bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Transcriptional profiles of supragranular-enriched genes associate with corticocortical network architecture in the human brain
Authors: Krienen Fenna M. , Yeo B. T. Thomas , Ge Tian , Buckner Randy L. , Sherwood Chet C. 
Published: January 2016

Significance
The human cerebral cortex is patterned with distributed networks that connect disproportionately enlarged association zones across the frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes. We asked herein whether the expansion of the cortical surface, with the concomitant emergence of long-range connectivity networks, might be accompanied by changes to the underlying molecular architecture. We focused on the supragranular layers of the cortex, where most corticocortical connections originate. Genes that are enriched in supragranular layers in the human cerebral cortex relative to mouse are expressed in a topography that reflects broad cortical classes (sensory/motor, paralimbic, associational) and their associated network properties. Molecular innovations of upper cortical layers may be an important component in the evolution of increased long-range corticocortical projections.
Reversal of morphine-induced cell-type–specific synaptic plasticity in the nucleus accumbens shell blocks reinstatement
Authors: Hearing Matthew C. , Jedynak Jakub , Ebner Stephanie R. , Ingebretson Anna , Asp Anders J. , Fischer Rachel A. , Schmidt Clare , Larson Erin B. , Thomas Mark John 
Published: January 2016

Significance
The recent rise in opioid addiction has made development of new treatments a public health priority. The effort has been impeded by a distinct lack of understanding how opioid-induced alterations in synaptic transmission and cellular plasticity within reward brain regions, such as the nucleus accumbens (NAc), drive addiction behavior. We examined whether repeated morphine induces differential alterations in synaptic strength and transmission in subpopulations of NAc neurons, those expressing dopamine D1 or D2 receptors, that play opposing roles in addiction behavior. Morphine enhanced synaptic strength and transmission at D1 medium spiny neuron (MSN) synapses and reduced signaling in D2-MSN. Reversal of this plasticity with in vivo optogenetics or the antibiotic ceftriaxone disrupted the rewarding properties of morphine, providing a targetable molecular mechanism for future pharmacotherapies.
Novel cystine transporter in renal proximal tubule identified as a missing partner of cystinuria-related plasma membrane protein rBAT/SLC3A1
Authors: Nagamori Shushi , Wiriyasermkul Pattama , Guarch Meritxell Espino , Okuyama Hirohisa , Nakagomi Saya , Tadagaki Kenjiro , Nishinaka Yumiko , Bodoy Susanna , Takafuji Kazuaki , Okuda Suguru , Kurokawa Junko , Ohgaki Ryuichi , Nunes Virginia , Palacín Manuel , Kanai Yoshikatsu 
Published: January 2016

Significance
Although molecular identification of transporters in mammals seems almost settled, some long-proposed transporters still remain to be revealed. The second cystine transporter in renal cystine reabsorption is one of such transporters. Its genetic defect has been proposed to be responsible for a type of cystinuria distinct from that caused by the mutations of the already known cystine transporter. In this study, we have found a membrane protein SLC7A13 as the second cystine transporter with proposed characteristics, and provided a possible clue to the genetics of previously unidentified cystinuria. Intricate functional coupling of SLC7A13 with the nearby glutamate transporter is also proposed. We have solved long-lasting problems in renal cystine transport physiology and paradoxes regarding the unmatched distribution of cystine transporter components.
History of Science and Its Rational Reconstructions
Authors: Lakatos Imre 
Published: January 2016

“Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind”. Taking its cue from this paraphrase of Kant's famous dictum, this paper intends to explain how the historiography of science should learn from the philosophy of science and vice versa. It will be argued that (a) philosophy of science provides normative methodologies in terms of which the historian reconstructs ‘internal history’ and thereby provides a rational explanation of the growth of objective knowledge; (b) two competing methodologies can be evaluated with the help of (normatively interpreted) history; (c) any rational reconstruction of history needs to be supplemented by an empirical (socio-psychological) ‘external history’.The vital demarcation between normative-internal and empirical-external is different for each methodology. Jointly, internal and external historiographical theories determine to a very large extent the choice of problems for the historian.
Cost-Benefit versus Expected Utility Acceptance Rules
Authors: Michalos Alex C. 
Published: January 2016

AbstractA rule for the acceptance of scientific hypotheses called ‘the principle of cost-benefit dominance’ is shown to be more effective and efficient than the well-known principle of the maximization of expected (epistemic) utility. Harvey's defense of his theory of the circulation of blood in animals is examined as a historical paradigm case of a successful defense of a scientific hypothesis and as an implicit application of the cost-benefit dominance rule advocated here. Finally, various concepts of ‘dominance’ are considered by means of which the effectiveness of our rule may be increased.
Ontological and Terminological Commitment and the Methodological Commensurability of Theories
Authors: Kleiner Scott A. 
Published: January 2016

