bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Jesuits and the drafting of the Irish constitution of 1937
Authors: Faughnan Seán 
Published: August 2016

In July 1987, the private papers of Éamon de Valera relating to the drafting of the Irish constitution of 1937 were opened to the public for the first time. The purpose of this paper is to examine, in the light of this material, which is held in the Francisan House of Studies, Killiney, County Dublin, and of documents now available in the Irish Jesuit Archives, the contribution of a number of Jesuit priests to the drafting of this constitution.On 24 May 1934, Éamon de Valera, president of the executive council, set up a committee of four civil servants to examine the Irish Free State constitution of 1922. Its membership consisted of Stephen Roche, secretary of the department of justice (committee chairman), Michael McDunphy, assistant secretary of the department of the president (committee secretary), Philip O’Donoghue, assistant to the attorney general, and John Hearne, legal adviser in the department of external affairs who, with de Valera, was to prove to be the principal architect of the 1937 constitution. It is clear from the minutes of this committee that its members were initially under the impression that what de Valera was seeking was a wholly new constitution. Thus, at its second meeting it was ‘agreed that the report of the committee should take the form of an entirely new constitution’. It soon became clear, however, ‘as a result of pronouncements by the president and of conversations which individual members of the committee had with him’, that what he really wanted was not a new constitution but ‘a selection within the framework of the present constitution of those articles which should be regarded as fundamental’ and ‘a recommendation as to how these should be rendered immune from alteration by ordinary legislation’.
The Irish parliament of 1560: the anglican reforms authorised
Authors: Jefferies Henry A. 
Published: August 2016

Few Irish parliaments were more important than that of 1560. It recognised Elizabeth Tudor’s title to the crown of Ireland and authorised the reform of the Irish church. Yet the sparse documentary record of its proceedings has lent itself to wildly differing interpretations. Controversy has centred upon the manner in which the ecclesiastical legislation reached the statute books, and the disposition of the bishops towards it. Even today, long after the interdenominational debate has ended, there is no consensus among historians on this very difficult subject.
In the most comprehensive treatment to date of the 1560 parliament Robert Dudley Edwards concluded that fraud and deception were employed to force the queen’s ecclesiastical legislation through a recalcitrant House of Commons. However, the opposition of the bishops in the upper house was insurmountable and the parliament was quickly prorogued without its legislative programme being sanctioned.
The New Model Army and the problems of siege warfare, 1648–51
Authors: Burke James 
Published: August 2016

The destruction of the Royalist field armies at Naseby and Langport in 1645 did not end the English Civil War. Althought the king had suffered irreversible military defeats, Parliament was unable to govern effectively while politically important towns and fortresses remained in enemy hands. To ensure political stability Parliament’s army was forced to besiege and reduce a large number of strongholds in England, Ireland and Scotland, a task that was not finally completed until the surrender of Galway in 1652. In particular the war in Ireland was to test the army’s siege-making capacity more severely than any previous campaign. To complete the political conquest of Britain and Ireland the army and its generals were compelled increasingly to practise an aspect of warfare that had been traditionally neglected by English soldiers. In contrast, siege warfare was an area in which their continental counterparts had excelled.In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, European wars produced few set-piece battles. Conflicts were more frequently resolved by the assault and defence of fortified cities and towns. Consequently the art of siege warfare evolved rapidly. England’s political and military insularity during this period detached the country from advances in siege technology that had transformed the conduct of European warfare. No major siege had been undertaken by an English army since Henry VIII had invested Boulogne in 1544, and as there had been no siege of English towns or fortresses since medieval times, there had been little innovation in defensive fortifications. What improvements did occur were sporadic and unco-ordinated. In the sixteenth century a great fortress was built at Berwick-on-Tweed to counter Scottish infiltration and a number of coastal towns in the south-east were refortified against the threat of Spanish invasion. However, by the outbreak of civil war in 1642, even these were obsolete by contemporary continental standards.
‘Paying no heed to public clamor’: Irish republican solipsism in the 1930s
Authors: English Richard 
Published: August 2016

