bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Lack of association between a functional variant of the BRCA-1 related associated protein (BRAP) gene and ischemic stroke
Authors: Liao Yi-Chu , Lin Hsiu-Fen , Guo Yuh-Cherng , Chen Chung-Hung , Huang Zhi-Zhang , Juo Suh-Hang Hank , Lin Ruey-Tay 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Background
Atherosclerosis shares common pathogenic features with myocardial infarction (MI) and ischemic stroke. BRCA-1 associated protein (BRAP), a newly identified risk gene for MI, aggravates the inflammatory response in atherosclerosis. The aim of this study was to test the association between the BRAP gene and stroke in a Taiwanese population.

Methods
A total of 1,074 stroke patients and 1,936 controls were genotyped for the functional SNP rs11066001. In our previous studies, the rare allele of this SNP has been repeatedly shown to exert a recessive effect. Therefore, in the current study, we tested for the same recessive model. First, the genotype distributions between all the controls and all the stroke cases were compared. Then to reduce heterogeneity, we explored several population subsets by selecting young stroke subjects (using 45 years of age as the cutoff point), age- and sex-comparable controls, plaque-free controls, and stroke subtypes.

Results
We did not find any significant association for the entire data set (OR = 0.94, p = 0.74) or for the subset analyses using age- and sex-comparable controls (p = 0.70) and plaque-free controls (p = 0.91). Analyses of the four stroke subtypes also failed to show any significant associations (p = 0.42 – 0.98). For both young and old subjects, the GG genotype of rs11066001 was similar in the stroke cases and unmatched controls (8.1% vs. 9.4% in young subjects and 8.0% vs. 7.8% in old subjects). Comparing stroke cases with plaque-free controls also failed to find any significant association.

Conclusions
The BRAP polymorphism may not play an important role in ischemic stroke in the studied population.
Modeling of TED Point Defect Paramater Extraction
Authors: Meyer Heidi , Dunham Scott T. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe work investigates simple transient enhanced diffusion (TED) behavior, which is a reflection of the interstitial behavior in the system. The analysis shows that TED depends mainly on two factors: the intial demage profiles and the DICI product. We find that, based on these two inputs, the extent of TED can be accurately diffusion capacity (DICI) which is compared to values previously extracted from diffcusion and silicon self-diffusion experiments.
Corporate Social Responsibility
Authors: Gibson Kevin 
Published: January 2013

AbstractCorporate social responsibility (CSR) is a broad term that suggests that business has duties beyond profitability. These might include philanthropy, socially progressive hiring and promotion schemes, community involvement, regard for the environment, and concern for future generations through sustainable practice. It is often contrasted to the notion that the sole aim for a private company is to maximize economic efficiency that will provide the greatest returns to shareholders. The term is also used to denote self‐regulation by business. CSR activities may be motivated by business leading the market by taking initiatives, or in response to stakeholder interests (seeAffirmative Action; Business Ethics; Environmental Ethics).
Humor, Ethics of
Authors: Benatar David 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

In spite of – or perhaps because of – the fact that humor can be so enjoyable, it has the capacity to cause significant offense (
see
Offense). Indeed one disagreement about humor ethics is whether typical moral breaches in this area are as serious as would be suggested by the outrage they often cause. Some take the view that humor is a trivial matter and that, even when it is errant, it is relatively harmless. Others take (purported) breaches of humor ethics much more seriously.
Psychopharmacology
Authors: Liao S. Matthew 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIndividuals have long been able to take caffeine, amphetamines, barbiturates, and other psychopharmaceuticals to alter their moods and emotions. In recent years, a number of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) such as Prozac have also been prescribed to individuals – with or without severe depression – to help them feel “better” (Kramer 1993). Advances in neurotechnologies and genetic engineering may lead to the development of “neuroceuticals” – neuromodulators that target multiple subreceptors in specific brain neural circuits – and “geneceuticals” that modify the genetic basis of our emotional capacities (seeBiotechnology). With these advances, we may be able to produce effects similar to those of current pharmaceuticals with greater efficiency and fewer side effects. As the possibilities and demand for mood enhancements increase, it is important to consider why mood enhancements might be desirable and to explore some key ethical issues they raise (seeBioethics; Euroethics).
Nihilism
Authors: Joyce Richard 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

