bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Inland Oiled Wildlife Response: It’s a Different Animal
Authors: Clumpner Curtis , Ziccardi Michael 
Published: December 2017

ABSTRACT 2017-311
The Oiled Wildlife Care Network (OWCN) was established in 1994 to address the need for timely, consistent, and professional science-based preparedness and response for wildlife at risk from oil spills occurring in the marine waters of California. Its mission focused on providing a high level of professional care based on the best available technology and science combined with the experience of many organizations that were pioneers in the field of wildlife rehabilitation. Since that time, the OWCN and its now more than 35 members have responded to over 100 spills while caring for more than 8,200 impacted animals. In 2014, in response to the increased risk due to changing sources and transport patterns in oil coming to refineries in California, the State legislature expanded the OWCN’s responsibility to include responding to oiled wildlife impacted during oil spills in all surface waters of California. Since then, the OWCN has worked to expand its plan and resources to ensure readiness to provide best achievable capture and care to a host of new species in the myriad of habitats and locations found in a large and ecologically diverse state. The biggest challenges to this expansion are the increased diversity of species and their habitats (California has 233 species and subspecies of reptiles and amphibians), and the increase in geographical scope. Working with the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (specifically the Office of Spill Prevention and Response, or OSPR), the OWCN staff have identified species at risk and response challenges unique to an inland environment and terrestrial species and the appropriate resources meet those challenges and fill current gaps. We have incorporated lessons learned by colleagues during wildlife responses to inland spills including CNR Lake Wabamun (2005), Enbridge Kalamazoo River (2010), Silvertip Pipeline Yellowstone River (2011), and CNRL Cold Lake (2013). We have repurposed and redesigned existing equipment as well as acquiring additional mobile equipment to increase capacity and decrease response time. We have identified and trained first responders over a wide geographical area focusing on regions with increased risk of incident and impacts while leveraging our current primary care facilities with field stabilization and wildlife transportation plans to achieve maximum flexibility and cost effectiveness. We detail both the process that was used to develop this expansion and the resulting additions to the wildlife plan aimed to provide best achievable care to all wildlife species impacted by an inland oil spill in California.
WHAT RECENT HHFT DERAILMENT FIRES TELL US
Authors: Narin van Court Wade A. , Hildebrand Michael S. , Noll Gregory G. 
Published: December 2017

ABSTRACT ID: 2017-145.
In July 2016, TRC Environmental Corporation (TRC) and Hildebrand and Noll Associates, Inc. (HNA) were requested to develop planning guidance on train derailments involving large volumes/high concentrations of denatured ethanol for the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA). As part of this project, as well as similar projects conducted by HNA for other clients, TRC and HNA assessed current firefighting strategies for the release of ethanol and/or crude oil from High Hazard Flammable Trains (HHFT) and developed the planning assumptions necessary to prepare for these types of incidents.
For these projects, studies and in-depth analyses of 27 HHFT derailments resulting in tank cars breaches that occurred in the United States and Canada involving denatured ethanol1 (ethanol) and/or crude oil2 from 2006 through 2015 were performed. The analyses were primarily based on the information from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and/or Transport Canada (TC) databases, with supplemental information from news reports in some cases. The objective of these analyses was to identify key planning assumptions that would be used in developing appropriate firefighting strategies by focusing on the number and types of cars derailed, approximate train speeds at the time of the derailment, number of cars breached, amount of product released, and whether or not the released product caught fire.
Additionally, the studies included obtaining and reviewing information on the properties and characteristics of ethanol, crude oils, and other Class 3 flammable materials, as well as information for railroad tank cars. Insights and understandings gained from these studies were used to further develop the firefighting strategies for HHFT derailment fires.
Comparative study of mangrove recruitment in oil deforested areas in Guimaras, Philippines
Authors: Barnuevo Abner P. , Sadaba Resurreccion B. 
Published: December 2017

