bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Religious and Legal Pluralism in Recent African Constitutional Reform
Authors: Green M. Christian 
Published: February 2016

Something unexpected has been happening in Africa—and not just Northern Africa, the locus of democratic revolutions since January 2011, when a winter's discontent produced an early Arab Spring. Over the last several years, several sub-Saharan African nations have held democratic elections, produced new constitutions, and even partitioned themselves in relative peace, despite the often dire predictions of foreign governments, media, and election-monitoring organizations.In many cases, the constitution and reconstitution of these states has been accomplished by means of the referendum vote—sometimes viewed as the anti-democratic purview of special interests in the developed West, but having greater respect and utility as a tool of democracy in the developing South. Kenya produced a new constitution in 2010 by a referendum that has been lauded by international observers for its peaceful process and outcome. The Kenyan referendum followed general elections in 2007, whose results were marred by violence in early 2008. The nearby countries of Zambia and Tanzania are currently in the process of constitutional reform, drawing lessons from Kenya's unexpectedly harmonious proceedings. In all three countries, the constitutional review processes have raised, among other issues, questions of legal pluralism, religious freedom, and relations between the Christian majority and Muslim minority.
A Science Like Any Other? Classical Legal Formalism in theHalakhicJurisprudence of Rabbis Isaac Jacob Reines and Moses Avigdor Amiel
Authors: Lindell Yosef 
Published: February 2016

Nineteenth century jurists sought to make law a science like any other. They believed that the law was not an unprincipled mass of archaic and contradictory rules, nor an extinct body of Latin words that should be venerated in a church reliquary and seldom studied. Rather, they said that it was time for law to take its place in the university and to be dissected under the microscope of scientific analysis. It was by these methods that law's fundamental axioms would be uncovered—which would in turn explain the relationship of all its parts to the whole. And with the right set of principles, new data could be effortlessly incorporated into an ever-growing scientific taxonomy of the law.This mode of thinking dominated both European and American legal jurisprudence in the mid- to late-nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, although it went by different names. One fundamental thread ran throughout—the law was not unprincipled, but logical. It could be reasonably explained and rationally ordered. This paper demonstrates that Rabbis Isaac Jacob Reines and Moses Avigdor Amiel, two important Jewish thinkers living at the turn of the twentieth century, saw Jewish law, orhalakha, in the same light. Although Reines and Amiel may not have been directly influenced by secular jurisprudence, many of the elements of this classical legal science provide an interesting parallel to the answers these two thinkers gave to some of the oldest problems of Jewish law. Most notably, the way in which Reines and Amiel explained the connection between the Torah's oral and written components, as well as the way in which they asserted the internal coherence ofhalakhicjurisprudence, was similar to the legal formalism of their contemporaries.
Common Cause in the Culture Wars?
Authors: Reyes René 
Published: February 2016

A significant body of legal academic writing produced in recent years has argued that one of the primary purposes of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses was to protect freedom of conscience. But in the two decades since the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, a number of commentators have suggested that freedom of conscience has lost its place as the focus of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Indeed, some have gone so far as to argue that protection for freedom of conscience has disappeared from the Free Exercise Clause almost entirely, leaving conduct that is motivated by a religious conscience without special constitutional protection. To be sure, some protection for freedom of conscience remains—but its constitutional source is often to be found outside of the Religion Clauses and its concern is often with non-religious activity.This evolution of doctrine has been extensively criticized by scholars of the Religion Clauses, many of whom view these developments as departures from original intent and from long-settled constitutional practice. Michael McConnell, Martha Nussbaum, and others have also advanced normative critiques, arguing that religious conscience is in many ways distinctive and merits distinctive constitutional solicitude under the Free Exercise Clause. At the same time, the Supreme Court's rejection of special privileges for religious claims of conscience has been welcomed by other scholars, some of whom have argued that preferential protection for religiously-motivated conduct is a form of unconstitutional discrimination. Two of the most prominent proponents of this position are Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager, who maintain that the Religion Clauses should be read to promote equal liberty rather than to provide special exemptions.
“Command and Coercion”: Clerical Immunity, Scandal, and the Sex Abuse Crisis in the Roman Catholic Church
Authors: Wirenius John F. 
Published: February 2016

