bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Individualism, Libertarianism and Non-Cognitivism
Authors: Kliemt Hartmut 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This paper suggests that libertarian and (related) contractarian ideas would be less vulnerable to certain forms of criticism if they would more carefully disentangle their legal and moral standards for the assess­ment of institutions from empirical, methodological, and epistemological assumptions about individualism and non-cognitivism. Holding apart several meanings of individualism different issues can be treated separately. It will be shown that the justification of libertarian norms raises some problems which are not too easily solved within a non-cognitivist approach. No attempt to solve them is made subsequently but how far in principle the ‘argumentation possibility frontier’ might be shifted out for that purpose is outlined. In this respect the paper might be regarded as a companion to Viktor Vanberg’s brillant reconstruction of contractarian liberalism in this issue of Analyse & Kritik (pp. 113–149).
Is Nuclear Deterrence Rational, and Will Star Wars Help?
Authors: Brams Steven J. , Kilgour D. Marc 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Deterrence means threatening to retaliate against an attack in order to deter it in the first place. The central problem with a policy of deterrence is that the threat of retaliation may not be credible if retaliation leads to a worse outcome - perhaps a nuclear holocaust - than a side would suffer from absorbing a limited first strike and not retaliating. - The optimality of deterrence is analyzed by means of a Deterrence Game based on Chicken, in which each player chooses a probability (or level) of preemption, and of retaliation if preempted. The Nash equilibria, or stable outcomes, in this game are compared with those in a Star Wars Game, in which the preemption and retaliation levels are constrained by the defensive capabilities of each side. Unlike threats in the Deterrence Game, which can always stabilize the cooperative outcome, mutual preemption emerges as an equilibrium in the Star Wars Game, underscoring the problem - particularly if defensive capabilities are unbalanced - that deterrence will be subverted by the development of Star Wars.
Über grundlegende Voraussetzungen fur Krisenstabilität in Europa ohne Kernwaffen
Authors: Huber Reiner K. , Linnenkamp Hilmar , Schölch lngrid 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
There are several reasons which suggest that the role of nuclear weapons for deterrence in Europe is gradually diminishing. Thus, Europeans are confronted with the question whether and under what conditions strategic stability can be obtained in a post-nuclear world. From the analysis of a simple conceptual model of military conflict the conclusion is reached that, in order to preserve crisis stability in a non-nuclear world and to dampen the arms race, the antagonistic land forces in Europe need to be gradually restructured in a manner so that neither side may perceive the other as a potential threat to its territorial integrity. The requisite structural changes ought to be brought about before nuclear weapons become altogether invailable for deterrence in Europe, otherwise the War saw Pact’s conventional superiority would, in a serious crisis, leave Western Europe only the choice between military defeat and a priori capitulation. There should be military as well as economic incentives for the implementation of structural changes toward a reduction of the offensive capabilities of conventional forces, if the so-called ‘defense efficiency hypothesis’ were to be validated. Otherwise, a deterioration of crisis stability must be expected during the transition period.
The Forms of Power
Authors: Wartenberg Thomas E. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The question of how to define the concept of social power has been a focus of controversy among social theorists. In this paper, I put forward a definition of social power that avoids many of the pitfalls of previous attempts at such a definition. Roughly, I define the power which one agent has over another as the ability that the dominant agent has to control the situation within which the subservient agent acts. Using this basic definition of power, I go on to define many of the central forms in which power actually exists, forms that are conceptualized by such concepts as force, coercion, and influence. I show that these different forms of power can all be understood as specifications of the generic definition of power that I offered and go on to develop an account of how they function in relation to one another in actual relationship of social power.
Recent Work on the Emotions
Authors: Farrell Daniel M. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In this paper I review recent philosophical work in English on the nature of emotion. I begin with the well-known attacks of Bedford, Kenny and Pitcher on what I call the traditional (i.e., Cartesian) view of the nature of emotion. I then trace and discuss the successive alternative views that have been developed in the past thirty years. My aim is both to review the development of these alternative views and to indicate what particular problems have come to be considered the central problems in this area. A comprehensive bibliography of recent work in English is appended.
The Limits of Homo Economicus in Public Choice and in Political Philosophy
Authors: Vaughn Karen I. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This paper argues that there are areas of political behavior for which the usual assumption of wealth maximizing homo economicus is to narrow to generate convincing explanation of behavior. In particular, it is argued that for many political decisions, people choose according to some set of moral preconceptions while for others, people have insufficient information to make economic choices even if they were inclined to do so. This implies that normative public choice can only be part of a political decision process in which non-pecuniary concerns influence choices . Finally, constitutional economics insofar as it is conceptually conceived, must presume some set of moral and informational properties of the parties to the social contract.
