bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Competitive Discounts and Antitrust Policy
Authors: Murphy Kevin , Topel Robert , Snyder Edward 
Published: June 2015

AbstractThis chapter deals with a broad class of quasi-exclusive, vertical agreements that we refer to as “quantity commitment discounts” (QCDs), though they are often referred to as “loyalty discounts,” as they appear to exchange price concessions for a buyer’s loyalty to a particular brand. As the discussion in section 5.2 indicates, law and policy have not evolved to yield clear standards for judging QCDs. Section 5.3 covers the basic economics of QCDs. Section 5.4 evaluates the circumstances when QCDs may cause harm to competition. We demonstrate that QCD agreements that would arise absent an ability or intent to exclude rivals might nevertheless do so, and might also cause ancillary harm to competition. Section 5.5 assesses the various means of testing for potential harm, discussing interpretations of the so-called attribution test and its flaws as well as other indicators of potential harm.
Treatments of Monopolization in Japan and China
Authors: Lin Ping , Ohashi Hiroshi 
Published: June 2015

Abstract
This chapter reviews how monopolization is treated under Japan’s 1947 antimonopoly law and China’s 2008 antimonopoly law. In addition to describing the relevant legal provisions, it also focuses on the economic principles and reasoning that have been adopted in both countries, as reflected in their laws and supplementing guidelines and regulations, and court rulings. Lastly, the chapter attempts to provide a comparative perspective on the legal and enforcement structures of these two countries. While Japan’s AMA and China’s AML have different historical roots, this chapter finds a number of similarities in the legal structure and enforcement of monopolization conduct.
Monopolization in Developing Countries
Authors: Heimler Alberto , Mehta Kirti 
Published: June 2015

AbstractIn developing countries, legal provisions that prohibit abusive behavior often have a wider application than in the EU or in the US. China’s law is also concerned with abuse of administrative power, Russia’s law overstresses unequal contracts conditions, India’s law takes over the idea of “unfair” pricing and often considers leveraging an abuse. These wider in scope provisions are meant to discipline dominant firms that are strong and connected. However, also an independent enforcer is necessary. Independence of the enforcing authorities may be strengthened by introducing binding presumptions for opening a proceeding. The chapter ends with enforcement examples from China, India, Russia, South Africa, and a number of other developing countries from Africa and Latin America.
Exclusive Dealing
Authors: Marvel Howard 
Published: June 2015

Abstract
Exclusive dealing is a vertical restraint that requires distributors of a supplier’s products to purchase most or all of the products or services that they offer for sale within a product category from that supplier, thereby excluding competing products of rival suppliers from those distributors. Exclusive dealing will likely remain a controversial segment of antitrust policy. There are clearly strong procompetitive reasons for its use in a wide variety of settings. But since suppliers can create property rights to customers unilaterally, and, given locked-in distributors, can enforce those property rights with anticompetitive effects, the boundaries of efficient and therefore permissible exclusive dealing will continue to be fought over for the foreseeable future. Standards, at least in the United States, have become must more lenient over time. But it is unlikely that any dominant firm will be able to adopt exclusive dealing without triggering charges that its actions harm competition.
Vertical Restraints Across Jurisdictions
Authors: Winter Ralph , Iacobucci Ed 
Published: June 2015

Abstract
Firms in a vertical relationship strike contracts that maximize joint surplus. If an increase in surplus from vertical restraints results from effects within the supply chain itself, competition policy should not intervene even if the restraints raise prices. Vertical restraints typically benefit a supply chain by correcting incentives of downstream firms to make self-interested decisions that do not serve the collective interest of the chain. In a wide variety of circumstances, for example, retailers compete excessively in prices rather than non-price dimensions such as sales effort. Vertical restraints can, on the other hand, have anticompetitive effects by facilitating cartelization of an upstream or downstream market. Only where vertical restraints negatively affect competition between supply chains should the law intervene. Antitrust law in the US increasingly reflects these principles, while the law in the EU remains overly interventionist.
Banking in a Post-Crisis World
Authors: Berger Allen N. , Molyneux Philip , Wilson John O. S. 
Published: June 2015

AbstractThis chapter provides a brief review of the recent financial crisis, the policy and banking industry responses to it around the world, and the resultant renaissance in banking research. This research suggests a need to better understand: financial development and the role of the state; financial innovation and the links to risk-taking; the optimal scale and scope of banks; and liquidity risk and creation. The chapter also provides a brief summary of the 39 additional chapters which make up the second edition of The Oxford Handbook of Banking.
Complexity and Systemic Risk
Authors: Herring Richard J. , Carmassi Jacopo 
Published: June 2015

