bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Deontic Logic
Authors: Hansson Sven Ove 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

In discussions on moral norms we tend to assume that a reasonable system of norms should have certain structural properties. Obligations should be consistent, so that a person cannot be morally required both to visit her father in his home and to stay out of the town where he lives. Certain norms imply other norms; someone who has a duty to mow her neighbor's lawn also has permission to enter her garden in order to do so. Deontic logic is the discipline that attempts to systematize such structural properties of systems of norms. Along with decision theory, the logic of preference, and game theory and rational choice, deontic logic is one of the disciplines that apply formal rigor to moral reasoning and to the subject matter of moral philosophy in general (
see
Preference; Game Theory and rational choice; Moral Reasoning).
Rights
Authors: Martin Rex 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThis essay begins with a brief history of rights, focused mainly on important natural rights theorists and documents of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the criticism of natural rights (occurring at the time of the French Revolution and after), and the revival of interest in human rights at the end of World War II. The essay then focuses on the contemporary idea of rights, and pays special attention to human rights and constitutional rights. A three‐part analysis of rights is undertaken by looking at (1) views of the constituent elements of rights, (2) the function(s) of rights, and (3) the grounding of rights. The essay concludes with a short synoptic account of the character and value of rights.
Paternalism
Authors: Scoccia Danny 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Much about paternalism is contested, including its definition. This essay will define it as an action or practice that “interferes” with choices thought to cause or risk causing harm to self, for the chooser's own good. The most common forms of interference are physical compulsion with small children and coercion with adults, but others include reducing the attractiveness of bad options (e.g., “sin taxes”), increasing the attractiveness of good ones (e.g., offering incentives), deception, and manipulation (
see
Manipulation). Few dispute that paternalism is sometimes permissible with small children and incompetents, but some deny that it is ever permissible when it uses coercion and targets the voluntary choices of competent adults. In particular, many liberal political theorists doubt the legitimacy of paternalism when the state practices it via the criminal law.
Comparative Religious Ethics
Authors: Stalnaker Aaron 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWhile comparative assessment of the ethics of different religious groups is an ancient and widespread pursuit, the modern field of comparative religious ethics arguably dates from the founding of the Journal of Religious Ethics in 1973. While there have been a variety of motivations for the attempt to study “religious ethics” rather than or in addition to “Christian ethics,” one animating idea has been the growing recognition that people from numerous religious groups propound sophisticated and powerful moral visions, which possess intriguing similarities and differences, and which are not easily reducible to a common denominator. Moreover, the variety and particular characteristics of such visions are historically and politically significant in the modern era of increasingly pervasive globalization. Indeed, comparative religious ethics may be desperately needed in our contemporary context of global interdependence, misunderstanding, and mutual mistrust. There are thus ample grounds, both social and purely intellectual, to suggest that this ethical variety needs to be engaged directly via rigorous comparison (seeReligion and Global Ethics).
Schopenhauer, Arthur
Authors: Wicks Robert 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIn accord with the spirit of nineteenth‐century philosophizing, it is only in view of Schopenhauer's metaphysics that his moral theory comes into an intelligible light. According to Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), the inner nature of the world is a unitary, unconscious, unbounded, nonrational, and essentially pointless impulse‐toward‐satisfaction that he callsWill. Schopenhauer apprehends Will directly in his bodily presence, after setting aside all humanly specific qualities such as rationality and advanced emotional states in an effort to disclose his basic constitution. Upon that primal foundation, he argues that his body's inner reality reveals the inner nature of all other things, assuming that his body is no different as such, from any other physical body, and, hence, that its inner nature is no different. Schopenhauer also observes Will manifesting itself when magnets attract iron, vines grow toward distant supports upon which they can ascend, birds anticipate their offsprings' needs by building nests, and humans tend toward increasing self‐knowledge, among many examples.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Authors: Pinkard Terry 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Although Hegel (1770–1831) never wrote a book with the word “ethics” in its title, many of his works had subsections with labels such as “morality” and “ethical life.” What many consider his masterwork, the 1807
Phenomenology of Spirit
, contained a lengthy critique of what he called in that book the “moral worldview.” In it he accused Kant and his immediate successors of promoting a kind of overly formalistic conception of the moral life, which could make itself plausible only by patching into itself disparate and conflicting elements that ultimately made the whole Kantian enterprise – and the possibility of a moral life lived in its light – untenable (
see
Kant, Immanuel). This problem was to be resolved, he claimed, through something like a practice of forgiveness and reconciliation, which also had something of a religious component (
see
Forgiveness). Likewise, during the part of his career when he was a middle‐school teacher in Nuremberg (from 1808 to 1818), Hegel taught courses on moral duties; the content of those courses fairly well recapitulated some of the themes he had already raised in his
Phenomenology
and was to continue to explore throughout his life.
Trolley Problem
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
The Trolley Problem concerns a set of cases that raise the problem of whether, when, and by whom some innocent bystanders may be killed in order that a greater number of different people can survive. I shall describe the problem in more detail, consider some proposed solutions, and illustrate the method of hypothetical cases used in discussing the problem. The cases are often unrealistic because, as in scientific experiments, they are constructed to isolate and test the significance of some factors while holding others constant.
Oppression
Authors: Cudd Ann E. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

