bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Weapons Research and Development
Authors: Forge John 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe best‐known example of weapons research and development (WRD) is the Manhattan Project, which produced the first three nuclear weapons and the only ones to have been used in wartime (seeNuclear Weapons). This project made use of discoveries in nuclear physics which were recent at the time, as well as other scientific theories and state‐of‐the‐art experimental and computational techniques. However, if WRD is defined as a species of applied science (Arrigo 2000: 303), then it becomes a relatively recent endeavor and much else that should be included under the heading will be ruled out. For instance, Mikhail Kalashnikov designed the AK‐47 assault rifle, at about the same time as the Manhattan Project, without consciously applying any scientific theory. The AK‐47 is sturdy, well‐made, reliable, easy to operate and is the most widely used weapon since World War II – and was surely the product of WRD. For this reason, a definition of WRD such as the following is recommended: WRD is research and development aimed at thedesignof new weapons, improvements of existing weapons, or the design and improvement of ancillary and support structures (Forge 2008: 153). The latter includes weapons platforms, such as ships, and methods of command, control, and communication. Given this broad characterization, and provided that research is not defined too narrowly, WRD can be dated from at least the fourth century BCE, if not earlier, when there were systematic and codified attempts to make siege artillery (Rihill 2007). WRD in this general sense, as opposed to specific examples of WRD directed towards particular weapons such as weapons of mass destruction, is a neglected but nevertheless important topic in applied ethics. What, then, are the issues that need to be addressed from this general perspective?
Virtue
Authors: Brewer Talbot 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

In sweeping and abstract terms, we can say that virtue is the achieved state of character that makes one a good human being (
see
Character; Moral Character). Yet things get complicated as soon as we ask “Good in what sense?” Different theorists have answered this question in fundamentally different ways, and this rules out any simple or succinct account of the notion of virtue. The idea itself is deeply contested. It takes on strikingly different contours in the works of the Greeks than in the works of most contemporary moral philosophers. We must be alive to this contest – to its basic terms, and its stakes – if we are to attain a clear understanding of particular philosophical writings about virtue.
Eudaimonism
Authors: Beaton Ryan Stuart , Whiting Jennifer 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThere are various forms of eudaimonism, each so called because of the central role played in it by what ancient speakers of Greek calledeudaimonia(commonly but not uncontroversially rendered “happiness”). Each claims that a human beingought, in some fundamental sense of that term, to live his or her life so as to realize eudaimonia (seeAncient Ethics). But the various forms differ from one another not just in presupposing different conceptions of eudaimonia (some stressing subjective satisfaction and others stressing objective conditions such as those involved in naturalistic conceptions of what it is for any organism to flourish;seeNeo‐Aristotelian Ethical Naturalism); they also differ in degree of egocentricity. Although the eudaimonist label has at times been applied to utilitarian views, with their emphasis on promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number (seeUtilitarianism), classical forms of eudaimonism tend to be formally egocentric if not substantively egoistic: they tend to assume that each agent should live so as to realize herowneudaimonia, which however is often construed broadly, to include the interests of others (such as family and friends) to whom she stands in certain special relations (seeEgoism). But even this broad construal is not enough to preempt the predominantly Kantian charge – based on a strict separation of the ethical sense of “ought” from the prudential sense – that eudaimonist theories are merely prudential (Prichard 1929;seeKant, Immanuel). It is however not clear whether ancient eudaimonists accepted – or whether eudaimonists in general need accept – the separation on which this charge is based: they may claim, not unreasonably, to use “ought” in a sense that involves (without however clearly distinguishing) both “ethical” and “prudential” aspects.
Corporate Culture
Authors: Goodpaster Kenneth E. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
The phrase “corporate culture” is used in a more general sense to mean the culture of any organized group or institution. In a narrower sense, “corporate culture” refers to the culture of a business corporation. In most contexts, however, the two senses are interchangeable. A corporation's culture impacts its behavior in significant ways, as much as if not more than strategy, which is often thought to be overriding in decision‐making. The subject of corporate culture, however, goes beyond the debate over which is more important. The 2009 National Business Ethics Survey reflects the ethics component of culture. Its results show that an ethical corporate culture “continues to have a profound impact on pressure, observed misconduct, reporting of observed misconduct, and rates of retaliation against reporters” (Ethics Resource Center 2009). It also found that “actions and perceptions of top managers drive the ethical culture of the company and have a significant impact on outcomes.”
Spinoza, Baruch
Authors: LeBuffe Michael 
Published: January 2013

