bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Need There Be a Problem of Induction?
Authors: Brown Harold I. 
Published: June 2016

The problem of induction has long been one of the central problems of empiricist epistemology. There are two main versions of this problem: to justify a strictly universal statement on the basis of a finite set of singular statements and to justify a new singular statement on the basis of some finite set of accepted singular statements. In both cases it is assumed that we have a set of singular statements with which to begin and that these singular statements are, somehow, provided by observation; neither of these assumptions will be disputed in this paper. But there is another assumption without which there might well be no problem of induction:A. Any synthetic statement which is to be accepted as known must be justified on the basis of observation.It is only because philosophers assume A that they are faced with the problem of showing how we can infer from statements which have been justified by observation to others which have not. It is this assumption which will concern us here, for if there are no adequate grounds for accepting A, the problem of induction may not arise at all.
Anti-Racism and Unlimited Freedom of Speech: An Untenable Dualism
Authors: Glass Marvin 
Published: June 2016

Perhaps it is best to begin on a semi-autobiographical note. In my liberal days, Mill's arguments in On Liberty for freedom of speech struck me as a paradigm of rationality: the force and eloquence of his presentation, I then thought, could not fail to impress themselves on any mature member of our species. But I am a Marxist now, and more and more of my former political beliefs now strike me as less and less tenable. It was considerations such as the one that follows which have recently led me to modify drastically, and in some cases abandon entirely, my former political views vis à vis the question of freedom of speech.Whenever there is an ascendant class, a large portion of the morality of the country emenates from its class interests and its feelings of class superiority. The morality between Spartans and Helots, between planters and negroes, between princes and subjects, between nobles and returiers, between men and women, has been for the most part the creation of these class interests and feelings ….
Actions and De Re Beliefs
Authors: Feldman Richard H. 
Published: June 2016

Many different analyses of the concept of de re belief have been proposed in recent years. Most of these analyses may be called ‘reductionist’ since they attempt to “reduce” de re belief to de dicta belief or to analyze de re belief in terms of de dicta belief. Some reductionist analyses are extremely liberal in their attribution of de re beliefs — they imply that people have de re beliefs in a variety of situations in which more restrictive analyses have no such implication. In this paper I will show that the most liberal of the reductionist theories, those Roderick Chisholm calls “latitudinarian theories”, are unacceptable.Latitudinarian analyses have been proposed by many philosophers, including Ernest Sosa, Mark Pastin, and also, perhaps, W. V. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars.
The Relationship of Substances and Simple Natures in the Philosophy of Descartes
Authors: Drury Shadia B. 
Published: June 2016

The purpose of this paper is to show that the ‘simple natures’ which appear in the Regulae are those very ‘modes’ and ‘attributes’ of ‘substance’ which appear in all of Descartes’ later works. Contrary to the opinions of some critics, I hope to show that simple natures were not discarded by Descartes for being inconsistent with his later philosophy; that is, if they were discarded at all! I also hope to show that simple natures do not have such a “wide berth” that they are inadequate in dealing with Descartes’ “mature philosophy”. On the contrary, I hope to make it sufficiently clear that they are indispensable for our understanding of the relationship between his epistemology and ontology.Descartes’ account of ‘simple natures’ is of utmost importance to his epistemology. His account of ‘substance’ constitutes the very essence of his ontology. We shall see that while ‘simple natures’ are all we can know, ‘ substance’ is all that exists. Hence the relationship of simple natures to substance should aid us in understanding the relationship of thought to being. This relationship serves to illustrate the correspondence between knowledge and existence which is the hallmark of Cartesian thought.
Church's Translation Argument
Authors: Leeds Stephen 
Published: June 2016

