bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Prospects for Contemporary Partisan Realignment
Authors: Brady David W. , Hurley Patricia A. 
Published: September 2013

With the exception of 1976, all national elections since 1964 have generated commentary among both media analysts and political scientists about the possibility of realignment. Reports have varied from the straightforward—yes or no—to the contrived—realignment has been realized at the presidential but not the congressional level. In this essay, we outline our view of those factors that are necessary for a realignment, and we evaluate the 1984 elections with respect to those factors. Our focus in this analysis is on the tripartite structure of American party systems: party in the electorate, party in government, and party as organization. In addition, we discuss the policy consequences associated with realignments.Theories of RealignmentsSchlesinger (1984: 371) reminds us that “[the parts of parties] are treated as though each leads a life of its own with little attention to what if anything holds them together.” This admonition also holds for students of realignments. One school of thought, centering around the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, focuses attention on party in the electorate. In this view, a realigning election is one in which the normal party vote shifts from one party to another, and because of the influence of individual partisan identification on electoral outcome, this new majority party dominates elections for a generation or more. This emphasis on the distribution of party identification in the electorate is beneficial in that it gives us an operational definition of realignment and allows us to assess both critical and secular (gradual) realignments.
Political Science and the Corporation
Authors: Menninger David 
Published: September 2013

In 1977, Charles Lindblom concluded his study ofPolitics and Marketswith the assertion that “the large private corporation fits oddly into democratic theory and vision. Indeed, it does not fit.” In 1983, Robert Reich envisionedThe Next American Frontieras the eradication of the distinction between business culture and civic culture in the United States and the full integration of the corporation into the country's key political and social processes. Failure to achieve such a new political-economic compact could mean, Reich asserted, the end of democracy's progress in America. Between Lindblom and Reich lie six short years in time and one vast gulf in political theory and policy perspective. Their positions set the framework for a whole series of political choices confronting American politics today. They also set an agenda for political science as a discipline that studies power, authority, and social change—an agenda calling for an expansion of both intellectual focus and analytical paradigms.Differences between the purposes and contents of Lindblom's and Reich's studies can be cited, of course.Politics and Marketspresents itself as a scholarly work in the theory of political economy, whereasThe Next American Frontierhas a definite prescriptive flavor designed to influence current political debate. But such differences do not obscure the important element shared by the two books: recognition of the power and position of large corporations as the determining factor in the political-economic future of liberal democracy. Generated from this are several critical questions both authors confront: What is the purpose of public power and that of private economic power in advanced industrial societies today? What should be the relationship between the two as regards the preservation of liberal democracy? Whatisthat relationship when the large corporation is taken into account? What redirection of corporate power is necessary or possible? What blending of corporate institutions and political institutions does liberal democracy allow—or demand?
Excerpts from First Declaration of Bernard Grofman in Badham v. Eu
Authors: Grofman Bernard 
Published: September 2013

1. I am a professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine.… I am thoroughly familiar with the congressional districts delineated in Assembly Bill 2X as implemented with the so-called March 17, Technical Changes. The congressional districts of A.B. 2X (Plan II, passed in 1983) as implemented constitute an egregious form of partisan gerrymandering.Methods of GerrymanderingGerrymandering is a technique which operates to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population by one or more of the following twelve methods:(1) Packing the voting strength of a group to insure that much of its voting strength is wasted in districts which are won by lop-sided margins—in particular, packing its strength to a greater extent than is true for the voting strength of the group controlling the district.(2) Fragmenting or submerging the voting strength of a group to create districts in which that group will constitute a permanent (or near certain) minority.(3) Reducing the re-election likelihood of some of a group's representatives by altering district boundaries to put two or more representatives from the group into the same district.(4) Reducing the re-election likelihood of some of a group's representatives by altering district boundaries to cut-up old districts so as to make it impossible for these representatives to continue to represent the bulk of their former constituents.
Excerpts from Declaration of Gordon E. Baker in Badham v. Eu
Authors: Baker Gordon E. 
Published: September 2013