Hermeneutik als Heilmittel?
Authors: Albert Hans 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Social scientists usually presuppose that individual behaviour is meaningful and understandable. At the same time they aim at nomological explanations. This is criticized by some economists who recommend a hermeneutical turn to overcome the crisis in economic and sociological thinking. The author tries to show that it is counterproductive to turn to hermeneutics to solve social science problems, and that it is misleading to use Max Weber in support of this claim, because Weber's ideas are incompatible with hermeneutics a la Heidegger.
The ‘Singer-Affair’ and Practical Ethics: A Response
Authors: Singer Peter 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This response to the articles in this issue of ‘Analyse & Kritik’ begins with some general remarks on the ‘Singer-Affair’ in which I suggest that while the rational discussion of the ethical issue of euthanasia poses no threat of a return to Nazism, there is a real danger in the creation of a climate in which people are ready to use force to suppress ideas with which they disagree. I then state and criticise two popular theses about t he wrongness of killing: that there is a crucial moral distinction between an act and an omission, and that all human beings possess an intrinsic right to life that no nonhuman beings have. This serves as a background to the section that follows, in which I take up the detailed criticisms of my views made by Professors Lenzen, Birnbacher, J.C. Wolf and Hoerster.
Objectivity of the Concepts of Health and Disease
Authors: Thompson Paul 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
It is now widely accepted that the concepts of “health” and “disease” in psychiatric and psychological contexts are value laden. In this article I argue that even in the realm of physical illness and disease (appendicitis, phenylketonuria, etc.), the concepts of “health”, “illness” and "disease” are value laden. I explore the four most common bases used to objectively ground the key concept “normal functioning”, namely, genetic structure, evolutionary fitness, non-premature death and absence of pain. I argue that they all fail to adequately provide an objective grounding for the. concept “normal functioning” (health) and, hence, for “abnormal functioning” (illness, disease). The reason an objective grounding cannot be given is that physical “health”, “illness” and “disease” rest on widely shared values in addition to the condition of the organism.
Liberal Justification and the Limits of Neutrality
Authors: Ripstein Arthur 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This paper examines a style of political justification prominent in contemporary liberalism, according to which policies are legitimate only if they can be shown to be acceptable to all. Although this approach is often associated with neutrality about the good life, it is argued that liberalism cannot be neutral about questions of the role of various goods, such as work, play and community. The paper closes by exploring the implications and applicability of this account of justification to contemporary political practice.
Constructivism and Practical Reason in Rawls
Authors: Baynes Kenneth 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This essay argues that Rawls’s recent constructivist approach waivers between a relativist defense and a more Kantian account which grounds his conception of justice in the idea of an agreement between free and equal moral persons. It is suggested that this ambiguity lies at the center of his attempt to provide a “political not metaphysical” account which is also not “political in the wrong way”.
Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance
Authors: Kymlicka Will 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In his most recent work, John Rawls argues that political theory must recognize and accomodate the ‘fact of pluralism’, including the fact of religious diversity. He believes that the liberal commitment to individual rights provides the only feasible model for accomodating religious pluralism. In the paper, I discuss a second form of tolerance, based on group rights rather than individual rights. Drawing on historical examples, I argue that this is is also a feasible model for accomodating religious pluralism. While both models ensure tolerance between groups, only the former tolerates individual dissent within groups. To defend the individual rights model, therefore, liberals must appeal not only to the fact of social pluralism, but also to the value of individual autonomy. This may require abandoning Rawls’s belief that liberalism can and should be defended on purely ‘political’, rather than ‘comprehensive’ grounds.
Stepping Back
Authors: Lloyd Sharon A. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Although Rawls insists that his argument for his theory of justice neither addresses nor requires that we settle in advance any of the deep questions of philosophy, there are nonetheless more subtle ways in which his work may bear on such questions. The article explores how Rawls’s work may advance our thinking on the general philosophical question of how language affects thought, by enabling us to assess the conceptual consequences of two alternative metaphors for describing our activity when we engage in critical self-reflection. The effects on our thinking of our common use of the metaphor of ‘stepping back’ to describe this activity are contrasted with those of an alternative metaphor suggested by Rawls’s work. The resulting conclusions are then employed to illuminate Rawls’s reply to an interesting objection to his theory raised by Michael Sandel.
‘Foundations of Social Theory’ oder ‘Foundations of Sociology’?