What are the objects of the so-called ‘propositional attitudes’ — belief, desire, and the like? One of the best-known accounts holds them to be sentences. According to this account — which I shall call the ‘linguistic theory’ — an analysis of the logical form of a sentence like(1) John believes that the moon is roundwill see the word ‘that’ as a hidden pair of quotation marks: except for niceties of idiom, (1) might be written(2) John believes ‘the moon is round’.(2) asserts that a certain relation, the ‘believes’-relation, holds between John and the sentence ‘the moon is round’.
How to Tell the Left From the Right
Authors: McMurtry John 
Published: June 2016

“If thou go on the left hand, thou shalt in this way be soon essayed.”Words on the Cross to Sir Galahad, The Holy Grail, by Thomas Malory, Chapter XIIWords on the Cross to Sir Galahad,The Holy Grail, by Thomas Malory, Chapter XIIThough left and right are fundamental terms of our social and political vocabulary, perhaps indeed the ultimate dividing concepts of ways of life on the earth today, their meaning seems to be as obscure as their application is ubiquitous.
Reason, Egoism, and the Prisoners' Dilemma
Authors: Eshelman Larry 
Published: June 2016

In this essay I shall try to show that the egoist's inability to avoid the Prisoners’ Dilemma is not a reason for rejecting egoism. In the first section I shall outline the Prisoners’ Dilemma and indicate why the egoist cannot avoid the dilemma. In the next section I shall consider an argument against egoism based upon an appeal to our intuitions as to what is rational. And in the final section I shall consider the argument that egoism is not self-supporting and so is not an adequate conception of rationality.But first a few words should be said about what is meant by egoism here. The egoist is commonly thought of as someone who acts from selfinterest. This is in keeping with the present use of the term as long as ‘self-interest’ is not understood in a too narrow a fashion. Perhaps a Jess misleading way of characterizing the egoist, though, is as someone who tries to maximize his happiness - i.e., he is an individual utility maximizer.
The Analysis of Knowledge in the Second Edition of Theory of Knowledge
Authors: Conee Earl B. 
Published: June 2016

Roderick Chisholm has offered a new attempt to define knowledge in the second edition of Theory of Knowledge. The purpose of this paper is to present an objection to that definiton.Here is the proposed definition (numbering below follows the text):D6.4 h is known by 5 =df h is accepted by S; h is true; and h is nondefectively evident for 5.To understand D6.4 we need to know what it is for a proposition to be nondefectively evident for a person. That has the following definition:D6.3 h is nondefectively evident for S=df Either h is sertain for S, or h is evident for S and is entailed by a conjunction of propositions each having for S a basis which is not a basis for any false proposition.There are four technical expressions in D6.3: “entailed,” “certain” “evident,” and “basis.“
Puccetti and Brain Bisection: An Attempt at Mental Division
Authors: Rigterink Roger J. 
Published: June 2016

Science is full of surprises. Fortunately, most of these surprises are small. A scientist, for example, might make an unexpected discoverey, but the discovery simply adds new data in support of an old theory. Or perhaps the discovery will endanger an existing theory, but one which has only local import. In cases like these, the existing theory will be modified, or perhaps even rejected; but the research tradition which surrounds the local theory will remain, by and large, unaffected and will continue on.Small surprises are welcomed within science; they are part of the daily grist. Science needs them in order to advance in an orderly fashion.
Rigid Designators and Disguised Descriptions
Authors: Cook Monte 
Published: June 2016

In “Naming and Necessity” Saul Kripke repeatedly uses modal arguments to show that proper names are not abbreviated or disguised descriptions. The arguments take the following form:(a)“The F might not have been the F” is false.(b)If N were used to mean the F, then “N might not have been the F” would be false (because of (a)).(c)But “N might not have been the F” is true.(d)Therefore, N is not used to mean the F.
Classical Theories of Reference
Authors: Travis Charles 
Published: June 2016

