bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Zur Kritik der libertären Eigentumskonzeption
Authors: Koller Peter 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice is, besides Rawls’s theory, one of the most widely discussed and intellectually most attractive conceptions within the field of contemporary political philosophy. Nozick’s theory uses Locke's conception of the state of nature and of natural rights, and tries, starting from this point of view, to deliver a comprehensive systematisation of libertarian political ideals. This essay deals mainly with Nozick’s conception of property rights. The argument is put forward that the concept of exclusive and unrestrictable ownership of which Nozick makes use, doesn’t find any acceptable justification on the basis of his theory.
Recht, Strafrecht und Sozialmoral
Authors: Lüderssen Klaus 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
It is shown by means of four examples that the demarcation between law and morals has become problematical. The study of more recent developments in ethics and in law indicates that in both fields the relevance of discourse and consent has grown. Though both law and morals aim at agreement their degree of dependance on it differs. The definition of law and morals suggested in this article is based on this view. Legitimate law consists of norms, which besides fulfilling other conditions have attained a certain degree of consent. On the other hand one can only talk of social morals when a very high degree of consent has been reached. The consequences of this definition are explained by means of the examples presented at the beginning.
Economic Theory, Ideal Types, and Rationality
Authors: Keita Lansana 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Contemporary economic theory is generally regarded as a scientific or at least potentially so. The replacing of the cardinal theory of utility measurement by the ordinal theory was supposed to prepare the groundwork for economics as a genuine science. But in adopting the ordinal approach, theorists saw fit to anchor ordinal theory to axioms of choice founded on principles of rational behavior. Behavior according to these axioms was embodied in the ideal type model of rational economic man. This model served the basis for scientific explanation of the choices made by actual economic agents. I argue though that the postulate of rationality is a normative principle and that this compromises the scientific pretensions of economic theory. Yet the theorist must rely on this principle to formulate predictive and explanatory theories. This raises questions as to whether it is possible that economic theory satisfy the same kind of scientific criteria set down for research in the natural sciences.
Produktion, Markt und technischer Fortschritt
Authors: Cogoy Mario 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The following article proposes a change of perspective in the capital-theory debate of political economy. Instead of insisting upon the differences between a Marxian labour theory of value and a Ricardo-Sraffaian theory of prices of production (Marx versus Sraffa) the common basis of the two approaches is stressed. The common basis consists in the paradigm of duality between physical quantities and evaluation standards. The last part of the paper collects sceptical arguments concerning the question of whether the duality paradigm can provide an adequate approach to an analysis of modern technical change.
Diskussion/Discussion. Kommentare zu R. Rorty: Zur Lage der Gegenwartsphilosophie in den USA (Analyse & Kritik 1/81)
Authors: Bennet Jonathan 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Rorty’s profound and challenging critique of contemporary philosophy is in several ways somewhat unfair. Analytic philosophy can contribute towards ‘wisdom’ in a reasonable sense of the term, though not in Rorty’s narrow sense; and his contrast between ‘sophist’ and ‘sage’, with the latter understood in Plato’s way, is also too constricting. Also, some contemporary ‘analytic’ work in the ‘history of philosophy’, so called, is not invalidated by Rorty’s strictures - especially his implied accusation that we shan’t be interested in the intellectual past if we can’t look down on it.
Diskussion/Discussion. Kommentare zu R. Rorty: Zur Lage der Gegenwartsphilosophie in den USA (Analyse & Kritik 1/81)
Authors: Rosenberg Jay F. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
: Rorty rejects the idea of a “permanent and neutral matrix of heuristic concepts”. The claim of privilege, however, is separable from the aim of universality, and this idea can be transposed into a regulative ideal, while still preserving the unique intellectual mission of a discipline of philosophy. Rorty’s own positive picture of “edifying philosophy” in contrast is arguably irresponsible and grounded in misreadings both of the epistemology of science and of episodes in the history of philosophy, especially the contributions of Kant.
The Concept of Primacy in Historical Explanation
Authors: Fisk Milton 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
G.A. Cohen interprets Marx as a technological materialist: the productive forces are “primary” in history. There are several mistakes here. First, for Marx technology is neither always nor predominantly the direct stimulus - either causal or functional - of the social relations of production. Second, it is not even the case that for Marx primacy in explanation is a matter of being a direct stimulus. It has to do rather with being a framework that underlies interconnections between direct stimuli and their results. It turns out that this framework cannot be technology but only the relations of production. Third, technological development is not an autonomous process but is for Marx one that is dependent on the cooperation of producers. This introduces the political element of the class struggle into technological development and refutes a technological reading of why a given class rules.
