bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Thermodynamics, Statistical Mechanics and the Complexity of Reductions
Authors: Sklar Lawrence 
Published: January 2016

That reductions of theories and unifications of science frequently occur by means of identifications is a widely accepted hypothesis of methodology. Usually we are concerned with the micro-reductions of things, in which an entity is identified with a structured aggregate of smaller constituents. And, it is frequently alleged, we must also take into account further identifications in which the attributes of the macro-object, expressed by predicates in the macro-theory, are identified with attributes of the aggregate of micro-entities differently expressed by predicates of the micro- or reducing theory.I am fundamentally in strong agreement with this view, but intend here to explore one case of inter-theoretic reduction where some important qualifications of this account of reduction are in order. Philosophical scepticism is frequently encountered as to the possibility of ever making coherent sense of the notion of attribute identification. This scepticism often shows itself in the opposition to the identificatory account of the reduction of the theory of mental states to that of neurological states.
Evolutionary Rationality
Authors: Skolimowski Henryk 
Published: January 2016

It may sound strange, if not heretical to suggest, as I wish to do, that there is no such thing as the rationality of science. At best we can talk about rationalities of science. Both historically and contemporarily we have used different criteria for explaining and justifying the alleged rationality of science. By giving different criteria for the justification of rationality, we ipso facto constitute different scopes for rationality.This immediately poses the question. If so, which of these criteria are more “justifiable” than others ? Which rationality is preferable to other rationalities ? Now the point is that in justifying a set of criteria which would elucidate for us a given concept of rationality, in other words, in outlining the scope of a given rationality, we do so by resorting to some kind of rationality. And it would be strange if the hidden rationality we resort to, in order to justify the explicit one, would be much different from the explicit one.
What is the Logical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics?
Authors: Demopoulos William 
Published: January 2016

Let me begin by briefly explaining the concept of ‘interpretation’ relevant to this discussion.Certain physical theories postulate abstract structural constraints which events are held to satisfy. Such theories are termed ‘principle theories’. Interpretations of principle theories aim to explain their relation to the theories they replace. Interpretations are therefore concerned with the nature of the transitions between theories.Theories of space-time structure provide the most accessible illustration of principle theories. For example, Newtonian mechanics in the absence of gravitation represents the 4-dimensional geometry of space-time by the inhomogeneous Galilean group, which acts transitively in the class of free motions, i.e. the inhomogeneous Galilean group is the symmetry group of the free motions: it is a subgroup of the symmetry group of every mechanical system, and the largest such subgroup. Einstein’s special principle of relativity is the hypothesis that the symmetry group of the free motions is the Poincaré group.
Evolution, Human Behavior, and Determinism
Authors: Alexander Richard D. 
Published: January 2016

Many of you know that there have been some dramatic theoretical changes in evolutionary biology during the past decade, and that sharp controversies have generated over whether or not, and how, they might be useful in our efforts to understand human behavior. It seems appropriate that these questions should be addressed at a meeting of philosophers of science.Those of you who are aware of the controversies may agree that they have not always clarified the issues — at least not to a degree commensurate with the intensity of the feelings aroused. The word socioblology, for example, could have become simply a label for a new and broad interest in evolutionary approaches to social behavior. Instead, almost exactly like a predecessor, ethology, it has become associated with a concept of naive and intolerable determinism, and sometimes with only a few statements by one man about the genetic background of behavior.
Some Remarks about Complexity
Authors: Suppes Patrick 
Published: January 2016

My remarks on Nelson and Simon are directed not so much at criticisms of what they have had to say as at questions generated by reading and studying what they have written. I also emphasize that my questions are genuine questions. They are not a rhetorical device for stating my own clear and definite views on the nature of complex systems. I have organized these remarks under seven headings.Although the official title of our symposium is “Complex Fuzzy Systems,” neither Nelson nor Simon spends any time on what it means to say that a system is not merely a complex system but a complex fuzzy system. Presumably, the organizers of the symposium had in mind the concept of fuzzy introduced by Zadeh.
Discoveries and The Emergence of New Fields in Science
Authors: Darden Lindley 
Published: January 2016

Understanding the growth of scientific knowledge is a central problem in philosophy of science today, a part of which takes the form of understanding how new knowledge arises and how it becomes unified with existing knowledge. As a way of tackling this problem, one may ask: how do new fields arise in science? And how is the knowledge in a new field related to that in other fields?In recent work I characterized a scientific field as an area of science consisting of the following elements: a central problem, a domain of items taken to be facts related to that problem, general explanatory factors and goals providing expectations as to how the problem is to be solved, techniques and methods, and concepts, laws and theories related to the problem which attempt to realize the explanatory goals (p. 44). Also in that work, my coauthor and I discussed interfield theories which serve to link two fields by postulating specific kinds of relations between them.
Four Contributions Values Can Make to the Objectivity of Social Science
Authors: Harding Sandra G. 
Published: January 2016