ABSTRACT
The MT Solar I oil spill that released over 2 million liters of bunker C oil in Guimaras in August 2006 affected mangrove forest in varying degrees from acute damages, sublethal stresses and long term effects. Although the incident caused only &lt;1 ha deforestation, large scale mangrove planting has been implemented as part of response initiatives without inference to scientific assessment of the natural recovery potential of the damaged habitat. The response and intervention in the aftermath of the oil spill primarily involved planting mangroves. This study assessed the mangrove recruitment and colonization in two deforested mangrove areas in Guimaras, Philippines and evaluated whether replanting was necessary as part of intervention. Results on reconstructed age extrapolated from the internodal index showed that recruitment started to take place one and two years after the spill in Site 1 (3.33% of tagged wildings) and Site 2 (11.67%) respectively. However, the wilding establishment in the former site was impaired in the succeeding years and maintained at very low numbers (0.07–0.15 m−2) whereas wilding establishment was high in Site 2 (2.19–3.31 per m−2). The difference between sites is statistically significant (P&lt;0.0001). The marked difference between sites is attributed to the prevailing interventions and persistent disturbances. The extraction of dead trees and downed wood in Site 1 impaired the progress of recovery and was further compounded by persistent disturbances brought by the socioeconomic activities, whereas, non-intervention in Site 2 favored the progress of natural recovery. Eight years after the incident, the colonizers in Site 2 were already reproductively mature as some already developed flowers. This study highlighted the capacity of mangroves to recover from perturbations as long as the geomorphological features of the habitats are not altered. The large-scale mangrove planting implemented in the affected areas is deemed unnecessary given that one year after the incident recruitment started to progress. Thus, future oil spill responses and interventions should carefully assess the natural recovery processes of the impacted areas first, before proceeding to large scale mangrove planting programs. Otherwise, the good intentions of implementing faster recovery of mangroves and other impacted habitats may be considered a waste of public funds and a futile effort vis-à-vis practicality.
Creation of National Strike Force Center of Expertise: U. S. Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces “Stem-to-Stern” Review
Authors: Campagnini Kathryn , Gunter Tim 
Published: December 2017

Abstract
The United States Coast Guard conducted a review of the National Strike Force’s alignment with the Coast Guard organization following direction from Admiral Papp, Commandant of the Coast Guard, for a “Stem to Stern” review of all Deployable Specialized Forces. The Deployable Specialized Force program and its support structure has made significant progress building and sustaining a highly specialized community. Some of these successes include the Incident Management Assist Team. The full purpose and integration of all Deployable Specialized Force units has still not completely achieved full operational capability. One of the recommended courses of action for Coast Guard Deployable Specialized Forces is to maintain proficiency and provide value across the Coast Guard’s mission spectrum included: Establish Centers of Expertise for disaster/incident response with functionality to include standardization teams, external assessment, and Tactics, Techniques and Policy integration. The review concluded that a separate unit should be established to conduct third party assessment of the National Strike Forces’ three Strike Teams. As a result, the National Strike Force Center of Expertise was created under the oversight of the Coast Guard Force Readiness Command. This paper will review the reasons for creation of the National Strike Force Center of Expertise and why it was placed under the Coast Guard Force Readiness Command as a detachment of Training Center Yorktown. Several functional statements of the National Strike Force Center of Expertise will be presented regarding managing environmental response and equipment standardization among the Strike Teams and how the National Strike Force Center of Expertise concept of operations will support future progress for the NSF mission.
Development and implementation of a common strategy for operating companies and OSROs
Authors: Jørgensen Kåre-L. 
Published: December 2017

ABSTRACT
In times where oil companies are looking for potentials for cutting their costs, oil spill response organizations become subject to budgets restrictions.
Norwegian Clean Seas Association For Operating Companies, NOFO, and her members, have developed and approved a common strategy for the next 5 years. The strategy implements the Good Practice Guidance (GPG) made by IOGP/IPIECA post Macondo JIP working groups.
The strategy was implemented through a process, breaking the main areas into action items, involving the entire NOFO OSRO into this work. By doing so, NOFO has succeeded in leading on in identifying activities, when to do what and the costs related to activities. As such, severe budget restraints have not been hitting the organization.
The process and involvement of this OSRO does have many elements easily applicable to other OSROs.
This presentation will describe how the strategy was made, the process from overall goals to aims and objectives to implementation and follow-up by the companies and NOFO, whereby the GPG have been put into effect.
Promoting the common strategy, including the GPG from IOGP/IPIECA has proven a valuable part of the industry and OSRO outreach and communication.
REALISTIC STABLE WATER-IN-OIL EMULSIONS AT OHMSETT
Authors: Stone Karen , Guarino Alan G. 
Published: December 2017

ABSTRACT
The subject of this paper is the production of reproducible W/O emulsions at Ohmsett. It discusses the first two phases of a multiphase study to create predictable stable water-in-oil (W/O) emulsions at Ohmsett including a lab study and a large tank-scale study. The first stage of the study refined the process of creating, characterizing, and testing small batches of W/O emulsions under controlled and reproducible conditions in the laboratory to determine if the subject crude oil was capable of emulsifying. The second phase of the study capitalized on the unique capabilities of the testing facility to “grow” mass quantities of emulsions. Ohmsett provides a large wave tank under quasi-natural conditions with wave energy and exposure to the elements, especially UV energy from natural sunlight, that are similar to conditions that might be present during a real spill in the marine environment. The tank-scale study supported a parallel Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) program supporting the 2010 Deepwater Horizon “lessons learned” by proving control and validation of surface oiling characterization efforts pursued under the Natural Resource Damage Assessment (NRDA) Oil on Water (OoW) Workgroup. This study provided a “first cut” exercise in what is intended to be an ongoing and evolving effort at Ohmsett. The lessons learned, as well as suggestions for future provisions and studies will be discussed.
EXERCISE WESTWIND – A COLLABORATIVE OIL SPILL RESPONSE BY OIL & GAS OPERATORS AND AGENCIES.
Authors: Miller Jessica , Quinn Nick 
Published: December 2017

