw a distinction between moral uses and nonmoral uses of the term. When we speak of a good man, a good motive, a good action, or refer to something as a “good thing,” the use is obviously moral. It seems equally clear that good laptops, good soccer balls, and good dentists, generally at least, are good in a nonmoral sense.
Retribution
Authors: Bennett Christopher 
Published: January 2013

AbstractSome people think that, if punishment can be justified at all, then it can only be justified because it has some good future effects, such as deterring potential criminals (Bentham 1907: Chs. 13–14). We could call this position atechnocraticposition on punishment: it sees punishment as a particular technique that might rationally be adopted for bringing about some desirable results – though only if there are no better nonpunitive alternatives. Others suspect that this cannot be all that there is to the importance of punishment. What about the case of holding to account a sex murderer who is now elderly and unlikely to be a danger to the public? It might seem as though something in oursense of justiceapplauds the fact that this person, having got away with it for so long, will now get his just deserts (seePunishment; Justice). You might experience the same feeling at the end of a film in which the bad guy finally gets his comeuppance. This sense of justice can be thought of as a desire forretribution. The idea of retribution is the idea that it might be important that a person be punished, or made to suffer, or have something bad happen to them, not simply (as in the technocrat position) because it is an efficient way to bring about some desirable results, but rather because of something bad or wrong that they did in the past. Whereas the technocratic position takes the importance of punishment to derive from future benefits, the idea of retribution is sometimes said to be backward‐looking: it sees the punishment as essential to “do justice to” some previously committed wrong.
Pragmatic Theory of Action
Authors: Kilpinen Erkki 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Human beings are creatures of habit. That only a being with habits could have a mind like ours is a recently established finding in cognitive science (Noë 2009). It supports the original thesis of classic pragmatism that human life as we know it would be impossible without habits. Pragmatism is a philosophy of action, but a curious one in that it refers to human doings by the term “habit,” and less by “action” (Kilpinen 2009a, 2009b). Having said this, one must hasten to make the next important point. In pragmatist discourse about action, the central term is old and established, but its underlying meaning is radically new; so new that it has never received its full due attention. Every school in philosophy and the human sciences is aware that the phenomenon of habit exists – i.e., repetitive action that operates before we have time for reflection, as David Hume once said (
see
Hume, David). In this sense the term is traceable to ancient Greece and medieval Scholasticism (Camic 1986). In modern times it has received an equivalent appellation: routine. A point that cannot be overemphasized is that this is not the pragmatist meaning of the term. The pragmatist meaning is more comprehensive and advanced, in which the habitual action process – which does not have to be merely repetitive – is,
pace
Hume, within the reach of reflection. Pragmatism maintains that these two phenomena, reflection and ongoing action, can overlap, even mix with each other. This does not concern merely everyday routines, but also those modes of action that traditionally have been taken to be the most important: the intelligent and the rational. According to pragmatism, we do not just slavishly follow our habitual routines, although this phenomenon is real and is to be included in the treatment of action. More importantly, we can be discursively aware of our own habits, even during their occurrence, distance ourselves from them, and objectify them for scrutiny. This is a novelty in the pragmatist conception of action. A simple example would be about how to drive a car. If there is a bend in the road, we must turn the steering wheel, and this needs to be done automatically, without pondering whether or not to. However, merely turning the wheel is not enough. If the road is slippery, we had better make a smooth turn, not turn the wheel too abruptly, whereas on a dry road this is less important. And we are supposed to know all this, both discursively and as physical skill, and negotiate our bends accordingly.
Good and Good for
Authors: Rønnow‐Rasmussen Toni 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIntuitively, if, in a tennis match betweenaandb,aplayed while injured and therefore lost, the following three claims would make sense: the injury was not good for persona; the injury was good forb; and it is not good, period, that the match was settled in this unfair way. In philosophy, there is a long tradition of treating as two separate inquiries the questions “what things aregood, period?” and “what things aregood forus (either in general or for some particular person)?” The former involves what has generally been considered an impersonal, moral, nonrelational value, the latter a personal (prudential or subjective) relational value: a “value for someone.” Just how far back the tradition stretches remains to be examined, though. For instance, it is still a matter of interpretation whether ancient Greek philosophy acknowledged the two varieties of good. In this essay focus is on “good for” and how it relates to “good, period.” However, it should be stressed that philosophers distinguish between several other kinds of good (seeGoodness, Varieties of).
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Authors: Harcourt Edward 
Published: January 2013

