bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Peter Damian: Could God Change the Past?
Authors: Remnant Peter 
Published: June 2016

Histories of philosophy frequently depict the later eleventh century as the scene of a series of bouts between dialecticians and anti-dialecticians — Berengar vs. Lanfranc, Roscelin vs. Anselm — preliminaries to the twelfth century welterweight contest between Abelard and St. Bernard and — dare one say? — the thirteenth century heavy-weight championship between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure.The bouts took place — no question about that — but whether the contestants can properly be characterized as dialecticians and anti-dialecticians is less certain. Dialectics is logic, the third part of the trivium, and increasingly cultivated in the eleventh century; men like Berengar and Roscelin were plainly eager to apply the logical tools with which they had been equipped to the solution of intellectual problems. In particular they undertook the solution of certain central problems of theology — Berengar that of the Eucharist and Roscelin that of the Trinity — and it was this, we are told, that aroused the ire of the anti-dialecticians: if the aim of the dialecticians was to lay bare the mysteries of faith to the light of reason that of the anti-dialecticians was to protect those same mysteries from profanation.
A Few Words About Knowledge, Scepticism, and Entailment
Authors: Daniels Charles B. 
Published: June 2016

In a recent article entitled “Scepticism and Knowing That One Knows” (Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6, pp. 655–63), Michael Hall poses a sceptical argument based upon two rules of inference:where ‘Kp’ stands for ‘it is known that p'. The argument goes:Hall (rightly, in my opinion) attacks R2, but he says little about R1. I wish to add a few words of warning about R1 as well.
Prospects for a Causal Theory of Knowledge
Authors: Hanson Philip P. 
Published: June 2016

Knowing is something that we do not have much of a theory about. (H. Putman, “The Analytic and the Synthetic,” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3 (1962), p. 365.)Interest has recently been shown in causal theories of perception, memory, inference, reference, truth, justification and belief, as well as in a more general “causal theory of knowledge” which would embrace and connect all of these concepts within a broad epistemological framework. The burden of this paper is that prospects are poor for an interesting and general enough causal theory of knowledge. A threat to generality arises from the causal theory's difficulties with knowledge of general truths. A threat to interest arises when attempts to accommodate general truths lead to a weakening of the notion of “causal connection” appealed to, making dubious the explanatory force of such an appeal.
Fictionalism and Realism
Authors: Neumann Michael 
Published: June 2016

Suppose that a scientific theory X is well confirmed, and either states or (in conjunction with certain specified systems of logic, mathematics, and semantics) implies a statement like “classes exist”. Suppose, if the statement is not explicit but implied, that the specified systems are ‘accepted’ by two individuals, R and F, as the ‘best available'. Suppose, finally, that both R and F, in some yet to be explained sense of the word, ‘accept’ and use theory X to regulate their experience. Then we have something very like the situation discussed by Putnam and van Fraassen in their debate over ‘fictionalism'. I will argue that, in this situation, there is a great mystery over what would separate a fictionalist F from a realist R. Neither Putnam nor van Fraassen seems to be conscious of the problems involved.Fictionalism, according to its opponent, Putnam, statesvarious entities presupposed by scientific and common sense discourse [are] merely “useful fictions”, or that we cannot, at any rate, possibly know that they are more than “useful fictions” (and so we may as well say that that is what they are) (PL 63).
Reid on Primary and Secondary Qualities
Authors: Greenberg Arthur R. 
Published: June 2016

In recent years renewed interest in Thomas Reid's philosophy has led to fruitful discussion of Reid's theories of sensation and perception. Although certain aspects of these topics can be discussed without setting out Reid's version of the primary-secondary quality distinction, the ultimate evaluation of Reid's work on both sensation and perception requires discussion of his views on primary and secondary qualities. Current Reid literature virtually ignores this important topic. This paper is an attempt to remedy this situation. In addition to setting out Reid's position on primary and secondary qualities I will discuss Reid's curious relation to the New Science of his day and will explain how Reid thought he could reintroduce the primary-secondary quality distinction despite Berkeley's attacks on the doctrine.In both of his major works, An Inquiry Into The Human Mind (1764), and Essays On The Intellectual Powers Of Man (1785), Thomas Reid was intent upon examining the philosophical problems of human knowledge. In the Inquiry perception received his exclusive attention. In the Essays other cognitive operations were examined as well. The impetus for these investigations was provided by Reid's negative assessment of the achievements of his philosophical predecessors.
Aristotle'sMetaphysicsZ 13
Authors: Teloh Henry 
Published: June 2016

