bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
RISK BASED PLANNING WILL YOUR REGULATORY COMPLIANT PLAN MEET YOUR ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS?
Authors: Wilson Kelly L. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
During the 2004 and 2005 Hurricane Season, one of the lesser known results, but potentially more environmentally threatening, were damaged, downed production platforms and the associated production.
Downed production platforms have multiple sources of potential releases. Combine multiple downed and damaged production platforms with the need to intervene and secure production, and the risk of an oil release is increased. One question that needs to be answered: What are the related risks to the many different scenarios that could possibly occur during impending, multiple, simultaneous operations?
One of the goals BP established was to not have oil impact the shoreline or nearby economically significant marine facilities. Both shoreline and economically sensitive areas are within 12 miles or less of the downed production platforms.
To accomplish the no impact goal, a three phased approach was used to create a supplemental response capability.
Phase 1: A risk matrix was created to address the multiple potential sources and impacts while evaluating the potential for environmental and economic impact.
Phase 2: Utilizing the existing response plan, which met or exceeded regulatory compliance, evaluated the effective ability to respond to the potential risk in the varied prevailing weather conditions and provide the best opportunity for preventing impact to environmental and economic priorities.
Phase 3: Developed a fiscally responsible plan to address the short-comings of the existing plan and secured resources based on the evaluation that would provide the best opportunity to meet the BP goals.
The paper will provide a discussion of the technical processes used during each phase and present practical means for assessing multiple risks and scenarios. This will include a unique application of a safety risk matrix evaluation. The second area of emphases will expand on the process of using the risk matrix results for resource planning.
The principles employed to prepare the response capability are well developed and historically substantiated, but they have been combined in a practical, technical and unique way to planning for environmental response in a real world risk.
OIL SPILL RESPONSES - THE POLITICAL DIMENSION
Authors: Weng Ho Yew 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
There are always lessons to be learnt from every oil spill response. Similarly, critics are always quick to point out how a response was too slow, the inadequacy of equipment / manpower resources and, inevitably, how the response lacks proper coordination. Yet many of these common criticisms can be resolved if artificial ‘roadblocks and red tape’ are removed so that Responders can go about doing their jobs, providing prompt responses in mitigating damages caused by oil spills. This paper will discuss the challenges of mounting an international oil spill response in the Asia Pacific with specific references to political roadblocks and red tape put up by ‘recipient’ countries.
Tier 3 Oil Spill Response organizations, namely Oil Spill Response and East Asia Response Limited (OSRL/EARL), regularly practices activations and resource deployments through exercises with different scenarios. These exercises can take the form of tabletop exercises or full scale deployment of equipment, recall of Members’ regional and worldwide teams. The larger scale exercises involve trans-boundary movement of people and equipment, including boats and aircrafts.
OSRL/EARL has conducted large scale exercises successfully. Unfortunately, there are also times when red tape prevented the company from responding in the swift and efficient manner that it endeavors. Various reasons given are ‘national security’ and the need for very ‘high level approvals’ as the recipient country will be deemed to be calling outside assistance for a national incident.
The paper will discuss some of OSRL/EARL'S experiences like:Response organizations refusing to participate in exercises due to ‘national security’ reasonsNational agencies refusing import of equipment due to taxation lawsProtracted approval processes, and sometimes outright refusal, for materials like dispersantRefusing entry of international aircraftsClearance and complicated permit requirements for Responders entering a country to assist in the response
The challenge to remove these road blocks is an uphill task.
OSRL/EARL has an on-going Advocacy program to engage and cooperate on these issues with Government Agencies and relevant bodies. The Author believes that the removal of ‘road blocks’ will expedite responses to oil spills.
OIL DROPLET SIZE DISTRIBUTION AS A FUNCTION OF ENERGY DISSIPATION RATE IN AN EXPERIMENTAL WAVE TANK
Authors: Li Zhengkai , Lee Kenneth , King Thomas , Boufadel Michel C. , Venosa Albert D. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The U.S. National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Understanding Oil Spill Dispersants: Efficacy and Effects (2005) identified two factors that require further investigation in chemical oil dispersant efficacy studies: 1) quantification of mixing energy at sea as energy dissipation rate and 2) dispersed particle size distribution. To fully evaluate the significance of these factors, a wave tank facility was designed and constructed to conduct controlled oil dispersion studies. A factorial experimental design was used to study the dispersant effectiveness as a function of energy dissipation rate for two oils and two dispersants under three different wave conditions, namely regular non-breaking waves, spilling breakers, and plunging breakers. The oils tested were weathered MESA and fresh ANS crude. The dispersants tested were Corexit 9500 and SPC 1000 plus water for no-dispersant control. The wave tank surface energy dissipatation rates of the three waves were determined to be 0.005, 0.1, and 1 m2/s3, respectively. The dispersed oil concentrations and droplet size distribution, measured by in-situ laser diffraction, were compared to quantify the chemical dispersant effectiveness as a function of energy dissipation rate. The results indicate that high energy dissipation rate of breaking waves enhanced chemical dispersant effectiveness by significantly increasing dispersed oil concentration and reducing droplet sizes in the water column (p &lt;0.05). The presence of dispersants and breaking waves stimulated the oil dispersion kinetics. The findings of this research are expected to provide guidance to disperant application on oil spill responses.
