bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Computer Ethics
Authors: Weckert John 
Published: January 2013

AbstractComputer ethics (or what is now often called the ethics of information and communication technology) is concerned with ethical issues that arise around the use of computers; more specifically, around activities that are enabled by computers. Whether or not it is a distinct field of applied ethics has been debated, but what is more important is that there is a cluster of issues centered on computer technology that demand ethical examination. (For a history of computer ethics, see Bynum 1999.) Problems in computer ethics are not different or new in the sense that they are different in kind from other ethical problems. Moral philosophy has been studied systematically at least from the time of the ancient Greeks and the ethical issues in computing are part of this tradition. For the most part they also arise in other applied ethics (seeApplied Ethics) contexts and overlaps exist between computer ethics and other applied fields, for example bioethics (seeBioethics) and business ethics (seeBusiness Ethics) (Weckert and Henschke 2010). Many of the problems, however, become more urgent because of computer technology or occur in new and perhaps even novel ways (Johnson 2001). Intellectual property is a good example. The ease of copying, together with the fact that in most cases the copy is as good as the original, has made the ethical problems (as well as the legal ones) more urgent. Some of the problems are also novel. Computer programs are a bit like text that is normally subject to copyright and a bit like machines, where intellectual property is usually protected by patents.
Civil Disobedience
Authors: Brand Jeffrey 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Civil disobedience is a form of civil resistance involving deliberate lawbreaking under special conditions. Defining “civil disobedience” has proven controversial, although there are widely recognized paradigm cases (see below). Civil disobedience raises many philosophical questions. This essay addresses two. First, what is it? Second, under what conditions, if any, is it morally justified?
Foot, Philippa
Authors: Hursthouse Rosalind 
Published: January 2013

AbstractPhilippa Foot (1920–2010) is widely regarded as one of the foremost Anglo‐American moral philosophers of the twentieth century. Her published work, spanning 50 years, consisted entirely of essays until its culmination in her only monograph,Natural Goodness(2001). Although her work forms, by and large, a coherent whole, subsets of the essays relate to different areas of ethics, in each of which she made a substantial contribution. Inapplied ethics, most of the essays are on abortion (1967, 1970, 1985). In the first one she famously introduced the trolley problem, one of many examples employed in a subtle discussion of the moral relevance of foreseen consequences involving the death of the innocent. The discussion involves the distinction between killing and letting die – a key feature in all the abortion essays, and also in “Euthanasia” (Foot 1977).
Value Pluralism
Authors: Mason Elinor 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWe talk as if there are lots of different values, like friendship, love, knowledge, and honesty, but that could be misleading. Perhaps these apparently different values are all reducible to one super value. Value monists like Jeremy Bentham argue that there is only fundamental value – for Bentham, famously, the value is pleasure, and all the other objects we think valuable are valuable only because they contribute to pleasure. Pluralists, by contrast, argue that there are several distinct values, and that they are not reducible to a super value.
Experimental Ethics
Authors: Nichols Shaun , Timmons Mark 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe experimental study of ethical judgment has blossomed into a thriving research area. Philosophers, psychologists, and scientists from other experimental fields have investigated a wide range of phenomena associated with human morality. Some of this work has focused on metaethical questions concerning the character and psychological nature of moral judgment itself. Other work has explored issues connected with normative ethics. The philosophical implications of the empirical work remain controversial, of course. But the field continues to grow in volume and sophistication. This essay will begin with a review of experimental approaches to issues in metaethics, followed by a review of experimental work that attempts to address issues in normative ethics. It should be noted at the outset that this discussion of the philosophical issues and experimental work is necessarily selective; it does not attempt to canvass the large and growing field of experimental ethics.
Virtue Ethics
Authors: Driver Julia 
Published: January 2013

AbstractVirtue ethics is an approach to normative ethical theory that builds upon the notion that virtue evaluation isprimary. For this reason it is useful to distinguish virtue ethics itself from the broader category of virtue theory. Virtue theory is compatible with other normative ethical theories such as Kantian ethics and utilitarianism, both of which offer distinctive accounts of virtue (seeKant, Immanuel; Utilitarianism). However, on those theories, virtue evaluation is understood in terms of more basic normative notions. Virtue ethics is distinctive in treating virtue itself as basic. Different approaches to virtue ethics have developed this idea differently. Some hold that virtue evaluation replaces deontic action evaluation. Instead of “that was morally right” or “that is what he morally ought to do” we get evaluations of the sort “that was a kind act” or “what a kind person.” However, the more common view is that action evaluation must be understood in terms of virtue evaluation rather than the other way around.
Bad Faith and the Unconscious
Authors: Webber Jonathan 
Published: January 2013