AbstractBaruch, or Benedictus, Spinoza (1632–77) is the author of works, especially theEthicsand theTheological‐Political Treatise, that are a major source of the ideas of the European Enlightenment. TheEthicsis a dense series of arguments on progressively narrower subjects – metaphysics, mind, the human affects, human bondage to passion, and human blessedness – presented in a geometrical order modeled on that of Euclid. In it, Spinoza begins by defending a metaphysics on which God is the only substance and is bound by the laws of his own nature. Spinoza then builds a naturalistic ethics that is constrained by, and to some extent is a product of, his strong metaphysics. Human beings are individuals that causally interact with other individuals and are extremely vulnerable to external influence. They are not substances. Moreover, human beings are bound by the same laws that bind all other individuals in nature, so Spinoza presents accounts of goodness, virtue, and perfection that are consistent with these perfectly general laws. Spinoza's principal influences include René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes (seeHobbes, Thomas), Moses Maimonides (seeMaimonides, Moses), the Roman Stoics (seeStoicism), and Aristotle (seeAristotle). Although his innovative philosophical views undoubtedly contributed to the strong writ ofcherem, or ostracism, that Spinoza received from the Portuguese Jewish community of Amsterdam in 1656, his work nevertheless also shows the influence of the study of Scripture and of Jewish law.
Pleasure
Authors: Sumner L. W. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractPleasure has been a subject of philosophical interest in the Western tradition since the time of the Greeks. Both Plato and Aristotle devoted extended attention to the place of pleasure in the good life, and the Epicureans made it the centerpiece of their ethical thought (seePlato; Aristotle; Hellenistic Ethics). More recently, pleasure was restored to this position of prominence by the nineteenth‐century utilitarians (seeUtilitarianism). Whether a principal theme or not, the pursuit of pleasure plays some role in virtually all ethical traditions. Indeed, few would deny that pleasure is one of the important goods in life, if not the only one. Through the twentieth century and into the twenty‐first century, philosophers have continued to ask two basic questions about pleasure: (1) What is its nature? In what does it consist? (2) What is its value? What place does it have in a theory of ethics or of the good life?
Falk, W. D.
Authors: Piker Andy 
Published: January 2013

AbstractW. D. Falk (1906–91) wrote extensively on moral philosophy from the 1940s to the 1980s. He never subscribed to the dominant moral theories of his time: the intuitionism of Prichard and Ross (seeIntuitionism, Moral; Prichard, H. A.; Ross, W. D.), or the emotivism (seeEmotivism) and prescriptivism (seePrescriptivism) of Stevenson and Hare (seeStevenson, C. L.; Hare, R. M.). Instead, he raised important objections to those theories, and explored issues – such as the relation between duty and motivation, the practical role of reason, and the nature of value and morality – that he did not believe they adequately addressed. Falk's own positions are rooted in a variety of historical sources, including the natural law (seeNatural Law) tradition and Kant's ethics (seeKant, Immanuel). His ideas (on moral obligation, for example) had a significant impact on the development of moral theory among his contemporaries. They also remain relevant to current work in moral philosophy; his views on the nature of value, for instance, might shed some light on the moral realism debate.
Gratitude
Authors: McConnell Terrance 
Published: January 2013