SVALBARD 2006 EXPERIMENTAL OIL SPILL UNDER ICE: REMOTE SENSING, OIL WEATHERING UNDER ARCTIC CONDITIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF OIL REMOVAL BY IN-SITUBURNING
Authors: Dickins David , Brandvik Per Johan , Bradford John , Faksness Liv-Guri , Liberty Lee , Daniloff Roger 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
This paper describes the findings from an experimental spill of 3,400 liters of Statfjord crude under first-year sea ice in Svalbard, Norway in March 2006. The objectives were to:1. Test commercially available radar and acoustics systems for detecting oil spilled under ice.2. Document the weathering processes governing crude oil behaviour in ice.3. Confirm the effectiveness of in-situ burning as an oil removal strategy.
The results of this project will be used in planning new Arctic oil exploration and development programs. With the growing awareness of the Arctic basin as a potentially important province for new oil and gas discoveries, there is a critical need to: (1) develop new technologies to detect and map spills under ice; (2) increase the understanding of oil behaviour in ice and: (3) continue to demonstrate the capabilities of in-situ burning as an important and safe Arctic response tool.
Tank tests conducted in 2004 (Dickins et al., 2005) showed that radar systems could detect and map oil pools as thin as 2 to 3 cm under controlled conditions under model sea ice up to 40 cm thick. This field experiment created a much larger-scale spill under thicker 65 cm natural sea ice to further evaluate potential remote sensing systems as practical operational spill response tools.
The findings of the 2006 experiment: (1) demonstrated for the first time the ability of ground penetrating radar to detect and map oil under natural sea ice from the surface; (2) documented oil weathering with a relatively warm ice sheet under spring conditions; and (3) confirmed the effectiveness of in situ burning as a primary oil removal strategy under Arctic conditions.
Oil weathering results are discussed and compared with small-scale field experiments performed on Svalbard during the period 2003–2006. Low temperatures and lack of waves in ice act to reduce oil spreading, evaporation, emulsification and dispersion. As a result, the operational time window for several spill response strategies such as dispersants and in-situ burning may be significantly extended compared to oil spills in open water.
MAINTAINING DISPERSANT STOCKPILES AND ASSESSING THEIR QUALITY
Authors: Clark James , Becker Ken , Lessard Richard 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
Ensuring the capability to mount a rapid and effective dispersant response when needed for an oil spill includes a proactive approach to manage dispersant stockpiles in such a way as to ensure that the quality of the product has not deteriorated over time. This includes 1) storage strategies that minimize potential adverse impacts of environmental elements (heat, cold, and humidity) on the chemical products and on their containers, 2) considerations to check the integrity of storage containers on a regular basis to ensure there is no loss of volatiles or introduction of water vapors (or endeavor to keep these processes to absolute minimums); 3) development and execution of a plan to rotate stock and use up older batches of product during response operations before mobilizing newer product; and 4) design and execution of a rational plan to sample the stored products on a logical and systematic schedule and have them analyzed for chemical quality and effectiveness.
This paper provides guidance on approaches to address these 4 areas using information from dispersant manufacturers, response organizations that manage dispersant stockpiles, and results of testing for chemical quality and effectiveness completed for dispersant samples taken from various U.S. stockpiles of Corexit 9527. These data demonstrate that where recommended practices have been followed to ensure quality storage of the dispersants, batches of Corexit that have been held for over 30 years can remain acceptable for spill response contingencies. The recommended stockpile storage and management practices will also be effective in prolonging the useful life of other dispersant products; however their effective shelf life must be determined individually due to differences in the chemical composition of various product lines.