On December 29, 1170, in the late afternoon (and thus after the main meal of the day but shortly before vespers), four knights entered Canterbury Cathedral. Impelled, as far as history knows, by the angry words of King Henry II, “will no one rid me of this turbulent priest,” they had come to confront Archbishop Thomas Becket and win King Henry's favor by forcing the long-simmering dispute between Becket and his king to some final resolution. When the Archbishop refused their conflicting demands and reacted with scorn to their insults, the knights withdrew, only to arm themselves and follow Becket into the cathedral. As the traditional account has it:[t]he bell for vespers began to sound, and the archbishop, with his cross borne in front of him, made his way in as usual into the cathedral. Hardly had he reached the ascent to the choir than the noise of armed men and the shout of the knights announced that the pursuers were at hand. “Where is the archbishop, where is the traitor?” resounded through the hollow aisles, mingling strangely with the recitation of the psalms in the choir. Becket, hearing this, turned back a few steps, and calmly awaited their approach in the corner of the northern transept before the little altar of S[t .] Benedict. “Here,” he cried, “is the archbishop—no traitor, but a priest of God.” Awed by his demeanor, and perhaps by the sanctity of the place, no one dared strike. A parley began. They sought to lash their failing courage into action by words. A hasty and insulting epithet gave Fitz Urse the opportunity he wanted. A blow aimed at the archbishop's head only knocked his skull-cap to the ground, but it was enough to loose the bandogs of hell. A stroke from Tracy cut off the tonsured back of [Becket's] skull, another from Brito brought him to his knees.
Church Property Disputes, Religious Freedom, and the Ordeal of African Methodists in Antebellum St. Louis:Farrar v. Finney(1855)
Authors: Volkman Lucas P. 
Published: February 2016

In October 1846, the men and women of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in St. Louis (African Church) met to consider whether they would remain with the Methodist Episcopal Church (MEC) or align with the recently-formed Methodist Episcopal Church, South (MECS). Two years earlier, in 1844, amid growing conflict over the question of slavery within the national Methodist Church, its General Conference had adopted a Plan of Separation that provided for the withdrawal of the southern Methodists and the creation of their own ecclesiastical government. The Plan provided that each Border State congregation would have the right to determine for itself by a vote of the majority with which of the two churches it would affiliate.After the southern conferences had organized the new MECS in May 1845, the trustees of the all-white Fourth Street Methodist Church (Fourth Street Church), whose quarterly conference exercised nominal authority over the African Church, informed the black congregants that they could retain their house of worship only if they voted to join the southern Methodists. Throwing caution to the wind, and putting at risk a decade-and-a-half of patient efforts to achieve formal congregational independence within the Methodist Church, the black congregants voted decisively, by a 110 to 7 margin, to remain affiliated with the Northern Conference.
Leadership From The Heart: One Tribe's Example
Authors: Hiers Rebecca H. 
Published: February 2016

We live in an era of remarkable and wonderful technological advances. We also live in an era of tremendous economic, environmental and social upheaval. Given these circumstances, today's leaders must make decisions of overwhelming importance in a world that is changing rapidly.In these confusing times, what values can our leaders look to as they try to address the many challenges that we face? Which values, if followed, are most likely to bring us the security and the happiness that we desire?Those who came before us had to survive difficult times of their own, and their experiences shaped the ways in which they looked at the world. Each generation taught the next generation those perspectives and those strategies that had helped them be successful; and over the centuries and even millennia, this ancient wisdom became condensed into fundamental values. We may take it for granted, since our values are such an intrinsic part of our lifestyles, but one of the greatest gifts that our ancestors gave to us are these values—the collective wisdom of the ages.
A Plurality of Discontent: Legal Pluralism, Religious Adjudication and the State
Authors: Hofri-Winogradow Adam S. 
Published: February 2016

The norms that the official legal systems of North American and European states apply do not derive directly from any religion. While some of those norms, such as some of the norms governing marriage, do originate, historically, in religion and religious law, no norms are today enforced by those legal systems because the norms are part of a specific religious legal order. And yet, adjudication according to religious norms is commonplace. In North America and Europe, the legal systems applying norms associated with specific religions to adherents of those religions are principally nonstate community tribunals. Outside this Northwestern world, state legal systems, particularly those of Muslim-majority jurisdictions, often permit religious normative materials to be applied to adherents of the relevant religions as a matter of state law. Both situations are examples of legal pluralism.The popularity of the application of religious norms by state legal systems throughout much of the contemporary world raises a challenge for the Western assumption that state-enforced legality and expressly religious norms should stay apart. Can a modern state provide its citizens, residents and others subject to its power with ajustandstablelegal order by referring them to norms associated with their several religions and enforced by state courts?
Individual and Group Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human Rights: Cracks in the Intellectual Architecture
Authors: Evans Carolyn 
Published: February 2016

