bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Well‐Being
Authors: Kraut Richard 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIn ordinary speech, “well‐being” is often used interchangeably with such terms as “health,” “happiness,” and “prosperity” (seeHappiness). To be concerned about someone's well‐being is to care whether he is doing or faring well. The word “well” that appears in these expressions plays an evaluative role – it is the adverbial form of the adjective “good,” and of course “good” is a grade we use to evaluate things. If someone is well‐off, his life is good. Hence, it is not surprising that we commonly move back and forth so easily between “well‐being” and such terms as “health,” “happiness,” and “prosperity”: most people assume that the life of a human being is a good one – that someone living such a life is faring well – only if it has at least some measure of these goods.
Cudworth, Ralph
Authors: Schroeder Mark 
Published: January 2013

AbstractRalph Cudworth (1617–88) was a leading member of the Cambridge Platonists, and an early and important influence on the British rationalist moral philosophers of the eighteenth century. In 1645 he became master of Clare Hall in Cambridge and was elected Regius Professor of Hebrew, and in 1654 became master of Christ's College, where he continued until his death in 1688. He was recognized as a leader among the Cambridge Platonists, a group of thinkers including, in addition to Cudworth, Henry More, Benjamin Whichcote, Nathaniel Culverwel, Peter Sterry, John Worthington, and John Smith.
Conservation Biology
Authors: Sagoff Mark 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIn an influential article published in 1985, biologist Michael Soulé announced the emergence of a new biological science, conservation biology (hereafter “CB”), which differed from other applied biological sciences such as forestry, fisheries, and wildlife management. These traditional disciplines address problems associated with individual species and the use of particular natural resources, for example sustainable yields. In contrast, CB “tends to be holistic,” Soulé wrote, and embraces normative postulates “that make up the basis of an ethic of appropriate attitudes toward other forms of life.” These postulates state: (1) “Diversity of organisms is good”; (2) “Ecological complexity is good”; (3) “Evolution is good”; and (4) “Biotic diversity has intrinsic value, irrespective of its instrumental or utilitarian value.” The mission of the Society for Conservation Biology, founded in 1986 and now with over 10,000 members, is “To advance the science and practice of conserving the Earth's biological diversity” (seeEvolution, Ethics and).
Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem
Authors: Jacobson Daniel 
Published: January 2013

AbstractA reason is said to be “of the wrong kind” when, although it counts as a consideration broadly in favor of (or against) having an attitude such as belief or desire toward some proposition or object, it doesnotbear on whether the proposition is true or the object valuable (seeReasons). To say that something is a wrong kind of reason (WKR), however, is not to say that it is a bad reason. Some WKRs seem to provide excellent reasons to believe or desire – or to have some emotion such as amusement, admiration, fear, and so forth. (Even this claim will prove contentious, as we shall see, but not in a way that calls into question the goodness of certain WKRs, only what they are good reasons for.) The central case in the recent literature concerns what can be called a demonic incentive: A demon credibly threatens to punish you unless you desire or admire something that, quite obviously, is not desirable or admirable. When the incentive is compelling enough, it apparently provides conclusive reason to believep, desirex, or admirey, if you can; but it is not a reason that showspto be true,xgood, oryadmirable. The fact that a demon will punish you unless you desire a cup of mud is thus the quintessential example of a wrong kind of reason to desire the mud, since such an exogenous incentive obviously does not make the mud desirable (Crisp 2000).
Faith
Authors: Roberts Robert C. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Not many decades ago, ethics was thought to be about the class of
actions
that are subject to adjudication in terms of
duty
: obligatory, proscribed, or permitted but not obligatory. The 1970s and 1980s began to allow ethics also to be about virtues and vices that might have little to do with obligation: courage and cowardice, generosity, stinginess, and profligacy, and so forth. Today ethics may also treat of personal relationships: friendship, marriage, parenthood, civic bonds (
see
civic friendship
;
family
;
fatherhood
;
filial duties
;
friendship
;
marriage
;
motherhood
). The concepts of such relationships naturally suggest an ethical ideality: the idea of an
excellent
friendship, marriage, and so on – and ethicists explore the lineaments of such idealities. Faith is an excellent personal relationship with God.
