bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Romantic Lives of Emerging Adults
Authors: Konstam Varda 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
The romantic lives of emerging adults are often baffling and contradictory: they prize committed and authentic relationships, yet they appear to be reluctant participants, and they prefer to foster ambiguity in their romantic relationships, even as they value honesty and clarity. This book grapples with these perplexing questions and considers the challenging economic conditions in which today’s emerging adults find themselves. With an emphasis on the constructs of commitment and sacrifice and their centrality to emerging adults’ readiness for long-term relationships, the main milestones in transitioning from an I identity to a we identity are reviewed. The concepts of choice and risk are discussed and structures such as asymmetrically committed relationships, cohabitation, marriage, and divorce are examined through the lens of risk and risk avoidance. The book probes extensively into the romantic lives of emerging adults—their attitudes, values, and expectations. In doing so, this text examines some of the developmental and contextual realities against which romantic attachment must be viewed. Critical topics such as casual and sexual experiences and relationships, going solo, breakups, the integration of work and love, and social media and its influence are considered. Original qualitative data about the topic is presented. The chapters conclude with a “close-up look” at one or more emerging adults so that their romantic lives are brought to life more vividly. The commonality and the individuality of the emerging adults that are presented throughout this text contribute to a rich understanding of emerging adults and how they live and love.
Identity
Authors: Konstam Varda 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
The dynamic processes of individual and couple identity formation are discussed against a theoretical background. Absence of strict codes of behavior creates an environment in which emerging adults feel freer to explore and experiment with identity options, both as individuals and as couples. Marcia’s four “identity statuses” are presented in a contemporary context, and the concept of group identification is discussed. The challenges of transitioning from an individual identity to a couple identity—from an I to a we—are analyzed. The 29 research participants discuss their personal experiences in forming a we identity and the difficulties in developing and maintaining an I while living in a we relationship. The chapter concludes with a case study of a young American woman of Middle-Eastern ethnicity who must contend with strong cultural and parental influences while trying to forge an individual and a couple identity.
“We’ll see you in court!”
Authors: Railton Peter 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Is there a distinctive normative force of law itself, as opposed to whatever moral or prudential reasons might speak on behalf of law? Answering this question requires attention to law as a distinctive kind of social scheme, which limits the number of degrees of freedom in interpersonal interactions and thereby structures expectations and practices in ways that create “opportunity paths” that would not otherwise exist. Such rule by law can be given a purely instrumental, external normative ground, as Hobbes argued. However, as he also argued, rules are not self-enforcing, so that the well-functioning and stability of a system of rule by law depends upon broad social presence of an array of evaluative attitudes that could robustly sustain playing one’s part in a scheme of self-constraint and mutualconstraint—rule by law as an explanatory kind. An expansion of these constraints to include those in power can underpin rule of law, giving it distinctive social dynamics as well as a distinctive character as a normative kind distinct from morality or prudence, and help explain why certain human rights have been viewed as part of the rule of law.
Laws as Conventional Norms
Authors: Southwood Nicholas 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
A persistent worry concerning conventionalist accounts of law is that such accounts are ill equipped to account for law’s special normativity. The chapter offers a particular kind of conventionalist account that is based on the practice-dependent account of conventional norms the author has offered elsewhere and considers whether it is vulnerable to the Normativity Objection. The chapter argues that it isn’t. It can account for all the ways in which law can justly claim to be normative. While there are ways of being normative that it cannot account for, it is an error to suppose that law is normative in any of those ways.
Legal Teleology
Authors: Copp David 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Legal Teleology seeks to embrace and to ground the most plausible tenets of both legal positivism and natural law theory. It is compatible with the positivist view that law consists at root in a social practice of a certain kind. Yet it also can accommodate at least some claims about the relation between law and morality that are advocated by opponents of positivism. Most important, it argues that law is “robustly normative”—roughly, law is a source of genuine reasons. Standard forms of positivism cannot account for this thesis, but, arguably, the central doctrines of positivism are compatible with it. Legal Teleology is an account of the normativity of law that is supported by “pluralist-teleology,” a naturalist account of normativity that has been proposed elsewhere (Copp 2009). Legal Teleology sees the law as having a purpose, and it says that law is defective insofar as it does not further that purpose. It agrees that jurists can sometimes help law better to serve its purpose when they invoke moral principles in interpreting law. Legal Teleology represents a kind of intermarriage between legal positivism and natural law theory.
