bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Diskussion/Discussion. Richard Rorty and the American Philosophical Scene
Authors: Turnbull Robert G. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Richard Rorty’s assessment of the American philosophical scene is unduly cynical. Part of the reason for this seems to lie in his recognition (in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) of the incoherence of “grounding” a linguistic or conceptual scheme on a “given”, but proceeding, nevertheless, to think of representation and truth as requiring conformity to a “given”. He, therefore, fails to appreciate the unity and seriousness of American philosophers who, abandoning the “given”, are working with some success·on plausible accounts of representation and truth. Surprisingly, neither in his article nor his book does he attend to the remarkable increase in sophistication and serious research on the part of historians of philosophy and historians of science. Both in serious work on representation and truth and in historical research there is more rapprochement between American and Continental philosophers than Rorty seems prepared to credit.
Richard Rorty – Two Philosophers or one?
Authors: Montefiore Alan 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Rorty makes a number of broadly convergent distinctions between different types of philosopher or philosophy. His own expressed view - or apparent view - that what he calls abnormal or edifying discourse is parasitically dependent on a prior acceptation of the norms of normality is fundamentally, even ‘foundationally’, correct. Any too reckless or too persistently sustained defiance of these norms or of this dependence is bound to involve a refusal of various orders of responsibility; including perhaps both moral and political responsibilities. There can, of course, be no straightforward proof that Rorty’s texts, stimulating and fruitful as they indisputably are, involve any of these irresponsibilities; indeed, he would no doubt accept the gist of much of the argument which seeks to make them explicit. It is nevertheless worrying to find him saying the things that he does say about the allegedly unbridgeable differences between ‘continental’ and ‘analytic’ philosophy; and·. though he might reply that one should not here take what he says as being the expression of a view on a matter of so-called fact, the factual inaccuracies of the views that he might ‘normally’ be taken to be expressing here are only too likely to be more misleading than fruitful, more harmful than harmless.
Der Intersubjektive Faktor. Bemerkungen zu Richard Rortys erkenntnistheoretischem Behaviorismus
Authors: Köhler Wolfgang R. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The following article is only in part a review of Rorty’s “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature”. First I sketch the development of the two leading metaphors, which Rorty considers as being central for epistemology, namely the mirror of nature and the eye of the mind. Then I try to bring out the antirealist implications of Rorty’s socalled “epistemological behaviorism” and to make sense of his slogan that truth is merely warranted assertability which in my view seems not to be in line with his favouring truth-conditional semantics. Thirdly I point to some possible consequences for the social sciences of using the antirealist “criteria!” semantics of the later Wittgen stein, one of Rorty’s heroes.
Virtues and Practices
Authors: Miller David 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Maclntyre presents an account of the virtues first in terms of practices and then in terms of the narrative unity of a person’s life. He fails, however, to observe an important distinction between self-contained and purposive practices; if the virtues are to be understood by reference to practices, they must be of the latter kind. By the same token, a defence of the virtues must refer to the social purposes which practices serve rather than to the goods internal to practices. An appeal to the idea of narrative unity does not save the position in the absence of any concrete specification of the good life for man. Maclntyre’s attempt to reconstitute the virtues falls foul of the moral pluralism that he has earlier diagnosed so acutely.
Civilizing Practices
Authors: Baier Annette , Practices Civilizing 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Maclntyre’s contrast between contemporary individualist versions of morality, expressive of arbitrary selfwill, and some less willful or less arbitrary moral guidance, is queried. All social practices, both those Maclntyre disapproves of and those he prefers, are claimed to contain elements of arbitrariness, and some scope for the expression of some individual human wills. Maclntyre’s neglect of the question of what allocation of power a particular practice or set of practices involves is contrasted with Hume’s due but not undue attention to this matter. Maclntyre’s treatment of Hume’s place in the history of the Aristotelian conception of the moral life as cultivation of virtues is criticized and tentatively explained as really due not to Hume’s anti-rationalism, but to his acceptance of the political and commercial practices which Maclntyre distrusts, and to his rejection of the non-Aristotelian religious concepts of other-worldly goods, sin and redemption from it, which Maclntyre wants added on to Aristotle’s moral theory.
Wer verdrängt was warum? - Schwierigkeiten in Freuds Begriff der Verdrängung
Authors: Bittner Rüdiger 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Freud’s concept of repression should be discarded because we do not understand what supposedly is being repressed, nor what is repressing, nor why it is done. Freud’s answers to the first two questions fall short of the dynamic picture of forces and counterforces implicit in the idea of repression. The answer to the last question invokes an unacceptable separation of agencies in the person.