“Nihilism” (from the Latin word
nihil
, meaning “nothing”) is not a well‐defined term. One can be a nihilist about just about anything: a philosopher who does not believe in the existence of knowledge, for example, might be called an “epistemological nihilist”; an atheist might be called a “religious nihilist.” In the vicinity of ethics, one should take care to distinguish moral nihilism from political nihilism and existential nihilism. These last two will be briefly discussed in the following text, only with the aim of clarifying our topic: moral nihilism.
Queerness, Argument from
Authors: Lillehammer Hallvard 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe so‐called “argument from queerness” is one of two arguments against the existence of objective values put forward by J. L. Mackie in hisEthics: Inventing Right and Wrong(1977), the other being his “argument from relativity” (seeMackie, J. L.; Disagreement, Moral). By the term “objective value,” Mackie primarily means moral goodness, rightness and wrongness, and duties and obligations, but he also takes his argument to affect certain nonmoral values (1977: 15). In a nutshell, his argument goes as follows: If there were objective values, they would be things of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe. Yet, we have no philosophically satisfying account of either the existence of such things or of how we could come to know about them. Therefore, we should not believe in objective values.
Cohen, Hermann
Authors: Dietrich Wendell 
Published: January 2013

AbstractHermann Cohen (1842–1918), a German philosopher, was the principal figure in the Marburg school of Neo‐Kantianism (seeKant, Immanue). His significance as an ethicist will, after an enumeration of his principal works, be spelled out in four sections: Cohen's construction of the moral self; social and political theory with special attention to the theme of social progress; arguments erupting during the period of World War I about the relation ofDeutschtum(Germanness) andJudentum(Judaism); a proposed present‐day redeployment of Cohen's position in recent discussions about Judaic ethical monotheism and intolerance.
Rancière, Jacques
Authors: May Todd 
Published: January 2013

AbstractAt first glance, it would seem unusual to include an article on Jacques Rancière in an encyclopedia dedicated to work in ethics. Rancière has written no books with the termethicsin the title, nor has he written any articles on the issue. He has no reflections that would be broadly categorized as ethical in the traditional sense. His work has been concerned with labor history, political reflections, and, more recently, aesthetic theory and art history.
Engineering Ethics
Authors: Pritchard Michael S. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractWhat isengineering? No doubt it is easier to present examples that involve engineering of one sort or another than it is to define what engineering is. (A version of “I know it when I see it.”) The same is true ofethics, and the combination,engineering ethics. To illustrate some of the difficulties, consider a definition of engineering attributed to the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET):
Genetically Modified Organisms
Authors: Lamont Julian , Lacey Justine 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

A genetically modified organism (GMO) is an organism whose genetic characteristics have been changed through the insertion of a modified gene or of a gene from another organism, or through the elimination of a gene. These genetic engineering techniques, also known as “recombinant DNA [deoxyribonucleic acid] technology,” aim to introduce a new property into an existing organism's genome for some human purpose (
see
Biotechnology). The genes inserted to create GMOs may include modified gene sequences from within the same species or from sexually compatible species (intragenic GMOs), or they may be sourced from distinct species (transgenic GMOs). Some examples of GMOs include transgenic microbes used to produce insulin for treatment of diabetes, transgenic plants created in order to resist pests or to provide greater nutritional value, and genetically modified viruses that deliver disease‐curing genes into human cells. Genetic engineering has also produced transgenic fish with growth‐enhancing properties, and even ornamental transgenic fish with fluorescent color.
Secession
Authors: Moore Margaret 
Published: January 2013

