bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Arbitration in the UAE
Authors: Blanke Gordon 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter discusses arbitration in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). There is a general perception in the international arbitration community that arbitration in the Middle East is an untested science and a risky, unpredictable business. However, arbitration has played a determinative role in the formation of the dispute resolution landscape of prominent Middle Eastern jurisdictions since pre-Islamic times and has left an indelible mark in the civil procedure codes of most of these jurisdictions. The UAE in particular has led by example in establishing a modern arbitration jurisdiction that, by and large, meets international standards and best practice. The chapter seeks to demystify the practice and procedure of arbitration as they prevail in the UAE and show that-contrary to common belief-arbitration there is modern and at times even genuinely avant-garde. The UAE serves as a role model on how arbitration in the Middle East has been developing into the preferred dispute resolution mechanism of international commercial disputes in the region and set the pace for other Middle Eastern jurisdictions to follow suit.
Recollections of Past Events and Reflections on Future Trends
Authors: Hunter Martin 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter presents the author’s recollections of his personal experiences involving the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and, more generally, the world of arbitration. He describes how he became a member of the Institute in the mid 1960s. He discusses the taking of evidence by arbitral tribunals, saying that the issue remains important because most commercial disputes are decided by arbitral tribunals based on material facts, rather than on an erudite analysis of the transaction agreement, or a microscopic evaluation of the provisions of the applicable national law. He also believes that arbitral tribunals must do their best to ensure that the costs incurred by the parties are reasonable. The Institute has the duty to educate its members and students on the importance of cost control, and to use their discretionary powers to allocate the costs of legal representation (and other costs) in their awards in a way that discourages excessive expenditure by the eventual winning party.
The Nature of ‘Agency’
Authors: Munday Roderick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter attempts to define the concept of ‘agency’, particularly within the scope of English and EU law. In English law, agency is a legal relationship that involves three parties: a ‘principal’, on whose behalf the agent acts; an ‘agent’, who acts on behalf of the principal; and ‘third parties’ whom the agent brings into legal relations with the principal. In recent years, European law has exerted considerable impact on the English law of agency. It affects the way in which certain bodies of rules require to be interpreted. It has also created an entirely new and commercially significant form of agency via the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993. Thus, since the passing of the Commercial Agents (Council Directive) Regulations 1993, a further distinct species of agent, the ‘commercial agent’, now exists alongside English law’s traditional forms of agent.
Creation of Agency
Authors: Munday Roderick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter describes the creation of the agreements between principal and agent. It shows how the agreement between principal and agent may be either express or implied. Although the great majority of agency agreements will in fact be contractual, even in the commercial setting this is not exclusively the case. Non-contractual duties borne by an agent, such as the fiduciary duty to account to the principal, may continue to bind the agent even after the agency contract has terminated or bind even if the agency is gratuitous ab initio. What is required, in the main, is that the parties should have consented to the agency.
Ratification
Authors: Munday Roderick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter concerns the ratification of unauthorized acts. The doctrine of ratification is concerned with acts performed without authority by an agent in the name of a principal. In short, ratification occurs whenever the ratifying party clearly manifests that he has adopted the unauthorized transaction effected by his agent purportedly on his behalf. There is no requirement that this intention must be communicated either to the third party or to the agent. Express ratification is self-explanatory. Implied ratification, however, will take place where either the conduct of the principal or the surrounding circumstances invite the inference that the principal has endorsed the agent’s conduct.
Legal Relations Between Principal and Agent
Authors: Munday Roderick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter describes the duties the agent owes to his principal, which fall into two broad categories. On the one hand, because the majority of agencies will arise out of a contract between principal and agent, the latter will owe well recognized duties at common law—most notably, a duty to perform the mandate with reasonable skill and care. On the other hand, however, equity also wields strong influence over the development of agents’ duties. Therefore, agents have often to be considered both as contracting parties, under customary contractual duties to their principals, and also as fiduciaries, owing strict equitable obligations to their principals arising out of the special position of trust in which the law of agency places them. These two species of obligation are considered separately in this chapter.
