bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
On the Metaphysical Distinction Between Processes and Events
Authors: Gill Kathleen 
Published: June 2016

In theMetaphysics, Aristotle pointed out that some activities are engaged in for their own sake, while others are directed at some end. The test for distinguishing between them is to ask, ‘At any time during a period in which someone is Xing, is it also true that they have Xed?’ If both are true, the activity is being done for its own sake. If not, it is being done for the sake of some end other than itself. For example, if I am thinking, it is true that I have thought. But if I’m making a blouse, it is not true that I have made a blouse, at least not this particular blouse. That’s not true until I have completed the project.There have been a number of attempts to deepen our understanding of this distinction. Anthony Kenny devoted a chapter of Action, Emotion, and Will to this issue, exploring the effect tense has on implication relations, and using that as a basis for dividing verbs of action into state-verbs, activity-verbs and performance-verbs. In more recent years the trend has been to generalize these categories so as to include occurrences other than actions, i.e., occurrences which do not involve intentions. While interest in this area tends to focus primarily on linguistic issues, such as the categorization of verbs, or on the logical analysis of sentences, there has been some interest in related metaphysical issues. In 1978 Alexander Mourelatos published ‘Events, Processes, and States,’ a paper which has turned out to be quite influential, in which he proposes an ontological trichotomy of occurrences. In his view, processes and events form distinct categories within the general category of occurrences. In this paper I will examine the reasoning underlying Mourelatos’s claim, arguing that the differences between processes and events cannot provide the basis for an ontological subcategorization of occurrences.
The Historical Discourse of Philosophy
Authors: Allen Barry 
Published: June 2016

What is philosophy today—philosophical activity, I mean—if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known?Michel FoucaultIt may be that we can learn nothing from history but the fact that we have a history ... but there is simply no other way of gaining sensitivity to a future than through insight into the uniqueness and irretrievability of what is past.Hans Blumenberg
Of Epicycles and Elegance
Authors: Adams Frederick 
Published: June 2016

I am pleased to be able to respond to Al Mele’s reply to my paper on trying and desire (‘Desiring to Try: Reply to Adams’ and ‘Trying, Desire, and Desiring to Try,’ respectively, both this volume). My remarks will bebriet.First, it is not thesis T (as stated in Mele’s reply) that I find objectionable. It may be possible for me to want TO TRY to quit smoking (prior to trying), while currently not wanting TO QUIT smoking (nor trying to quit). I may want to try because I want to ACQUIRE the desire to quit, since people persist in nagging me to quit. So I accept thesis T because it is not the issue. The issue is whether one can PERFORM THE ATTEMPT to quit smoking WHILE one lacks the desire to quit smoking. THAT is what I find objectionable and impossible. Mele accepts that it is possible. I believe such an attempt to be merely ‘going through the motions’ in bad faith and not a genuine attempt at all. I believe this for the controltheoretic reasons that I outlined in my original paper and elsewhere.
Gender and the Biological Sciences
Authors: Okruhlik Kathleen 
Published: June 2016

Feminist critiques of science provide fertile ground for any investigation of the ways in which social influences may shape the content of science. Many authors working in this field are from the natural and social sciences; others are philosophers. For philosophers of science, recent work on sexist and androcentric bias in science raises hard questions about the extent to which reigning accounts of scientific rationality can deal successfully with mounting evidence that gender ideology has had deep and extensive effects on the development of many scientific disciplines.Feminist critiques of biology have been especially important in the political struggle for gender equality because biologically determinist arguments are so often cited to ‘explain’ women’s oppression. They explain why it is ‘natural’ for women to function in a socially subordinate role, why men are smarter and more aggressive than women, why women are destined to be homebodies, and why men rape.
Unsettled Problems with Vague Truth
Authors: Mills Andrew P. 
Published: June 2016

A tempting solution to problems of semantic vagueness and to the Liar Paradox is an appeal to truth-value gaps. It is tempting to say, for example, that, where Harry is a borderline case of bald, the sentence(1)Harry is baldis neither true nor false: it is in the ‘gap’ between these two values, and perhaps deserves a third truth-value. Similarly with the Liar Paradox. Consider the following Liar sentence:(2)(2) is false.That is, sentence (2) says of itself that it is false. If we accept the Tarskian schema(T) S is true iff pwhere ‘S’ is a name of a sentence ‘p,’ we are led into paradox. Both the assumption that (2) is true, and the assumption that (2) is false lead us, via (T), to(3)(2) is true if and only if (2) is false.Given this result, a natural reaction is to place (2) in a ‘gap’ between true and false.
Rape and Persuasive Definition
Authors: Burgess-Jackson Keith 
Published: June 2016