AbstractSecession is the removal of part of the state and the territory from an existing state. Secession usually occurs along administrative boundaries, and is common when the administrative unit is culturally or linguistically distinct from other parts of the state (McGarry and O'Leary 1993). It is different from partition, because partition typically involves a “fresh cut” and is imposed by an external actor, such as Britain in Ireland and in India (O'Leary 2004).
Feminist Ethics
Authors: Clement Grace 
Published: January 2013

AbstractEmerging as an identified area of academic philosophy in the 1980s, feminist ethics begins with the assertion that there is a masculine bias in traditional ethics and then goes on to rethink ethics and correct that bias. Feminist ethicists have shown that the bulk of the Western philosophical tradition of ethical thinking has a masculine bias in the sense that it focuses on and prioritizes the experiences and values of men over those of women. This tradition is, in general, biased not only against women but against the concerns, activities, and ways of thinking associated with women. This bias is more often evident through a lack of attention to certain interests and experiences than through explicit denigration of them. Feminist ethicists seek to reformulate ethics in ways that regard women and women's experiences and values as equally worthy of respect as men and men's experiences and values. They therefore often seek to demonstrate the moral significance of areas of human experience that have generally been excluded from the realm of moral significance in traditional ethics. For instance, feminist ethics often concerns itself with the so‐called “private” realm of family and personal relations, care for children and other dependents, and emotion and bodily experience, all areas of life which have been regarded as “feminine” and none of which fits comfortably into traditional moral frameworks.
Reparations
Authors: Valls Andrew 
Published: January 2013

AbstractHistory, both recent and more remote, is replete with injustice, cruelty, and violations of individuals' basic rights. The issue of reparations is what ought to be done to address those violations and their aftermath, with particular attention to how the victim should be compensated or otherwise “made whole.” Reparations also concern social trust and political legitimacy. In the wake of mass violence, or war, or other systematic violations of human rights, social relations – especially between groups associated with victims and perpetrators – and the legitimacy of the political regime associated with the abuses, are often at a low ebb. Reparations include the means by which a society attempts to overcome the violence and abuses of the past, and to lay the foundation for a more just social and political order.
Same‐Sex Marriage
Authors: Corvino John 
Published: January 2013

AbstractSame‐sex marriage, like heterosexual marriage, can be understood at a variety of levels: as a personal commitment between partners, as the social acknowledgment of that commitment, as a formal legal status, as a religious sacrament, and so on. While the different levels are related, they may vary independently: for instance, it is possible for a marriage to be recognized by a state but not a church, or vice versa.
Exploitation
Authors: Holmstrom Nancy 
Published: January 2013

AbstractOnly people exploit. What they exploit and under what conditions determine whether or not it is morally wrong. The verb “exploit” and the noun “exploitation” have broader meanings in English than in some other languages. Thus in English (or French) we can speak of someone exploiting an opportunity or natural resources, which usually conveys no negative moral connotation, but we can also speak of exploiting people (or their labor or bodies), and then it does. In German, however, different words would be used for these kinds of cases; the term for “utilize” would be used for the former. The focus here will be on the interpersonal use of the term because of its (almost) invariable moral import.
Bloch, Ernst
Authors: Geoghegan Vincent 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

The German philosopher and social critic Ernst Bloch (1885–1977) held chairs in philosophy at the universities of Leipzig (1949–61) and Tübingen (1961–77). Before this, after studying in Munich, Würzberg, Berlin, and Heidelberg, he had begun a wandering life as a freelance intellectual and journalist, publishing a number of books in which he began to lay the basis for his later philosophical system. With Hitler's accession to power in 1933, Bloch, as a Marxist and a Jew, went into exile, first in Central Europe and France, and then in the United States (1938–49). He first came to prominence with his 1918 book
The Spirit of Utopia
. Its title proclaimed the central theme of his life's work: the development of a positive and greatly expanded concept of the “utopian,” grounded in the category of hope. In what many consider his greatest work,
The Principle of Hope
(written between 1938 and 1947), he provided, in three volumes, an encyclopedic account of the many manifestations of hope in history and contemporary life, from simple daydreams to complex visions of perfection. Unsurprisingly, in this exploration of the better and the best, his works return time and again to the subject matter of ethics, and in 1961 he produced his most sustained discussion of ethical traditions in
Natural Law and Human Dignity
. As a Marxist, however, he had to do all of this in a tradition of thought that tended to use the word “utopian” as a term of abuse, and which was famously inhospitable to the use of moral critique and exhortation. The result was a distinctly unorthodox Marxism, one possessed of a richness and vigor that has continued to speak to readers far beyond that tradition.
Minimalism about Truth, Ethics and
Authors: Miller Alexander 
Published: January 2013

