bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Evolutionary Foundations of Strong Reciprocity
Authors: Alexander Jason McKenzie 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Strong reciprocators possess two behavioural dispositions: they are willing to bestow benefits on those who have bestowed benefits, and they are willing to punish those who fail to bestow benefits according to some social norm. There is no doubt that peoples' behaviour, in many cases, agrees with what we would expect if people are strong reciprocators, and Fehr and Henrich argue that many people are, in fact, strong reciprocators. They also suggest that strongly reciprocal behaviour may be brought about by specialised cognitive architecture produced by evolution. I argue that specialised cognitive architecture can play a role in the production of strongly reciprocal behaviour only in a very attenuated sense, and that the evolutionary foundations of strong reciprocity are more likely cultural than biological.
‘Nostrism’: Social Identities in Experimental Games
Authors: Schmid Hans Bernhard 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In this paper it is argued that a) altruism is an inadequate label for human cooperative behavior, and b) an adequate account of cooperation has to depart from the standard economic model of human behavior by taking note of the agents’ capacity to see themselves and act as team-members. Contrary to what Fehr et al. seem to think, the main problem of the conceptual limitations of the standard model is not so much the assumption of selfishness but rather the atomistic conception of the individual. A much-neglected question of the theory of cooperation is how the agent's social identity is determined, i.e. how individuals come to think of themselves and act as members of a group. Considering as an example one of Fehr et al.’s third party punishment experiments, I shall argue that the agents' identities (and thus the result of the experiment) are strongly influenced by the way the experiment is presented to the participants, especially by the collectivity-related vocabulary used in the instructions.
Altruism and the Indispensability of Motives
Authors: Peacock Mark S. , Schefczyk Michael , Schaber Peter 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In this paper we examine Fehr’s notions of “altruism”, “strong reciprocity” and “altruistic punishment” and query his ascription of altruism. We suggest that, pace Fehr, altruism cannot be defined behaviourally because the definition of altruism must refer to the motives of actors. We also advert to certain inconsistencies in Fehr’s usage of his terms and we question his explanation of altruism in terms of ‘social preferences’.
A Communitarian Critique of Liberalism
Authors: Bell Daniel A. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Communitarian thinkers have argued that liberalism devalues community in modern societies. This essay assesses the three main strands of the contemporary debate betweeen communitarianism and liberalism: (1) the communitarian critique of the liberal universalism, (2) the communitarian critique of liberal individualism, and (3) the communitarian critique of liberal politics. In each case, it is argued that the debate has moved from fairly abstract philosophical controversies to more concrete engagement with political disputes in Western as well as East Asian societies.
Aristotelianism versus Communitarianism
Authors: Knight Kelvin 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Alasdair MacIntyre is an Aristotelian critic of communitarianism, which he understands to be committed to the politics of the capitalist and bureaucratic nation-state. The politics he proposes instead is based in the resistance to managerial institutions of what he calls ‘practices’, because these are schools of virtue. This shares little with the communitarianism of a Taylor or the Aristotelianism of a Gadamer. Although practices require formal institutions. MacIntyre opposes such conservative politics. Conventional accounts of a ‘liberal-communitarian debate’ in political philosophy face the dilemma that Alasdair MacIntyre, often identified as a paradigmatic communitarian, has consistently and emphatically repudiated this characterization. Although neo-Aristotelianism is sometimes seen as a philosophical warrant for communitarian politics, MacIntyre’s Aristotelianism is opposed to communitarianism. This paper explores the rationale of that opposition.
Der Gerechtigkeit einen ‚Ort geben‘
Authors: Luutz Wolfgang 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The paper is concerned with the role of spatial delineations in Walzer’s theory of distributive justice. The argument put forward here is that Walzer’s concept of the existence of spheres of justice requires socio-spatial and territorial differentiations as a precondition. Walzer himself analyses different socially delineated places of distribution, such as the market (i.e. the economy) or the school (i.e. education). This contribution concentrates on the problem of distribution of political membership, advancing the thesis that we cannot understand Walzer’s approach without giving consideration to his concept of concrete delimited territory. According to Walzer, distributive justice needs the framework of the territorial state, but this entity should not be identified with a centralized, ethnically homogenous nation state: One of the merits of Walzer’s theory of justice is to draw attention to the value of the locale.
Fairness as Justice
Authors: Jasay Anthony de 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The paper questions Binmore’s identification of justice with fairness and his corresponding focus on bargains to the neglect of conventions, notably of ownership. Section 1 deals mainly with the role ascribed to man’s earliest genetic heritage in shaping fairness norms and the putative effect of such norms on bargaining solutions. Section 2 argues that the scope of fairness as opposed to justice in determining the social order is quite narrow, It sketches a theory of fairness distinct from justice, derived from the principle of treating like cases alike.
