bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Fisk on Capacities and Natures
Authors: Aune Bruce 
Published: January 2016

Fisk begins his discussion by asserting, that the FS model attempts to complete the SR model by accounting for the necessity with which, according to the SR model, a capacity will be exercised when certain operations are performed. He argues that the FS model ultimately fails in this task, and he seeks to improve upon the FS approach by grounding the relevant necessity in an entity's nature - a component that defenders of the FS model ignore or misinterpret. For the most part my comments will concern the general strategy of his paper rather than details of the arguments he offers.Since the major focus of Fisk's paper is on the necessity with which, according to his description of the SR model, a capacity is exercised under certain conditions, it is worth emphasizing that this idea is pretty implausible.
Randomness and Knowledge
Authors: Coffa J. Alberto 
Published: January 2016

Until recently, the debate concerning whether chance, randomness and disorder are ever instantiated in Nature has been considerably one-sided. Since Aristotle, the mainstream of philosophical thought seems to have been nearly unanimous in agreeing that these characters exist only ‘in the mind’. The shared conviction that every event has a cause or a determining condition led most philosophers who addressed themselves to the topic to the conclusion that there is no randomness in things.The disquieting suggestion of twentieth century physics that the appeal to probabilities in our attempt to describe the world was not merely a convenient device, dispensable in principle, but maybe the best that can be done, brought the classical problem of chance back to the attention of philosophers of science. Those committed to a realistic interpretation of science felt it was incumbent upon them to provide a realistic interpretation of chance.
Unified Theories and Unified Science
Authors: Causey Robert L. 
Published: January 2016

Discussions of unified science frequently suppose that the various scientific theories should be combined into one unified theory, and it is usually supposed that this should be done by successive reductions of the various theories to some fundamental theory. Yet, there has been little systematic study of the characteristics of unified theories, and little foundational support for the use of reductions as a unifying procedure.In this paper I: (a) briefly review some of my previous work on microreductions, (b) state some conditions which are necessary in order for a theory to be unified, (c) argue that when certain identities exist between the elements in the domains of two theories, then the only satisfactory way to combine these two theories into one unified theory is by a microreduction, and (d) indicate briefly some further applications and consequences of this work.
Meaning in Science and Mathematics
Authors: Fitzgerald Paul 
Published: January 2016

Philosophers working in the logical empiricist tradition, such as Rudolf Carnap and Carl Hempel, have held that theoretical terms get their meanings from their connections with observational terms in the postulates of scientific theories. They have tried to explain exactly how this happens, in the sense of giving a logical reconstruction of it. For various reasons, to be discussed below, the belief arose that it is impossible in general to give explicit definitions of theoretical terms. Attention thus shifted to showing how correspondence rules relating theoretical and observational terms give ‘partial interpretations’ to the theoretical terms.Three objections can be raised against the way in which this enterprise was conceived and carried out. These objections involve what will here be called (1) ‘The Problem of the Theoretical-Observational Dichotomy', (2) ‘The Meaning-Magic Problem', and (3) ‘The Problem of Unwanted Interpretations'. The purpose of this article is to set forth the second
and third of these objections and develop a solution to them.
Assurance and Agnosticism
Authors: Agassi Joseph 
Published: January 2016

The scientific ethos of the modern Western world contains two conflicting moods, of utter lack of assurance and of utter assurance. The question posed here is, how do the two go together? The answer I offer is, all assurance is contingent on the supposition that our system as a whole, still survives, but there is no assurance for the survival of the system as a whole.The mood of agnosticism, expressed in the music of Schoenberg and Webem (even though the latter, at least, was profoundly religious), in the art of Jackson Pollack and Franz Kline, in Buñuel’s ‘Los Olvidados’, and in ever so many other manifestations of the modern world, is philosophically best expressed in Bertrand Russell's ‘Free Man’s Worship’.
The Hierarchy of System Specifications and the Problem of Structural Inference
Authors: Zeigler Bernard P. 
Published: January 2016

The activity of modelling proceeds by successive rounds of constructing abstract representations of reality and testing them against real world data. Since the testing is a comparison of behavior generated by the model with behavior observed for the modelled real system, it cannot directly validate the model structure, i.e., its claim as to how the real system works. This raises a central issue in modelling: is it possible to ascertain, even allowing an infinite comparison of behavioral data, that a model truly represents the mechanism underlying a real behavior?To consider this issue, along with others of a similar fundamental nature, theories of modelling and simulation are being developed ([1], [2], 19]). The author's theory ([8], [9], [10]) consists of a set of postulates about the objects and activities involved in the modelling enterprise (a model of modelling) phrased within the theory of systems ([3], [5], [6], [7]) and employs the tools of the latter to consider such issues as the structural inference one mentioned above.
Is Scientific Realism Tenable?
Authors: Sellars Wilfrid 
Published: January 2016

