bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Randomness and Reality
Authors: Hellman Geoffrey 
Published: January 2016

In previous technical work ([1] and [2]) on which his present paper [3] draws, Benioff has presented results conforming with the following argument-scheme:First, if we construe Quantum Mechanics as making claims to the effect that infinite outcome sequences (generated by repeated measurements on a system for a given observable in a given state) be random; and second, if a strong definition of “random” is adopted in this construal, then certain models of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (ZF) cannot be “carriers for the mathematics of physics”.How interesting is this? One can approach the matter on two levels, the level of the specific technical results, and the level of more general implications of this pattern of argument for understanding connections between mathematics and physics. The second more general level should be our primary focus, but it will pay at the outset to look briefly at the technical level.
History and Evolution: On the Changing Relation of Theory to Practice in the Work of Jürgen Habermas
Authors: McCarthy Thomas 
Published: January 2016

The relation of theory to practice has been a persistent concern of Marxist thought, so much so, in fact, that this type of acute self-consciousness might be regarded as one of its constitutive features. Thus in his introduction to the 1971 edition of Theory and Practice, Jürgen Habermas offers the following characterization of critical theory:The theory specifies the conditions under which a self-reflection of the species has become objectively possible. At the same time it names those to whom the theory is addressed, who can with its help gain enlightenment about themselves and their emancipatory role in the process of history. With this reflection on the context of its origin and this anticipation of the context of its application, the theory understands itself as a necessary catalytic moment of the very complex of social life that it analyses; and it analyzes this complex as an integral network of coercion, from the viewpoint of its possible transformation.
Dissonance and Consistency according to Shackle and Shafer
Authors: Levi Isaac 
Published: January 2016

R.A.Fisher introduced the fiducial argument as a means for obtaining something from nothing. He thought that on some occasions it was legitimate to obtain a posterior probability distribution over a range of simple statistical hypotheses without commitment to a prior distribution [4].H.Jeffreys thought he could tame Fisher by casting his argument in a Bayesian mold through a derivation of the fiducial posterior from a suitably constructed ignorance prior via Bayes’ theorem and conditionalization on the data of experimentation. According to Jeffreys, Fisher was using something to obtain something after all ([7],pp.381-383).D.V.Lindley furthered the process of taming by specifying allegedly necessary and sufficient conditions for the consistency of fiducial reasoning in contexts of one parameter estimation with Bayesian requirements [14]. I. Hacking exploited Lindley’s result to supply his own ingenious method for taming Fisher([5],ch. 9).T.Seidenfeld has recently demonstrated that Lindley’s conditions are insufficient for consistency and that reconstructions like Jeffreys’ or Hacking’s lead to contradiction ([15], PP. 721-727).
Micro-States in the Interpretation of Quantum Theory
Authors: Hardegree Gary M. 
Published: January 2016

In the present work, I discuss the interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) from the viewpoint of quantum logic (QL). I regard the objects of QL to be the possible (accidental) properties that can be ascribed to a quantum system SYS. The basic idea is that, at any given moment t, SYS actualizes some properties, but not others. The micro-state of SYS at time t is identified with the set of all properties that SYS actualizes at time t.One thing an interpretation of QM is supposed to do, I believe, is delineate the admissible quantum micro-states. Since the characterization of quantum micro-states is intimately related to the characterization of quantum logical consistency, the interpretation of QM is intimately tied to the interpretation of QL.Two kinds of interpretations are discussed. Strict interpretations are based on the assumption that the properties of a system are individuated by the projection operators on the associated Hilbert space.
Are There Cases of Simultaneous Causation?
Authors: Kline A. David 
Published: January 2016

The problem of the direction of causation has received considerable press. Justifiably so, since it is a major bottleneck in accounts of causation and explanation. But there is another, not unrelated, yet unexamined, temporal issue for those same accounts. Numerous writers have uncritically assumed that there are instances of simultaneous causation. (A necessary condition for e and e', two causally related events, to be in a simultaneous causal relation is that there be no time-difference between e and e' or that e and e' occur at the same time.)The assumption is not impotent. Alleged instances of simultaneous causation have been used to argue against various views of causation/explanation. For example, Richard Taylor (1966), Douglas Gasking (1955) and Baruch Brody (1972) have used such cases to critique regularity or nomic-subsumption accounts. Myles Brand (1979) in a very recent paper uses simultaneous causation to challenge Wesley Salmon's statistical relevance analysis (1970).
Do Virtual Particles Exist?
Authors: Weingard Robert 
Published: January 2016