The Genetics of Cooperation
Authors: Hardin Russell 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Binmore analyzes the genetic basis of cooperation. Much of the literature doing this supposes that we must explain directly the cooperative tendency, whether by individual or group selection. A more effective way to go is to find something more general and likely more deeply embedded in personal traits that enables and even enhances cooperation. Hume, with whom Binmore claims affinities, long ago proposed a psychological phenomenon now called mirroring, which induces good relations through shared sentiments in a way that is essentially hard-wired. Mirroring indirectly contributes to cooperativeness. There may be other similarly indirect ways to account for human cooperativeness.
Making Sense of Categorical Imperatives
Authors: Lahno Bernd 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Naturalism, as Binmore understands the term, is characterized by a scientific stance on moral behavior. Binmore claims that a naturalistic account of morality necessarily goes with the conviction “that only hypothetical imperatives make any sense”. In this paper it is argued that this claim is mistaken. First, as Hume’s theory of promising shows, naturalism in the sense of Binmore is very well compatible with acknowledging the importance of categorical imperatives in moral practice. Moreover, second, if Binmore’s own theory of moral practice and its evolution is correct, then the actual moral practice does-and in fact must-incorporate norms, which have the form of a categorical imperative. Categorical imperatives are part of social reality and, therefore, any (normative) moral theory that adequately reflects moral practice must also include categorical imperatives.
Justice: Political Not Natural
Authors: Peter Fabienne 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Ken Binmore casts his naturalist theory of justice in opposition to theories of justice that claim authority on the grounds of some religious or moral doctrine. He thereby overlooks the possibility of a political conception of justice−a theory of justice based on the premise that there is an irreducible pluralism of metaphysical, epistemological, and moral doctrines. In my brief comment I shall argue that the naturalist theory of justice advocated by Binmore should be conceived of as belonging to one family of such doctrines, but not as overriding a political conception of justice.
Is Rawlsian Justice Bad for the Environment?
Authors: Schramme Thomas 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In this paper I show that Rawls’s contract apparatus in A Theory of Justice depends on a particular presumption that is in conflict with the goal of conserving environmental resources. He presumes that parties in the original position want as many resources as possible. I challenge Rawls’s approach by introducing a rational alternative to maximising. The strategy of satisficing merely goes for what is good enough. However, it seems that under conditions of scarcity Rawls’s maximising strategy is the only rational alternative. I therefore scrutinise the common account of scarcity. I distinguish between absolute and relative scarcity in order to show that scarcity is influenced by our decisions. If we would not accept the claim to as much as possible without further legitimisation, like Rawls does, then scarcity might not be as severe a problem. Finally, I reject Rawls’s proposed solution for dealing with problems of sustainability, namely his idea of the just savings principle. I conclude that Rawlsian Justice as Fairness is bad for the environment.
Political Liberalism and Ecological Justice
Authors: Bell Derek R. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Liberalism and ecologism are widely regarded as incompatible. Liberalism and (anthropocentric) environmentalism might be compatible but liberalism and (non-anthropocentric) ecologism are not. A liberal state cannot promote policies for ecological or ecocentric reasons. An individual cannot be both a liberal and a committed advocate of ecologism. This paper challenges these claims. It is argued that Rawls’s ‘political liberalism’ is compatible with ecologism and, in particular, the idea of ‘ecological justice’. A Rawlsian state can promote ecological justice. A committed political liberal can also be a committed advocate of ecological justice. The argument is developed through a close textual examination of Rawls’s brief discussion of our duties to ‘animals and the rest of nature’. Rawls leaves far more scope for liberal ecologism than his critics have suggested. The proposed version of liberal ecologism is defended against charges of substantive and procedural bias toward humans and against nonhuman nature. Liberal ecologism may not be enough for some ecologists-especially ‘ecological constitutionalists’ seeking constitutional protection for nonhuman nature-but it is a serious and defensible political and moral theory.
The Brain Is Not Enough
Authors: Schumacher Ralph 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The desire for founding educational reform on a sound empirical basis has coincided with a period of impressive progress in the field of neuroscience and wide public interest in its findings, leading to an ongoing debate about the potential of neuroscience to inform education reform. But is neuroscience really suited to provide specific instructions for improving learning conditions at school? This paper explores the educational implications of neuroscience.