AbstractThis chapter updates and extends our earlier work on the corporate complexity of large international banks (chapter 8 in the first edition of this handbook). Much has happened since 2007, when that first version was published. At that time, the issue of large, complex financial institutions had just begun to catch the attention of some policymakers, but the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 highlighted the problem. The Lehman crisis revealed that policymakers were totally unprepared to resolve a large, cross-border financial institution without causing damaging spillovers or requiring taxpayer support. After the crisis, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) negotiated a framework for the resolution of the so-called globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) to be adopted by each member country. The chapter begins with an overview of G-SIBs, and examines how their complexity has changed since the crisis. We then consider what corporate structure banks would prefer in the absence of tax and regulatory constraints. Next we introduce tax and regulatory constraints and show that they appear to motivate a considerable amount of corporate complexity. Finally, we analyze some post-crisis policy initiatives to tackle the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) problem and improve the resolution framework. Our conclusion emphasizes the importance of enhancing transparency and market discipline to deal with these problems and urges that the authorities reexamine some of the tax and regulatory factors that have motivated banks to adopt increasingly complex corporate structures.
Universal Banking
Authors: Morrison Alan D. 
Published: June 2015

AbstractUniversal banks provide banking, insurance, and other financial products under a single corporate umbrella. While universal banking has been the norm in Germany since the nineteenth century, it was uncommon until recently in other countries, and was proscribed by regulators in the United States. I examine the theory and evidence that explains historical patterns of universal banking; I discuss in detail academic work concerning the Glass–Steagall Act, which separated commercial from investment banking in the US, and I outline evidence concerning the efficiency of modern universal banks. I provide a technological explanation for the recent growth in universal banking, and I relate this explanation to the early work of Gerschenkron (1962). Finally, I outline the emerging post-crisis regulatory consensus over universal banking, and I identify serious problems in writing useful rules for universal banks.
Measuring the Performance of Banks
Authors: Hughes Joseph P. , Mester Loretta J. 
Published: June 2015

AbstractThe unique capital structure of commercial banking—funding production with demandable debt that participates in the economy’s payments system—affects various aspects of banking. It shapes banks’ comparative advantage in providing financial products and services to informationally opaque customers, their ability to diversify credit and liquidity risk, and how they are regulated, including the need to obtain a charter to operate and explicit and implicit federal guarantees of bank liabilities to reduce the probability of bank runs. These aspects of banking affect a bank’s choice of risk vs. expected return, which, in turn, affects bank performance. This chapter gives an overview of two general empirical approaches to measuring bank performance and discusses some of the applications of these approaches found in the literature. One application explains how better diversification available at a larger scale of operations generates scale economies that are obscured by higher levels of risk-taking. Studies of banking cost that ignore endogenous risk-taking find little evidence of scale economies at the largest banks while those that control for this risk-taking find large scale economies at the largest banks—evidence with important implications for regulation.
Consumer Lending
Authors: Durkin Thomas A. , Elliehausen Gregory 
Published: June 2015

AbstractConsumer lending involves intertemporal transactions typically provided by financial intermediaries operating in an environment with imperfect information. This suggests the possibility of default risk and credit rationing. Economists have studied these matters extensively and have developed sophisticated models of lending decisions. In recent decades automated information systems known as credit reporting agencies (or credit “bureaus”) have arisen to improve the availability of information to lenders, and statistical methodologies collectively called credit scoring have been employed to improve the quality of lending decisions and to make them more consistent. For centuries, governments have regulated lending to individuals. Among the more important modern methods have been attempts to improve market transparency through required disclosures. There also are many additional governmental restrictions on lending and lending practices.
Residential Mortgages
Authors: Donadio Gregory , Lehnert Andreas 
Published: June 2015

Abstract
Mortgages are loans to households secured by real property. Mortgage banking has historically comprised three functions: origination (the extension of credit), servicing (payment collection), and funding (financing the loans). Regulatory developments, technological advances, and demand from investors led to the separation of these three functions. Mortgages funding moved towards securitization, contributing to the growth of the shadow banking system. These developments were at the heart of the 2002–06 credit boom in the US and the ensuing financial crisis. Research since then has focused on the causes of the credit boom, the connection between credit growth and house prices, the optimal strategy for modifying mortgages, and the scope for regulation of mortgage markets to promote financial stability—a key part of so-called “macroprudential” policy. Since the financial crisis, underwriting standards have tightened dramatically, both because of new regulations and because of lenders’ increased caution following the outsized credit losses of the financial crisis.
Securitization
Authors: Casu Barbara , Sarkisyan Anna 
Published: June 2015

