bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Rauschenbusch, Walter
Authors: Beckley Harlan 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWalter Rauschenbusch (1861–1918) is widely recognized as the most influential and sophisticated theologian of the Social Gospel movement. Gary Dorrien, among the most prominent writers on American liberal theology, goes a step further. Dorrien (1995: 6) calls Rauschenbusch “the crucial figure” in the making of social Christianity in the United States and “the most instructive precedent for the modern liberationist project” (Dorrien 1990: 17). This essay supports a more modest yet broader claim. Reading Walter Rauschenbusch informs and benefits theological and social ethics whether or not it fits within the liberationist project.
Sentiments, Moral
Authors: Debes Remy 
Published: January 2013

AbstractMoral sentiments are those emotions, passions, or affective states and dispositions that play a necessary or explanatorily important role in moral judgment, experience, or motivation. In contemporary discussion (especially in the empirical and social sciences) these are often taken to include some combination of guilt, shame, resentment, indignation, contempt, benevolence, sympathy, and perhaps gratitude, esteem, respect, and admiration. However, any such list is necessarily contentious, for it hangs on various assumptions that conceal, even betray, the real complexity of philosophical thinking about “moral sentiments.”
Corruption
Authors: Miller Seumas 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWhile there is a vast literature on the topic of corruption (Heidenheimer and Johnston 2002; Hopkin 2002), including its causes and consequences, there is a paucity of developed theoretical accounts of the concept of corruption. This is presumably in part because conceptual analysis tends to be the preserve of philosophy and very few philosophers have focused on corruption. Moreover, many of the available accounts of corruption are really only brief definitions rather than theoretical accounts. As such, they do not offer the kind of illumination provided by an adequate full‐blown theoretical account. Further, many of these are in terms of the abuse of power or authority on the part of public officials motivated by private gain, for example, “Corruption is the abuse of power by a public official for private gain” (Nye 1967: 417). While definitions in this area are inevitably to some extent stipulative and relative to one's purposes, there are a number of problems with this kind of definition insofar as it purports to be a general definition serviceable in relation to corruption in all its main forms and institutional settings.
Emotion
Authors: Roberts Robert C. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe disciplinary diversity of the recent literature on emotions is indicative of the many dimensions of human life that emotions touch. Neuroscientists and other physiologists study them because emotions have rather specific neurological, neurochemical, and other bodily correlates. Anthropologists and historians study them because their character and the popular understanding of them can vary significantly from culture to culture and age to age. Evolutionary psychologists study emotions because at least the most basic ones have defensive and reproductive functions in supporting species survival. Experimental and social psychologists study them, often, with respect to their behavioral outputs, where “behavior” covers a wider class of movements than what philosophers call “actions,” for example emotions’ spontaneous facial expressions. Clinical psychologists study emotions because they impinge on social functioning and psychological well‐being. Legal theorists study them because of their connection to the legal responsibility of defendants and their roles in the judgments of judges and juries. Specialists in religion study emotions because many or all religious experiences have emotional characteristics. Emotions interest philosophers in virtually all of the above connections, and in the ways these interrelate. Each of these disciplinary domains will tend to favor its own kinds of theories about what an emotion is – neuroscientists neurological models, anthropologists social regulation models, evolutionary psychologists biological survival models, etc. – but even theorists sharing the same discipline often offer many competing models. After surveying a few “scientific” models, Ronald de Sousa comments, “It should be clear from this partial sampling that … emotions theory has not unequivocally emerged from the methodological chaos that entitles it to be called philosophy” (2010: 103).
Moral Agency
Authors: Watson Gary 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe phrase “moral agency” is a term of art, but it designates an utterly familiar concept – the concept of an individual who can, to a significant extent, act effectively and competently in moral matters. This concept shows up in a variety of practical contexts. It is at issue when we worry about the criminal responsibility of 12‐year‐olds, or of psychotically deluded lawbreakers. From a different angle, it figures in our thoughts about whether to comply with the wishes of depressed hospital patients to discontinue life‐support. These contexts exhibit different features of the concept. Moral agents are bothautonomous(in other words, self‐determining or self‐governing;seeAutonomy) andaccountable.
Conscience and Professionals
Authors: Wicclair Mark R. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractActs of conscience by professionals can be based on their understanding of the norms and standards of their respective professions (seePROFESSIONAL ETHICS;CODES OF ETHICS). They are aptly designatedprofessional integritypreserving acts of conscience. Cases 1 and 2 exemplify acts of conscience of this type:
Schelling, Friedrich
Authors: Gardner Sebastian 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Over the course of his long philosophical development, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775–1854) neither devoted a single work to moral philosophy, nor attempted to produce a systematic ethical theory of the sort characteristic of Kantian philosophers. In this regard Schelling contrasts with Kant and his fellow German Idealists, Fichte and Hegel, for whom the construction of a system of practical norms is an essential part of the task of philosophy as
Wissenschaft
(
see
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Kant, Immanuel). Schelling's discussions of topics in practical philosophy, furthermore, remain comparatively fragmentary, insofar as they occur principally in contexts devoted to other issues and display changes of standpoint between writings of different periods. The absence of a systematically elaborated ethics from his work does not mean, however, that Schelling lacked a substantive and original conception of morality, nor that his work fails to pursue the systematic implications of Kantian ideas for practical philosophy. The former is contained in Schelling's metaphysical foundation of morality, the latter in his theory of right and the state (
see
Rights). Schelling's systematic and historical importance lies in the originality of his attempt to base morality on a metaphysics of monistic idealism, and in the distinctive challenge which he poses to better‐known and more historically influential forms of post‐Kantian ethics.
Climate Change
Authors: Gardiner Stephen M. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractFor some time, and especially over the last two decades, scientists have been warning that humanity is carrying out a giant geophysical experiment by pumping large volumes of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere as byproducts of fossil fuel use and deforestation (Weart 2003). Such activity is already affecting the world's climate, and if current trends continue, looks likely to do so increasingly in the future, potentially leading to catastrophic impacts on human and natural systems (IPCC 2007). As a result, scientists have been calling for cuts in anthropogenic emissions in carbon dioxide, the main culprit, of between 50 and 80 percent in coming decades. However, despite this, both global emissions and those of most major countries have been increasing. From 1990 to 2005, global emissions rose by almost 30 percent, and US emissions by just over 20 percent (Marland et al. 2008). Moreover, prior to the global financial crisis, the rate of growth had been accelerating in a way previously unanticipated, from an average of 1.5–2 percent per annum in the late 1990s to nearly 3 percent in 2007. As theWashington Postput it late in 2008, “The rise in global carbon dioxide emissions last year outpaced international researchers’most dire projections” (Eilperin 2008).
Divine Command
Authors: Hare John E. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Within the domain of theological ethics as this has been understood within the Christian tradition (
see
Early Christian Ethics), there have been two main accounts of the basis of morality. We can call them natural law theory (
see
Natural Law) and divine command theory, though the labels are to some extent misleading. Two very similar alternatives can be found within the theological understanding of ethics within Judaism (
see
Rabbinic Ethics) and Islam (
see
Islamic Ethics). Outside the Abrahamic faiths the notion of divine command gets less salient. In Plato and Aristotle, for example, there is nothing like a divine command theory (
see
Plato; Aristotle). The divine functions in Plato and Aristotle as a magnet, drawing the cosmos toward itself, but not by command. In the
Eudemian Ethics
(VIII.3, 1249b15), Aristotle says “God is not a ruler in the sense of issuing commands.”
Organic Unities
Authors: Heathwood Chris 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