In a recent paper, Shrader-Frechette (1977) has argued that there is a serious (and perhaps fatal) unclarity in the notions of particle and fundamental particle currently used in high energy physics. Shrader-Frechette focuses on the notion of a virtual particle as one of the contributors to this unclarity. Among the reasons offered for this focus are: (1) virtual particles are (in some sense) not observable, and (2) they are introduced merely to balance the “books” so conservation laws hold.More recently, Hendrick and Murphy (1981) have argued that Shrader-Frechette's overall critique of the notions of particle and fundamental particle rests on a number of confusions and in this I am in complete agreement. Here, I am just interested in their response to Shrader-Frechette's remarks about virtual particles.
Quantum Field Theory for Philosophers
Authors: Redhead Michael L.G. 
Published: January 2016

…the quantum theory of fields is the contemporary locus of metaphysical research. (Stein 1970, p. 285)It is now generally recognized that Quantum Field Theory (QFT), after many vicissitudes and a period of almost total neglect, has emerged during the last ten years as a triumphant framework in which to do elementary particle physics.If philosophers are prepared to use current physical theory as a guide to resolving metaphysical questions (and that is a big “If”), then QFT is what philosophers should all be studying. But the subject is notoriously.recondite, and philosophers are busy people, so the objective of the present paper is to cut through all technicalities and try to tell in as straightforward a way as possible just what QFT has to say about “reality”.
Inference in Perception
Authors: Rock Irvin 
Published: January 2016

The thesis of this paper is that perception is intelligent in that it is based on the same kinds of operations that characterize thought. However, the dependence of perception on sensory information makes for certain differences between it and “higher” cognitive functions such as imagination and thinking. Clearly the phenomenal experience of a percept is different from that of thought. Still the processes underlying these different mental end products may be quite similar. Although we know little about the nature of thought, a demonstration that perception results from cognitve operations does constitute an explanation. Others seek to explain perception in very different ways.To turn the problem around so to speak, it is entirely possible that thinking evolved from perception. Perception might be the evolutionary link between low level sensory processes that mediated simple detection of environmental changes in phylogenetically primitive organisms and high level cognitve processes.
Presentations and the Status of Theories
Authors: Griesemer James 
Published: January 2016

Accounts of the structure of scientific theories in twentieth century philosophy of science have tended to focus on epistemological questions to the near exclusion of the metaphysical consequences of their solutions. This emphasis can be understood as resulting from the interest and concerns of the logical positivist movement and continued by proponents of the so-called “received view” of theories (Suppe 1977). One area where this division of interest has been a barrier to progress is understanding the growth of scientific knowledge.While philosophers as diverse as Nagel, Hempel, Kuhn, and Lakatos have attempted to explain the historical course of science, they have largely built their views on foundations designed to explicate the relation between theories (paradigms, scientific research programs) and the world. Thus, the received view's model of progress via theory (or indeed, whole science) reduction (e.g., Nagel 1961) rests on its largely syntactic/logical account of theory structure.
Pluralism and Panselectionism
Authors: Beatty Joh 
Published: January 2016

It is certainly not unreasonable to try to account for patterns of variation in nature in terms of evolution by natural selection. But there are more or less “avid” proponents of this way of understanding nature who are, according to critics, more or less reasonable in inverse proportion. Attempts to understand nature in terms of evolution by natural selection can, according to these critics, be pushed too far. Just how far such pursuits can reasonably be pushed is the central problem of this paper.I will discuss this issue in the context of an episode in the history of evolutionary biology that has been labelled by Stephen Gould, “the hardening of the evolutionary synthesis” (Gould 1980, 1982, 1983). In the course of the hardening of the synthesis, evolutionists attributed a greater and greater role to natural selection, and correspondingly less and less a role to alternative evolutionary agents—minimizing in particular the role of so-called “random drift”.
Philosophy and Economic Methodology
Authors: Hausman Daniel M 
Published: January 2016

Most methodological writing on economics is by economists. Although the bulk is produced by lesser members of the profession, almost all leading economists have at one time or another tried their hand at methodological reflection. The results are usually poor. If one read only their methodology, one would have a hard time understanding how Milton Friedman or Paul Samuelson could possibly win Nobel Prizes. It thus is less surprising that the economics profession professes such scorn for philosophizing than that its members spend so much of their time doing it.Methodological reflections on economics pose other puzzles, too. Although this literature is heavily influenced by philosophy—both current and, especially, out-dated—, it is cut off from philosophical discourse. This quasi-autonomy is puzzling, since this literature is concerned with questions that appear to be instances of, if not the same as the questions with which philosophers of science are concerned.
The Reception of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems
Authors: Dawson John W 
Published: January 2016

“Die Arbeit über formal unentscheidbare Sätze wurde wie ein Erdbeben empfunden; insbesondere auch von Carnap.” - - (Popper 1980).“Kurt Gödel's achievement in modern logic … is a landmark which will remain visible far in space and time.” - - John von NeumannIt is natural to invoke geological metaphors to describe the impact and the lasting significance of Gödel's incompleteness theorems. Indeed, how better to convey the impact of those results - - whose effect on Hilbert's program was so devastating and whose philosophical reverberations have yet to subside - - than to speak of tremors and shock waves? The image of shaken foundations is irresistible.
Internal Realism, Truth and Understanding
Authors: Steinhoff Gordon 
Published: January 2016