To be frank, it is apparent that an agreement between your forces and the forces of the I.R.A. is a national necessity. They can do the things you will not care to do or cannot do in the face of public criticism, while the I.R.A. pay no heed to public clamor so long as they feel they are doing a national duty.Joseph McGarrity to Eamon de Valera, 2 Oct. 1933This article will concentrate on two Irish republican projects from the 1930s: Cumann Poblachta na h-Éireann and the I.R.A.’s British bombing campaign. It will, in each case, focus on one leading individual: Cumann Poblachta’s Seán MacBride and, for the bombing campaign, the I.R.A.’s Seán Russell. Drawing on much material which has not previously been discussed in the literature, it will examine the self-sustaining republican mentality which characterised both projects and both individuals. It will be argued that republicanism in the 1930s is best understood in terms of the concept of solipsism, defined as the view that self is ‘the only thing really existent’. The argument is that republicans acted as though their own political views, beliefs and culture were the only really existent ones and that those of others could, as a consequence, be ignored. Republicans could — in the words of leading Irish-American republican, Joseph McGarrity — ‘pay no heed to public clamor’ as long as they felt that they were ‘doing a national duty’. As such, they were in possession of a self-sustaining but, it will be argued, ultimately self-defeating mentality.
The flight of the earls, 1607
Authors: McCavitt John 
Published: August 2016

The ‘flight of the earls’ is considered one of the most intriguing events in Irish history. Traditionally, historians explaining this event have been divided into two schools of thought. Some have depicted the earls as offended innocents, forced into exile by unwarrantable pressure from Lord Deputy Chichester’s administration. Others have accepted the conspiracy theory, agreeing with the Dublin government’s contemporary view that the earls fled because they feared that their treasonable machinations had been uncovered. Since 1971, however, historical interpretation of the affair has been dominated by an article written by Nicholas Canny.Departing from the previous lines of explanation, Canny focused on the intentions of the earl of Tyrconnell and Cuchonnacht Maguire to leave Ireland in 1607 as the key to understanding the flight. Anxious to leave the country because they were in acute financial difficulties, they were determined to seek profitable service with Archduke Albert, governor of the Spanish Netherlands. The ‘premature’ arrival of the ship that was sent to encompass Tyrconnell’s passage discomfited Tyrone, then preparing to go to court, causing him to ‘panic’ and take flight.
The Fenian rising in Dublin, March 1867
Authors: Takagami Shin-ichi 
Published: August 2016

The story of the Fenian rising in 1867 may be regarded as starting with the expulsion of James Stephens from the headship of one of the two factions of American Fenians in December 1866. Stephens tried to postpone a rising planned to take place before 1 January 1867. At that time there was vocal dissatisfaction within the rank and file at the lack of action. The Dublin organisation itself was divided on the question. According to the report of Superintendent Ryan of the Dublin Metropolitan Police in January 1867:
The minor members of the conspiracy made open profession of doubts regarding the sincerity of James Stephens and some went so far as to say they would abandon the movement altogether, but the more prominent members ... made all sorts of apologies for the inability of Stephens to fulfil his promise.Thomas J. Kelly, a former captain in the Federal army now bearing a title of colonel in Fenian terminology, and who had been in Ireland in early 1866, could now count on considerable support in Ireland. A bigger problem he faced was that of bringing the Fenians in Britain under his leadership as soon as he returned from America. Those Americans already in England (largely men who had fled from Ireland after the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act (29 Vict., c. 4) in February 1866), as well as many of the Irish Fenians there, already entertained doubts about the future purpose of an organisation guided by a remote leadership in America. As a result, the American officers and the Fenians in England decided to launch a rising without waiting for future American help, and for this purpose they formed a Directory in England not later than early February but more probably in January 1867.
Chicanery and candour: the Irish Free State and the Geneva Protocol, 1924–5
Authors: Kennedy Michael 
Published: August 2016

The foreign policy of the Irish Free State under the Cumann na nGaedheal administrations of 1922–32 was a far more complex issue than has generally been realised. Policy had a greater scope than simply Anglo-Irish relations. It had two basic foundations. Through the 1921 treaty, the state reluctantly joined the British Commonwealth. Then, with great deliberation, the Free State joined the League of Nations, being admitted on 10 September 1923. By developing an active multidimensional foreign policy using these structures, the new state sought to show its ‘international’ and European credentials. The Irish Free State was to carve out a small niche for itself in the post-Versailles world order. An analysis of the Free State’s response to the Geneva Protocol of 1924 provides a case study of this multifaceted foreign policy in action.As the foundations of Irish foreign policy in the 1920s, the League and the Commonwealth were played off against each other. A prominent stance at the League indicated that although the Free State was a dominion, it was not tied to the imperial line and could act independently to secure its own interests. The Free State’s position as a radical dominion was emphasised through League membership as the state used its independence at the League in the 1920s to develop the concept of the Commonwealth as a looser international grouping of equals. This approach to foreign policy served to benefit both core aspects of the state’s foreign relations. Generally these two core aspects of foreign policy complemented each other.
Regional industrial structure and labour force decline in Ireland between 1841 and 1851
Authors: Geary Frank 
Published: August 2016