AbstractGratitude can refer to a feeling of appreciation or to a sense that one ought to make a positive response to an act of kindness. Here the term is used in the latter sense, to designate an obligation or duty that an agent might have to another under certain conditions. The phrase “debt of gratitude” is sometimes used to describe this obligation or moral requirement. There are at least two fundamental questions that must be asked about gratitude. What conditions must obtain before one person owes gratitude to another? When an agent owes another person gratitude, what is the content of that requirement? Let us begin with examples.
Weakness of Will
Authors: Tappolet Christine 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWeakness of will is generally taken to involve a conflict between practical thought and action (seeAction), such as when we have another glass of wine even though we judge that it would be better to refrain, all things considered. Failures of this kind often lead to imprudence (seePrudence) and blameworthiness (seeBlame); and they are commonly taken to be paradigmatically irrational (seeRationality). One interest in weakness of will is practical. Moral philosophy focuses on the nature and causes of the moral failure that is often involved in weakness of will, and examines ways to restore self‐control. Another interest comes from moral psychology (seeMoral Psychology). A better understanding of the nature of weakness of will promises to shed light on practical thought and its relation to motivation (seeMotivation, Moral) and action. In fact, weakness of will is often used as a test case for theories of action and theories of moral reasoning (seeMoral Reasoning).
Moral Equality of Combatants
Authors: Bazargan Saba 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe moral equality of combatants (MEC) is a doctrine about the principles governing the conduct of combatants in a war (where “conduct” is taken to include not only how combatants are permitted to fight, but whether they are permitted to fight). According to MEC, the principles governing the conduct of combatants in a war do not depend on what side in the war the combatants are fighting on. Thus, if MEC is correct, then for any side in a war, the principles governing the conduct of the combatants do not depend on whether that side is fighting a just war. Consequently, if it is permissible to fight in a just war, combatants do no wrong by fighting in an unjust war. The most distinguished supporter of this application of MEC is Michael Walzer. In his influential book Just and Unjust Wars (2000), Walzer argues that the responsibility for waging an unjust war rests with military and civilian leaders – not with combatants who typically have no control over the decisions made by their leaders, and who typically are subjected to deception, indoctrination, and coercion by the state. Thus, in a war with a just and unjust side, the combatants fighting on the unjust side (unjust combatants) are typically no less morally innocent than those fighting on the just side (just combatants). Walzer argues that since both just and unjust combatants are morally innocent (unless they commit war crimes) the principles governing combat ought not to distinguish just combatants from unjust combatants.
Rorty, Richard
Authors: Hiley David R. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Richard Rorty (1931–2007) was educated at the University of Chicago and Yale University, receiving his PhD in philosophy from Yale in 1959. He taught philosophy at Wellesley College and Princeton University, was university professor of humanities at the University of Virginia, and taught comparative literature at Stanford University until his retirement. He received the prestigious McArthur Fellowship (1981–6); and he held a number of important lectureships, including the Howison (Berkeley 1983), Northcliffe (University College London 1986), Clark (Trinity College, Cambridge, 1987), Romanell (Phi Beta Kappa 1989), Tanner (Michigan 1990), Oxford Amnesty Lecture 1993, Massey (Harvard 1997), and Donellan (Trinity College Dublin 1998). While his earliest published work was in the tradition of analytic philosophy, writing on issues in epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language, his most important and controversial book,
Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
(1979), sought to undermine foundationalist tenants of analytic philosophy and the traditional view of philosophy of which it was a part. His subsequent publications worked out the consequences of anti‐foundationalism for philosophy, science, ethics, and politics. This essay will begin with an overview of his critique of traditional philosophy in order to draw out its implications for ethics.
Natural Law
Authors: George Robert P. , Tollefsen Christopher 
Published: January 2013