How to Argue for Law’s Full-Blooded Normativity
Authors: Letsas George 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter aims to make space for the view that law possesses full-blooded normativity in a top-down way. Here is the dialectic of the inquiry: What would have to be true of morality for the claim that some specific practice is full-bloodedly normative to be plausible? The chapter assumes that the practice of morality as a whole has full-blooded normativity in the sense that its requirements give one genuine reasons to act, irrespective of one’s subjective wants, desires, and beliefs. The focus is on what it means to say of a specific practice that it partakes of morality’s normativity. The reason is simple: it should be an open question whether this or that practice has full-blooded normativity. For if it is not possible for any particular practice to have full-blooded normativity, then the question of whether law has full-blooded normativity would make no sense from the get-go. The account put forward builds on the idea of obligations of role. A practice, has full-blooded normativity when it instantiates a distinct set of obligations, one that pertains to people in a particular capacity, such as friends, parents, doctors, or teachers. The proposition that there are distinct moral practices, which are not reducible to a single moral concern, is of course disputed territory in moral philosophy. But if this proposition is accepted, one can ask, by analogy, whether legal practice instantiates an obligation of role and, as a result, bears the attributes of full-blooded normativity. This way of proceeding perceives the relationship between law and metaethics differently: it shows that law’s claim to full-blooded normativity ultimately depends on contestable assumptions about the nature of morality as a whole.
Legal Philosophy à la carte
Authors: Toh Kevin 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Recent philosophical thinking about the nature of law has been hampered by a systematic conflation of the goal of identifying the facts or considerations in virtue of which legal claims are true, and the goal of identifying the facts or considerations in virtue of which a community of people have a legal practice, including discursive aspects of that practice. This chapter diagnoses the source of this conflation, and argues that new avenues of theorizing about the nature of law would be opened up by being clear-headed about the distinction. Some influential recent contributions to the literature, including that by Brian Leiter, are scrutinized and criticized along the way.
Normativity in Language and Law
Authors: Silk Alex 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter develops an account of the meaning and use of various types of legal claims, and uses this account to inform debates about the nature and normativity of law. The account draws on a general framework for implementing a contextualist theory, called Discourse Contextualism (Silk 2015a, 2016, 2017). The aim of Discourse Contextualism is to derive the apparent normativity of claims of law from a particular contextualist interpretation of a standard semantics for modals, along with general principles of interpretation and conversation. Though the semantics is descriptivist, it avoids Dworkin’s influential criticism of so-called “semantic theories of law,” and elucidates the nature of “theoretical disagreements” about the criteria of legal validity. The account sheds light on the social, interpersonal function of normative uses of language in legal discourse. It also gives precise expression to Hart’s and Raz’s intuitive distinctions among types of legal claims (internal/external, committed/detached). The proposed semantics and pragmatics of legal claims provides a fruitful framework for further theorizing about the nature and metaphysics of law, the relation between law and morality, and the apparent practical character of legal language and judgment. Discourse Contextualism provides a solid linguistic basis for a broader account of legal discourse and practice.
Authority and Interest in the Theory of Right
Authors: Nieswandt Katharina 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
The chapter suggests a new role for authority and interest in the theory of right: Rights can be explicated as sets of prohibitions, permissions and commands, and they must be justified by interests. The chapter argues as follows: (1) The two dominant theories of right—“Will Theory” and “Interest Theory”—have certain standard problems. (2) These problems are systematic: Will Theory’s criterion of the ability to enforce a duty is either false or empty outside of its original legal context, whereas Interest Theory includes in the definition of a right what actually belongs to the justification of the practice within which that right is assigned. (3) The chapter recasts the connection between authority, interests, and rights in a way that avoids each theory’s standard problem. (4) The resulting theory also has three further advantages: It analyzes rights in terms of very basic and familiar concepts, it mirrors the understanding of rights in actual public discourse, and it is compatible with a wide selection of moral theories. Since its core is about a specific use of modal auxiliary verbs, this new theory is called the “Modal Theory of Right.”
