bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Reasons for Action, Morality and
Authors: Littlejohn Clayton 
Published: January 2013

AbstractYour friend asks if there is any good reason not to order the cod. You both know that the cod is healthier and tastier than anything else on the menu, so this is not a question about health or taste. You take this to be some kind of moral question. She might be asking a substantive question (e.g., she might want to know if morality tells us not to order the cod given their low numbers). She might instead be asking a question about the rational authority of morality (seeRationalism in Ethics). If morality says not to order the cod, do moral reasons help determine what there is overall reason to do? We shall focus on this question.
Moral Education
Authors: Nucci Larry 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

As in every area of teaching, systematic approaches to moral education are a function of the goals and underlying assumptions about the processes that account for educational outcomes. Broadly speaking, two schools of thought have dominated this field since the early 1930s. One approach has its roots in traditional educational practices buttressed by the writings of the sociologist Emile Durkheim (1925;
see
durkheim, emile
), and the psychological schools of behaviorism and social learning theory. On this account morality is defined by the norms and values of society. Moral education entails processes of transmission resulting in the inculcation of the young into the normative value framework of the adult community (Wynne and Ryan 1993). Borrowing loosely from Aristotle, the goal of this enculturation vision of moral education is to instill personal characteristics or “virtues” within students that will form the moral aspect of the student's character and serve to motivate and guide behavior (Carr 2008;
see
Aristotle; Virtue; Virtue Ethics; Character).
Civic Friendship
Authors: Scorza Jason A. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractCivic or political friendship (politikē philia) is a bond of reciprocal good will between fellow citizens (seeCitizenship) expressed through norms of civic behavior, such as mutual recognition of moral equality, mutual concern, and mutual defense and support. Theories of civic friendship are, at their heart, normative arguments about the proper nature of political unity – that is to say, arguments about how fellow citizens in general should regard and relate to one another in the public sphere.
Good and Bad Samaritanism
Authors: Malm Heidi 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Questions regarding good and bad samaritanism range from metaethical questions about the causal status of the omissions of the bad samaritan, to normative questions about whether individuals have a moral right to be rescued, to applied questions about whether or to what extent the law should be used to encourage acts of good samaritanism and discourage acts of bad samaritanism. In the course of covering this broad range of issues, debates about samaritanism connect with a wide variety of other moral and legal debates, including those related to the ethics of aid, duty vs. supererogation, doing vs. allowing, and criminal vs. tort law, to name just a few.
Intention
Authors: Paul Sarah K. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractG. E. M. Anscombe (1958) famously argued that it is not profitable to do moral philosophy until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology (seeAnscombe, G. E. M.). The investigation of what we are morally permitted to do is integrally bound up with the puzzle of what it is to act. Intentional actions are paradigm objects of moral evaluation; therefore, grasping what it is to act is part of understanding and justifying such evaluation. In turn, the study of intentional action is integrally bound up with the notion of intention. What is done intentionally stands in some relation to the intention with which one acts: the very same physical event of an arm rising might on one hand be an unintentional spasm, and on the other any of the intentional actions of hailing a taxi, voting, stretching, or signaling for the revolution to begin. And in addition to contributing to the determination of what is done, the intention with which an action was performed may influence our moral assessment of that action. An account of the nature of intention and its relation to intentional action is thus highly relevant for moral philosophy.
Compromise
Authors: May Simon Căbulea 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Compromise is an inescapable part of human coexistence, from the mundane choices of domestic life to the grand stage of world politics. Edmund Burke (1993: 257) famously remarks that “all government, indeed every human benefit and enjoyment, and every prudent act, is founded on compromise and barter.” To create and enjoy the many benefits of social cooperation, individuals must make concessions to each other in one way or another. Notwithstanding its ubiquity, compromise raises a number of philosophical puzzles. One kind of problem is conceptual: what is compromise, and how might it differ from similar social phenomena, such as consensus and bargaining? These questions are discussed in the first section. A second kind of problem concerns the murky ethics of compromise, particularly on matters of moral significance. Compromise may have a salutary role in facilitating cooperation, but it can also involve the sacrifice or betrayal of important values. Can there be moral reasons for genuine moral compromise and, if so, what form might they take? Similarly, are there any limits to moral compromise, or are all moral commitments ultimately subject to negotiation? These questions are discussed in the second section.
King Jr., Martin Luther
Authors: McGary Howard 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Although Martin Luther King Jr. (January 15, 1929–April 4, 1968) wrestled with philosophical texts and ideas, he was not a professional philosopher. He was a world‐renowned social activist, an accomplished Baptist minister, a superb public speaker, and a tireless advocate for peace and social justice. He received many honors in a life that was cut short by an assassin's bullet, including the Nobel Peace Prize in 1964.
Just Cause (in War)
Authors: Luban David 
Published: January 2013