Reflective Equilibrium
Authors: DePaul Michael 
Published: January 2013

AbstractNelson Goodman (1965: 66–7) introduced the method of reflective equilibrium (RE) into contemporary philosophy as a way to justify principles of induction and deduction. John Rawls (seeRawls, John) brought the approach over to moral and political philosophy, employing it to construct his theory of justice. It is to Rawls (1971: 19–21, 48–51) that we owe the term “reflective equilibrium.” In his early and influential paper on the topic, Norman Daniels described RE as “an attempt to produce coherence in an ordered triple of sets of beliefs held by a particular person, namely (a) a set of considered moral judgments, (b) a set of moral principles, and (c) a set of relevant background theories” (1979: 258). RE has become the default view of how moral inquiry should be conducted even though it is controversial how RE should be understood and RE faces serious objections.
Tragedy of the Commons
Authors: Schmidtz David 
Published: January 2013

AbstractToday, the word “tragedy” is used to refer generically to anything really bad. The word has an older meaning, though, referring to literary works that depict a protagonist caught up in events inexorably leading to his or her doom. Some of that older meaning is implicit in the logic of what we now call the “tragedy of the commons.” The phrase was invented by Garrett Hardin (1968), who credits the idea to W. F. Lloyd (1833); (see also H. Scott Gordon 1954).
Pharmacist Ethics
Authors: Ho Dien 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
The diverse professional roles which modern pharmacists play create an ethical landscape that gives rise to a variety of moral problems. In order to understand the different types of ethical issues in pharmacy ethics, we must examine some of the main professional roles pharmacists undertake. This essay examines three of these roles and outlines the interdependency between the professional roles of pharmacists and ethical issues generated by them.
Marx, Karl
Authors: Reiman Jeffrey 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Karl Marx did not present a systematic analysis of the moral good (Kamenka 1969: 2). He did, however, have a moral vision – a notion of the good human life – that has proven extremely influential. We can see that vision by considering what Marx took to be evils of capitalist society and projecting from them to what he thought a good human society would be like. Marx had two main objections to capitalism. First, he thought that capitalism was
alienating
: it estranged human beings from their labor, their bodies, their fellows, and from nature. Second, he thought that capitalism was (effectively)
unjust
: it exploited workers by forcing them to give more labor to capitalists than they were compensated for. Though there is controversy over whether Marx's basic views on these matters changed or remained the same over his life, it is fair to say that the alienation charge is most fully developed in Marx's early writings, in particular
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
; and the injustice charge is most fully developed in Marx's later writings, in particular
Capital
. To these charges must also be added that Marx had a critical view of prevailing moral notions, in particular justice, rights, and liberty. They were products of the society in which they arose and, as such, tended to be understood in ways that disguised the moral failings of that society. That moral notions could function in this
ideological
way is a distinct and important Marxian contribution to ethics. Accordingly, the discussion here will be divided into three parts: (1) alienation, (2) injustice, and (3) ideology.
Relativism, Moral
Authors: Wong David B. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractTwo kinds of moral relativism – metaethical and normative – are here distinguished. Metaethical relativism holds that conflicting moral judgments can both be correct. Normative relativism holds that we have moral reason not to impose our moral views on others if their opposing views are as correct as ours. The most radical versions of these views attract the most attention and criticism: as morally dangerous because they allegedly encourage a light regard for morality and the need for patient, critical examination of difficult moral issues; as confused because they conflate the moral value of tolerance with moral neutrality; and as ill‐founded, because they take diversity in moral belief as direct evidence for the absence of universally valid moral requirements. On the other side, moral relativists have taken such criticisms to reflect a moral imperialism that does not trouble itself with an attempt to understand before judging the different to be inferior or mistaking dogmatism for well‐founded conviction. In their more moderate forms these relativist views deserve dispassionate consideration on the basis of their power to explain and respond to fundamental moral disagreement.