AbstractNatural law ethics forms a distinctive family of ethical theories, all of which take the human good, or human well‐being, as central to their theoretical approach. After a period of diminishing influence following the Enlightenment, during which natural law theory was largely a matter for Catholic seminaries, natural ethics has seen a resurgence in recent decades in normative ethics, philosophy of law, political theory, and applied ethics.
Dirty Hands
Authors: Blattberg Charles 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWhen Machiavelli (1950: Ch. 15) famously wrote that the prince who would govern effectively must learn “how not to be good,” he gave powerful articulation to an idea that has become commonplace, namely, that we cannot practice politics without “getting our hands dirty.” To attempt otherwise is to court disaster – for oneself, of course, but also for one's subjects. Consider the “ticking time bomb” scenario, which has become prominent in the literature. A terrorist has been captured who has knowledge of a bomb that will soon explode, causing a great loss of innocent life. Should those in charge authorize the use of torture in order to obtain the information for finding and defusing the bomb? On the one hand, many believe that torture is always wrong; on the other, there exists a responsibility toward all those innocent lives. Does this mean that, in politics, it can be right to do wrong? But is that not a contradictory, even paradoxical claim? Overall, contemporary moral and political philosophers can be said to have given three answers to these questions.
Boycotts
Authors: Stoll Mary Lyn 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

A boycott occurs when one or more parties ask that consumers refuse to patronize an organization in order to achieve some goal. The goal of a boycott may be primarily instrumental, i.e., designed to effect policy changes, or the goal may be fundamentally expressive, i.e., an expression of moral disdain. Most boycotts involve both. The term “boycott” originates in disputes between British estate manager Charles Cunningham Boycott and his Irish workers. After years of leaving workers in deplorable living conditions, Boycott paid tenant farmers to bring in the harvest at a fraction of their normal wage. Workers who refused were evicted; they vowed to ostracize Boycott completely (
see
Economics and Ethics).
Paradoxes of Voting
Authors: Saari Donald G. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe 2000 Florida presidential elections, where Bush beat Gore even though Gore would have beaten Bush in a head‐to‐head comparison, combined with US Electoral College outcomes where a popular vote winner can lose, capture the uncomfortable reality that election outcomes can reflect the choice of a voting rule rather than voter preferences. This concern is crucial because “winners” affect our future. “Voting paradoxes” prove that the problem is much worse than commonly believed.
Rabbinic Ethics
Authors: Schofer Jonathan Wyn 
Published: January 2013

AbstractSome modern and postmodern readers consider ethics to be at the heart of Judaism, perhaps its essence. This view appears, in very different ways, through formulations of “ethical monotheism” and through the primacy that Emmanuel Levinas gives to ethics in his phenomenology. Other modern and postmodern readers contrast ethics with Jewish law, attributing lesser significance to ethics or even questioning whether the category of ethics is appropriate for classical Judaism at all (Levinas 1969; Gibbs 2010; Newman 1998; Vial and Hadley 2001; Schweiker 2004). Such positions presume very different understandings of what ethics entails. Louis Newman (1998) concludes his extensive examination of Jewish law and Jewish ethics by arguing that we need to clarify the relation between law, ethics, and religion.
Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Authors: Connolly Anthony J. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe rights of indigenous peoples (or indigenous rights) are those rights aspired to, claimed, held, exercised, or enforced by or on behalf of the indigenous peoples of the world (Connolly 2009). The United Nations has estimated the worldwide population of indigenous people at around 370 million, inhabiting 90 countries across all the regions of the world (United Nations 2009). In 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This agreement codified many of the rights asserted by the world's indigenous groups over the past few decades and offered those groups a clear and authoritative moral and legal basis upon which to pursue their ongoing struggle for recognition and justice (United Nations 2008;seeIdentity, Politics of; Recognition; Reconciliation). The promulgation of the Declaration also signaled the increased importance within national and international moral, political, and legal discourse of issues surrounding the status and needs of indigenous peoples.
Respect
Authors: Woodruff Paul 
Published: January 2013