Gerrymandering—the intentional manipulation of legislative boundaries for political advantage—is a venerable practice. Why, then, some might wonder, should we pay greater attention to it at this time? In particular, should judicial inquiry into constitutional issues of fair representation, intense for some two decades, now turn to what may well seem to comprise the heart of the “political thicket”? Throughout this period of reapportionment litigation, federal courts have alluded to the problem, with increasing concern shown by members of the Supreme Court of the United States, about its importance (e.g.,Karcher v. Daggett, 103 S. Ct. 2653: 1983). Is the time ripe for a direct judicial examination of the gerrymander on constitutional grounds? And, if so, does California comprise an appropriate test case?Prerequisite to answering such questions are: (1) an understanding of how and why gerrymandering, in magnitude, extent, and impact, has become an essentially new kind of issue rather than a mere extension of a traditional practice; and (2) a need to develop judicially manageable standards of identifying gerrymanders.Prior to the reapportionment revolution of the 1960s, there existed a variety of constraints that conditioned boundary manipulation. For one thing, a large number of states simply failed to redistrict for several decades, the situation that triggeredBaker v. Can(369 U.S. 186: 1962),Wesberry v. Sanders(376 U.S. 1: 1964),et al.This resulted in great disparities in population among districts, a form of “silent” or “status quo” gerrymander that in practice minimized periodic boundary manipulation. For example, district lines for Congress were typically redrawn only in states—usually a minority—that lost or gained seats.
Excerpts from Declaration of Bruce Cain in Badham v. Eu
Authors: Cain Bruce 
Published: September 2013

1. Bruce Cain, declare as follows: …2. Based on my study of redistricting, I believe that the attempt to define unbiased and objective standards of political fairness is futile. The reasons for this are several. First, there are many possible standards of political fairness, and political scientists do not agree as to which is best, as is demonstrated by the contradictory arguments in the declarations of Professors Grofman and Baker. Professor Baker argues for a compactness criterion while Professor Grofman disparages the use of what he terms “formal criteria” such as the shape of district lines and proposes instead a seats-votes measure. Secondly, the two standards of political fairness proposed by Grofman and Baker will prove contradictory in many circumstances, and this will force the courts to choose between them. Thirdly, the proposed standards are inconsistent with other redistricting criteria—particularly, with the court's efforts in the last decade to protect racial and ethnic minority voting strength. Finally, attempts to use fairness formulae are fundamentally flawed and impractical: they underestimate the many complex factors that determine the outcome of an election and overestimate the capacity of social scientists to predict future electoral outcomes.
Declaration of Nelson W. Polsby in Badham v. Eu
Authors: Polsby Nelson W. 
Published: September 2013

1. I offer the Court this declaration because I believe that it is helpful for the Court to consider the extent to which the reapportionment process is inescapably political and value-laden. The drawing of district boundaries requires the weighing of many different and often conflicting interests. Any result will be a political result pleasing to some and not to others. Tests that could be used by the courts to manage cases, like this one, in which a partisan group petitions the courts to impose a judicial result in a state in which one political party claims to be disadvantaged by the outcome of the political process, are not neutral but political in their outcomes, and trade-offs between and among the various tests that might be used require the exercise of political judgment.2. In the early 1960s, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the principle that members of Congress must represent districts containing equal numbers ofindividuals(regardless of whether they vote or are even eligible to vote) as measured by the United States census. The application of this standard required only that the courts determine the respective populations of districts, a readily manageable task. The plaintiffs in this case, however, are asking the Court to do something much more difficult, namely protect the interests of one of many political or socialgroups, and have suggested that there may be an ideal degree of collective “effectiveness” of votes cast by a particular group. This is an entirely different matter.
The Dual Problems of Peace and National Security
Authors: Gilpin Robert G. 
Published: September 2013

The strategic consensus that has characterized American official and popular thinking about nuclear weapons since World War II has greatly eroded in recent years. That consensus consisted not only of an American determination to use nuclear weapons to deter a direct Soviet attack on the United States but also of a commitment to extend the American deterrent to cover a Soviet nuclear or large-scale conventional attack on America's principal allies. In the face of the recent massive and continuing growth of Soviet nuclear and conventional capabilities this consensus has come under growing challenge.This challenge to the consensus on the policy of nuclear deterrence has come from both ends of the political spectrum. On the political “right,” the Reagan administration has argued that deterrence alone is too weak a reed to forestall a Soviet attack on the United States or one of its allies; the prevention of a Soviet attack requires the development of a nuclear war-fighting strategy similar to that which the Soviets themselves are presumed to possess. On the political “left,” a large and highly vocal antinuclear movement largely under the banner of the “freeze,” challenges one aspect or another of the deterrence strategy and demands a deemphasis on, if not the complete elimination of, nuclear weapons. Both of these positions, I believe, are flawed and fail to provide a satisfactory solution to the difficult situation in which the United States finds itself in the closing decades of the twentieth century.
On Political Edification, Eloquence and Memory
Authors: McWilliams Wilson Carey , Landy Marc K. 
Published: September 2013

