bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
British Idealism: Its Political and Social Thought
Authors: Simchoni Avital 
Published: August 2016

British Idealism is often identified with the three best known British Idealists: T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley and B. Bosanquet. However, the full range of British Idealists includes also E. Caird, D.G. Ritchie, J.S. Mackenzie, H. Jones, J.H. Muirhead, W. Wallace, A.S. Pringle-Pattison, R.B. Haldane, R.L. Nettleship and J. Watson. Shortage of space does not allow a satisfactory discussion of the nature of British Idealist thought, nor is it the aim of this article. What follows intends to be introductory only. It brings to the fore the concept of reconciliation as the idea that gives unity to British Idealism, explains the role of Idealist thought in nineteenth century British social thought, and reveals the contribution of British Idealism to substantive social and political thought. This introductory account is coupled with a bibliographical essay to illustrate the range of concerns Idealist thought embraces.British Idealism is sometimes described as an intellectual ‘movement’ not as a result of any comprehensive study of the idealists and their views so much as on the strength of its supposed role in providing intellectual support for the ‘collectivism’ or increasing state intervention that is claimed to have dominated British politics in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the intellectual interest in British Idealism has generally followed on the belief that Idealism was the major force behind the politics of collectivism.Although British Idealists did constitute a group, this group did not and, indeed, could not have had the effect on British politics that is usually suggested. British Idealism could not have lent itself exclusively to one line of policy.
Hegel and Onto-Theology
Authors: Westphal Merold 
Published: August 2016

Postmodernism and religion. The discussion continues to become increasingly rich and complex. In the background of much of it is Heidegger's critique of onto-theology, in which Hegel is one of his two prime paradigms. He introduced this term in 1949 in relation to Aristotle's completion of his ontology with a theology of the Unmoved Mover. When he returned to it in 1957, it was in the context of a seminar on Hegel's Science of Logic. There he described onto-theology as allowing God to enter philosophical discourse only on philosophy's terms and in the service of its project and complained, in the spirit of Pascal and Kierkegaard, that this God was religiously otiose. What he says there specifically about Hegel will best be understood after we see in what sense Hegel is a pantheist.It is possible to date quite precisely the time when Hegel abandoned theism for good. Ironically, it was in 1795 in correspondence with his two friends from seminary days at Tübingen. Schelling and Hölderlin had become Fichte enthusiasts, as we see from letters they sent to Hegel early that year. On the basis of prepublication access to Fichte's 1794 Wissenschaftslehre, Schelling wrote on January 5,Philosophy is not yet at an end. Kant has provided the results. The premises are still missing. And who can understand the results without the premises? … Kant has swept everything away, but how is the crowd to notice? One must smash it to pieces before their very eyes, so they grasp it in their hands. The great Kantians now everywhere to be seen have got stuck on the letter … [;] the old superstition of so-called natural religion as well as of positive religion has in the minds of most already once more been combined with the Kantian letter. It is fun to see how quickly they get to the moral proof. Before you can turn around the deus ex machina springs forth, the personal individual Being who sits in Heaven above! Fichte will raise philosophy to a height at which even most of the hitherto Kantians will become giddy … . Now I am working on an ethic á la Spinoza (HL 29).
The Parmenides and De Anima in Hegel's Perspective
Authors: de Laurentiis Allegra 
Published: August 2016

In the chapter on ‘Plato and Aristotle’ of the Lectures on the History of Philosophy Hegel praises Aristotle's work for displaying a principle of ‘pure subjectivity’ in a manner that he considers to be largely absent from the Platonic corpus:In general, Platonic thinking [das Platonische] represents objectivity, but it lacks a principle of life, a principle of subjectivity; and this principle […], not in the sense of a contingent, merely particular subjectivity, but in the sense of pure subjectivity, is proper to Aristotle. (W vol. 19, p. 153)Elsewhere, Hegel refers to Aristotelian conceptions of organic life and of thinking as to the earliest speculative insights of Western philosophy. In § 378 of the Encyclopaedia (1830) he calls the De Anima ‘the best or even only work of speculative interest ever written on the philosophy of spirit’. In yet other places, however, Hegel attributes at least ‘intuitive’ forms of speculation to Plato as well.In a preliminary way, a 'speculative relation’ in Hegel's acceptation is instantiated by a subject's theoretical and practical relation to itself — that is, theoretical self-knowing and practical self-will. ‘Speculative’ is any concept which grasps as a unity what other kinds of cognition keep asunder: for example, the subjective and objective dimensions of a phenomenon or state of affairs. But even independently of a detailed analysis of what ‘the speculative’ entails, one is struck by the apparent inconsistency of these claims regarding Plato or Aristotle with Hegel's overall view of the logical necessity of philosophy's historical development. This view is synthetically expressed in the 1820 Introduction to these same Lectures.
Hegel on Aristotle's Energeia
Authors: Ferrarin Alfredo 
Published: August 2016

