bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Zeno Vendler on the Objects of Knowledge and Belief
Authors: Dunn Robert , Suter Geraldine 
Published: June 2016

In Chapter V of his book Res Cogitans — “On What One Knows” — Zeno Vendler attempts to maintain the thesis that the objects of knowledge and belief are incompatible, i.e., that the immediate object of believing is a picture of reality and “the immediate object of knowing is not a ('true’) picture of reality but reality itself”. We shall(I) argue that he fails in this attempt because his “incompatibilism” depends on the view that the that-clauses which are the basic verb objects of know and believe are of a type which reflect a distinction between the subjective and objective dimensions of the mental world; and it is exactly this which he does not establish;and(II) question the philosophical significance of the wh-nominal.In Chapter IV — “Propositions” — Vendler tries to draw a distinction between “the subjective and objective dimensions of the mental world”. The subjective dimension corresponds to the world of propositions.
Defeasibility Theories of Knowledge
Authors: Levy Steven R. 
Published: June 2016

There have been many attempts of late to formulate a satisfactory theory of knowledge with which to replace the traditional justified true belief analysis. Almost all agree that it must be the case that in order for S to know that p; i.) p be true, and ii.) S believe that p. Although many argue that there must be a condition stating that S has adequate evidence for p, requirements other than i.) and ii.) are controversial. The most popular approach taken, however, is the addition of a requirement to the effect that for S to know that p there must be no other evidence against p strong enough to undermine S's belief that p, should this evidence come to S's attention. I shall call such a requirement a “defeasibility condition” and any theory containing such a requirement a defeasibility theory.Defeasibility theories are quite effective in handling a certain kind of difficulty to which theories of knowledge are subject, namely problems dealing with what Harman has termed the social aspect of knowledge.
A Solution to the Predictor Paradox
Authors: Stack Michael F. 
Published: June 2016

William Newcomb and Robert Nozick have provided us with the following problem in rational decision-making. There are two boxes, A and B. A contains either a million dollars (M) or nothing (0). B contains a thousand dollars (T). I come into the room in which we have the boxes, closed. I must make one of two choices. Either I open A and take whatever money is present, M or O, or I open both and take whatever money is present, M + T or O + T. What is the rational choice for me to make?Nothing unusual is meant by “rational” in this context. We assume that a person making the choice desires as much money as possible. We assume that he will take into account all relevant available information as to what decision will lead to more money. If he believes that doing X will, or is likely to, lead to more money than doing not-X, then he will do X.In the above case, it would seem that the rational choice is both. T is there for the taking, whether or not I get M, and I might as well try for both.
Reviving the Logical Connection Argument
Authors: Otten James 
Published: June 2016

The causal theory of human action that maintains that a person's wants cause his actions has recently gained considerable support in the philosophical community. The so-called logical connection argument, once a seemingly powerful obstacle to this theory, has fallen into disrepute. Roughly stated, this argument claims that since the relation between a want and the supposedly resultant action is logical in nature, whereas the relation between any cause and its effect must be contingent in nature, a want therefore cannot be the cause of an action.In this paper I shall first of all consider four classical formulations of the logical connection argument (hereinafter the LCA), expounding them step-wise and reviewing various objections, some telling, that have been brought against them. Next I shall present my own formulation of the LCA, which is immune to such objections. Finally I shall propose a natural modification of the causal theory which would enable it to escape the brunt of the LCA. I shall then argue, however, that when the causal theory is modified in this way there are insuperable difficulties to the task of gathering evidence in support of it.
Feyerabend's Rationalism
Authors: Lugg Andrew 
Published: June 2016

I like to say there is no scientific method as such, but rather only the free and utmost use of intelligence.P.W. BridgmanIt is generally believed—see, for example, Lakatos, Dorling, Koertge, Gellner, and Finnocchiaro—that Feyerabend is committed to the view that science is an essentially irrational enterprise. In this paper, I argue initially that this is so only if Feyerabend is saddled with an unreasonable notion of rationality. Next, I point out, first, that there is a reasonable notion of rationality which is compatible with Feyerabend's non-method ‘anything goes’; and, second, that unless coupled with some form of rationalism this non-method is obviously and trivially false.
Justice and Historical Entitlement
Authors: Cooper Neil 
Published: June 2016

The aim of a theory of justice appears to be to find an explanation of our intuitive judgments in this area, an explanation which is capable of yielding, at any rate eventually, answers to particular questions of social policy. The difficulty of constructing such a theory is due partly to the many elements in the concept of justice. To assert that there is more than one concept of justice would be to take the easy way out; to say that there is only one simple concept, as Robert Nozick appears to do (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Princeton, 1974) is to narrow to an unwarranted extent the application of the concept.Any adequate concept of justice must include amongst its ingredients fairness, entitlement or right, desert, need, reciprocity and the relative paramountcy of the concept. Nozick's historical-entitlement theory explains both the connection of justice with entitlement and the relative paramountcy of the concept. But it does not show, as it should, the connection of entitlement with the other elements in the concept of justice.
Phenomenology of Phenomenology
Authors: Bertoldi Eugene F. 
Published: June 2016

