bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Early Modern Ethics
Authors: Guyer Paul 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThis essay concerns the development of ethics in Britain and Europe from the publication ofLeviathanby Thomas Hobbes in 1651 to the early work (1764–5) of Immanuel Kant (seeHobbes, Thomas; Kant, Immanuel). There are numerous ways to classify ethical theories in this period. The simplest way would be to regard the entire period as a response to the perceived egoism of Hobbes, the view that people are motivated only by concern for their own well‐being and may do anything they consider necessary for that, although if they are rational all will see that it is in their own self‐interest to institute a state that will define and enforce public laws. The next simplest way would be to regard the period as responding to Hobbesian egoism on the one hand and to the voluntarist ethics of divine command on the other (seeDivine Command), according to which right and wrong are defined by the will of God and human beings comply with the moral laws so instituted motivated by fear of punishment and hope of reward from God or his human regents.
Confucius
Authors: Angle Stephen C. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractConfucius (551–479BCE) is the Latinized name of Kong Qiu, best known in Chinese as Kongzi (Master Kong). Only partially successful in his public career, Confucius' private teaching inaugurated an era of reflectiveness and helped to define core elements of Chinese civilization. Subsequent generations of students built on his initial formulations to develop one of the world's great philosophical traditions, which in English we call “Confucianism”; various terms are used in Chinese, includingRu jia(the Scholars' School) andDao xue(the Learning of the Way). While later Confucian thinkers would develop elaborate frameworks of metaphysics, mind, and epistemology, Confucius' own teachings concentrated on ethics, politics, social values, and personal improvement. These teachings and the key terms in which they are phrased remained touchstones for the tradition ever after, and the Confucian tradition became absolutely central to what it meant to be Chinese. Given the scope of China and its civilization, it is no exaggeration to say that Confucius is among the most influential of humanity's thinkers.
International Criminal Justice
Authors: Rodman Kenneth A. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractInternational criminal justice is a field of international law that calls for the trial and punishment of those individuals who bear the greatest responsibility for the most serious war crimes and human rights abuses. Its increasing prominence in international tribunals and national courts since the 1990s has prompted ethical debates over whether there is a universal duty to prosecute international crimes or whether that duty needs to be weighed and balanced against the potentially adverse consequences of insisting on trials for other interests and values.
Hart, H. L. A.
Authors: Kramer Matthew H. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractHerbert Lionel Adolphus Hart (1907–92) was the foremost legal philosopher and one of the foremost political philosophers of the twentieth century. Born into a Jewish family in Yorkshire, England, Hart pursued his undergraduate education at Oxford and went on to qualify as a barrister. After practicing law for several years, he worked for the British intelligence service MI5 during the World War II. When the war ended, he returned to Oxford to take up a fellowship in philosophy at New College. He subsequently became Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford (and Fellow of University College) and, later still, Principal of Brasenose College. During the closing years of his career as an active scholar, he devoted much of his time to editing and interpreting the works of Jeremy Bentham (seeBentham, Jeremy). Many former students of his, including Ronald Dworkin, Joseph Raz, John Finnis, Neil MacCormick, Herbert Morris, and Wilfrid Waluchow, have been among the most prominent legal philosophers of the next generation.
William of Ockham
Authors: Guilfoy Kevin 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

