bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Profit Motive
Authors: Sandberg Joakim 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

The profit motive refers to what is generally taken to be the underlying motivation of business and commercial activity: to collect revenues in excess of costs or, more simply, to make money. While both “profit” and “profit motive” may be given more technical definitions in economics, the latter's meaning is typically broader in philosophical discussions and so, for example, even managers of nonprofit organizations may be accused of sometimes acting from a profit motive. The profit motive is typically the object of ambivalent moral attitudes in present‐day society: on the one hand, the plethora of commodities and services made possible by the modern market economy, fuelled to a large extent by the profit motive, are easily recognizable. On the other hand, it is generally regarded as a serious moral criticism to say of a certain commercial agent that he or she is motivated by profit alone, and pecuniary motives are often associated with selfishness and greed (
see
Egoism). (Compare comments like: “While it perhaps was a good thing that company X supported this social venture, they are not to be trusted – they only did it for the money!”)
Semantics, Moral
Authors: Schroeder Mark 
Published: January 2013

AbstractSemantics is the investigation of meaning, and semantic theories, including semantic theories about moral language, come in two very different kinds.Descriptivesemantic theories are theories aboutwhatwords mean. So descriptivemoralsemantic theories are theories about whatmoralwords mean: words like “good,” “better,” “right,” “must,” “ought,” “reason,” and “rational.” In contrast,foundationalsemantic theories are theories aboutwhywords mean what they do, or, more specifically, about whatmakes it the casethat words mean what they do. So foundationalmoralsemantic theories are theories about what makes it the case that moral words mean what they do: words like “good,” “better,” and so on. Since both kinds of theory are sometimes referred to as varieties of “moral semantics,” this essay will cover both.
Propaganda
Authors: Walton Douglas 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

The word “propaganda” arose from the name for a committee of cardinals called the
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide
(Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith) formed in 1622 by Pope Gregory XV, but can be traced even earlier to a smaller propaganda commission of 1568 (Cunningham 2002: 15) The term originally did not have the negative meaning it has now, and in the two world wars it appeared to have less negative meaning in Germany and Russia than in England and North America. According to Marlin (2002: 47), the use of the word “propaganda” by the Allies characterized only the enemy opinion‐forming activities as propaganda, and treated them as composed mostly of lies. These practices have now left the word with strongly negative connotations. From a point of view of ethics, the problem is to judge whether propaganda should be seen as an inherently bad thing that is deceptive, unethical, and against norms of reasoned discourse (
see
Discourse Ethics), or as sometimes a useful or necessary way of carrying out a good objective, like winning a just war, or a war we think to be just.
Wrongful Life
Authors: Bayne Tim 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe notion of a wrongful life figures in both legal and moral theory. Legally, a wrongful life suit is brought by, or on behalf of, someone who claims that they were wrongfully brought into existence, typically on the grounds that it could reasonably be foreseen that their quality of life would be so bad as to ensure that their life would not be worth living. Morally, a wrongful life claim is that the person's creation flouts some moral norm. The notion of wrongful life raises deep and difficult questions concerning the relationship between harm and wrong‐doing, the scope and grounds of our obligations to those who do not exist, and the nature of parental rights and responsibilities (seeParents' Rights and Responsibilities; Nonidentity Problem).
Refugees
Authors: Seglow Jonathan 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

The 1951 UN Convention defines a refugee as a person who “owing to well‐founded fear of being persecuted … is outside the country of his nationality” (UNHCR 1951: Art. 1), and due to such fear is unable or unwilling to return to it. This definition, crafted in the aftermath of World War II, has been criticized on a number of grounds. First, it excludes internally displaced persons who flee persecution but who remain in their own country (perhaps during a civil war). Second, as Andrew Shacknove argues in a much‐cited article, the focus on persecution seems unfounded, since persecution is but one instance of a broader phenomenon: the absence of state protection of a citizen's basic needs (1985: 277). Refugees, in his view, are individuals who have no option but to seek international restitution of their needs. Along these lines, courts in Western states have adopted a broad notion of persecution, entertaining claims for asylum from people fleeing ethnic conflict, criminal gangs, family abuse, or seeking urgent medical care. On Shacknove's view, desperate people from the world's poorest regions (
see
Global Poverty) and victims of natural disasters also count as refugees or something very similar to them. So too would victims of human‐made catastrophes, such as those induced by climate change (Bell 2004; Nine 2010;
see
Climate Change). Shacknove's definition, however, drops one requirement that may seem distinctive of refugees (and is suggested by the wording of the UN Convention): that they flee whatever disruption to their basic needs is visited on them. By including victims of purely natural events and also, perhaps, the global poor, Shacknove also fails to draw the morally relevant distinction between cases in which a state is willing but unable to meet its citizens’ needs, and cases in which the state actively harms its citizens or fails to prevent harm being inflicted on them where it could do so. These distinctions may affect where we think responsibility to address the injustice should fall. More recently, Matthew Price (2009) has reasserted the orthodox view of refugees, arguing that what is distinctive about them is their state's denial of their claim to political membership (
see
Citizenship). In contrast to other groups whose basic needs are insecure, refugees are exiles, targeted for persecution by their own state in a way. Such persecution communicates that, politically speaking, they no longer count.
Liberty
Authors: Pettit Philip 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIt is a platitude that I enjoy liberty just to the extent that I as an agent am in control of my choices. A good way into understanding the notion of liberty or freedom – I shall use these words interchangeably – is to ask what this platitude rules out (MacCallum 1967). How do we best interpret the three requirements it imposes, namely that I am the agent of the exercise, that the exercise is one of control, and that the target of control is my choices?
Bribery and Extortion
Authors: Frederick Robert 
Published: January 2013