Aristotle states inMetaphysicsZ13 (1038b9-11) that nothing said universally τῶν ϰαϑόλου λεγομένων is substance (οὐαία), rather the substance of each thing is particular to it (οὐαία ἐϰάστου ὴ ίδιος ἐϰάστῳ). The natural interpretation of this statement is that being said universally is a sufficient condition for not being substance. But this claim is very perplexing since it is the key premiss in the following apparently inconsistent set:(1)Form is substance.(2)Form is universal.(3)Nothing universal or said universally is substance, rather the substance of something is particular ἴδιος to it.
Descartes: Body and Soul
Authors: Remnant Peter 
Published: June 2016

There is an account of the soul's capacity to activate its body which is frequently attributed to Descartes and, so far as I know, has only once been said not to represent his opinion on this topic. I shall refer to it with, I hope, pardonable exaggeration as the standard account. The earliest attributions to Descartes of the standard account, which I have been able to discover, are in various writings by Leibniz; there is a rather full version in his “Explanation of the New System of the Communication of Substances” (1696):You know that M. Descartes believed that the same quantity of motion is conserved in bodies …. Even so, the changes which take place in the body as a consequence of the modifications of the soul caused him embarrassment, because they seemed to violate this law. He thought therefore that he had found a way out of the difficulty, which is certainly ingenious, by saying that we must distinguish between motion and direction of motion; and that the soul cannot increase or diminish the motive force, but that it changes the direction or determination of the course of the animal spirits, and it is in this way that voluntary motions take place.
Rule Utilitarianism and Cumulative-Effect Utilitarianism
Authors: Harrison Jonathan 
Published: June 2016

‘It is to be observed, in the second place, that the obligation, as a general rule, to respect possession and promises, admits of being clearly shewn by reference to the consequences of actions taken as species and classes.’ Alexander Smith: The Philosophy of Morals.Once upon a time I wrote a paper in which I defended a version of utilitarianism. This paper has received a certain amount of attention, but, I think, not as much individual attention as it might have done, had it not been confused with another version of utilitarianism, which became prevalent at about that time. This second version of utilitarianism came quite quickly to be known as rule utilitarianism. It has engendered a considerable amount of interest, so much so that it seems to me to be very likely that philosophers, who are utilitarians at all, are nowadays more likely to be rule utilitarians than they are to be ordinary act utilitarians.
Incomplete Symbols and Russell's Proof
Authors: Wilson W. Kent 
Published: June 2016

The primary purpose of this paper is to explain Russell's notion of ‘incomplete symbol’. The paper was provoked by some discussions of a controversial argument, advanced by Russell in several places - as early as Principia Mathematica (1910) and as late as My Philosophical Development (1959) - whose conclusion is that definite descriptive phrases have no meaning. It will be shown how the doctrine of incomplete symbols helps to resolve some of the questions raised about this argument.One virtue of the account given here is that the theory of definite descriptions may be seen to continue the departure from the earlier Principles of Mathematics approach, where it is allowed that “grammar, though not our master, will yet be taken as our guide” (p. 42), to the quite different outlook of “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism” where logical grammar and a logically perfect language are distinguished from natural languages and their (apparent) grammars. It marks a departure from “surface” grammar even more radical than that marked by the Frege-Russell treatment of quantification, but yet is a continuation of that same approach to language.
Note on Defining 'Punishment'
Authors: Scheid Don E. 
Published: June 2016