PHOTOGRAPHIC TIMELINE OF PRUDHOE BAY GC−2 SPILL CLEANUP AND TUNDRA REVEGETATION
Authors: Parson John 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
Photographic timeline (March 2006 to Current) of the GC-2 spill clean up (Prudhoe Bay, Alaska) and revegetation technique. This will include a discussion of the tactics used and lessons learned. This spill occurred during very inclement weather and utilized several new tactics for the clean up and revegetation of the effected area.
ASSESSING THE INCREASING RISK OF MARINE OIL POLLUTION SPILLS IN CHINA
Authors: Woolgar Lisa 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
As the Chinese economy continues to develop at a rapid pace, shipping has also increased significantly over recent years. This rise in traffic brings a greater threat of oil pollution from vessels. Assessing the risk of oil spills can be a complex process, yet by modelling and analysing the amount of oil transported around coastal areas during 2001 and 2005, using data obtained from Lloyds’ Marine Intelligence Unit (LMIU) and comparing it with the historical data from ITOPF'S tanker spills database, an improved representation of risk can be made. Using a GIS platform to graphically visualise this information and integrate further datasets regarding local sensitivities we can understand the risk more thoroughly and present the aggregated information more effectively.
In response to the increased risk experienced in and around Chinese waters, ITOPF and other international organisations are working to build awareness of the risks and develop links with key parties through training courses and seminars. By working closely with the Chinese Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) and with the Northwest Pacific Action Plan (NOWPAP), a regional UNEP initiative, the threat of future incidents can be minimised and handled in a rational manner.
This paper looks at the risks associated with increased traffic and developments taking place to meet the threat of marine oil spills in Chinese waters.
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS IN ADDRESSING PREVENTION, PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO OIL POLLUTION AND THE EXTENSION OF THESE TO ADDRESS THE CHALLENGE OF HAZARDOUS AND Noxious Substances (HNS)
Authors: Charlebois Patricia 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
As knowledge, policies and infrastructure related to marine oil spill prevention, preparedness and response have continued to evolve and are now considered to have reached a state of relative maturity; attention has more recently turned to developing systems to address spills of hazardous and noxious substances (HNS) in the marine environment.
The International Maritime Organization (IMO), as the specialized agency of the United Nations with a global mandate for the protection of the marine environment from pollution caused by shipping, discharges its commitment to protecting the marine environment from pollution from oil and HNS at the global level along four different but interdependent paths: prevention, preparedness and response, and technical co-operation.
Two mutually supporting IMO instruments that together address the Prevention-Preparedness-Response (PPR) continuum for HNS are: The International Convention for the Prevention of pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocols of 1978 and 1997 relating thereto (MARPOL Convention), notably Annexes II (noxious liquid substances in bulk) and III (harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form), covering prevention, and the Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, 2000 (HNS Protocol), which addresses preparedness, response and cooperation to spills of HNS.
Together, these instruments provide a framework for countries to establish the necessary systems for tackling the complex issue of prevention, preparedness and response to HNS, with the goal of embedding the principles set out in these instruments into national legislation and policy that are fully implemented at both institutional and operational levels. At the same time, it is equally recognized that the topic of preparedness and response to HNS is still in its infancy and that any systems developed must borrow heavily from the established systems for oil pollution, in order to maximize the use of existing capacity in planning and preparing for HNS, at the same time acknowledging the unique issues presented by these substances.
The paper will examine these elements in greater detail and will discuss the requirements for developing systems for preparedness and response for oil and HNS, comparing areas of similarity, contrasting the differences and identifying the distinct considerations that are necessary for each.
EVALUATING THE CONSENSUS ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT WORKSHOP AS A TOOL FOR FACILITATING DECISION-MAKING DURING SPILL RESPONSE AND PLANNING
Authors: Mearns Alan , Evans Mary 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
In early 2007, NOAA'S Environmental Response Division (ERD) initiated a project to evaluate the effectiveness of Consensus Ecological Risk Assessment (CERA) workshops in improving spill response planning and increasing awareness of response options and their limitations. A CERA workshop is a spill drill in which participants, especially resource trustees, learn and practice a risk-based method for assessing the relative benefits and impacts of alternative response actions, including no response, open water cleanup, dispersion, in situ burning, and shoreline cleanup. Most CERAs have been sponsored by the US Coast Guard and all have been co-facilitated by ERD.
Since 1998, 15 regional CERA workshops and four national spill drills have involved more than 700 people from about two dozen nations. While anecdotal information indicates that the workshops have prompted some changes in spill response and response planning, ERD'S research project is the first directed effort to systematically investigate the nature and extent of these changes.
