bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Micro-Macro Transitions in Rational Choice Explanations
Authors: Opp Karl-Dieter 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The rational choice approach focuses on explaining macrosocial phenomena or relationships by applying a theory about the behavior of individual actors. This paper addresses James S. Coleman’s account of micro-macro transitions involved in rational choice explanations. The starting point of this account is a macro-relationship. Its independent variable has a causal effect on the independent variable of a micro-relationship. The dependent variable of this relationship in turn influences the dependent variable of the macro-relationship (see Figure 1 of this paper). The paper extends this account by delineating other types of micro-macro explanations and discusses some of its problems.
The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust
Authors: Hardin Russell 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Rational choice and other accounts of trust base it in objective assessments of the risks and benefits of trusting. But rational subjects must choose in the light of what knowledge they have, and that knowledge determines their capacities for trust. This is an epistemological issue, but not at the usual level of the philosophy of knowledge. Rather, it is an issue of pragmatic rationality for a given actor. It is commonly argued that trust is inherently embedded in iterated, thick relationships. But such relationships are merely one source of relevant knowledge in a street-level epistemological account. Early experience may heavily influence later capacity for trust. For example, bad experience may lead to lower levels of trust and therefore fewer opportunities for mutual gain.
Putting Coleman’s Transition Right-Side Up
Authors: Blau Peter M. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Coleman states that social phenomena cannot be directly accounted for by their social antecedents without analyzing three intervening steps: what motives the antecedents create, how these affect individual behavior, and the transition from the acts of interdependent individuals to social phenomena. The last is most important. I agree, but Foundations has its causal link upside down. Reanalyzing some of his cases, I try to show that macrostructures are not the product of microfoundations but the existential conditions that circumscribe individuals’ choices.
Die Kontroverse um die Menschenrechte
Authors: Tugendhat Ernst 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
It is assumed a) that the statement that a human right exists means that a state which does not grant it is not legitimate, and b) that the legitimacy of power can, in modern times, be justified only by showing that it is in the equal interest of everybody. Mere democracy is insufficient to legitimate political power. Freedom for every individual must be guaranteed. So much is common ground in the controversy on human rights, but to interpret these freedom as a negative freedom, as the classical conception of human rights has done, is insufficient and therefore illegitimate, because it is not in the equal interest of everybody. To add a positive concept of freedom is correct but not enough, because it still neglects those who even if they are given the facilities do not have the capacity. Since the handicapped, the old and the young cannot even enter a contract and the disposessed cannot enter a fair contract, the contractarian foundation of human rights must be discarded.
The Point of Politics
Authors: Betzig Laura 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Why do men and women compete? And what makes them compete more or less? An answer to the first question follows directly from Darwin. If Homo sapiens, like other species, is a product of natural selection, then we should have evolved to compete in order to reproduce. An answer to the second question follows from more recent versions of Darwinism. People, like other organisms, are likely to compete socially - to form dominance hierarchies - to the extent that it is costly for subordinates to flee ecologically. This paper first reviews evidence that winners at political competition have consistently won at reproductive competition. Next, it documents the slow shift toward declining political competition - toward democracy, and toward declining reproductive competition - toward monogamy, in the course of Western history. Last, it offers a model of what might account for that change.
Die biologischen Wurzeln des Inzestverbots
Authors: Klein Jörg 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Does an inclination towards incest exist and why is incest prohibited? There are mainly two points of view: that of Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, and that of Edward Westermarck, a Finnish-British anthropologist. Freud is of the opinion that men have a profound desire for incest, whereas Westermarck presumes an instinctive aversion against it. Nowadays the discussion has received fresh impulse due to a modem interpretation of Westermarck’s theory and the controversy over the sexual abuse of children in their families. The author is in favour of the Westermarck theory and tries to explain the prohibition of incest based on a natural inhibition towards incest.
Structured and Unstructured Valuation
Authors: Broome John 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Economists can value things for cost-benefit analysis using either a structured or an unstructured approach. The first imposes some theoretical structure on the valuation; the second does not. This paper explains the difference between the approaches and examines the relative merits of each. Cost-benefit analysis may be aimed at finding what would be the best action, or alternatively at finding which action should be done in a democracy. The paper explains the difference, and argues that the appropriate aim is the first. Given that, it comes down in favour of the structured approach to valuation. As an example, it discusses different approaches to valuing life in economics.
Sind alle Werte vergleichbar?