Abstract
On June 9th, 2015, ACME Oil Company’s rig suffered a dynamic positioned ‘run-off’. The mobile drilling unit lost its station above the wellhead and a loss of well control was experienced. “A massive environmental emergency unfolded…affecting pristine coastline and masses of wildlife”. Incident Management and Field Response Teams were activated in a multi-agency operation, bringing together 200 personnel from 16 oil and gas companies and 18 government agencies and third party providers. Source control, aerial, offshore, nearshore, shoreline and oiled wildlife response capabilities were deployed and national/international support was utilised.
Jointly managed by the Australian Marine Oil Spill Centre (AMOSC), the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA), the Federal Department of Industry and Science, and the Western Australian Department of Transport -Exercise Westwind was a successful multi-faceted marine spill response, demonstrating Australia’s collective Industry/Government capacity to respond to a large, offshore loss of well control incident in a remote and isolated location.
ACME Oil Company was a fictitious company formed to enable the amalgamation of Australian petroleum companies to exercise industry arrangements under one ‘banner’ during the exercise period. ACME Oil Company had its own set of credentials, company website and Oil Pollution Emergency Plan. The company also held real time memberships with a number of service providers including AMOSC, Oil Spill Response Ltd, Trendsetter Engineering International, Oceaneering Australia and addenergy. Representing an innovative approach to spill response exercising, ACME Oil Company was a valuable and critical aspect to industry and governments participation under a non-attributable banner. Additionally, it enabled safe, widespread lessons to be observed, allowed for real-time testing of arrangements and provided a safe environment for regulators, stakeholder and industry interplay.
The exercise was an efficient and practical solution for Industry titleholders and their third party supporting organisations, to test shared response resources and to ensure Industry arrangements for responding to oil pollution are in accordance with the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Environment) Regulations 2009.
This paper will discuss the development program behind the exercise and the experience of managing an exercise of this nature. It will highlight the successes including the creation and implementation of a fictitious company and the extensive collaboration between the industry and government personnel involved. It will also look forward – where are we 11-months later?
Can the history of exercising and/or response help us improve for the future-implementation of change and continued testing is critical in furthering our oil spill response capability and capacity.Exercise Westwind – Operational Phase TwoExercise Westwind – Operational Phase Two
Integrated Ocean Observing Systems as a source of scientific information for supporting oil spill response – From Gulf of Mexico to Gulf of Guinea
Authors: Anifowose Babatunde , Beegle-Krause CJ , Willis Zdenka , Quintrell Josie , Musa Idris 
Published: December 2017

ABSTRACT
As of 2013, the Gulf of Guinea produces about 5.5 million barrels of oil per day – more than 60% of the total daily crude oil production in sub-Saharan Africa. Potential oil spills and their impact on the environment and the economy are of concern. As was seen in the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, information from the United States Integrated Ocean Observing Systems (IOOS®) was key in the response. A robust IOOS-like system in the Gulf of Guinea could support oil spill response and enhance the existing Global Ocean Observing System for Africa (GOOS for Africa). There is great potential within the Gulf of Guinea for regional stakeholder resources to coordinate systematic metocean and coastal data, and share these data across the West, Central and Southern African countries. Through such coordinated efforts, the society benefits from the development of a “blue economy” and from improved disaster response more than from individual observations. Drawing from the examples in the Gulf of Mexico, the paper integrates the lessons from IOOS types of assets into useful response efforts for the Gulf of Guinea area. Responders, decision makers, scientists and the public all benefit from improved access to environmental information and forecasts. We include a “mock up” of how an IOOS asset would support scientific spill response in the Gulf of Guinea.
Development of API Selection and Training Guidelines for in situ Burning Personnel
Authors: O’Brien James Patrick , McCaffrey Patrick S. 
Published: December 2017