On the Legal Syllogism
Authors: Duarte d’Almeida Luís 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter argues against rule-deductivism. Rule-deductivism is the view that the justification of law-applying decisions is adequately understood on the model of a deductive argument—a “legal syllogism”, as it is often called—with a statement of an applicable rule as the “major premise”, and a statement of the relevant facts as the “minor” one. Rule-deductivism—not to be confused with formalism—has long been a popular view in legal argumentation theory. Endorsed by Kelsen, Hart, MacCormick, and Alexy, it continues to be accepted by authors such as Gardner, Leiter, and Marmor, among many others. But it is wrong, as this chapter tries to show. This chapter begins by offering a clear characterization of rule-deductivism; goes on to argue that rule-deductivism is not, even in its stronger version, a view that should be accepted; and concludes by sketching and motivating a new model of the justification of law-applying decisions that overcomes the flaws of the model of the legal syllogism.
Dworkin’s Literary Analogy
Authors: Shpall Sam 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
For decades Ronald Dworkin defended the view that legal interpretation is constructive. One of his most fascinating arguments for this idea, which turns on an analogy between legal and literary interpretation, has been more or less ignored by philosophers of law—probably because they have not been especially interested in the claims about literary interpretation that it presupposes. This chapter explores Dworkin's analogical argument with the sensitivity it deserves, and with particular attention to its controversial ideas about the interpretation of literature. The chapter evaluates the implications of Dworkin’s analogy for his overall anti-positivist project, and for one’s thinking about legal interpretation more generally.
Constitutional Realism
Authors: Rosati Connie S. 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Constitutional discourse bears the realist earmarks of normative discourse more generally. Those who debate the morality of affirmative action programs, for instance, generally talk as if there were a correct answer from the standpoint of morality. In similar fashion, those who debate the constitutionality of a particular affirmative action program generally talk as if there were a correct answer from the standpoint of constitutional law. The aim of this chapter is to take seriously these earmarks and offer an account of the nature of constitutional facts: facts about what a constitution requires, forbids, or permits. This chapter proposes that constitutional facts are facts about what a specific constitution requires, forbids, or permits when it is interpreted in accordance with norms that are appropriate given the function of a constitution. It argues that this account of constitutional judgments and facts should be accepted because of its explanatory value. Understanding constitutional facts in this way well explains disagreement and patterns of constitutional argument. It explains why first-order constitutional theorizing takes the shape that it does. And it accounts for the objectivity and normativity of constitutional judgments.
How Brains Make Minds
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Brains make minds because mental representations and processes are performed by neural mechanisms. Mental representations work by patterns of firing in neural groups. More complicated representations that go beyond sensory experience can be formed by binding representations together, combining patterns of firing into new ones. In particular, binding can produce semantic pointers that coalesce and compress different kinds of information, including sensory, motor, emotional and verbal information. Semantic pointers retain connections to sensory and motor experience while also acquiring the autonomy that is usually attributed to symbols. Eliasmith’s semantic pointer hypothesis shows how neural cells can interact to produce high-level thinking. Different representations compete with each other to provide accounts of what is going on in the world through a parallel process of satisfaction of multiple constraints. Neural networks can learn by changing the synaptic connections between neurons.
Perception and Imagery
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter provides a general account of imagery that applies to both external senses such as vision and internal senses such as pain. It identifies five mental operations that occur in all kinds of imagery: intensification, focusing, combination, juxtaposition, and decomposition. Each of these operations results from neural mechanisms that are part of the Semantic Pointer Architecture, including storage, retrieval, neural representation, binding, competition, and transformation. There is abundant psychological and neural evidence that imagery is real and that the brain’s computations employ special patterns of neural representation that develop from sensory inputs. This development requires binding into semantic pointers that are susceptible to symbol-like manipulation that exploits the different sensory characters of visual, auditory, and other sorts of representation.
Concepts
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Concepts are mental representations corresponding roughly to words. Construed as semantic pointers, concepts are capable of playing inferential roles, but they also maintain embodied connections with sensory–motor processes. Understanding concepts in this way enables us to give biologically and psychologically plausible accounts of innateness, learning, and categorization. Learning new concepts can occur not only through slow, incremental use of multiple examples but also by fast, sometimes revolutionary conceptual combinations. The process of categorization is carried out by retrieval through reactivation of neural patterns and through parallel constraint satisfaction accomplished by competition among semantic pointers. Categorization can contribute to different kinds of problem solving, including planning, decision making, and explanation. Concepts do not have strict definitions, but they can nevertheless be meaningful because of their relations with sensory and motor inputs and with other concepts.
