bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Eugenics
Authors: Agar Nicholas 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

The word “eugenics” was coined by Francis Galton, a Victorian intellectual who was among the first to explore the social implications of the theory of evolution. It combines the Greek
eu
, meaning “good” or “well,” with the suffix –
genēs
, meaning “born.” In a definition published in 1883, Galton characterized eugenics as “the science of improving stock, which is by no means confined to questions of judicious mating, but which, especially in the case of man, takes cognizance of all influences that tend in however remote a degree to give to the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less suitable” (Galton 1883: 17 n.1). The history of eugenics has been decidedly spotty. This essay samples selectively from that history and comments on the relevance of the concept to contemporary moral debates.
Dilemmas, Moral
Authors: Bagnoli Carla 
Published: January 2013

AbstractMoral dilemmas are cases where agents are bound by conflicting moral claims and cannot resolve the conflict by further deliberation. Jean‐Paul Sartre (1957) relates the dilemma of a student torn between joining the Resistance and assisting his mother at home. He is bound by patriotic and filial duties. Either he fails to do his part in liberating his country, or he fails to support his mother.
Religious Saints
Authors: Flescher Andrew 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
The term “saints” is traditionally understood in connection with Roman Catholicism and signifies publicly venerated figures formalized through a process of “canonization,” the act of declaring a dead person a saint following beatification (the formal act of declaring one blessed in Heaven), and an examination of the miracles attributed to the person while he or she was living (Cunningham 1980: 7, 48–9). In this context, the “cult” of the saints refers to those early Christians who, having practiced the Christian virtues to an exceptional degree, or having martyred themselves, have officially been put forward by the Church as interceding mediators between heaven and earth (Brown 1981: 1–3). When we speak of “religious saints,” we thus technically allude to a process sanctioned by a specific institutional mechanism.
Environmental Ethics
Authors: McShane Katie 
Published: January 2013

AbstractEnvironmental ethics is the field that investigates the question of which ethical norms are appropriate for governing human interactions with the natural environment. Considered a branch of practical or applied ethics, environmental ethics has only existed as a field since the late 1970s. At that time, concern about environmental problems was growing, and some philosophers concluded that mainstream ethics' focus on humans' relationships with other humans had left it without a useful theoretical framework for ethically evaluating the relationship between humans and the nonhuman natural world. In response to this situation, they suggested that a new field of inquiry was needed to investigate this matter directly (Rolston 1975; Callicott 1979; Routley and Routley 1979; Regan 1981).
Sexual Morality
Authors: Primoratz Igor 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Ethical discussions of sexual morality focus on two related questions. The first is about the contents of sexual morality: what is right and wrong, morally good or bad, in relation to sex? The second concerns the nature and standing of sexual morality: is there a set of moral considerations that apply only to sex‐related behavior, or is such behavior to be guided by and judged in terms of moral considerations that also apply elsewhere? Are there distinctively sexual rights and wrongs, virtues and vices? Our answers to these questions will obviously be determined, wholly or largely, by our views of the nature of sex and its significance in human life.
Nonnaturalism, Ethical
Authors: Cuneo Terence 
Published: January 2013

AbstractEthical nonnaturalism has a distinguished pedigree. Ancient philosophers such as Plato, moderns such as Thomas Reid, Henry Sidgwick, and G. E. Moore, and contemporary philosophers such as Derek Parfit and David Wiggins, have all defended it (seemoore, g. e.;plato;reid, thomas;sidgwick, henry). Despite its impressive pedigree, the view has experienced significant swings in popularity. For roughly the first half of the twentieth century, nonnaturalism was an extremely influential metaethical theory, arguably the dominant one. However, during the latter half of the century, the view experienced a precipitous decline in popularity, being supplanted by varieties of non‐cognitivism and moral naturalism (seenon‐cognitivism;naturalism, ethical). In more recent years, however, nonnaturalism has enjoyed a modest renaissance, having received sophisticated defenses from philosophers such as Parfit, Russ Shafer‐Landau, and Ralph Wedgwood (see Parfit 2011; Shafer‐Landau 2003; Wedgwood 2007). Given its rather tumultuous history, one wonders: What exactly is the position that philosophers from Plato to Parfit have championed? And what is there to be said in favor of it?
Jain Ethics
Authors: Heim Maria 
Published: January 2013

