bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Byron’s Reviewers
Authors: Schoina Maria 
Published: October 2024

AbstractThis chapter focuses on those influential reviewers and reviews that crafted many versions of Byron’s poetic and personal identity, often creating a conflicted and polemical image of the poet. It argues that reviews in periodicals offer important insights into the period’s literary tastes and political, social, and religious biases, as well as the shifting alliances of its authors, publishers, and reading audiences. Byron’s reputation was influenced by some of the best-known reviewers of the Romantic period. At the same time the reviewers’ attitudes strengthened his poetic sensibility and significantly conditioned the course of his career and reading of his works. Byron responded vigorously to his reviewers, and also impacted literary reviewing by creating the need for a new critical language. Byron’s case therefore exemplifies the embattled spaces created between authors and reviewers by the nineteenth-century explosion of periodical culture, literary professionalization, and the emerging forces of the literary market.
Reading Byron’s Body and Mind
Authors: Shears Jonathon 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
This chapter explores the intersections between body and mind in Byron’s work and self-presentation. These can be viewed through five main lenses: the Galenic language of the four humours; discourses of passions and affections; new understanding of the nervous system; the comic deflation typical of the eighteenth-century novel; the Godwinian idealistic belief that the mind could be independent of the body. In each case, the essay argues that Byron worked with these inherited ideas to explore questions of agency, free will, and the deep-lying reasons for human action. It further suggests that, even as Byron is often viewed as the most embodied of Romantic poets, the actions of his characters are usually set in the context of mental activity. The chapter reads three decisive scenes in Byron’s work as examples where a mediating cognitive context operates and directs what might otherwise be viewed as primarily bodily reactions to an environment.
Byron and Travel
Authors: Thompson Carl 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
This chapter addresses the centrality of travel to Lord Byron’s career and poetic creativity. The first section focuses on the travel poem that made Byron famous, Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage: it discusses Byron’s Mediterranean tour of 1809–11, the poet’s cosmopolitan persona in Childe Harold, and the poem’s influence on later touristic practices. The second section explores the complex political implications of Byron’s self-fashioning as a transgressive, alienated traveller allegedly at odds with his homeland. The final section then considers the period after 1816 when Byron became a permanent exile from Britain. Here travel arguably gave way to transculturation, as Byron found himself increasingly ‘Italianized’ by his extended residence in that country. This makes Byron’s post-1816 writings a revealing case study of what it means not just to be performatively cosmopolitan but to actually cross cultural borders and so acquire a more genuinely hybrid, ‘hyphenated’ cultural identity.
Byron’s Early Poetical Practices
Authors: Bhattacharji Shobhana 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
In the more than 170 poems Byron wrote between 1798 and March 1812, when Childe Harold’s Pilgrimage was published, he developed and honed the poetical practices he would use to the end of his career. This chapter examines his very first poem, the first and last volumes of the Southwell poems, and his early sonnets, which show him discovering and developing quickness of composition, variations on ab rhymes, voice and tone, enjambment, digression, single sentence poems and stanzas that became the long cadences of Childe Harold. It looks at examples of Byron trying out conversational styles by loosening the insistent rhythm of the earliest lyrics, and experimenting with changing perspectives, voice and metre, direct addresses to the reader or subject of a poem, skilful alliteration, and imitations of his poetic predecessors. It argues that Byron created poetic spaces for himself within inherited forms, particularly the sonnet, and it explores Byron’s habit of embedding sonnets within his longer poems, foreshadowing his later use of shorter poetic forms within long poems.
Singapore
Authors: Lee Jack Tsen-Ta 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
Barring some radical change in policy or party, it seems likely that the executive and legislative branches of government will continue to strongly influence the development of Singaporean constitutional law, including the very structure of government, given the ease with which Parliament can amend the constitution and enact legislation. Where judicial review by the courts is concerned, the predominant trend appears to be one of deference to the government’s policy choices, while retaining a measure of judicial latitude for action in exceptional circumstances. Whether the courts will be prepared to scrutinize the acts of the political branches more strictly remains to be seen.
Vowel Harmony in Optimality Theory
Authors: Finley Sara 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of how research on vowel harmony (VH) in Optimality Theory (OT) has contributed to discussions related to the typology, representation, and learnability of VH systems. OT has made a tremendous impact on Generative Phonology, and VH is no exception. In OT, the grammar of every language is encoded in a (possibly universal) set of constraints, making OT particularly well suited for the study of both typology and learnability. The chapter includes a basic overview of OT and Harmonic Grammar, including summaries of several major approaches to VH in OT and Harmonic Grammar (e.g., Align, Agree, and Agreement by Correspondence constraints). In addition, theoretical issues particularly pertinent to VH in OT are discussed. Such questions include differentiating between the explanatory value of various harmony-inducing constraints, integrating constraints on the typology of VH into learning algorithms, and issues of gradience in VH.