Legal Relations Between Principal and Agent
Authors: Munday Roderick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter examines the three principal rights enjoyed by the agent specific to the principal–agent relationship. The first is the agent’s entitlement to remuneration: if it is a term of the contract, the agent will be entitled to remuneration in accordance with what the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed in their contract. Alternatively, the agent may be entitled to recover from the principal on the basis of a quantum meruit. Next is the right to indemnity: regardless of whether or not there is a contract, an agent is entitled to be indemnified for expenses incurred and losses occasioned in the performance of the agency. Finally, the chapter looks at how the agent may enjoy a possessory lien over the principal’s property.
Legal Relations Between Agent and Third Party
Authors: Munday Roderick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter explores the legal relations between the agent and the third party. An agent acting for a disclosed principal (named or unnamed) normally can neither sue nor be sued by the third party on contracts concluded on behalf of that principal. In cases of disclosed agency, the object is to bring principal and third party into direct contractual relations. At this point, the agent customarily drops out of the transaction, neither acquiring rights against the third party nor incurring liability to the third party. There are, however, a number of exceptions to the general rule that an agent does not customarily acquire rights or incur liabilities under their principal’s contract, which are elaborated in the chapter.
Termination of Agency
Authors: Munday Roderick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter considers both how agencies come to be terminated, and the effects of termination. In the ordinary course of events, as between principal and agent, an agency will come to an end because the parties so wish it. As a general rule, parties whose legal relations derive from agreement are at liberty to release one another from their obligations. Certain agencies, however, are treated as irrevocable, and cannot be freely revoked. An agency may also be terminated by operation of law, independently of the will of the parties. These two species of liability are therefore treated separately in this chapter.
The Temporal Jurisdiction of International Tribunals
Authors: Gallus Nick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
The period of an international tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction is the span of time during which an act must have occurred before the tribunal may consider if the act breached an obligation. There are many questions concerning this particular aspect of an international tribunal’s jurisdiction. Does a tribunal have power over acts that occurred after the entry into force of the obligation allegedly breached but before the tribunal’s jurisdiction was accepted? What about acts that began before the tribunal’s jurisdiction was accepted but continued after? To what extent can acts before the period of the tribunal’s jurisdiction affect its decision on whether or not there is a breach through acts afterwards?This book examines these questions in depth. Despite its importance, the temporal jurisdiction of international tribunals is not well understood. Tribunals often confuse different aspects of their jurisdiction and refuse to hear cases they should have heard, or agree to hear cases they should not. This book reduces this confusion by clarifying the different limits on the temporal jurisdiction of international tribunals and the important distinctions between those limits. The book examines the temporal limits resulting from the entry into force of the obligation allegedly breached, from the acceptance of the tribunal's jurisdiction, and from the period of limitation, as well as the effect of acts that occurred before these limits. The book comprehensively compares decisions from a wide variety of sources including the International Court of Justice Human Rights Courts World Trade Organization panels and investment treaty tribunals. It comments on decisions that arose from some of the most notorious events of the twentieth century including the ‘Katyn Massacre’ of the Second World War the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the ‘forced disappearance’ of American political opponents. It reviews these decisions and identifies common principles that help define the temporal jurisdiction of tribunals to decide breaches of international law.
The Effect of Acts before the Main Temporal Limits on the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction over Later Acts
Authors: Gallus Nick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter addresses the inconsistent jurisprudence on the effect of acts outside the temporal limits previously addressed in this book—the entry into force of the obligation allegedly breached, the acceptance of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and the period of limitation—on tribunals’ power over the acts within those limits.
The Effect of Acts before the Main Temporal Limits on the Determination of Breach through Later Acts
Authors: Gallus Nick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter addresses the effect of acts before the period of a tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction on the decision whether or not the act within the period of the tribunal’s jurisdiction has breached the obligation. The chapter explains that tribunals have universally accepted that they can take into account earlier acts when deciding if acts within the period of their temporal jurisdiction breached an obligation. It then explains that there is little uniformity on the degree to which a prior act has been taken into account when it is part of a series, or part of a single act, that continues into the period of temporal jurisdiction.