William of Ockham's (1287–1347) ethical theory defies easy categorization. Fundamentally, Ockham is an intentionalist in the tradition of Augustine and Abelard: only acts of will are morally significant. However, he develops his theory in the framework of an Aristotelian virtue ethic (
see
Augustine, Saint; Abelard, Peter). The combination of an intentionalist ethic and an Aristotelian virtue ethic is an uneasy marriage, but one that Ockham makes sense of. The most significant problem in explicating Ockham's ethical thought is that he develops two different accounts of the ultimate standards of morality. He argues that all moral norms are determined by divine command. He also argues that human reason, even when ignorant of God, can discover moral norms. This tension is found at the foundation of Ockham's moral theory. Ockham divides moral science into two branches: positive and nonpositive (Quod. II.14). Positive moral science recognizes that God has the absolute power to command anything that does not involve a contradiction, and that any act is good (or evil) only because it is commanded (or prohibited) by God. Nonpositive moral science derives its norms from the exercise of human reason. Some nonpositive moral principles are known
per se.
These principles are somewhat abstract: “anything dictated by right reason should be done” (sent. III.12). Others are known by experience. These principles are more practical and directive: “an angry person should be soothed with calm words” (connex. 2.14). For Ockham, divine command and human reason each provide us with a set of moral norms and code ethical conduct. Ockham's many defenders are hard pressed to explain how he reconciled these two competing bases of moral norms.
Corporate Governance
Authors: Donaldson Thomas 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIn a world where corporations dominate ever larger segments of global society, the question of how corporations are governed, i.e., corporate governance, is vital. Definitions for the term “corporate governance” vary. The broadest definition, and the one that we shall use here, includes the rules, policies, habits, institutions, and laws affecting the activities of the organization. Corporate governance in this sense is concerned with phenomena that philosophers call “prescriptive” or action‐guiding. The rules, policies, and other elements of governance are whatguideor control the firm. The term “corporate governance” usually also implies a for‐profit firm, i.e., one designed to earn money for its owners. We shall restrict the term similarly here. The for‐profit firm can be either “private,” meaning that it is owned by a particular group of investors, or “public,” meaning that its shares of stock are publicly traded and hence subject to securities laws. Sometimes a state‐owned enterprise (SOE) can be profit‐making, but we shall exclude them from discussion here.
Troeltsch, Ernst
Authors: Sockness Brent W. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractErnst Troeltsch (1865–1923) ranks together with Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930) as one of the most accomplished and influential German liberal Protestant theologians of the early twentieth century. His magisterial 1912 work in the history of Christian social teachings (Troeltsch 1931) and various historical studies of Western ethical traditions (Troeltsch 1925) – e.g., of the ethos of the Hebrew prophets; of Stoic, Christian, and modern forms of natural law; of the British moralists; of the social philosophy of Christianity – have long made Troeltsch required reading for students of religious, especially Christian, ethics. Far less recognized is his constructive proposal in ethical theory, which, in critical engagement with Marburg and Southwest Neo‐Kantianism, retrieved aspects of Schleiermacher's philosophical ethics (seeSchleiermacher, Friedrich) as well as Kant's (seeKant, Immanuel). This enabled him to construct a moral–theoretical framework capable of providing a general account of concrete cultural values emergent in history and, more specifically, a defense of the contributions of Hebraic and Christian moral traditions to modern European and North American societies. Following a few biographical and contextual observations, this essay will identify the “crisis of historicism” motivating Troeltsch's lifelong interest in practical philosophy and then sketch the lineaments of his ethical theory proper as a response to the crisis of orientation into whichfin de siècleEuropean society was widely perceived to have fallen.
Calvin, John
Authors: Little David 
Published: January 2013

AbstractAs an important leader of the “Reformed” branch of the Protestant Reformation that arose in Europe and Great Britain during the sixteenth century, John Calvin (1509–64) may best be described as a practical theologian. Presupposing, as he did, the familiar aphorismecclesia reformata semper reformanda(“the church reformed, ever reforming”), he understood reform as comprehensive and ongoing. He proceeded to revise Roman Catholic doctrine and the interpretation of scripture and tradition in close conjunction with proposals to restructure social practice as a whole, including moral understanding and conduct and the institutions of church and state. According to Calvin, human beings cannot be content with knowledge of God based on “empty speculation” that “merely flits in the brain,” but only with that which “takes root in the heart.” “All right knowledge of God is born of obedience” (1960, I: 61, 72).
Power
Authors: Patton Paul 
Published: January 2013

AbstractPower is a central concern for many fields of social, political, and moral inquiry. For this reason, power is defined and described in many different ways. For some theorists, it is primarily associated with domination, coercion, violence, and other negative forms of action on individuals and groups. For others, power is primarily positive, expressed in the exercise of legitimate collective authority or in the educative and transformative control of children by parents and teachers. Some conceive of power as opposed to the freedom of individuals and groups, while others conceive of it as a condition of freedom. Because of the many conceptual and normative differences in the way that social theorists use the term “power,” it has been suggested that it is an “essentially contested” concept (Connolly 1974; Lukes 2005). Others have argued that there are distinct concepts of power, some of which are related by Wittgensteinian family resemblances (Wartenberg 1990; Clegg and Haugard 2009). A better model is to suppose that there is a core concept of power that is normatively neutral with respect to the character of its effects, which then underpins a number of different conceptions, each characterized by the incorporation of further concepts. This model, which will be employed here, accords with the structure of other moral and political concepts such as justice and equality.
Healthcare Resources, Distribution of
Authors: Daniels Norman 
Published: January 2013