AbstractJainism is a religion in India that offers a distinctive moral vision centered on nonviolence and asceticism. Jains regard their doctrines as eternal truths, but these truths have not always been known to humans and they come to be periodically discovered and taught by historical figures called Tirthankaras (“Ford‐Makers,” also called Jinas, “Conquerors”). The most recent Tirthankara was the great teacher Mahāvīra who lived in northern India about 2,500 years ago. Mahāvīra founded a monastic community of men and women and a larger circle of lay supporters that have survived and flourished in India to the present day. While they constitute a small minority of the population of India (less than 1 percent), Jains have enjoyed influence on the intellectual and cultural life of India disproportionate to their relatively small numbers.
Imperatives, Logic of
Authors: Vranas Peter B. M. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractSuppose that a sign at the entrance of a restaurant reads: “Do not enter these premises unless you have a reservation and you are properly attired.” You see someone who is properly attired and is about to enter, and you tell her: “Don't enter these premises if you don't have a reservation.” She asks why, and you reply: “It follows from what the sign says.” It seems that you made a valid inference from an imperative premise to an imperative conclusion. But it also seems that imperatives cannot be true or false; so in what sense is your inference valid? Its validity cannot consist in thetruthof its premise guaranteeing the truth of its conclusion. One is thus faced with “Jørgensen's dilemma” (Ross 1941: 55–6): apparently imperative logiccannotexist, because logic deals only with entities that, unlike imperatives, can be true or false; but apparently imperative logicmustexist. It must exist not only because inferences with imperatives can bevalid, but also because imperatives (like “Enter” and “Don't enter”) can beinconsistentwith each other, and because one can apply logical operations to imperatives: “Don't enter” is thenegationof “Enter,” and “Sing or dance” is thedisjunctionof “Sing” and “Dance.” A standard reaction to this dilemma consists in basing imperative logic onanaloguesof truth and falsity. For example, the imperative “Don't enter” issatisfiedif you don't enter and is violated if you enter, and one might say that an inference from an imperative premise to an imperative conclusion is valid exactly if thesatisfaction(rather than the truth) of the premise guarantees the satisfaction of the conclusion. Imperative logic may matter for metaethics (seeMetaethics): if one understands moral claims as disguised imperatives (seePrescriptivism) and thus as lacking truth values (seeNon Cognitivism), then imperative logic may help explain how inferences involving moral claims can be valid (seeFrege‐Geach Objection). But before getting into the details of imperative logic, more needs to be said about what exactly imperatives are.
Duty and Obligation
Authors: Zimmerman Michael J. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe concept of duty or obligation is fundamental to ethics. In everyday discourse, the term “duty” tends to be reserved for those obligations that one has in virtue of holding some official position. (Consider the sworn duties of a police officer or politician.) Another term often used in this context is “responsibility” (seeResponsibility) – understood in the prospective sense of what one has a responsibility to see to in the future, as opposed to the retrospective sense of the responsibility one bears for something that has happened in the past – although this term tends to be used somewhat more broadly than “duty” to refer to obligations that one has in virtue of filling some role, whether official or not. (Consider the responsibilities of a parent or friend.) In philosophical discourse, however, there is a tendency not to use “duty” and “responsibility” so restrictively but rather to use them interchangeably with the term “obligation” to refer to obligations that one has irrespective of whether they arise from the fact that one fills some particular role. (Consider the obligation not to cause gratuitous harm to another person, which is something that applies to people generally, regardless of office or station or role. Philosophers typically do not shrink from talking of a duty not to cause such harm.) In keeping with this liberal practice, this essay will treat the terms “duty,” “obligation,” and “responsibility” (understood in its prospective sense) as synonymous.
Evil
Authors: Thomas Laurence 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Evil behavior is morally wrong behavior that is particularly egregious. The following observation readily brings out this point. A person who never committed a single morally wrong act, no matter how small, would alas be a morally perfect human being. By contrast, an individual need not be morally perfect at all, and yet it can be true that the person goes through life without ever committing a single evil act. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that most people go through life without committing any evil acts. Morally wrong behavior admits of a continuum with evil acts at one end and minor wrongs at the other end. For instance, stealing an ordinary dime (as opposed to a dime that one knows to be a rare coin) is a moral wrong. No one should so behave. Yet, doing so surely counts as a minor wrong. A less minor wrong, which nonetheless stops short of being evil, would be that of merely breaking the window of an empty car for the fun of it. Though clearly worse than stealing an ordinary dime, the fact is that this wrong can be wholly repaired. By contrast, to kill an individual by slowly inflicting burns upon the person would count as a paradigm example of evil behavior.
Zhuangzi
Authors: Chong Kim‐Chong 
Published: January 2013