(1)This paper is an excellent example of putting a cart before the horses. It was originally conceived as a reply to my critics, of whom there have been many, and, in particular, to my fellow symposiasts, whose careful exploration of and sympathetic disagreement with certain views of mine which are not inappropriately labeled ‘scientific realism’ have deserved a response which they have so far not received.(2)Many of the criticisms could, I believe, be construed as matters of detail and countered by a myopic strategy of confessing error here and claiming misunderstanding there, all supported by a judicious use of self-quotation. And, in moderation, of course is not inappropriate. I have made mistakes and, I believe, I have been misunderstood, and where the relevant points are reasonably substantial they should be noted for the record.
Theory-Ladenness and Theory Comparison
Authors: Jones William B. 
Published: January 2016

Both the most controversial and the most widely publicized aspect of the “new empiricism” of Feyerabend Hanson Kuhn and Toulmin is the thesis (rightly or wrongly) attributed to them that irrationality and subjectivity play a central role in science. The idea that science is pervaded by apt parallels to religious conversion and political propagadizing has achieved truly surprising currency. The epistemological root of this view is the belief that the theory-laden conception of observation which these philosophers espouse effectively prevents any rational comparison of the observational support commanded by competing theories. It has even been pointed out that in the absence of a neutral observational language in terms of which to identify and describe the objects or processes with which rival theories are (supposedly) concerned, there can be no real basis for calling them “rivals”.It is the intent of this paper to set forth conditions which, if met, would provide a rational basis for believing, even in a context in which observation is theory-laden, that two theories are rivals and that one of them enjoys observational support that is superior to that enjoyed by the other.
The Role of Psychology in Functional Localization Research
Authors: Klein Barbara V.E. 
Published: January 2016

It takes no more than a passing acquaintance with functional localization research in the neurosciences to notice that psychological notions often come into play in the characterization of human brain functions. In the past, such notions were taken primarily from one form or another of associationism; currently, they are adopted from the language of information processing. A rather typical example can be found in a recent article by A.R. Luria (see also). He describes the human brain as made up of three main blocks incorporating basic functions. These functions are described as follows:The first block regulates the energy level and tone of the cortex, providing it with a stable basis for the organization of its various processes …. The second block … plays a decisive role in the analysis, coding and storage of information …. We can easily identify areas in the second block that are respectively responsible for the analysis of optic, acoustic, cutaneous and kinesthetic stimuli.
Approximative Explanation
Authors: Girill T. R. 
Published: January 2016

Sometimes, when an explanandum E is a quantitative claim, we are unable to explain why the specific numerical value mentioned in E is correct. Sometimes an explanans X is available, however, which accounts for a statement E' asserting a value close to that mentioned in E. Although X strictly speaking provides evidence against E, it is in some circumstances seen as approximatively explaining E along with E'. Such an approximative explanation may be defined as follows:A set of statements X constitutes an approximative explanans for an explanandum E iff (i) there exists a statement E' such that X adequately explains E', and (ii) E' approximates E.Explanans X is linked to the desired explanandum E only indirectly, by means of E's closeness to E'. Hence, a special problem arises about the conditions under which such an approximative explanation is really acceptable.
The Metalogic of Quantum Logic
Authors: Mittelstaedt Peter 
Published: January 2016

In order to establish the object language of quantum physics, we begin with a quantum mechanical system S (atom, nucleus, elementary particle) and consider propositions A,B,… about this system S which can be proved or disproved by measuring processes. These propositions will be called elementary propositions. We will assume here that elementary propositions are value definite, i.e.,there always exists an experimental testing procedure which decides between truth and falsity of the respective proposition.The logical connectives A ∧ B (A and B), A ∨ B (A or B), A → B (A then B) and ┐ A (not A) will be defined by means of dialogs. A dialog is a formalized kind of discussion between two participants, the proponent P who asserts a certain proposition and the opponent 0 who attempts to refute it.
In Praise of Truth and Substantive Rationality: Comments on Laudan’s Progress and Its Problems
Authors: Koertge Noretta 
Published: January 2016

Like most philosophers, Laudan [7] believes that by and large science makes cognitive progress and that the development of science is more or less rational. His book deals with two major problems:(a)In what sense does science progress? What is scientific progress?(b)Wherein lies the rationality of the growth of science? What is scientific rationality?In the main body of this paper, I first summarize and evaluate some of Laudan’s criticisms of his predecessors. Then I outline and criticize Laudan’s own theory of scientific progress and scientific rationality. In the Postscript I sketch my own views concerning the issue of changes in the canons of scientific rationality and the problem of using history to evaluate normative theories of scientific rationality.
Quantum Logic and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics
Authors: Hughes R.I.G. 
Published: January 2016