AbstractBribery and extortion are distinct yet related corrupt activities that can pose a significant risk to social welfare, legitimate business practices, and political stability (Wrage 2007;seeCorruption). In all or almost all jurisdictions both are illegal, and it seems likely that there is near universal agreement that both are immoral (Noonan 1984; Hess and Dunfee 2000). However, an analysis of the morality of bribery and extortion is complicated by two factors. First, it is often difficult to tell them apart in practice, and second, the moral blameworthiness of the participants in bribery and extortion can differ significantly in different circumstances (seeBlame). This essay will begin with a brief explanation of bribery and the main types of extortion, followed by a discussion of some of the ways they can overlap. It will conclude with an analysis of their moral status.
Groups, Moral Status of
Authors: Shockley Kenneth 
Published: January 2013

AbstractGroups are relevant for morality. By being a member of one group rather than another, I can have different roles and different responsibilities. For instance, if I am a police officer, I have the authority to direct traffic and the responsibility to enforce the law – authorities and responsibilities that ordinary citizens lack. However, this is not to say that the group consisting of police officers has any inherent moral status (seemoral status). Groups may describe features of individuals that are morally significant without those groups having moral status themselves. Yet some groups may have inherent status. In this essay I will examine some of the reasons for holding groups to have inherent moral status. The operative distinction for matters of moral status is between those groups that have moral standing and those that do not. In what follows I will take “moral standing” to apply only to those things that count morally, in their own right, rather than instrumentally, for the sake of some other thing. A group is commonly thought to have moral standing either because of properties it has or because of the way we treat it. We will see these two options reflected in various ways in the positions outlined below.
Prostitution
Authors: Marino Patricia 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Prostitution is the practice of engaging in sexual activities in exchange for money or other goods. A prostitute is thus a kind of sex worker. Several aspects of prostitution make it ethically complex. For example, because the provision of sexual services is an inherently bodily activity, the customer may seem to treat the prostitute as an object or a commodity, someone less than fully human. Moreover, since much actual prostitution is provided by poor women living in sexist societies, the mere fact that these women are not forced into prostitution may appear insufficient to legitimate it.
Juvenile Justice
Authors: Ramsay Marc 
Published: January 2013

AbstractJuvenile justice concerns how society should deal with pre‐adults who are alleged to have violated penal laws. The juvenile justice debate is dominated by two moral ideals. First, there is the broad idea of just deserts or retribution – all persons who commit an offense should receive a punishment that is proportionate to the severity of that offense (seeJustice; Punishment; Retribution). Second, just punishment also requires genuine responsibility – blame for a wrongful act may be diminished or eliminated if a person lacks appropriate responsibility (seeResponsibility). To be responsible for an act, one must have an appropriate level of understanding, rationality, and self‐control. Children's diminished responsibility has often been used to justify some form of “welfarism,” the idea that the law should protect, rehabilitate, and educate juvenile offenders. Traditionally, welfarism has been implemented through a separate penal system designed around juveniles' needs and capacities. However, while they prioritize welfarist goals over punishment, many welfarists endorse some level of retributive punishment for juvenile offenders.
Online Journalism
Authors: Singer Jane B. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractVirtually all journalism produced today is available online. In fact, a growing volume is available only online or in some other digital format such as a mobile platform. As the Internet has become an increasingly dominant news medium around the world, journalists have wrestled with the applicability and adaptability of practitioner ethics (seeJournalistic Ethics) in this open and perpetually changing networked space.
Weber, Max
Authors: Bird Frederick 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