AbstractClassical just war theory distinguishes the justice of going to war (jus ad bellum) from the justice of how war is waged (jus in bello) (seeWar). As the theory ofjus ad bellumevolved over the past millennium, a war had to satisfy multiple criteria to be just. The war must be waged (1) by alegitimate authoritywho is (2) acting withright intention; (3) the war must havereasonableprospects of successat attaining its goals, the importance of which is (4)proportionalto the harm that the war can be expected to inflict (seeProportionality (in War)); (5) the war must be thelast resort; and (6) there must be ajust causefor the war. None of these criteria is clear or unambiguous, but just cause is perhaps the most contested.
Military Occupation
Authors: Ryan Cheyney 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe topic of military occupation has gained increasing attention from philosophers in recent years, due partly to political events. The actions of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised serious questions about what foreign powers may legitimately due in countries they have occupied. Interest in these matters has led many to look back on the experiences of Germany and Japan in the post‐World War II years, when the victorious Allied powers reconstructed the defeated enemies along democratic lines. In addition, discussion has concerned the means by which an occupying power pursues its ends, through military actions or other uses of force. War, proper, has its rules by which fighting must proceed; what are the rules by which an occupation must proceed, and do they differ for just and unjust occupations? Finally, cases of unjust occupation have focused attention on the response of occupied peoples to their predicament; for example, are terrorist‐type actions ever legitimate as a response?
Durkheim, Emile
Authors: Lukes Steven 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) was one of the founders of sociology and the author of several of that discipline's classic texts. One is
The Division of Labor in Society
(1984 [1893]), which contrasts two forms of social solidarity: the “mechanical solidarity” of pre‐industrial societies, with a strongly unifying, religiously based common consciousness, and the “organic solidarity” of advanced, organized socially differentiated societies integrated by functional interdependencies. A second is
Suicide
(1951 [1897]), which focuses on the distinctively modern social pathologies indicated by current high suicide rates whose social causes are the breakdown of restraining social norms (“anomie”), in both the economic and sexual spheres, and social isolation (“egoism”) (
see
Suicide). A third is
The Elementary Forms of Religious Life
(1995 [1912]), which, through a study of totemism, proposes sociological explanations of the causes and consequences of religious beliefs and ritual practices and an interpretation of these in social terms (“I see in divinity,” he wrote, “only society transfigured and conceived symbolically” [1953: 52]). These works, together with his lectures on moral education (Durkheim 1961;
see
Moral Education) and on professional ethics and civic morals (
see
Professional Ethics), were pioneering contributions to the sociology of morality, as was much of the work of the “Durkheimian” scholars grouped around the
Année sociologique
, the remarkable journal of monographs and reviews whose 12 volumes he edited from 1898 to 1913.
Coercive Wage Offers
Authors: Anderson Scott A. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractKarl Marx argued that workers in a capitalist economy are both exploited by the owners of capital and coerced or forced to work for them (Marx 1975: 274; 1971: 819;seeCoercion; Exploitation; Marx, Karl). Both claims have attracted considerable discussion without consensus, but it would seem that the latter claim, that workers are coerced into accepting offers of employment from their employers, is demonstrably false, if one accepts recent theories of coercion. Twentieth‐century scholarship has tended to associate coercion exclusively with the use of threats, and has correspondingly held that offers cannot coerce those who receive them. This has prompted some to rethink the nature of coercion, and to defend the possibility of coercive offers. This dispute is of interest both for the light it sheds on political economy and the nature of employment relations (seeEmployers and Employees; Work, Nature and Value of) as well as on our understanding of the nature of coercion.
Publicity
Authors: Kelly Erin I. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractPublicity is a broad topic, potentially spanning many others. I will consider publicity primarily as a feature of what I will refer to as the political justification requirement. Publicity is an aspect of the moral demand that political arrangements be justified to their subjects. This means that political justification should be public in these ways: it should be transparent; it should represent common knowledge; and it should be grounded in shared values. So understood, publicity is a condition of the legitimacy of political authority and of the justice of political institutions. Justice and legitimacy are aspects of the morality of institutions (seeAuthority; Citizenship; Justice).
Wilderness, Value of
Authors: Nelson Michael P. , Vucetich John A. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Why should we preserve areas known as wilderness? What good is wilderness preservation? What is wilderness preservation for? An answer to each of these questions will presuppose that those places we call wilderness have a certain value or set of values. For over a century people have been putting forth various arguments for why we should value and preserve wilderness. Over time, the assumed values of wilderness have changed. In the early part of the twentieth century these arguments appealed to the broad range of recreational values wilderness provides. More recently, wilderness arguments have been premised upon scientific values associated with wilderness preservation. Upon examination, however, these arguments are not all equally persuasive. Here we review these arguments and offer a general examination or critique of the values upon which these arguments are premised.
Montesquieu, Charles‐Louis de Secondat, Baron de
Authors: Radasanu Andrea 
Published: January 2013