AbstractZhuangzi (ca. 369–286BCE), along with Laozi, is a seminal figure in philosophical Daoism (seeLaozi; Daoist Ethics). The 33‐chapter text of theZhuangziis a result of extensive editing by the fourth‐century commentator Guo Xiang (seeGuo Xiang) and it is widely believed that the first seven (“Inner”) chapters were either written by the historical Zhuangzi or best represent his thought (Graham 1979; Liu 1994). However, some central themes can be discerned throughout the text. These are encapsulated in the remark by Xunzi (seeXunzi) that Zhuangzi was blinded by heaven and did not pay attention to human beings (Knoblock 1994: 102). We may analyze this statement to bring out the main features of Zhuangzi's philosophical ethics.
Morally Tragic Life
Authors: Jacquette Dale 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe concept of a morally tragic life is that of a well‐intentioned moral agent caught up in the circumstances of a genuine moral dilemma (seeDilemmas, Moral). Moral tragedy strikes when, through bad luck, a subject is confronted with a choice between conflicting comparably imperative moral obligations. The dilemma gives rise to moral tragedy when it is rationally irresolvable, in the sense that prevailing events make it practically possible at best to satisfy one conflicting obligation only at the expense of another. It occurs inevitably in such situations that, regardless of what thoughtful choice among conflicting action possibilities the individual makes, there follows as a result an irreparable loss of a significant desired moral good or value.
Golden Rule
Authors: Carson Thomas 
Published: January 2013

AbstractRoughly, the golden rule says that we must treat others as we would be willing to have them treat us or, alternatively, that we must not treat others in ways in which we are unwilling to be treated ourselves. The golden rule entered the Judeo‐Christian tradition from ancient Mesopotamia. The Mesopotamian tradition includes the following injunction: “Son, that which seems evil to thee, do not to thy companion.” Shortly before the birth of Christ, Rabbi Hillel said: “That which is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor: that is the whole of the Torah, while the rest is commentary thereon; go and learn it.” By “neighbor” Hillel meant all fellow human beings (Wattles 1996: 49–50). Jesus gives two statements of the golden rule in the New Testament: “And as you want that people do to you do thus to them” (Luke 6:31); “All things therefore which you will that people do to you, do thus to them for this is the law and the prophets” (Matthew 7:12). The following statement is attributed to Mohammed: “That which you want for yourself, seek for mankind.” Confucius (who predates Hillel, Christ, and Mohammad) said: “Do not impose on others what you do not desire others to impose on you.” (See Wattles 1996: 15–67 for these references.) One of the earliest statements of the golden rule is found in the Hindu Upanishads (800–600BC): “Let no man do to another that which would be repugnant to himself; this is the sum of righteousness; the rest is according to inclination” (Hertzler 1934: 420). Hertzler also attributes versions of the golden rule to Zoroastrianism, the Buddha, and Lao‐Tze (1934: 420–1).
Gadamer, Hans‐Georg
Authors: Grondin Jean 
Published: January 2013