Eine individualistische Theorie sozialen Handelns. Zu Raimo Tuomelas ‘A Theory of Social Action’
Authors: Leist Anton 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This critical review concentrates on four important parts of Raimo Tuomela’s analytical theory of social action. It examines the book’s reconstructions of social action, of practical reasoning in this context, of social norms and it investigates its claim to a conceptual individualism. The result is critical in several aspects. Tuomela’s most original idea in the analysis of joint action, that of we-intentions, is not broad enough to cover more than a part of social action in the commonly understood sense. His ‘social’ practical reasoning incorporates an implausible premiss. The game-theoretical reconstruction of social norms strikes one as unlikely to be fulfilled in social reality. Hardly any of these analyses back up the individualist claims of Tuomela’s project.
Intentional Social Action and We-Intentions
Authors: Belzer Marvin 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In his recent book Professor Tuomela presents a philosophical account of social action that relies upon the presuppositions of his purposive-causal theory of individual action. In particular, the concept of “we-intention” plays as central a role in the new theory as does that of intention in the earlier one. This article examines Tuomela’s concept of “we-intention”. Tuomela’s introduction of the concept into social action theory is motivated by the assumption that theories of individual actions and social actions are analogous relative to the role of a concept of intention in those theories. This assumption is criticized; and a number of difficulties with the new concept are discussed.
Individual Choice and Institutional Constraints
Authors: Vanberg Viktor 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Normative individualism appears to be an obvious normative premise underlying a liberal conception of the desirable social order. The shortcomings of some common Interpretations of this premise are discussed and a more consistent as well as a more workable standard for assessing the ‘goodness’ of alternative socio-institutional arrangements is specified. With such an Interpretation of normative individualism, a contractrarian conception as advocated by J.M. Buchanan can be viewed as a systematic extension of classical liberalism.
Normen und Interessen als soziologische Grundbegriffe
Authors: Hopf Christel 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This article attempts to clarify and critically to discuss some variants of the sociological Interpretation of regularities in social action. The widely held view that the concept of norm yields the decisive approach to a specifically sociological understanding of behavioural regularities is placed in opposition to Weber’s reflections on the basic concepts of sociology. Weber from the start reserves room for an utility - and interestoriented component of explanation, apart from the concept of norm and in principle not less important. In this connection the article also works out and criticises Parsons' attempt to ‘integrate’ Weber's sociology into a normativistic conception of the discipline. As o consequence of this criticism the author stresses the value of using the concept of norm - and also tho of rule - in o more differentiated fashion. In particular we should distinguish clearly between on the one hand norms, or rules with obligatory components, and on the other utility- or means -ends-oriented rules, followed in the process of furthering one’s own interests. If we neglect this distinction and, like Parsons, subsume o conflation of these concepts under the notion of norm, we run the risk of perceiving any moderately polished and strategically prudent pursuit of an agent’s own interests as a case of norm-governed action.
Nuclear Deterrence: The Rational and the Political
Authors: Quester George H. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
While it is often argued that U.S. military strategy has gone through substantial changes over the post three decodes, it is not so clear if this is so, or why this should be so. Some changes in the real strategic problem of the west must be considered, including the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Changes in our perception of the problem may be at least as important, however, amid some possibilities of ‘Finlandisation’. Changes in the West’s opportunities must also be considered, including ‘limited nuclear war’, and a totally conventional defense. Finally to be considered are the bureaucratic motivations of those advocating any such changes in western military postures, all of which suggest that current policies may still be better than the alternatives.
Die Mängel der Abschreckung: Lassen sie sich beheben?
Authors: Frei Daniel 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The strategy of deterrence suffers from at least 8 deficiencies: 1. The deterrence threat may be underestimated or overestimated. 2. The efficacy of deterrence is conditioned by o variety of factors. 3. Deterrence is highly questionable inasmuch as it represents the principle of revenge. 4. Deterrence may lead to self-deterrence. 5. Extended deterrence may have a low degree of credibility. 6. The stability of the deterrence system is constantly jeopardized. 7. Deterrence may lead to accidental nuclear war. 8. Moral acceptability of deterrence is decreasing. Attempts to overcome these deficiencies by upgraded deterrence postures, arms control, unilateral disarmament and defensive systems have been futile. Therefore mankind will have to live with deterrence; efforts ought to be undertaken, however, to prevent a ‘nuclear Sarajevo’ by appropriate measures stabilizing the strategic system.