Authors: Schaber Peter 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Are the values of different options and goods, as cost-benefit analysis assumes, commensurable? Not always. The incommensurability of certain options is based on the fact that preferences are sometimes not rankable, even if the agent is fully informed about the options in question. In addition, even if all values were commensurable they could not be compared in monetary terms. If this is the case, cost-benefit analysis should not be seen as a decision procedure.
Rational Choice Fundierungen von Gerechtigkeitsprinzipien
Authors: Schmidt Johannes 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The paper draws on a conceptual analysis of justice in discussing the power of rational choice justifications of conceptions of justice. It is argued that the concept of justice can be reduced to two independent moral dimensions. From this conceptual thesis a simple conceptional criterion is derived which any powerful theory of justice must satisfy. An attempt is made to use this fundamental criterion in evaluating a wide variety of rational choice theories of justice. It is shown that there is but one variant of the rational choice approach which in substantiating principles of justice does not violate this criterion.
Welfare, Rights, and Social Choice Procedure: A Perspective
Authors: Suzumura Kotaro 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Sen’s “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal” was meant to crystallize his fundamental criticism against the welfaristic basis of welfare economics in general, and social choice theory in particular. This paper vindicates Sen’s criticism, arguing that its logical relevance is not lost in light of recent criticisms against his method of articulating individual rights in terms of a person’s decisive power in social choice. We show that some recent proposals that Sen’s articulation failed to capture a strong libertarian tradition of free contract and that an appropriate formulation of this tradition wipes off the Sen impossibility cannot be sustained. We then show that the game form articulation of rights casts serious doubts on the Sen articulation of liberty, but the Sen impossibility strenuously comes back in the context of realizing conferred game form rights as well as in the context of initial conferment of game form rights.
Individual Rights and Legal Validity
Authors: Hees Martin van 
Published: May 2016

AbstractThe condition of liberty which Sen used in his famous theorem on the impossibility of the Paretian liberal was defined in terms of individual preferences. The preference-based approach has been the subject of much criticism, which led to the evolution of the game-theoretic analysis of rights. In this approach no references to individual preferences are made. Two questions are examined in this paper: how can different types of right be distinguished within a game-theoretic setting, and how do rights come into existence? These questions are addressed on the basis of ideas originating from legal theory. The discussion shows that an analysis of rights should take account of the whole legal system of which a legal norm forms part. Furthermore, it reveals that preferences should be re-introduced into the formal study of individual rights.
Constitutional and Liberal Rights
Authors: Mueller Dennis C. 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Amartya Sen has demonstrated a possible inconsistency between a (liberal) right and Pareto optimality. Neither Sen nor the subsequent literature have discussed the origin of the rights that lead to the liberal paradox. In this article I examine one possible origin of rights definitions-a constitutional contract agreed to by all members of the community. Constitutional rights are show to be vulnerable to a similar paradox as with liberal rights, but if the writers of the constitution were correct in their choice of actions to protect, such paradoxes will be unlikely and involve small welfare losses when they do occur. The article demonstrates that both the origin of rights and their potential role in advancing the interests of citizens can be explained using a utilitarian/welfarist methodology.
Diskursverfahren: Liebe auch auf den zweiten Blick?
Authors: Oberholzer-Gee Felix , Vautravers-Busenhart lsabelle , Falk Armin , Spindler Jürg de 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Discourse-based processes seek to arrive at socially acceptable decisions by adhering to a specific set of procedures. In this case study, we empirically test how successful the ,Cooperative Discourse' was in identifying a socially acceptable site for a solid-waste landfill in Switzerland. Our results indicate that even individuals living in the community designated as the prospective site think highly of the ,Cooperative Discourse', but they know close to nothing about this procedure. This ignorance is rational, because, under Swiss laws, the recommendations of the discourse are not legally binding and siting projects can easily be thwarted by town hall meetings. In this case, the ,Cooperative Discourse' may have reached a consensus proposal because this proposal is socially not very relevant.
Auf der Suche nach dem Gespenst des Ökonomismus
Authors: Kirchgässner Gebhard 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
First, the role of markets as co-ordination mechanisms and, more generally, the role of exchange relations in a society is discussed. We consider illegal markets as well as markets where transactions are performed not using money but some other exchange medium. Secondly, we ask for the political possibilities to intervene into such markets. Finally, we discuss the increasing ,economising of social relations' and possible reasons for it.
Weltarmut und Ressourcen-Zugang
Authors: Kesselring Thomas 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Thomas Pogge suggests that world poverty should be fighted against with the help of a global dividend on resources (GRD). In the first part of this comment Pogge’s moral argumentation is reviewed. In the second part the coherence of the GRD proposal is discussed critically. It is argued that GRD should be spent primarily for ecological purposes.
