bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Feeding a diet devoid of choline to lactating rodents restricts growth and lymphocyte development in offspring
Authors: Lewis E. D. , Goruk S. , Richard C. , Dellschaft N. S. , Curtis J. M. , Jacobs R. L. , Field C. J. 
Published: August 2016

AbstractThe nutrient choline is necessary for membrane synthesis and methyl donation, with increased requirements during lactation. The majority of immune development occurs postnatally, but the importance of choline supply for immune development during this critical period is unknown. The objective of this study was to determine the importance of maternal supply of choline during suckling on immune function in their offspring among rodents. At parturition, Sprague–Dawley dams were randomised to either a choline-devoid (ChD; n 7) or choline-sufficient (ChS, 1 g/kg choline; n 10) diet with their offspring euthanised at 3 weeks of age. In a second experiment, offspring were weaned to a ChS diet until 10 weeks of age (ChD-ChS, n 5 and ChS-ChS, n 9). Splenocytes were isolated, and parameters of immune function were measured. The ChD offspring received less choline in breast milk and had lower final body and organ weight compared with ChS offspring (P<0·05), but this effect disappeared by week 10 with choline supplementation from weaning. ChD offspring had a higher proportion of T cells expressing activation markers (CD71 or CD28) and a lower proportion of total B cells (CD45RA+) and responded less to T cell stimulation (lower stimulation index and less IFN-γ production) ex vivo (P<0·05). ChD-ChS offspring had a lower proportion of total and activated CD4+ T cells, and produced less IL-6 after mitogen stimulation compared with cells from ChS-ChS (P<0·05). Our study suggests that choline is required in the suckling diet to facilitate immune development, and choline deprivation during this critical period has lasting effects on T cell function later in life.
Hegel's Confrontation with the Sciences in ‘Observing Reason’: Notes for a Discussion
Authors: Ferrini Cinzia 
Published: August 2016

According to a well-known statement in Hegel's Encyclopaedia, what differentiates the philosophy of nature from physics is ‘the kind of metaphysics used by them both’ (W9: §246Z: 20, N: 11). In the same vein, recent scholarship has stressed that Hegel criticises the logical procedures and metaphysical presuppositions of the working scientist's activity, taking issue with their lack of awareness about the mental categories they use and the alleged consistency of their way of arguing. Put rather more critically, it is often claimed that Hegel's concerns were purely philosophical, and that he never entered into genuinely scientific debate. Unlike Schelling, who engaged in scientific debate, Hegel is thought to have confined himself to observing and judging it, demonstrating his ability to grasp its main features, on the basis of which later to build his philosophy of nature.To combat the old tradition of negative assessment of Hegel's relation to the empirical sciences, which saw it as aprioristic, dogmatic, misleading and ill-informed, the editors of the critical edition of the Phenomenology retrace some of the contemporary scientific sources for Hegel's objections to description and classification in the natural sciences, and document his appreciation of new developments in electricity and chemistry. Through a primarily historical approach, Hegel's critical remarks on the attempt to fix laws for organic forces (sensibility, irritability, reproduction) and his critique of the scientific status of physiognomy and phrenology, all of which elucidate his allusions in ‘Observing Reason’, are shown to be rooted in contemporary scientific debates. Recendy, however, it has been contended that this kind of scholarship that identifies Hegel's active engagement with the science of his time, ‘tend[s] to reduce the text to a document for historians of nineteenth-century science’ (Stone 2005: xv). In Italy, a scholar has also made a subtle case for his claim that, in contrast to his mature system, Hegel's confrontation with the natural sciences in the Phenomenology is essentially and necessarily critical, aiming to reveal the partiality, one-sidedness, and inadequacy of forms of cognitive approach typical of the natural sciences, and that it forms part of Hegel's dissolution of all of consciousness's forms of externality.
Toward a Formal Interpretation of Kant's Analogies of Experience
Authors: Blok Johan 
Published: August 2016