Das grundlegende Puzzle des historischen Materialismus
Authors: Parijs Philippe Van 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
How is it possible, at the same time, to claim that there is a causal primacy of the productive forces over the relations of production and to recognize that the development of the productive forces causally depends on the nature of the relations of production? This irritating puzzle, which threatens the very core of historical materialism, had never received a satisfactory solution until G.A. Cohen’s Karl Marx’s Theory of History. The latter asserts that only a functional interpretation of historical materialism can effect the required reconciliation. On one reading of the “primacy puzzle”, however, this claim turns out to be trivial, while on the only other plausible reading it turns out to be false. Having delineated this dilemma, the article sketches an alternative solution.
The Claims of After Virtue
Authors: MacIntyre Alasdair 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
After Virtue claims that it is characteristic of contemporary society that its debates are peculiarly unsettlable; that this state of affairs is the result of the failure by the thinkers of the Enlightenment to construct a rational, secular defence of shared moral principles; and that the Aristotelian tradition of the virtues provides the only rationally defensible alternative to post-Enlightenment morality.
Culture, Morality and Rights: Or, Should Alasdair Maclntyre’s Philosophical Driving License Be Suspended?
Authors: Flathman Richard E. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Taken at face value, Professor Maclntyre’s charge that modern culture is “emotivist” is conceptually incoherent and betrays epistemological confusion. Examination of the modern concept and practice of rights indicates hat his comparisons between modern and pre-modern cultures exaggerate the irrationality, individualism, and fragmentation of the former, the rationalism, unity, and communalism of the latter. There are important differences among the several cultural forms that Maclntyre distinguishes. It is less clear that, lacking (as he admittedly does) a satisfactory account of moral reasoning, Maclntyre has made persuasive his case for abandoning modern liberalism in favor of communalisms inspired by pre-modern cultures.
We-Intentions and Social Action
Authors: Tuomela Raimo , Miller Kaarlo 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In the paper “We-intentions and Social Action” conceptual issues related to intentional social action are studied. By social actions we here mean actions that are performed together by two or more agents. The central concept of we-intention is introduced and applied to the analysis of simple social practical reasoning. An individualistic analysis of the notion of we-intention is proposed on the basis of the agents’ I-intentions and beliefs. The need and indispensability of we-intentions and we-attitudes in general in a theory of intentional social action is emphasized along with the fact that we-intending leads to action in suitable circumstances.
Cultural Pessimism and the Setting aside of Marxism
Authors: Nielsen Kai 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
I examine Alasdair MacIntyre’s grounds for setting aside Marxism. I find them wanting. I argue that his criticisms are either unsound or fail to consider plausible alternative readings of Marxism which would elude what, on the reading MacIntyre gives, are sound criticisms. I consider MacIntyre’s remarks about Marx’s predictions, his remarks about the moral failures of Marxism and its alleged theoretical impoverishment in considering questions of value.
The Deceptive Self: Liars and Layers
Authors: Oksenberg-Rorty Amelie 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This paper gives an account of the picture of the self that saves the phenomena of self-deception. On one theory of the self, the phenomena of selfdeception are incoherent: the self as a unified critically reflective rational inquirer cannot deceive itself. On another theory of the self, the phenomena evaporate: the self as a loosely organized system composed of relatively independent subsystems can be conflicted, mistaken, ignorant, compartmentalized. But it does not deceive itself. Our practices as moral agents and rational inquirers are explained by the first theory; our capacities as adaptive survivors are explained by the second. Neither picture can be reduced to the other; neither can be abandoned. The phenomena of selfdeception appear - and are saved by the superimposition of the two theories.
Modernity and Conflict
Authors: Doppelt Gerald 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In this essay, seek to provide a plausible alternative to Maclntyre’s bold and provocative conception of modernity. I contest his claim that modern social life is marked by (1) the absence of any shared paradigm of the good, tradition, and social morality; (2) rationally interminable normative conflict; (3) characteristically instrumental poweroriented social relations; and (4) the impossibility of genuine human achievement and virtue. I argue that modern conflict is rooted not in the absence of a shored paradigm of the good or the moral; but rather in a structure of social irrationality built into the modern conception of the good or the achievement of individual recognition in and through socioeconomic activity. I argue that while this conception has affirmative dimensions and does permit genuine virtue, the way it is culturally interpreted and institutionally embodied in modern capitalist society reproduces destructive scarcities in human recognition and the degradation of ordinary persons’ capacity for virtue. Where Moclntyre argues for a restoration of the pre-modern (Aristotelian) conception of the moral to be realized in spheres of activity external to socio-economic life, I argue for on immanent critique of modern liberal individualism which would humanize the meaning, conditions, and results of lobar and livelihood.