Triumph und Grenzen des Marktes
Authors: Beckert Jens 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
While markets are important mechanisms for coordination of social exchange it has to be looked at their limits and preconditions as well. This paper advocates three claims: First, under conditions of externalities and asymmetric distribution of information the eflicient functioning of markets depends on non-market institutions. Second, social limitations of the expansion of markets reflect a value-realm in which society constitutes itself. These values, though they change, are normatively immune against efficiency consideration. Third, the rational-actor model of economics is insufficient for the understanding of the non-rational preconditions of markets and the embeddedness of markets in social values.
Diskussion/Discussion. Normen und das ökonomische Handlungsmodell
Authors: Beckert Jens 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This note on my exchange with G. Kirchgässner points to a possible misunderstanding and one serious difference of opinion. On the empirical side I tried to make visible social values and norms which cannot be reduced to economic preferences. On the normative side I tried to criticise the rational-choice-approach for being either obviously wrong or empirically empty.
Die ,sozialdemokratische‘ und die ,liberale‘ Variante der neoaristotelischen Sozialphilosophie
Authors: Dietrich Frank 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This article examines the neoaristotelian theories of Martha Nussbaum and Douglas Rasmussen/Douglas Den Uyl. Both sides give a similar account of good human living, which emphasizes the significance of individual autonomy. But they disagree sharply on the political institutions necessary to promote human flourishing; Nussbaum formulates a ,social democratic' position; Rasmussen/Den Uyl hold a ,liberal‘ standpoint. The article explores both lines of reasoning. It is shown that neither Nussbaum nor Rasmussen/Den Uyl present conclusive arguments for their political position.
Collective Intentionality, Self-referentiality, and False Beliefs: Some Issues Concerning Institutional Facts
Authors: Celano Bruno 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
J. R. Searle’s general theory of social and institutional reality, as deployed in some of his recent work (The Construction of Social Reality, 1995; Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society, 1998}, raises many deep and interesting problems. Four issues are taken up here: (1) Searle’s claim to the effect that collective intentionality is a primitive, irreducible form of intentionality; (2) his account of one of the most puzzling features of institutional concepts, their having a self-referential component; (3) the question as to the point, or points, of having institutions; (4) Searle's claim to the effect that false beliefs on the part of the members of the relevant community are compatible with the existence of related institutional facts. It is argued that, under all four respects, Searle's theory proves to be hardly satisfactory.
Generalised Reciprocity and Reputation in the Theory of Cooperation: A Framework
Authors: Abell Peter , Reyniers Diane 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
We study the Iterated Bilateral Reciprocity game in which the need for help arises randomly. Players are heterogeneous with respect to ‘neediness’ i.e. probability of needing help. We find bounds on the amount of heterogeneity which can be tolerated for cooperation (all players help when asked to help) to be sustainable in a collectivity. We introduce the notion of Generalised Reciprocity. Individuals make a costly first move to benefit another under the reasonable expectation that either the other or somebody else will reciprocate. We hope that these tentative attempts at extending Axelrod’s seminal work on cooperation will inspire future efforts in the field of organisational culture and social theory more generally.
Exit, Anonymity and the Chances of Egoistical Cooperation
Authors: EdK-Group  
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This paper presents the results of computer simulations with a community of actors playing a large number of voluntarily iterated two-person-PD. The simulations are designed to enable uncooperative actors to exploit partners, leave them and find a new partner who knows nothing about their previous behavioral history. Hit-and-run exploitation should thrive under these conditions. However, as Schuessler (1989; 1990) has shown, the setting is highly unfavorable to uncooperative players. The present study extends this result to a wider set of strategies which can alternatively stay with defectors {and try to improve them) or leave them quickly. In addition, a class of seemingly clever strategies is introduced which try to exploit the expected dynamics of looking for a partner. Still, a high amount of egoistical cooperation can persist in the present scenario.
On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory
Authors: Axelrod Robert 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The symposium included in this issue of Analyse & Kritik extends the basis of Cooperation Theory as set forth in Axelrod’s Evolution of Cooperation (1984). This essay begins with an overview of Cooperation Theory in terms of the questions it asks, its relationship to game theory and rationality, and the principal methodologies used, namely deduction and simulation. This essay then addresses the issues raised in the symposium, including the consequences of extending the original paradigm of the two person iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma to take into account such factors as nonsimultaneous play, the ability to offer hostages for performance, social networks of interaction, information sharing that can support reputations, learning behavior, envy, misunderstanding, and an option to exit. The essay places the contributions of this symposium in the context of previous research on these and related issues.