AbstractHans‐Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) is the founder of modern‐day philosophical hermeneutics. His relevance for ethics lies mainly in the fact that he relied on Aristotle's notion of phronesis (practical wisdom, prudence) to describe the hermeneutic experience of understanding and in his strong defense of Aristotle's conception of ethics, with its insistence on custom shaped by education and tradition, which helped usher in a rehabilitation of a practical philosophy that does not follow the Kantian model of a universalistic, normative ethics.
Bluffing
Authors: Brenkert George G. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Bluffing is discussed, most frequently, in business ethics (
see
Business Ethics), and even there it is a minor topic. It is unfortunately not discussed in most ethics books. Part of the problem is that bluffing is identified with business bargaining or negotiation situations. Examples in the ethics literature typically mention cars, houses, or bids in poker. But bluffing takes place outside of business (and poker games) in government, nonprofits, and even in some marriages. Bluffing may also be found in games and competitive situations not involving negotiations. In baseball, the catcher may bluff a throw to second base. In wartime, one army may seek to bluff by constructing fake tanks and designing troop movements in directions other than it intends to attack. Finally, bluffing may occur in everyday situations when someone wants something that is blocked or prevented by someone else, and seeks to gain what he or she wants through some artful behavior, either verbal or nonverbal, which misrepresents the truth. Thus, a social climber might, by bluffing, gain admittance to a dinner thrown by the head of state and only open to a select list of individuals. Similarly, job interviewees might seek to bluff their way through an interview.
Worth/Dignity
Authors: FitzPatrick William J. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe concept of dignity is famously multifaceted, with such a variety of applications that some have even dismissed it as incoherent (Pinker 2008). Dignity is often said, for example, to be an inalienable quality that all people have, serving as a foundation for basic human rights. However, if dignity is inalienable, why would Oregon need a “Death With Dignity Act” to ensure that people can die with it? How could abusive and demeaning treatment “take it away” from victims of oppression, as is also often said? Do contestants on reality television shows retain their dignity even as they degrade themselves to the delight of mocking viewers? Are certain unpleasant diagnostic procedures “undignified,” as many feel, and does that imply that dignity has only a limited value that can reasonably betradedfor other goods such as medical benefits? While the concept of dignity is indeed complex, however, the appearance of incoherence can be dispelled with some basic distinctions that will also serve to focus the discussion to follow.
Cost–Benefit Analysis
Authors: Hansson Sven Ove 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIn order to facilitate a decision on a proposed project, it is advisable to make a list of all its advantages and disadvantages, and characterize each of these in as much detail as possible. The decision‐maker can then weigh all the pros and cons against each other and – at least ideally – make a decision that is based on knowledge of all the relevant factors.
Prichard, H. A.
Authors: Shaver Robert 
Published: January 2013