Vowel Harmony In Emergent Phonology
Authors: Archangeli Diana , Pulleyblank Douglas 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
This chapter explores how a stripped-down theory of phonology can account for complex patterns of phonological distribution and alternation found in vowel harmony. The hypothesis is that the complex patterns found in phonological systems arise from general human cognition, learning language from the bottom up—Emergent Grammar. Without innate predispositions, lexical items are represented as sets of surface morphs, replacing the unique underlying representations posited in much of generative grammar. Harmony is characterized by well-formedness conditions which prohibit certain feature sequences, a formalization of asymmetries in directly observed distributions. Through examination of harmony in four languages, we demonstrate Emergent analyses of root-restricted harmony (Kɔɖa), root and word harmony (Dàgáárè), opacity and directionality (Fula), non-canonical harmony (Nata), and lexical disharmony (Kinande). The Emergent analyses relate transparently to surface forms, yet express generalizations about phonological and morpho-phonological patterns with analyses that very directly characterize the properties of the harmony systems themselves.
Vowel Harmony in Bantu Niger-Congo Languages
Authors: Boyd Virginia (Ginger) 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
Vowel harmony is a common, although not universal, feature of Bantu languages. It affects languages throughout the Bantu region, from the northwestern Zone A languages to the southeastern Zone S languages and virtually everywhere in between. However, how vowel harmony functions varies rather widely from zone to zone and language to language. The most common types of Bantu vowel harmony are height harmony and advanced tongue root (ATR) harmony. Retracted tongue root (RTR) harmony is also recognized as fairly common in Bantu C languages among others. While other types of vowel harmonies are found in Bantu languages, this chapter presents these more common types of vowel harmony in Bantu with an emphasis on some of the particularities found.
Vowel Harmony in Mongolic Languages
Authors: Svantesson Jan-Olof 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
The main section of this chapter describes vowel harmony (VH) in Khalkha Mongolian, which has both tongue-root harmony and rounding harmony. The vowels are divided into two classes, retracted tongue root (RTR), a, ɔ, ʊ, and advanced tongue root (ATR), e, o, u, while i is neutral. There is rich inflectional and derivational morphology based on suffixes, whose vowels alternate with the harmony class of the word. Rounding harmony applies only to the non-high vowels a, ɔ, e, o, high rounded ʊ and u being opaque and i transparent. There is interaction between tongue-root harmony and velar versus uvular consonants. The contrast between palatalized and plain consonants occurs only in the context of RTR vowels. The VH status of the other Mongolic languages is described briefly. Some have lost VH altogether, and others have retained it in different forms. Oirat (including Kalmyk) is the only Mongolic language with palatal harmony.
Vowel Harmony in Papuan Languages
Authors: Klamer Marian 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
This chapter reflects the current descriptive and typological asymmetry of vowel harmony (VH) in Papuan languages by presenting two cases of ‘unbounded’ VH: Amele and Umbu-Ungu, and four cases where harmony is more local: Mian, Ngkolmpu, Komnzo, and Kaera. Ngkolmpu and Umbu-Ungu show harmony of a particular phonetic feature, while the other languages show harmony with the entire vowel. In most cases, harmony is leftward, but it is rightward in Umbu-Ungu, while Amele has harmony in both directions. The vowel triggering the harmony is part of a lexical root in Ngkolmpu, Mian, Umbu-Ungu, and Kaera. In Komnzo and Amele, it is part of functional items, but in Amele harmony in the nominal domain is also triggered by noun stem vowels. Umbu-Ungu is the only language where harmony occurs beyond the morphological word to include phrasal enclitics. VH is related to unspecified vowels and epenthesis in Amele.
Laxing Vowel Harmony
Authors: Henriksen Nicholas , Kendro Kelly 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
This chapter sets out to review multiple cases of the phenomenon known as laxing harmony—that is, an assimilation process in which two nearby vowels are produced having an identical tense/lax quality. First, the chapter distinguishes between laxing harmony and advanced tongue root (ATR) harmony, limiting the scope of laxing harmony to language varieties for which the tense/lax distinction is otherwise not phonemic. It then moves on to discuss the current understanding of why and how laxing harmony occurs, summarizing research on three key examples: Eastern Andalusian Spanish, Laurentian French, and Cantabrian Spanish. Finally, it offers ideas for future empirical work regarding production and perception.