Very often, the rise of non-Euclidean geometry and Einstein's theory of relativity are seen as the decisive defeat of Kant's theoretical philosophy. Scientific progress seems to render Kant's philosophy obsolete. This view became dominant during the first decades of the twentieth century, when the movement of logical positivism arose. Despite extensive criticism of basic tenets of this movement later in the twentieth century, its view of Kant's philosophy is still common. Although it is not my intention to defend Kant infinitely, I think that this view is rather unsatisfactory and even misleading.Let us consider the first factor: non-Euclidean geometry. If one reads the first Critique carefully, it becomes clear that the claims of transcendental logic do not imply Euclidean geometry. Kant's notion of space, as explained in the aesthetics chapter, is rather limited: it does neither entail nor presuppose a specific form of geometry (Cf. B37-B57). None of his statements about the form of space is specific enough to imply or support Euclidean geometry. Although Kant uses several examples, Euclidean geometry does not play any systematic role; only the pure form of space is at issue in the aesthetics chapter. In my view, the same holds in the case of Newton's physics: it is neither presupposed nor entailed by Kant's transcendental logic. The justification of Newton's physics requires further specialisation and application of the transcendental framework to empirical concepts like matter and motion. Kant took this step in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.
Geometrical Studies
Authors: Hegel G.W.F. 
Published: August 2016

The fragmentary nature of GS makes it difficult to read as it stands, and for this reason, I have rearranged the material slightly so that it falls into four primary, reasonably coherent, parts. Their titles are: ‘The nature of mathematical objects’, ‘Thirteen propositions of Euclid 1’, ‘The philosophy of parallel lines’ and ‘On the algebra of geometrical figures’. GS actually starts with ‘Thirteen propositions of Euclid 1’. The justification for the reversal of order in the translation is to have Hegel's philosophical basis for geometry available first, to provide a context for his detailed discussion of geometrical propositions. The reader can easily reconstruct the original order of GS as follows. Interchange the first and second parts and also the third and fourth parts. Next, move the passages marked a …. a', b …. b',c …. c' to the places in the text marked a-a', b-b' and c-c'. For the reader wishing to locate the original German passages in Dok., the page and paragraph for each of these passages are given at the start of that passage.In addition, subtitles for sections in these parts have been added which do not appear in the original. They are included in the translation to help orient the reader. I have inserted in some places words not in the original in order to clarify the meaning of the text. These insertions as well as my comments on the text are also enclosed within square brackets. Further clarifications can be found in the appended endnotes.
Metaphysics and Morality in Kant and Hegel
Authors: Sedgwick Sally 
Published: August 2016

Even for those who have struggled with Hegel long enough to discover that he is neither a positivist nor a communitarian, nor (at the other end of the spectrum) a Platonist, the fact that he also insists upon distinguishing his approach to practical philosophy from Kant's may seem deeply puzzling. After all, the two philosophers share in common the same principal opponents. Both set out to undermine the sceptic's doubts about the possibility of objective practical judgments and requirements; both in addition reject positivist derivations of law, exclusively empiricist accounts of human behaviour, and intuitionist forms of justification. The two philosophers furthermore seem to share the same conception of the conditions of human freedom. For Hegel as well as Kant, a theory of morality and political right devoted to advancing the cause of freedom must require more than just the absence of obstacles preventing the satisfaction of our animal passions. For Hegel as well as Kant, freedom requires in addition the respect of the ends we have as rational natures. We achieve this kind of freedom when our actions are motivated by the legislation of reason and when the social norms which constrain us are norms we can rationally endorse.Despite these similarities, Hegel tells us in the Philosophy of Right that the conception of freedom he associates with Kant and discusses under the heading of “Moralität” must give way to the more adequate conception of “Sittlichkeit” or “ethical life”. It is clear that Hegel finds unacceptable what he calls the “empty formalism” of Kant's practical philosophy; it is also clear that he thinks that Kant's practical philosophy is “formal” because its supreme law or categorical imperative is an a priori law of reason. But this doesn't yet tell us why, for Hegel, these features of the Kantian approach are objectionable. In my view, we do his critique little justice if we say that it is aimed at a consequence which presumably follows from Kant's preoccupation with providing an a priori foundation for law and morality: namely, the failure to give sufficient moral weight to the empirical particulars which individuate persons and situations and need to be taken into account in the practice of moral assessment. As I shall argue below, the suggestion that Kant's formalism requires us to ignore empirical content in this way is neither plausible as a critique of Kant nor accurate as a representation of what troubles Hegel about Kant. We go more to the heart of the matter, I believe, if we say instead that Hegel is out to challenge the very distinction between the “empirical” and the “pure” or “a priori” so fundamental to both Kant's practical and theoretical philosophy. Hegel's critique of Kant's practical philosophy is an instance of his critique of Kant's idealism more generally, and of the assumptions about reason and nature upon which that idealism rests. Or so I shall argue here.
Climbing Harris' Ladder
Authors: Flay Joseph C. 
Published: August 2016