AbstractRespect is, most generally, appreciation of the value of a person or thing, accompanied by appropriate affect, and expressed in appropriate behavior. Respect may take objects from a broad range, but is most often accorded to human beings. In addition to respecting a person, e.g., for honesty, one might respect a gale of wind for its strength or a position of power for its rank (regardless of the person who holds it). This essay, like most ethical discussions of respect, will focus on respect for persons, which occupies an important place in the ethics of human relationships. Some thinkers treat respect as the foundation for human rights (seeRights). Thinkers under the influence of Kant hold that we are morally required to respect each other for our value as human beings, i.e., for our capacity for rational choice and our dignity as ends in ourselves (seeKant, Immanuel).
Brain Death
Authors: Howsepian A. A. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractFew philosophical questions have as much practical import as how to understand the nature of organismic death (hereafter, “death”seeDeath).Dead human beings, for example, are believed to be proper objects of autopsy, burial, vital organ procurement for purposes of transplantation (seeOrgan Transplantation), and release from previous social obligations. At its most basic conceptual level, an organism dies when it ceases to be; however, even this very basic idea requires explanation. What does it mean for an organism to cease to be? A very natural and widely embraced suggestion is that an organism has died when it ceases to function as an integrated whole, when it has lost its somatic integrative unity or, alternatively, when it has lost its “principle of organization” (or “soul”) (seeAquinas, Saint Thomas; Aristotle; Organic Unities). Yet even if this issue were settled, disagreement concerning other levels involved in the definition of death would remain in dispute, including general physiological standards which reflect that death has occurred, operational criteria concerning death, and what specific evaluative steps are appropriate for establishing that death has occurred (Capron and Kass 1972).
Ought Implies Can
Authors: Howard‐Snyder Frances 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

The idea that ought implies can (hereafter, OIC) or perhaps more perspicuously, that inability to do something implies that one does not have an obligation to do it, has been around a long time. It has been traced back to Pelagius and Augustine and is akin to the Roman legal maxim
impossibilium nulla obligation est
, but is usually associated with Kant (1996;
see
Kant, Immanuel). It is connected to issues of Moral Luck (
see
Moral Luck), moral Dilemmas (
see
Dilemmas, Moral), questions about subjective and objective obligation, and the debate over freedom, determinism, moral responsibility, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (
see
Free Will). I will consider different versions of OIC, major arguments in support of it, and major arguments against it.
Beauvoir, Simone de
Authors: Deutscher Penelope 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Simone de Beauvoir (1908–86) is associated with mid‐twentieth‐century French existentialist thought (
see
Existentialism), on which she partly drew in the development of
The Second Sex
(1949), one of the most important texts of twentieth‐century feminist thought (
see
Continental Feminist Ethics). It achieved worldwide sales exceeding one million copies. She is also a noted author of four volumes of autobiography (including
Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter
, 1958), significant narrative works on the deaths of her mother (
A Very Easy Death
, 1964) and of her partner Jean‐Paul Sartre (
Adieux: A Farewell to Sartre
, 1981;
see
Sartre, Jean‐Paul), and of fiction, in which her philosophical themes are further developed. Her novel
The Mandarins
was awarded the prestigious French literary prize, the Goncourt, in 1954.
Zhu Xi
Authors: Makeham John 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThecentral topic of Confucian moral philosophy isren xing, or “human nature.” Within that tradition, the two most influential accounts of the topic are those of Mencius (fourth centurybce;seeMencius) and Zhu Xi (1130–1200). Mencius lived at a time when many thinkers were troubled by a profound metaphysical doubt as to whether “heaven” (tian) underpins human moral values.Ren xingis what links us with the nonhuman universe, the normative order of heaven. Mencius maintained that humans (ren) are beings born for goodness; at birth, there exists a natural tendency for goodness, as inevitable as the natural tendency of water to flow downward. When left unhindered and properly nurtured, our innate good tendencies – the moral predispositions of our “heart‐mind” (xin) – will become manifest of their own accord (seeIntuitions, Moral).