bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
ENHANCEMENTS TO STOCK CCG TRANSFER PUMPS/SKIMMER UNITS
Authors: Cooper D. , MacKay R. , Brown C. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
A number of modifications and enhancements of the two primary transfer pump/skimmer units, specifically the GT-185 and GT-260 stocked by the Canadian Coast Guard have been proposed over the past few years. Much of the focus of the testing during this time has centered on dealing with very viscous oils, but the proposed changes will impact the performance of these devices when dealing with any oil.
This paper details the development of a collaborative series of projects supported by Environment Canada and the Canadian Coast Guard over the past six years. It provides background information on the original problems or design limitations of the oil spill recovery equipment. Descriptions of the subsequent modifications are presented, along with performance information which quantifies any improvements to performance. The work has evolved to include partnerships with federal government organizations from Canada and the United States, along with contributions by manufacturers of similar spill response equipment during testing trials.
FACTORS AFFECTING MARINE HYDROCARBON EMISSIONS IN AN AREA OF NATURAL SEEPS AND ABANDONED OIL WELLS - SUMMERLAND, CALIFORNIA
Authors: Leifer Ira , Wilson Ken , Tarpley John , Lewis Robin , Imai Randy , Sowby Michael , Mayer Ken , Moore Carlton 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
A video-monitored oil-seep capture tent and an intertidal seep tank were developed and deployed to quantify emissions in shallow (5-m) nearshore waters and at an intertidal location at Summerland Beach, California. At two sites, where bubbles appeared clear, gas to oil ratios were 105:1; at a site where bubbles were dark, gas to oil ratio was 8.4:1. Nearshore oil emissions were conservatively estimated at 0.8 L dy’1. The size distribution of oily bubbles sharply peaked at 1500 µm, and the gas to oil ratio varied between bubbles. Oil affected the bubble's buoyancy and hydrodynamics. Time series of seabed emissions showed oil was mostly released in pulses. Several mechanisms that may cause variability in oil emissions were proposed. Intertidal oil emission were estimated a 12 L dy−1. Also, beach surveys showed less than trace amounts of beached oil and no oiled fauna over a 19-month period.
EVOLVING POLLUTION-RELATED REQUIREMENTS INTERNATIONALLY AND IN THE UNITED STATES
Authors: Waldron Jonathan K. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
This paper will analyze the domestic and international pollution-related requirements for vessels that have recently come into force, or will likely soon affect, vessel owners and operators. In particular, the international requirements reviewed include: MARPOL Annex I, Annex IV, Annex VI, the International Convention for the Control and Management of Ship's Ballast Water, the International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-Fouling Systems, and the London Convention and its 1996 Protocol. The analysis of changing domestic law reviews the pollution related amendments to the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Act of 2004 (CGMTA), Pub. L. No. 108-293, which was signed into law on August 9, 2004, which made numerous amendments relating to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90), Pub. L. No. 101-380. Vessel owners and operators should continue to monitor evolving pollution related regulations in order to comply with new requirements.
OIL SPILL RESPONSE ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT—BOHAI SEA—CHINA
Authors: Boben Mark , Yuheng Liu 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
Oil spill response along the coast of China has been recognized as an important issue by the Chinese government. The Bohai Sea in particular, is an area of high oil exploration and production activity, with offshore developments comprising platforms and FPSO's (floating, production, storage and off-loading) together with associated vessels and pipelines. Major shipping lanes from the East China Sea into China also pass through the offshore oil fields. For the oil companies operating in the area, the prospect of an accidental oil spill is a concern from both a domestic and international perspective.
In 2000, the companies involved in upstream activities in the Bohai Sea began discussions with the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to develop an oil spill response capability. Led by ConocoPhillips, the international oil companies worked with CNOOC to build a framework for developing an oil spill response organization (OSRO) to provide appropriate services within the Bohai Sea. The key tenet for this OSRO, was to be able to perform to international standards.
In 2002, the CNOOC executive management, through its subsidiary, Bohai Corporation(COOBC) committed to establishing a commercial oil spill response organization, Bohai Environmental Services Ltd. (BES). The BES remit is focused on the Bohai Sea, but with the eventual goal of providing response services along the wider China coastal region and eventually fulfilling a longer term vision of expanding into the international market.
This Paper describes the standards required by the international oil companies and how BES was conceived and organized to meet them.
PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT… STILL THE KEY TO ACQUIRING AND MAINTAINING, “RIGHT MIX” CAPABILITIES
Authors: Bates Clifford Scott 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The most recent national study of the adequacy of government owned versus private sector oil spill removal capability, known as the capability limits or (CAPS) review, is currently seven years old. While oil spill response preparedness assessments have continued via the National Strike Force Coordination Center Oil Spill Removal Organization (OSRO) assessment visits, the Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP), and the Spills of National Significance (SONS) exercises, the outdated CAPS review stands as a great impediment to the Coast Guard's ability to continue to make sound overarching policy decisions regarding known national oil spill removal equipment inventories and expertise levels as they pertain to oil spill risks. The CAPS review established a baseline by which regulatory decisions pertaining to the “Right government/private Mix” of capabilities for oil spill response could be made. The ability to accurately assess this mix is a critical component of the Preparedness model that has been used for oil spill response and should continue to be used for Preparedness for all contingency response. This model is depicted below in Figure 1.FIGURE 1PREPAREDNESS (TO RESPOND) MODELFIGURE 1. PREPAREDNESS (TO RESPOND) MODEL
Prior to Sept 11, 2001, it was assumed that the costly and cumbersome to complete findings of the CAPS review would remain valid for an extensive period of time. This was a valid assumption given the stability of Post OPA 90 oil spill response capability at the time. When Sept 11, 2001 shifted government and private response priorities away from oil spills, the validity of the assumption began to degrade. Unfortunately, a request for an update must now compete for funding and support with security-related studies. Further, just as this study provides appropriate support for overarching oil spill regulatory decisions, so too could it be used as the national preparedness assessment model for any developing Hazardous Substance or Weapons of Mass Destruction legislation. The oil spill response communities' inability to promote the value of having an easily updated thorough CAPS review process ensures the model will be overlooked or dismissed in the development of a healthy national all contingency response capabilities assessment program. All of this negatively impacts national preparedness pertaining to either oil or HAZMAT response. To bolster my assertions this paper will first define and discuss impressions of the 1998 CAPS review. Secondly, the paper will review some of the long-standing response principles that have established assessment as crucial to preparedness in the oil spill response field. Lastly, the paper will outline an assessment model that incorporates the successes of the oil spill response program and explain the value that adoption of such a model would have for a national all-contingencies preparedness assessment program.
TIER 3 RESPONSE CENTRES—THE CHALLENGE OF OPERATING IN A TIER 2 ENVIRONMENT1
Authors: O'Driscoll Declan 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
East Asia Response Limited (EARL) in Singapore is a regional Tier 3 centre that provides response services throughout the Asia Pacific region.
The Tier 3 response centres are designed to provide external international support to members. When these resources are used, the management of the response and the logistics support are drawn from the receiving organization.
When a spill occurs in the Singapore Straits, particularly involving a shipping company or a P & I club, a whole new set of expectations and responsibilities need to be recognized both from the Government and the responsible party's point of view.
The Port Authority has the jurisdiction over Singapore Port and is responsible for managing the clean-up under the guidance of the National Contingency Plan. The responsible party is looking for a comprehensive spill response service.
EARL has put in place various additional arrangements to meet the new expectations of authorities and responsible parties. These include the training of external manpower sources, development and testing of booming plans for sensitive sites and logistics plans to support response crafts and waste management.
This paper will highlight preparedness, response planning and activation in what is one of the world's busiest ports.
THE BEHAVIOUR AND TREATMENT OF ORIMULSION® BITUMEN STRANDED ON PEBBLE, COBBLE OR IMPERMEABLE SUBSTRATE SHORELINES
Authors: Owens Edward H. , Sergy Gary A. , Harper John 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
Bitumen from an Orimulsion® spill can strand on shorelines in the form or dispersed bitumen or coalesced bitumen. Wetness of the shoreline substrate is an important factor in the adhesion of the bitumen and this in turn significantly effects selection of a treatment technique. Stranded bitumen on the surface of a shoreline that remains wet and/or non adhesive can be removed relatively easily by a combination of low-pressure washing, flooding, and recovery, or by manual and mechanical removal techniques. When stranded on dry surfaces or when interfacial surfaces dry, then the bitumen will strongly adhere to shoreline substrates either in the form of thin coatings or thick deposits of bitumen that are difficult to remove. Heated, high-pressure seawater washing is effective but must be accompanied by flooding to minimize penetration into coarse sediments. Sediment relocation, sediment removal, wet tilling and natural recovery techniques are appropriate techniques under specific oiling conditions. Temperature greatly effects bitumen penetration into sediments. Where bitumen coatings or deposits form in subsurface sediments then treatment becomes extremely difficult, requiring sediment removal or techniques to bring oiling surface sediments to the surface for treatment.