Temporal Jurisdiction over Disputes that Arose before the Acceptance of the Tribunal’s Jurisdiction
Authors: Gallus Nick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter focuses on the temporal limits over disputes that arose before the acceptance of the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The distinction between a provision that defines a tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction by the time of an act and one that focuses on the time of a dispute can be critical because an act that is challenged does not necessarily occur at the same time as the dispute that gave rise to that challenge. This chapter examines the different means through which states have confined the temporal jurisdiction of an international tribunal to future disputes. It then considers if, in the absence of such provisions, general principles of law impose a similar limit. In addition, the chapter addresses the extensive jurisprudence on the crucial moment that a ‘dispute’ arises. Finally, it examines how tribunals have determined if the dispute before them is separate from a dispute that clearly did arise before the acceptance of the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
Conclusions
Authors: Gallus Nick 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This concluding chapter reflects on how this volume has accomplished its aims. It identifies the consistencies shown throughout the decisions examined in the previous chapters, as well as the inconsistencies. Although the book has not explored the reasons for these inconsistent decisions, this chapter does draw out some general reasons for them. The chapter notes that the divergences in decisions on temporal jurisdiction create uncertainty and provides some suggestions on how drafters of new treaties can reduce that uncertainty.
Principles of Contractual Interpretation
Authors: Calnan Richard 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
The purpose of the book is to state the principles which guide anyone who has to interpret contracts. The interpretation of contracts is an art, not a science, and it is ultimately a matter of judgment about which two perfectly reasonable people can have quite different views. It is therefore important to understand the different approaches to interpretation. The outcome of cases concerning the interpretation of contracts is notoriously difficult to predict. The book explains why this is so and attempts to give guidance to those who interpret contracts. The book also considers related concepts, such as implied terms, rectification, and estoppel by convention, all of which play a part in the overall question of how contracts are read. It also contains a brief discussion of the effect of these principles on the way in which contracts should be drafted in practice.
Principle 1
Authors: Calnan Richard 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter explains that the purpose of contractual interpretation is to establish the intention of the parties to the contract. This is done objectively: what would a reasonable person understand their common intention to be from what they have written, said, and done? The chapter discusses what we mean when we talk about the intention of the parties. It explains how the objective approach to interpretation works, and why it is preferred to the subjective approach. Interpretation is important in practice because of the breath of the principle of freedom of contract. The chapter discusses this and its limits, including the penalty doctrine.
Principle 3
Authors: Calnan Richard 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter explains that contracts are read as a whole. Words and expressions in a contract cannot be seen insolation. They get their colour from the rest of the contract and, if the contract is part of a wider transaction, from the other transaction documents. It also considers the principle that a person interpreting a contract should strive to give effect to each part of the contract. It explains how these issues are dealt with in practice. It also discusses those limited types of case in which contracts are not read as a whole.
Principle 5
Authors: Calnan Richard 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter is concerned with what words mean. It states the basic principle that words are nearly always given their ordinary meaning in their context. It discusses the controversy about whether words do have an ordinary meaning, and looks at what is meant by reading words in their context. It discusses the basic principle that, once it has been decided what the ordinary meaning of words is in their context, then they are given effect however odd the result. It considers definition clauses, technical terms, common expressions and standard form contracts. It discusses the canons of construction such as ejusdem generis. It also discusses how to distinguish the interpretation of contracts from their categorization.
Principle 7
Authors: Calnan Richard 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter discusses the circumstances in which the courts do not give words their natural meaning. Very occasionally, it is clear that the parties cannot objectively have intended words they have used to have their ordinary meaning. If so, they are given the meaning which the parties must objectively have intended. The more unreasonable the result, the more unlikely it is that the parties can have intended it. This is a very controversial principle and different judges take a more—or less—expansive view of it. The chapter discusses the different views, and why they are held. It analyses the recent cases to establish where the law is at the moment. It looks at particular types of case where the courts have been more willing to twist the meaning of words. These include exclusion and limitation clauses, clauses limiting liability for negligence, and termination for minor breach. It discusses recent cases in which the courts have twisted the meaning of words in contracts, and also those where the courts have declined to do so.