AbstractFew people who become ill or have ill loved ones want less than the best care possible, regardless of cost. Their clinicians generally want to do the best they can for their patients, being spurred either by career and monetary incentives or by ethical obligations. In response, all the developed societies spend considerable resources on meeting healthcare needs (seeNeeds). European countries expend 8–11 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) on healthcare, mostly on personal medical services (Organisation for Economic and Co‐Operation and Development 2009). The US, an extravagant outlier, spent 17.6 percent of GDP on healthcare in 2009 (Goldstein 2011); this figure represents 50 percent more than the next highest spending country. Yet the US is the only wealthy country that falls well short of providing universal health insurance coverage; and this is in spite of the fact that it has higher infant mortality rates and lower life expectancy than other wealthy countries – which is a result of inefficiency in its health system – and that population health is influenced by other factors than personal medical expenditures (Commonwealth Fund 2008; Davis et al. 2007). The Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act of 2010, if it withstands legal challenges and any legislation that follows the 2012 election, will close around 60 percent of the gap in coverage in the US, reducing the numbers of uninsured from close to 50 million to 30 million; but this is still not universal coverage, even if it significantly reduces inequalities in access to healthcare (HR 3590–111th Congress: Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 2012).
Cheating
Authors: Green Stuart P. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
The concept of cheating is ubiquitous in our legal and moral lives: we talk about it in the context of academic institutions, sports and games, business, the professions, politics, war, even love. Yet it has largely been ignored in the philosophical literature. Although the term “cheating” is often used as a generalized, somewhat vague term of disapprobation, reflection suggests that it does in fact represent an analytically and expressively distinct form of moral wrongfulness.
Reductionism in Ethics
Authors: Heathwood Chris 
Published: January 2013

AbstractEthical reductionism is a doctrine in metaethics, the area of ethics in which we ask not what the facts are concerning our moral obligations, or concerning what things in life are worth pursuing, but, among other things, questions about the nature (or even the very existence) of such facts. One such question is whether moral facts are, to put it roughly, identical to facts of another kind. Reductionism in ethics is the view that they are. That is, reductionists hold that moral facts, or moral properties, are identical to facts or properties that can be expressed using nonmoral vocabulary.
Homicide
Authors: Ferzan Kimberly Kessler 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Homicide is the killing of a human being (
see
Killing
). This is an act that is often prohibited, and indeed, criminally punished. This essay will first survey what it means to (1) “kill” (2) a “human being.” It will then turn to when it may be permissible to kill. Finally, in those instances when killing is impermissible, many legal systems punish more culpable killings more severely, and the last portion of this essay will examine these culpability doctrines.
Sin, Concepts of
Authors: Weaver Darlene Fozard 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Sin is a theological term, a name for the “disruption of our proper relationship to God” (McFadyen 2000: 5). It can apply to actions, situations, social structures, aspects of the human condition, and expressions of human freedom and willing. The language of sin cannot be translated into secular ways of speaking about moral frailty without incurring some loss. The value of sin as a concept, and a reason for maintaining a variety of concepts for explicating the meaning of sin, lies precisely in its theological character. As a theological language, sin is an irreducibly relational term, always locating the person in relation to God, the source and end of being and goodness. For ethics – religious or secular – an appreciation for the depth and richness of sin places wrong‐doing, vice, and evil in the context of reflection on the ground of and purpose for human life. Sin is therefore always a morally freighted concept, although among theologians the relationship between sin and immorality is complex and contested. Concepts of sin appear in monotheistic religions; other religious traditions speak of human weakness or wrong‐doing in allied but not equivalent ways.
Potential Persons
Authors: Bayne Tim 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe notion of a potential person is central to many debates in what, following Heyd (1992), we might call “genethics” – the domain of moral inquiry that is concerned with the creation of persons. Some genethical questions concern thenumberof people that we bring into existence. Do we have moral reasons to create as many people as we can? Do we have moral reasons to create as few people as we can? Or is morality indifferent to the number of people that we create? Another set of genethical questions concern thetypesof people that we create. Should we try to create certain kinds of people? Should we attempt to avoid creating certain types of people? Or, again, is morality relatively indifferent to the kinds of people that we bring into existence? A third set of questions concerns the ways in which the interests of possible people should bebalanced offagainst the interests of actual people. Should the interests of actual people always trump those of potential people, or are there situations in which the interests of potential people ought to take precedence over those of actual people? As we shall see, these questions raise acute challenges for existing moral theories, and are very far from being solved.
Coherentism, Moral
Authors: DePaul Michael 
Published: January 2013