Combining Brain and Behavioral Data to Improve Econometric Policy Analysis
Authors: Houser Daniel , Schunk Daniel , Xiao Erte 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
For an economist, ultimate goals of neuroeconomic research include improving economic policy analysis. One path toward this goal is to use neuroeconomic data to advance economic theory, and productive efforts have been made towards that end. Equally important, though less studied, is how neuroeconomics can provide quantitative evidence on policy, and in particular the way in which it might inform structural econometric inference. This paper is a first step in that direction. We suggest here that key forms of preference (or decision strategy) heterogeneity can be identified by brain imaging studies and, consequently, linked stochastically to observable individual characteristics. Then, recognizing that brain-imaging studies are substantially costly, we derive conditions under which the probabilistic link between observable characteristics and type, a quantity critical to policy analysis, can be estimated more precisely by combining data from traditional and brain-based decision studies.
Choices, Norms and Preference Revelation
Authors: Baigent Nicholas 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This paper considers lexical combinations of choice functions where at least one is interpreted as arising from a norm. It is shown that in for all possibilities in which a norm is present, in general final choice may be consistent with preference optimization, but that it need not be so. It is concluded therefore that a fruitful approach to understanding the effect of norms on choice is to consider particular classes of norms rather than norms in general as in the work by Wulf Gaertner among others.
Indifferences and Domain Restrictions
Authors: Barberà Salvador 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the extent to which allowing for individuals to be indifferent among alternatives may alter the qualitative results that are obtained in social choice theory when domain restrictions are defined on profiles of linear orders. The general message is that indifferences require attention and careful treatment, because the translation of results from a world without indifferences to another where agents may be indifferent among some alternatives is not always a straightforward exercise. But the warning is not one-directional: sometimes indifferences complicate the statement of results, but preserve their essential message. Sometimes, they help to create domains where some rules work better than in the presence of linear orders. In other cases, however, their presence destroys the positive results that would apply in their absence. I provide examples of these three situations.
The Shortage of Human Organs: Causes, Consequences and Remedies
Authors: Breyer Friedrich , Kliemt Hartmut 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
There is an ever increasing shortage of human organ transplants in Germany. This paper aims at understanding the reasons for that shortage better and then discusses various ways to overcome it. After estimating the potential supply of donor organs it is discussed why actual supply remains far below potential supply. Insufficient reimbursement for hospitals, a lack of incentives to donate, and mistaken donation rules are diagnosed to cause the shortage. Thus, organ shortage is due not to natural constraints but to inappropriate social institutions. Introducing a presumed consent rule, reciprocity in organ allocation, better payments for hospitals and for donors seem potential remedies.
Multivariate Lorenz Majorization and Heterogeneity Measures: An Axiomatic Approach
Authors: Eichhorn Wolfgang , Krtscha Manfred 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This work introduces two new curves that are multivariate generalizations of the “classical” Lorenz curve. All data of d-variate distributions can be visualized by drawing these curves in the plane, whereas Koshevoy’s and Mosler’s generalization by a lift zonoid in ℝd+1 can only be drawn for d = 2. The generalizations of the Lorenz curve induce partial orderings of d-variate distributions. Furthermore, two inequality or heterogeneity measures that are consistent with the induced rankings are proposed. They can be considered as new generalizations of the univariate Gini coefficient. For deciding which of the two measures is more appropriate for measuring a sort of convergence concerning different countries of an union or of regions of a country, we establish systems of axioms. Although these systems are reflecting natural properties, several of the axioms are new. Moreover, by means of these axioms well- known inequality measures are tested, too.
A Critical Discussion of the Characteristic Properties of List PR and FPTP Systems
Authors: Hout Eliora van der , Stecher Jack , Swart Harrie de 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This paper discusses the characteristic properties of List PR systems and FPTP systems, as given in Hout 2005 and Hout et al. 2006. While many of the properties we consider are common to both systems, it turns out (see Hout 2005) that the British system distinguishes itself by satisfying the district cancellation property, while the Dutch system distinguishes itself by satisfying consistency and anonymity. For scoring rules, topsonlyness is equivalent to being party fragmentation-proof (see Hout 2005; Hout et al. 2006). One might present this as an argument in favour of requiring topsonlyness. However, we will also give counter-arguments against insisting upon the property of being party fragmentation-proof.
Instances of Indeterminacy
Authors: Piggins Ashley , Salles Maurice 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This paper is a survey of how economists and philosophers approach the issue of comparisons. More precisely, it is about what formal representation is appropriate whenever our ability to compare things breaks down. We restrict our attention to failures that arise with ordinal comparisons. We consider a number of formal approaches to this problem including one based on the idea of parity. We also consider the claim that the failure to compare things is a consequence of vagueness. We contrast two theories of vagueness; fuzzy set theory and supervaluation theory. Some applications of these theories are described.