AbstractSecuritization, a structured process involving the transformation of illiquid assets into marketable securities, experienced an exponential growth in the 1990s and early 2000s. After a prolonged period of rapid expansion, securitization markets froze in 2008, as investors lost confidence in structured products. This chapter charts the rise and fall of securitization and attempts to map the future of the market by identifying the key issues that need to be addressed: (1) the alignment of incentives; (2) the reduction of complexity; (3) increase in transparency; and (4) improvements in the use of credit ratings. Despite its controversial role during the 2007–08 financial crisis, the economic importance of securitization is undeniable. Several policy interventions at the national and international levels have recently been enacted to accelerate the recovery of the market, as there is an emerging consensus that the benefits of high-quality securitization outweigh the costs and that this technique can play a key role to foster economic recovery and growth.
Shadow Bank Monitoring
Authors: Ashcraft Adam B. , Adrian Tobias , Cetorelli Nicola 
Published: June 2015

AbstractWe provide a framework for monitoring the shadow banking system. The shadow banking system consists of a web of specialized financial institutions that conduct credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation without direct, explicit access to public backstops. The lack of such access to sources of government liquidity and credit backstops makes shadow banks inherently fragile. Shadow banking activities are often intertwined with core regulated institutions such as bank holding companies, security brokers and dealers, and insurance companies. These interconnections of shadow banks with other financial institutions create sources of systemic risk for the broader financial system. We provide elements of monitoring risks in the shadow banking system, including recent efforts by the Financial Stability Board.
Lender of Last Resort and Bank Closure Policy
Authors: Freixas Xavier , Parigi Bruno M. 
Published: June 2015

AbstractDuring the last 20 years a consensus has emerged that it is impossible to disentangle liquidity shocks from solvency shocks. As a consequence, the classical lender of last resort (LOLR) rules, as defined by Thornton and Bagehot and which is based on lending to solvent illiquid institutions, appears ill-suited to this environment. We summarize here the main contributions that that consider this new paradigm and discuss how institutional features relating to bank closure policy influences lender of last resort and other safety net issues. We devote particular emphasis to the analysis of systemic risk and contagion in banking and the role of the lender of last resort to prevent it. We argue that the financial crisis that began in 2007 redefines the functions of the lender of last resort of the twenty-first century placing it at the intersection of monetary policy, fiscal policy, supervision, and regulation of the banking industry, and the organization of the interbank market.
Risk-Based Regulatory Capital and the Basel Accords
Authors: Gordy Michael B. , Heitfield Erik A. , Wu Jason 
Published: June 2015

Abstract
Regulators impose minimum capital adequacy requirements on banks to mitigate moral hazard and reduce systemic risk and deadweight loss arising from bank failures. The Basel II reform to the original 1988 Basel Accord aimed to better align regulatory capital requirement with banks’ own risk management practices. In the wake of the financial crisis that began in 2008, Basel III addresses many of the shortcomings revealed. This chapter reviews the development of the Basel Accords and in particular the theoretical and empirical underpinnings for the derivation of capital requirements.
Competition in Banking
Authors: Degryse Hans , Morales-Acevedo Paola , Ongena Steven 
Published: June 2015

AbstractThis chapter combines recent findings from the empirical banking literature with established insights from studies of banking competition and regulation. It starts with a concise overview and assessment of the different methodological approaches taken to address banking competition. While market structure indicators are readily available, they may not be overly informative about the competitive conditions in banking markets. The literature has focused to date on “non-market structure” indicators such as the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, the Lerner index, and the Boone indicator. The chapter then structures a discussion on the empirical findings based upon a framework that finds its roots in the different theories of financial intermediation. Many other specific approaches to infer banking competition are discussed, in particular, the impact that regulation and information-sharing between banks may have on banking competition.
Systemically Important Banks (SIBs) in the Post-Crisis Era
Authors: Barth James R. , Nolle Daniel E. , Li Tong (Cindy) , Brummer Chris 
Published: June 2015

Abstract
Policymakers around the world continue to respond vigorously to the problems in financial systems brought into high relief by the global financial crisis which began in 2008. However, the overall understanding of these responses remains rather vague and limited. Our study contributes to improving the state of knowledge by focusing on one particularly relevant issue, the regulation and supervision of systemically important banks (SIBs). We first present a “global view” by explaining the role of G20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) in reforming the global financial system, with special focus on systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). We then provide an overview of SIFI initiatives in 135 countries, using the new data collected by the World Bank on post-crisis regulation and supervision. We conclude that, despite substantial progress at both the national and international levels, regulators face an uphill battle, a point underscored by the discussion in our penultimate section of legal issues bearing on cross-border regulation of SIBs.
Systemic Risk in Banking after the Great Financial Crisis
Authors: Hartmann Philipp , De Bandt Olivier , Peydró José Luis 
Published: June 2015

