bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Generosity
Authors: Hunt Lester H. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

With few exceptions, the moral philosophers of the last several centuries have written little about generosity. Those of the ancient, medieval, and Renaissance periods, however, often treated it as an important subject. Though Plato ignores it, Aristotle (1985) devotes a substantial chapter to it, as does Aquinas (1948). Indeed, in Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics (1119
b
–1122
a
) Aristotle recognizes two different virtues that could be regarded as subspecies of generosity: eleutheria (“freedom”) and megaloprepeia (“magnanimity”). Descartes (1989) calls generosity “the key of all the virtues, and a general remedy for all the disorders of the passions” in his treatise The Passions of the Soul (Art. 161). Spinoza (2005;
see
Spinoza, Baruch) discusses it at some length in Part IV of his Ethics and treats it as intimately connected with freedom (Propositions 37 and 50–73). After that, philosophers seem to have lost interest in the idea of generosity, until Nietzsche (2006;
see
Nietzsche, Friedrich), a philosophical atavist on so many matters, sings the praises of something he calls a “gift‐giving virtue” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Part I, Ch. 22). Most likely, Nietzsche's gift‐giving virtue and Spinoza's generositas are best understood as a super‐virtue, a sort of generous‐mindedness, of which the trait that we ordinarily call generosity is a natural consequence.
Confucian Ethics
Authors: Shun Kwong‐loi 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

“Confucianism” is generally used as a translation of the Chinese expression
rujia
, or the school of
ru
, to refer to a school of thought that started with Confucius (sixth–fifth century
bce
) (
see
Confucius) and that continues to be influential in China, as well as in East and Southeast Asia. The character
ru
referred to a social group that had existed well before Confucius' time, a group that was well versed in ancient rituals and that earned its living as professional ritualists and educators. Confucius was a member of the group, but his influence was due largely to ideas he developed in response to the social and political problems of his time.
Nanotechnology, Ethics of
Authors: Weckert John 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

In 1986 Eric Drexler raised the issue of gray goo in his book
Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology
. Nanotechnology, he argued, would lead to the development of self‐replicating nanorobots, which if left unchecked could destroy the world. This self‐assembly would also enable desktop, or personal, factories that could produce just about anything. Bill Joy's article “Why the Future Doesn't Need Us” (2000) argued that possible developments in nanotechnology and related technologies were so dangerous that a moratorium on research was warranted. The gray goo debate has receded since then, with less emphasis being placed on self‐replicating machines. Discussion of personal factories continues, however, although not so much in the mainstream nanotechnology literature, and we will return to this later. There are still calls for moratoria on some nanotechnology research, although more because of the potential dangers of some nanoparticles than for the reasons that Joy advanced. The actual course of nanoethics, the study of the ethics of nanotechnology, has been rather mundane compared with the Drexler and Joy scenarios, and even the need for nanoethics is not generally accepted.
Non‐Cognitivism
Authors: Ridge Michael 
Published: January 2013

AbstractNon‐cognitivism is perhaps better understood as a philosophical tradition than as a single unified doctrine. Moreover, the tradition is itself subtle and multifaceted, with different branches of the tradition emphasizing different ideas. My aim in this essay will be to give a newcomer to this tradition some idea about both the variety of the theories falling within the tradition (and why the differences between them matter) and a sense of what unifies these theories as constituting a coherent and philosophically important tradition.
Hunting
Authors: Evans J. Claude 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
When we inquire into the moral permissibility of hunting, it becomes important to distinguish between different kinds of hunting. Subsistence hunting, where the nourishment from the hunted animal's flesh is required for a healthy diet, plays a crucial role in some indigenous cultures and a minor role in most developed countries. It is thought to be permissible in almost all approaches to moral principles. Commercial hunting for markets is outlawed in the United States; it is carefully regulated in Europe; and it constitutes a serious issue in Africa (“bush meat”). Sport hunting, or hunting for its own sake, whether this is understood in terms of amusement, pleasure, recreation, traditional cultural practice, domination, or meaningful participation in natural ecosystems, is controversial. Hunting is also an instrument for managing populations of wildlife.
Weil, Simone
Authors: Bell Richard H. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractSimone Weil was born in Paris on February 3, 1909, and died on August 24, 1943. Her legacy is found primarily in a number of her original political and philosophical writings. These embody her understanding of (1) justice as compassion as found in an individual's love and attention toward other human beings, (2) a sense of order in the natural world, and (3) a sense of God as shown in one's love and compassion for another (seeAttention, Moral; Moral Point of View; Responsibility). Her intellectual work and her practical engagement with evil in the world are at the center of her life and written corpus. Particular focus is given to individual harm‐doing, the rise of all forms of colonial oppression, and to the two World Wars' effects on her own beloved France. Her life and work draw the reader's attention to unethical behavior and to a general lack of moral sensibility in our twentieth‐century culture and continues to have relevant application in our twenty‐first century.
Violence
Authors: Bufacchi Vittorio 
Published: January 2013