A day can go better or worse for a person, as can a whole life. One's whole life evidently comprises all of the days of one's life. What is the relation between how well each of a person's days goes and how well her whole life goes? The simplest answer is
summation
: just as a life is nothing more than the days that make it up, the value of a life is nothing more than the sum of the values of those days. But, G. E. Moore (1903: 28) warns in full italics that “
The value of a whole must not be assumed to be the same as the sum of the values of its parts
,” thus inaugurating a subject of inquiry mostly missed in the history of ethics before him (
see
Moore, G.E.; for earlier discussions, see especially the work of Franz Brentano [
see
Brentano, Franz], as expounded in Chisholm 1986: 69–90).
Von Wright, G. H.
Authors: Toppinen Teemu 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003) was a Finnish philosopher whose work covered a variety of topics from induction to modal logic and from value theory to philosophy of action. He is also widely known for his succeeding Wittgenstein as professor of philosophy at Cambridge in 1948, and as one of Wittgenstein's literary executors. Von Wright never developed a detailed ethical theory, but he made some significant attempts at providing what he believed to be parts of the crucial conceptual groundwork for moral philosophy. I shall here focus on (1) his account of the notion of
the good of man
in
The Varieties of Goodness
(“
The Varieties
” or “
VG
,” from this point on), (2) the analyses of moral concepts in terms of this notion, (3) von Wright's metaethics, and (4) his pioneering work in deontic logic.
Discourse Ethics
Authors: McMahon Christopher 
Published: January 2013