In his two volume work, Hegel's Ladder, spanning over 1500 pages, Henry Harris describes Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807 as “an epic story about God” (I. 31). Harris' work is itself a work of epic proportions. It is the fullest commentary on Hegel's Phenomenology I have ever seen. We are brought, paragraph by paragraph, from the beginning to the end of Hegel's Phenomenology, without break. And although Harris describes it as an epic about God, there is nothing of the usual mystification that surfaces when “theological” interpretations are offered.There is, of course, no possibility of commenting on this work in any adequate way, short of perhaps writing a 3,000 page commentary on his commentary of some 1500 pages. After briefly, and inadequately, offering a summary of some of the important characteristics and positions of Harris' work, I want to pose some questions to Professor Harris concerning his interpretation.As already mentioned, the format Harris chooses is to comment in detail on each of the paragraphs of the Phenomenology. This commentary follows two previous volumes, Hegel's Development I: Toward the Sunlight, and Hegel's Development II: Night Thoughts, in which we are given an erudite and thorough account of Hegel's studies and of his writings prior to the Phenomenology of Spirit. These previous volumes are integral to the present two volumes, as indicated by Harris' challenge to his readers and his critics.My own view — after studying and laying out Hegel's intellectual development as completely and coherently as I could — is that no thesis about Hegel's project should be preferred to the one that I am about to advance unless it coheres with and provides answers to all of the exigencies that I have pointed to in the “genesis” of the book at least as well as mine does. (But many other theses may be valid complements to the one maintained here.) (I. 9)And, indeed, one of the characteristics of Hegel's Ladder is that we are constantly reminded of how and why the problematic at issue derives from the way that Hegel's thought had developed. Thus, Hegel's Ladder has significance not only as a commentary on the Phenomenology, but also as a link between the Phenomenology and Hegel's earlier development.
A Question of Origin: Hegel's Privileging of Spoken Over Written Language
Authors: McCumber John 
Published: August 2016

In ‘Le puits et la pyramide’, Jacques Derrida critiques the way in which Hegel privileges speech over writing at Encyclopedia §459. He traces that privileging back to Hegel's teleologically motivated view of time as the sublation of space, which he takes in turn to be motivated by Hegel's concern, as a metaphysical thinker, for validating and securing the philosophical dream of “full presence”. This, on Hegelian terms, involves subjecting the “materiality” of space to the “ideality” of time.Perhaps surprisingly, Hegel himself openly concedes Derrida's first two points. By limiting his discussion of language in the Encyclopedia to consideration of its function as a vehicle for the expression of representations, Hegel requires himself to discuss the relative merits of spoken and written utterances, an issue which he then argues out in favour of the former. Within the written domain, alphabetic and hieroglyphic writing must also be compared, and it is hardly astonishing that Hegel should view the key contrast between the two as that of the temporality inherent in alphabetic speech, which captures sound, as opposed to the spatiality of hieroglyphics, which exist only as inscriptions.Hegel's privileging of speech over writing is thus no mere slip; it is a whole set of consciously elaborated arguments, undertaken for specifically stated reasons. This casts doubt on the third of Derrida's points above: is Derrida mistaking the purpose of a specific discussion for the motivating force of teleology in general? Is Hegel's openly conceded privileging of spoken over written language justified by something other than a teleology dictated by an unexamined metaphysical preference for “full presence”?
Hume, Hegel, and Abstract General Ideas
Authors: Westphal Kenneth R. 
Published: August 2016

