bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
NATIONAL STRIKE FORCE EMPLOYMENT IN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF: MONONGAHELA RIVER OIL SPILL1
Authors: Crouse James W. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
In January 1988, 3.9 million gallons of diesel fuel were released from an Ashland Oil Company oil storage tank. Of that amount, approximately 770,000 gallons entered the Monongahela River near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
The U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic Area Strike Team was called in to assist the first federal official on scene, U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port-Marine Safety Office (MSO) in Pittsburgh, and subsequently the predesignated federal on-scene coordinator (OSC) provided by the Environmental Protection Agency Region III. Among the duties performed by the strike team were providing a temporary water supply to the city of Wheeling, West Virginia, and attempting to supply Robinson Township, Pennsylvania.
This paper is an evaluation of the events and logistics, and an assessment of how federal services could be used in this manner with no obstruction to commercial interests.
CLEAN SEAS' RESPONSE TO THE SINKING OF THE PAC BARONESS
Authors: Onstad Skip , McCloskey Thomas 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
At 5:30 a.m. on September 21, 1987, the dry bulk carrier Pac Baroness collided with the freighter Atlantic Wing approximately 14 miles west of Point Conception. The Pac Baroness foundered throughout the day and was under tow, out to sea, when it sank at 4:18 p.m. At 5 p.m., a large discharge of oil began rising to the surface from the sunken vessel, and by 6 p.m. a slick had formed in the vicinity of the wreck site that was 1.5 miles long and 0.5 miles wide. A large quantity of oil continued to bubble to the surface from the sunken ship for several days.
The incident occurred in the Clean Seas’ area of responsibility. Although the incident involved a nonmember company, Clean Seas was activated minutes after the collision. All three of Clean Seas’ oil spill response vessels were on-scene from Tuesday, September 22, to Friday, September 25, when the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) released Mr. Clean and Mr. Clean II from service. Mr. Clean III remained on-scene until September 29.
Oil Spill Preparedness in Kenya
Authors: Okolo N. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
Following oil spills and petroleum fire incidents in Kenya, and in light of the recent increase in environmental awareness worldwide, the oil industry in Kenya and its affiliates have taken tangible steps to enhance alertness and implement emergency response plans. A National Oil Pollution Committee was formed in 1989 and charged with (1) assessing the existing capability of the industry to cope with oil spills, and (2) defining the maximum credible incident that the industry can handle, including establishing stock levels of equipment and chemicals, setting up plans, and organization and development of regular practice drills.
Since the oil industry in Kenya cannot provide resources capable of responding to, and effectively controlling all emergencies which might occur, the National Oil Pollution Committee includes representatives of two government corporations, Kenya Ports Authority and Kenya Pipeline Company, and the four government ministries of Transport and Communications, Energy, Tourism and Wildlife, and Environment and Natural Resources. The Kenya Ports Authority has been appointed as the oil spill coordinator responsible for manpower, storage and maintenance of the equipment stockpile, and equipment employment in case of an oil spill.
Analysis of Oil Recovery Vessels used Worldwide
Authors: Kerambrun Loïc , Peigné Georges 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
Before considering any possibility of increasing her capacity to combat an oil spill offshore, the French Navy asked CEDRE to inventory the different types of vessels used worldwide, and more especially in Europe, to recover oil spilled offshore. Two types of ships can be differentiated:those which were specifically conceived for recovering oil,and those which have been adapted or used for this mission.In the last case, we can also make a distinction between vessels which are only, or mainly, used for antipollution combat and those which are normally used for commercial activities, e.g., dredgers or coastal tankers.Except for Germany, the only country to have ships that were specifically conceived for recovering oil offshore, most countries make use of dredgers or supply vessels. Storage capacities for recovered oil are generally between 500 and 1,000 m3, except for dredgers which may have storage capacities of 6,000 m3 and even more. The oil recovery devices associated to these vessels generally combine oil containment and recovery and are deployed alongside. Most of them are mechanical weir skimmers and use high-capacity transfer pumps.Taking into account the conditions of intervention off the French coastline, the comparison of the different solutions pointed out numerous advantages of supply vessels having large storage capacity inboard, even if improvements are still needed to increase the capacity of controlling a large oil spill with bad sea conditions.