AbstractSelf‐deception is a complicated and puzzling phenomenon. How is it possible to actively hide something from yourself? Philosophers find this question interesting for two main reasons. One is that the answer promises to be informative about the mind more generally, or at least it seems that any theory of the nature and structure of the mind that cannot account for self‐deception must be wrong. The other is that the ethical concern with how one should live and the more specific moral concern with right and wrong actions seem to require us to evaluate our own lives and those of others in an honest and unprejudiced way, a requirement we would be better equipped to fulfill if we had a clear idea of the ways in which self‐deception about these things can occur. There have thus been major philosophical discussions of the nature of self‐deception in both the anglophone and the European traditions of philosophy over the past century. However, these two traditions of thought have taken crucially different examples as their paradigms of self‐deception.
Continental Feminist Ethics
Authors: Murphy Ann 
Published: January 2013

Abstract“Continental feminist ethics” refers to a field of philosophical inquiry and a group of thinkers that is notably diverse. Included in this category would be not only Continental feminist thinkers from France, Italy, Belgium, and Germany, but also feminist thinkers in the United States, the UK, and Australia who use concepts and strategies inherited from the canonical thinkers in nineteenth‐ and twentieth‐century European philosophy. Despite the breadth and even vagueness of this category, it is possible to trace a line of inheritance in Continental feminist ethics that begins with the thought of French feminist Simone de Beauvoir, who is popularly regarded as the seminal figure in this philosophical tradition (seeBeauvoir, Simone De).
Machiavelli, Niccolò
Authors: Lloyd S. A. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Niccolò di Bernardo Machiavelli (1469–1527) spent the earlier part of his life as a diplomat and government officer of the Florentine Republic. When the Medici family took over the government of Florence, Machiavelli found himself out of work and took to his study to write two of the works he is known for today,
The Prince
and his
Discourses on the First Ten Books of Livy
. These books are full of historical anecdotes and character studies from his experience as a diplomat, and they lack the systematic character students generally expect in a work of great moral or political philosophy. However, Machiavelli does develop two original and important ideas of significance to ethics. He articulates the theory that there exist no outcome‐independent virtues or vices. Traits of character traditionally lauded as virtues may operate as vices in some contexts; and character traits traditionally derided as vicious may actually operate for good in some cases. Virtue of character, then, lies in practical judgment about how to achieve good ends in the specific circumstances (
see
Character; Practical Virtue Ethics).
Political Ethics
Authors: Thompson Dennis F. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Political ethics (sometimes called political morality or public ethics) is the practice of making moral judgments about political action, and the study of that practice. As a field of study, it is divided into two branches, each with distinctive problems and with different though overlapping literatures. One branch, the ethics of process (or the ethics of office), focuses on public officials and the methods they use. The other branch, the ethics of policy (or ethics and public policy), concentrates on judgments about policies and laws. Both draw on moral and political philosophy, democratic theory, and political science. But political ethics constitutes a free‐standing subject in its own right. Most writers on the subject do not try to apply foundational moral theories but rather work with mid‐level concepts and principles that more closely reflect the considerations that political agents could take into account in making decisions and policies.
Disabilities, People with
Authors: Wasserman David , Asch Adrienne 
Published: January 2013

AbstractPeople with disabilities are present everywhere, and increasingly visible in many spheres of public life. Yet there is much debate about what counts as a disability, and what difference disability makes in various contexts. This essay briefly reviews these questions to set the stage for discussing some of the main ethical issues concerning people with disabilities: the impact of disability on well‐being; the relevance of disability for decisions about creating and extending lives, allocating scarce resources, and undertaking medical and surgical interventions; and the obligations of a just society to people with disabilities. Often, these issues involve conflicts between the perspectives of bioethics and disability scholarship.
Race
Authors: Spencer Quayshawn 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe nature and reality of race is one of the most controversial and fascinating issues that philosophy has ever tackled. The topic also has more direct relevance outside of philosophy than most metaphysical debates. In ordinary life, and even in other realms of academia, we typically assume that race is real. For example, pollsters take the reality of race for granted when they record voting behavior by race, sociologists and psychologists take the reality of race for granted when they study institutional, aversive, and other subtle forms of racism (seeRacism), and even medical researchers take the reality of race for granted when they measure disease risk or drug metabolizing efficacy as a function of race. However, a small group of philosophers, who we can call “philosophers of race,” have questioned both the reality and nature of race since at least 1775 when Immanuel Kant (seeKant, Immanuel) became the first philosopher to ask, “What is a race?”
Cyrenaics
Authors: Keefe Tim O' 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