There is no such thing as “The Quantum Logical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics”. Rather, there is a cluster of interpretations, all of which can be described as “quantum logical”. Here I provide a general framework for discussing interpretations of this kind, and then locate various suggestions within it. The presentation owes much to van Fraassen (see, in particular, van Fraassen 1974 ); his “modal interpretation” is one of those I discuss, along with those of Jauch, Putnam and Kochen. I begin by rehearsing some orthodox quantum theory.Within quantum mechanics we deal with a set 0 of measurable quantities, or observables (position, momentum, components of spin and so on). Experiment can determine the value of an observable for a given system: the values so determined will be real numbers. A maximal amount of information about what the result would be for a given system, whatever experiment we chose to perform on it, is available once we know the state of the system.
The Philosophical Relevance of Statistics
Authors: Mayo Deborah G. 
Published: January 2016

The foundations of a number of scientific theories are more or less relevant to philosophy. The better a theory is at elucidating the structure of science and scientific method the more a study of its foundations is relevant for philosophers, particularly philosophers of science. But while philosophers have studied probability and induction, statistics has not received the kind of philosophical attention mathematics and physics have. Although the terms “philosophy of induction” and “confirmation theory” are common, the term “philosophy of statistics” is rarely used; and despite the fact that modern statistical methods have been used increasingly in a number of sciences, specific developments of statistics have been little noted in the philosophy of science literature.Statistics has been fundamental for determining such things as whether a substance causes cancer, which method of psychotherapy gives the most recoveries, whether censorship causes the instability of nations, whether a fossil belongs to a man or a chimpanzee, whether there is regularity in the oscillations of the velocity of gas in the sun's atmosphere, whether an individual authored a piece of writing, whether the economy will improve, and numerous other issues involving uncertainties.
Realism, Miracles, and the Common Cause
Authors: Brown James Robert 
Published: January 2016

Scientific realism is the doctrine that our theories are intended to literal descriptions of the world. It is the claim that there is a realm of non-observable entities and processes, and that science legitimately appeals to this realm in its explanations of the observable world. This is a sketchy characterization, and with it go some sketchy arguments. These are the miracle arguments for scientific realism. Here is the way J.J.C. Smart puts his version:If the phenomenalist about theoretical entities is correct we must believe in a cosmic coincidence. That is, if this is so, statements about electrons, etc., are of only instrumental value: they simply enable us to predict phenomena on the level of galvanometers and cloud chambers. They do nothing to remove the surprising character of these phenomena....[But is] it not odd that the phenomena of the world should be such as to make a purely instrumental theory true?
Temporality, Secondary Qualities, and the Location of Sensations
Authors: Fitzgerald Paul 
Published: January 2016

Several philosophers in recent years, e.g., Baker (1974-5, 1979), Grünbaum (1971), Rescher (1973) and Salmon (1974) have argued that something they call “temporal becoming” is mind-dependent. They see the issue as analogous to the traditional one about the mind-dependence of secondary qualities. Do directly seen colors, felt coldness, and salty taste exist in the mind-independent world? Or only within experience? We know how the dialectic dances around that question….“Roses are red, violets are blue, in the same way that some of our afterimages and sense-data are.”“No, roses and violets don't really have colors. Roses only have the property of selectively reflecting light in the 7200 Å region. That makes them look red to us. But they aren't really red. Science shows that.“
Arguments for Randomizing
Authors: Suppes Patrick 
Published: January 2016

I have organized my remarks about randomizing under four headings: computation, communication, causal Inference, and complexity. It Is hard to think of a wore controversial subject than that of randomization. My remarks are simpler and more extreme than they ought to be. I have put them in a rather bald and definite way in order to draw the lines more sharply and to make my message as clear as possible. I do not doubt that under extended debate it would be necessary to qualify some of the things I have to say, but I would insist on the point that I would be offering qualifications, not retractions.It is often said by pure Bayesians that once the likelihood function is available knowledge of any randomization scheme used is superfluous Information. It seems to me that this argument misses an Important point which I want to illustrate by a simple artificial example.
Autonomous Psychology: What it Should and Should Not Entail
Authors: Bechtel William 
Published: January 2016