Recent Strategic Developments: A Critical Overview From A Just War Perspective
Authors: Johnson James Turner 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Beginning with a sketch of the major moral ideas contained in just war tradition, this essay applies them to three controverted issues in contemporary military debate: nuclear deterrence strategy, the strategic defense initiative, and the possibility of building and deploying fractional megatonnage nuclear weapons on delivery vehicles of extremely high accuracy. It is argued that, in terms of the criteria of just war tradition, deterrence in its present form poses grave moral problems. The two new weapons systems are then examined in terms of whether, by just war criteria, they represent more moral means of defense than contemporary nuclear deterrence.
Nuclear Deterrence and Just War Theory
Authors: Phillips Robert L. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The just war tradition stands as the moral and prudential alternative to both pacifism and realism. It forms the only reasonable ethical basis for the understanding of state initiated force. As applied to questions of nuclear deterrence, just war theory is incompatible with Mutual Assured Destruction and with the threat of MAD. Just war theory entails a move toward counterforce with discriminate targeting of military capabilities and away from city targeting . This is now becoming possible technically and is morally indicated. The counterforce option is realistic in that nuclear disarmament is an extremely remote possibility and alternate strategies such as bluff ore not workable. A counterforce strategy would be both discriminate and proportional as well as being in accord with political realism.
Elements of Constraint
Authors: Häyry Matti , Airaksinen Timo 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This paper analyses the various effects of threats and offers on freedom. Both threats and offers are related to social power. Threats are part of coercion and they are constraints. We try to say why this is so. Offers are more problematic. We identify soft and hard offers, or offers that can be refused and those that cannot. Hard offers have several interesting features, especially in relation to individual preference orders and sets of action alternatives. This paper studies problems which are implicit in Thomas Wartenberg’s study of the various forms of social power in this issue of Analyse & Kritik.
Die neue Welt der Ökonomie
Authors: Kirchgässner Gebhard 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The article starts out with a sketch of the model of Individual behaviour, basic for modern economic theory, including the consideration of typical criticisms. The model then is examined in its application first to micro- and macroeconomic theorizing, then to the economic analysis of politics and of law. It concludes by pointing out some drawbacks inherent in the economic approach to the social sciences: economic imperialism, conservativism and the illusion of manageability.
Der Homo Oeconomicus: Ausnahmeerscheinung in jeder Situation oder Jedermann in Ausnahmesituationen?
Authors: Zintl Reinhard 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Even if formally precise, the economic concept of rationality has different empirical implications depending on how it is used in theory building. If it is used as a tool of microfoundation in multi-level analysis it can be applied universally, but does not imply a specific model of human behavior. As a means of constructing microtheories proper it is, on the other hand, translated into a definite model of man but can be applied only to specific situations. This model, known as homo oeconomicus or economic man, should not be taken as an assertion about human nature but rather as a shorthand description of the behavior enforced and stabilized by social situations of a certain type.
Methodologische Überlegungen zum ökonomischen Imperialismus
Authors: Homann Karl , Suchanek Andreas 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Starting point is the thesis that economics - as well as other social sciences - is imperialistic with regard to the area of its subject, but not with regard to its approach. Underlying economics is the following schema: Try to explain under the presumption that actors maximize their expected utility under constraints. Conditions and possibilities of interdisciplinary research within all sciences being considered imperialistic are discussed according to this schema. Theoretical guide-lines are provided by the systematic connection of ‘problem’ and ‘schema’, as well as the concept of ‘fruitfulness’ as primary criterion of judgement.
Wissen, Präferenzen und Kommunikation – eine ökonomische Theorie
Authors: Witt Ulrich 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Given that individual information processing and memory capacity are severely limited, many institutional and procedural properties of the social communication process can be explained within an individualistic approach as the outcome of a co-evolution of action-inherent knowledge and preferences. This argument is outlined by referring to phenomena such as the competitive release of information (advertising), the role of celebrities and the rent they collect, and some characteristic ‘critical mass’ features.
Norminterpretation und ökonomische Analyse des Rechts
Authors: Kirchner Christian , Koch Stefan 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Normative economics and a hermeneutic approach to interpretation of legal norms are only compatible if - and this is the exception - such legal norms have the goal of accomplishing economic efficiency. But economic analysis of law as a positive approach may be used in the legal interpretation process in order to evaluate different options of norm interpretations. In fields of law where economic issues are at stake such a methodological evaluation of interpretative variants are superior to common sense analysis and should be applied. But even in fields where non-economic issues play a major role an economic analysis is a helpful tool in order to get aware of the opportunity costs of economically sub-optimal solutions. Economic analysis of law thus becomes an integral part of the norm interpretation process without colliding with the autonomy of the legal decision enhancing the rationality of the endeavour.
Ist „zwanghaftes Handel” ein paradoxer Begriff?