In his intellectual autobiography, Rudolf Carnap describes a dispute between Otto Neurath and the rest of the members of the Vienna Circle.All of us in the Circle were strongly interested in social and political progress. Most of us, myself included, were socialists. But we liked to keep our philosophical work separated from our political aims. In our view, logic, including applied logic, and the theory of knowledge, the analysis of language, and the methodology of science, are, like science itself, neutral with respect to practical aims, whether they are moral aims for the individual, or political aims for a society. Neurath criticized strongly this neutralist attitude, which in his opinion gave aid and comfort to the enemies of social progress. We in turn insisted that the intrusion of practical and especially of political points of view would violate the purity of philosophical methods, (p. 23).
Belief and the Incremental Confirmation of One Hypothesis Relative to Another
Authors: Mirabelli Andre 
Published: January 2016

I will present a theory of confirmation (support or corroboration) which can be considered both an extension of the work of Ian Hacking on support and of Karl Popper on corroboration. However, it will be clear that my theory is not a “mere conjunction of these two theories” (p. 202) but a formally simple and intuitive synthesis that explains their strengths and corrects their weaknesses.Popper's explication of corroboration relies on the expression P(e,h) - P(e)2 normalized in different ways (p. 410). He goes on to state the following additional criteria for the corroboration of h by e: (a) we can only “rationally justify a preference for one theory out of a set of competing theories…. so far proposed” (p. 82); (b) e must be the result of a severe test (pp. 414, 418); (c) more-falsifiable hypotheses must be preferred (p. 41); (d) if h is a probabilistic hypothesis then e can only be a statistically interpreted finding, and thus e is often not allowed to be the total available evidence (p. 413).
On The Correct Definition of Randomness
Authors: Benioff Paul 
Published: January 2016

The concept of randomness as applied to number sequences is important to the study of the relationship between the foundations of mathematics and physics. A reason is that while randomness is often defined in mathematical-logical terms, the only way one has to generate random number sequences is by means of repetitive physical processes. This paper will examine the question: What definition of randomness is correct in the sense of being the weakest allowable? Why this question is so important will become clear during the course of the discussion.The main body of this paper is divided into three sections. Section 1. discusses the use of probability theory to describe various statistical processes and some of the alternative definitions of randomness that have been proposed.In Section 2. a criterion which a definition of randomness should satisfy is proposed.
The Purposes of Biological Classification
Authors: Platnick Norman I. , Nelson Gareth 
Published: January 2016

All biologists use classifications to one degree or another, and those of us who work on classifications use the results of all other biologists to one degree or another, so you might reasonably expect that biologists in general would share some common conception of how classifications should be constructed and how they can be used. Certainly one might expect that all taxonomists, at least, would share such a perspective. But this is not the case; in fact, the theory of taxonomy is at present a very controversial subject, with much of the controversy revolving around the question of how to go about constructing an ideal classification.Surprisingly, there is relatively little controversy about what properties an ideal classification would have. Admittedly, different terms are used to describe these properties, various workers arguing that classifications should be maximally stable, or maximally useful, or maximally informative, or maximally testable, or maximally refutable, or maximally predictive, and so on.
Grounding Probabilities from Below
Authors: Hacking Ian 
Published: January 2016

What is at issue between the propensity and the long run frequency schools of thought about objective probability? Recent debate, although vigorous, has contributed little to our understanding of natural law or statistical inference. Yet there is at least one real question, none other than the much maligned topic of emergentism. Although this invokes a number of metaphysical views, such as the unity of science, emergentism primarily poses a question of matter of fact. Is it the case that every stable frequency, correctly represented by a mathematical probability, is ‘grounded from below’ by probabilities that apply to individuals? That is, does the frequency distribution in the population derive from probabalistic facts about the individuals that compose it? Or are there some stable frequencies that pertain to populations, but do not derive from probabalistic facts about members of the population?At least two approaches to these questions have been developed.
Against Evolutionary Epistemology
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: January 2016