The Exxon Valdez 1989 Wildlife Rescue and Rehabilitation Program
Authors: Monahan Thomas P. , Maki Alan W. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
During 1989 the Exxon-operated bird and sea otter rehabilitation program was the largest and most comprehensive effort of its kind ever attempted. In total, eight centers were established, with three for otters, four for birds, and one for raptors. In total, over 140 boats and five aircraft were dedicated to this operation. Costs directly associated wth this effort were approximately $45 million. This paper describes the types of facilities used to treat these animals, the expertise of the people staffing these centers, and the techniques developed. Also discussed are the relative bird and otter release rates and some of the key findings and lessons from this program.
Volunteers at Oil Spill Cleanups: Guidance for On-Scene Coordinator1
Authors: Spears Ray E. , Helton Suzanne E. , Pease Anita L. , Wendel Thearin R. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
Contamination of waters, beaches, shorelines, and wildlife after oil spills is the subject of increasing public concern, especially in the wake of recent large spills receiving extensive media attention. In many areas, members of local communities have demonstrated their concern by arriving at the sites of oil spills and volunteering to participate in efforts to clean up affected areas. The volunteers often arrive in large numbers and are usually untrained in the mechanisms of oil spill response and cleanup.
The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) specifies that a designated federal on-scene coordinator (OSC) coordinate and direct federal activities at the site of certain response and removal actions, including the way in which volunteers will be used. What is crucial to OSCs is distinguishing between those people who fall under the legal concept of “volunteer” and those who are offering to provide gratuitous services. Accepting voluntary services, as opposed to gratuitous services, presents a dilemma in the form of liability to both the government and OSC.
This discussion focuses on statutory requirements that OSCs must follow at the site of an oil cleanup, the difference between “volunteer” and “gratuitous” service, and liability when accepting these services. The NCP specifies that OSCs identify ways in which volunteers be used, and recent oil spill cleanup efforts in three states provide examples of the way in which gratuitous service workers can be used to make significant contributions.
Shoreline Evaluation Methods Developed During the Nestucca Response in British Columbia
Authors: Owens Edward H. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The oil from the Nestucca accident that reached the coasts of British Columbia washed ashore sporadically over a three-week period along the 500-km west coast of Vancouver Island. This region has a complex topography and shoreline configuration and few road or air access points. During the first week of the Canadian response, information about the location and degree of oiling was often incomplete and sketchy. An interagency shoreline evaluation team was established to locate stranded oil and investigate oil sightings. This team involved a representative of the on-scene coordinator (the Canadian Coast Guard), Environment Canada, and the local Native Council. A second team was established later to survey the northwest coast of Vancouver Island. These helicopter-supported evaluation teams were supplemented by a ground surveillance team that surveyed the coasts adjacent to the towns of Tofino and Ucluelet. Standard reporting and a set of oil character and oil cover definitions were introduced to provide a consistent information base from which response decisions could be developed.
Trends in Natural Removal of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill in Prince William Sound from September 1989 to May 1990
Authors: Michel Jacqueline , Hayes Miles O. , Sexton Walter J. , Gibeaut James C. , Henry Charles 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
As part of NOAA's scientific support of the federal on-scene coordinator, a program was conducted to monitor the changes in the distribution and character of oil spilled by the Exxon Valdez along the various shoreline types of Prince William Sound between September 1989 (when treatment was terminated) and May 1990 (when treatment was to be resumed). The primary objective of the program was to determine the extent of natural removal over the winter and identify the types of treatment problems to be addressed in 1990. Eighteen stations were established in Prince William Sound, including four set-aside sites, where no treatment was conducted. At monthly intervals, the stations were surveyed for changes in the topographic profile, sediment distribution patterns, surface oil coverage, and the concentration and distribution of subsurface oil. Weatherstations were installed at three locations in Prince William Sound to record localized patterns in wind speed and direction for correlation with shoreline changes.
Natural processes during the storm season removed up to 90 percent of the surface oil from exposed and intermittently-exposed shorelines. Even sheltered shorelines showed up to 50 percent surface oil removal. Subsurface oil, the deepest of which occurred on exposed cobble/boulder beaches, was removed by sediment reworking of the top 20 cm on most beaches and deeper at the high-tide berm. However, oil below these depths showed an average 40 percent reduction for the period September 1989 to March 1990. The persistence of this subsurface oil continued to be a major issue during the 1990 treatment activities.
The Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committee: A Cooperative Approach to Shoreline Cleanup—the Exxon Valdez Spill
Authors: Knorr John R. , Lethcoe Nancy , Teal Andy , Christopherson Sharon , Whitney John 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
Following the spill of 11 million gallons of North Slope crude oil by the Exxon Valdez in Alaska on March 24, 1989, a major cooperative effort to plan for the cleanup of Prince William Sound and the Gulf of Alaska shorelines was undertaken in Valdez, Alaska. All aspects of the spill response—the lightering of oil remaining on the stricken tanker, the containment of free-floating oil, and the unknown miles of remote shoreline to be cleaned up—were much larger than anything in American experience. The event provided unprecedented organizational challenges in shoreline cleanup planning and execution.
The scope of the shoreline cleanup and the extended cleanup time anticipated, due to geography, weather, logistics, and other factors, required an organization not specifically identified in the National Contingency Plan or the Alaska regional contingency plan. The Interagency Shoreline Cleanup Committee—an interdisciplinary, interagency cleanup planning group—evolved in Valdez concurrently with the larger response organization implemented under existing contingency plans. As a day-to-day working group serving the needs of the federal on-scene coordinator, it included Exxon, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, federal and state land and resource management agencies, Alaska natives, and commercial fishing and environmental groups. The planning model that evolved was refined and streamlined in early 1990 and carried through the remaining cleanup seasons.
Contingency Planning: Implementation Is The Key
Authors: Hollingsworth Wayne 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The two basic components of oil spill contingency planning are developing the plan and implementing the plan. An organization with an effective oil spill contingency plan will have considered both components.
Armed with thick oil spill contingency plans, companies expect to be able to respond adequately to major oil spills. For several reasons, this expectation may be unrealistic. For example, the plans may incorporate inadequate appraisals of available response assets, they may have been developed merely to satisfy regulatory requirements, or they may fail to consider various spill scenarios. Plans based on unattainable or unrealistic expectations end up on the shelf collecting dust. Thus, one of the first things to consider in contingency planning is what the plan will be expected to do.
Another factor in the effectiveness of a contingency plan is its format. Oil spill contingency plans that are comprehensive and easy to use are essential. It is useful to divide the plan into three major sections: response procedures, background information, and scenario development. The response procedures section should be relatively short and contain step-by-step procedures to be followed during a spill response. The background information section should contain the background information accumulated during the planning period. The scenario development section should contain the scenarios identified for various spill sizes.
An excellent contingency plan is of limited value if it is not effectively implemented. Effective implementation requires that everyone in the response and planning organization know the company's ideas, policies, and strategies regarding oil spill response, understands his or her roles and responsibilities in preparing for and carrying out a response, and is committed to carrying out the program. Implementation is often difficult because it involves changing the organization's way of doing things. When the way an organization does business does not match a new program being implemented, leadership is required to match them, either by changing the way of doing business or by changing the program. Changing a new program could be as simple as making a decision. Changing the way an organization does business is a process and is usually very difficult, especially in a large, complex organization like an oil company.
Fate of Oil and Debris Recovered from Spill Cleanup Operations
Authors: McKinley Audrey A. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
Although we consider a pollution case closed when the product is sufficiently removed from the environment, the case is far from closed for the on-scene coordinator, project manager, or contractor who must dispose of or otherwise deal with the material. Landfill regulations are tightening, and a barrel of petroleum-contaminated soil can no longer be easily disposed of at the local sanitary landfill.1 This paper addresses the current issues, regulations and problems of petroleum spill cleanup material disposal, and talks about what industry is doing to deal with regulatory requirements, especially in relation to the solid waste crisis facing this country. Innovative, practical, and environmentally sound methods of remediation and disposal are emphasized, and future expectations and technology are explored.
Overview of Bird Search and Rescue and Response Efforts During the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill
Authors: Holcomb Jay 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The Exxon Valdez oil spill presented the International Bird Rescue Research Center with a variety of unique and unprecedented challenges. One was the development and management of two search and rescue programs: one in Prince William Sound, with the home base being Valdez, and the other along the Kenai Peninsula, with Seward as home base. Local fishing boats, float planes, and personnel were organized to create two functional search and rescue fleets that combed about 900 miles of coastline in search of live oiled birds and oiled carcasses. This effort resulted in the capture of 1,630 live oiled birds and the recovery of thousands of dead oiled birds and mammals.
During most oil spills only one oiled bird rehabilitation center is needed to care for all the affected birds. Strong currents began moving oil out of Prince William Sound and north along the Alaskan coastline. At the same time, public pressure to save the victims of the spill increased. It became evident that animal care services in even the most remote areas needed to be developed. Four oiled bird care centers and four search and rescue programs were strategically located near the most heavily affected areas to care for live oiled animals.