The Cyrenaics were one of the “minor Socratic” schools, founded by Aristippus (fourth century
BCE
), a follower of Socrates, although its theory was largely formulated by Aristippus' grandson, confusingly named Aristippus too. The Cyrenaics were hedonists (
see
Hedonism)and egoists (
see
Egoism well outside the mainstream of Greek ethics (
see
Ancient Ethics). Later Cyrenaics argued against the more moderate hedonism of Epicurus and modified the Cyrenaic ethical doctrines. The school died out around the middle of the third century
BCE
.
Environment and Ecology in Religions
Authors: McKim Robert 
Published: January 2013

AbstractDo some or all of the religious traditions have anything unique to contribute to understanding, and to solving, our global environmental problems? Or are some or all of them obstacles to doing so? We will have trouble answering these questions about all religions, even all major religions, both because there are so many such religions and because environmental problems are so numerous and so various. To make this topic, which is the subject of a vast contemporary literature, more manageable, I introduce a two‐part environmental goal that is part of any adequate environmental ethic – though I cannot defend that judgment here. I then explore ways in which religions may encourage or be consonant with, or for that matter inhibit, pursuit of this goal.
Mencius
Authors: B. Wong David 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

After Confucius (
see
Confucius), Mencius (the name is the Latinized form of “Mengzi” or “Master Meng”) is the most influential Confucian philosopher of the classical period. In his life during the fourth century
BCE
, the authority of the Zhou king became increasingly nominal and various Chinese states vied for power and sought territorial expansion. Mencius' philosophy presents a diagnosis of China's problems and a remedy that consisted in the ethical transformation of character, most especially that of rulers. His argumentation in defense of Confucian ethics (
see
Confucian Ethics) against rival ethical philosophies, his theory of human nature as containing the beginnings of ethical virtue (a character attribute of an ideal of the
junzi
or exemplary person) that needs nurturance through the appropriate social environment and by the agent's personal efforts in self‐cultivation, and his nuanced picture of self‐cultivation as involving emotion, discretion, and analogical reasoning laid the foundation for a version of Confucianism that arguably has occupied the center of a complex and diverse Chinese philosophical tradition.
Ring of Gyges
Authors: Morris Christopher W. , Singpurwalla Rachel 
Published: January 2013

AbstractPlato's Socrates holds that we always have reason to be just, since being just is essential for living a happy and successful life (seePlato;Socrates). In Book II of Plato'sRepublic, Socrates' main interlocutor, Glaucon, raises a vivid and powerful challenge to this claim. He presents the case of Gyges, a Lydian shepherd who possesses a ring that gives him the power of invisibility. Glaucon's contention is that Gyges does not have reason to be just in this circumstance, since being just will not promote his happiness. Thus, the argument poses the following challenge: what reason do we have to be just, particularly in circumstances where we can get away with injustice? (seeReasons For Action, morality and; Why Be Moral; Justice; Happiness; Well‐Being. In this essay, we describe Glaucon's challenge, highlight its similarity to challenges offered by other skeptical figures in the history of philosophy, namely, Hobbes' Foole and Hume's sensible knave, and present three broad lines of response.
Motivation, Moral
Authors: Schroeder Timothy 
Published: January 2013

AbstractSometimes there is something you ought to do, and you do it. Perhaps you ought to return a book to a friend, and so you bundle up the book and bring it to your friend. Or perhaps you ought to do a little more to help prevent parasitic infection in a distant country, and so you donate to a charity specializing in that cause. The theory of moral motivation is concerned with explaining the motivations people have to do these sorts of things: the things that they have good moral reasons to do.
Medieval Ethics
Authors: Osborne, Thomas M. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe medieval period contains an extraordinarily rich variety of approaches to ethics. Until the end of the twelfth century, much of moral philosophy was developed in the context of theological debates within the intellectual tradition of Western Christianity. Monks and teachers in cathedral schools developed the thought of the earlier Christian Fathers, which was heavily influenced by Stoicism and Neo‐Platonism (seeAncient Ethics; Hellenistic Ethics; Stoicism). In the late twelfth century universities arose, and in the thirteenth century Aristotle'sNicomachean Ethicsbecame a part of the educational tradition (seeAristotle). Theologians and Masters of Arts developed a complicated moral philosophy and moral theology which took into account both the thought of Aristotle and the earlier Christian tradition. In particular, there were lengthy discussions of the relationship between happiness and ethics (seeHappiness; Eudaimonism), the role of nature in the natural law, and the subject and connection of the virtues (seeVirtue; Virtue Ethics). These medieval discussions provide the background for late scholastic and early modern treatments of the relationship between happiness and the virtues, as well as the importance of will for moral obligation. The scholastic thinkers were greatly influential until the politically motivated closing of university theological faculties and religious houses of formation in the late eighteenth century.
Metaethics and Ethics
Authors: Brunero John , Wiland Eric 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