ABSTRACT
Guidance for in situ burning of oil spills has been developed under the auspices of the Joint Industry Oil Spill Preparedness and Response (OSPR) Task Force (JITF) and the American Petroleum Institute (API), Oil Spill, Emergency Preparedness & Response Subcommittee (OSEPR). These groups convened to evaluate the procedures and lessons learned during the Deepwater Horizon oil spill response. The initial focus was to identify potential opportunities for improvement to the oil spill response system. One of the categories addressed by the JITF and OSEPR was in situ burning of spilled oil. Within this category a number of projects were identified to be worked on by individual project teams. One of those projects was to develop selection and training guidance for oil spill responders to in situ burns. Consequently, a project team was formed of volunteers representing the oil and gas industry, federal and state government, subject matter experts, oil spill response organizations and manufacturers of relevant equipment.
THE GREAT PATAGONIAN OIL SPILL (METULA), 41 YEARS LATER
Authors: Gundlach Erich R. 
Published: December 2017

ABSTRACT: 2017-300
On 9 August 1974, the supertanker VLCC Metula spilled over 50,000 tons of Saudi Arabian crude oil and 2000 tons of bunker oil into the eastern portion of the Strait of Magellan in southern Chile. Oil spread over 200 km of glacially derived shorelines primarily composed of mixed sand and gravel to boulder-sized material. No cleanup was performed. Initial and follow-up investigators from Chile, U.S., U.K. and Canada reported on oiled shoreline conditions and spill persistence through 2005.
This report extends the analysis to February 2015 for the primary areas noted as having remaining oil, i.e. within Puerto Espora behind Espora spit and the sheltered East Espora Marsh. Both are located along the First Narrows on the Tierra del Fuego side of the Strait. Comparisons are made to previous site visits in 1975–76, 1981 and 1995.
Conditions at Puerto Espora historically showed a wide band of thick asphalted gravel pavement in a slow process of breakup. This area in 2015 has been further degraded by physical processes but mineralized asphalt remnants are still evident over a discontinuous length of 180 m (maximums: width = 8 m, thickness = 10 cm).
In East Espora Marsh, oil initially entered during a very high tide such that oil settled on to channel banks and upper areas dominated by salt-tolerant plants (Salicornia, Puccinellia and Sueda). In 2015, oil remains very much in evidence as weathered asphalt in thin deposits, as a high viscosity black oil with underlying brown mousse common in thicker (&gt;4 cm) deposits, and as oil buried up to 10 cm below a layer of fine silt/clay. Vegetation has recovered to an estimated 75% in interior marsh areas and to ~35% in the outer marsh located at the entry to the marsh.
The Metula site remains of great scientific interest in terms of oil spill persistence in a cool dry environment that may be compared to other high latitude habitats such as found in the newly opening Arctic Ocean area.
Validating Marine Oil Spill Response Planning Assumptions and Execution with Analytics Model
Authors: Osen Holly , Casement Marcy , Sparks Fred 
Published: December 2017

ABSTRACT # 2017-209
Running a full-scale emergency response operation involves coordinated and interdependent workstreams that must be sufficiently resourced and supported to ensure that objectives are accomplished. Oil spill response planning provides the framework to rapidly scale up those operations and enable essential workstreams through pre-identified resources, facilities, logistics and capabilities. A systematic analysis of response plans can be used to validate an executable tier 1 response based on local capabilities, and provide a basis for planning the strategic cascading of additional resources for tier 2 and 3 responses with consideration for the limiting factors identified through analytics.
A proprietary analytics model was developed to examine and validate planning assumptions, resources and logistics against response requirements. The analysis includes a facilitated cross functional plan review using pre-defined response “workstreams” (e.g., shoreline protection and clean-up) broken down by tasks (e.g., SCAT or beach clean-up). For each task, the resources and logistics needed to accomplish the task are defined and evaluated to identify the limited or critical resources (e.g., supervisor qualifications, waste capacity, transportation, etc.). The resource requirements and constraining factors identified through the analysis are compared to the resourcing identified in existing plans and validated by business function representatives to highlight resource gaps and areas for planning and capability improvements.
The emergency response planning analytics model was tested using existing oil spill response plans from two business units within the organization. A worst case scenario oil spill simulation was used as the basis for the plan analysis. The analysis produced findings indicating that existing plans were insufficient in specific areas and existing resources would be exhausted before cascaded resources could arrive to support a longer-term response to a major oil spill on water unless alternative resourcing plans were established. Specific gaps in planning, trained personnel, equipment, logistics and support facilities were identified along with recommendations for gap closure. Pilot testing of the analysis tools suggests that effective planning requires a detailed understanding of critical resources, limiting factors and workstream interdependencies so that that the strategies and tactics defined in planning (and those developed during an active response) optimize their use. Additionally, outputs from the model may be used as the basis for increasing local reserves of response equipment and supplies, developing regional mutual aid capabilities and establishing training and exercise objectives.