What is coming to assert itself as the mainstream reading of Hegel's philosophy at the start of our century is the picture of a reaction to, elaboration of, and finally solution to, Kantian problems. What goes hand in hand with this reading is a rejection of metaphysics as supposedly uncritical pre-Kantian baggage unaware of its presuppositions and unable to examine its own sources and the legitimacy of its claims.However complex this perspective and intelligent its merits, even if the intention is the well-meaning one of liberating Hegel's philosophy from whatever smacks of traditionalist views fuelling the various Hegel myths and legends and of making Hegel palatable again to a naturally suspicious English-speaking world, I think that this picture does Hegel a disservice. It is also detrimental to our understanding of the pre-Kantian tradition, which is all too often misconstrued as indistinguishable from Wolffian metaphysics. While I do not intend to dispute in any way the crucial importance of critical philosophy for the genesis of absolute idealism, or suggest that this appropriation of Hegel is merely instrumental, I am saying that it is one-sided in that it ignores Hegel's extraordinary attempt at understanding his own philosophy as digesting what is best about our tradition, assimikting it, and making it speak for us again in a new voice.So I am not denying that trying to update or appropriate Hegel might shed considerable light on select deeper meanings of a thought whose opacity still makes us regard it as an inert and surd obstacle to straight and unambiguous philosophical practice. But all too often one gets the impression that for most proponents of such a view metaphysics is the naive description of a sort of formal ontology, which does not question its fixed meanings but adopts stable substrates represented as such from ordinary experience, and understands thought as a description, as the realistic mirroring of an objectivity that is given to it.
The Young Hegel on ‘Life’ and ‘Love’
Authors: Sembou Evangelia 
Published: August 2016

Wilhelm Dilthey, the first scholar to study Hegel's early writings, most of which have been published by Herman Nohl under the title Hegels Theologische Jugendschriften, examined the thought of the young Hegel in the light of German idealism; Dilthey was interested in establishing the Kant-Fichte-Schelling-Hegel Entwicklungsgeschichte. Another line of interpretation, no doubt encouraged by the tide of Nohl's compendium, has been to see these writings as dealing with a religious experience and religious issues. Unique in the literature stands Laurence Dickey's study of intellectual history, in which he shows that the young Hegel was influenced by the culture of Old Württemberg – more specifically, by Württemberg's ideal of Protestant civil piety. Finally, Georg Lukács and Raymond Plant concentrate on the social and political concerns of the young Hegel. On the one side, Lukács, writing from a Marxist perspective, explores the political and economic ideas of the young Hegel as well as the way these have contributed to the development of the dialectical method. For his part, Plant has put forward the view that the essays compiled by Nohl in his collection constitute a series of attempts on the part of the young Hegel to comprehend and account for the cultural and socio-political crisis of his time. For Plant, Hegel sought the causes thereof in religion.I propose to look at the young Hegel from yet another angle. I shall argue that what lies beneath Hegel's exegesis of the Scriptures is a Platonism. H. S. Harris has noted this aspect of Hegel's thought in his seminal study of Hegel's development, but the Platonism of the young Hegel has generally been under-researched. In this paper I shall try to bring this out. To do this, I shall explore the meaning and significance of ‘life’ and ‘love’ by focusing on ‘The Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate’ essay, the fragment on ‘Love’, as well as some of the fragments in the appendix of Nohl's volume. Let us not forget that, despite his practical concerns, Hegel was also interested in theological doctrine, which, he thought, expressed substantial truths in metaphorical language; so in the ‘Spirit of Christianity’ essay, as well as providing an historical account of Judaism and a description of Christian ethics, Hegel also discusses theological tenets. Hegel always believed that theory and practice go hand in hand, and he was convinced that religion was as much about dogma as it was about practice. For this reason I deem it necessary to look at Hegel's interpretation of Christian theology in the course of this paper.
The Functionality of Christian Life: Problems of The Early Hegel's Epistemology of Religion
Authors: Schulting Dennis 
Published: August 2016