“Oppression” names a harm (
see
Harm) through which groups of persons are systematically and unfairly or unjustly constrained, burdened, or reduced by any of several social forces. Theories of oppression consider the kinds of harms that constitute oppression, what it means for these harms to be inflicted unfairly or unjustly, who suffers and who inflicts oppressive harms, and how they are inflicted. The historical roots of current theories of oppression lie primarily in modern political philosophy, in discussions of liberty, slavery, the subjection of women, and the deprivation and coercion of workers (
see
Liberty; Slavery). Oppression is now seen as a normative concept that names a social injustice (
see
Justice) that affects people because of and through their social group status. These group identities or attributions include gender, sexual, racial, ethnic, religious, and class based groups. The main controversies about oppression include which groups are oppressed, but also the main causes and harms of oppression, and even whether oppression is a univocal phenomenon. There are also controversies concerning the possibility of and moral responsibility for ending oppression.
Population
Authors: Roberts Melinda A. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe choices we make today have consequences for what life will be like for future people, how many future people there will be, and who those future people are. Suchquality, quantity, andidentityissues – and more besides – fall within the domain ofpopulation ethics. A widely accepted goal within moral philosophy is the design of a moral theory that plausibly instructs whether an agent's choice to distribute well‐being across a given population in a given way is morally permissible in light of alternative distributions of well‐being across that same population available to that agent at the critical time. Closely related is the design of a theory that plausibly ranks one such distribution against another in terms of the respective moral value, or degree of goodness, of each. The recognition that drives population ethics is that any adequate moral theory must also take into account that the very choices under evaluation for their permissibility may themselves produce distinct populations – some larger, some smaller, some that overlap in terms of identities of their membership, and some that do not. An adequate moral theory must give a plausible account, in other words, of both “Same People” (and hence “Same Number”) cases and “Different People” (whether “Same Number” or not) cases (Parfit 1987: 356, 351–454; Blackorby et al. 1997, 2005).
Daoist Ethics
Authors: Lee Jung H. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractDaoism represents one of the major indigenous traditions of China, dating back to the Warring States Period (479–221bce) and having a cultural reach rivaling Confucianism and Buddhism (seeBuddhist Ethics; Confucian Ethics; Confucius). Although Daoism has sometimes been dismissed as a mystical tradition, seemingly indifferent to the moral life, we can discern in its foundational texts (e.g.,Zhuangzi,Laozi,Huainanzi,Neiye) a distinct moral language and vision that address the question of “how one should live” (seeLaozi; Morality, Definition of; Zhuangzi). At the most general level, Daoism, or at least the textual tradition of the Warring States Period and the early Imperial Age, can be classified as a form of virtue ethics that commends its practitioners to cultivate certain virtues of the Dao (“the Way”), its source of normativity (seeNormativity; Virtue; Virtue Ethics). Particular attributes of the Dao such as “tranquility” (jing), “emptiness” (xu), “responsiveness” (ying), and “selflessness” (wu‐si), when acquired in inner‐cultivation practices and exercised in intelligent awareness, can all be characterized as stable psychophysiological states or dispositions which seem to enable the Daoist to achieve those goods and excellences definitive of the well‐lived life and integral to the general project of human flourishing. It is through such cultivation, according to early Daoist texts, that one fully realizes the Good.
Impartiality
Authors: Cullity Garrett 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Impartiality is primarily a feature of normative or evaluative deliberation – deliberation about what ought to be done or about something's goodness or badness. An initial description is this: such deliberation is impartial when it is not unduly influenced by the deliberator's own interests, preferences, or loyalties. Derivatively, impartiality can be attributed to actions that are guided by (or perhaps merely conform to) deliberation with this feature, or persons who characteristically deliberate or act in this way.
Whewell, William
Authors: Schultz Bart 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWilliam Whewell (1794–1866) developed and vigorously defended an impressive, deeply historically informed intuitionism (seeIntuitionism, Moral) at odds with the secular and theological forms of utilitarianism (seeUtilitarianism) gaining currency in his day. Although various influential critics complained that his view was no more than a simplistic intuitionism used to defend unreflective commonsense morality – by claiming that everyone just sees, clearly and distinctly, that promise‐keeping, truth‐telling, etc., are right – Whewell knowledgeably countered that charge. He held that the theory of morality, once philosophically developed and refined, yielded a system ofa priorimoral truths, and that these were apprehended intuitively but discovered and tested historically and empirically. This approach, for Whewell and his defenders, marked a productive middle path between pure rationalism, emphasizing the role of reason (rational insight or intuition) in grounding knowledge independently of sense experience, and pure empiricism, emphasizing the role of sense experience in grounding knowledge.
Montaigne, Michel de
Authors: Hartle Ann 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Michel de Montaigne (1533–92) is best known for his invention of the essay in its modern form. What is less well recognized is the philosophical significance of the
Essays
, especially the radical transformation of moral philosophy of which the essay form is the literary expression. Montaigne's project might be described as the emergence of the private, common man out of the hiddenness and shame of privacy, into the light of publicity. This philosophical act announces the coming into being of modern society and a fundamental change in the relationship of the individual to the political realm.
Ethics of Aging
Authors: Tong Rosemarie 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