“La théorie, c'est bon, mais ça n'empêche pas d'exister”J. M. CharcotRoughly speaking, references (as they concern us here) relate what is said to just those things about which it is said. A theory of reference is commonly taken to be a statement or characterization of that relation which references effect — that relation, that is, which holds between something that is said and some object just in case in that which is said (or perhaps in saying it) reference is made to that object. Such a theory is often further conceived as answering one or both of the questions: (a) For any given object X, what is it for a reference to be made to X (or under what conditions will a reference have been made to X?), and (b) For any given reference, R, what is it for an object X to be the referent of R (or under what conditions will X be the referent of R?). Let us call a theory which correctly answers at least some of these questions a classical theory of reference.
Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points
Authors: Daniels Norman 
Published: June 2016

In ATheory of Justice,John Rawls defines a hypothetical contract situation and argues rational people will agree on reflection it is fair to contractors. He solves the rational choice problem it poses by deriving two lexically-ordered principles of justice and suggests the derivation justifies the principles. Its soundness aside, just what justificatory force does such a derivation have?On one view, there is no justificatory force because the contract isriggedspecifically to yield principles which match our pre-contract moral judgments. Rawls provides ammunition for this claim: “By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments [about what is just] and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”
Doing Marx Justice
Authors: Young Gary 
Published: June 2016

The circumstance that on the one hand the daily sustenance of labour power costs only half a day's labor, while on the other hand the very same labor power can work during a whole day, that consequently the value which its use during one day creates is double what he [the capitalist] pays for that use, this circumstance is without a doubt a piece of good luck for the buyer but by no means an injustice [Unrecht] to the seller [the worker].[T]he surplus product [is] the tribute annually exacted from the working class by the capitalist class. Though the latter with a portion of that tribute purchases the additional labor power even at its full price, so that equivalent is exchanged for equivalent, yet the transaction is for all that only the old dodge of every conqueror who buys commodities from the conquered with the money he has robbed them of.
Identity Conditions and Events
Authors: Wierenga Edward , Feldman Richard 
Published: June 2016

According to Myles Brand, ‘[t]he key to advocating a particularist account of events -or any account of events - is to provide adequate identity conditions’ . He thinks that the function of an identity condition is ‘to specify the nature of’ events.To state an identity condition for events is to provide a way to complete the formula:(IC) (e) (f) (if e and fare events, then e=f iff----)The mere fact that a proposed completion of (IC) is true does not imply that it is an informative identity condition for events or that it plays any role in specifying the nature of events.
Marx, Atheism and Revolutionary Action
Authors: Myers David 
Published: June 2016

Prima facie there is confusion in that part of Marx's theory which deals with religion and revolution. On the basis of Marx's scattered statements on religion one can construct two views of the relationship between revolutionary action and the abolition of the religious mentality. One view is that the exploited class can come to atheism prior to the creation of communist society, and, indeed, must attain a secular consciousness if it is to be the agency of revolution. The other view is that the power of religion cannot be broken until after the communist revolution because only a new economic order can remove the material conditions which sustain religion as a mass phenomenon.In the face of these conflicting views we are left with two alternatives. Either we can take one of the constructions as the authentic one, or, we can conclude that Marx's position is incoherent. Seeking the best in both worlds, my approach involves showing why the charge of incoherence appears plausible while arguing for a resolution in the direction of the first construction.
Can Hume Answer Cromwell?
Authors: Pence Gregory E. 
Published: June 2016

In the first written volume of David Hume's History of England, Hume describes Oliver Cromwell in this uncomplimentary way:The strokes of his character are as open and strongly marked, as the schemes of his conduct were, during the time, dark and unpenetrable. His extensive capacity enabled him to form the most enlarged projects: His enterprising genius was not dismayed with the boldest and most dangerous. Carried, by his natural temper, to magnanimity, to grandeur, and to an imperious and domineering policy: he knew, when necessary, to employ the most profound dissimulation, the most oblique and refined artiface, the semblance of the greatest moderation and simplicity. A friend to justice, tho’ his public conduct was one continued violation of it; devoted to religion, tho’ he perpetually employed it as the instrument of his ambition; his crimes derived from the prospect of sovereign power, a temptation, which is, in general, irresistible to human nature.
Escape from Boredom: Edification According to Rorty
Authors: Levi Isaac 
Published: June 2016