Dictionaries distinguish the following senses of ‘punishment’:(1a)the act of punishing, or the fact of being punished - where ‘punish’ is defined as: an act of public authority causing an offender to suffer for an offense. As In: ‘the respectable not only obey the law, but punish those who refuse to do so’.(1b)that which is inflicted as a penalty for an offense. As in: ‘all punishments are to be carried out in the Barrack Yard’, ‘fit the punishment to the crime’.(2)severe handling or treatment causing heavy damage, injury or loss. As in: ‘the fighter had been subjected to heavy punishment in his losing bout’, ‘the ships received considerable punishment from the batteries’.
Leibniz and Russell on Existence and Quantification Theory
Authors: Skosnik Jeffrey 
Published: June 2016

Never shall this be proved, that things that are not are. ParmenidesTo say that something does not exist, or that there is something which is not, is clearly a contradiction in terms; hence “(∀x) (x exists)” must be true. Moreover, we should certainly expect leave to put any primitive name of our language for the “x” of any matrix “ … x … ”, and to infer the resulting singular statement from “(∀x) ( … x … )”; it is difficult to contemplate any alternative logical rule for reasoning with names.
Supervaluations without Truth-Value Gaps
Authors: Herzberger Hans G. 
Published: June 2016

For a very long time truth-value gaps were under a cloud of suspicion because they were considered logically unmanageable. So Frege declared that:“as regards concepts we have a requirement of sharp delimitation; if this were not satisfied it would be impossible to set forth logical laws about them”.Three-valued logic promised to dispel the cloud but in the eyes of many it had promised more than it could deliver. So in response to Reichenbach's plea for a three-valued quantum logic Russell replied:“This is one of a number of questions as to which I am prevented from accepting a certain view by difficulties in carrying it out, but am prepared to alter my opinion if technical skill supplies an answer to my difficulties”.‘By now technical skill has supplied many alternative systems of three-valued logic, but few answers and numerous additional difficulties.’
Kleist
Authors: Mondadori Fabrizio 
Published: June 2016

“Chaque homme est divisé entre les hommes qu'il peut être”, P. Nizan (for Sylvie)As if we had in mind something like a scale of might-have-beens, erratically decreasing in specificity, in which each point provides some or all of the grounds for a transition to the next one, but not conversely, we could claim that Kleist might not have met Henriette Vogel; that he might not have committed suicide at all; that he might have had different properties than the properties he in fact had; even, in a somewhat figurative vein, that he might have been a different person than the person he was; and so on; and so forth, either adding new marks to the scale, or with a different scale in mind, along similar lines. Scales of this sort not only qualify as a kind of string of causally and temporally related might-have-beens; they also qualify, at the same time, as partial lists of true de re modal predications about Kleist.
Is There a Marxist Personal Morality?
Authors: McMurtry John 
Published: June 2016

Man must prove the truth i.e., the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.As individuals express their life, so they are.Karl Marx.The idea of a Marxian personal morality is in some ways irresistible. It strikes a personal chord in us, as most Marxian ideas may not, and it brings us close to the heart of the Marxian vision, its concern for the welfare of oppressed others.Yet Marxist theory, with its emphasis on classes, social laws, and historical determinism, seems to rule out the domains of the personal and the moral in principle. And this standard theoretical preemption is reflected in practice. Marxists rarely examine, or seek to revolutionize, their individual lives as they do societies. Indeed they may be inclined to be disdainful of any such venture as a sort of ‘bourgeois individualism.’
Virtue and Happiness: Kant and Three Critics
Authors: Friedman R.Z. 
Published: June 2016

'Contentment with our existence, ‘Kant observes, ‘is not, as it were, an inborn possession or a bliss, … it is rather a problem imposed upon us by our finite nature as a being of needs.’ Happiness is an inescapable problem for man; is it, however, the central problem of morality? Kant thinks not. The central problem of morality is the tension between two sets of demands, between two goods- virtue and happiness.Happiness, according to Kant, is the fulfillment of all of one's wants. It is ‘a rational being's consciousness of the agreeableness of life which without interruption accompanies his whole existence.'
Demarcating Actions and their Effects
Authors: Thalberg Irving 
Published: June 2016