Reasons, Internal and External
Authors: Arkonovich Steven 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIt is common sense to say that, at least sometimes, what someone has reason to do depends on what he or she wants. It is a philosophical doctrine – a doctrine called “internalism” – to hold that this is always the case, and so to say that all of one's reasons for action depend on one's desires. According to internalism, any consideration (whether it concerns prudence, morality, aesthetics, finance, etc.) can give rise to reasons only for those agents who care about such considerations. I will sometimes refer to the internalism that concerns us here as “reasons internalism” to indicate that it is a completely general view about the conditions under which agents have reason to act.
Dewey, John
Authors: Eldridge Michael 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIt is questionable whether John Dewey (1859–1952) (seePragmatic Ethics) had a moral philosophy; certainly, the foremost American philosopher of the first half of the twentieth century did not have a well‐worked out systematic moral philosophy presented in one place or in a series of books or articles (for the latter claim, see Pappas 2008: 4). This is not all that surprising, for Dewey rejected or was ambivalent about many of the usual philosophical categories – metaphysics (Seigfried 2004; Eldridge 2005: 631–2), epistemology (Eldridge 2005: 632), philosophy of religion (Eldridge 1998: 126–69), and political theory (Eldridge 1998: 67). To be sure, he reflected on morality and one can, using his work, engage contemporary moral philosophy, as Pappas (2008), Elizabeth Anderson (2010), and Jennifer Welchman (2010) have done. Pappas has even attempted to develop Dewey's “moral vision” into a cohesive whole (Pappas 2008: 4). Dewey did philosophically consider morality in such works asHuman Nature and Conduct(1922) and the popular textbookEthics(Dewey and Tufts 1985 [1908]). But he also thought conventional morality was inadequate for the times in which he lived (Anderson 2010) and his naturalistic (seeNaturalism, Ethical) but cognitivist theory (Welchman 2010) was at odds with the prevailing metaethics of G. E. Moore (seeMoore, G. E.), other intuitionists (seeIntuitionism, Moral), and the ensuing emotivists (seeEmotivism) and other non‐cognitivists (seeNon‐cognitivism) whose work dominated the first two‐thirds of the twentieth century. Not only was Dewey's normative theory not one of the standard ones (utilitarian, deontological, or virtue ethics) (seeUtilitarianism;Deontology;Virtue ethics), but his work shows little concern with universality or realism; rather, he proposed that we engage in intelligent action. A recommendation to be experimental in one's conduct would seem to drain that which is compelling from morality as ordinarily understood.
Moore, G. E.
Authors: Baldwin Thomas 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

G. E. Moore (1873–1958) was one of the most influential British philosophers of the twentieth century. His career was based in Cambridge (England), where he was Professor of Philosophy and a close associate of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein. During the course of his life Moore addressed a broad range of philosophical issues, but in his early writings it is ethical questions which are given most attention, most notably in his only substantial monograph,
Principia Ethica
(1993). Moore wrote
Principia Ethica
while he held a prize fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge, which he had been awarded on the basis of a dissertation on “The Metaphysical Basis of Ethics” (see Moore 2011). After completing
Principia Ethica
in 1903, however, Moore devoted relatively little attention to ethical theory apart from a short introductory book,
Ethics
, which he completed in 1912 (Moore 1966). But in 1941, finding himself confronted by several critical essays on his ethical theory in
The Philosophy of G. E. Moore
, he wrote a substantial reply to them (Moore 1942).
Early Christian Ethics
Authors: Cahill Lisa Sowle 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe term “early Christian ethics” may refer to the historical study of the morality and ethical ideals of Jesus himself and his first followers; to those of later communities who produced the Christian New Testament, as well as other “noncanonical” texts, from the middle to the end of the first century; or to the ethics of Christian communities from the second through fourth centuries (seeAugustine, Saint), particularly the second.