If we [women] have not stopped rape, we have redefined it, we have faced it, and we have set up the structures to deal with it for ourselves.[T]he definition of rape, which has in the past always been understood to mean the use of violence or the threat of it to force sex upon an unwilling woman, is now being broadened to include a whole range of sexual relations that have never before in all of human experience been regarded as rape.In 1989 the philosopher and self-described feminist Christina Sommers published a short essay — ‘an opinion piece,’ she called it — that was eventually developed into and published as a philosophical article. In this essay Sommers criticized ‘feminist philosophers’ (her term) for being ‘oddly unsympathetic to the women whom they claim to represent.’ Specifically, Sommers accused these philosophers of ignoring the ‘values of the average woman’ and of being caught up in an ‘ideological fervor.’ To emphasize her point that the so-called feminist philosophers have lost touch with ‘the average woman,’ Sommers wrote that ‘One must nevertheless expect that many women will continue to swoon at the sight of Rhett Butler carrying Scarlett O'Hara up the stairs to a fate undreamt of in feminist philosophy.’
Beyond Singular Propositions?
Authors: Soames Scott 
Published: June 2016

Propositional attitudes, like believing and asserting, are relations between agents and propositions. Agents are individuals who do the believing and asserting; propositions are things that are believed and asserted. Propositional attitude ascriptions are sentences that ascribe propositional attitudes to agents. For example, a propositional attitude ascription α believes, or asserts, that S is true iff the referent of a bears the relation of believing, or asserting, to the proposition expressed by s. The questions I will address have to do with the precise nature of propositions, and the attitudes, like belief, that we bear to them.I will assume both that propositions are the semantic contents of sentences, and that the proposition expressed by a sentence is a structured complex made up of the semantic contents of the parts of the sentences that express it.
Defective Contexts, Accommodation, and Normalization
Authors: Richard Mark 
Published: June 2016

Propositional Attitudes defends an account of ‘believes’ on which the verb is contextually sensitive. x believes that S says (quite roughly) that x has a belief which is ‘well rendered’ or acceptably translated by S; since contextually variable information about what makes for a good translation helps determine the extension of ‘believes,’ the verb is contextually sensitive. Sider and Soames criticize this account. They say it has unacceptable consequences in cases in which we make multiple ascriptions of belief to a single individual - as happens, for example, when we say that Odile believes such and such, that the woman in the corner believes so and so, but are ignorant of the identity of Odile and the woman in the corner.I will distinguish two objections along these lines, and argue that neither is forceful. The objections differ as to whether or not the speaker mistakenly presupposes that the believers under discussion are distinct.
Hume's Extreme Skepticism in Treatise I IV 7
Authors: Singer Ira 
Published: June 2016

Hume finds himself in an appalling state during Treatise I iv 7 (the conclusion of Book I). He is almost bereft of beliefs; he believes, for a short time, only that he cannot believe anything else. But, being an assiduous student of human nature, Hume makes this extreme skeptical crisis into material for naturalistic study. He carefully reports how extreme skepticism comes about, what it is like, and how it passes. So I iv 7 has two aspects: involved personal experience of a skeptical crisis, and detached naturalistic reflection on that crisis. Interpreting the text correctly requires taking both these aspects seriously.An old interpretive tradition ignores or downplays Hume's detached naturalistic reflections in I iv 7, and focuses only on his involved personal experience of skepticism. Oddly enough, interpretations in this tradition tend to treat Hume's experience dismissively and derisively.
Made in the Shade: Moral Compatibilism and the Aims of Moral Theory
Authors: Railton Peter 
Published: June 2016

The general facts about human needs and abilities are perhaps clear enough and I shall assume that commonsense knowledge suffices for our purposes here.John RawlsTheorizing is a distinctive activity. Within almost any discipline, for example, one finds a recognized distinction between theorists and nontheorists, theoretical work and non-theoretical work. To be sure, the distinction is often a matter of degree. Typically, theorists are identified by their commitment to developing an understanding of their subject matter that possesses certain characteristic features- they aim for generality, comprehensiveness, coherence, well-foundedness, and explanatoriness. They aim to formulate and justify systematic representational systems.Theorizing is not to be confused with reflection, which can be more or less lacking in theoretical ambition. Nor is theorizing to be confused with criticism, which can be piecemeal. Theorizing is a form of reflection, and it can be critical, but theories can be vindicatory, even apologetic.
Perception as Input and as Reason for Action
Authors: Levi Isaac 
Published: June 2016