In this essay, we'll consider the relationship between metaethics (
see
Metaethics) and ethics. Specifically, we'll consider the question of whether philosophers can answer questions within metaethics while remaining neutral on substantive questions within ethics. We'll outline and evaluate some recent challenges to the idea that metaethics can remain neutral with respect to ethical issues.
Murdoch, Iris
Authors: Cokelet Bradford 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
This essay provides a broad overview of Dame Iris Murdoch's work in moral philosophy. Although Murdoch is best known as a novelist, the focus here will be on her philosophic work. Throughout her life, Murdoch (1919–99) characterized herself as a Platonic realist and attacked other approaches to moral philosophy for obscuring our understanding of what she calls “the moral life” – roughly, our attempts to understand, evaluate, and improve ourselves and our lives together. While most philosophers are skeptical about her positive views, many also believe we can enrich our moral theories by engaging with her work and attending to the aspects of ordinary moral life it highlights.
Moral Psychology
Authors: Mason Michelle 
Published: January 2013

AbstractHuman beings confront the question of how they should live, a question posed by the gap between animal inclination and human choice. The presupposition of this gap supports the thought that human beings, unlike other animals, possess uniquely moral, or more broadly ethical, capacities: capacities of thought and feeling that equip them to act rightly or wrongly, display virtuous or vicious characters, or live morally good or bad lives. The field of moral psychology investigates these capacities. While philosophers may disagree over the precise delineation of the moral domain, philosophical work in moral psychology pursues questions whose foci include: (1) emotions and forms of regard directed toward persons as moral agents (e.g., respect and the various modes of moral approval and disapproval); (2) capacities key to moral judgment and the motivational sources that account for such judgments' practical influence (e.g., perception, reason, emotion/pleasure/desire, belief, and intention; altruism versus egoism); (3) the development and education of moral character (including the cultivation of virtue); and (4) the prerequisites of moral responsibility. Social scientific approaches to moral psychology bring experimental methods to bear on these topics. In modern parlance, “moral psychology” is a domain of study systematically pursued by a subfield of philosophy, a subfield of psychology, and a collaborative research program that draws on both disciplines.
Public Goods
Authors: Lippert‐Rasmussen Kasper 
Published: January 2013

AbstractSome important goods are public. An example is national defense. Suppose the Netherlands were to build an anti‐ballistic missile system. Because the Netherlands is a very small country, to protect one Dutch person – the Dutch queen – the system would have to be able to eliminate any ballistic missile targeting any part of the Netherlands. Once such a system has been built it will, at no extra cost, protect all Dutch citizens, so the good produced by the system will be joint in supply. Moreover, the good will be non‐exclusive. It is impossible to withhold protection specifically from Dutch citizens who are unwilling to pay for it. Other examples of public goods include unpolluted air, the ozone layer, avoidance of global warming (seeClimate Change), radio signals, and the rule of the law.
Conscience
Authors: Wicclair Mark R. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractConscience is an important concept in moral philosophy. It is a subject that gives rise to challenging conceptual, metaphysical, and epistemological questions, and it has generated broad multidisciplinary scholarly interest. It also is a phenomenon that figures prominently in everyday life, as evidenced by expressions such as “I can't do that in good conscience,” “I must follow my conscience,” and “I have a bad conscience.”
Globalization
Authors: Dower Nigel 
Published: January 2013

Abstract“Globalization” is a general term used to describe the process of increasing connectedness and interdependence of relationships across the world, in which cultural, moral, political, and economic activities in one part of the world have significant effects in other parts of the world. These effects may be causal, like economic or environmental impacts, or psychological, in terms of a greater sense of global connectedness. While many would argue that globalization goes back much further, it is a phenomenon that most associate with changes in the last 30–40 years because of the scale of these effects and relationships. There really is not any serious debate whether globalization has occurred; it has. This is not a process we can completely stop or wholly undo. But there is debate about the extent to which it has occurred. The “skeptics” interpret the phenomena globalization describes as making relatively little difference to how people live or how political institutions and businesses operate; whereas the “hyper‐globalizers” claim that it has completely transformed – or is in the process of completely transforming – the world. This essay assumes a middle position, namely that there is a significant process going on.