AbstractMontesquieu (1689–1755) was arguably the most influential philosopher of the eighteenth century, particularly with respect to his views on morality. His elliptical and aphoristic manner of writing, however, has made it difficult to interpret his thought on this subject and others. In his masterwork,The Spirit of Laws(1748), Montesquieu seems to take part in both the tradition of natural law and the new Enlightenment science of morality, providing accounts of morality in various historical and political circumstances from an intellectual distance. He has been labeled a latter‐day Thomist, a follower of Hugo Grotius's secularized school of natural law, a Stoic, a proto‐sociologist, a critic of Hobbes's reduction of justice to convention, and even a follower of Hobbesian positivism (see Courtney 2001; MacDonald 2001; Manent 1994; Pangle 1973; Waddicor 1970 for important points of view on this matter) (seeNatural Law; Aquinas, Saint Thomas; Grotius, Hugo; Stoicism; Durkheim, Emile; Hobbes, Thomas). Whatever the role of these various strands of thought in his work, an analysis of Montesquieu's ethical stance should begin with the observation that he championed and helped invent a cosmopolitan ethic of gentle mores (doux moeurs). Some of the main hallmarks of this view are moderate government, protection of individual liberties (including property rights and religious toleration), lenient penal law, and peaceful international relations. These are some of the defining characteristics of liberalism, broadly understood (seeLiberalism).
Balguy, John
Authors: Hill Benjamin 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

John Balguy (1686–1748) was a Cambridge‐educated clergyman who is best remembered for a dogged defense of moral rationalism (
see
Rationalism in Ethics), clever critiques of Francis Hutcheson's moral sense theory (
see
Hutcheson, Francis), and staunch opposition to Hobbesian egoism (
see
Hobbes, Thomas).His influence can be seen in David Hume's (
see
Hume, David) reformulations of the doctrine of moral sense and the rationalisms of Richard Price and Thomas Reid. Balguy's thought belongs squarely within the tradition of British rationalism (Ralph Cudworth, Samuel Clarke, Price, and Reid). It stands opposed to both the skeptical/egoistical tradition of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Bernard Mandeville and the sentimentalist tradition of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume, and Adam Smith (
see
Sentimentalism; Sentiments, Moral).
Ethical Issues in Teaching
Authors: Cholbi Michael 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Learning is any process that, by engaging with a person's rational powers, results in an improvement in that person's knowledge, skills, behaviors, or values. Learning can of course occur unaided. Teaching, however, is the deliberate effort to induce learning in another person. The ethics of teaching, then, addresses the ethical standards, values, or traits that govern deliberate efforts to induce learning in others.
Butler, Joseph
Authors: Phillips David 
Published: January 2013

AbstractJoseph Butler (1692–1752) was a bishop, theologian, and philosopher. His corpus is quite limited: essentially just theFifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel(1726; second edition 1730) andThe Analogy of Religion(1736). And for moral philosophers the really interesting texts are still more circumscribed: roughly two thirds of the sermons (The Preface and Sermons 1–3, 5–6, and 8–12), and theDissertation of the Nature of Virtue(an appendix to theAnalogy). Nonetheless his work had a significant influence on the development of British moral philosophy: in the introduction to hisTreatise, David Hume listed him (with Locke, Mandeville, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson) as one of the “late philosophers inEngland, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing” (Hume 1978: xvii;seeHume David); and in the short intellectual autobiography included in the Preface to the sixth edition of theMethods(Sidgwick 1981: xvii–xxiii, esp. xx–xxi), Henry Sidgwick makes Butler (with Mill and Kant) one of his three modern “masters” (seeSidgwick, Henry).
Biopiracy
Authors: Magnus and David C. , Allyse Megan 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
“Biopiracy” is a term, originally attributed to the Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) (Mooney 1993), that refers “either to the unauthorized extraction of biological resources and/or associated traditional knowledge from developing countries, or to the patenting of spurious “inventions” based on such knowledge or resources without compensation” (Robinson 2010: 20). While inflammatory, the term encapsulates a complex and fraught debate about the relationship between developed and developing countries, the notion of shared heritage and who “owns” natural resources.
Nationalism and Patriotism
Authors: Archard David 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe statement, frequently made some years ago, that nationalism and patriotism are neglected topics in moral and political philosophy is now dated. Since the 1990s, a wealth of relevant material has been published. Although by no means universally sympathetic to its subject the work has nevertheless not, on the whole, shared the disparaging tone that had previously explained the neglect. Thus, no one now simply dismisses nationalism and patriotism out of hand as unprincipled and shameful. Equally, not everyone agrees that the principles underpinning both patriotism and nationalism are beyond reproach.
Clarke, Samuel
Authors: Garrett Aaron 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) was one of the most original and influential British moral philosophers between Thomas Hobbes and Joseph Butler. He was a close confidante of Isaac Newton and a central figure in the Newtonian revolution in the natural sciences. Notably, he served as Newton's defender, translator of the
Optics
into Latin (a translation which pleased Newton so much that he gave Clarke one hundred pounds for each of his five children [Whiston 1730: 9]), and then amanuensis in the Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence, the work for which he is best known today. His learning and interests were formidable and ranged from theology – he was a chaplain and rector, and his theological views informed much of the rest of his interests – to physics, to mathematics, to classics, to metaphysics, to moral philosophy. As a moral philosopher Clarke was a great influence on Catharine Cockburn Trotter, Butler (Butler corresponded with him when he was in his teens), Thomas Reid, Henry Sidgwick (who held him in the highest regard as a moral philosopher), and many others (
see
Butler, Joseph; Reid, Thomas; Sidgwick, Henry). He is today perhaps even better known through his critics, in particular David Hume (
see
Hume, David) and Francis Hutcheson (
see
Hutcheson, Francis), both of whom used attacks on Clarke's metaphysical moral realism as launching pads for their sentimentalist programs (
see
Sentimentalism).
Stakeholder Theory
Authors: Norman Wayne 
Published: January 2013