After Tradition?: Heidegger or MacIntyre, Aristotle and Marx
Authors: Knight Kelvin 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Philosophical tradition has been challenged by those who would have us look to our own practice, and to nothing beyond. In this, the philosophy of Martin Heidegger is followed by the politics of Hannah Arendt, for whom the tradition of political philosophy terminated with Karl Marx’s theorization of labour. This challenge has been met by Alasdair MacIntyre, for whom the young Marx’s reconceptualization of production as a social activity can inform an Aristotelianism that addresses our shared practices in traditional, teleological terms. Looking to the social nature of our practices orientates us to common goods, to the place of those goods in our own lives, and to their place within political communities. MacIntyre’s Thomistic Aristotelian tradition has Heideggerian and other philosophical rivals, but he argues that it represents our best way of theorizing practice.
MacIntyre, Thomism and the Contemporary Common Good
Authors: Osborne Thomas 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Alasdair MacIntyre’s criticism of contemporary politics rests in large part on the way in which the political communities of advanced modernity do not recognize common goals and practices. I shall argue that although MacIntyre explicitly recognizes the influence of Jacques Maritain on his own thought, MacIntyre’s own views are incompatible not only with Maritain’s attempt to develop a Thomistic theory which is compatible with liberal democracy, but also relies on a view of the individual as a part which is related to the whole in a way that is incompatible with Maritain’s understanding of the spiritual individual or person.
Traditional Moral Knowledge and Experience of the World
Authors: Smith Benedict 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
MacIntyre shares with others, such as John McDowell, a broad commitment in moral epistemology to the centrality of tradition and both regard forms of enculturation as conditions of moral knowledge. Although MacIntyre is critical of the thought that moral reasons are available only to those whose experience of the world is conceptually articulated, he is sympathetic to the idea that the development of subjectivity involves the capacity to appreciate external moral demands. This paper critically examines some aspects of MacIntyre’s account of how knowledge is related to tradition, and suggests ways in which the formation of moral subjectivity involves the ability to experience the world.
Moral Philosophy, Moral Identity and Moral Cacophony: On MacIntyre on the Modern Self
Authors: Morgan Seiriol 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This paper focuses on Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique of the modern self, arguing that we are not as bereft of the resources to engage in rational thought about value as he makes out. I claim that MacIntyre’s argument presumes that philosophy has a much greater power to shape individuals and cultures than it in fact has. In particular, he greatly exaggerates the extent to which the character of the modern self has been an effect of the philosophical views of the self that have been influential during the period, leading him to be overly pessimistic about its nature and powers. Finally, I argue that MacIntyre has provided us with no strong reason for thinking that a moral tradition structured by modern values could not be viable.
What More Needs to Be Said? A Beginning, Although Only a Beginning, at Saying It
Authors: MacIntyre Alasdair 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The responses to my critics are as various as their criticisms, focusing successively on the distinctive character of modern moral disagreements, on the nature of common goods and their relationship to the virtues, on how the inequalities generated by advanced capitalist economies and by the contemporary state prevent the achievement of common goods, on issues concerning the nature of the self, on what it is that Marx’s theory enables us to understand and on how some Marxists have failed to understand, on the differences between my philosophical stances and those both of John McDowell and of the physicalists, on the nature of human rights and of productive work, on the ancient Greek polis, and on the metaphysical commitments presupposed by my theorizing.
Social Criticism and the Exclusion of Ethics
Authors: Keat Russell 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
As Axel Honneth has recently noted, the critical concerns of social philosophers during the past three decades have been focused primarily on questions of justice, with ethical issues about the human good being largely excluded. In the first section I briefly explore this exclusion in both ‘Anglo-American’ political philosophy and ‘German’ critical theory. I then argue, in the main sections, that despite this commitment to their exclusion, distinctively ethical concepts and ideals can be identified both in Rawls’s Theory of Justice and in Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action, taking these as exemplary, representative texts for each theoretical school. These ethical elements, and their implications for the critical evaluation of economic institutions, have gone largely unnoticed. In the final section I indicate the kinds of debates that might be generated, were these to be given the attention they arguably deserve. I focus especially on the significance of empirical issues, and hence on the role of social science in social criticism.
Die Idee einer Hegelianischen ,Wissenschaft‘ der Gesellschaft
Authors: Neuhouser Frederick 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This paper sets out the kind of intellectual enterprise Hegel’s science of society is by explaining its aim (reconciliation) and the method it employs to achieve that aim. It argues that Hegel’s science of society, similar to Smith’s and Marx’s, offers an account of the good social order that is grounded in both an empirical understanding of existing institutions and a normative commitment to a certain vision of the good life. It spells out the criteria Hegel appeals to in his judgment that the modern social order is fundamentally good and worthy of affirmation, namely, that its three principal institutions−the family, civil society, and the constitutional state−form a coherent and harmonious whole that promotes the basic interests of all its members in a way that also realizes freedom in all three of the senses relevant to social theory: personal, moral, and social freedom.