The Evolution of Religious Freedom in the European Court of Human RightsArticle 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects religious freedom, looked for many decades as though it was going to be effectively a dead letter. The European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) did not find a violation of Article 9 until the case of Kokkinakis v. Greece which was decided only seventeen years ago, in 1993. Even after that seminal decision, religious freedom cases were still relatively rare for several years; in 2001, there had been fewer than thirty Court cases on Article 9. However, in the last decade the case law has expanded significantly; and from 2001 to 2010 there have been more than sixty additional cases. Thus, in a relatively short period, the Court has been pushed to develop a jurisprudence of religious freedom to deal with increasingly complex and controversial cases. As the case law has multiplied and the issues have diversified, however, it has become clear that the Court has not yet developed a sufficiently coherent and principled approach to this area. So far, its approach has proved of very limited utility to individuals making claims of religious freedom.This is not to suggest that the Court has played no role in the protection of religious freedom in Europe. Indeed, in recent years, it has arguably played an increasingly positive role, particularly in cases involving group religious rights. However, this jurisprudence has not translated into greater protection for religious individuals in many instances.
Defining the Unspeakable: Incitement in HALAKHAH and Anglo-American Jurisprudence
Authors: Crane Jonathan K. 
Published: February 2016

“What constitutes evil speech? Rabbah said: As when one says,There is a fire burning in [the oven of] So-and-So's house.Abbaye asked: But what harm does he do? He merely provides information.Nevertheless, [said Rabbah,] such information may be uttered with intent to slander,As though he were saying: where else would such a fire be burningExcept in the house of So-and-So, who has plenty of meat and fish?”(BT ‘Arakhin 15b)One significant challenge confronting any state legal system is defining what speech should be permitted, or, more precisely, what speech should and should not enjoy protection from governmental interference. While the parameters of freedom of speech have been shaped and reshaped over several centuries, Anglo-American jurisprudence has not yet fully defined one of the several categories of speech that is not—and should not be—protected from interference. This is the category of incitement. Jewish law (halakhah), too, has long wrestled with this category of speech and has yet to define its contours clearly. This paper explores how these two legal systems define this category of speech, whether their approaches are commensurable, and how each can benefit from nuances found in the other.
Autonomy in Jewish Law—In Theory and in Practice
Authors: Resnicoff Steven H. 
Published: February 2016

Individuals and communities play critical roles, both theoretically and practically, in the preservation and development of Jewish law. Some of these roles allow for considerable autonomy, at least if that term is understood as the employment of one's intellectual creativity and ethical judgment. Jewish law does not purport to micromanage all of a person's decisions. Quite the contrary, in many instances, it provides and encourages moral choice so that, in part, a person can become a moral agent rather than merely someone who does moral acts.In Part I, we examine how the scope of autonomy is shaped by basic Jewish law axioms. For example, Jewish law assumes that the Pentateuch, also known as the “Written Torah” or “Written Law,” contains words which were communicated to humankind directly by God. Yet, unlike the approaches of some fundamentalist religions, Jewish law does not always construe these divine words literally. In fact, Jewish law authorities openly acknowledge that various Pentateuchal passages, taken by themselves, are incomplete, incomprehensible or at times ostensibly inconsistent. Jewish law assumes that God transmitted to humankind two interrelated bodies of teachings: one, the Pentateuch, was to be written down, and the other, known as the “Oral Torah” or the “Oral Law,” was to be transmitted from Teacher to Student. It is the Oral Torah that clarifies, resolves and supplements the Written Torah. Indeed, because the Oral Torah is necessary to understand the Torah, Jewish legal sources say that “the Oral Torah is the more important of the two.” Throughout this article, unless stated to the contrary, the term “Torah” refers to the Written Torah, the Oral Torah, or both, and the phrase “Torah Law” pertains to the laws that arise from the Torah.
Law, Religion and Human Dignity in the Muslim World Today: An Examination of OIC's Cairo Declaration of Human Rights
Authors: Abdullah al-Ahsan  
Published: February 2016

