bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
British Hegelianism: A Non-Metaphysical View?
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: August 2016

Of all the major episodes in Hegel's Rezeptionsgeschichte, British Hegelianism can seem the most foreign and outmoded, to have the least relevance to our current understanding of Hegel's thought. Even today, we are lead back to the Young Hegelians for the problems they pose in reading his work; we can sympathise with the concerns of Peirce, Royce and Dewey that drew them to him, and the interpretative picture they developed; we can take seriously the attempts by Croce and Gentile to bring about their “reforms”, given our contemporary ambivalence to his project; and we can see how in different ways the influence of Hegel on Kojève, Sartre, Lukács and the Frankfurt School have made some of his ideas central to our times. But few feel this sense of identification and illumination on encountering the work of Hegel's British interpreters from the turn of the century; rather, in their writings we seem to find a Hegel that is darker, more distant, more difficult for us to relate to contemporary concerns.This is not true in every respect, of course. In particular, several recent commentators have stressed how far it is possible to find here a reading and assessment of Hegel's political thought that does connect directly with many current issues, and that in this respect the thought of T H Green, Bernard Bosanquet and Henry Jones is not dead, either as a tradition within political philosophy, or as an interpretative approach to Hegel's theory of the state. Nonetheless, even those who seek to defend the importance of British Hegelianism in this regard clearly recognize that this is a fairly modest claim: for it fails to resurrect and revitalize the more fundamental aspect of the their encounter with Hegel, which was with his metaphysics – on which, as for Hegel, their political theories were based, rather than being primary in themselves. Those concerned with the political thought of the British Hegelians have not tried to take on this wider issue, leaving unchallenged the assumption that in their appropriation of his metaphysics, the British Hegelians have little to offer us either interpretatively or philosophically.
T H Green's Doubts About Hegel's Political Philosophy
Authors: Nicholson Peter 
Published: August 2016

In this paper I look at T H Green's use of Hegel, with specific reference to political philosophy. I try to assess in particular the limits which Green set to his use of Hegel. I begin by considering briefly Green's knowledge of Hegel, and the extent to which Hegel's ideas can be discerned in his writings. Then I discuss a famous passage which is usually cited as expressing a serious reservation about Hegel's view of politics. I conclude that it is by no means clear how Hegelian Green is: and that this is not a question which Green would have thought important.Green died suddenly, weeks before his forty-sixth birthday. He left no autobiography to help us trace his intellectual debts, and we have to rely on the evidence of his writings together with the recollections of his friends. Consequently it is impossible to be certain how much of any particular author Green read. Writers on philosophy were not then generally expected to support every statement with references. Green himself seldom appends footnotes which reveal his sources. Furthermore, his friend and first biographer Nettleship tells us, Greennever overcame his native repugnance to wide reading. He liked, as he used to say, to ‘browse’ amongst books, and it was by brooding over the great sayings of philosophers rather than by traversing their systems in detail, that he seemed to get most of his intellectual nourishment. His mind was reflective, not accumulative.
Collingwood's Reform of Hegelian Dialectic
Authors: Peters Rik 
Published: August 2016

The relation between Collingwood and Hegel has been mentioned very often but so far it has seldom been the subject of a thorough inquiry. Collingwood himself is for a large part responsible for this situation because he never expressed his debts to Hegel's philosophy. In the Idea of Nature and in the Idea of History, both published posthumously, Collingwood confines himself to a critical account of Hegel's philosophy of nature and history. The quality of Collingwood's interpretations in both works however, leads one to suspect that Collingwood had a very profound knowledge of Hegel's philosophy. This suspicion is confirmed by Collingwood's manuscripts in the Bodleian Library which show clearly that Collingwood studied Hegel much more thoroughly and continuously than his interpreters have assumed so far. In the manuscripts we find long and profound commentaries on Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, on his Science of Logic and on all parts of the Encyclopedia. The material in the Bodleian is so abundant that a whole book would be needed to interpret it satisfactorily. In this paper, however, I will restrict myself to the kernel of the Hegel's and Collingwood's philosophies which is the dialectic.It needs no comment that Hegel's system is thoroughly dialectical. About the dialectical character of Collingwood's philosophy, however, many interpreters have their doubts and even when they admit, always after long discussion, that some parts of Collingwood's thought are dialectical, they immediately claim that these parts are not the best.
McDowell's Kant: Mind and World
Authors: Bird Graham 
Published: August 2016