Scientific revolutions have been described as episodes in the history of science in which old empirical research activities, standards of achievement, problem fields and even ontologies have been exchanged for new (Kuhn, 1962; Feyerabend, 1962).Also it has been claimed that rational canons for the evaluation of theories cannot reach across scientific revolutions. The revolutionary new theory can be defended only by rhetorical techniques, not by hypothetico-deductive or other inductive argumentation to or from empirically ascertained evidence. A revolutionary new theory achieves dominance over its predecessor only after the authority sustaining the latter theory is no longer effective. Thus, succeeding theories in scientific revolutions are held to be methodologically incommensurable. That is, logical argumentation cannot be used to assign differential values to succeeding theories.A superficial examination of what it means for two theories to differ ontologically might lead to the conclusion that theories so differing are methodologically incommensurable.
Random Thoughts about Randomness
Authors: Good Irving John 
Published: January 2016

In this paper I shall bring together some philosophical and logical ideas about randomness many of which have been said before in scattered places. For less philosophical aspects see, for example [27].When philosophers define terms, they try to go beyond the dictionary, but the dictionary is a good place to start and one dictionary definition of ‘random’ is ‘having no pattern or regularity’. This definition could be analyzed in various contexts but, at least for the time being, I shall restrict my attention to sequences of letters or digits, generically called ‘digits’. These digits are supposed to belong to a generalized alphabet; perhaps a new word should be used, such as ‘alphagam’, but I shall use the word ‘alphabet’ in the generalized sense so as to avoid a neologism. For simplicity I shall assume that the alphabet is finite and consists of thetdigits 0, 1, 2,…,t— 1.
Observationality and the Comparability of Theories
Authors: Ostien Philip A. 
Published: January 2016

Feyerabend and others have been defending for some time the thesis that even observation sentences depend for their meanings on the thegries in which they play a role. According to the most radical version of this thesis, if two theories contain incompatible theoretical statements, then even if the observation terms and sentences associated with the two theories are the same, these terms and sentencesmeansomething different, according as they are associated with one theory or the other. This claim has made it hard to see how, on this view, any two theories could be said to compete, or be incompatible, or be comparable on the basis of observation.The whole dispute over this claim seems highly suspect to begin with. For look at the philosophical terms in which it is couched. On the one hand there is the notion of the “meaning” of a term or sentence, whose status as a useful tool of philosophical analysis has been in serious question for the past two or three decades.
The Relevance of Philosophy of Science for Science Education
Authors: Martin Michael 
Published: January 2016

What relevance - if any - does philosophy of science have for science education? Unfortunately, this question has been largely unexplored. To be sure a great deal has been written on the philosophy of science; perhaps even more has been written in science education. However, surprisingly little has been written on the relation between the two areas. In this paper I will suggest some ways in which philosophy of science can have relevance for science education.Before one considers how philosophy of science can have relevance to science education it is important to consider what is meant by ‘philosophy of science’. Some contemporary philosophers of science have distinguished two different approaches to philosophy of science: analytic and speculative. However in recent years a view of the philosophy of science has become popular that does not seem easily to fit into either the analytic or speculative categories.
How Do We Apply Science?
Authors: Cartwright Nancy Delaney 
Published: January 2016

Until recently, philosophers have either denied that there is such a thing as philosophy of technology or have held it in contempt. A philosophy of technology would be as absurd as a philosophy of sport, they scoffed. Nowadays philosophers pay more attention to this crucial area We recognize that technology raises economic, moral, and social problems that demand philosophical attentioa But we still tend to overlook that applied science has conceptual problems – problems for the philosopher of science – independent of the moral, social, and aesthetic problems of technology. It is the need for philosophical study of these conceptual problems that I want to stress.To make clear that these problems are scientific problems separate from the familiar problems of decision theory, costbenefit analysis, and social responsibility, I shall choose two examples at a fairly high level in the application of physics – one quantum, one classical.
Rationality and Sociality
Authors: Schick Frederic 
Published: January 2016

What this paper has to do with the theory of rational choice is not clear. Still, I won't apologize. The ideas here grow out of a study of some applications of rationalism. It seems to me that the rationalist model neglects a great deal. This is not a criticism. Every model abstracts from nature. But the aspects of choosing what this model ignores are often those we most need to note in order to explain behavior. And we need to bring them out for other purposes too. Hence this essay toward a fuller analysis.First about rational choice theory itself. On the rationalist theory, every person pursues his interests, and, in particular, pursues them in a certain way. He considers the consequences of his options, and chooses that option whose consequences he prefers to the consequences of each of the others.
Induction and Causality in a Cellular Space
Authors: Uchii Soshichi 
Published: January 2016