ASSESS INTERTIDAL IMPACTS: LESSONS LEARNED FROM 11 YEARS OF MONITORING IN PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND1
Authors: Coats Douglas A. , Shigenaka Gary 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
“How many samples do we need?” and “Where should we collect them?” are questions common to most field monitoring programs. They are especially compelling when an oil spill impinges on a coastline and an intertidal monitoring program must be rapidly implemented to assess impacts. Moreover, these initial sampling decisions profoundly affect the ultimate validity of the assessment study. While it is important to avoid squandering limited resources by oversampling, an undersized study is equally wasteful if it cannot reliably discern significant impacts and produce useful results.
All else being equal, the power to detect change in an ecosystem is dictated by its inherent variability. Variability estimates were computed for a variety of intertidal assemblages using data collected within Prince William Sound over eleven years, following the Exxon Valdez oil spill. The sample-size recommendations that emerge from these power analyses demonstrate that spill and cleanup impacts to most intertidal taxa can be reliably detected using four to six replicate samples collected at three or more treatment sites, and at an equivalent number of reference sites. They also demonstrate that collecting more than eight replicate samples within each site does little to increase the power to detect differences in mean populations.
Analogously, “parallelism” tests on multi-year data provide a reliable means of quantifying long-term recovery in intertidal populations following an oil spill. Parallelism tests examine temporal trends in mean abundance at impacted sites relative to reference sites. However, the ability to detect major recolonization events with parallelism tests varies widely depending on the taxa being tested. For example, the marked recolonization in Fucus and epifaunal invertebrates that was experienced four years after the Exxon Valdez spill could have been detected by sampling at only two reference and two impact sites. In contrast, infaunal populations exhibit greater variability, making detection of nonparallel trends difficult without sampling at least six reference and six impacted sites.
OIL SPILL MONITORING HANDBOOK
Authors: Stevens Leigh , Wardrop John 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
This paper describes afield handbook jointly prepared for the New Zealand (NZ) Maritime Safety Authority (MSA) and Australian MSA (AMSA) to help plan the scope, scale, and design of oil spill monitoring programs. A two-class monitoring nomenclature is used to classify monitoring according to its underlying purpose.
Type I (Operational) Monitoring: provides information of direct relevance to spill response operations, i.e. information needed to plan or execute response or cleanup strategies.
Type II (Scientific) Monitoring: relates to non-response objectives, i.e. short and long term environmental damage assessments (including recovery), purely scientific studies, and all post spill monitoring activities.
The two-class monitoring nomenclature recognizes the very different objectives of Type I and Type II monitoring, and the methods, scope, and degree of scientific rigour required for each. These in turn, have a significant bearing on the cost of the monitoring, and who will pay for it.
Currently, Type I monitoring costs are recovered in NZ and Australia from the spiller (or insurer) alongside other operational response costs. The handbook, formatted as a field pocket guide, provides specific guidance as to what may be considered “necessary” and “reasonable” Type I monitoring, as well as presenting guidelines for defining study objectives, spatial boundaries, monitoring parameters, sampling and assessment methods, study duration, logistics, design constraints (and solutions), resources, and termination criteria. Type II monitoring programs are usually not integral to the response, and funding is less well defined, so Type II monitoring is not specifically addressed in the Handbook. However, many of the Type I guidelines are also relevant for Type II studies.
The Handbook is intended to provide responders with sufficient guidance to determine the type of information necessary for an operational spill response, and an overview of the methods commonly used to collect the information needed to reach defensible spill response decisions in an appropriate time frame, and with an acceptable level of accuracy. The Handbook is supported by a Background Paper describing the key issues to be considered in establishing a monitoring program.
CONDUCTING A NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (NRDA) FOR SEA TURTLE INJURY RESULTING FROM AN OIL SPILL NEAR FORT LAUDERDALE, FL
Authors: Jeansonne James H. , Moore Thomas , Bernhart David , Snover Melissa 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
Following a mystery oil spill near Ft. Lauderdale, Florida in August 2000, natural resource trustee agencies (Trustees) conducted a natural resource damage assessment (NRDA) under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA). During the NRDA, injury to several life stages of Loggerhead sea turtles (Carena caretta) and Green sea turtles (Chelonia my das) was quantified using a computer model, SIMAP (French-McCay, 2001), and the type and scale of restoration required was determined. Quantification of injury required Trustees to determine key model input parameters based on a variety of scientific data sources. The restoration scaling portion of this NRDA required Trustees to quantify the number of Loggerhead sea turtle hatchlings it would take to replace a post-pelagic juvenile (age 17 to 20 years) and an adult female (42 to 50 years old). To accomplish this, Trustees developed a simple model based on recent life stage and population dynamics assumptions for the south Florida Loggerhead sub-population. Details of the sea turtle NRDA method and rationale for determining the required model input parameters are discussed.