A Brief Rejoinder
Authors: Gewirth Alan 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Two main points in Maclntyre’s reply to my Rights and Virtues are shown to be incorrect. First, the right-claims I attribute to every agent are based on the needs of action, and the correlative “must” hence falls within the recognized language of practical advocacy. Second, the ‘conative normality’ I attribute to all agents is not confined to ‘the individualistic social order of modernity’ but instead characterizes every agent who wants to act for the fulfillment of his or her purposes.
Zur Entstehung der Moral aus natürlichen Neigungen
Authors: Hegselmann Rainer , Raub Werner , Voss Thomas 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Do individuals accept a moral point of view - if they are completely oriented towards their natural preferences and interests? The present article outlines the context of discussion concerning this question within moral philosophy and the social science. In addition it suggests a game-theoretical model with the help of which the question can be answered positively.
Diskussion/Discussion. Replies to the Critics of A Theory of Social Action
Authors: Tuomela Raimo 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The paper is a reply to the critical reviews of the author’s A Theory of social Action by Anton Leist, Marvin Belzer, and Julian Nida-Rümelin in this journal. As to Leist’s main criticisms, which concern the notions of social action, social practical reasoning, individualism, and social norms, they are argued to be incorrect and unjustified. Belzer’s criticisms are on the whole well taken, and in fact all of them have been noted by the author in his later work.Belzer does not, however, consider these newest analyses and improvements. Nida-Rümelin presents some comments on the relationships between collective preferences and we- intentions. These points are correct.
Group Action and Social Ontology
Authors: Ware Robert 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In recent years there has been an interesting turn in the philosophical literature to groups and collective action. At the same time there has been a renewed interest in various forms of methodological individualism. This paper attempts to show the diversity of group action that is overlooked by much of the literature, to clarify some of the ambiguities that plague our language about groups and collectives, and to support the view that social entities are genuine. Some important arguments against social entities being genuine are rebutted. The existence of social entities gives some substance to the debate about methodological individualism, but the resolution of the debate has depended too much on empirical results in the distant future. The article ends with some suggestions on how the debate matters in looking for biases in the directions of current social theorizing.
Rational Choice and Moral Order
Authors: Vanberg Victor , Buchanan James M. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The article discusses some of the fundamental conceptual and theoretical aspects of rational choice and moral order. A distinction is drawn between constitutional interests and compliance interests, and it is argued that a viable moral order requires that the two interests somehow be brought into congruence. It is shown that with regard to the prospects for a spontaneous emergence of such congruence, a distinction between two kinds of moral rules which we call trust-rules and solidarity-rules is of crucial importance.
Reason and Morality in the Age of Nuclear Deterrence
Authors: Narveson Jan 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The argument in this paper is that although rationality and morality are distinguishable concepts, there is nevertheless a rational morality, a set of principles, namely, which it is rational of all to require of all. The argument of this paper is that such a morality would certainly issue in a general condemnation of aggressive war. (Whether this also makes it irrational for States to engage in such activities is another, and not entirely settled, matter). Correlatively, it would issue in a strong right of defense. Would this right be sufficient to include resort to nuclear deterrence, if need be? It is argued that the answer must be in the affirmative - although the question of ‘need’ is by no means settled in current circumstances.
Kollektive Güter und individuelle Verantwortung
Authors: Leist Anton 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In acting within large groups the single actor typically suffers from the symptom of irrelevance of his contribution. A single contributory effect may be extremely small or, due to ‘threshold effects’, even non-existent. Given such conditions not only self-interested action, also purely altruistically motivated contribution seems to be rendered irrational. The article reasons that the famous ‘principles of generalization’ are of no help on this problem. However, a ‘principle of division’ could be used in showing, that in many situations of collective action altruistically motivated contribution is rationally sound.
What Does Doing One’s Part of a Joint Action Involve?
Authors: Tuomela Raimo 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The paper gives a conceptual clarification of what the notion of a part of a joint action (project, etc;) involves. The - mutually recognized - division of a joint action into parts can be based on social norms (viz. formal or informal rules, or proper social norms such as conventions or group specific social norms) or it can be based on agreement, coercion, or some analogous social mechanism. The paper also discusses the notions of a we-intention, of the intention to perform an action as one’s part of a joint action, and of an agent’s intentionally performing an action as his part of a joint action.