By “evolutionary epistemology” I mean Darwinian models of the growth of scientific knowledge. Such models rely on analogies between the development of biological species and the development of scientific theories. Recent proponents of evolutionary epistemology include the psychologist Donald Campbell (1974a), the sociobiologist Richard Dawkins (1976), and philosophers of science Karl Popper (1972), Stephen Toulmin (1972), and Robert Ackerman (1970). I shall argue that the similarities between biological and scientific development are superficial, and that clear examination of the history of science shows the need for a non-Darwinian approach to historical epistemology.The neo-Darwinian model of species evolution consists of Darwin's theory of natural selection synthesized with twentieth century genetic theory. The central ingredients of the neo-Darwinian model are variation, selection and transmission. Genetic variations occur within a population as the result of mutations and mixed combinations of genetic material.
History and the Norms of Science
Authors: Brown James Robert 
Published: January 2016

Most philosophers have a schizophrenic attitude toward the history of science. On the one hand, they want their philosophical accounts of how science ought to be done to do justice to typical scientific practice; but on the other hand, they want to avoid any confusion of historical facts with philosophical norms. A fine example of such a schizophrenic attitude is the one expressed by Wesley Salmon who says: “If a philosopher expounds a theory of the logical structure of science according to which almost all of modern physical science is methologically unsound, it would be far more reasonable to conclude that the philosophical reasoning had gone astray than to suppose that modern science is logically misconceived.” (Salmon 1970, p. 73).But after conceding so much, he takes it all back when he adds: “In spite of this the philosopher of science is properly concerned with issues of logical correctness which cannot finally be answered by appeal to the history of science….
Idealization, Explanation, and Confirmation
Authors: Laymon Ronald 
Published: January 2016

Scriven, with his well-known bridge example, showed that explanations need not carry with them accurate or useful predictions. A bridge has collapsed, but there is no history of overload or natural shock. Metal samples taken near the break show severely reduced elastic capabilities of a sort usually associated with natural aging. Therefore, given that the bridge did fall, it fell because of this sort of metal fatigue. However, on the basis of current theoretical and measurement capabilities, it could not have been predicted that it would fall. (Scriven 1962, pp. 181-185).The existence of explanations which lack true or even usefully approximate predictions is not restricted to complex situations in engineering. Nor are such explanations the exclusive property of the non-physical sciences. The existence of such explanations, I want to claim, is common in the physical sciences as well.
“Internal” and “External” Evidence in Linguistics
Authors: Zwicky Arnold M. 
Published: January 2016

It has become customary for linguists (especially generative linguists) to draw a distinction (initially rather unnatural for philosophers of science) between “internal” and “external” evidence. Usually classified as internal are data on the cooccurrence and alternation of linguistic elements in some language, as well as such systemic considerations as formal simplicity, economy, and the like. External evidence is everything else: the use of phonemes in rhyme schemes, patterns of acquisition, comparison to other languages, speech errors, dialect differences, historical change, and so on. The distinction is usually made invidiously--only internal evidence is probative--or defensively--external evidence, or at least some types of external evidence, are relevant and useful.The distinction arises at two quite different points in the investigation of language. It arises first in the division of labor between linguistics and other fields.
Causal and Explanatory Asymmetry
Authors: Hausman Daniel M. 
Published: January 2016

Explanations sometimes involve a certain asymmetry. For example, given Ohm's Law and the voltage of a battery, one can calculate the current in an electric circuit if one knows the resistance, or one can calculate the resistance if one knows the current. Both of these calculations are (roughly) deductive-nomological arguments, but only the calculation of the current from the resistance is an explanation. Why should only one of these calculations be an explanation?One plausible diagnosis of such explanatory asymmetries is that they arise from the asymmetry of causal relations (see, for example, Salmon 1978 or Beauchamp and Rosenberg 1981, p. 313). The direction of explanation is the direction of causation. The resistance of the wire is a causal condition influencing the amount of the current, while the amount of current does not (as a first approximation) influence the resistance.
The Historical Objection to Scientific Realism
Authors: Leplin Jarrett 
Published: January 2016

Scientific Realism, as I shall understand it, holds that (a) the purportedly referential terms of current theory are genuinely referential, and (b) the theoretical, lawlike statements of current theory are at least approximately or partly true. Realism recommends itself as an explanation of the success of current science at the level of explanations and predictions of experientially accessible phenomena. That is, the case for realism assumes:(1) Current theory in fact achieves such success, and achieves it on balance, i.e., is free of serious disconfirmations.(2) Realism explains such success; i.e., the truth of (a) and (b) would justify us in expecting current theory to be successful.(3) There is no viable nonrealist explanation of the success of current theory.(4) No features of current theory independent of predictive failure discredit (a) or (b).I shall comment briefly on each of these assumptions.
The Status and Meaning of the Laws of Inertia
Authors: Coleman Robert Alan , Korte Herbert 
Published: January 2016