AbstractDiscourse ethics is a program in moral philosophy that is associated most closely with the work of Jürgen Habermas (1990). The program is meant as a response to the problem that under modern conditions, reason no longer seems able to put us into epistemic contact with a set of timeless and universal moral truths. Thus many writers on ethics have been attracted by subjectivist and emotivist accounts of moral thinking (seeEmotivism). Discourse ethics, by contrast, is a cognitivist program which seeks to make a place for correct answers to moral questions by extracting moral normativity from the normativity associated with the use of language (seeCognitivism; Normativity). To the extent that reason can be identified with the normative framework governing our use of language, the success of the program would provide morality with a foundation in reason.
Direction of Fit
Authors: Schueler G. F. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

The difference between cognitive and conative mental states, such as beliefs and desires, has sometimes been held to be that they have different “directions of fit” between the mind and the world – mind‐to‐world for beliefs and world‐to‐mind for desires (
see
Desire). Some philosophers have pursued the idea that if this thought can be given a plausible explanation it can be used to ground Hume's claim that “reason is the slave of the passions,” i.e., that no moral or other “practical” belief, e.g., about what is best or right to do, can ever by itself be enough to motivate action. A desire or desire‐like state is always required (
see
Reason and Passion; Hume, David). This issue will be discussed below.
Organ Transplantation
Authors: Taylor James Stacey 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
The first successful transplant of an organ into a person whose original organ was failing to function properly was performed in 1954, with the transplant of a human kidney. This was followed in 1966 with the first simultaneous kidney–pancreas transplant, and then in 1969 with the first successful pancreas transplant. These successes were followed in 1983 with the first successful single‐lung transplant, and in 1986 with the first successful double‐lung transplant; the first successful intestine transplant was performed in 1987. More recently, the first successful womb transplant was performed in 2000, and in 2005 the first successful transplant of islet cells was performed.
Risk
Authors: Hansson Sven Ove 
Published: January 2013

AbstractPublic debates on risk often center around ethical issues, such as: When is it justified to expose others to a risk? Does an exposed person's consent justify a risk imposition? What is required for the social distribution of risks to be fair? A careful analysis of questions like these should be an important part of socially responsible risk management. In addition, many risk assessments contain inherent moral values that need to be identified and explicitly stated. Therefore, moral philosophy has important tasks in the risk decision process.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb
Authors: Moyar Dean 
Published: January 2013

AbstractJohann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) is one of the founders of the philosophical movement known as German idealism. He is most often discussed as a transitional figure between Immanuel Kant (seeKant, Immanuel) and G. W. F. Hegel (seeHegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich), but he deserves to stand in his own right as one of the greatest innovators in modern ethical philosophy. He was an uncompromising advocate of human freedom and a relentless systematizer who inaugurated a new method of philosophical idealism. Elevated by a wealthy benefactor from a working‐class background to an education with Saxony's elite at the famous Pforta school in Leipzig, the school attended later by Friedrich Nietzsche (seeNietzsche, Friedrich), Fichte struggled to establish his own intellectual and professional position until his reading of Kant's critical philosophy in 1790 (especially theCritique of Practical Reason) inspired him to develop his own philosophy of freedom. In 1792 he burst onto the philosophical scene as a result of his first work,Attempt at a Critique of All Revelation, which was published anonymously and widely mistaken, initially, as authored by Kant himself. Fichte would go on to have an enormously influential stint as a professor at the University of Jena (1794–9); this period came to an end with his dismissal for alleged atheism. He continued to teach and write in Berlin, and he would eventually become the first elected rector of the newly founded university in Berlin (later the Humboldt University). Fichte's philosophical system, which he called theWissenschaftslehre(the “Doctrine of Science”), continued to evolve throughout his career, but it had its most lasting influence in the versions taught and published while he was in Jena (see La Vopa 2001 for a good account of Fichte's development and Jena career). The following discussion focuses on the Jena period writings, and in particular on hisSystem of Ethicsof 1798.
Metaethics
Authors: Olson Jonas 
Published: January 2013