Cognitivism is now rather clearly the dominant approach in psychology. Philosophers such as Putnam (1975), Dennett (1978), Lycan (1981), and Cummins (1983) have supported the cognitivist strategy by proposing that mental states are to be defined functionally in terms of their interactions with other mental states. One of the most prominent features of the cognitivist-functionalist position is the autonomy it is thought to bestow upon psychology. Psychology, as viewed from this perspective, describes the processing of mental representations within the mind-brain and does not need to concern itself with the neurological activity that underlies its operation.The arguments that are raised to support the autonomy of psychology from neurophysiology are arguments against a strong reductionist position that makes psychology dispensable (a view held, for example, by P.S. Churchland (1980)). The arguments are designed to show that there are regularities in nature that are not captured in the laws of physics.
On Explaining Experiences of a Quantum World
Authors: Healey Richard 
Published: January 2016

“the view advanced by H. W. Everett (1957)—that there simply is no reduction—quite fails to account for the actual phenomena of physics, which we may summarize as the appearance of reduction: namely, our experience of definite observations.” (Stein 1983, p. 573.)In an interesting recent paper, Geroch (1984) has sought to state the content of, “and to some extent to advocate” a view toward quantum mechanics which is at least closely akin to the view advanced by Everett, known popularly (but, arguably, misleadingly) as the many-worlds interpretation. While sensitive to objections along the lines of that by Stein quoted above, Geroch believes that these can adequately be answered. The key to answering such objections is to argue that physics is not responsible for accounting for our experience of physical phenomena—it is enough that it account for the physical phenomena themselves. It is this last argument that I wish to examine in this paper, both in general, and specifically in its application to Everett's interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Niels Bohr, Complementarity, and Realism
Authors: Folse Henry J. 
Published: January 2016

The so-called “orthodox” interpretation of quantum physics attributed to Niels Bohr is commonly regarded as abandoning realism. I have already opposed this view elsewhere (Folse 1985) but partially in response to criticism of my position (Shimony 1985), here I propose to relate Bohr’s realism to recent contributions to the realism debate given by Hacking (1983), Cartwright (1983), and Ellis (1985). Specifically, I argue that Bohr’s complementarity viewpoint requires a causal entity realism. Furthermore, labeling Bohr an anti-realist with respect to theories is misleading because it assumes the correspondence theory of truth that Bohr holds quantum theory forces us to reject.Although there are many realist views, I take the root of realism to be the quest for knowledge about the reality producing the phenomena we experience. It is realism in this sense that Bohr defended and that makes science significant to metaphysics.
Minimal Disturbance in Quantum Logic
Authors: Martinez Sergio 
Published: January 2016

In this paper I formalize the notion of minimal disturbance, as this seems to be required by usual interpretations of the theory of quantum mechanics, and construct a quantum logical (lattice) model of the type of situation that seems to be at the root of the problem of the interpretation of Luders’ projection rule as a criterion of minimal disturbance for individual state transformations. What is particularly interesting in the situation to be depicted here is that, on the basis of a simple model, which depends only on some very general features of the lattice structure of the theory (and its semantical interpretation), usual interpretive assumptions on minimal disturbance appear to be wanting.If we restrict our attention to the statistics of measurement results, Luders’ rule can, easily be interpreted as a formula describing ‘minimal change’ for statistical states.
Scientific Anti-Realism and the Epistemic Community
Authors: Seager William 
Published: January 2016

The ability to observe is the ability to reliably detect, but that is not all observation is. A thermometer reliably detects temperature yet does not observe the temperature, whereas I do, even though in terms of reliability I cannot match the thermometer. An observation is detection accompanied by active classification and, typically, the subsequent formation of opinion. Even when we say of an animal that it can see something we mean more than that it reliably detects things of a certain sort but also that it deals with such things as objects, gauging their usefulness or lack thereof in relation to its interests and to other aspects of the world. This crucial addendum to the notion of observation can be enshrined in slogan: observers are potential believers. This marks the difference between mere detecting mechanisms and observers.The contemporary scientific anti-realism of one such as van Fraassen, which is developed in detail under the label of “constructive empiricism” in van Fraassen (1980), can be characterized in terms of detecting mechanisms.
Individuality and Macroevolutionary Theory
Authors: Ereshefsky Marc 
Published: January 2016

The issue of whether species are individuals is now an old one; the literature abounds with arguments, counter-arguments and counter-counter-arguments for their individuality. The question I want to take up in this paper is not whether species are indeed individuals, but what ramifications their alleged individuality has for macroevolutionary theory.According to those biologists who argue for a new theory of macroevolution, the individuality of species is one of the fundamental premises of that theory. For example, Joel Cracraft writes of himself and others thatThe issue of individuality… is at the heart of arguments of those evolutionary biologists who see a need to view the patterns and processes of evolution as being hierarchically arranged into microevolutionary and macroevolutionary levels (1987, p. 332).