Krankheit als Funktionsgestörtheit
Authors: Pawelzik Markus 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Contrary to the bio-medical sciences most philosophers of medicine regard disease as an evaluative concept. C. Boorse’s well- known naturalist attempt to conceptualize disease exclusively on the basis of physiological fact seems highly plausible at first sight, since on this Supposition it is possible to make use of the impressive explanatory knowledge of modern medicine. But critical examination of his meta- physiological notion of “disease” as subnormal functioning shows that it does not conform to licensed medical disease-judgements. Furthermore his doctrine seems unjustified since it’s empirical implementability is highly questionable. This suggests that medicine is a naturalist enterprise that is guided by evaluation. An alternative conception of disease is advanced that tries to make the ‘nexus’ of physiological fact and evaluation intelligible: Disease is (extensionally) the class of physiological processes that (actually or prospectively) undermine the physiological conditions of human well-being.
Irrationality and the DSM-III-R Definition of Mental Disorder
Authors: Gert Bernard 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
I provide an account of irrationality that takes the concept of an irrational action as more basic than that of an irrational belief. While explaining the various elements of the OSM-III-R definition of mental disorders, I show that even though ( 1) not all mental disorders involve irrational beliefs or delusions, (2) not all irrational actions are due to mental disorders, and (3) not all mental disorders lead to irrational actions, there is a close conceptual connection between irrationality and mental disorders because both involve suffering or an increased risk of suffering an evil or harm, independent of the circumstances one is in.
Zwischen Leben entscheiden: Eine Verteidigung
Authors: Singer Peter , Kuhse Helga 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
We examine the view that all human life is of equal worth or sanctity. We find that this view is a legacy of the Judeo- Christian tradition, and cannot be justified in non - religious terms. We therefore argue that it should be rejected, and that we should openly acknowledge that some Jives are of less worth than others. We then consider a common objection: that this will lead us down a slippery slope to Nazi- style atrocities. We give our reasons for finding this objection unpersuasive. We explain why no-one has any grounds for feeling threatened by our proposal. Finally we discuss who should make the decision involved in selecting whether a person should come into existence, and how that decision should be carried out.
Facetten der Macht
Authors: Koller Peter 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Social power has many facets. This paper aims to illuminate some of these. First of all, it considers the general conceptual framework in which the concept of power is embedded. The author then elaborates on an analysis of the elementary concept of social power resulting in a proposal how to define power. Furthermore, the article deals with complex networks of power relations, namely constellations and structures of power. Another section focuses on some special aspects of the dynamics of power structures. Finally, the author discusses the problem of legitimation of power.
Drei Theorien der Macht
Authors: Kersting Wolfgang 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In distinguishing and describing three types of theories of power, i.e. the concept of subjectivity-based power, the concept of system-based or structuralist power and the concept of intersubjectivity-based power, this paper analyses and discusses in detail the communitarian concept of power invented and developed by Hannah Arendt and criticizes her thesis of politics and community being independent of any considerations concerning normative truth.
Macht oder Metaphysik
Authors: Steinvorth Ulrich 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Our acting and thinking can be guided by two ends which may combine but are irreducible nevertheless: the end of satisfying one’s interests and the end of distinguishing between true and false, right and wrong. Recognition of the difference between these ends led philosophers before the modem age to contrasting the life of power and the life of spirit or mind. Modern philosophers, in particular pragmatists, utilitarians and communication theorists, tried to show that truth and justice can be conceived of without implying an opposition to power and mind. I argue that they are wrong.
Zur Philosophie der Demokratie: Arrow-Theorem, Liberalität und strukturelle Normen
Authors: Nida-Rümelin Julian 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The paradoxes and dilemmas of social choice theory can be taken as an argument against a certain view of democracy: For the identity theory democracy represents a collective actor standing for aggregated individual interests. According to a second model of society, democracy has its normative basis in structural traits of interaction and cooperation. Within the formal theory of politics both the Arrow-Theorem and the Liberal Paradox undermine the identity theory and give us reasons for the second, the normative theory which takes democracy as being constituted by structural rules.
Der ungleiche Wert der Freiheit
Authors: Rössler Beate 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Starting from the given societal fact of an unequal ‘worth of freedom’ for men and women in pursuing possible plans of life, and the assumption that this difference is due to the distinction between the private and public realm, the author investigates into the gender-structure of recent political theories. Following the lines of the debate between communitarians and liberals she argues for the thesis that while communitarians try to ‘privatize’ the public sphere on the model of the ideal family or given traditions of communities and thus cannot account for the idea of emancipation from given structures and roles, liberals have to ‘publicize’ the private in order to give substance to the idea of an ‘equal worth of freedom’ for men and women. Thus, liberalism has to rethink the theoretical distinction of the private and the public sphere and its practical consequences.