McDowell's Mind and World is a commentary on a traditional, dualist, epistemology which puzzles over, and offers accounts of, a fundamental division between mental, subjective items, and non-mental, objective items in experience. The principal responses to that tradition which McDowell considers are those of Davidson's coherentism, Evans's form of realism, and Kant; but it is Kant's famous B75 text which occupies centre stage:Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer; Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.(Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind).I shall unfortunately say nothing of the philosophical import of McDowell's reflections on these positions, for my aim here is to focus on his account of Kant. My view is that his account is fundamentally mistaken, and I can indicate the points of disagreement in two related ways. First, as McDowell stresses, his Kant is Strawson's Kant. But, as I have argued elsewhere Strawson's Kant is not Kant, and so McDowell's Kant is not Kant either. Second, more specifically, Strawson's Kant has notoriously two sides, light and dark, insightful and monstrous, in which the dark side, the so-called ‘Metaphysics of Transcendental Idealism”, cannot be eliminated, and McDowell follows Strawson in this. Indeed in Strawson's The Bounds of Sense that dark side has equal status with the more promising insights, although more recently he has modified that strong view. My claim is that this bizarre dualism, and especially the dark side which McDowell unwisely calls the “transcendental story” (MW p 41), are not present in Kant in anything like the way that Strawson and McDowell suppose.
The Reciprocity Thesis in Kant and Hegel
Authors: Patten Alan 
Published: August 2016

Following Henry Allison's terminology in his book Kant's Theory of Freedom I shall take the reciprocity thesis to be the thesis that morality and freedom are reciprocal concepts. To be free, the reciprocity thesis claims, is to be subject to the demands of morality; to be subject to the demands of morality is to be free.Despite quite different understandings of the domains of ethics and morality, Kant and Hegel both affirm versions of the reciprocity thesis. Kant's best known statement of the thesis can be found at the beginning of Chapter III of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: “a free will and a will under moral laws”, he asserts, “are one and the same. Consequently if freedom of the will is presupposed, morality, together with its principle, follows by mere analysis of the concept of freedom”. This assumption of reciprocity is an explicit premise in the subsequent argument that, since a rational agent must take himself to be free, he must consider himself subject to the moral law. And it reappears again in the Critique of Practical Reason's reversal of this argument, which claims that, since a rational agent has a sense of himself as subject to the moral law (the so-called “fact of reason”), he therefore has a consciousness of his freedom. Finally, it is worth noting that something like the reciprocity thesis underlies much of the argument of Chapters I and II of the Groundwork as well as the opening arguments of the second Critique: for in these texts Kant frequently moves directly from the proposition that the moral will must be determined independently of all of its desires and inclinations (it is free) to the conclusion that it must be subject to the moral law.
Beauties of Nature and Beauties of Art: On Kant and Hegel's Aesthetics
Authors: D'Oro Giuseppina 
Published: August 2016

This paper is an attempt to sketch the general framework of Kant and Hegel's Aesthetics, which are dealt respectively in sections I and II.The first section considers Kant's stated aims in the introduction to the Critique of Judgment, his location of judgments of taste within the problematic of reflective judgment, his treatment of reflective aesthetic judgments in the analytic of the beautiful and the distinction between objective reality and subjective universal validity. The second section provides a sketch of Hegel's division of artistic beauty into symbolic, classical and romantic art in the attempt to explain how Hegel's restriction of the subject matter of aesthetics to fine art, may shed light on his critique of Kantian ‘subjectivism’.Kant's discussion of aesthetics is located within the problematic of reflective judgment in general, that is, within a discussion of the suitability of nature for cognition. Reflective judgments are first contrasted with determinant judgments and then divided into two kinds, aesthetic and teleological. The distinction between aesthetic and teleological reflection, captures the distinction between a kind of pleasure which arises from the conformity or harmony of imagination and the understanding, and a kind of pleasure which arises from the conformity or harmony of the understanding with reason. The fact that pleasure arises in reflective judgments in general, and is not an exclusive feature of aesthetic reflection, is not transparent from Kant's introduction, but is suggested by the claim that although the acknowledgment that the various empirical laws of nature are amenable to systematic categorization, no longer gives rise to pleasure, this is simply due to the fact that the repeated experience of the systematic unity of empirical laws, is no longer an occasion for surprise:It is true that we no longer notice any decided pleasure in the comprehensibility of nature, or in the unity of its divisions into genera and species, without which the empirical concepts, that afford us our knowledge of nature in its particular laws, would not be possible. Still it is certain that the pleasure appeared in due course, and only by reason of the most ordinary experience being impossible without it, has it become gradually fused with simple cognition, and no longer arrests particular attention.
Kant and Hegel: Their Religious Philosophies Compared
Authors: Crichlow Harold E 
Published: August 2016