Husserl and others have spent a great deal of time writing introductions to phenomenology, and in trying to explain its nature. One thing that becomes clear from these efforts is that phenomenology claims to have a method for analyzing the essential structures of “mental events” (erlebnisse). This raises the possibility of phenomenology turning back on itself, for surely the analysis itself must consist of “mental events”. Hence, at some point in its investigations, phenomenology itself could become what phenomenologists seek to analyze. Husserl foresaw this when he suggested the possibility that:transcendental phenomenology itself then becomes a theme for constitutional and critical inquiry at a higher level, for the sake of conferring on it the highest dignity of genuineness: the ability to justify itself down to its roots.What becomes apparent here is that phenomenology's self-reflection is necessary, not merely possible: without self-reflection phenomenology would lack final “genuineness” or the “ability to justify itself down to its roots”. Unfortunately while Husserl, here and in other places, signals the necessity of this sort of reflection, he nowhere seems actually to carry it out at length.
Pronouns, Quantifiers, and Relative Clauses (l)
Authors: Evans Gareth 
Published: June 2016

Some philosophers, notably Professors Quine and Geach, have stressed the analogies they see between pronouns of the vernacular and the bound variables of quantification theory. Geach, indeed, once maintained that ‘for a philosophical theory of reference, then, it is all one whether we consider bound variables or pronouns of the vernacular'. This slightly overstates Geach's positition since he recognizes that some pronouns of ordinary language do function differently from bound variables; he calls such pronouns ‘pronouns of laziness'. Geach's characterisation of pronouns of laziness has varied from time to time, but the general idea should be clear from a paradigm example:(1) A man who sometimes beats his wife has more sense than one who always gives in to her.The pronouns ‘one’ and ‘her’ go proxy for a noun or a noun phrase (here: ‘a man’ and ‘his wife’) in the sense that the pronoun is replaceable in paraphrase by simple repetition of its antecedent.
On Foucault's Philosophical Method
Authors: McDonell Donald J. 
Published: June 2016

In 1966 Michel Foucault pointed out that the generation of thinkers who had taken as their model Sartre or Merleau-Ponty had suddenly become part of the intellectual museum. A new generation of thinkers had appeared whose passion was not for “meaning”, “man” and “commitment”, but for the “concept and the system”.One could say that the break with the past generation began the day that Levi-Strauss with regard to societies and Lacan with regard to the unconscious showed us that “meaning” was probably nothing but a sort of surface effect, a scum, and that that which affected us most profoundly, that which preceded us, that which maintains us.in space and time was the system.“Our task, Foucault went on, is to free ourselves from humanism and in that sense our work is political.” For some time Foucault and those who thought like him were classed as ‘academics”, that is as people whose thinking had little or no implications for the ongoing state of the society. Then came the May movement of 1968 and in February of 1969 a major gathering was held and the main speakers were Jean-Paul Sartre and Michel Foucault.
Rawls and the Contract Theory of Civil Disobedience*
Authors: Sumner L. W. 
Published: June 2016

Since its appearance in 1971, John Rawls’ A Theory of justice has attracted much critical attention. Most of this attention has inevitably centred on the two principles of justice for institutions and on their derivation from the original position. This paper will examine a part of the system which has not yet received such close scrutiny — Rawls’ theory of political obligation in general and civil disobedience in particular. My main aim is to understand this theory, since there are crucial respects in which it is undeveloped. But I shall also along the way comment on its possibilities; these comments will for the most part take the form of comparisons with its utilitarian rival.In what follows I shall not confine myself to the material in Rawls’ book, but rather use the appearance of the book as an opportunity to review the development of the theory of political obligation since “Justice as Fairness”. When one surveys the period bounded by that initial paper and by the book, certain patterns form.
Fair Contracts and Beautiful Intuitions
Authors: Pence G. E. 
Published: June 2016

John Rawls, the twentieth century political liberal and arch-foe of utilitarianism, has resurrected the moral methodology of contractualism on the battleground of normative ethics. Rawls’ theory illuminates both the power and the weaknesses of all theories of contractualism in normative ethics.In this paper, I examine what Rawls believes contractualism can accomplish in ethics. Then I examine one crucial aspect of Rawls’ contractualism — the notion of fairness. Next, I argue that Rawls begs the question of the choice of principles against utilitarianism. One way in which question-begging occurs is by forsaking any real conception of bargaining agents, substituting instead many abstract instantiations of one non-envious, mildly self-interested, impartial agent. Rawls claims that it is of “great importance” (141-142) that agents in the social contract achieve unanimity. In reality, the contractstipulatesunamimity among its agents, instead of the opposite, where unanimity follows from consensus over fair principles. The veil of ignorance does not guarantee impartiality, but instead, it precludes choosing utilitarian principles. Finally, I test the adequacy of Rawlsian contractualism by applying it to an important problem in modern medicine involving justice,viz.,the just allocation of scarce medical resources.
Relative Identity and Number
Authors: Perry John 
Published: June 2016