Kant on Method
Authors: Schafer Karl 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
This chapter offers an opinionated overview of the central elements of Kant’s philosophical methodology during the Critical period. It begins with a brief characterization of how Kant conceives of the aims of human inquiry—focusing on the idea that inquiry ideally aims at not just cognition (Erkenntnis), but also the more demanding cognitive achievements that Kant labels insight (Einsehen) and comprehension (Begreifen). It then explores the implications of this picture for philosophy, emphasizing Kant’s distinction between critical and doctrinal phases of philosophical inquiry, with the first of these playing both a negative and a positive role with respect to the second. It argues that this positive role is possible, according to Kant, only insofar as philosophy follows a ‘capacities-first’ methodology—that is, one that treats basic cognitive capacities (such as reason) and their self-conscious activities as fundamental (in both a cognitive sense and in an explanatory sense) for the sort of philosophy human beings are capable of. It is this methodology that allows Kant to introduce the first principles that philosophy in its doctrinal phase requires in a manner that is neither arbitrary nor (at least obviously) incompatible with Kant’s own Critical restrictions on cognition. The chapter concludes by discussing some of the implications of this methodological picture, including the methodological significance of self-consciousness and regressive or ‘transcendental’ arguments, Kant’s distinction between analytic and synthetic methods in philosophy, and Kant’s conception of reason as autonomous.
Kant on the Special Sciences
Authors: Williams Jessica J. 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
While Kant was arguably as deeply engaged with the emerging special sciences of his time as he was with Newtonian physics, there is a deep tension in his treatment of these disciplines. On the one hand, Kant endorses a reductionist approach in natural science. On the other hand, Kant is committed to a variety of anti-reductionist positions in empirical psychology, chemistry, and the emerging biological sciences. This chapter examines the precise form that Kant’s anti-reductionism takes in each of these domains and the corresponding set of questions about the extent to which each of these constitutes a genuine science for Kant.
Kant on the Moral Law
Authors: Herman Barbara 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
The task of this chapter is to answer three questions about the moral law. (1) How is the moral law a principle of practical cognition? (2) In what way does the moral law make a rational demand on the human will? (3) How is the moral law related to our duties? The answers begin with an account of the moral law as the principle of a rational will’s causality. Practical cognition then involves a representing of the will’s object, either as an object of subjective interest, or as what the moral law, represented as a causal principle, can make real. The moral law thus determines the will of the rational being to act for what is objectively good. E.g. the moral goodness of a promise kept is the result of a representation of the moral law as a practical cognition of the promisor that it is good to do. While the moral law is the source of the freedom or power of the human being to act for the objective good, it does not prevent our acting for the merely apparent good. Last, it is argued that our duties are the working principles of the moral law, necessary to secure the existence conditions of free, rational action where our natural tendencies in choice and action would undermine them. This puts duties of right, along with duties of virtue, at the centre of Kant’s moral project.
Kant on Humanity
Authors: Grenberg Jeanine , Vinton Matthew 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
Kant’s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the so-called Formula of Humanity, appeals to the humanity in our persons as an unconditional end-in-itself that may never be used merely as a means. Various interpretive challenges have led to scholarly disagreement concerning what Kant meant by the term ‘humanity’ in this formulation. Four views emerge from the literature: (1) humanity is an abstract idea, (2) humanity is the capacity for end-setting generally, (3) humanity is the capacity for morality, and (4) humanity is a good will. After surveying each of these views, this chapter argues for a teleological reading of ‘humanity’ in one’s person. A focus on Kant’s first Critique discussion of ideas and ideals reveals that the ‘idea of humanity’ and ‘ideal of humanity’ both determine which capacities define an actually existing human being and provide the regulative ideal or telos articulating the vocation of that human being’s existence. This ‘idea’ and ‘ideal’ of humanity reveal that the capacity for morality, broadly conceived as autonomous self-legislation of categorical moral demands extending both to the choice of maxims and the setting of obligatory ends, a capacity which undergirds and makes possible one’s non-moral capacities for end-setting and prudential choice, is definitional of humanity. This capacity simultaneously identifies human beings as the kind of being they are, and allows those beings to become worthy of that humanity through moral development.
Kant on Community
Authors: Lau Chong-Fuk , Lowe Chun-Yip 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
This chapter examines the concept of community through its different facets and far-reaching implications in Kant’s philosophy. It first addresses the concept of community as one of the twelves categories in the Critique of Pure Reason, showing its synthetizing role for the categories of substance and causality. It argues that Kant’s concept of the phenomenal world assumes a communalistic unity in reference to which individual objects acquire their identities. The main part of the chapter then focuses on Kant’s practical philosophy, in which the notion of community plays an even more significant role, even though Kant’s concept of autonomy and the theory of the categorical imperative may seem to be founded on an individualistic conception of morality. Not only does the formula of humanity presuppose the intersubjective endorsability of moral maxims in a community of rational agents, but more importantly the realization of the highest good in the unity of morality and happiness requires the idea of a kingdom of ends in which every autonomous agent can be considered a law-giving member. In the earthly world, the kingdom of ends has to be realized by the establishment of a political and an ethical community, to which the last two sections of the chapter are devoted. While a political community is concerned with the external freedom of rational agents to protect everyone as free and equal, an ethical community aims at cultivating the virtue of rational agents towards holiness.