In this paper I want to explore a central line of reasoning in Hegel's early philosophy of religion, which he expounded in fragments he wrote while he was in Bern and Frankfurt in the 1790's. These fragments are known under the titles, Fragmente über Volksreligion und Christentum (dated around 1793–94), Die Positivität der christlichen Religion (1795–96), Entwürfe über Religion und Liebe, and a later essay entitled Der Geist des Christentums und sein Schicksat, they were written sometime between 1798 and 1800, a few years before Hegel published his seminal Jena texts, but they remained unpublished in his lifetime. These texts have, since Nohl's edition of 1907, come to be known collectively as Hegel's ‘theologische Jugendschriften’. I believe that they contain the inchoate system of Hegel's thought in general and his mature philosophy of religion in particular. My main claim here is that Hegel believes that there is an intimate relation between reason and religion, so much so in fact that one can argue that there is reason in religion.In the first section of my paper, I elaborate on some general problems concerning the relation between faith and reason, in particular, concerning the criterion of truth and viewpoint-neutrality. In the second section, I introduce Hegel's well-known problematic of the sublation of conceptual oppositions, which in the context of an account of the positivity of religion he already articulates, in some form, in these early documents and which may provide a solution for the problems that, in the first section, I argue arise around the relation between faith and reason. This will be merely a rough outline. I subsequently discuss, very briefly, some central aspects of Kant's philosophy of religion, to which to an important extent Hegel's is indebted. In the fourth section, I go on to indicate, also very broadly, the sense in which Hegel attempts to improve upon Kant and thus apparently proves to be more consistent than him. I then raise an issue concerning Hegel's particularist position in his epistemology of religion, which does not sit well with the notion of rationality as viewpoint-neutral. To illustrate this, I look at Hegel's reading of the Eucharist. This is all very sketchy and is meant mainly to elucidate the sense in which, according to Hegel, there is reason in religion.
The Word Became Flesh or The Orthodox Hegel
Authors: Burbidge John W. 
Published: August 2016

Certain men, rejecting the truth, are introducing among us false stories and vain genealogies, which serve rather to controversies than to God's work of building up in faith. By their craftily constructed rhetoric they lead astray the minds of the inexperienced, and take them captive, corrupting the oracles of the Lord, and being evil expounders of what was well spoken.Thus did Irenaeus of Lyons initiate his treatise on the Refutation and Overthrow of the Knowledge Falsely So-called, commonly called Adversus Haereses. The targets of his polemic were the Gnostics: Valentinus, Marcion, Cerinthus and Basilides; among whom, for our purposes, we shall concentrate simply on Valentinus. According to Irenaeus, the Valentinians held that “neither was the Word made flesh, nor Christ, nor the Saviour who was made out of all the Aeons. For they allege that the Word and Christ never came into this world, and that the Saviour was neither incarnate nor suffered, but that he descended as a dove [that is, at his baptism] upon that Jesus who was made by dispensation, and when he has proclaimed the unknown Father ascended again into the Pleroma [that is, when Jesus said, ‘Into thy hands I commend my spirit.’] It is important to notice the distinction Valentinus draws between Christ, the divine Son (who simply appropriates the human Jesus for a time), and the Jesus who was born of Mary and died on Calvary. They are not to be simply identified.
The Role of Religion in Hegel's Epistemology
Authors: Collins Ardis B. 
Published: August 2016

“Is there a way the world is regardless of how we think about it? If so, can we know the way the world is? Is knowledge a socio-historical phenomenon?” With these questions, Kenneth Westphal begins a study that explicitly aims at connecting Hegel's theory of knowledge to main stream epistemology. The project I am proposing here examines the connection between epistemological and religious issues. It will show how Hegel's strategy for an examination of knowledge changes the fundamental orientation of the epistemological project, transforms the questions we usually associate with it, and demonstrates an inseparable connection between epistemology and religion. Throughout the discussion, Westphal's questions will represent the concerns of contemporary epistemology. The project begins with an account of Hegel's strategy for a critical examination of knowledge.Hegel defines his relation to epistemology in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit. It seems natural to assume, Hegel says, that we must first come to an understanding about cognition — its different forms, their nature and limits — before we use cognition to know what truly is. Hegel describes this assumption as “a certain uneasiness,” “a mistrust,” a “fear of error,” which “seems justified.” If we do not determine precisely what cognition can and cannot know, if we do not identify which form of cognition is appropriate for knowing reality as it truly is, we might accept as true of reality itself what is only cognition's way of knowing it.
‘Sense Certainty’, or Why Russell had no ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance’
Authors: Westphal Kenneth R. 
Published: August 2016

Famously, by launching analytic philosophy Moore and Russell revolted against British Idealism, with Hegel tossed in for good measure. In 1923 Russell declared:I should take ‘back to the 18th century’ as a battle-cry, if I could entertain any hope that others would rally to it. (CP 9:39)To Russell, the philosophical headmaster of the Eighteenth Century was Hume, not Kant. Russell sought to dispatch rationalism with his logically sophisticated empiricism, based on ‘knowledge by acquaintance’: the non-conceptual apprehension of simples. He sought to dispatch Hegel in particular by condemning his alleged conflation of the ‘is’ of identity and the ‘is’ of predication.The battle lines thus drawn between analytic philosophy and (especially) Hegel's philosophy have had deep, lasting and very unfortunate consequences in the field. Hence it is all the more tragic that neither of Russell's criticisms of Hegel is sound. Sense Certainty presumes that the ‘is’ of identity and the ‘is’ of predication are the same, or rather, that it can dispense with predication and hence with any predicative use of ‘is’. Hegel accepts Sense Certainty's presumption as a premise in his reductio ad absurdum argument against sense certainty. Thus Hegel shares rather than denies Russell's thesis about the two senses of ‘is’. However, Hegel further argues that predication is required in order to identify any particular one presumes to know. In this way, Hegel refutes Russell's ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ just over a century in advance.
Ethics as Transformative Love: The Moral World of Etty Hillesum
Authors: Hannafey Francis T. 
Published: August 2016