Human dignity is the recognition and respect of human need, desire and expectation one individual by another. This recognition is indispensable because no human being survives alone: Human dignity creates the foundation of society and civilization. Our knowledge of history suggests that religious ideas have provided this basic foundation of civilization. Describing the first recognized civilization in history one historian says, “Religion permeated Sumerian civic life.” According to another historian, “Religion dominated, suffused, and inspired all features of Near Eastern society—law, kingship, art, and science.” Based on these observations while defining civilization Samuel Huntington asserts, “Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations.”In Islam, the Qur’an declares that: “We have bestowed dignity on the progeny of Adam.” The verse then continues to remind the whole of mankind of God's special favor unto them with physical and intellectual abilities, natural resources and with superiority over most other creatures in the world. This dignity is bestowed through God's act of creating Adam and breathing into him His Own Spirit. Since all human beings originated from Adam and his spouse, every single human being possesses this dignity regardless of color, race, religion and tribe. The whole of mankind, as khalīfah (vice-resenf) is responsible for establishing peace on earth through divinely ordained values such as amānah (trust), ‘adālah (justice) and shūra (consultation).
“Taking Religion Seriously”? Human Rights andHijabin Europe— Some Problems of Adjudication
Authors: Cumper Peter , Lewis Tom 
Published: February 2016

It is a view widely held amongst psychologists that human beings have a basic need to create a positive social identity for themselves, either as individuals or as members of a group. In this regard, choice of dress is likely to be particularly important. A person's clothes can reveal much about their identity, in relation to their gender, class, sexual orientation, and religious beliefs. Yet what an individual wears can also attract great controversy, as evidenced by the fact that, in Europe of late, there have been few issues more controversial than that of religious dress.Today in towns and cities across Europe a significant proportion of Muslims—in particular Muslim females—have eschewed conventional western clothes in favor of garments (such as veils and headscarves) traditionally associated with Islam. With a new generation of “European Muslims” keen to cultivate a distinct identity for themselves as members of the continent's second largest religion, Islamic dress often has an “emblematic status” as a “powerful and overdetermined marker of difference.” Yet the right to wear religious dress varies significantly in Europe. In some countries there are clear restrictions on what can (or cannot) be worn in public (e.g., France and Turkey), whereas in other parts of the continent (e.g., the U.K.) young people are relatively free to wear the religious dress of their choice. Mindful of this state of affairs, the European Court of Human Rights has chosen to tread warily, letting governments retain considerable discretion in the field of religious dress. Consequently, states enjoy a wide “margin of appreciation” when determining whether their curbs on religious symbols or related garments are compatible with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
William Lloyd Garrison and the United States Constitution: The Political Evolution of an American Radical
Authors: Osborn Ronald 
Published: February 2016

On August 6, 1824, William Lloyd Garrison, not yet twenty years old, penned a letter to the Salem Gazette opposing John Quincy Adams's bid for the presidency and endorsing the candidacy of a dedicated Georgian, United States Senator William Crawford. There is no mention in the document of the slavery issue and no hint that the young Garrison viewed the Constitution as anything less than a triumph of the founding fathers. The “high and exalted character” of the elections proved the Federalist Party “worthy of its great leader, the immortal WASHINGTON” and spread “vigor and strength throughout the political fabric of our constitution and government,” Garrison wrote. “It is peculiarly gratifying, too,” he declared,to observe the dignified course pursued generally by the few sentinels of freedom, who advocate and uphold those principles, which were promulgated by the Father of his Country, and sanctioned by JAY and HAMILTON, and AMES, with a host of other distinguished patriots.Garrison went on to stress the civic duty of voting, arguing that although no citizen was legally required to support any of the presidential candidates, reason “dictates that we should” so as not to upset “the peace of the Union.” Federalists should make pragmatic political choices, he wrote, and not squander their votes on ideal but unlikely candidates.
Child Custody in Jewish Law: From Authority of the Father to the Best Interest of the Child
Authors: Kaplan Yehiel S. 
Published: February 2016

The understanding of Jewish law of the legal rationale of the relationship between parent and child developed gradually. In the first stage, in ancient Jewish law, the dominant tendency was to affirm the authority of the Jewish father over the members of his family. During this period, the idea that parents have a natural responsibility to love their children, care for them and provide for their welfare was less transparent. The main purpose of the rules concerning the relationship between parents and children at this stage was the assertion of the rights and needs of the father of the family.1 Consequently, some of the regulations of ancient Jewish law regarding the relationship between parents and children were not necessarily focused on the best interest of the child and the ideological basis for the legal policy in the sphere of custody in the ancient period was somewhat vague.By contrast, during the second, medieval stage of development of Jewish law on the relationship between parents and children, the ancient supreme principle, of the father's authority over members of his family in all spheres including the sphere of custody of children, was largely replaced by an explicit rule in Jewish law: the best interest of the child is a paramount consideration. Indeed, we could say that the explicit implementation of the principle of best interest of the child in Jewish custody cases is a medieval invention, introduced by Jewish scholars at this period in their child custody verdicts. By contrast to the ancient period, the rules of custody, which had become fully defined at this stage, utilizing this principle, usually favored the mother.