AbstractNo other issue provokes moral debate as intensely as violence. From wars to suicide, torture to rape, violence is at the heart of virtually all our deepest moral concerns (seeRape; Torture; Suicide; War; Domestic Violence). Moral philosophers are primarily interested in the question: “Can violence be justified?” Yet, before this question can be tackled, a preliminary inquiry needs to be undertaken: “What is violence?”
Shaftesbury, Third Earl of
Authors: Anderson Abraham 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713), is commonly regarded as the founder of the “moral sense school,” whose best‐known representative is Francis Hutcheson (
see
Hutcheson, Francis). He is important in the history of ethics in part because he offers a basis for ethics which does not depend on theological dogma (Gill 2006: 77–132; Schneewind 1998: 295–309). The starting point of Shaftesbury's thought was a problem posed by Pierre Bayle in his
Various Thoughts on the Occasion of a Comet
(1682): does moral virtue depend on belief in correct religious doctrine, and does social order require the maintenance of a religious orthodoxy (Klein 1994: 52; Jaffro 1998: 180–1;
see
Religion and Politics)? Bayle had argued that neither is the case. In his “Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit,” first published in 1699, Shaftesbury agrees with Bayle. In defending this position he asserts that human beings are endowed with a moral sense connected with a natural sociability. The doctrine of natural sociability, which has roots in Stoic thought (
see
Stoicism), offers an interesting anticipation of modern views on ethical emotion in sociobiology and evolutionary psychology (Filonowicz 2008;
see
Evolution, ethics and).
Paradox of Deontology
Authors: Hurley Paul 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Consider a case in which, if some person A1 injures, lies to, kills, or in some other way violates another person P1, she will set in motion a chain of events that will prevent two other persons, A2 and A3, from similarly violating two other persons P2 and P3. Intuitively, it is wrong in such a case for A1 to violate P1: A1 has an obligation not to violate others just as A2 and A3 do, and prevention of their violations of P2 and P3 does not justify A1 in violating her obligation to P1. Rights, for example, are commonly understood as generating such obligations not to violate even in certain cases in which such a violation can prevent more such violations from happening (
see
Rights). Many moral theories, including deontological theories (
see
Deontology), attempt to provide rationales for such intuitive moral restrictions.
Scheler, Max
Authors: Kelly Eugene 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Max Ferdinand Scheler (1874–1928) was born in Munich. He made significant contributions to philosophical anthropology; to ethics, including an important critique of Kantian deontology (
see
Deontology); to epistemology, especially the sociology of knowledge; to metaphysics; and to philosophy of religion. He entered university at Jena, but transferred to Berlin to study medicine. There he came under the influence of Wilhelm Dilthey (
see
Dilthey, Wilhelm), who turned him to the study of philosophy. He returned to Jena, where he studied with Rudolf Eucken (1846–1926), a philosopher with ties to German Idealism. He received under Eucken both his doctorate in 1897 and his habilitation in 1899. He began as a lecturer in Jena after 1900 and moved to Munich as a Privatdozent in 1906. In 1902, he became familiar with the work of Edmund Husserl (
see
Husserl, Edmund) and the concept of phenomenology. After 1913, he worked with Husserl and others as an editor of the chief organ of the phenomenological movement,
Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung
. He converted to Catholicism in 1899, and, until his denial of theism in or about 1921, he was an influential Catholic thinker.
Mercenaries and Private Military Companies
Authors: Baker and Deane‐Peter , Pattison James 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
The large‐scale employment of private contractors in support of the US‐led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been hailed by some analysts as one of the most significant changes in the conduct of armed conflict in the contemporary era. It has also led to numerous accusations of mercenarism being directed against these contractors. Despite the strongly negative connotation associated with the mercenary label, surprisingly little focused analysis of the ethics of contracted force has been published.
Personal Relationships
Authors: Oakley Justin 
Published: January 2013