AbstractFor a philosopher best known for his work outside ethics and whose best‐known view about ethics is that ethics “cannot be put into words” (Wittgenstein 1974 [1922]: 6.421), there is a surprising amount to say about Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) and ethics. The subject can be divided into two: Wittgenstein's ethics, and developments in ethics under Wittgenstein's influence. The subject of Wittgenstein's ethics itself subdivides into Wittgenstein's explicit writings on ethics, and the ethical significance which his work, even when not explicitly concerned with ethics, has widely been thought to bear.
Social Contract
Authors: Fabre Cécile 
Published: January 2013

AbstractContrast the following two political communities: one is governed by rulers who have not at any point elicited their subjects' consent to their rulership; the other is governed by rulers who would not be in power were it not for the consent of those who are subject to their laws. According to social contract theory, the former rulers are illegitimate, precisely in so far as they do not govern with the consent of the governed, whereas the latter are legitimate, precisely insofar as they govern with such consent (seeConsent).
Collective Responsibility
Authors: Shockley Kenneth 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Groups of people can be responsible for what they do. When two people rob a bank, or work together to build a charity center, they are responsible for what they do. But can a group, apart from the individuals in it, be responsible? Can we hold a corporation or a nation responsible? Can we hold such groups
morally
responsible? Or are such appeals to responsibility merely shorthand for the attribution of responsibility, moral or otherwise, to individual members of such groups in virtue of their membership? This essay will examine the philosophical issues underlying these questions, and consider some of the arguments for versions of collective responsibility.
Omissions
Authors: Persson Ingmar 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Omissions to act are primarily of ethical interest because of the deontological act‐omission doctrine (
see
Deontology). Roughly, this doctrine is to the effect that it is harder to justify morally the (active) causing of certain kinds of harm, for example death, than letting them happen by omitting to act in some way. Suppose that whenever you omit doing some action, you allow something to be the case, or let it be the case, for example let some state or process continue. Suppose also that whenever you allow something to be the case, it occurs by your omitting to do some action. Then the act‐omission doctrine would be equivalent to a doctrine of doing and allowing (
see
Doing and Allowing). However, some philosophers claim that you can allow something to be the case by acting rather than merely by omitting to act, and some other philosophers claim that by omitting to act, you can
do
things rather than allow them to be the case. If either of these views is right, omissions might be of less moral interest than allowings, so I shall begin by critically examining these views before defining the concept of an omission.
Moral Reasoning
Authors: Black Sam 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe most fundamental disagreement about moral reasoning is whether moral wisdom is necessary for good moral reasoning, and if so, how. This controversy dates back to the origins of Western philosophy. According to Plato in theRepublic, moral reasoning resembles reasoning in geometry, with one major difference. Geometrical reasoning is said to regard its axioms as beyond critical scrutiny, whereas knowledge of the highest good is attained through the method of philosophical dialectic. For Plato, wisdom is knowledge of the highest good. Once that knowledge has been acquired, moral reasoning proceeds, like geometry, to deduce rules and to resolve particular cases through application of those rules (Plato 1992: Pt. 7, Bk. 6). In theNicomachean Ethics, Aristotle disavows this model of moral reasoning, maintaining that unlike precise sciences such as geometry, all general rules in ethics have exceptions. The notion that good moral reasoning is the derivation and application of clear‐cut rules is consequently misguided (Aristotle 2000: Bk. 1.3). For Aristotle, wisdom resembles the practical skills found among master craftsmen. Wisdom must be acquired from worldly experience and not from dialectic alone. And because wisdom requires training at the hands of those who are skilled it is accessible only to people who have the good fortune to be well brought up.
Conscientious Objection
Authors: Coady C. A. J. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractConscientious objection to state commands is not a wholly modern phenomenon. In the early phase of Western civilization, the Greek philosopher Socrates, now a revered figure in our culture, refused an order from political authority to carry out an immoral action. Socrates was commanded, along with four others, to arrest Leon of Salamis, so that the latter could be put to death (seeSocrates). The tyrants wanted men of repute to carry out this command because this would have given their regime of terror more public standing. But Socrates ignored the order and simply went home.
Smith, Adam
Authors: Garrett Aaron 
Published: January 2013