I have recently developed two kinds of model for inductive logic with causal modalities, the deterministic and the probabilistic. Roughly speaking, the first provides certain syntactic and semantic criteria for causal necessity, so that a causal or nomic universal can be deductively derived from a certain actual universal; whereas the second model allows only a probabilistic transition from actual universality to causal universality. These models are meant to provide, from a modal point of view, a formal explication of nomic universality both in its semantic and inductive aspects.However, these models are too abstract if we want to treat adequately such problems as causality, the confirmability of causal laws, etc., in that they do not have a framework of space and time, which seems essential to our conception of causality.
Rational Conceptual Change
Authors: Harper William L. 
Published: January 2016

One of the salient features of Carnap's systems of inductive logic is a conditionalization learning model, which also plays a fundamental role in the orthodox Bayesian account of rationality. This learning model does not allow for revision of previously accepted evidence. It is, therefore, not adequate to represent all rational learning by an agent who accepts corrigible propositions as evidence. Recently I used a generalization of the concept of conditional belief to extend the model so that rational revision of previously accepted evidence can be accommodated. My generalization of conditional belief carries with it a natural way of representing an agent's conceptual framework. In this paper I exploit this representation to produce learning models that can accommodate rational conceptual change.The idea of conceptual change has received considerable attention in recent work of philosophers of science. The following quotation from Hilary Putnam is instructive.
John Stuart Mill, John Herschel, and the ‘Probability of Causes’
Authors: Strong John V. 
Published: January 2016

Any discussion of probability theory in early nineteenth-century Britain requires a specially vigorous exercise of the historical imagination. A century of subsequent thought about the foundations of the subject has made both historians and philosophers of science only too aware of how elusive and polyvalent a term ‘probability’ is; indeed, since Carnap, it has scarcely been possible to use the word without a qualifying adjective or subscript. Before the nineteenth century, on the other hand, during the ‘emergence’ of formalized probabilistic thinking, writers from Pascal and Fermat onwards were keenly conscious that the concept they used was often ill-defined and equivocally employed.There is a sensation, therefore, of sailing unexpectedly into a patch of flat calm when one turns to such early Victorian writers (I use the term in its common, extended sense to refer to the period from around 1830 till the middle of the century) as Lubbock, Drinkwater-Bethune, Galloway, and, above all, De Morgan.
Rhetoric and Scientific Rationality
Authors: Finocchiaro Maurice A. 
Published: January 2016

The problem of scientific rationality and Feyerabend's views on the subject need no special introduction in this context. What does need emphasis is the desirability of resisting the widespread tendency either to dismiss him as a Dadaist or to take his rhetoric seriously and despair about the rationality of science. Both tendencies betray a failure to appreciate his peculiar contributions, which are a (relatively) novel theory of rationality, and a (relatively) novel problem. The theory is that scientific rationality is essentially rhetorical, in the sense that scientific method ultimately reduces to a matter of techniques of persuasion (as distinct from, say, a matter of “method”); and the problem, which remains even for those who may reject the theory, is that of the role of rhetoric in science.Since Feyerabend's latest book is full of the rhetoric of irrationalism, it is best to begin by purifying the air surrounding such rhetoric.
The Logic of Mathematical Discovery Vs. the Logical Structure of Mathematics
Authors: Feferman Solomon 
Published: January 2016

Mathematics offers us a puzzling contrast. On the one hand it is supposed to be the paradigm of certain and final knowledge: not fixed to be sure, but a steadily accumulating coherent body of truths obtained by successive deduction from the most evident truths. By the intricate combination and recombination of elementary steps one is led incontrovertibly from what is trivial and unremarkable to what can be non-trivial and surprising.On the other hand, the actual development of mathematics reveals a history full of controversy, confusion and even error, marked by periodic reassessments and occasional upheavals. The mathematician at work relies on surprisingly vague intuitions and proceeds by fumbling fits and starts with all too frequent reversals. In this picture the actual historical and individual processes of mathematical discovery appear haphazard and illogical.The first view is of course the currently conventional one which descends from the classic work of Euclid.
On the Use of Likelihood as a Guide to Truth
Authors: Kimbrough Steven Orla 
Published: January 2016

Much work in confirmation theory is directed towards finding or interpreting a function, c, taking on hypotheses and evidence as its arguments and returning a value by which the degree of support of the evidence for the hypothesis can be assessed. Confirmation functions are generally thought of as probability functions. That is, c(H,E) is thought to obey the axioms of probability theory, where H is an hypothesis and E the evidence being considered. A difficulty with this approach is that the various problems of induction, including Hume's and Goodman's, militate against construing any confirmation function as a probability function. To date, no satisfactory probability function has been found which addresses the general problem of ampliative inference and which is immune to the standard objections of the Humean or Goodmanian type.These sorts of considerations suggest it would be promising to examine, as candidates for an acceptable confirmation function, functions which are not probability functions.
Is Temporality Mind-Dependent?
Authors: Fitzgerald Paul 
Published: January 2016