Authors: Esser Hartmut 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The comment deals with the relevance of Coleman’s Foundations of Social Theory for so called ‘sociological theory’. On the one hand Coleman’s work is an extraordinary contribution to the solution of some of the most important ‘classical’ questions of sociology. On the other hand it is to be expected that the enormous potential of the book probably has only limited effects within the wider sociological profession. One reason for that estimation is the unfamiliarity of many sociologists with Coleman’s instruments of aggregation of collective effects. The other - more important - reason is that Coleman almost completely leaves out any discussion of the importance of ‘symbolic’ and ‘cultural’ processes. Insofar the book is indeed a ‘Foundation of Social Theory’ but not a foundation of ‘sociology’ in its past and present understanding.
Rechte und Normen als soziale Tatsachen
Authors: Baurmann Michael 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The concept of right plays a central role in Coleman’s Foundations of Social Theory. It is defined as an empirical concept which refers to rights as social facts. One consequence of this view is according to Coleman that the normative-ethical question of how rights ought to be distributed can have no answer. The following article wants to show that this thesis is not convincing. The main focus of the article is a critical analysis of Coleman's theory of the relationship between rights and norms. It is argued that Coleman’s ‘right-based’ approach to define the concept of norm-existence with the concept of right is not tenable. On the contrary only a ‘norm-based’ approach is adequate which bases the concept of right on the concept of norm. Some explanatory consequences of this alternative view are discussed and it is shown that on this ground Coleman's attack on normative ethics can be rejected.
Kymlicka on British Muslims
Authors: Modood Tariq 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Will Kymlicka has recently (in Analyse & Kritik 14, 33-56) argued that western liberals are mistaken in assuming that religious pluralism presupposes a commitment to individual rights. He instances the millet system of the Ottoman Empire as a successful form of toleration based on group rather than individual rights. In the course of his argument he makes some remarks about British Muslims and arranged marriages, sexual segregation in education and the Rushdie Affair which are false or highly misleading though typical of the prejudice-cum-ignorance with which British and other intellectuals discuss Muslims.
Ernst Tugendhat über Menschenrechte- Kontroverse Bemerkungen
Authors: Koller Peter 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In this critical comment on Ernst Tugendhat's paper I dispute his view in two respects: the first refers to the concept, the second to the justification of human rights. As far as the concept of human rights is concerned, I argue that Tugendhat fails to notice that there are different kinds of human rights which are to be distinguished carefully. This conceptual failure prevents him from seeing that different human rights are justified by different reasons. While universal human rights can be justified by the principle of universalization, community rights are based on the demands of social justice.
Volksabstimmungen, Verhandlungen und der Schleier der Insignifikanz
Authors: Baurmann Michael , Kliemt Hartmut 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
To combine some views of 'Diskursethik' and Constitutional Political Economy seems to be promising. In our comments on Frey's and Kirchgässner's attempt to join the forces of Discourse theory and Political Economy in defending the wider spread use of referenda we direct attention to three points. Firstly, the normative basis of both concepts is unsettled. Secondly, an economic approach contrary to the supposition of Frey and Kirchgässner provides substantial insights into the processes which precede collective decisions. Thirdly, the 'veil of insignificance' in referenda will not necessarily increase altruism in voting behavior.
Zwischen Kultur und Genen?
Authors: Winkler Paul 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Evolutionary biology tries to explain the adaptability of different traits including social behaviour. However, it does not and cannot say anything about what is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ behaviour. If scientists try to do so they risk being put into the same category as ideologists and political demagogues. Evolutionary biology can tell us something about the phylogeny of certain types of behaviour including xenophobia. It can describe which constraints can lead to the outbreak of such behaviour, without thereby legitimating this behaviour.
Rational Rights
Authors: Steiner Hillel 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
A rational moral code must satisfy the condition of completeness. This same condition applies to a set of moral rights, where it takes the form of requiring that all the rights in that set be compossible: that their respective correlatively entailed duties be jointly fulfillable. Such joint fulfillability is guaranteed only by a set of fully differentiated individual domains. And if moral rights are to play any independent role in moral reasoning - any role logically independent of the values that bring persons into conflict - those domains must be determined by rules which are not derived from those values.
Kommunitaristische Paradoxe
Authors: Rivera-López Eduardo 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Two basic kinds of communitarians are discriminated. ‘Weak communitarians’ reject only the liberal metaethical theses that I call ‘universalism’ and ‘neutralism’, but endorse liberal norms and institutions at the normative level. ‘Strong communitarians’ condemn liberalism at both levels: they reject not only universalism and neutralism, but also substantive liberal norms defending communitarian values (family, tradition, solidarity, etc.). This article intends to show certain internal paradoxes of these two versions of communitarianism.