Citizenship is notterra incognitafor political science, but it is not home ground either. Citizenship is more art than science, more practice than theory, and in the education of citizens, political science is subject to two obvious limitations.In the first place, the basic character of citizens is formed before they become students of political science and even before they are taught civics by the schools. The first principles by which they perceive the world and relate to others already have been shaped by the family, by the laws and by early education generally. In that sense, political science influences citizens most profoundly when it teaches their teachers, although in a more superficial way political science can and does instruct citizens themselves.Second, as Aristotle taught us, civic virtue is not identical with human goodness, and citizenship is a questionable excellence. The art of citizenship is specific to and limited by the regime in which the citizen is to practice it. In the ordinary sense of the term, a good citizen accepts the laws and “works within the system,” and even if we argue that citizens should pursue ends which are universal and by nature, citizenship requires them to do so inwayswhich are adapted to a particular people, place and time.
Teaching About and Educating for Citizenship
Authors: Porter Mary Cornelia , Vanning Corey 
Published: September 2013

The objective of liberal education is, surely, to help students develop the skills, capacities, perceptions, and imagination to enable them to enrich and enhance not only their own lives, but the life of the community as well. Educating for citizenship, thus broadly defined, is an endeavor shared by political scientists with colleagues in related fields, in the arts, the sciences, and the humanities. Citizenship assubject matter, however, has fallen within our purview. Put differently, as educators all of us consider, in a diffuse sort of way, the relationship between our teaching on the one hand and the polity on the other. Those of us who are political scientists must consciously concern ourselves with matters that fall under the rubric of citizenship. Notwithstanding the high purposes of the Academy as a whole, citizenship has for all practical purposes been defined in terms of the political, and political science has been charged with providing an academic experience that should inform and inspire the citizen experience. A tension, therefore, may be said to exist between political science's competency to teachaboutand its more general responsibility to educateforcitizenship. The writers here address the question of how we can best teach about citizenship, ply our trade as it were, in ways that educate for citizenship.First, it would be useful to remind ourselves how we typically teach about citizenship. That some subfields of the discipline lend themselves more readily than others to the enterprise is not at issue. Whatever the emphasis in a wide variety of courses, our students should leave our tutelages with an understanding of citizenship as a status, a cluster of activities, a concept, and a value. More tellingly, most of us would like to think that we expose our students to frames of reference and modes of analysis that encourage them to make and act upon informed, critical, and sophisticated judgments about political phenomena and public affairs.
Politics: American and Non-American
Authors: Berger Suzanne 
Published: September 2013

Tocqueville, considering how Americans compare their nation with others, observed that general ideas about politics testify to the weakness of human intelligence. “The Deity does not regard the human race collectively.… Such is, however, not the case with man. … Having superficially considered a certain number of objects, and remarked their resemblance, he assigns to them a common name, sets them apart, and proceeds onwards.”As it is for human beings, so, too, for political scientists. And of the generalizations which have helped Americans and American political scientists organize the confusing mass of differences and similarities between this country and others, none has been more important and enduring than the notion of the uniqueness of the American political community. This conception is reflected in the split within the discipline between those who study the U.S. political system and those who study comparative politics, a field understood to encompass various foreign countries. The rubric that in theAmerican Political Science Reviewuntil the 1950s used to read “Foreign Governments and Politics” has been replaced by a subsection of the book reviews that is entitled “Comparative Politics.” But today as in the past, it is rare to find teaching or research in political science that truly integrates the analysis of American politics within a comparative framework.Why this should remain the case is difficult to understand, for over the past half-century there have been many shifts in the discipline and in the world that challenged the premises of research based on American exceptionalism. Already in the interwar period, significant work in political science was moving beyond configurative case studies of individual countries. C. J. Friedrich's importantConstitutional Government and Democracy(1937), indeed, included the United States in its examination of how well certain general political theories explained the experiences of major political systems. Whatever reservations one might have had about the methodologies of comparative research on which Friedrich relied, the broad influence of his work promised a new integration of American politics into an expanded field of comparative politics.
Explaining the Burger Court's Support for Civil Liberties
Authors: Baum Lawrence 
Published: September 2013