ABSTRACTEtty Hillesum, a Dutch Jew who died at Auschwitz at the age of twenty-nine, left behind a diary and letters written during the last two years of her life. In An Interrupted Life and Letters from Westerbork, Hillesum tells a deeply moving story of religious experience, evil and suffering, spiritual growth, and interior and exterior moral transformation. While current scholarship on Hillesum focuses almost entirely on her personal life and religious journey, this essay examines the moral vision that emerges in her writings. Hillesum's diaries and letters present an engaging vision of the moral life—one that points with clarity to the importance of love of God and love of neighbor. This essay proposes that a love ethic is at the center of Hillesum's worldview and examines major influences on her religious and moral thought.
Practicing Catholic “Place”—The Eucharist
Authors: Sheldrake Philip F. 
Published: August 2016

ABSTRACTA sense of place is critical to human identity. The Eucharist is a ritual practice that “places” us within a narrative wider than our individual and exclusive stories. The Eucharist breaks open private identities to embrace theoikumenēof all times, places and people. This article explores ways in which the Eucharist may be thought of as “the practice of Catholic place.” It does this by integrating sacramental and ethical perspectives. The eucharistic narrative in a radical way makes a place for stories of suffering and exclusion that demand redress. It is a place of reconciliation that makes space for memories that refuse to remain silent. The Eucharist draws believers into the all-embracing catholicity of God. It thus engages a power beyond the ritual enactments themselves that makes an entry point for “the other,” not least for the oppressed, the marginalized and the excluded.
Commitment to One—Openness to Others: A Challenge for Christians
Authors: Knitter Paul F. 
Published: August 2016

As we so often hear, Christians of every new generation, or in any new cultural context, have to answer for themselves the question Jesus posed for the first generation of disciples: “Who do you say I am?” (Mk 8:27) This is a question that can be answered only in the light of other questions—that is, the personal, social, political, scientific questions we find ourselves grappling with in our own age and experience. The meaning of Jesus “becomes flesh” again in the meaning and direction we struggle for in our own times.Among the questions that most stir the minds and feelings of Christians today, perhaps one of the most rankling and challenging is that of other religions traditions and other religious believers—the issue of religious pluralism. To answer the question “Who do you say I am?”, we have to connect it to the question “Who do you say they are?” How do we understand Jesus—his person and his work—in view of so many other religious persons and their words and works of wisdom? As Roger Haight has perceptively pointed out, the reality of other religions is not a question we take up after we have worked out our Christology. It enters into, and directs and determines, how we do our Christology from the very start.If I can try to formulate how “Who do you say I am?” translates into the context of religious pluralism, it might be something like: “How can I be truly committed to Christ and at the same time be truly open to other religions?” That, I think, captures the questions and the struggles many Christians are feeling as they try to understand themselves as Christians in a world of many religions.
A Process Theological Interpretation of the Primeval History in Genesis 2–11
Authors: Gnuse Robert Karl 
Published: August 2016

ABSTRACTGenesis 2–11, or the primeval history of the Yahwist tradition, has been assessed theologically in several ways by biblical commentators over the years. The author suggests that this portion of the biblical text may be analyzed from the perspective of a process theological hermeneutic to gain new insights. In particular, one may observe the progressive involvement of Yahweh in the creative activity of establishing a world order, which is not always perfect in its developmental advance. Such a portrayal reflects not an omnipotent deity of classical theology, but rather a personal deity deeply related to the on-going creative processes of this world. Such perceptions of God dovetail well with the assumptions of process theology.
A Study of Catholicism: An Interdisciplinary Faculty Seminar
Authors: Heft James L. 
Published: August 2016

ABSTRACTThis essay describes an intensive eight-month long interdisciplinary faculty seminar which brought together faculty from the social sciences and humanities to explore, with different methodologies, the nature and traditions of Catholicism. It describes the way in which the seminar was organized, the participants selected, the syllabus chosen and how the discussion unfolded. It concludes with an evaluation by the author of what was learned, and then provides a brief description of the research projects undertaken by the seminar participants.