C.A. Macdonald's incisive note, ‘On the Unifier-Multiplier Controversy', gave me fresh thoughts regarding the method of actindividuation which he defends against Jonathan Bennett's and my own misgivings. I believe a second look at the Reductive Unifying account, in light of Macdonald's apology for it, will help us size up the issues, notably those involving causation and time.I shall follow previous debaters and dwell upon examples of mayhem, where one individual kills another by carrying out a more rudimentary action. Here is Donald Davidson's case. A queen murders her royal husband by emptying a vial of poison into his ear as he sleeps. To be exact: she rotates her wrist, and the lethal drug cascades toward his ear.
Can Inconsistency be Reasonable?
Authors: Campbell Richmond 
Published: June 2016

We cannot know something unless it is true. The things that we know, therefore, must be logically consistent. Moreover, we cannot know something unless we are justified in believing it. But it does not obviously follow that the things that we are justified in believing must be consistent with each other. For we can be justified in believing something that turns out to be false. Knowledge entails truth and hence consistency. Rationally justified belief does not entail truth and it may not entail consistency.Knowledge, however, requires especially good justification. We can have reason to believe something that happens to be true, even good reason (say, strong circumstantial evidence linking a suspect to a crime), without our belief being so well-grounded that we know it to be true.
Truth and Universal Assent
Authors: Kirwan C.A. 
Published: June 2016

One of the theses defended by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics books VII and X is that pleasure is good (VII. 13, 1153b4) or is one of the good things (X. 2, 1172b26): and Aristotle thinks that it follows from this that the best thing is a pleasure, or is pleasure in a certain way (VII. 13, 1153b26). Among his arguments for the latter we find the following:The fact that all things, both brutes and men, pursue pleasure is an indication that the best thing is in a certain way that (VII. 13, 1153b25-6).
Reference to Abstract Entities
Authors: Oldfield Edward 
Published: June 2016

Platonism, considered as a philosophy of mathematics, can be formulated in two interestingly different ways. Strong platonism holds that numerals, for example, refer to certain non-physical, non-mental entities. Weak platonism holds only that numerals uniquely apply to certain non-physical, non-mental entities. (Of course, there may even be weaker views that deserve to be called ‘platonistic.’The distinction between referring to an object and uniquely applying to an object may be illustrated as follows. If there is a tallest person and I say, ‘the tallest person is over seven feet tall,’ without knowing who that person is, then my use of ‘the tallest person’ uniquely applies to someone, but it does not refer to anyone. The distinction is at least as old as Russell, for we might put his views in our terms by saying that for Russell only logically proper names refer to things, while ordinary proper names and definite descriptions at best uniquely apply to things.
Liberty, Equality, and Capitalism
Authors: Exdell John 
Published: June 2016

According to conventional wisdom, the causes of economic inequality under capitalism are different in kind from those operating in a socialist system. In socialist societies today the distribution of wealth and income is determined by political authority, whereas in capitalism it is thought to arise mainly from the choices of individuals freely transferring goods and services in the competitive market. Robert Nozick's account of the workings of a ‘free society’ expresses this view clearly:There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out. What each person gets, he gets from others who give to him in exchange for something, or as a gift. In a free society, diverse persons control different resources, and new holdings arise out of the voluntary exchange and actions of persons … The total result is the product of many individual decisions which the different individuals involved are entitled to make.
Spinoza: A Response to De Vries
Authors: Trompetter Linda 
Published: June 2016

The most devastating objection against Spinoza's thesis that there is only one substance in the universe is that raised by his contemporary Simon De Vries: If substance has an infinite number of distinct essences and substance is identical to its essence, how can there be only one substance?The majority of Spinoza scholars have considered De Vries’ objection an insoluble problem. Joachim, for example, has stated:We must therefore admit that there is a serious defect in Spinoza's general theory of the nature of Reality. The unity of Substance which seemed so absolute — the unity which was more than the unity of a system — resolves itself into a mere ‘togetherness’ of an infinite multiplicity. The Reality falls apart into a substratum without character …
Beyond Russell and Meinong
Authors: Bourgeois V. Warren 
Published: June 2016