Sind Marktpreise gerecht?
Authors: Michel Heiner 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
This article objects to two major economistic shortcomings of Philippe Van Parijs’s Real Freedom for All: (1) Van Parijs claims that market prices are the best metric for equal real freedom. This is challenged. Market prices admittedly are the best instrument for distributive purposes at hand. They are, however, a means of transport for supply and demand contingendes. Hence market prices are to be considered as an insufficient metric for equal freedom. (2) Van Parijs claims that Real Freedom for All is all there is to social justice. This claim is rejected. Despite its demanding egalitarian ambition, Real Freedom for All fails to protect a flourishing human life. Basic human rights like the right to social recognition and, in part, the right to health care are violated. Curiously even the right to autonomy is in want of full protection. These lacks are caused by the monetarism and the Straightforward market optimism of Real Freedom for All.
Die Bretter, die gebohrt werden, bleiben dick
Authors: Strünck Christoph 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Deregulation of the political process could be an instrument to reduce the overwhelming power of specialised interest groups and tighten the links between voters and politicians. But deregulation causes serious problems. Reputation pooling by international political enterprises depends on a transnational public sphere which is quite unrealistic. And political enterprises are not capable of shaping candidates for public service. Putting political finance in the hands of voters simply moves lobbying activities to the level of voters and does not change the asymmetrical influence of interest groups. Above all, the idea that political enterprises exchange experts in parliament does not fit into the crucial principle of parliamentary government and political responsibility.
Politik ohne Wettbewerbshindernisse
Authors: Weede Erich 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
Whereas Eichenberger advocates better policies by deregulation of politics, politicians and political scientists in Western Europe are quite satisfied with Western democracies and their performance. This satisfaction is based on neglecting the insights from ‘Public Choice’ theorizing as well as on negating the coming pension crisis in ageing societies. Including Eichenberger’s ideas there are now five schools of thought about how to improve Western democracies: more direct democracy, strengthening market-preserving federalism, less law and fewer lawyers, exploiting international rivalries for limiting government and, now, dismantling the protection from foreign competition which elected representatives enjoy almost everywhere in the West.
Kidney Allocation in Eurotransplant
Authors: Ahlert Marlies , Gubematis Gundolf , Kliemt Hartmut 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
In the Eurotransplant region transplantable kidneys from cadaveric donors are allocated according to the Wujciak-Opelz algorithm. This paper shows that the algorithm as it stands fulfils certain normative standards of a more formal nature while violating others. In view of these insights, it is explored how the algorithm could perhaps be improved. Even if issues of substantial rather than formal adequacy need to be addressed separately, analyses as presented in this paper can prepare the ground for a discussion of substantive normative issues. In any event, axiomatic accounts can tell us something about what we are in fact doing when using a procedure like the Wujciak-Opelz algorithm.
The Eurotransplant Kidney Allocation Algorithm–Moral Consensus or Pragmatic Compromise?
Authors: Marckmann Georg 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
The selection and balancing of values for the Eurotransplant kidney allocation algorithm poses both practical and ethical challenges. The paper argues that any allocation algorithm can only be justified by reference to some substantive conception of a good life that reflects our value preferences regarding the allocation of scarce donor kidneys. It is concluded that the criterion of HLA compatibility maximizes overall rather than individual utility. The paper emphasizes that good pragmatic arguments for maintaining the primacy of HLA matching can never replace a more systematic, independent ethical justification. As neither the selection nor the balancing of the different allocation criteria are based on an explicit ethical justification, the paper concludes that the choice of the Wujciak-algorithm was rather a product of pragmatic compromise than moral consensus.
Functionalist Socialization, Family and Character
Authors: Mackie Gerry 
Published: May 2016

Abstract
According to functionalism, the family internalizes and transmits society’s supposed value consensus from one generation to the next, and such socialization explains morality, social order, and cultural uniformities. I present three investigations that challenge the concept of functionalist socialization, and propose alternative theories that may better explain observations. First, I present evidence from developmental psychology based largely on American subjects and an ethnographic report from Burkina Faso which suggest that the characters of children are not formed by parental socialization. Second, I report data from Europe which suggest that the weaker is family and its supervision, the stronger is character and internalized morality. Third, I report an account of European modernization which suggests that weaker family ties broaden extrafamilial associations and generalize moral orientation. Finally, I suggest that Schelling’s game-theoretic account of social conventions is a better explanation of cultural continuities and discontinuities than is functionalism.