Abstract:Hegel's phenomenological method allows and requires him to justify his own positive views only by thorough internal critique of the views he opposes; Hegel calls this ‘determinate negation’ (§1). Hegel's transcendental-pragmatic epistemology is sharply opposed to empiricism. One key tenet of Modern empiricism is aconceptual ‘knowledge by acquaintance’ of particulars. This view is deeply embedded in Hume's official ‘copy theory’ of sensory impressions and ideas. Both of these views are required by Hume's account of abstract general ideas. Both of these views saw widespread revival in twentieth-century empiricism. Can these views be criticised on strictly internal grounds, as Hegel requires? This paper answers in the affirmative. More thoroughly than any other philosopher, Hume attempted to analyse our conceptual, propositionally-structured thought solely in terms of our ultimate awareness of nothing but objects, whether they be sensory impressions or their copies, ‘ideas’. In this context, Hume's account of our ideas of space and time have long been regarded as anomalies in, if not exceptions to, his account of the generality of thought. I argue that these ideas are not anomalous, but rather are typical of Hume's account of the generality of thought, an account that ultimately undermines Hume's official empiricist account of the generality of thought, based on his copy theory. I reexamine Hume's ‘idea of existence’ to identify some key equivocations between ‘ideas’ as objects and ‘ideas’ as concepts that are crucial to Hume's attempt to account for the generality of thought. The main issue is clarified by placing it within its Modern context (§2). The key issues are then specified by considering Hume's idea of existence (§3). The fundamental role played in Hume's account by his equivocations are then developed in detail by examining Hume's accounts of abstract ideas (§4), of distinctions of reason (§5), of the idea of equality (§6), and of the ideas of space and time (§7). On this basis I contend that Hume's account of the generality of thought is fundamentally linguistic, and is rooted in judgmental discriminations of kinds that cannot be accounted for by appeal to impressions of sensation or reflection, nor their corresponding idea-objects. These conclusions are reinforced and extended by critical evaluation of Garrett's analysis and defence of Hume's account of abstract ideas (§8). Hume is thus not only the great Modern exponent of the copy theory of impressions and ideas, he is also its first and still one of its most profound critics (§9). To this considerable extent, not only are the most basic principles of Hume's empiricism subject to internal critique, as Hegel requires, but Hume himself provides all the essentials of such a critique. These results serve to substantiate and highlight the philosophical significance of Hegel's critique of ‘Sense Certainty’ (§10).
Was Bosanquet a Hegelian?
Authors: Sweet William 
Published: August 2016

It is generally held that 19th and early 20th century British Idealism was fundamentally Hegelian in character and the term ‘the British Hegelians’ has long been in common usage. Yet, particularly in recent years, it has been argued that some of the most influential British idealists were not Hegelians at all. T H Green may still be an idealist, and F H Bradley an ‘absolute idealist’ but, despite traces of Hegelian vocabulary or principles in their work, several scholars now hold that neither ought to be considered a disciple of Hegel. One might well wonder whether this is also true of Bernard Bosanquet, who has generally been regarded as the most Hegelian of the major idealists.It is unlikely that Bosanquet would be offended in being called a Hegelian. In his metaphysics, his political philosophy and, particularly, his logic, Bosanquet draws on Hegel's insights and arguments. He saw his work as indebted to Hegel (specifically, to a tradition that traced its roots through Hegel, back to Kant, Rousseau and, ultimately, Plato) and, at the beginning of his philosophical career, Bosanquet criticised F H Bradley's logic for not having respected the principles laid out by Hegel beforehand. It is no surprise, then, that Bosanquet described Hegel as one of the two “great masters who 'sketched the plan’” (the other being Kant).Still, it is hard to say what, precisely, is it that makes an author a ‘Hegelian’. Is it the use of Hegel's categories and terminology? Is it that the author is explicitly indebted to Hegel? Is it that the author's work shows an allegiance to Hegel's conclusions and that he sees himself as, at most, completing and extending what Hegel did? One might also ask, what type of Hegelian we have in mind – there are ‘left Hegelians’, ‘right Hegelians’ and so on. Of course, in attempting to trace such an intellectual debt, one must, as far as possible, try to distinguish what is distinctively Hegelian from what is to be found in earlier authors, but taken up by Hegel.
Pippin on Hegel
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: August 2016