OIL SPILL PLANNING AND RESPONSE IN A TERRORIST ENVIRONMENT REAL LIFE EXPERIENCES1
Authors: Peng Daniel Chan Kok 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The world's perspective on security issues had greatly changed after the events of the 9/11 incident. Great strides to enhance maritime security were made following that incident. We see nations working together for a safer environment as seen in the rapid adoption and implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in July 2004.
Historically, most oil spill response activities took place in coastal waters and coastlines due to collision and grounding of vessels. We must now also consider the possibility of oil spills occurring in ‘non traditional’ areas due to terrorism and piracies.
The threat of terrorism is very real. The “USS Cole” at Aden, Yemen on October 2000 and “MT Limburg” off the coast of Yemen on October 2002 were examples. Many regions of the world with high maritime traffic are considered hot spots for such terrorist and piracy activities. For instance, certain parts of the Malacca Strait are known for piracy and sea robberies. These activities may well lead to major oil spills. Vessels are considered “soft targets” for a terrorist attack. These incidents will generate high publicity and may create devastating environmental damage. The consequences are too severe for us to ignore as the economic impact may cripple the global economy.
Oil spill responses are complex and each incident presents their own challenges. Oil spill response organizations have little exposure when dealing with an incident resulting from a terrorist attack. What considerations are given to the oil spill responder's safety? Oil spill response organisations must factor in such scenarios into their contingency plans. In the bigger picture of a major incident the role of the oil spill responder may not be the primary focus of an incident command. They have to be proactive to make necessary preparations and security arrangements with government agencies and security providers.
The author will use the case history of the ‘Limburg,’ to which the Alliance responded, as an example to illustrate the response and responder security issues that arise during such an event.
OIL SPILL SPILL TRAINING AND EXERCISES – IS IT QUANTITY AND QUALITY?1
Authors: Mead Lindsay 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The good news it that the frequency of oil spills is reducing. Better preparedness and prevention measures, quality systems and the sheer threat of the political and economic damage that may rise have focussed attention on this area.
We should not however allow ourselves to be complacent. A key component of preparedness is the training and exercising of contingency plans. Whilst the regime for the submission of contingency plans is generally well established, training and exercises are poorly regulated.
Some countries regulate the frequency with which training must be carried out, but in most places it is haphazard and generally dependent on local management. In very few places is the currency of training considered as a factor in the competence of those trained. To draw a parallel, is a terminal fire drill limited to once every three years just because we do not have fires, and is the competence of staff assumed or measured in some manner?
This paper will look at the issues behind training and exercises and propose that not only should the frequency be regulated but also question whether the quality, competence and currency of trainers be assessed. The author will also look at different training regimes around the globe to assess their relative merits as a template for others to follow.
WHERE CRISIS AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT MEET1 (MANAGING CONCURRENT OPERATIONS)
Authors: Sarubbi Jonathan D. , Lynch Brian , Deal Tim Y. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The National Preparedness for Response Exercise Program (PREP) was created in response to the 1989 EXXON VALDEZ oil spill disaster and is focused on strengthening a port community's preparedness to respond to oil spills. In planning for its PREP exercise in 2003, the oil spill response community within the Delaware River Port Complex saw an excellent opportunity to leverage the PREP exercise program to create an exercise that combined a major oil spill response with law enforcement operations that included: implementing security measures for protection of maritime infrastructure, crime scene investigation and intelligence collection.
The PREP exercise scenario involved a catastrophic oil spill that was the result of a terrorist incident. The overarching objective of the exercise was to use the Incident Command System (ICS) to manage concurrent operations involving law enforcement response (Crisis Management) and response operations aimed at protecting public health and safety (Consequence Management). To integrate the two distinct disciplines of law enforcement operations and oil spill response, the exercise objectives included: (1) testing an ICS organizational model to manage spill response and maritime security with the FBI's Joint Operations Center (JOC), which is responsible for investigation and intelligence activities; (2) developing Incident Action Plans that integrate both oil spill and maritime security operations; and, (3) using the common processes inherent in ICS, to coordinate the efforts of 25 responding agencies to create a cohesive response. In the case of the Philadelphia exercise, the convergence of crisis and consequence management required unprecedented cooperation by all responding agencies. Focusing on the Incident Command System was absolutely critical for multi-agency operations. This paper discusses the 2003 Philadelphia PREP exercise and the valuable lessons learned in conducting concurrent operations under a single management system.