The censuses of 1841 and 1851 provide the earliest detailed and consistent data on the occupations pursued by the people of Ireland in the first half of the nineteenth century. This paper presents a series, constructed from this data, on occupations classified by industry for the years 1841 and 1851. Its purpose is to establish the industrial distribution of the labour force for each of the four provinces, to describe the changes in industrial employment by province during the famine decade, and to make a contribution to debate on the origins of employment decline.IIn its return of occupations, the census of 1841 differed from the censuses of 1821 and 1831 in three ways: in method of estimation, in compilation, and in system of classification. As regards estimation, the 1841 commissioners issued a ‘Form of family return’ to be completed by the head of the family, rather than, as in 1821 and 1831, having the details entered by the enumerator from viva voce inquiry. This has its limitations in that it depends on the accuracy of the householders’ returns, but it is preferable to relying on the accuracy of enumerators’ returns. As regards compilation, the 1841 census returned the occupations of all persons active in the labour force by age and gender; the 1821 census returned all persons active; the 1831 census returned males upwards of twenty years of age in agriculture, industry and services (except servants), all male servants and female servants (age unspecified). As regards the system of classification, the 1821 occupation returns were made under three, and the 1831 under eleven general headings with no return of the numbers engaged in the component occupations of these headings (but see note 1); the 1841 census provided a return of the numbers of males and females engaged in each of 471 occupations classified as belonging to one of nine classes: ministering to food; clothing; lodging; furniture; machinery, etc.; health; charity; justice; education; religion; unclassified.
Wood’s Halfpence, Carteret, and the government of Ireland, 1723–6
Authors: McNally Patrick 
Published: August 2016

The Wood’s Halfpence affair has long been recognised as one of the most serious disputes to have occurred between the Irish and British political establishments during the eighteenth century. There is no doubt that the conflict — caused by Irish resentment over the patent granted to William Wood to coin copper halfpence for Ireland — was one of the most serious ruptures in Anglo-Irish relations between the Williamite war and the ‘patriot’ campaign of the 1750s. The simple fact is that in 1723–4 the British administration was unable to implement its policy in Ireland. The Irish parliamentary managers declined to co-operate in the implementation of Wood’s patent, the Irish privy council failed to offer advice about how the conflict might be resolved, and the Irish lords justices refused to obey the positive orders of the British government.In the past historians have argued that, shocked by the demonstrable unreliability of its Irish servants during this episode, the British government adopted a systematic policy of appointing English officials to the highest offices of Irish state and church. The appointment of Hugh Boulter as primate of the Church of Ireland in 1724 and of Richard West as lord chancellor in 1725 seemed to support such an interpretation.
A political minefield: southern loyalists, the Irish Grants Committee and the British government, 1922–31
Authors: Brennan Niamh 
Published: August 2016

All classes of the loyalist community ... [are] victims.Irish Grants Committee report, 3 Nov. 1930I‘A considerable number [of refugees] have left on a plea of compulsion without any justification whatever for that plea,’ declared the secretary to the Provisional Government in 1922, referring to the departure from the twenty-six-county area of disbanded members of the R.I.C., British ex-servicemen and civilians believed to have been loyal to the British régime in Ireland. Such a claim was greeted with scant belief in Britain in the spring of 1922 as perhaps as many as 20,000 people, some with their entire families, arrived on British shores and were given refugee status by the British government through its Irish Distress Committee, founded to aid Irish loyalist victims of the Civil War. The committee first sat in May 1922 under the chairmanship of Sir Samuel Hoare, a Conservative, and its function was to give loans of money to refugees from Ireland until they either found work in Britain or decided it was safe to return home. At first it had a budget of £10,000, which was fairly meagre, even by the standards of the early 1920s, considering that it dealt with 3,349 applicants in its first six months. Relief was available to claimants through loans and grants. Even at that early stage when the Civil War was far from over, the Irish Distress Committee realised that its work ‘only touches the fringe of the bigger question of compensation’, though perhaps it did not realise just how big that question was to be in the aftermath of Irish independence.
The narrow road: Harry Midgley and Catholic schools in Northern Ireland
Authors: McGrath Michael 
Published: August 2016

The Ministry of Education was, and remains, the most important government department for the Catholic church in Northern Ireland. As Cormack, Gallagher and Osborne note,
The Department of Education in Northern Ireland occupies a distinctive place in terms of the general relationships between the government and the Catholic community. Throughout the period since the creation of Northern Ireland, the most significant social institution over which the Catholic community has exercised control, principally through the Catholic church, has been the Catholic education system.The devolved government appeared to recognise Catholic educational interests by usually appointing as Minister of Education one of the more liberal figures within the Ulster Unionist Party such as Lord Londonderry, Lord Charlemont and Samuel Hall-Thompson. However, in the first week of 1950 Sir Basil Brooke ‘surprised everyone, and appalled Catholics’ by appointing Harry Midgley, an avowed opponent of the Catholic clergy and autonomous Catholic schools, as Northern Ireland’s sixth Minister of Education.
The career and correspondence of Thomas Allan, c. 1725-1798
Authors: Johnston Edith M. 
Published: August 2016