A number of philosophers have written about the moral status of children. Some talk about children's special rights (
see
Children's Rights); others discuss special duties children might have: to obey their parents, heed their teachers, respect the elderly, and so forth. Still others talk about special duties that others, especially parents, have to children. Although philosophers’ explanations for these special rights and duties vary, all trace them back to particular facts about children and their relationships. Children are especially vulnerable; they lack important knowledge and experience; and they depend on their parents and other adults for most everything, including food, clothing, shelter, education, medical attention, and, even more importantly, love.
Last Person Arguments
Authors: O'Neill John 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Last person arguments form a class of arguments for the extension of the domain of beings and states which have intrinsic value beyond those of human and sentient beings. The arguments appeal to thought experiments about destructive actions by the last existing person or persons on parts of nonhuman nature. They appeal to a moral intuition that the persons act wrongly. Since no person can be wronged by the last persons, the thought experiment intuition is taken to show that the domain of intrinsic value includes nonhuman and beyond this nonsentient beings.
Firth, Roderick
Authors: Carson Thomas 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Roderick Firth (1917–87) received his BA from Haverford in 1938 and his PhD from Harvard in 1943. He taught at William and Mary from 1943 to 1945 and at Swarthmore between 1945 and 1953. From 1953 until 1987 he taught at Harvard, where he became Alford Professor in 1962. Most of Firth's writings are in epistemology; he defended a version of radical (Berkeleyan/phenomenalist) empiricism (see Troyer 1998: 4–9). His reputation in ethics rests almost entirely on his paper “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,” which gives the classic statement of the ideal observer theory (IOT;
see
Ideal Observer Theories).
Sexual Consent
Authors: McGregor Joan 
Published: January 2013

AbstractConsent is generally thought to play a critical role in our moral relationships, purportedly by transforming impermissible acts into permissible ones (seeConsent). In sexual relationships, consent changes the nature of the activity, from a sexual violation to a voluntary sexual encounter, and performs a central role in the legal analysis of rape or sexual assault (seeRape). Given the morally transformative function of consent, what is consent's nature, its moral force, and what conditions undermine it are widely debated. Beyond the concerns about what consent really is and what its moral force is, there are questions about whether attention to consent is misguided. Questions such as whether consent is a sufficient condition to make any sexual behavior morally permissible (seeSexual Morality) and whether genuine consent to sex is even possible in a society with extensive gender hierarchy and oppression are argued as more critical to the discussion about the legitimacy of sexual interactions than the discussion about consent.
Moral Character
Authors: Badhwar Neera Kapur 
Published: January 2013

AbstractA moral character is the set of traits, good or bad, that make someone the kind of person she is. In the original Greek, kharaktēr is an engraving or stamping tool; the Latin “character” comes to mean a distinctive engraving or mark. This idea of distinctiveness is often imported into talk of moral character by contemporary philosophers and psychologists. Yet although our characters do nearly always distinguish us from each other, distinctiveness is not essential to the idea of moral character. Two identical twins with the same virtues or vices, the same strengths or weaknesses, have a character, even though their characters don't distinguish them from each other.
Cognitivism
Authors: Strandberg Caj 
Published: January 2013