AbstractAdam Smith's main work of moral philosophy,The Theory of Moral Sentiments(TMS), first appeared in 1759. It was Adam Smith's favorite among his works, was one of the major works of the Scottish Enlightenment, and is again being seen as one of the most important works of moral philosophy of the eighteenth century. Smith was born in Kircaldy, Scotland in 1723 and educated first at Kircaldy and then Glasgow and Oxford. In Glasgow he studied with Francis Hutcheson (seeHutcheson, Francis), the leading figure in the rise of Moderate religious and intellectual culture in Scotland and one of the greatest influences on Smith as a moral philosopher. Smith found Oxford to be intellectually impoverished and upon leaving he returned to Scotland where he lectured on rhetoric at Edinburgh. He was then called to the Chair of Logic in Glasgow in 1751 and soon after the Chair of Moral Philosophy, which had been held by Hutcheson. Smith resigned in 1763 to travel to Europe as the tutor to the Duke of Buccleuch. He published theWealth of Nations(WON) in 1776 to great acclaim. Smith also planned to produce works on natural law which would provide a bridge between the moral theory of theTMSand the political economy ofWON, but the manuscripts and notes were destroyed after Smith's death in 1790, although student notes from the courses which Smith gave on natural law have been preserved.
Offense
Authors: Shoemaker David 
Published: January 2013

AbstractPhilosophical interest in offense is a relatively recent phenomenon, and it has focused almost exclusively on whether or not offensive conduct ought to be restricted by the liberal state. This essay will explore the nature of offense, its distinction from harm, and the philosophical case for the restriction of offense in public life, primarily by focusing on the pioneering work of Joel Feinberg (1926–2004;seeFeinberg, Joel).
Communitarianism
Authors: Muirhead Russell 
Published: January 2013

AbstractCommunitarianism affirms that the community rather than the individual should be the primary focus of philosophic and political attention. For contemporary communitarians, individuals remain important, but the moral significance of individual lives is inextricably bound to communities. In its recent iteration, communitarianism refers to a development in political theory in the 1980s and 1990s associated most prominently with such philosophers as Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, and Michael Walzer. But in the most general sense, communitarian ideas can be traced back to Aristotle, whosePoliticsasserts that the full development of individual capacities presupposes a certain kind of political community, and that in this respect “the city is prior to … each of us” (I.2 p. 37: 1253a20;seeAristotle). Among modern philosophers, communitarianism has an affinity with Hegel's thought, which explains moral ideals by reference to social conventions, orsittlichkeit(seeHegel, Georg Willhem Friedrich).
Eastern Orthodox Ethics
Authors: Hamalis Perry T. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
The term “Eastern Orthodox Ethics” carries two common meanings. First, it refers to a normative way of life that reflects the teachings of the Eastern Orthodox Church about how to live, about right and wrong, and about the meaning of human flourishing. Second, it refers to the discipline of scholarly inquiry and application practiced by religious ethicists working within the tradition of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. Before considering the term's two meanings in greater detail, a brief overview of the Eastern Orthodox Church will orient and ground the topic.
Doctrine of Double Effect
Authors: Marquis Don 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe doctrine of double effect (hereafter DDE) is so called because it is concerned with the moral permissibility of actions that have both a good effect and a bad effect. DDE is an important part of standard Catholic moral philosophy and also has been defended by some philosophers outside the Catholic tradition. It consists of criteria for the moral permissibility of actions that are typically morally wrong. Joseph Mangan's (1949: 43) statement of DDE is best known:
Fatherhood
Authors: Hubin Donald C. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWhile fatherhood has received significantly less philosophical attention than motherhood (seeMotherhood), spurred by advances in reproductive technologies and changes in social arrangements for raising children, interest in both the concept of fatherhood and the basis of paternal rights and responsibilities has increased in recent years. Despite this increased attention, there remain significant disagreements concerning both topics. These disagreements raise serious problems for law and social policy. (See Anderson 1992; Shanley 1995a, 1995b; Cannold 2002; Hubin 2003: 50–60.)