Proportionality (in War)
Authors: Haque Adil Ahmad 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Proportionality imposes moral and legal constraints on at least two aspects of the use of force by parties to an armed conflict (
see
War). First, proportionality is part of
jus ad bellum
, the moral and legal norms which constrain the initial resort to armed force, as well as the continuation of armed conflict. Second, proportionality is part of
jus in bello
, the moral and legal norms which regulate the conduct of hostilities. In both contexts, proportionality judgments depend on an evaluation of the relevant harms and relevant benefits brought about by military force; a standard specifying whether and to what extent the benefits must outweigh the harms or vice versa; as well as external variables, such as intention, national identity, and responsibility, which may alter the moral significance of the harms and benefits or the applicable standard of comparison (Hurka 2005).
Sexual Harassment
Authors: Cudd Ann E. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Sexual harassment is discriminatory and harassing conduct that involves sexual, heterosexist, or sexist behavior and violates the rights (
see
Civil Rights) of individuals not to be harassed in employment (
see
Employers And Employees) or education. Sexual harassment was invented as a concept in US law by Catharine MacKinnon in her 1979 work
Sexual Harassment of Working Women
, in which she argued that it is a form of prohibited sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. She identified two types of such harassment: quid pro quo, “in which sexual compliance is exchanged, or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment opportunity,” and what has become known as “hostile environment sexual harassment,” where sexual harassment is a pervasive condition of the work environment (MacKinnon 1979: 32). The two types introduce different philosophical complications about what is wrong about the behavior. Quid pro quo raises the issue of how an offer can be coercive (
see
Coercive Wage Offers); hostile environment problematizes the harms (
see
Harm) of and criteria for judging sexual harassment. Both types are also recognized in educational environments as rights violations. Claims of sexual harassment have broadened beyond MacKinnon's original conception to include harassment of homosexuals, transgender persons, and other gender norm violators, and sexual harassment of men by other men. The analysis of the wrongness of sexual harassment has been reconceived to fit these various forms. While objections to sexual harassment as a unified conception of harm have been made, recognition of the many types of harms that go under the name sexual harassment represents significant moral progress.
Global Business Ethics
Authors: Frederick Robert 
Published: January 2013

AbstractGlobal business ethics has both empirical and normative aspects. From an empirical point of view it is an investigation of the actual ethical practices of profit oriented businesses engaged in buying and selling goods and services in the world economy. The normative point of view has two subdivisions. First, it is a discussion of the normative role businesses ought to play with respect to local and global moral problems; and second, given that role, of the ethical norms and procedures they ought to follow as they deal with specific issues such as poverty, wages and working conditions, corruption, healthcare, education, ethnic and religious conflict, environmental degradation, and human rights violations (seeGlobal Poverty; Rights) The primary focus of this essay will be on the first part of the normative aspect for two main reasons. First, it is important to be clear about the normative role of business before making judgments about what an individual business ought or ought not to do with respect to specific moral problems. Second, particular problems, e.g., environmental pollution, are both highly context dependent and rapidly changing, making it difficult to say anything constructive about what a business morally ought to do about them without a detailed analysis of local conditions. Such an analysis is beyond the scope of this essay. However, there are certain conditions in which global business operates that are essential for understanding the normative role of business. Some of these are briefly described in the next section.
Pro‐Attitudes
Authors: Sehon Scott 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe term “pro‐attitude” is a quasi‐technical term that philosophers have used to designate a loosely defined subset of mental states. Which subset is thereby specified to be in the extension of the term varies somewhat from philosopher to philosopher, and the usage has shifted over time. The term is sometimes used in the process of characterizing various philosophical doctrines, including expressivism, non‐cognitivism, and the Humean theory of motivation (seeCognitivism; Non‐Cognitivism; Motivation, Humean Theory of).