The German scholar Max Weber (1864–1920), educated in history, law, and economics, was one of the founders of modern sociology. He also wrote extensively about ethics, both with regard to explicit codes and principles and with regard to the character of cultural milieu. His most famous work,
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
, analyzed the relations between a religious ethic, what he referred to as the “practical ethic of ascetic Protestantism,” and a modern economic ethic, which he characterized using the phrase “spirit of capitalism.” He undertook studies as well of Confucian, Daoist, Hindu, Buddhist, and ancient Jewish ethics. In addition, he discussed ethics in several of his methodological essays. Finally, he ended his essay on “Politics as Vocation” by contrasting an ethics of conviction with an ethics of responsibility. Overall, his writings about ethics assumed three major forms.
Ortega y Gasset, José
Authors: Ilundáin‐Agurruza Jesús 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955) is Spain's foremost philosopher of the twentieth century (Ortega hereafter). His presence went well beyond the walls of academy: besides his academic work as metaphysics chair, he presented his work in newspapers, founded cultural magazines, published books and innumerable essays, gave conferences, and established distinctively intellectual political organizations. Under his editorship, works by many of his finest contemporaries – Einstein, Freud, Husserl, Heidegger – were first translated into Spanish.
Functionalism, Moral
Authors: Jackson Frank 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Sometimes we infer the moral status of an action – its status as captured by using terms like “ought,” “morally good,” “wrong” and the like – from its nonmoral properties. Perhaps we discover that an action would lead to many deaths and conclude that it would be wrong; or, on discovering that Gordon had inside information when he bought shares, we conclude that he ought not to have bought them. Similarly, we make inferences from nonmoral information about motivation to moral conclusions about character. We learn, say, that Mary often puts the interests of others ahead of her own, and we conclude that she is a morally virtuous person.
Moral Point of View
Authors: Bloomfield Paul 
Published: January 2013

AbstractA general sense of “the moral point of view” is difficult to discern, given how at its essence the very phrase engenders the question of exactly which or whose point of view counts. The phrase is clearly ambiguous and there is no “correct” account of it to be had just by examining its meaning or use; favoring one disambiguation over others is a ramification of theoretical choices which must be justified on a much broader basis than merely stipulative claims to some sort of semantic or lexical priority of one possible meaning over others. Arguably, however, the phrase can do the most work at a level closer to conceptual analysis in discerning what is required for engaging in peculiarly moral thought. There is little agreement on this among those who work on issues in normative moral theory, though the assumptions which generate the disagreement are often so deep as to go undetected.
Practical Conditionals
Authors: Bedke Matthew S. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractA conditional has the form “if p [antecedent], then q [consequent].” A practical conditional is a conditional that has a practical prescription in its consequent. For example, all of the following are practical conditionals: “If Jim wants to get good seats, he should camp out in the ticket line,” “Jill has some reason to help Jim move, if she promised him she would,” and “If it morally ought to be the case that you bring about the best consequences, then it morally ought to be the case that you donate more money to charity.” Here, “prescription” is interpreted widely, and any differences between “ought to be” and “ought to do” are ignored.
Green, T. H.
Authors: Dimova‐Cookson Maria 
Published: January 2013

AbstractT. H. Green (1836–82) was a leading figure among the British idealists. His work was particularly influential in Oxford in the period between 1880 and 1914. His most significant legacy was in moral and political philosophy where he developed distinctive theories of moral agency, common good, political obligation, liberty, and rights (seeCommon Good; Liberty; Moral Agency; Rights). He was also an active member of the Liberal Party and campaigned, in a manner fully consistent with his moral and political philosophy, for legal protection of workers' and land tenants' rights, for extending education and the franchise, and for temperance reform. He is acclaimed for having succeeded in utilizing the resources of German idealism, typically associated with conservative politics, in the service of a left‐wing Liberal Party program. Nowadays Green's ideas are used in various political theory projects including reconciling liberalism (seeLiberalism) and communitarianism (Simhony 2003), justifying “recognition” theories of rights (Martin 2001; Darby 2009), and substantiating the feminist discourse on ethics of care (Decoste and Boyd 2009).
Discrimination
Authors: Lippert‐Rasmussen Kasper 
Published: January 2013

AbstractMany real‐life complaints about unjust treatment and unjust inequalities are articulated as complaints about discrimination. Philosophically, discrimination raises a number of questions: What is discrimination? What makes it wrongful? What should be done about it? The first question, which I address in the first section, is the most basic one: we cannot answer the last question, if we do not know what makes discrimination wrongful, and to know that, we need to know what discrimination is. The second to fifth sections address the second question. The second section surveys various general theories of the morality of discrimination, while three to five explore the moral features of three specific kinds of discrimination: indirect and statistical discrimination, and differential treatment on the basis of reaction‐qualification. The sixth and seventh sections cover two issues in relation to the last question: What should be done about discrimination in the private sphere and does proportional representation of groups neutralize the effects of discrimination?
Comparable Worth
Authors: Manis Eleni 
Published: January 2013