The question is oversimple. We are more likely to find the right set of answers if we focus sharply a distinction which is invariably blurred by those who discuss the issue, especially those who argue that “temporal becoming” is a mind-dependent feature of reality. We must distinguish the “indexicality theme” from the “elapsive theme”. Failure to do so has bred some confusion, I think.A bit of background first. Those who discuss the mind-dependence of temporal becoming think of that issue as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence of secondary qualities. Do colors, felt hotness, and salty taste exist in the mind-independent world? Or only within experience? “Roses are red, just like some of our after-images.” “No they aren't. Roses only have a property of selectively reflecting light in the 7200 Å region. That makes them look red to us. But they aren't really red.” “You're both wrong.
Causal Analysis of Hidden Variables
Authors: Suppes Patrick 
Published: January 2016

My contribution to this symposium is focused on the retreat from strong conditions of causality that have been forced upon us by quantum mechanics. My intent is to describe in more or less successive stages the retreat from the paradise of deteministic causation. This retreat has taken place through a thicket of quantum-nechanical details. It is ny intention to describe the general principles involved but to refer to the literature for proofs and full technical elaboration, even of matters that are crucial to the conceptual development.The history of the efforts to prove or disprove the possibility of hidden variables begins at least with von Neumann and includes important work by Kochen and Specker and others, but much of the recent analysis has centered around Bell's inequality and related results. In spite of its importance and significance I shall ignore this earlier history and begin with these recent discussions.
The Creation of Similarity: A Discussion of Metaphor in Light of Tversky's Theory of Similarity
Authors: Kittay Eva Feder 
Published: January 2016

The cognitive interest in metaphor and simile derives from a conceptual detour: through these figures we regard one thing in terms of another, and in so doing our understanding of the first is modified in light of perspective gained by the second.But why, in terms of cognitive gain, engage in such conceptual detours? That is, what motivates our use of metaphor and simile? The motivation of metaphor has often been thought to be the assertion of asimilarity amongst things generally not thought to be similar. However, as Max Black pointed out in criticizing the “comparison theory of metaphor”, metaphors are not simple comparisons of “objectively given” similarities, wherein to the question “is A like B in respect of P?” we might have a definite answer.
Paradigm Shifts, Scientific Revolutions, and the Unit of Scientific Change: Towards a Post-Kuhnian Theory of Types of Scientific Development
Authors: Tang Paul C. L. 
Published: January 2016

One of the central problems of Kuhn's theory of scientific development is its reductionistic and local approach, i.e., its application of one basic pattern of scientific development—Kuhnian revolutions or K-revolutions—to only one area of science, the physical sciences. But the question arises as to why significant developmental episodes in the history of physics and chemistry only should be taken as paradigm cases, especially inasmuch as Kuhn himself claims to be describing and explaining the development of science generally. As Kuhn says, scientific revolutions “are at the heart of the most significant episodes of scientific development.“(Kuhn 1962, p. 140).I shall take a somewhat radical position. First, I shall argue that the concepts of paradigm shift and scientific revolution are asymmetrical. That is, paradigm shifts represent a genus, and scientific revolutions are species within that genus; and whereas all K-revolutions are paradigm shifts, the converse does not hold.
Pragmatic Incommensurability
Authors: Collier John 
Published: January 2016

Thomas Kuhn (1962) proposed that there are theories which are not only incompatible but also semantically incommensurable in order to explain historical evidence that scientists who hold consecutive theories often fail to come to terms with each other, being unable to resolve differences by appeal to evidence, authority or convention. Despite Kuhn's objections, this thesis has generally been interpreted by friends and foes alike so as to preclude direct rational communication across revolutionary divides in science. In this paper, I will sketch a weaker form of incommensurability which allows eventual comparison of incommensurable theories, but is consistent with Kuhn's model of science.According to Kuhn, mature science normally operates within a disciplinary matrix which determines the nature of both scientific problems and their solutions. Such a matrix is composed of an articulated formalism, together with a set of standard problems called “exemplars”, and a set of preferred analogies for extending the exemplars to new applications.
What is Darwinism Today?
Authors: Mayr Erns 
Published: January 2016

One of the dominant interests of the philosophers of science has always been the problem of theory construction. How is a new theory established? To what extent can a theory be changed? Do theories change gradually or are they replaced during revolutions?Most of the theorizing on these questions has been done with theories of the physical sciences, but there are indications that, for several reasons, Darwin's theory of evolution does not fit in the traditional framework. For instance, the number of theories still competing with each other in the 80 year period from the Darwinian revolution (1859) to about 1940 is quite extraordinarily large, and it was not one of these competing theories that was ultimately victorious, but rather an eclectic theory in which the best components of several opposing theories were synthesized in the 1940s.