Kant on Practical Reason
Authors: Kitcher Patricia 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
Kant’s declaration in the Critique of Practical Reason that the freedom established by the moral law ‘forms the keystone of the whole edifice of a system of reason’ (5:3) invites readers to view his theory of practical reason through the lens of his moral theory. But Marcus Willaschek (1992) argued that Kant scholars erred in narrowing their study of Kant’s theory of practical reason to just the faculties required for the possibility of a Categorical Imperative. He maintained that Kant drew on his predecessors’ concepts and theories to develop a more general account of practical reasoning, one that is not limited to moral reasoning. To explain practical reasoning, Kant appealed to the faculty psychology of his day and to his own views about the systematicity of empirical sciences. He began his study of the possibility of morality by regressing from the ordinary person’s judgments about morally good and bad actions—and about the necessary psychological conditions for moral action. The two desiderata for Kant’s theories of moral and practical reasoning—ordinary moral consciousness and a systematic faculty psychology—are not fated to conflict. This chapter shows, however, that there are real tensions between the two, and serious problems with his use of a psychological concept that he borrows from the tradition, ‘Willkür’. Its central claim is that it is not Kant’s goal of vindicating free will and morality that limits his theory to moral creatures, but his understanding of how practical reasoning can be cognized.
Kant on Peace and History
Authors: Maliks Reidar 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
The first part of this chapter is devoted to the concept of peace, the second part is devoted to the concept of history and historical progress towards peace. Peace is to Kant a condition in which the rights of individuals and states are protected by law and where disputes can be settled by a court; it is the highest good of the Doctrine of Right. Heads of states are under an obligation to exit the international state of nature and enter a league of nations governed by the right of nations (Völkerrecht). Despotic states are prone to war while republics are peaceful, a claim contemporary international relations theorists have used to generate the democratic peace theory. Kant is concerned not only to justify the moral duty to pursue peace, but also to motivate humans to strive for it by demonstrating that it is not unachievable. To this end he develops a teleological history that holds humanity inevitably to progress to the better, both through the perfectibility of moral agency and through the perfectibility of legal institutions. The chapter discusses various objections to this idea of providential history and suggests that Kant’s theory has an emancipatory purpose. It was to give confidence to agents that their moral strivings can be effective in subjecting power to law and realizing perpetual peace.
Kant on Beauty and Humility
Authors: Matherne Samantha 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
At the heart of Kant’s aesthetics is a universalist theory of beauty. On his view, when I judge something to be beautiful, I am not judging it to be beautiful just ‘for me’; I am judging it to be beautiful ‘for everyone’. However, some have worried that this universalist view of beauty promotes a kind of arrogance in aesthetic appreciators. Although one can see why these concerns have been raised, a closer look at Kant’s theory of beauty reveals that far from encouraging aesthetic arrogance, his theory promises to serve as a corrective for it. In this vein, this chapter examines how Kant’s account of the conditions that we must meet in order to make a judgment of the beautiful cuts against such arrogance. It, furthermore, explores how Kant’s view of beauty implicitly offers resources for developing an account of aesthetic humility as a virtue of aesthetic appreciation, which can serve as a corrective to the vices of aesthetic arrogance and servility. By attending to Kant’s account of these conditions and this Kantian model of aesthetic humility, this chapter aims to bring out a more promising version of Kant’s universalist account of beauty than he is often credited with.
Kant on the Empirical Self
Authors: Moran Kate 
Published: October 2024

Abstract
This chapter examines the empirical self insofar as it is involved in moral conflict, deliberation, and action. To begin, it outlines the faculties of feeling and desire that constitute a large part of what Kant characterizes as the empirical self, paying special attention to the precise ways in which feeling and desire might pose a threat to morality. Despite these dangers, Kant’s suggestion is not that we should extirpate sensibility altogether. Indeed, the faculty of feeling, in particular, is fundamentally bound up with our moral capacity and our moral experience. The chapter goes on to explore various ‘aesthetic preconditions’ related to feeling that must already be in place in order for an agent to be bound or obligated by morality. Crucially, however, this is not a claim that the moral law itself is somehow secretly grounded in feeling. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the proper place of the empirical self in Kant’s moral theory, including the attitudes that we ought to take toward the empirical self, and how this might ultimately inform our interpretation of moral action and moral choice.