AbstractMen earn more, on average, than women. Moreover, male‐dominated jobs typically pay higher wages than female‐dominated jobs, and many jobs are segregated by sex: as of 2003, 52 percent of working women would have to change jobs to end this segregation (Charles and Grusky 2004: 4). Social scientists have not reached a consensus on the relative importance of the different factors that contribute to the male–female earnings gap. Much can be explained in terms of non‐discriminatory factors, particularly differences in men's and women's work experience, education, and occupational choices, but it seems clear that discrimination also plays some role in producing the gap. Comparable worth is a policy proposal for bridging the gap that postulates and addresses a particular discriminatory pathway: that prevailing methods of wage‐setting undervalue women's labor, imposing a wage penalty on the incumbents of female‐dominated jobs. Advocates of comparable worth propose that a job's value to an employer can be gauged relative to that of other jobs offered by the same employer: even dissimilar work, such as that of a truck driver and an administrative assistant for a truck company, can be compared. These comparisons yield guidelines for achieving more equitable pay across the jobs, and as a consequence, contribute to bridging the male–female earnings gap.
Desire
Authors: Schapiro Tamar 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe notion of desire features prominently in debates in philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, and ethics. Philosophers of mind usually start from the thought that desire is a mental state, and their aim is to explain how desire is similar to and distinct from other mental states, such as belief. Philosophers of action focus on desire as a motive to action, and their aim is to show how desires play a role in the explanation of action, in particular rational or intentional action. Moral philosophers are also generally concerned with desires as motives, but their focus is typically on the idea that motivation by desire can conflict with another kind of motivation, motivation by duty or principle. In reading through these literatures, it is important to keep in mind that they may not always share a common concept of desire or a common understanding of what a theory of desire must do.
Shame and Honor
Authors: Sussman David 
Published: January 2013

AbstractShame and the love of honor are emotions that reside uneasily in the ethical life of modern liberal societies. Both sentiments are fundamentally concerned with maintaining a public appearance of power or importance. A person has honor to the extent that he occupies a socially recognized status by which he can expect to be taken seriously by others, either as a potential compatriot or as a competitor. To feel shame is, in its most basic forms, to be painfully aware that this status has been threatened or compromised, if not altogether lost. Such shame involves a sense of the diminishment of our self‐worth through the thought that we have been exposed to others as appropriate objects of derision, contempt, or pity (seeSelf‐Respect And Self‐Esteem; Worth/Dignity). A disgraced person is no longer someone who can be admired, loved, or feared, but only something to be turned away from and forgotten.
Punishment
Authors: Holtman Sarah 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWhat is punishment? What (if anything) justifies its use? Whom may we justly punish? What criteria limit the methods and severity of just punishment? These are the fundamental questions that theoretical analyses of punishment typically address. Somewhat less usual in such literature are discussions of moral constraints on the tools we employ in arrest and prosecution, the place of moral emotions, e.g., pity or resentment, in sentencing and related decisions, and the prison conditions to which we subject inmates. Both the more and the less usual questions are considered below.
International Relations
Authors: Fabre Cécile 
Published: January 2013

AbstractConsider the following claims: “Germany invades Belgium,” “The United States imposes economic sanctions on Iraq,” “Russia threatens to cut off Ukraine's gas supplies,” “The United Kingdom and Argentina are locked into a territorial dispute over the status of the Falkland Islands,” “Germany develops assistance programs aimed at Malawi and Rwanda,” etc. Those claims describe the stuff of international relations. They imply, on the face of it, that states are actors in the same way as individuals are: they reflect, make decisions, change course when required, and so on.
Emerson, Ralph Waldo
Authors: Bates Stanley 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–82) was a major figure in nineteenth‐century American culture. He was born in Boston and lived in Boston and Concord all of his life. He originally trained for the Unitarian ministry at Harvard Divinity School, and after some years as a schoolteacher, was ordained as the minister of the Second Church of Boston. After the death of his young first wife, and after a dispute in the church about the serving of the Lord's Supper, he resigned from that position. He then visited Europe for an extended period, and on his return invented a new career for himself as a public lecturer, an essayist, and a somewhat reluctant cultural celebrity. He was at the center of a group of young people who were becoming aware of recent German philosophy – especially the philosophy of Kant – originally through Coleridge's
Aids to Reflection
. They formed the Transcendental Club, and Emerson became known as the central figure of transcendentalism, though he was uneasy with that label. In 1836 he published
Nature
, more of an extended essay than a book, though still the most systematic of his writings. It had an immense influence on the transcendentalists and on a younger generation of American thinkers and writers. Almost all of his subsequent writing began as journal entries which were developed for lectures and which reached final form in essays, a form of writing of which he was the greatest master since Montaigne.