Authors: Löw-Beer Martin 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
What does it mean that a person is psychologically forced to do certain things? It is argued that there are, strictly speaking, no compulsive actions. Talking of compulsive actions people refer to intentional actions that are means of avoiding irrational panic attacks. People know that certain situations will cause them irrational fears and that is the reason why they avoid these situations. These irrational fears are either mediated by wrong perceptions or by emotional delusions. In the former case the people believe wrongly that they are in danger, while in the latter case they know that they “feel wrong”, but cannot help it. The compulsive elements cannot be found in the actions but in the irrational fears and the obsessions that are part of them.
Wahn, Sinn, Sprache und Analyse
Authors: Kettner Matthias 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
I discuss Wolfgang Tress’ attempt to apply analytic philosophy to the field of psychiatry and psychological medicine. According to Tress the concept of a person as a rational intentional system is fundamental for psychological medicine and irreducible to concepts of the natural sciences. But the rationality assumptions that are crucial for the concept of a person need much more clarification than Tress provides. Furthermore, Tress’ concept of schizophrenia as a disorder of ‘semantic coherence of the person’ is seriously flawed empirically. Pragmatics rather than semantics should provide the methodological framework for the reconstruction of psychopathological concepts, such as “schizophrenia” and “delusion”.
Utilitaristische Ethik und Tötungsverbot
Authors: Birnbacher Dieter 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
One of the standard criticisms of classical utilitarian is that it is unable to provide an adequate ethical foundation for the wrongness of killing. It is reasoned that the five arguments against killing available to the classical utilitarian are indeed sufficient to provide such a foundation and that recourse to preference utilitarianism is neither called for nor helpful since it generates a number of problems of its own. On this basis, Singer’s discussion of selective abortion and the selective euthanasia of newborns is criticized from within utilitarianism for not giving sufficient weight to direct and indirect social side-effects, especially if ‘external’ criteria are introduced into the valuation of human life.
Kindstötung und das Lebensrecht von Personen
Authors: Hoerster Norbert 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
According to the view of Peter Singer, only persons deserve a right to life. As a consequence, a human being can claim such a right only at a certain point of its postnatal development and there is no essential moral difference between infanticide and abortion. Against this view, it is argued that - even on the basis of personhood as the fundamental criterion - there are convincing pragmatical reasons for attributing a right to life in social practice at the point of birth. It is also shown how this position can be combined with a morally satisfactory position on the important problem of the treatment of infants who are severely handicapped.
Max Weber and the Legitimacy of the Modern State
Authors: Beetham David 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Max Weber’s typology of legitimate ‘Herrschaft’ has provided the basis for the treatment of legitimacy in twentieth century sociology and political science. The thesis of the article is that this typology is a misleading tool for the analysis of the modern state, and especially for the comparative analysis of political systems. This is because of basic flaws in Weber’s conceptualisation of legitimacy itself, and in his account of the normative basis of authority. The article offers an alternative, multi-dimensional, account of political legitimacy, and suggests how it might be used to develop a typology of forms of ‘Herrschaft’ more appropriate to the analysis of the modern state.
Two Theorists of Action: Ihering and Weber
Authors: Turner Stephen P. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Rudolf von Ihering was the leading German philosopher of law of the nineteenth century. He was also a major source of Weber’s more famous sociological definitions of action. Characteristically, Weber transformed material he found: in this case Ihering attempt to reconcile the causaland teleological aspects of action. In Ihering’s hands these become, respectively, the external and internal moments of action, or intentional thought and the factual consequences of action. For Weber they are made into epistemic aspects of action, the causal and the meaningful, each of which is essential to an account of action, but which are logically and epistemically distinct. Ihering thought purposes were the products of underlying interests, but included ‘ideal’ interests in this category. Weber radicalized this by expanding the category and making it historically central. This radicalization bears on rational choice theory: if ideal interests have a large historical role independent of material interests, and are not fully explicable on such grounds as ‘sour grapes’, the methods appropriate to the study of the transformation of ideas, meaning genealogies in the Nietzschean sense, are central to the explanation of action.
Rawls and the Socratic Ideal
Authors: Nielsen Kai 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
John Rawls’s recommendation that political philosophy should be kept free of metaphysics has recently come under attack by Jean Hampton. According to her philosophy as a Socratic quest has to orient itself by radical probing and that unavoidingly involves us in metaphysical commitment. Non-Socratic philosophy in the later Rawls, she claims, reduces itself to a mere ‘modus vivendi’. In defending Rawls the article makes clear how Hampton underrates the method of reflective equilibrium. Rawls makes a rationally reconstructed use of the Socratic ideal, that can be turned not only against Hampton’s critique of Rawls, but also against its relativist appropriation by Richard Rorty.