AbstractOutside of ethics, “coherentism” most frequently denotes one of the two main accounts of epistemic justification, the other account being foundationalism. Coherentism rejects foundationalism's metaphor of justification structured like a building. According to this metaphor, all justified beliefs are eventually justified by special basic beliefs that are not justified by any further beliefs, just as an entire building is supported by foundation stones that are not supported by any other elements of the building. Coherentism takes the planks of a raft as its preferred metaphor: just as all such planks are held in place only by their connections to other planks, all beliefs are epistemically justified only by their relations to other beliefs (see Sosa 1980).
Confidentiality
Authors: Draper Heather , Rogers Wendy A. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
“Confidentiality” refers to the duty not to disclose private information to other people. It is often associated with healthcare professionals’ duty to safeguard patient information, but confidentiality extends to all personal information provided in circumstances or relationships which imply that the information will not be disclosed to others. In some relationships the duty to maintain confidentiality is regarded as absolute (priests in the confessional, for example). In others, although the duty is a strong one, it is not absolute and some disclosures may be required (e.g., by law) or justified with reference to other duties (e.g., protection of the public interest). This essay will concentrate on confidentiality as it applies to healthcare practice. It will look at why there is a duty, various justifications for breaking confidentiality, and difficult cases.
Projectivism
Authors: Price A. W. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractProjectivism is a position in philosophy that makes acts of projecting a mental state upon an external reality central in the explanation of certain concepts that seem problematic. These have included ethical and aesthetic concepts, and also concepts of modality (notably, necessity). It is primarily an aetiological (or developmental) view about the origin of such concepts; yet it may have implications for our view of whether such concepts can be applied to the world truly or falsely.
Ideal Observer Theories
Authors: Kawall Jason 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Ideal observer theories are metaethical theories according to which the truth of moral judgments is determined by the attitudes of hypothetical ideal observers (
see
Metaethics; Moral Judgment). Intuitively, ideal observer theorists attempt to characterize ideal observers (henceforth, IOs) with traits that would eliminate common flaws that mar the reactions of ordinary humans. For example, we often seem to go wrong in our moral judgments because we have false beliefs, lack crucial information, are biased in our own favor, inconsistent, and so on. IOs are thus often characterized as being well informed (or even omniscient), impartial, consistent, and empathetic (
see
Impartiality).
Precautionary Principle
Authors: Munthe Christian 
Published: January 2013

AbstractFollowing the statement in the United Nations'Rio Declarationof 1992 that countries should apply a “precautionary approach” in policymaking on environmental and technological issues, the notion of a precautionary principle (PP) has gained ground in worldwide policymaking and regulation, thus catching the interest of ethics scholars. Although seldom explained in much detail, and resulting in quite different policy results in different countries and areas (O'Riordan et al. 2001; Sandin 1999; Trouwborst 2002; Zander 2010), PP is generally understood as a norm urging or permitting policymakers to take preventive action in the face of unknown, uncertain, or probable dangers, motivated by the experience of how seemingly valuable and promising practices may lead to seriously adverse consequences in spite of lack of solid evidence to this effect (Sandin 1999). In ethics debate, this idea has been applied not only to matters regarding the large‐scale introduction and use of technology (e.g., regarding energy production, transport and communication, nano‐ or biotechnology, and so on) (seeBiotechnology; Nanotechnology, Ethics of) with possible ensuing impact on the natural environment connecting to the notion of sustainability (seeSustainability), but also, for example, to abortion (seeAbortion), medical genetics, embryo experimentation (seeEmbryo Research), the treatment of animals (seeAnimal Experimentation), terrorism (seeTerrorism), and general research ethics (seeResearch Ethics) (Munthe 2011). Many of these applications advocate strong conclusions in spite of the fact that PP or its normative justification have not been made very clear. At the same time, PP has been the subject of criticism, much of which boils down to three points: lack of clarity, lack of practicality, and/or ethical implausibility. Curiously, these critical points have often been made in conjunction, in spite of the fact that a clear sense of what PP means seems necessary for backing up the other two objections.