Imperfect Duties
Authors: Baron Marcia 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Although the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties predates Immanuel Kant (1724–1804;
see
Kant, Immanuel), it received its most sustained and (currently) most influential development from Kant. Kant mentions the distinction in the
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
, explaining it briefly in a footnote and indicating that he will develop it more fully in a future work. In that footnote (
Groundwork
421, n.) he says he understands a perfect duty (
see
Duty and Obligation) as “one that admits no exception in favor of inclination,” leaving the reader to surmise that imperfect duties do allow exceptions in favor of inclinations. In
The Metaphysics of Morals
, where he develops the distinction, the distinction is more complex and less tidy than it sounded in the
Groundwork
. Indeed it is untidy enough that it is more accurate to view imperfect duties as falling along a slide which at one end has juridical duties (those duties that entail a corresponding right to exercise compulsion) (
see
Rights) and at the other, those duties with greatest latitude (what Thomas E. Hill, Jr. [1992] has called the “wide imperfect duties”).
Desire Theories of the Good
Authors: Lukas Mark 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Desire theories of the good hold that we are better off, in some fundamental way, if the things we want to happen do, and we are worse off if they do not. If we think of the objects of desire as propositions, we can say that a person's desire that P is
satisfied
if P is true and
frustrated
if P is false. We can then characterize a desire satisfaction as a state of affairs consisting of a person desiring that P and P being true and a desire frustration as one consisting of a person desiring that P and P being false. Desire theories of the good, then, tell us that the basic constituents of well‐being are desire satisfaction and desire frustration (
see
Well‐Being).
Moral Absolutes
Authors: Robinson Luke 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

The term “moral absolute” refers to many different ideas. In contemporary moral philosophy, it most commonly refers to the idea of a moral prohibition or rule that holds without exception. Less commonly, it refers to the idea of a moral rule or standard that applies to all moral agents, rather than only to members of a particular society or culture or only to particular individuals (e.g., those who accept it). The present topic is moral absolutes in the first of these two senses (hereinafter, “moral absolutes”). Notable philosophers who have maintained that there are such absolutes include Immanuel Kant and Elizabeth Anscombe (
see
Kant, Immanuel; Anscombe, G. E. M.). And the debate over the existence of moral absolutes has implications not only for general moral theory, but also for many topics in applied ethics and just war theory. For example, the question of whether the prohibition on deliberately killing the innocent is absolute has important implications for abortion, euthanasia, and noncombatant immunity (
see
Abortion; Euthanasia; Civilian Immunity).
Kelsen, Hans
Authors: Paulson Stanley L. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractHans Kelsen (1881–1973) was born in Prague. Three years later, the family moved to Vienna, where Kelsen attended a Protestant primary school and then Vienna's highly respectedAkademisches Gymnasium. In 1906 he took a doctorate in law at the University of Vienna, and, five years later, he completed theHabilitation, a procedure in the German‐speaking countries that includes a major dissertation and leads to thevenia legendior state license to hold university lectures. Kelsen published the dissertation under the titleHauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre(1911; Main Problems in the Theory of Public Law). Notwithstanding its title, the treatise is decidedly juridico‐philosophical in character, and its profound challenge to psychologism and naturalism (seeNature and the Natural) in legal science distinguished Kelsen, from the beginning, as a figure to reckon with.
Xunzi
Authors: Stalnaker Aaron 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Xunzi (“Master Xun,” ca. 310–ca. 220
bce
) was the third great Confucian thinker of China's classical age, after Confucius and Mencius (
see
Confucius; Mencius). Xunzi lived during the end of the Warring States period of Chinese history, as brutal interstate warfare accelerated in both frequency and ferocity. Xunzi participated in government at times but more frequently devoted himself to teaching and writing. He wrote unified essays expounding a complex and systematic philosophy, but also wrote poetry and instructed his many students in the Zhou dynasty classics revered by all Confucians (
see
Confucian Ethics).