AbstractH. A. Prichard (1871–1947) was educated at Clifton College and at New College, Oxford. He later held fellowships in Oxford at Hertford College and then at Trinity College. He was elected White's Professor of Moral Philosophy in 1928 (and a fellow of Corpus Christi College), and retired in 1937.
Self‐Respect and Self‐Esteem
Authors: Dillon Robin S. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Self‐respect and self‐esteem are forms of self‐regard involving one's worth. Although the terms are ordinarily used interchangeably, the concepts and phenomena are distinct. That's why it makes sense to describe someone as having high self‐esteem but little self‐respect, and why saying that someone has no self‐respect expresses moral criticism while saying they lack self‐esteem might evoke sympathy. The
Oxford English Dictionary
expresses the distinction thus: self‐esteem is “a favorable appreciation or opinion of oneself”; self‐respect is “proper regard for the dignity of one's person or position” (
see
Worth/Dignity). Self‐respect is a normative concept while self‐esteem is not.
Pedophilia
Authors: Benatar David 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Attitudes toward sex have undergone considerable liberalization in many countries in recent decades. Yet, in such societies, pedophilia, along with practices such as bestiality and necrophilia, are still widely reviled and constitute serious criminal offenses. By contrast, in some of the most sexually conservative societies today, pedophilia, far from being taboo, enjoys approval within the context of marriage between young girls and much older men. It has been suggested that even many of those societies that now condemn pedophilia were once more tolerant of it (Ehman 1984).
Ethical Investment
Authors: Sandberg Joakim 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Ethical investment (also known as social investment, socially responsible investment [SRI], or sustainable investment) typically refers to the practice of integrating putatively ethical, social, or environmental considerations into a financial investment process – for instance, a pension fund's process of deciding what stocks or bonds to buy or sell. Whereas conventional or mainstream investment focuses solely upon financial risk and return, ethical investment thus also includes various nonfinancial goals or constraints in typical investment decisions. This type of investment has grown to be a well‐established feature of many stock markets in the past two decades or so. A recurring point of debate, however, is to what extent this phenomenon indeed constitutes a more ethical alternative to conventional types of financial behavior.
Pride
Authors: Taylor Gabriele 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Pride manifests itself in many different ways. It may be a temporary emotional experience, felt more or less frequently and in varying degrees of intensity. But it may also be a character trait, a settled disposition to feel, think, and act in certain ways. In either case it has its place in a person's mental life, and so the concept of pride lies within the province of the philosophy of mind. But since character traits govern our behavior a person's pride is also a matter for appraisal, of rating it a virtue (
see
Virtue) or a vice, and so it is also a concern of the moral philosopher. In all its forms pride relates to the view a person takes of his or her own standing in life.
Pragmatic Ethics
Authors: Wallace James D. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractPragmatic ethics, propounded in the works of William James (seeJames, William) and John Dewey (seeDewey, John) and in those of some later writers, is distinctive in making the following claims. Norms – knowledge of how properly to do things – are discovered by people as they solve practical problems. This is true of moral as well as nonmoral norms. Our knowledge of ethical norms and goods is derived from our experience in resolving problems encountered in living with one another and pursuing common practices and goals; it is our knowledge of how to live with one another. The knowledge isa posteriori– based on experience (seeA Posteriori Ethical Knowledge). Since the world and our lives change continually, ethical norms properly undergo change, although the change is generally gradual and incremental. Changes are effected as people resolve problems involving conflicts among practices and their constituent norms and share with others what they have learned. Some or all of the norms in conflict are modified so that they can be followed in concert.
Practical Virtue Ethics
Authors: Swanton Christine 
Published: January 2013

AbstractRenewed attention to virtue and vice has resulted in a wealth of “virtue ethical” articles which deal with, for example, environmental virtues and vices, and the notion of the virtuous lawyer or doctor (such as “the lawyer as friend”). This development is to be applauded, for it greatly enriches the moral landscape and focuses attention on the ethical nature of agents in their aspects as beings of character (seeCharacter; Moral Character; Virtue). Nonetheless, to explicate specific virtues and vices is notipso factoto proffer a distinctively virtue ethical approach to applied ethics. Thus, the question of what counts as virtue ethics is important in the practical application of virtue ethics as a distinctive type of moral theory (seeVirtue Ethics).
Schleiermacher, Friedrich
Authors: Louden Robert B. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractFriedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768–1834), “the father of modern theology,” founder of modern hermeneutics, translator of Plato into German (seePlato), cofounder (with Wilhelm von Humboldt) of the University of Berlin, and early advocate of equality for both women and Jews, is today justly celebrated for his outstanding accomplishments in multiple areas of human endeavor. But among Anglophone readers his extensive and significant work in ethics has only recently begun to be acknowledged. The neglect of Schleiermacher's moral theory is all the more surprising in light of the facts that his earliest writings focused exclusively on themes in moral philosophy, that ethics remained a central concern throughout his writing and teaching career, and that many scholars (particularly in Germany, but, increasingly, elsewhere as well) have argued that Schleiermacher's work on ethics constitutes his most outstanding intellectual achievement.