In this paper I intend to discuss difficulties which face Hilary Putnam’s internal realism, difficulties which involve issues in semantics. I hope to show that Putnam has not presented a viable theory of truth. Putnam wishes to avoid relativism, which he claims is incoherent. My argument against Putnam’s theory of truth will be that Putnam has avoided relativism at only a very superficial level. On a deeper analysis we will see that Putnam has in fact not avoided relativism.Putnam has abandoned the correspondence theory of truth since he can make no sense of the claim that our words, thoughts, images, sensations, etc. correspond to external objects. Considerations of human psychology (1983a, p.viii), as well as problems concerning reference (1981; 1983a, pp.vii-xviii; 1983b), have led Putnam to adopt the view that truth must be analyzed in terms of justification.
What is Wrong with Strict Bayesianism?
Authors: Maher Patrick 
Published: January 2016

Bayesian decision theory in its classical formulation supposes that for any rational agent and for any possible state x of the world, there is a number P(x). which represents the agent’s judgment of the probability of x. Similarly, the theory assumes that for any possible outcome y of the agent’s actions, there is a number u(y) which represents the utility or value of y to the agent. Given these assumptions, the theory is able to define the expected value for the agent of any act. Bayesian decision theory then recommends that the agent should choose, from amongst the available acts, one which has maximal expected utility.The assumption that an agent has a determinate personal probability function has often been attacked.
Abduction by Classification and Assembly
Authors: Josephson John R. , Chandrasekaran B. , Smith Jack W. , Tanner Michael C. 
Published: January 2016

We describe a general problem solving mechanism that is especially suited for performing a particular form of abductive inference, or best-explanation finding. A problem solver embodying this mechanism synthesizes composite hypotheses. It does so by by combining hypothesis parts as a means to the satisfaction of explanatory goals. In this way it is able to arrive at complex, integrated conclusions which are not pre-stored.The intent is to present a computationally-feasible, task-specific problem solver for a particular information processing task which is nevertheless of very great generality. The task is that of synthesizing coherent composite explanatory hypotheses based upon a prestored, and possibly vast collection of hypothesis-generating “concepts”. The authors’ claim is nothing less than to have shown, in a new sense, and surpassing all other work in this area, how it is computationally possible for an agent to come to “know”, based upon the evidence of the case.
Experiment and the Development of the Theory of Weak Interactions: Fermi's Theory
Authors: Franklin Allan 
Published: January 2016

One of the enduring problems in history and philosophy of science is the interaction between theory and experiment. Hacking (1983) has argued persuasively that experiment often has a life of its own, independent of theory. Lakatos (1970), on the other hand, has argued that theory often proceeds independently of experimental results. More typically, the interaction seems to be rather complex. Experiment may confirm or refute a theory or call for a new theory. Theory may suggest new experiments, offer a new interpretation of known results, or help to validate an experimental result. These are, of course, not the only possibilities (Hacking 1983 and Franklin 1986, Chapter 4).In dealing with the complex interaction between theory and experiment the old cliche, “Man proposes, Nature disposes,” has been shown to be far from adequate. Pickering's study of quark models and theory (1984a) has shown that it is not always clear at the time what is being proposed.
What Numbers are Real?
Authors: Manders Kenneth L. 
Published: January 2016

Perhaps one of the chief items of pride of mathematical philosophy in the last century and a half is the insight that mathematics is the science of formal structures; as opposed to the traditional view, that ‘the proper and exclusive subject matter of mathematics is…quantity.’ Closely associated with this insight is the distinction between pure mathematics, the beneficiary of the freedom conferred by the new status, and applied mathematics (in the philosopher's rather than the mathematician's sense of the word), which has been sent into philosophical limbo, supposedly under the care of philosophy of empirical science.These two insights allow us to avoid many embarrassments. Our postulated freedom to adore gods other than Quantity allows us to break the seemingly endless circle of pointless debate, whether or not negative and complex numbers are legitimate quantities; our assumption that mathematical truth is independent of physical truth relieves us of the worry, whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean geometries are legitimate.
Probability as a Theoretical Concept in Physics
Authors: Krüger Lorenz 
Published: January 2016

What is the use of probability theory in the sciences? A common answer to this question is: probability is the conceptual tool for statistics, i.e. for the evaluation of collections of numerical data. This reply, that covers a wide range of applications may be rendered by saying that the calculus of probability is the theory for statistical practice. Under this interpretation, probability is part of scientific method; it belongs to the ‘logic’ of science, i.e. it regulates scientific inference. At most, it says something about the state of justified belief of a scientist, but nothing about the nature of his objects.If I speak of probability as a theoretical concept, I intend to refer to a different use of probability in the sciences; an explanatory use, or - more cautiously put - a use within the framework of explanatory theories, e.g. in microphysics or evolutionary biology. Compared with the standard application to statistics, this use is exceptional and problematical.
One Epistemological Interfield Relation
Authors: Kinoshita Joyce 
Published: January 2016