In 1972 Gilbert Ryle published a eulogy to Meinong's theory of objects:Let us frankly concede that Geganstandstheorie itself is dead, buried and not going to be resurrected. Nobody is going to argue again that, for example, “there are objects concerning which it is the case that there are no such objects.”Since that time, the firm of Routley, Routley, Chisholm and Parsons has vigoruously defended Meinong's theory. Are they advocates for a dead client?
Doing Something Intentionally and Moral Responsibility
Authors: Graham George 
Published: June 2016

The basic idea motivating this paper is that something can be done intentionally even when it is not done with the intention of doing it. An implication of this idea is that the distinction between doing what one intends and doing something as a foreseen avoidable consequence of doing what one intends cannot be used to exonerate agents for misdeeds.My immediate purpose here is to illustrate these points and show how they pertain to the morally relevant difference between active and passive euthanasia, and to the exoneration of God for the production of evil. In particular, I shall try to show, first, that the American Medical Association's recent attempt to distinguish between active and passive euthanasia is seriously defective. Second, I shall try to show that a popular version of the so-called Free Will Defense of God for Evil is also seriously defective.
Events and the Essentiality of Time
Authors: Lombard Lawrence Brian 
Published: June 2016

It is obvious that identical events must occur at the same time. This follows simply from the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals and from the fact that events have temporal features among which are those which attribute to events times of occurrence. Thus,(1) (x) (y) (x is an event & y is an event ﬤ (x=y ﬤ (t) (x occurs at t ≡ y occurs at t))).But from the fact that (1) is true, and is, indeed, true necessarily, it does not follow that events necessarily occur at the times at which they in fact occur. This latter claim about events is expressed as follows:(2) (x) (t) (x is an event & t is a time & x occurs at t ﬤ ◻ (y) (y=x ﬤ y occurs at t)),
Frege, Perry, and Demonstratives
Authors: Yourgrau Palle 
Published: June 2016

'You ask me about the idiosyncrasies of philosophers? There is their lack of historical sense, their hatred of even the idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they are doing a thinghonourwhen they dehistoricize it,sub specie aeternitatis— when they make a mummy of it.'Nietzsche,Twilight of the Idols
Mechanics on Duty: The Limitations of a Technical Definition of Moral Expertise for Work in Applied Ethics
Authors: Caplan Arthur L. 
Published: June 2016

A former Prime Minister of Israel is alleged to have said that her country would never ascend to the status of authentic statehood until it possessed certain well-known social attributes — organized crime, prostitution, and corruption. These features, while obviously undesirable, were she felt, reliable indices of societal maturation. This anecdote is suggestive in understanding current events pertaining to the field of applied ethics.Philosophers have produced a massive body of opinion and argument on a diverse range of subjects under the rubric of applied (or practical) ethics. Moreover, they have assumed positions on various panels, commissions, governmental bodies and committees in the hope of making an informed contribution to the formulation of institutional and public policy. These accomplishments have begun to elicit the kinds of attributes commonly associated with philosophical maturation — exposées, debunkings, refutations, and ideologically informed critiques.
Rape and Mens Rea
Authors: Thornton M.T. 
Published: June 2016

‘Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.’ But when is a mens rea? In the last twenty years discussions of this question have been stimulated by controversial decisions in the English House of Lords in the cases of Smith, Morgan and Majewski.The case of Smith decided that a man might be guilty of murder if a reasonable person, knowing the circumstances, would have foreseen that death would result even if the agent himself did not so foresee. This appeal to the ‘reasonable person’ imports what is known as the ‘objective test’ as opposed to the ‘subjective test’ of the agent's actual foresight or knowledge. The case of Morgan inclined per contra to the subjective test.