Geach has claimed that Frege had an insight about number which should have led him to the doctrine of relative identity:I maintain it makes no sense to judge whether x and y are “the same or whether x remains “the same” unless we add or understand some general term — the same F. That in accordance with which we thus judge as to the identity, I call a criterion of identity; … Frege sees clearly that “one” cannot significantly stand as a predicate of objects unless it is (at least understood as) attached to a general term; I am surprised he did not see that this holds for the closely allied expression, “the same”.Frege has clearly explained that the predication of “one endowed with wisdom” … does not split up into predications of “one” and “endowed with wisdom” … It is surprising that Frege should on the contrary have constantly assumed that “x is the same A as Y” Does split up into “x is an A (and y is an A)” and “x is the same as … y.” We have already by implication rejected this analysis.
Castañeda on Phaedo 102b-d
Authors: Gallop David 
Published: June 2016

In replying to my criticism of his interpretation of this passage, Professor H-N. Castañeda has disregarded much of my argument. In particular, he has ignored my contention that a contrast between 'essential’ and ‘accidental’ predication is integral to the wider argument for immortality in which Phaedo 102b-d is embedded. This would remain the case whatever the grammar of 102b-c, and whatever the exact force of πεφυxέναι and τυγχάνει at 102c1-2. Further, Castañeda pays no heed to the difficulty of interpreting Plato's other relational examples in his way, given that no analysis parallel to that of 102b-d is anywhere hinted at for them. Moreover, he disregards the difficulty that several other examples in the nearby context are analysed in terms of the Theory of Forms, and yet are not overtly ‘relational’ in the usual sense at all.Castañeda says (note 12) that it is ‘clear’ from my own translation of several passages (72e6, 103e7, 109d4, 110b2, 111c2, etc.) that τυΥχάνει in the Phaedo ‘has nothing to do with accident.’
Circularity and Consistency in Descartes
Authors: Dreisbach Donald F. 
Published: June 2016

The problem of the Cartesian Circle has been with us ever since the publication of the Meditations. This is quite remarkable, since the error of circularity which Descartes is accused of having committed is not a subtle one but is, if there is such an error, a gigantic blunder which is not difficult to discover, which was pointed out to Descartes shortly after the Meditations appeared, and which completely undermines Descartes’ primary project, the establishment of sure and certain knowledge. It is incredible that Descartes, a slow and careful thinker with considerable philosophical talent, could have made such an obvious and egregious error. It is much more plausible that there really is no circularity in Descartes’ argument, and that the charges of circularity grow out of a misunderstanding of Descartes’ intention or of the way in which his argument progresses.The incredible, of course, is possible, and I am not proposing that the question of the circle be resolved merely by dismissing it, nor am I suggesting that the text be ignored in order to force consistency onto Descartes’ thought.
On ‘Moral Expertise’
Authors: Szabados Béla 
Published: June 2016

Not so long ago it was fashionable to claim that it is not the moral philosopher's business to say what things are good or what actions we should perform. This view is succinctly stated by A. J. Ayer:There is a distinction, which is not always sufficiently marked, between the activity of a moralist, who sets out to elaborate a moral code, or to encourage its observance, and that of a moral philosopher, whose concern is not primarily to make moral judgments but to analyse their nature.On the other hand, in direct opposition to this, recently many philosophers actively moralize, in the sense that they argue for substantive normative ethical positions. In doing this they tend to assume but not to explore seriously two views: (1) that the notion of moral expertise is unproblematic, and (2) that moral philosophers in particular are moral experts. My aim in this paper is to promote the exploration of these questions. (1) is logically prior to (2). Nevertheless I begin with discussing (2); for puzzles about expertise in morals naturally emerge when one examines the credentials of candidates for the job.
Pearce on Behalf of the Materialist
Authors: Puccetti Roland 
Published: June 2016