Despite the existence of a Promethean strain in the history of western thought from the Pre-Socratics down to the time of Kant and Hegel, it is fair to say that mankind generally had some kind of belief in the Gods or the one God. Even before recorded history began, people felt surrounded on all sides by superior supernatural beings who inspired terror and who could only be placated by sacrifice – human, animal and plant – the stage of animism. Since Kant and Hegel, despite the rapid and growing secularisation of society and the decline of overt acts of religion in European societies which lead the word in freedom and material development, census figures show that a large number of people still hold some kind of religious belief.The subject of religion in Kant and Hegel is too wide to be dealt with comprehensively in a paper of this kind, and I shall be looking very briefly at three areas, viz, epistemology where God is presupposed in both systems, freedom through which the religious dimension in human life is expressed, and the possibility of an after-life traditionally treated under the title of the immortality of the soul. God, Freedom and the Immortality of the Soul have been the fundamental issues that have engaged the minds of the great system-builders in philosophy from Plato and Aristotle to Kant and Hegel.
Hegel in France
Authors: Regnier Marcel 
Published: August 2016

‘Hegel in France’ is a title which poses two questions: (i) the extent of French acquaintance with Hegelian thought, (ii) the influence exercised by Hegel on French philosophy. Initially it is necessary to recall what Hegel's personal contacts were with the French and the time he spent in France.In 1818 Victor Cousin (1792–1857), who had already been to Germany in 1817, suggested going to Munich. He wrote to Hegel asking him for letters of introduction. Hegel was still at Heidelberg, but had just been named Professor at Berlin and he replied on the 5 August 1818. Cousin thus met Hegel at Heidelberg. In 1824 while accompanying the Duke of Maitebello's son in Germany he was arrested in Dresden by Saxony police at the request of the Prussians who then imprisoned him in Berlin. Hegel intervened on his behalf to free him. In 1827 Hegel visited him in Paris, a visit about which Hegel wrote extensively to his wife, and Cousin followed him back to Germany.To what extent had Cousin, who exercised a wide influence on French universities himself, been an Hegelian and would he have contributed to the diffusion of Hegelian philosophy in France? In the important year 1828 when the change of government allowed him to take up his teaching again, he declared: ‘In Germany, a philosophy which draws its glory fran calling itself the philosophy of nature, has succeeded subjective idealism and in France if not on the ruins of, at least in the face of empiricism, a philosophy has developed which certainly has pronounced spiritual dimension. What can we conclude from these changes?
Hölse, System and Subject
Authors: Pippin Robert B 
Published: August 2016

Hegel, the philosopher most responsible for linking philosophy to history, appropriately argued that in his own day there simply could not be Platonists, Aristotelians, Stoics, or Epicureans, that one could not bring back an earlier stage of thought. In this massive two volume study Vittorio Hösle argues that, in the spirit of Hegel himself, there also cannot be contemporary Hegelians. But there can be “philosophers who attempt to mediate the tradition of objective idealism from Plato to Hegel with post-Hegelian philosophy and with contemporary science”, (p 57n) In the past many of the philosophers who have attempted such a “mediation” have concentrated on one or another aspect of Hegel's project, usually his philosophical anthropology, his social theory or political theory, his critique of modernity, theory of alienation, etc. Hösle ambitiously takes up what looks to be the most unlikely candidate for any “contemporary mediation,” Hegel's entire systematic attempt to link together “Logic”, “Philosophy of Nature” and “Philosophy of Spirit”.Often Hösle's study is simply a survey of Hegel's systematic enterprise, providing paraphrase and plausibility where possible, summarising claims, excusing or pointing out excesses, pausing to debate other commentators, or complain about prominent mis-readings. He introduces his account with a long historical and theoretical discussion of Hegel's Encyclopedia system, and then offers a running commentary on its three major parts, devoting the largest blocks of attention to the Logic and the philosophy of objective spirit in the Rechtsphilosophie. But there is throughout one great thematic problem at issue that sets the tone of the book at the beginning and is returned to again and again.
Hegel and the New Historicism
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: August 2016

… intellectual and moral process (is) a history of increasingly useful metaphors rather than of increasing understanding of how things really are.” (Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 9)In an engaging recent paper, Ian Hacking has argued that Hegel is “speaking to us” once again, after a long period (in Anglo-American philosophy, at least), in which he appeared to be speaking to another audience, located in another world. He has our ear once more because our philosophical thought has once again begun to incorporate Hegelian themes, after decades in which our respective paths did nothing other than diverge. The aim of much Anglo-American philosophy has been to combine a Kantian “conceptual scheme” idealism with a late Wittgensteinian picture of the individual subject as embedded within a system of shared norms, practices and understandings; this has meant that it is now receptive to a form of “internal realism”, which also has a social, historical, contextual dimension, and it is this that many claim to have found in Hegel. As Richard Winfield has noted recently, after decades in the wilderness, Hegel is now an inspirational figure for the anti-foundationalism, anti-Cartesianism and anti-realism of the “new orthodoxy”:
Hegel's Ethical Thought
Authors: Houlgate Stephen 
Published: August 2016