AbstractIssues concerning minimalism about truth are relevant to important matters in metaethics (seeMetaethics): specifically, to questions about the plausibility of expressivist (or non‐cognitivist) accounts of moral judgment (seeNon‐Cognitivism). Historically, expressivists and non‐cognitivists rely on minimalist views of truth to respond to certain criticisms of their view. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that minimalism about truth actuallyunderminesexpressivism and non‐cognitivism. In this essay, after brief introductions to ethical expressivism and minimalism about truth, we distinguish between minimalism about truth and minimalism abouttruth‐aptitude, and explain why it is the latter that is crucial to expressivism's plausibility. We then explain why some philosophers have claimed that minimalism about truth‐aptitude undermines expressivism, while others have claimed that ethical expressivism can wholeheartedly embrace minimalism about truth‐aptitude (seeTruth in Ethics).
Blame
Authors: Smith Angela M. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractBlame – for better or worse – is a pervasive feature of our moral experience. In both moral and nonmoral contexts, we are often concerned to determine who or what is the appropriate target of blame, and most of us will go to great lengths to avoid being seen as such a target. Yet it is surprisingly difficult to say what, exactly, blame is (Sher 2006: vi; Scanlon 2008: 122). While some regard blame as simply a negative (moral) evaluation, others insist that blame involves additional emotional and/or behavioral responses that go beyond such cognitive assessments. My aim in this essay is to survey some of the most prominent philosophical accounts of the nature of blame, and to explain how blame is connected to several other important philosophical concepts, including moral agency (seeMoral Agency), responsibility (seeResponsibility), and free will (seeFree Will).
Universalizability
Authors: Adler and Jonathan E. , Gowans Christopher W. 
Published: January 2013

AbstractA judgment isuniversalizableonly if the reasons for it do not depend on the individuals referred to in that judgment ineliminably. If someone judges that Joe is musically gifted because he was accepted at the Julliard School, that judgment is universalizable only if it commits the agent to the claim that, under normal conditions, any music student who is accepted at Julliard is gifted. Universalizability implies that it is the generic qualities of the individual that justifies the judgment, rather than singular qualities (ones that refer to that individual essentially).
Ewing, A. C.
Authors: Olson Jonas , Timmons Mark 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

A. C. Ewing (1899–1973) came last in the tradition of British moral philosophers that began with Henry Sidgwick and continued with H. A. Prichard, G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, and C. D. Broad. Philosophers in this tradition shared a nonnaturalist realist view of moral metaphysics and the nature of moral judgment, but they differed on the relations between normative concepts and on normative ethics. Ewing made substantial contributions to these controversies and anticipated several moves in the contemporary debates as he sought to reconcile putatively incompatible views. Attempts to find conciliatory “middle ways” are a recurring theme in Ewing's work. This essay focuses on three main topics: moral metaphysics and the nature of moral judgment, the relation between
intrinsic goodness
and
ought
, and utilitarianism and Rossian deontology. Finally, it describes briefly Ewing's work in other areas of moral philosophy.
Nuclear Weapons
Authors: Lee Steven P. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Nuclear weapons are the most destructive military technology ever developed. The original atomic bomb of 1945 was about a thousand times as powerful as the largest existing conventional weapon, and the hydrogen or thermonuclear bomb, developed eight years later, was about a thousand times more powerful than the 1945 bomb (
see
Weapons Research and Development). Within the short space of less than ten years, the amount of destructive power in human hands increased a million‐fold, an augmentation by six orders of magnitude.
Price, Richard
Authors: Louden Robert B. 
Published: January 2013