AbstractMoral philosophers often ask whether abortion is morally permissible, whether the suffering of nonhuman animals is on a par morally with human suffering, and whether an action is morally right if and only if it maximizes happiness. Political philosophers often ask whether persons have inviolable rights to their bodies and whether distributive inequality that benefits the worst off is morally acceptable. These are all examples offirst‐ordermoral questions. But such questions are not the business of moral and political philosophers only. First‐order moral questions pervade everyday thinking and acting: Is it wrong to eat meat? Ought one to donate more to charities? Is there reason to vote in elections?
Naturalism, Ethical
Authors: Dowell J. L. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractOn its most common characterization, ethical naturalism is the thesis that ethical properties exist and are natural. This makes the thesis metaphysical and realist. (Roughly,ethical realismis the thesis that genuinely ethical properties exist;seeRealism, Moral; Non‐Cognitivism; Prescriptivism; Projectivism.) Importantly different ethical views have been categorized by their champions as naturalist, however. Some see ethical naturalism as primarily involving a metaphysical commitment (e.g., Gibbard 1990; Brink 1989; Boyd 1988), others as involving methodological commitments (e.g., Copp 2003). Some see ethical naturalism as requiring commitment to the existence of ethical properties (e.g., Brink 1989; Boyd 1988), others don't (e.g., Gibbard 1990; Blackburn 1988).
Preventive and Preemptive War
Authors: Lee Steven P. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Preventive wars and preemptive wars are wars fought for an ostensibly defensive purpose but which involve a first use of force (
see
War). These wars are like wars of aggression in that they involve a first use of force, but, unlike paradigm forms of aggression, they have an ostensible defensive justification. Preventive and preemptive wars are fought by a state against an opponent in an attempt to prevent an expected future aggression by the opponent. Preventive war is an anticipatory response to aggression expected at some indefinite time in the future, while preemptive war is an anticipatory response to aggression expected to begin in the immediate future. The question is whether one or both sorts of war may be morally justified.
Harrington, James
Authors: Karstadt Elliott 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

James Harrington (1611–77) is not primarily remembered as a writer on ethics. Historians tend to focus instead on his political writings and on their importance in relation to understanding the English Civil Wars. But it is also crucial to see Harrington as working within a particular tradition of moral philosophy. In particular, he is responsible for marrying a Platonic ethical ontology with a Machiavellian political morality to produce a novel philosophy of virtue (
see
Machiavelli, Niccolò; Plato).
Reciprocity
Authors: Mackenzie Catriona 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIf someone bestows a good or benefit on us we often (and ought to) feel gratitude (seeGratitude), but we typically also feel a strong sense of obligation to reciprocate; to repay our benefactor in some way, even if the benefit is one we did not ask for and may in fact not want. We also expect others to feel similarly obliged and may blame, feel resentful towards, or desire to punish another person who fails to reciprocate.
Internalism, Motivational
Authors: van Roojen Mark 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe term “internalism” is a label for a number of distinct philosophical positions. We shall be concerned with metaethics (seeMetaethics), where it is a term used to label positions that posit a conceptual or necessary connection between moral judgments, moral truths, or reasons on the one hand, and motivation or reasons on the other. Restricting ourselves to specifically motivational internalism, our concern would be with whether there is a necessary or conceptual connection between either moral judgments, moral truths, or reasons and motivation. For example, a motivational internalist concerned with morality might think that a sincere moral judgment must necessarily be such as to motivate a person who accepts that judgment to act as the judgment suggests. Or a motivational internalist about reasons may think that reasons necessarily depend on elements in an agent's existing motivational system such as desires (Williams 1981;seeWilliams, Bernard). These examples should give a rough sense of the sorts of claims internalists make. We'll consider other sorts besides these.
Properties, Moral
Authors: Strandberg Caj 
Published: January 2013

AbstractA central topic in metaethics (seeMetaethics) concerns the existence and nature of moral properties: Are there any moral properties and, if there are, what are they like? The answers to these questions bear on a number of fundamental issues in moral philosophy, such as the nature of moral judgments (seeMoral Judgment), whether there are any moral truths (seeTruth in Ethics), and the possibility of moral knowledge.
Suffering
Authors: Radden Jennifer 
Published: January 2013

Abstract“Suffering,” “pain,” “hurt,” “distress,” “agony,” and like terms point to a category of profound moral significance. It encompasses in every casestates of consciousness, when these are the product of afflictions both somatic and psychological. We suffer when we are subject to painful ailments and injuries; we also suffer from bad luck and all the misery to which our relationships and situations make us prey. Our physical suffering is sometimes object as well as target of our suffering – not merely suffering the pain itself, we suffer over the presence of pain and its sequelae. Our nonsensory, emotional distress also effects, and affects, physical suffering.
Good and Better
Authors: Hansson Sven Ove 
Published: January 2013

AbstractMorality is concerned with evaluating and recommending. Therefore, among the key terms of moral discourse we find evaluating words like “good,” “bad, ” and “better, ” and we also find words expressing norms or recommendations, such as “ought, ” “forbidden, ” and “permitted. ” This essay is concerned with the evaluative terms. (On the normative terms,seeDeontic Logic.)