Richard Rorty sings in the antifoundationalist chorus. His song equates the rise of foundationalist epistemology with the professionalization of philosophy. The discordant notes he finds in the foundationalist score become, as a consequence, subversive of philosophy as an autonomous discipline.Nonetheless, the most salient feature of Rorty's recent book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, is that it is by a professional philosopher, for professional philosophers and about the future of philosophy as a profession. The early chapters of the book are polished pieces of professional philosophical prose addressed to issues which have provoked interest in recent years among members of academic philosophy departments. They represent efforts to undermine foundationalist epistemology even in some of its currently fashionable guises as philosophy of language.
An Objection to the Revision of The Logical Connection Argument
Authors: Lee Jig-Chen 
Published: June 2016

In a paper entitled ‘Reviving the Logical Connection Argument,’ James Otten attempts to revive the Logical Connection Argument (LCA), which is intended to refute the causal thesis. Otten distinguishes two versions of the causal thesis. The general causal thesis:(G) W1 … Wn are certain of S's wants, and W1 … Wn cause A,and the restricted causal thesis:(R): W is S's want to perform A, and W causes A.
The Lockean Proviso
Authors: Sarkar Husain 
Published: June 2016

Within Robert Nozick's theory of Justice as presented in his Anarchy, State and Utopia, does the Lockean proviso dovetail with the theory of entitlement? The main burden of this paper is to establish that far from dovetailing, there is a serious conflict between the two.Nozick's theory of Justice consists of at least three principles, namely, the principle of Justice in acquisition, the principle of Justice in transfer, and the principle of rectification of injustice. These principles treat the topics of how unheld things came to be held, how they came to be transferred, and how injustice in respect to them came to be corrected or rectified. Although Nozick does not provide a detailed philosophical picture of these principles of Justice, he says enough about each of them by way of examples and explanations to constitute a powerful, criticizable doctrine.
The Historian's Presupposition on Feminism: A Case Study
Authors: Marcil-Lacoste Louise 
Published: June 2016

More and more frequently, the general question whether there is an identifiable feminist methodology for investigating historical and philosophical writings about ‘the problem of women’ is raised. As of yet, there is no general, let alone systematic answer to this question, and many would claim it to be unanswerable. Ultimately, indeed, nothing short of the creation of an entirely new form of rationality would seem to be required, if the issue is to replace the so-called phallocentric grammar of our culture.My suggestion here is that a significant way to provide elements of answers to this general question is to analyze works already done in this field with the view of delineating some of the conditions under which an adequate treatment of the women issue can be made. One such condition will be discussed here. It will be claimed that unless one is clear about the issue of equality, one cannot address the central issue raised by most writings on women.
Plato's Greatest Accusation against Poetry
Authors: Belfiore Elizabeth 
Published: June 2016

InRepublicX.605c-607a, Plato makes what he says is the greatest accusation against imitative poetry: ‘We have not yet made the greatest accusation against it [sc.mimetikē]. For the fact that it is able to harm reasonable people, except for a very few, is surely most terrible’ (605c6-8). What follows is a subtle theory of audience psychology. Plato accuses the poet of creating special circumstances in which knowledge of what constitutes moral virtue is not an adequate protection against wrong-doing. The poet does not merely give us false beliefs, as a sophist does, he attacks the very order of the soul.This new charge depends on those preceding it, in which the poet was said to make things ‘third from the truth’ and to deceive the ignorant in a way analogous to that in which the painter makes children and fools think that a painted carpenter is a real carpenter, if they see it from afar (598c). We must begin by examining this important analogy.
Imagery: From Hume To Cognitive Science*
Authors: Bower Kenneth J. 
Published: June 2016