AbstractThe chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of systemic risk in banking, as the primary ingredient in understanding financial crises that cause severe negative effects for the real sector. First, the important analytical elements of systemic risk are integrated into a coherent working concept. Three sources of systemic risk are distinguished, taking into account interactions between banks and asset prices, as well as the role of liquidity: contagion effects, aggregate and the endogenous buildup and unraveling of widespread financial imbalances. Ex ante (preventive) and ex post (crisis management) public policy to contain systemic risk and financial crises (including macroprudential policy) are also discussed. Second, the existing theoretical and empirical literature about systemic risk is reviewed in light of the previously developed general concept and on the basis of the experience of thefinancial crisis that started in the summer of 2007.
Banking in the European Union
Authors: Goddard John , Molyneux Philip , Wilson John O. S. 
Published: June 2015

AbstractThe European banking industry has been influenced by a wide range of regulatory developments. The deregulation that has taken place until the credit crisis reduced or eliminated many of the lines of demarcation between banks and other financial service providers, and helped to facilitate both domestic and cross-border competition. The credit crisis of 2007–08 and the more recent European sovereign debt crisis have led to large losses and the failure and closure of many banks, and forced the intervention of both central banks and governments in domestic banking systems. It is against this background that this chapter discusses the recent evolution of the European industry along with a discussion of the latest regulatory developments, which include plans for a European Banking Union.
Banking in Africa
Authors: Beck Thorsten , Cull Robert 
Published: June 2015

AbstractThis chapter takes stock of the current state of banking systems across sub-Saharan Africa and discusses recent developments including innovations that could help Africa leapfrog more traditional banking models. Using an array of different data, the chapter documents that African banking systems are shallow but stable. African banks are well capitalized and over-liquid, but lend less to the private sector than banks in non-African developing countries. African enterprises and households are less likely to use financial services than their peers in other developing countries. The chapter also describes a number of financial innovations across the continent that can help overcome different barriers to financial inclusion and have helped to expand the bankable and the banked population.
Banking in Transition Countries
Authors: Bonin John P. , Hasan Iftekhar , Wachtel Paul 
Published: June 2015

AbstractModern banks were virtually non-existent in the planned economies of Central Europe and former Soviet Union. In the transition period, banking sectors developed during years of macroeconomic decline and repeated bank crises. Governments eventually dealt successfully with the accumulated bad loans and poor regulation. Rapid progress in bank privatization and consolidation took place in the late 1990s and early 2000s, usually with the participation of foreign banks. By mid-2000s, banking sectors in many transition countries were dominated by foreign banks offering a wide range of services. Credit growth resumed, sometimes too rapidly, particularly in the form of lending to households. The global financial crisis put transition banking to the test. Countries that had expanded credit rapidly were vulnerable to the macroeconomic shock and there was considerable concern that foreign owners would reduce their funding to transition country subsidiaries. However, the banking sectors turned out to be resilient.
Annual parallax measurements of a Mira variable star, U Lyncis
Authors: Kamezaki Tatsuya , Nakagawa Akiharu , Omodaka Toshihiro , Handa Toshihiro , Inoue Kan-ichiro , Kurayama Tomoharu , Kobayashi Hideyuki , Nagayama Takumi , Ueno Yuji 
Published: June 2015

Abstract
We have measured the annual parallax of the water maser around a Mira star, U Lyncis (U Lyn) with VLBI Exploration of Radio Astrometry (VERA). The value of the parallax is 1.27 ± 0.06 mas, corresponding to a distance of $786^{+40}_{-36}\:$pc. This is the first VLBI measurement of the parallax of U Lyn. We obtained the period and the apparent magnitude of U Lyn based on near-infrared observations with the Kagoshima University 1 m telescope. The period and the mean magnitude of the K′ band are 437.9 day and +1.15 ± 0.09 mag, respectively. Using our measured parallax and period, we find that the location of U Lyn on the period–luminosity plane is consistent with its nature as a Mira variable fundamental mode pulsator. Also, we estimated the distance using the period–luminosity relationship, our period and apparent magnitude and this gave a difference of about 100 pc between our parallactic distance and the distance estimated by using the period–luminosity relationship. We estimated the luminosity, radius, and mass of U Lyn to be 10100 ± 420 L⊙, 391 ± 34 R⊙, and 1.9 ± 0.7 M⊙, respectively. We found 50 water maser spots with a distribution ∼ 13 au around the star and the motion implies the existence of an outflow.