John McDowell (1979) suggests that virtuous agents have a perceptual sensitivity allowing them to determine reliably what to do in any specific context of deliberation. Moreover, the reliable perception yields an accurate depiction not only of the facts of the situation but of the morally right act to do. Finally, the reliably kind behavior of a kind personis not the outcome of a blind, non-rational habit or instinct, like the courageous behaviour- so called only by courtesy- of a lioness defending her cubs. Rather, that the situation requires a certain sort of behaviour is … his reason for behaving in that way, on each of the relevant occasions (331). Perception delivers a reason for action.
Punishment and Community: The Reintegrative Theory of Punishment
Authors: Reitan Eric 
Published: June 2016

There seems to be nearly universal agreement that society cannot do without some form of criminal punishment. At the same time, it is generally acknowledged that punishment, involving as it does the imposition of hardship and suffering, stands in need of justification. What form such a justification should take, however, is a matter of considerable contention, in part because of basic theoretical disagreements on the nature of moral obligation, and in part because of disagreements concerning the nature and purpose of criminal punishment itself.These disagreements have given rise to a number of rival ‘theories’ of punishment - rival accounts of the purposes of punishment and the conditions which justify it. The traditional theories can be broadly categorized as deterrence theories, incapacitation theories, retributive theories, and rehabilitative theories (broadly conceived to include moral education theories). My purpose here is to contribute to this discussion on punishment by introducing a largely overlooked theory of punishment, one whose outlines can be found in the writings of Simone Wei!, but which has yet to be fully developed and discussed. This theory, which I call the ‘reintegrative theory,’ has, I believe, a number of advantages over more traditional theories of punishment.
The Beginning of the Universe and of Time
Authors: Swinburne Richard 
Published: June 2016

What does it mean to say that the Universe had a beginning? There are different ways of spelling this out. I shall develop them, consider the logical relations between them, and support one as best capturing our intuitive understanding of this notion. I shall then draw a conclusion about whether Time could (it is logically possible) have a beginning. Finally I shall consider, on my preferred understanding of what it is for the Universe to have a beginning, what physical cosmology can show about whether it did in fact have a beginning.I understand by a Universe, a system of substances temporally connected to each other. I understand by a substance a thing with causal powers or liabilities, that is able to act or be acted upon. Substances will thus include both material objects and any other physical objects there may be such as chunks of energy or the fluctuating ‘vacuum’ of quantum field theory, and immaterial objects, if there are any, such as souls and ghosts. I understand by two substances being temporally connected that they exist for periods of time which are either earlier than, overlap with, or are later than each other.
Priority and Time
Authors: McKerlie Dennis 
Published: June 2016

Some of us believe in giving priority to people who are badly off in designing social policies and in acting ourselves to help others. As Thomas Nagel puts it, the badly off should be first in the queue when benefits are distributed. This idea is one way of explaining moral views that are called ‘egalitarian.’ Egalitarian moral views can depend either on the idea of valuing equality itself or on the idea of giving priority to the interests of the badly off (some egalitarians might accept both ideas). This paper is concerned with the second kind of egalitarianism.The purest form of the idea explains the priority in this way: a benefit for someone badly off can be more important morally, or can have more value, than a benefit of the same size for someone better off. This is to suppose that the priority in question cannot be explained by thinking in utilitarian terms and accepting the principle of diminishing marginal utility.
In Search of a Post-National Identity: Who are My People?
Authors: De Wachter Frans 
Published: June 2016

The Nation as Philosophical ProblemThe problem of the nation is well articulated in a speech given in 1985 by then president of the Federal Republic of Germany, R. Von Weiszäcker:I belong to a people, the German people. What are the characteristics which we Germans share as a people? What does it mean to belong to such a people? What does the fact that I am German have to do with my identity as a person? Does this fact place a claim on me? Does it mark me? Does it include responsibilities for me? Does it include obligations to me as a German, obligations which I would otherwise not have to fulfil?(…) It is up to us to give content to the term ‘German,’ a content with which we ourselves and the world would like to live in peace.This is not a psychological comment. It is not about the deep-seated need of people to express feelings of collective identity. The question of the nation here is asked from a normative perspective. That will also be the starting point of this study.
The Nation-State as a Political Community: A Critique of the Communitarian Argument for National Self-Determination
Authors: Dahbour Omar 
Published: June 2016

The principle of national self-determination has usually been justified by extending to national groups an entitlement that individuals are regarded as having, namely, to the conditions necessary for their self development. In order to extend the concept of self-determination to nations in this way, an argument that it is important for nations to exist within their own political communities must be given. In this essay, I describe and criticize one type of argument for such a principle of national self-determination – what I will call the communitarian argument.Contemporary communitarians (such as Michael Walzer and David Miller) usually contend that determining who rightfully has membership in a political community must precede the allocation of rights and responsibilities between members. Community is understood to mean a national community; membership in communities therefore results from the ascription of national identities to individuals and to the consequent sorting out of loyalties that follows from this ascription. A right of self-determination for nations is required, on this view, in order to ensure that political communities are legitimately formed in accordance with national identities.
Barbarous Nationalism and the Liberal International Order: Reflections on the ‘Is,’ the ‘Ought,’ and the ‘Can’
Authors: Prager Carol A.L. 
Published: June 2016