For eighteen years, Supreme Court watchers have been waiting for the other shoe to drop. Under Chief Justice Earl Warren in the 1960s, the Court expanded legal protections for civil liberties far more than it had in any previous period. After Richard Nixon was elected president in 1968, many observers expected that his appointments would move the Court away from its commitment to civil liberties. When Nixon was able to appoint four new justices in his first three years in office, that expectation was strengthened. Since that time, each presidential election victory and each Supreme Court appointment by a conservative Republican has led to new hopes and fears that the Cout would abandon its strong support for civil liberties.To a degree, these expectations already have been realized. Without doubt, the Supreme Court under Warren Burger was less supportive of civil liberties than it had been under Earl Warren. But it did not take the clear conservative position that many Court watchers had anticipated. Reflecting their surprise, a 1983 book about the Burger Court was subtitled, “The Counter-Revolution That Wasn't” (Blasi, 1983).
Reforming the “President”: The Individual as Leader
Authors: Edwards George C. 
Published: September 2013

Proposals to reform the presidency fall into three increasingly exclusive categories. The most inclusive are those that focus on reforming the American political system and by doing so altering the balance of power within the government, usually in favor of the chief executive. The effort to strengthen the party system is probably the most prominent representative of this orientation. Other proposals, such as a presidential item veto, would increase the president's power on a more modest scale but still require change in the fundamental rules of the game.A second class of proposals has the narrower aim of reforming the presidency as an institution. Rather than emphasizing increased power for the president, these recommendations attempt to aid the chief executive in carrying out his responsibilities more judiciously. They often focus on providing the president more or better decision-making resources. Plans for reorganizing or otherwise improving the White House staff system or the Executive Office of the President or for insulating the president from parochial demands through a single six-year term are notable examples of suggestions for institutional reform.The variety of reformist proposals that is most common and most restricted in scope concentrates on improving the presidency by changing the characteristics of the individuals who occupy the Oval Office. Some would have us pay more attention to the character or personality of candidates for the office, while others stress the importance of choosing presidents who possess the proper skills for governing. To achieve these goals, proponents of change advocate reforms ranging from alterations in the processes by which we select presidents to candidate psychoanalysis.
Nonacademic Careers for Political Scientists
Authors: Friedman Robert S. 
Published: September 2013

We are hearing a great deal these days about a declining marketplace for our Ph.D.s. The evidence collected by the American Political Science Association and many of its sister disciplines is clear: The number of academic jobs is declining. Yet, despite reductions in graduate enrollments, the more than 110 departments of political science which grant doctorates produced over 765 Ph.D.s in 1974.What might be done to solve the problem of this imbalance? One proposal recommends dismantling many of our doctoral programs. I have mixed feelings about this. The argument that only the most distinguished departments should continue to grant Ph.D.s, because only they produce a marketable product, is fallacious. In my experience, the most distinguished departments have no better record in placing their doctorates than those which are less distinguished. I have been involved personally in program reviews at a number of institutions of various prestige levels, and I have found that some of the “so-called” marginal programs do extremely well in placement.
Doctoral Output in Political Science-Tables for 1973–76
Authors: Peterson Walfred H. 
Published: September 2013

The tables that follow together with those that appeared in the Fall, 1972 issue ofPSgive some roughly comparable data on Ph.D. output in political science for seven years. Perhaps, the most important change in the new data is the contrast between the 1975 and 1976 totals. Output fell by 77. The drop was accounted for mostly by decreases in the figures for the three sub-fields of Foreign and Cross-National Political Institutions and Behavior; International Law, Organization and Politics; and U.S. Political Institutions, Processes and Behavior.The most important changes in the presentation between this and the earlier article are these: first, the division of former Table I into Table IA and IB, each covering only two years. This change was required by the new classification of dissertation topics that began in 1975. That year two of the earlier categories were dropped—Constitutional and Administrative Law in the United States, and Canadian Government and Politics. Three new categories were added—Methodology; Political Stability, Instability and Change; and Public Policy: Formation and Content. Three were altered in both scope and terminology—Political Theory; Foreign and Cross-National Institutions and Behavior; and U.S. Political Institutions, Processes and Behavior. Only two were unaltered-Public Administration; and International Law, Organization and Politics. Given these changes, no confident comparisons can be made between any of the sub-field categories of the present and the past, though the two unaltered categories may allow for rough comparisons.