Ever since Plato coined the metaphor, it has been tempting to treat the history of philosophy as a series of battles between Gods and Giants, as a ‘clash of argument’ between idealists and materialists, rationalists and naturalists, and idealists and realists. Many commentators, provoked by Hegel's combative remarks, have been led to see the Kant-Hegel relation in this way; and yet it has not always been easy to determine either what the issue between these two antagonists really is, or indeed which of them is the Giant and which the God. Robert Pippin, in his new book, Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, pp. xii + 327, hb £30.00, pb £10.95) casts new light on the nature of the struggle, and makes clear what was at stake: a non-rationalist, non-metaphysical answer to the sceptic, and with it absolute knowledge.Pippin's densely written but engrossing book provides the focus of discussion for this issue of the Bulletin. The contributions by H.S. Harris and Terry Pinkard offer critical comments on Pippin's approach to Hegel, and they are followed with a response by Pippin himself. These pieces were originally presented as a meeting of the Western APA, and assume an acquaintance with Pippin's argument, which I will try to outline in what follows.Like many recent commentators, Pippin begins by insisting that we take seriously Hegel's claim to have ‘completed’ Kant, and so rejects any metaphysical, rationalist readng of Hegel. On the other hand, Pippin wants to understand Hegel's claim to have found a form of idealism that answers Kant's transcendental scepticism regarding the ‘thing-in-itself’, without collapsing back into rationalism.
Hegel's Idealism: Prospects
Authors: Pippin Robert B. 
Published: August 2016

First of all, I am very grateful to both commentators for the attention they have devoted to Hegel's Idealism; I am heartened by the kind words and humbled by the magnitude of the problems introduced by their criticisms. These criticisms both rightly refer to what is the heart of my interpretation, the Kant-Hegel relation, and, interestingly enough, raise objections from roughly opposite directions. Professor Pinkard, in effect, charges that I have made too much of that relation and thereby confused transcendental and speculative concerns. He argues here, as he does at greater length in his recent book (Hegel's Dialectic: The Explanation of Possibility), that the philosophically valuable core of Hegel is a ‘category theory’ limited to an ‘explanation’ of the conceptual ‘possibility’ of various judgments, practices, institutions, etc. Professor Harris charges, on the other hand (and with some irony), that I have made too little of the Kant-Hegel relation, or have construed it too narrowly, that the interpretation of Hegel's idealism which I provide thus either unfairly neglects, or does not have the resources to deal with, Hegel's full theory of the ‘whole’, or of Absolute Spirit, his account of the modern community's reconciliation with itself in time. I am thus alleged to have provided an interpretation that is at once too ambitious, and not ambitious enough, and I hope that such responses, at least for the Aristotelians in the audience, count as prima facie evidence that I must have said just the right thing.My claim in Hegel's Idealism is that the well-known Hegel Renaissance, in post-war Western Europe especially, has still failed to produce a contemporary reconstruction of Hegel's fundamental position, his ‘identity theory’, his identifying the ‘self-actualization’ of the Notion with ‘actuality’, or his theory of the reality of the Absolute Idea.