This paper focuses on how both of the oiled bird search and rescue programs were created and functioned throughout the six-month-long oiled bird rescue and rehabilitation effort. It emphasizes the chronology of planning and decision-making processes during this crisis. Further discussion highlights how the search and rescue fleets coordinated their efforts with the rehabilitation centers for the greatest effectiveness. The paper also discusses the capture and safety techniques used during the actual pursuit of animals and the initial care and transportation of captured birds.
Major Oil Spills Caused by Hurricane Hugo, St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands1
Authors: Bills Charles E. , Whiting Daniel C. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
The destruction caused by Hurricane Hugo in September 1989 resulted in two major oil spills on the island of St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. Roughly 10,000 barrels of oil were discharged from damaged storage tanks at the Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation (HOVIC), and 14,000 barrels of oil were discharged from the Virgin Islands Water and Power Authority (VIWAPA) facility in Christiansted. Pollution responders overcame the lack of power, water, food, lodging, communications, and transportation to perform an effective cleanup of these spills. This paper presents details of the pollution response effort as coordinated by the federal on-scene coordinator.
Preparation of Marine Pollution Contingency Plans for Small Island Nations
Authors: Brodie Donald 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
Many small and remote nations of the South Pacific depend primarily on subsistence fisheries for their livelihoods. The foreshores of many of these nations are fringed by coral reefs, on which very active marine ecological systems depend. Oil spills in these areas would have a serious effect both on these systems and on the islands’ economic activities.
As part of the International Maritime Organization technical assistance program for Pacific Island nations, the Australian government has carried out a number of missions to develop marine pollution contingency plans. This paper discusses the essential issues for these plans, which are often based on an assumption of low risk, but need to recognize the severe effect that a pollution incident would have on the community and the environment. The linking of national plans with effective regional assistance arrangements is also discussed.
Response to the Presidente Rivera Major Oil Spill, Delaware River1
Authors: Wiltshire Glenn A. , Corcoran Lewis 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
On June 24, 1989, the Uruguayan tankship Presidente Rivera grounded in the Delaware River south of Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania. The grounding resulted in the discharge of over 300,000 gallons of “high pour” No. 6 oil into the river. This paper discusses the actions taken by the various involved parties to respond to the spill and to remove the oil from the river and its shorelines. Cleanup operations were especially difficult because of the tar-like consistency of the oil, the nonavailability of appropriate containment and recovery equipment, and the accessibility and environmental sensitivity of areas affected by the oil. Nontraditional methods, including clamshell bucket dredges and hopper barges, had to be used to contain and remove the oil from the water. The paper also addresses some of the political issues faced by the federal on-scene coordinator during this response and cleanup.
The Mega Borg Fire and Oil Spill: A Case Study
Authors: Leveille Thomas P. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
On June 8, 1990, an explosion and fire disabled the tankship Mega Borg during lightering 57 miles off the Texas coast in the Gulf of Mexico. The Mega Borg drifted, leaking burning oil, for several days before the fire could be extinguished and the vessel taken in tow. The ensuing response brought into action more than 50 commercial vessels and two Coast Guard cutters, with more than a dozen skimmers. A variety of aircraft were also used, including the Coast Guard's AirEye side-looking airborne radar system, helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft for visual surveillance, and C-130 transports equipped to apply dispersants. Good weather and the accident's distance from shore prevented all but a small amount of oil from coming ashore. Communications problems arose throughout the response, which had to rely largely on cellular telephones for lack of standardized radio frequencies. Media relations for this serious accident were a major organizational challenge.
Coast Guard Response to the Volgoneft 263 Oil Spill
Authors: Fagoe Thomas E. 
Published: January 2013

ABSTRACT
On the morning of May 14, 1990, a collision occurred between the Soviet tanker Volgonef 1263 and the West German dry cargo ship Betty off the south coast of Sweden. One Coast Guard air surveillance aircraft and one oil spill recovery ship arrived at the site less than two hours after the collision.
The Coast Guard considered the threat to the marine environment to be serious and therefore ordered not only the most effective Swedish oil spill recovery resources to the place, but also requested assistance from U.S.S.R., F.R.G., Denmark, and Finland.
After less than 48 hours, 26 Coast Guard, Naval, and foreign ships were fighting the spill. The operation lasted for 13 days and practically all the oil was recovered before it reached shore. The operation showed that using modern oil spill recovery equipment it is possible to recover practically all the oil at sea and also showed that international cooperation can be quick and efficient, if, as in this case, an agreement of cooperation has already been reached.