Abstract

Richard Price (1723–91) was a Welsh dissenting (i.e., non‐Anglican) minister who made major contributions not only to ethics but also to theology, political thought, national finance, probability theory, and actuarial science. His main work in moral philosophy (the focus of this essay and also his first publication) is
A Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals
(1758; 2nd ed. 1769). In the third edition (1787), normally referred to in contemporary discussion of Price, the title was shortened to
A Review of the Principal Questions of Morals
. Also important for Price's ethics is a set of letters that he co‐published with his friend Joseph Priestley in 1778 entitled
A Free Discussion of the Doctrines of Materialism and Philosophical Necessity
. Here Price extends the analyses of liberty of will and self‐determination defended earlier in the
Review
(
see
free will
).
Nietzsche, Friedrich
Authors: Reginster Bernard 
Published: January 2013

AbstractThe importance of the philosophy of Nietzsche (1844–1900) in the history of ethics is no longer in dispute, but the nature of this importance very much is. It is commonly believed to lie in his sharp critique of the authority of morality. Moral values are assumed to have two kinds of authority – they areuniversalandoverriding– and Nietzsche challenges both. Moreover, this critique of morality also assigns a controversial role topsychology, particularly inOn the Genealogy of Morality(1887), which is widely considered his most important work on the subject. Although this common view certainly captures an important strain of Nietzsche's ethical thought, it also overlooks another which is arguably of equal importance, namely his development of a distinctive new conception of happiness as an alternative to the traditional, and in his view unrealistic, conception of it in terms offulfillment. I shall accordingly divide this essay in two main sections: I shall devote the first section to Nietzsche's critique of morality and attempt to elucidate the role of psychology in it, and I shall focus on his new conception of happiness in the second section.
Needs
Authors: Brock Gillian , Hassoun Nicole 
Published: January 2013

AbstractMoral and political discourse frequently appeals to matters of need. Indeed, we often think claims made in virtue of need deserve a certain weight, more so than many claims grounded in wants, desires, or preferences. What are needs? Do needs have some special moral force? How are they related to other key concepts or aspects of well‐being? What role do needs play in social and political philosophy, or policy more generally? This essay addresses these questions. The next section considers the concept of needs, why needs often have a certain normative force, and some of the most influential accounts in the literature. The section following focuses on the role of needs in normative theory and public policy. The final section concludes.
Fictionalism, Moral
Authors: Mabrito Robert 
Published: January 2013

AbstractMoral fictionalism is the view that, when we discuss and think about morality, what we are doing (or, on some versions, what we should be doing, even if we are not currently doing it) is roughly what we are doing when we tell stories or we pretend. As a view concerning the status of moral talk and thought, moral fictionalism belongs to metaethics. There has been a growth of interest in fictionalism, and fictionalist accounts of numerous areas have been proposed. (Kalderon 2005a collects articles discussing several of them.) Recent discussions of moral fictionalism – by Joyce (2001), Kalderon (2005b), and Nolan et al. (2005) – are part of this trend. A key distinction is between those versions of moral fictionalism that offer fictionalism as a description of our moral talk and thought as it is now and those versions that deny that fictionalism accurately describes our current practices but argue that there is good reason to revise our practices along fictionalist lines. The descriptive version of the theory is usually called hermeneutic moral fictionalism, and the revisionary version revolutionary moral fictionalism. This essay divides into three sections: a brief description of moral fictionalism and its relationship to other metaethical positions; a discussion of arguments for hermeneutic moral fictionalism; and a discussion of arguments for revolutionary moral fictionalism.