Glenn Pearce, labels the identification of the firing of one's pain centres in the brain with feeling pain ‘a naive view,’ the refutation of which cannot much threaten any serious version of materialism. But in fact at least a dozen proponents of contemporary materialism have already hypothesized the identification of feeling pain with activation of a specific neural mechanism, although they picked the wrong mechanism, namely C-fibres. Just to take a recent example, James Cornman and Keith Lehrer, trying to get around the objection to the identity theory that the language of neural processes and the language of feeling pains belong to different linguistic categories, suggest that the materialist could devise a new term to refer to the same entity across categories: ‘fibain.’They write,He would then claim that there are fibains, that is, entities with those properties usually associated with pains, and also with the properties usually associated with firing C-fibers. He can, then, avoid category mistakes by saying that what are thought to be pains and what are thought to be firing C-fibers are really fibains.
Doing Without Events
Authors: Trenholme Russell 
Published: June 2016

Events have played a central role in a number of recent philosophical analyses. In general, there are two different sorts of arguments that might be offered in favour of an event analysis: first, it might be held that the constructions being analyzed contain certain nominals (expressions like “the sinking of theLusitania,”or “Nixon's resignation“) which intuitively refer to events, and further that any satisfactory analysis must respect these intuitions; second, it might be argued that quite aside from our intuitions, the concept of an event — perhaps as a purely technical device — permits the solution of philosophical problems implicit in alternative non-event analyses (which typically take nominals as non-referring sentence transformations).I wish to argue that both the above sorts of arguments fail. First, I argue that our intuitions about the reference on nominals are inconsistent, varying from context to context, so that the various sorts of event analyses cannot be talking about a single category of entities.
Volitions and Actions
Authors: Martin Michael 
Published: June 2016

In a recent paper Lawrence Davis has argued that the difference between an arm raising and someone raising his arm is that in the latter case a volition causes the arm to rise. In this paper I will show that Davis's theory is faulty and that certain obvious ways of repairing his theory do not work.Davis proposes the following as an account of Sam's raising his arm:(E) Sam raises his arm if he willed to raise his arm and this caused his arm to rise.According to Davis the volition — Sam's willing to raise his arm — need not be interpreted psychologically. Volitions could be ghostly mental events, but they might not be. He leaves this open. He also leaves open the question of whether volitions are introspectable events. Davis allows that in some cases Sam's arm rising can be caused by a volition different from the volition to raise his arm. For example, Sam might will to step on a pedal.
What Schooling in Capitalist America Teaches Us about Philosophy
Authors: Nicholson Linda J. 
Published: June 2016

As a philosopher working in the area of education, I believe Samuel Bowles’ and Herbert Gintis’ recent book, Schooling in Capitalist America1 to be an important work. I believe it to be important first of all for the concrete ideas it raises about education in the history and present reality of American society. Secondly, it serves as an excellent example in a lesson in what philosophy, both philosophy of education, and philosophy generally, ought to become. In particular, by contrasting this work in its conclusions and methods with other works in mainstream contemporary philosophy of education, I believe we can see more clearly certain defects in contemporary philosophy of education, which apply also to other fields in philosophy. To accomplish this goal, I would like first of all to summarize the book itself.The aim of Schooling in Capitalist America is to expose many of those self-deceptions which our society has about itself and its educational system.
Impartiality
Authors: Henberg M. C. 
Published: June 2016

A great deal of philosophical consideration has been given in recent years to the issue of justice. In large measure this effort has focused upon justice in . relation to social institutions, to the distributive question of disbursing social benefits on the one hand or punishments and burdens on the other hand. Essentially we may view justice as having two basic requirements. In the first place we need conditions assuring impartial treatment of individuals and, in the second place, conditions for reasonable treatment of individuals — as injustice may arise either if relevantly similar persons are accorded dissimilar treatment or if they receive similar but unreasonable treatment.In this article I shall examine a number of devices which have been proposed to meet the first requirement — that of impartiality. Social theorists have pursued impartiality with strategies ranging from the disinterested Ideal Observer of many utilitarians to the ‘veil of ignorance’ conditions in John Rawls's revitalized contract theory. I shall demonstrate that the preoccupation with impartiality in social institututions has had an unfortunate consequence. It has obscured the original motive for impartiality and led to a misunderstanding of the concept.
Opacity in the Attitudes
Authors: Fales Evan 
Published: June 2016

Philosophical logic has its problem-children; and among these the Principle of Substitutivity of codesignating expressions — the linguistic spawn of Leibniz's law—has achieved a place of prominence. It has become increasingly apparent that a certain style of linguistic analysis, which seeks to impose formal regimentation ruled by the constraints of classical quantification theory, does not yield results with the kind of uniformity and elegance one should hope for from a satisfyi.ng theory. The root of the difficulty, I believe, bears upon the answers to fundamental questions concerning the nature of cognitive agents and the purposes which their use of language is designed to further. If this is the case, one might expect to find some of the trouble surfacing at precisely those points where the language is used to convey information about the cognitive activities associated with the use of language by such agents. So it is.The central problem of this essay is the interpretation of referential expressions in statements involving propositional attitudes, with the focus on belief contexts. But I shall begin by placing the discussion within a broader theoretical framework.