AbstractPersonal relationships, such as friendships and family relationships, vary widely in their quality, but play a crucial role in many of our lives. A human life with no such partial ties is difficult to imagine, and many believe that a life devoid of close personal relationships cannot be a life well‐lived. These were familiar ideas to Aristotle and other ancient Greek philosophers, but the impartialist basis of Kantian and Utilitarian approaches to ethics raises challenges about the place of personal relationships in an ethical life. To what extent can Kantianism and Utilitarianism allow us to engage in friendships and family relationships? Debates about these questions have also led to more abstract disputes about whether such theories are fatally flawed – if living by their dictates turns out to be incompatible with genuine friendship, or whether, conversely, friendship itself might have to be renounced by those seeking to live an ethical life. More radically, the special authority that morality and moral reasons are commonly assumed to have are sometimes questioned from a perspective that regards personal relationships as essential to a life worth living. Ethical scrutiny of partiality also extends to questions about the proper grounds of various familial obligations, such as parental obligations to children, and adult children's obligations to their elderly parents, and to questions about the content of such obligations, and even whether there are any such special duties in the first place.
Moral Luck
Authors: Enoch David 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIf two drivers drive equally negligently, but only one of them causes serious harm or injury (say, because a pedestrian is present in the wrong time and place only in front of one of the drivers' cars), are they equally morally blameworthy? After all, they were equally negligent, and the difference between them was due to a factor that wasn't under their control, it was a matter of luck. Or is the driver who injured a pedestrian more blameworthy? After all, she injured an innocent pedestrian, and the other driver didn't. If two judges are equally willing to take a bribe, but only one takes it because only he was offered a bribe, are they equally morally blameworthy? After all, they were equally willing to act wrongly, and the fact that only one of them was offered a bribe was – as far as they were concerned – a matter of luck. Or is the judge who took a bribe more blameworthy than the one who didn't? After all, the latter did nothing wrong.
Death
Authors: Fischer John Martin 
Published: January 2013

AbstractDeath has inspired much philosophical literature to go along with the existential dread. Indeed, much of the literature has explored the issue of whether the dread is justified; Epicurus and his followers argued that it is not, as they hold that death cannot be bad for the individual who dies (seeStoicism). Although the Epicurean view seems unacceptable to most contemporary philosophers, it has its adherents, and many would at least concede that one can learn much from seeking to refute Epicureanism about death.
Motivation, Humean Theory of
Authors: Sobel David 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe Humean theory of motivation maintains that beliefs by themselves are insufficient to motivate action and that a desire is a necessary component in explaining action. Intuitively the idea is that merely accepting that such and such is the case – say, that the cat is on the mat – in no way by itself provides the agent with a goal which could lead to action. But if we add in a desire – say, a desire that the cat not be on the mat – then this belief/desire pair could motivate one to act to remove the cat from the mat. Of course, one might slip and fall with no desire to do so, but this would not be the sort of intentional action at issue here. The Humean view should, and typically does, recognize that a desire by itself is insufficient to motivate action as action requires not only a goal but some beliefs about what one might do that would help promote that goal.
Quasi‐Realism
Authors: Blackburn Simon 
Published: January 2013

AbstractQuasi‐realism is the view especially associated with Simon Blackburn and Allan Gibbard that expressivists in subjects like ethics can explain and justify the forms of thought that have been taken to be inconsistent with their theory (Blackburn 1993, 2010; Gibbard 1990, 2003;seePrescriptivism).
Ricoeur, Paul
Authors: Pellauer David 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005) was one of the leading French philosophers of the twentieth century. His writings addressed a wide range of questions and issues in philosophy. His work, which began from phenomenology, moved on to hermeneutics, and then, in the last years of his life, dealt more explicitly with ethics both as theory and in relation to moral and political problems of the day. While he always acknowledged an ethical dimension to his work, the fullest statement of that ethics did not appear until quite late in his career. In his Gifford Lectures, published as
Oneself as Another
, he presents what he calls his “little ethics.” The basis of this ethics is the idea of a good life lived with and for others in just institutions. This is an ethics that necessarily involves three “moments”: a teleological idea of a good life, a deontological moment comprising the normative principles meant to achieve that life, and a practical moment that arises when we have to apply this teleological idea and its normative expression to concrete situations. These may include difficult cases where it will be necessary to bend the rule given the specific circumstances or to negotiate a conflict between possible applicable rules. This latter moment, which Ricoeur speaks of as one that calls for practical wisdom, is in the hardest cases one where the choice is between bad and worse rather than simply between an obvious right and wrong. It is also possible to read this threefold schema backwards in some cases; for example, in the case of a newly discovered disease where a physician must deal with the patient for the first time, but then shares her results with colleagues who go on to develop treatment protocols and learn to refer them back to a broader understanding of the idea of good health.
Motherhood
Authors: Mullin Amy 
Published: January 2013