It is often assumed that Hegel's philosophy contains no practical dimension, no doctrine of how human beings should live, but is concerned exclusively with showing that human existence, as the product of reason, is already fully rational. As a consequence, even though Hegel's social and political thought (which is set out mainly in his Philosophy of Right) has been the subject of extensive and detailed study over the years, few commentators have ever tried to develop a Hegelian ethical theory to place alongside those of Aristotle, Kant and Mill. In his book, Hegel's Ethical Thought, Allen Wood has set himself the task of remedying this situation and, in my view, has succeeded in producing one of the most thoughtful, informative and provocative accounts of Hegel's Philosophy of Right to date.Wood's achievement is extraordinary. He offers a coherent and sophisticated account of virtually all the major elements of Hegelian “objective spirit”, including freedom, happiness, recognition, right, property, punishment, morality, conscience, civil society, poverty, the state and history; and in the process he engages Hegel in a fascinating and highly instructive dialogue with a whole host of thinkers, including Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Fichte, J F Fries and J S Mill, in a way that exceedingly few commentators have succeeded in doing (or have even tried to do). As a result, I believe that Wood has shown conclusively that Hegel is an ethical theorist who is every bit as sophisticated as Aristotle, Kant and Mill, and whose contribution to ethical theory can no longer continue to be disparaged or ignored (as is largely the case) by contemporary students of the subject.
Hegelianism in Slovenia: A Short Introduction
Authors: Vezjak Boris 
Published: August 2016

My modest aim and scope in this article is to outline the present philosophical situation in Slovenia, inasmuch as it is linked with the development of Hegelian thought and influenced by the work of Hegel. I will briefly discuss some historical characteristics of its origin, with no attempt to depict “ethnographic” features of it or to show its ideological basis. Later on I will introduce some aspects of Hegel's philosophy, as understood by Slovenian lacaniens, trying to summarize their reading of Hegel and consequently point out how deeply their work on Lacan is inspired by him. My hidden and not explicitly discussed assumption throughout this paper will be that their research, although manifestly concerned with Lacan, is for the most part inspired by Hegel, and therefore Slovenian Lacanians are actually Hegelians. I will, however, try to avoid disputing and making comments on the main views of their orientation and how they concur with Hegel — this would require an extra space for comparison of both standpoints and be too complicated hermeneutically.Slovenia, which used to be a part of Yugoslavia, grew up in a-rigorous tradition of communist thinking with Marxism as a systematical ideological basis. This happened in almost all Eastern European countries, which shared the same destiny till the fall of the Berlin wall.The ideological restrictions behind the so-called “iron curtain”, so typical and easily recognizable within all these countries, caused a total eclipse of almost every non-Marxist philosophy in Slovenia up to the sixties.
The Origins of Hegel's Knowledge of English
Authors: Waszek Norbert 
Published: August 2016

A detailed and full-scale study of “Hegel and the ‘Gelstesleben’ of Great Britain” is still lacking. What we have, Instead, are either rough sketches for a later painting, or individual pieces for a mosaic, of which plenty of stones have not yet been produced. It has become clear, however, that any full-scale study would Involve at least five major areas:a) Hegel's interest in and reaction to the political life of Great Britain, from the allusion to Pitt's politics of the 1790s to the Reform Bill article of 1831;b) Hegel's indebtedness to Scottish political economy and theory of civil society (Ferguson, Hume, Steuart, Smith);c) Hegel's assessment of British works of art (e.g. Shakespeare, Milton, Scott) and aesthetic theories (Shaftesbury, Kames);d) Hegel's discussion of British philosophers in the History of Philosophy (Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Berkely, Hume, Scottish School);e) Hegel's study of British historians (Gibbon, Hume) and his description of England's role in world history.For the extent and dates of Hegel's contacts with these British sources, and to compare and identify them with certain passages from Hegel's writings, ths question of his knowledge of English is of considerable importance, rather than being a matter of mere biographical curiosity. However, before raising expectations too high, it must be emphasized that the present article does not provide, nor indeed pretend to provide, an ultimate answer to this question: a watertight proof has not yet come to light. What is hoped to be achieved is, firstly, to bring together the available direct and indirect evidence on the issue. Secondly, to draw some conclusions from the admittedly inconclusive material. These conclusions should be seen as first hypotheses which any scholar can scrutinize on the basis of the evidenoe presented. The greatest reward for the present attempt would be to spark off further research which eventually might result in finding further evidence.