Hume said that to have a memory image of some individual, x, is to perceive a ‘faint copy’ of some prior perception of x. This classical view of memory images includes three distinct claims:(1) Images and percepts are mental entities which serve as objects for a ‘direct’ or ‘non-inferential’ perception.(2) A memory image of some individual, x, shares numerous properties with some prior perception of x. (’ … great resemblance … in every other particular, except their degree of force and vivacity.’)
Indeterminate Descriptions
Authors: Fitch G.W. 
Published: June 2016

One of the most important insights that Russell had in presenting his philosophy of language was his view of singular definite descriptions. Russell held that singular phrases of the form ‘the so-and-so’ should not be viewed as names, but rather incomplete symbols which can be said to have meaning only in a context. We should not represent the sentence(1) The inventor of bifocals is bald.as a simple subject-predicate sentence of the form ‘Fa.’ but rather as a complex existential sentence. According to Russell we should analyze (I) as(2) There is a unique x such that x invented bifocals and x is bald.Moreover, if Russell's analysis is correct then the proposition expressed by (1) will be true in a given circumstance provided that there is a unique inventor of bifocals who is bald in that circumstance.
The Defence of the Ant: Work, Life and Utopia
Authors: Rives Joel 
Published: June 2016

It was the middle of winter now and the Grasshopper was long dead. Skepticus and Prudence, being not quite grasshoppers had retreated into a burrow dug by Prudence and stocked by her for the winter.Unfortunately, Skepticus had taken the Grasshopper far too seriously and had not assisted Prudence in laying up for winter. Thus, by the time January came around, the cupboard was bare (metaphorically speaking) and the insects once again had to choose between going the way of the Grasshopper and another (seemingly appalling) alternative.PRUDENCE: There is simply no doubt about it. We must either starve like the Grasshopper or we must take refuge with the Ant. He laid up enough food to tide a dozen insects over the winter so he couldn't possibly mind if we went over to share it with him.
Searle on Programs and Intentionality
Authors: Sharvy Richard 
Published: June 2016

… it is possible for a man to write a piece correctly by chance or at the prompting of another: but he will be literate only if he produces a piece of writing in a literate way, and that means doing it in accordance with the skill of literate composition which he has in himself.Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II 4 1105a23-35
On Characterizing Unary Probability Functions and Truth-Value Functions
Authors: Leblanc Hugues 
Published: June 2016

Consider a languageSLhaving as its primitive signs one or more atomic statements, the two connectives ‘∼’ and ‘&,’ and the two parentheses ‘(’ and ‘)’; and presume the extra connectives ‘V’ and ‘≡’ defined in the customary manner. With the statements ofSLsubstituting for sets, and the three connectives ‘∼,’ ‘&,’and ‘V’ substituting for the complementation, intersection, and union signs, the constraints that Kolmogorov places in [1] on (unary) probability functions come to read:K1. 0 ≤ P(A),K2. P(∼(A & ∼A)) = 1,K3. If ⊦ ∼(A & B), then P(A ∨ B) = P(A) + P(B),K4. If ⊦ A ≡ B, then P(A) = P(B).2
Humes Criterion of Significance
Authors: Williams Michael 
Published: June 2016

IThere are various ways of being a sceptic. Most obviously, perhaps, versions of scepticism can differ with respect to scope. Scepticism can be universal; it can be directed against beliefs belonging to certain broad kinds, say beliefs having to do with the external world; or it can be quite focussed, as in the case of religious scepticism. But there is also the question of force. Some philosophers treat scepticism as a purely theoretical affair, defining it as the thesis that knowledge is impossible. This kind of scepticism, theoretical scepticism, has no essential connection with any particular sceptical practice. A theoretical sceptic does not necessarily entertain doubts or suspend judgment about any particular matter of fact or theory. He may think that the problem of induction is insoluble yet not be seriously concerned that the sun will not rise tomorrow. But in other versions, the force of scepticism is taken to be practical, in which case to be a sceptic is to entertain doubts or suspend judgment, and not just to take a certain theoretical position in epistemology.