ERD'S inquiry is designed to answer three questions: (1) What has been the importance of the ERA process to people who have participated in them? (2) What has been the impact of the CERA process on spill response and spill response planning in the US? (3) How can the CERA workshop format be improved? ERD'S evaluation process relies on two primary methods widely used by social scientists: (1) surveys and unstructured interviews of CERA participants, and (2) qualitative analysis of participant comments and recommendations captured during past workshops.
Initial results of ERD'S research will be reported
NOAA NATIONAL MARINE SANCTUARIES AS RESOURCE TRUSTEES IN THE UNIFIED COMMAND: GOOD OR BAD?
Authors: Symons Lisa C. , Pavia Robert 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is a federal trustee within the National Contingency Plan (NCP) in addition to providing scientific and technical support to the Incident Command System (ICS) during a response. NOAA is also the home of the National Marine Sanctuary Program (NMSP), a system of 14 marine protected areas that encompass 150,000 square miles of coastal and oceanic waters. NOAA is increasing its capacity for addressing a significant incident through participating in and leading spill response exercises. One of the most intense aspects of those experiences is often the discussion of the role of NOAA as a trustee and whether they should be part of the Unified Command (UC). While the NCP outlines the expectations of Regional Response Team (RRT) members from the Department of the Interior and the Department of Commerce (NOAA), it provides the Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) considerable flexibility in determining whether to include trustees within the UC or working with the Liaison or through the Environmental Unit. A recent Technical Assistance Document from the National Response Team speaks directly to this issue and provides RRT'S more specific guidance. There are some RRT'S that feel strongly that the only trustee in the UC should be the states. NOAA and the DOI believe that they should be afforded the same considerations in the marine and coastal environment as trustees or landowners in the terrestrial environment. Both the Safe Sanctuaries 2005 in Florida and the Safe Seas 2006 in California provided a forum for dialogue on this issue. In both instances, the FOSC did engage the trustees in the UC. It is not always necessary or appropriate for NOAA to participate as a member of the UC. In some situations it could be more effective to participate in other capacities within the ICS and NOAA may not be the trustee with the most significant resources at risk. When participating in a UC, it is incumbent upon the NOAA representative to work with other members of the UC to manage the response under a single, collaborative approach.
IMPACTS AND RESPONSE CHALLENGES OF THE TANKER SOLAR 1OIL SPILL, GUIMARAS, PHILIPPINES: OBSERVATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ADVISORS
Authors: Yender Ruth , Stanzel Katharina , Lloyd Anthony 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The tanker SOLAR 1 sank in the Guimaras Strait in the central Philippines on August 11, 2006, spilling a significant part of her 2,100 tonne cargo of IFO 217. The Philippine Coast Guard led the challenging response to this spill, which impacted sensitive tropical habitats, disrupted fisheries, and affected coastal communities. The spill oiled shorelines along the southern coasts of Guimaras Island and several smaller islands in the Guimaras Strait. This area is rich in mangroves, coral reefs, and seagrass beds, which makes it very important for fisheries and aquaculture. Extensive areas of mangroves were oiled, including stands in the Taklong Island National Marine Reserve. Oil also stranded along sand, pebble, and cobble beaches, often seeping into the substrate or becoming buried. The remoteness and rugged terrain of the affected area made shoreside access for cleanup difficult and oversight of cleanup operations complicated. Political demands and press attention frequently made it more difficult for response managers to direct response operations. Shoreline cleanup, organized under the auspices of the national oil company Petron, was conducted manually by hired local residents. The removal of heavy contamination was completed in most areas within three weeks but more detailed cleaning and clearing recovered oily waste continued for approximately three months. As recommended by mangrove experts, little cleanup was conducted in oiled mangroves. Monitoring a year after the spill indicates that impacted mangroves are recovering naturally and suffered only minor mortality. Perceptions that seafood might be contaminated affected fisheries far beyond the areas actually contaminated by oil. Misunderstanding of the health risks associated with the spilled oil led to prolonged evacuation of a number of villages and hardship for coastal subsistence communities.
Several international oil spill experts provided guidance to Philippine responders. A U.S. advisory team, including representatives of the U.S. Coast Guard Pacific Strike Team and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration'S Emergency Response Division, spent three weeks on-scene in the spill area, working with Philippine responders and natural resource managers. Representatives of the International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation provided technical guidance and advice on-scene for several months. Based on the observations of external advisors, this paper summarizes the impacts and challenges responders confronted in cleaning up the SOLAR 1 oil spill.