Abstract“Stakeholder theory” is a rubric that emerged in the field of business ethics (seeBusiness Ethics; Applied Ethics) in the 1980s and has been used to identify a wide range of normative, conceptual, and empirical claims about the relations between a business firm and its stakeholders. While it may not really qualify as atheoryin the way moral and political philosophers generally use that term, stakeholder theory is centrally concerned with the obligations of firms and their managers to key stakeholder groups like investors, employees, consumers, creditors, suppliers, and local communities, among others. Stakeholder theorists see themselves as providing an alternative to what they take to be the “prevailing view” within economics and management studies, which holds: that the firm is owned by its investors; that its purpose is to serve the owners’ interests; and that the managers of the firm are obligated, primarily or solely, to advance the interests of the owners in whatever ways are permitted by law. In contrast, stakeholder theorists think of the firm as a vehicle to advance the interests of all stakeholder groups, with investors or shareholders beingbut oneof many such groups, and having no inherent priority over the others. Through the last decade of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty‐first century, it was almost certainly the most widely discussed approach to business ethics within the scholarly literature.
Public Health Ethics
Authors: Verweij and Marcel , Dawson Angus 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIn the first decades of its development, bioethics has mainly focused on ethical issues in clinical medicine and medical technology (seeBioethics). Since the end of the twentieth century, however, more and more attention has been given to moral and legal issues in public health. The field of public health encompasses a broad range of health problems and societal responses that inevitably raise ethical questions. Infectious disease control, mass screening, and health promotion have the potential to reduce the burden of disease within populations, but they can also be in tension with other values such as liberty or individual well‐being, or raise questions about justice in relation to priority setting. However, public health ethics is not just about a new set of topics, but can also be thought of as a distinctive approach to biomedical ethics for at least three reasons. First, public health interventions are generally aimed at populations rather than individuals, and therefore cannot easily be tailored to individual choice. Hence, whereas “autonomy” and “informed consent” are seen as core elements of clinical bioethics, their role in public health ethics is less clear (seeAutonomy; Informed Consent).
Rationalism in Ethics
Authors: Birondo Noell 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe word ‘rationalism,' as it appears in philosophical discussions of ethics and morality, signifies at least one of a cluster of theses, each of which connects some aspect of ethical experience toreasonorrationality. The most provocative rationalist thesis arises in contemporary discussions in metaethics (seeMetaethics); and it is this thesis that remains the most likely referent, in contemporary discussions, of the phrase ‘moral rationalism.' The thesis is more accurately referred to, however, as metaethical rationalism, since it concerns the provenance and nature of moral obligations, rather than their substance. A strong version of metaethical rationalism maintains that if someone is morally obligated to perform a certain action, then performing that action is what she has the strongest reasons, all things considered, to do. A weaker version of metaethical rationalism claims that if someone is morally obligated to perform a certain action, then performing that action is something that she hasareason to do, even though the reason might not be decisive: another reason, for instance of prudence, might trump the reason she has to act morally (seePrima Facie and Pro Tanto Oughts). It is rationalism in this metaethical guise that will be the ultimate focus of this essay.