Ein politisch-ökonomischer Blick auf Diskurse
Authors: Eichenberger Reiner 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Cooperative discourse procedures produce consensual siting proposals for NIMBY-projects-but only if these proposals do not affect the final siting decision. Then, the members of the discourse commissions stay independent and face few incentives to pursue consequentialist interests. However, the more influential discourse procedures become, the stronger the interest groups’ incentives are to take advantage of them. Thus, cooperative discourses turn into competitive, interest-centred procedures whose outcome is rejected by the less influential groups. The evolution of discourse procedures into functionally specialized parliaments or even into FOCJ (Functional, Overlapping, Competing Jurisdictions) seems worth pursuing.
Kompensationen in alternativen. Konfliktregelungsverfahren
Authors: Holzinger Katharina 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In many cases collectively desirable projects can be carried out only after considerable social conflict because the unequal distribution of burden and benefit from such projects leads to local Opposition. From an economic perspective this problem can (and should) be resolved by compensating those who are negatively affected. Using a fictitious example, the author demonstrates that compensation packages will ( a) increase the collective welfare, (b) have a positive redistributive effect, and ( c) contribute to unblocking negotiation standstills that result from local veto. In actual practice, however, compensation offers will often be rejected by those affected. In order to increase the acceptability of compensation, it is important that all the possibilities to limit and restitute damage be explored before consideration is given to acceptable forms of substitution or compensation. The search for adequate means of substitution and compensation requires the inclusion of all parties affected. Therefore alternative dispute resolution provides an ideal framework for such a process.
The Obedience Alibi
Authors: Mandel David R. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Stanley Milgram’s work on obedience to authority is social psychology’s most influential contribution to theorizing about Holocaust perpetration. The gist of Milgram’s claims is that Holocaust perpetrators were just following orders out of a sense of obligation to their superiors. Milgram, however, never undertook a scholarly analysis of how his obedience experiments related to the Holocaust. The author first discusses the major theoretical limitations of Milgram’s position and then examines the implications of Milgram’s (oft-ignored) experimental manipulations for Holocaust theorizing, contrasting a specific case of Holocaust perpetration by Reserve Police Battalion 101 of the German Order Police. It is concluded that Milgram’s empirical findings, in fact, do not support his position-one that essentially constitutes an obedience alibi. The article ends with a discussion of some of the social dangers of the obedience alibi.
Self-love, Seif-interest and the Rational Economic Agent
Authors: O’Neill John 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Hume has a special place in justifications of claims made for rational choice theory to offer a unified language and explanatory framework for the social sciences. He is invoked in support of the assumptions characterising the instrumental rationality of agents and the constancy of their motivations across different institutional settings. This paper explores the problems with the expansionary aims of rational choice theory through criticism of these appeals to Hume. First, Hume does not assume constancy. Moreover, Hume’s sensitivity to the relationships between institutional setting and individual motivation owes something to the relative transparency of the plural language of vices and virtues that he employs. Second, rational choice theory’s minimal modification of Hume’s account of the relation of reason and the passions through the introduction of constraints of consistency on preferences is unstable.
Märkte, Normen und das ökonomische Handlungsmodell
Authors: Kirchgässner Gebhard 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
First it is shown that in order to function well markets depend on some preconditions even if there are no external effects and there is complete information. One of these conditions is that individuals follow some moral norms. Then it is asked whether these norms are non-consequentialist. There might be some norms for which no consequentialist foundation can be constructed. However, these are not the norms which have to be followed in order that a market system functions well. Such norm-following-behaviour can successfully be analysed with the economic model of behaviour, if the motivational assumption of this model is not artificially restricted to consider only financial incentives. Finally it is pointed to the fact that it is reasonable to employ the economic model of behaviour not only for analysing social processes but also for developing policy recommendations.
Sind Wünsche Handlungsgründe?
Authors: Heuer Ulrike 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Desires are often taken to be the basis for all practical reasons. I introduce one of the most powerful arguments to sustain this view: the argument from motivation (sec. 1). In section 2, however, I develop an equally powerful objection to desire-based approaches showing that desires are not suited to accommodate the justificatory role of reasons. The objection suggests that at least one of the premises of the argument from motivation must presuppose that only desires can explain actions. This move is, however, fatal for desire-based views of practical reason.
Normative Handlungsgründe
Authors: Schaber Peter 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
It is a widely held view in moral philosophy that reasons for action are based on desires. This view should be rejected. Reasons for action are never provided by desires. Desires provide us with motives, whereas reasons for action are based on valuable facts which obtain independently of our desires. The recognition of these reasons does not necessarily motivate us. Motives depend on desires, for instance the motive for moral actions on the desire to do the morally right thing.