A great deal of literature on the status and meaning of the Laws of Inertia in spacetime theories has nurtured and given wide currency to the claim that the laws are conventional in character, that they are definitions, or circular and without empirical content.Philosophers who argue for the conventional character of the laws, do so, either emphasizing epistemological or ontological considerations concerning the structure of spacetime.Those who argue for their conventional character mainly on epistemic grounds, point out, that the laws do not supply independent criteria of what is to count as force-free or natural motion. The only way of knowing when no forces act on a body is that it moves as a free particle traveling along the geodesies of spacetime. But how, without already knowing the geodetic structure of spacetime is one to determine which particles are free and which are not?
The Insights and Oversights of Molecular Genetics: The Place of the Evolutionary Perspective
Authors: Beatty John 
Published: January 2016

Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. (Dobzhansky 1973)Along with the notion that DNA is at the bottom of things biological, goes the notion that molecular genetics is on top. That is, along with the notion that DNA is the informational basis of life, goes the notion that the deepest explanations in biology are molecular-genetic. But even if the former notion is correct, the latter is not. More specifically; the molecular-genetic perspective alone is inappropriate for explaining those biological generalities that call out instead for an evolutionary account. Moreover, the molecular-genetic accounts that are brought to bear upon biological generalities are often themselves subject to evolutionary scrutiny in the final analysis. I cannot entirely rule out the possibility of an explanation of a biological generality that is, in the final analysis, molecular-genetic and nonevolutionary. I am, in this regard, in somewhat the position of the natural historian.
Artificial Intelligence and Philosophy of Science Reasoning by Analogy in Theory Construction
Authors: Darden Lindley 
Published: January 2016

As a historian and philosopher of science, I am interested in the process of the construction of new scientific theories. The hypothesis to be explored in this paper is that analogies may play an important role in the generation of new ideas that are built into new theories.In order to make clear the locus of my discussion, I would like to present an over-simplified view of the levels of organization of scientific knowledge. The three levels are the following: data, empirical generalizations, and explanatory theories. At the lowest level of generality are the data, particular statements about, particular facts. For example, if we consider data from genetics, in a cross between a yellow pea plant and a green pea plant, all the peas of the first generation of hybrids are yellow; if the hybrids are self-fertilized, the second hybrid generation has a ratio of three yellow peas to one green pea.
Artificial Intelligence, Psychology, and the Philosophy of Discovery
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: January 2016

In their contributions to this volume, Bruce Buchanan (1983) and Lindley Darden (1983) have provided compelling reasons why philosophers of science concerned with the nature of scientific discovery should be aware of current work in artificial intelligence. Buchanan presents abundant examples of the mechanization of generation of empirical hypotheses in current AI programs, while Darden, at a more speculative level, discusses the use of analogy in theoretical discovery. The implication of both these studies is that the philosophy of discovery can profitably borrow notions from work in artificial intelligence, since useful analogies can be found between problems in that field and the problems facing philosophers studying scientific discovery.I have no quarrel with this claim, except that it is too weak. I shall argue that work in AI is not only useful but essential for investigations in philosophy of science concerning discovery. The connecting link between the two fields is empirical cognitive psychology.
van Fraassen's Semanticism
Authors: Minogue Brendan P. 
Published: January 2016

Bas van Fraassen has formulated a semantical or model theoretic analysis of the structure of scientific theories. He contrasts his semantical approach with the syntactic approach of the logical positivists and argues that his theory is preferable on a number of grounds. My aims in this paper will be threefold. First, I will present a brief description of van Fraassen's approach. Secondly, I will compare his theory with that of the logical positivists and, in so doing, identify the virtues that van Fraassen believes recommend, his theory over the positivist theory. Finally, I will raise an objection that is positivist in spirit which suggests that, epistemically, his account is indistinguishable from classical historicism.For van Fraassen, “To present a theory is to specify a family of structures, itsmodels; and secondly, to specify certain parts of these models (theempirical substructures) as candidates for the direct representation of observable phenomena.
The Logic of Science as a Model-Oriented Logic
Authors: Hintikka Jaakko 
Published: January 2016

It has been suggested by Larry Laudan and others that scientific inquiry be conceptualized as a problem-solving and question-answering activity. This approach will be called here the interrogative conception of scientific inquiry. The logic of such a conception of scientific inquiry has not been studied systematically, however. In this paper, some of the main aspects of the logic on which the interrogative conception of science is based will. be briefly outlined on certain simplifying assumptions.It is in fact natural to think of the typical task that confronts a scientist as a question-answer process in two different senses. Our scientist - I shall call her or him the Inquirer - is given a theory T as a starting-point and a question “C or C?” to be answered. Theory T is here assumed to be a truly general theory, i.e., it is assumed not to contain any individual constants.