AbstractCognitivism is the position in metaethics (seeMetaethics) according to which moral sentences function to convey facts, which means that they can be true or false in the same manner as ordinary fact‐stating sentences (seeSemantics, Moral). Whether cognitivism is correct or not has implications for a number of central issues in moral philosophy, such as the possibility of moral truths, the existence of moral properties, the objectivity of morality, the nature of moral disagreement, and the connection between moral language and attitudes. Cognitivism has consequently become a focal point of much of the discussion in contemporary moral philosophy within the analytic tradition, although related questions have also been discussed by a number of classical philosophers (seeHume, David) and philosophers within other traditions.
Privacy
Authors: Moore Adam D. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThere is little agreement about how to define the term “privacy.” For example, Warren and Brandeis, following Judge Thomas Cooley, called it “the right to be let alone” (Warren and Brandeis 1890: 194). Alan Westin (1967) described privacy in terms of information control. William Parent argued that “privacy is the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others” (1983: 269), while Julie Inness defined privacy as “the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions, which include decisions about intimate access, intimate information, and intimate actions” (1992: 140). Privacy is also viewed by many as morally valuable and worthy of protection, while others have viewed it with suspicion. This essay will review each of these areas, including (1) a brief history of privacy, (2) philosophical definitions of privacy along with specific critiques, (3) views about the value of privacy, and (4) general critiques of privacy.
Consent
Authors: Kleinig John 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Although consent has always played some role in determining the legitimacy of human transactions, that role has greatly expanded. The marriage of individual rights to diverse conceptions of human flourishing has increased the importance of consent for interpersonal and group transactions. Consent has become (for many) a
sine qua non
of political legitimacy (
see
Political Obligation; Social Contract); informed consent is accorded a pivotal role in many professional–client relations (
see
Informed Consent); and – for the most part – consent transforms what would be the rights‐invasions of assault, theft, and rape into (say) a sporting tackle, a loan, and a romantic encounter. Why does consent have the role it does, how does it accomplish this role, and to what extent does it legitimate such transactions?
Thomasius, Christian
Authors: Schröder Peter 
Published: January 2013

AbstractChristian Thomasius (1655–1728) was one of the leading German intellectuals of the seventeenth century. From 1669 he studied philosophy in his birth‐town at the University of Leipzig. He moved on to the Calvinist university of Frankfurt an der Oder, where he studied law and came into contact with the natural law theories of Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and Samuel von Pufendorf (seePufendorf, Samuel Von). In 1679 he was awarded a doctorate in law. He returned to Leipzig where he practiced as a lawyer and continued his academic work. The orthodox Lutheran theologians in Leipzig severely criticized him for his more moderate views on religion and succeeded in having him banned from teaching and publishing. He left his birthplace and moved to Halle in 1690 where he was appointed by the Ritterakademie. In Halle he was one of the founding fathers of the newly established university under the elector, Frederic III of Brandenburg, which replaced the Ritterakademie in 1693.
Maimonides, Moses
Authors: Diamond James A. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractMoses Maimonides (1138–1204), or Rambam the Great Eagle, the acronym and sobriquet he has been revered by in the traditional Jewish academy since his lifetime, is arguably the most seminal thinker to have emerged throughout the course of Jewish intellectual history. Virtually every current of Jewish thought intersects in his written legacy, be it philosophy, theology, biblical exegesis, rabbinics, or jurisprudence. He was born in Cordoba, Spain, and, after frenetic peregrinations caused by Almohadic Islamic extremism, ended in old Cairo (Fustat) Egypt, a somewhat more tolerant environment, where he led an active and exhausting career as community head, physician, rabbinic decisor, and writer of much of his literary corpus that remains with us today. That corpus embraces a wide spectrum of Jewish thought and, although there is no tract dedicated exclusively to ethics and ethical theory, it was a subject that preoccupied him, as evidenced by its treatment in practically every genre of thought he engaged. Living within the Islamic orbit all his life, and exposed to its rich rapport with Greek science and philosophy by such Islamic thinkers as Al‐Farabi (seeAl‐Farabi), of course influenced his formulations in all areas, ethics being no exception (seeIslamic Ethics). However, of paramount importance to understanding, or reconstructing, his ethical theory is his own religious faith and tradition. While a prominent exponent of medieval Jewish rationalism, struggling with the reconciliation of reason and divinely revealed scripture, he was also a devout rabbinic Jew, thoroughly committed to Judaism's combined foundational canon of the Old Testament and classical rabbinic literature, primarily represented by the Talmuds of both Palestine and Babylonia. Any account of his ethical theory then must take into consideration his dedication to Jewish law as refracted through the rabbinic lens, and cannot be divorced from his conceptions of God and revelation as the sources of the normative Jewish apparatus to which he remained dedicated (seeRabbinic Ethics).
Glass Ceiling
Authors: Oxley Julinna C. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe phrase “glass ceiling” refers to the invisible barrier that prevents a qualified person from advancing into an organizational leadership position or from attaining political office. The phrase was first used in 1984, and the US Department of Labor defines it as “artificial barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias that prevent qualified individuals from advancing upward in their organization into management‐level positions” (Barreto et al. 2009: 5). It is generally used to describe women's experiences, although it may also apply to race or ethnicity.