From 1700 to 1767 it was customary for the lord lieutenant of Ireland to reside in the country only during the period when the Irish parliament was actually in session. Before the amendment of Poynings’ law in 1782 the parliamentary session had lasted approximately six to eight months in every second year. On its prorogation the viceroy had returned to Great Britain for the intervening eighteen months, placing the government of Ireland in the hands of three prominent Irish politicians known as the lords justices. For some years before 1767 the British government had been considering the appointment of a permanently resident lord lieutenant in order to instil stability into the Irish political administration and to remove the necessity for the appointment of Irish politicians as lords justices.In 1767 the Pitt-Grafton administration appointed George, Viscount Townshend, lord lieutenant of Ireland. On his arrival the new viceroy found that the government of the kingdom was in the hands of the great borough proprietors, many of whom were connected with the influential whig families in Great Britain. These Irish politicians were accustomed to carry through, or undertake, the king’s business in parliament in return for a generous share of administrative patronage, which they used to increase their political power and family prestige. This patronage was mainly connected with the control of the revenue board of which John Ponsonby, speaker of the Irish house of commons, brother of the earl of Bessborough and closely connected with the duke of Devonshire, was the first commissioner.
An agenda for women’s history in Ireland, 1500–1900: Part I: 1500–1800
Authors: MacCurtain Margaret , O’Dowd Mary 
Published: August 2016

In the last twenty years women’s history has emerged as a major field of scholarly inquiry. An extensive literature has accumulated on the history of women in western Europe and North America, and the contribution which women have made to many different aspects of western society has been rediscovered. New areas of study have been developed as the gender differences in men’s and women’s lives have been recognised and researched. The expanding secondary literature has also led to a lively debate about the purpose, methodology and theory of women’s history. A central focus of discussion has been the relationship between women’s history and mainstream history. Initially research on the history of women tended to work within the parameters of traditional history: to be fitted into its ‘empty spaces’. But dissatisfaction with the male-centred and patriarchal nature of the predominant historical discourse has led women historians to seek out new methodologies and to argue that consideration of history from the perspective of women, as well as of men, is a major challenge to the whole nature of historical inquiry. As Gerda Lerner, a pioneer of women’s history in the United States, put it, women’s historychallenges the traditional assumption that man is the measure of all that is significant, and that the activities pursued by men are by definition significant, while those pursued by women are subordinate in importance. It challenges the notion that civilization is that which men have created, defended, and advanced while women had babies and serviced families and to which they, occasionally and in a marginal way, ‘contributed’.
Irish peasant women in revolt: the Land League years
Authors: TeBrake Janet K. 
Published: August 2016

Between 1879 and 1882 a mass agrarian movement, led by the Irish National Land League, became a strong, all-encompassing force in Irish life for a brief but crucial period. This movement, one of the largest agrarian movements to take place in nineteenth-century Europe, has been treated as a nationalist movement, with emphasis of study placed on the role, contributions and aims of the league’s national leaders. These men, seeking their own varieties of self-government, saw the land movement as means to a political end. To them the land agitation provided a stepping-stone to national independence. It was the Irish peasantry, however, motivated primarily by economic considerations, that provided the driving force behind the movement, and at this level Irish peasant women made major contributions to the agrarian revolt. In this study the Land League movement is viewed as an agrarian protest movement; its purpose is to examine in particular the roles played by the Irish peasant women during the Land League period.These contributions have not been adequately recognised in historical literature. Recently the role of the Irish peasant has been duly acknowledged, but in these discussions a male image usually appears. When the Irish women’s role in the land movement is examined, it is done so in the context of the organisation known as the Ladies’ Land League. These studies concentrate on the activities of the upper- and middle-class urban leaders, particularly the Parnell sisters. But to dwell only on the Ladies’ Land League as the focus of women’s participation in the Land League movement is far too narrow, for it obscures the fact that hundreds of peasant women were fighting the Land War on a daily basis long before the formation of the women’s organisation. The papers of some of the local branches of the Land League provide evidence which shows that Irish rural women participated in the Land War from its beginning. Although the archival sources of the Land League period are biased towards men, enough material regarding the peasant women’s activities, admittedly limited and somewhat sparse, does exist to allow a strong argument to be put forward that peasant women performed effectively in the Land War.