AbstractPrior to the twentieth century, philosophers rarely attended to issues relating to motherhood. Plato and Nietzsche made repeated references to pregnancy throughout their work, but both also asserted the considerable superiority of metaphorical pregnancy (in which philosophers give birth to ideas) over the merely physical pregnancy associated with women. Plato briefly discussed physical pregnancy when explaining how to improve the quality of one's progeny, but in doing so he lamented the need even to mention the “distasteful topic of the possession of women and procreation of children” (1961: 502e). While there was some philosophical interest in questions about parental rights and filial obligations (seeParents' Right and Responsibilities), particularly in the early modern period, fathers' rights were emphasized. Neither pregnancy nor mothering was considered of philosophical significance.
Subjectivism, Ethical
Authors: Alm David 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWithin ethics the term “subjectivism” refers to a rather diverse array of positions. Yet it is possible to identify a unifying characteristic, at least to a reasonably good approximation. According to any form of subjectivism, ethical factsdependon mental facts, in the sense that an ethical fact obtains only if some appropriate mental fact obtains.
Luther, Martin
Authors: Anderson Per 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Martin Luther (1483–1546) was a sixteenth‐century German pastor, theologian, and church reformer who made enduring contributions to Christian understandings of the moral life. In 1520, early in his occasional and pastoral writing on ethics, Luther published
The Freedom of a Christian
.The text articulates the religious bases and structure of his ethical thought. It sets forth the basic norm of a Christian life, which Luther develops in subsequent writings. For Luther, how a person should live begins with an unmerited saving relationship to God through faith. In response to divine giving,a Christian exists to serve the well‐being of others. Luther writes,
Objective Relativism
Authors: Hickman Larry A. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

The term “objective relativism” was coined by Arthur Murphy in 1927 to characterize a philosophical position embraced by both Alfred North Whitehead and John Dewey (
see
Dewey, John).Although the roots of objective relativism can be found as early as Dewey's 1905 essay “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism” (1977a), Murphy claimed that this “genuinely new philosophy” was “not discernable” until the appearance of Whitehead's
Science and the Modern World
and Dewey's
Experience and Nature
, both published in 1925 (1927: 122).
Heidegger, Martin
Authors: Hatab Lawrence J. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe philosophy of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) was not directly concerned with standard questions in ethics; it was primarily focused on ontology, on the meaning of being as distinct from beings (particular entities and specific areas of inquiry such as history, art, and science). Heidegger insisted on the “ontological difference,” or the radical difference between being and beings, which can be understood in two main senses: (1) rather than to objective descriptions of entities, being refers to the existentialmeaningfulnessof entities in the light of lived interests and purposes; and (2) rather than to positive descriptions, the meaning of being is always related tonegativeconditions that exceed actuality. Because of such negativity, Heidegger claimed that being is “essentially finite” (2008: 108).
Ross, W. D.
Authors: Stratton‐Lake Philip 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWilliam David Ross (1877–1971) was a leading exponent of early‐twentieth‐century ethical intuitionism (seeIntuitionism, Moral). Intuitionists maintain that basic moral principles are self‐evident, that there are genuine moral properties in the world, that these properties cannot be defined wholly in terms of natural properties (seeNaturalism, Ethical), and (with a few exceptions) that basic moral principles cannot be subsumed under one single grounding principle, as, for example, Kant (seeKant, Immanuel) and consequentialists (seeConsequentialism) claim. Intuitionists, then, are nonnaturalist moral realists, and pluralists. In many ways, Ross draws together the best elements of previous intuitionist philosophers, and defends these views in a lucid and concise manner. However, his most significant contribution to moral philosophy is his concept of aprima facieduty, which A. C. Ewing described as one of the most important discoveries in moral philosophy in the twentieth century (1959: 126).
Dilthey, Wilhelm
Authors: Makkreel Rudolf A. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) is mainly known for his philosophical contributions to the human sciences, hermeneutics, and the understanding of history. But his positions in these areas are informed by views on ethics that he developed early in his life. He wrote his doctoral dissertation on Schleiermacher's ethics and his inaugural dissertation of 1864 was published as an essay entitled “An Attempt at an Analysis of Moral Consciousness.” In this essay, which inaugurated his university teaching career, Dilthey proposes that the analysis of what is valid in moral consciousness be brought into relation with what actually motivates us to engage ethically with the world. Ultimately, we need an ethics that will have a reformative influence on human life.
Child Abuse and Neglect
Authors: Vopat Mark C. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract
The concepts of both child abuse and child neglect are social constructs that have developed differently in different times and places. Prior to the nineteenth century, very little was written on the subject of child maltreatment. Child abuse and a concern for children generally revolved around issues of the exploitation of children in the workplace. In industrialized countries such as Britain and the United States, this concern was expressed through labor laws. Beginning around 1819, Britain enacted a series of child labor laws meant to protect children (Tuttle 2001). While several states in the US had passed restrictions on child labor in the early 1800s, national regulations would not find their way into law until 1938 (29 USC §203[l] and 29 USC §212). And while these and subsequent laws indicate a growing appreciation for the plight of children in certain parts of the world, they are not indicative of a universal agreement about what constitutes child abuse and neglect. In certain instances, family violence or child abuse is not distinguished from other types of harm, but is covered by charging offenders under the applicable criminal code (e.g., the Canadian Criminal Code). The socially constructed definition of abuse and neglect thus suggests that a fair amount of cultural relativity pervades the issue as not all cultures recognized the same acts or omissions as harmful.