Principle 9
Authors: Calnan Richard 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter considers the circumstances in which a court can change the meaning of the words which the parties have used in their contract. If a written contract does not record the parties’ common intention at the time it was entered into, it will be amended to reflect that intention. The principles concerning rectification are controversial, with different judges expressing different views about the importance of objective or subjective common intention. This chapter discusses the different approaches to rectification—the subjective view and the objective view—and then discusses the current position. Because the controversy has not yet been resolved, it also discusses the alternative approaches and suggests a possible solution.
Principle 10
Authors: Calnan Richard 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter considers the circumstances in which one party to a contract can be prevented from relying on the words of the contract. If the parties to a contract have dealt with each other on the basis of a common understanding about the meaning or effect of the contract, that interpretation will bind them if it would be unjust to go back on it. The chapter discusses the principles concerned, and the test for the application of estoppel by convention. It also gives examples.
Introduction
Authors: Möckesch Annabelle 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter provides an introduction to the concept of attorney–client privilege. It briefly illustrates that the nature and scope of the privilege vary between jurisdictions. It then discusses the role of attorney–client privilege in international arbitration and the difficulties that arise when determining the applicable attorney–client privilege standard in international arbitration. To enhance further discussion, the chapter also defines several key terms to be used throughout this book. These terms include ‘privilege’, ‘attorney–client privilege’, and ‘work-product protection’. Moreover, privilege is contrasted with the duty of confidentiality in international commercial arbitration and attorney–client privilege is contrasted with the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality. Lastly, the chapter makes a few practical observations on the document production process, in which attorney–client privilege is often invoked.
England and Wales
Authors: Möckesch Annabelle 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter follows the structure of the previous chapter. It gives a brief introduction to the Woolf Reform and the Civil Procedure Rules, which regulate the conduct of civil court proceedings and are based to a large extent on Lord Woolf’s recommendations. The chapter then briefly sets out the course of a lawsuit and presents the taking of evidence in civil litigation in the pre-action, the pre-trial, and the trial phase. Lastly and most importantly, the chapter explores legal professional privilege, which has two sub-heads under English law: legal advice privilege and litigation privilege.
European Union
Authors: Möckesch Annabelle 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter presents the applicable attorney–client privilege standard on the European level. It first describes the investigative powers of the European Commission as competent authority to uncover infringements of European competition law, such as requests for information and inspections. The second part of this chapter devotes itself to the attorney–client privilege as established by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in relation to European competition law investigations.
Seeking Inspiration from Judicial and Administrative Proceedings for the Arbitral Context
Authors: Möckesch Annabelle 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter draws inspiration from a number of judicial and administrative proceedings in regard to the determination of the applicable privilege law for the arbitral context. The chapter describes the approaches taken in national civil court proceedings in the United States and Germany, EU competition law investigations, and judicial assistance proceedings under the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters of 1970 and Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation between the courts of the Member States in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters.
Applicable Privilege Standard in International Commercial Arbitration
Authors: Möckesch Annabelle 
Published: June 2017

Abstract
This chapter contains an analysis of the most appropriate way to determine the applicable attorney–client privilege standard in international commercial arbitration. To this end, this chapter deals with the characterization of privilege as substantive or procedural, the legal framework for attorney–client privilege in international commercial arbitration, international mandatory rules of law, and the enforcement regime under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1958. Against this background, the chapter includes an analysis of the possible approaches to determining the privilege standard. These include the application of general principles of law, the application of a single national law determined through a choice-of-law approach such as the closest connection test, the cumulative application of several national laws, and the creation of an autonomous standard defining the scope of attorney–client privilege. Lastly, the chapter examines whether corrective measures, such as the lowest common denominator approach or the most protective rule, are needed to ensure equal treatment of the parties and fairness of the proceedings. This chapter concludes with key findings on how to determine the applicable attorney–client privilege standard in international commercial arbitration.