In recent decades, much work has been directed toward clarifying the logical relations among various sciences. Because of an emphasis on the logical aspects of interfield relations, the issue of scientific unity often wore a distinctly logical mantle.1 For example, Robert Causey, a prominent philosopher of this tradition, has linked scientific unity and progress to a project of successive microreductions. He states, “Other things being equal, we tend to feel that our understanding of a class of phenomena increases as we develop increasingly general and intuitively unified theories of that class of phenomena. It is therefore natural to consider the possibility of one very general, unified theory which, at least in principle, governs all known phenomena.” (1977, p. 1)Kinds of unity separable from reductive logical unity have, of course, been proposed; these include reductive and nonreductive unities of method, translation, and ontology. For example, J.A. Fodor (1974) has argued for a broad kind of ontological unity of token physicalism, and against type reduction.
Five Theses on Instrumental Realism
Authors: Baird Davis 
Published: January 2016

Some may find an oxymoron in my title. But, my use of “instrumental” is to focus attention on the real instruments of science-pumps, dynamos and cyclotrons-and not the view that scientific theories are best understood as instruments. In what follows I characterize and argue for a kind of realism strongly wedded to what we do with scientific instruments, and divorced from what our theories may say about the entities manipulated by these instruments. My discussion owes much to Ian Hacking’s “Experimental Argument for Realism” (Hacking 1983, ch. 16).The following fantasy might help give some idea of the view I am interested in. Suppose that the diskettes, which many people use in conjunction with a small computer, do not store information magnetically; in fact they store it “radioactively,” exactly how, is not relevant. IBM decided that many people in their target personal computer market would be put off by “nuclear diskettes.”
Arguing for the Natural Ontological Attitude
Authors: Rouse Joseph 
Published: January 2016

In several recent papers, Arthur Fine has developed a far-reaching attack upon both the standard realist interpretations of science and their most prominent anti-realist alternatives (1986a, 1986b, 1986c). In their place, Fine proposes not another position on the realist/anti-realist axis, but an attitude toward science, the “natural ontological attitude” (NOA), which is supposed to remove any felt need for a philosophical interpretation of science.In this paper I will be concerned with Fine’s reasons for adopting NOA rather than his arguments against realism and anti-realism. Unless these reasons are adequate, Fine’s papers are likely to set off a scramble for new and better arguments concerning realism, rather than the reorientation of the philosophy of science which his polemics are clearly intended to provoke. Thus for my purposes, we can presume that Fine’s criticisms of standard positions are generally sound. The question is whether Fine’s proposed alternative attitude can then satisfy the same argumentative standards.
Truth or Consequences? Generative Versus Consequential Justification in Science
Authors: Nickles Thomas 
Published: January 2016

For the past century the Central Dogma of confirmation theory has been:All empirical support (of a theoretical claim) = empirical evidence = empirical data = successful test results = successful predictions or postdictions = true empirical consequences (of the claim plus auxiliary assumptions).According to the Dogma, all empirical support derives from empirical testing of predicted consequences. I shall attack this pure consequentialism and defend the importance of generative justification in science.One question which has been widely debated through the years is whether “postdicting” or explaining already known phenomena provides as much epistemic support for an hypothesis as predicting new phenomena or, indeed, whether explanation provides any support at all. I believe that explanation is on a par with prediction, but I want to address a different question here. Both explanation and prediction (as usually construed) involve consequential reasoning.
Toward a More Objective Understanding of the Evidence of Carcinogenic Risk
Authors: Mayo Deborah G. 
Published: January 2016

The field of quantified risk assessment is a new field, only about 20 years old, and already it is considered to be in a crisis. As Funtowicz and J.R. Ravetz (1985) put it:The concept of risk in terms of probability has proved to be so elusive, and statistical inference so problematic, that many experts in the field have recently either lost hope of finding a scientific solution or lost faith in Risk Analysis as a tool for decisionmaking. (p.219)Thus the ‘art’ of the assessment of risks… is at an impasse. The early hopes that it could be reduced to a science are frustrated. …[O]thers are tending to introduce the ‘human’ and ‘cultural’ factors. The question now becomes, to what extent should these predominate? Would it be to the reduction or exclusion of the ‘scientific’ aspects? For, …if the perceived phenomena of ‘risks’ are interpreted as lacking all objective content or being merely a small part of some total cultural configuration, then there is no basis for dialogue between opposed positions on such problems, (pp.220-221)