It's a mistake to endow the Holocaust or any other massive case of crimes against humanity with cosmic significance. We want to do it because we think the moral enormity of the events should be balanced by an equally grand theory. But it's not. The attempt to do so is poignant.Alain FinkielkrautSavage ethnonationalism, dating back to the end of the eighteenth century, and violent ethnic conflict, as ancient as history, are sometimes viewed as if for the first time in the post-Cold War era. Still, it is the case that the end of the discipline imposed by the bipolar international system has permitted temporarily repressed ethnic and nationalist passions to reassert themselves. In response, a vast literature has sprung up discussing what states should do about genocide and ethnic cleansing, the gravest human rights abuses. In what follows I will consider barbarous nationalism in the context of the liberal international order put into place at the end of the Second World War, the roles of politics, law and morality forming a sub text to that discussion.
Can the Eleatic Principle be Justified?
Authors: Colyvan Mark 
Published: June 2016

The Eleatic Principle or causal criterion is a causal test that entities must pass in order to gain admission to some philosophers’ ontology. This principle justifies belief in only those entities to which causal power can be attributed, that is, to those entities which can bring about changes in the world. The idea of such a test is rather important in modem ontology, since it is neither without intuitive appeal nor without influential supporters. Its supporters have included David Armstrong (1978, Vol2, 5), Brian Ellis (1990, 22) and Hartry Field (1989, 68) to name but a few.Clearly though, if such a principle is to be anything more than just a statement of a certain version of physicalism, it must be argued for. In this paper I will look at the arguments that have been put forward for the principle and suggest some problems for each of these.
C.S. Peirce: Belief, Truth, and Going from the Known to the Unknown
Authors: Wiggins David 
Published: June 2016

The third philosophical stratagem for cutting off inquiry consists in maintaining that this, that, or the other element of science is basic, ultimate, independent of aught else and utterly inexplicable- not so much from any defect in our knowing as because there is nothing beneath it to know. The only type of reasoning by which such a conclusion could be reached is retroduction.Now nothing justifies a retroductive inference except its affording an explanation of the facts. It is, however, no explanation at all of a fact to pronounce it inexplicable.That, therefore, is a conclusion which no reasoning can ever justify or excuse. (Peirce, Collected Papers 1.139)Abduction consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them. Its only justification is that, if we are ever to understand things at all, it must be in that way. (Peirce, Collected Papers, 5.145)[Scientific procedure] will at times find a high probability established by a single confirmatory instance, while at others it will dismiss a thousand as almost worthless. (Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic (1884), p. 16)
Pragmatism and Change of View
Authors: Levi Isaac 
Published: June 2016

Foundationalism in epistemology imposes two demands on the beliefs of intelligent inquirers: (1) thatcurrentbeliefs be justified, and (2) that there be foundational premisses and principles of reasoning that are self-certifying on the basis of which the merits of other current beliefs and principles may be derived. Many anti-foundationalists give up (2) but not (1). They demand that current beliefs be justified by showing these beliefs to be integrated into a systematically satisfactory network of beliefs. Pragmatists belong among those who give upboth(2) and (1).Pragmatists do not think that the project of justifying current beliefs is implementable. In this respect, they are sceptics. Such scepticism does not imply that because agentXat timetcannot justify his current beliefs, he should cease having them. Scepticism about reasons does not imply scepticism with respect to belief. In “The Fixation of Belief” Peirce explicitly dismissed doxastic scepticism when he observed that merely writing down a question challenging some current assumption is not sufficient to create the sort of doubt that should occasion an inquiry.
Respect for Persons
Authors: Buss Sarah 
Published: June 2016

We believe we owe one another respect. We believe we ought to pay what we owe by treating one another ‘with respect.’ If we could understand these beliefs we would be well on the way to understanding morality itself. If we could justify these beliefs we could vindicate a central part of our moral experience.Respect comes in many varieties. We respect some people for their upright character, others for their exceptional achievements. There are people we respect as forces of nature: we go to great lengths to accommodate their moods, wiles, and demands. Finally, most of us seem to respect people simply because they are people. This is the sort of respect of special interest to moral theory.In order to be worthy of this last sort of respect, it is not only sufficient but necessary that one be a person. We can, of course, take a similar attitude towardnonpersons.