Analogies
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Analogies contribute to many kinds of human thinking, including problem solving, decision making, explanation, persuasion, and entertainment. An analogy is a systematic comparison between a source analog and a target analog, where information about the source is used to generate inferences about the target. The major stages of analogical thinking are (a) obtaining a source analog by memory retrieval or other means, (b) mapping the source to the target, (c) adapting the source to inform the target, and (d) learning by generalizing source and target into a schema. Most theories of analogy have used verbal representations, but a much broader appreciation of analogical thinking can be gained with semantic pointers. Analogies often use words, but they can also operate with visual, auditory, and other sensory modalities, all of which can contribute to all stages of analogy.
Emotions
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Emotions serve not only to stand for things in the world but also to indicate their value. Decision, action, and many kinds of problem solving require determining how the world should be, not just how it is. Humans and other animals evolved with emotions as part of their innate biological machinery to guide action and inference. Emotions are patterns of neural firing that result from binding three different factors that are complementary rather than conflictive. A verbal or sensory representation of a situation can be bound both with a representation of the physiological states that the situation elicited and a cognitive appraisal of the import of the situation. Cognitive appraisal can also incorporate social factors because of the contributions of social goals and the culturally established associations of emotional words.
Consciousness
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Progress is being made in understanding how brain mechanisms generate conscious experience. Simple conscious experiences such as sensations of colors, shapes, and sounds require only neural representations as patterns of firing that result from sensory inputs and internal processing. More complicated conscious experiences, such as awareness of reading in a chair in a room, require the amalgamation of sensations and images into more complex representations through binding into semantic pointers. Recursive binding—bindings of bindings of bindings—can produce the most complicated kinds of conscious experience of which humans are capable, taking people from feelings to awareness to self-awareness. Consciousness is limited because recursive binding and competition among the resulting semantic pointers depend on processing by many neurons.
Language
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Semantic pointers handle syntactic structure in a way that integrates with other key aspects of language, including semantics, pragmatics, and phonology. Semantic pointers plausibly provide the underlying neural mechanisms for Jackendoff’s parallel architecture and for other theories of language that go beyond Chomsky’s syntax-first approach. In particular, they show how the mental representation of a word can efficiently combine information about sound, meaning, and grammar to enable the organization of words into sentences. Semantic pointers cast the meanings of words and sentences as multidimensional, relying not just on the relations of words to other words but also on the relation of words to the world through sensory-motor operations, with further contributions from genetic and social processes. The Semantic Pointer Architecture also provides neural mechanisms for explaining complex linguistic phenomena such as conceptual blending and metaphor.
Creativity
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Creativity results from neural processes that include binding of representations, generation of new concepts and rules, and the application of analogies. The Semantic Pointer Architecture accommodates the full range of multimodal representations needed for creativity in the domains of scientific discovery, technological invention, artistic imagination, and social innovation. New semantic pointers can be generated by convolution-based bindings in ways that produce new and useful images, concepts, rules, and analogies. Procedural creativity is the generation of new methods expressed as rules. The pragmatic focus of creative problem solving and the evaluation of the goal relevance of new products can be carried out by emotions. Competition among semantic pointers explains how the realization that one might have done something creative enters consciousness.
The Self
Authors: Thagard Paul 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
The self is a complex of mechanisms at multiple levels that include the molecular and the social. Semantic pointers are crucial to the self with respect to various phenomena, including how one represents oneself to oneself and to others, as well as in how one evaluates oneself. Also explained are operations that the self does to itself in efforts to achieve short-term goals such as self-control and long-term goals such as self-fulfillment. Semantic pointer explanations of images, concepts, and other mental representations are important for understanding how selves accomplish their goals. Representations of the self via semantic pointers can recursively be bound into semantic pointers for beliefs, desires, and intentions. Discussion of the social mechanisms relevant to the self begins to connect neural and mental mechanisms with discussions of social sciences and professions.
Crime and Uncertainty
Authors: Idler Annette 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Chapter 5 discusses security dynamics in the context of unstable short-term arrangements among violent non-state groups. These arrangements cluster at illicit business hubs, including at strategic nodes where various illicit flows coalesce and at the starting points of international trafficking routes. In such contexts of inter-group mistrust, community members are exposed to selective killings carried out by violent non-state groups to preempt or retaliate cheating or betrayal. This engenders a constant presentiment of danger among community members. General distrust and uncertainty erodes the community’s social fabric. Depending on the specific type of arrangement, community members can adapt their behavior to various degrees to the logics of illicit economies or employ avoidance strategies to minimize exposure to violence. Impunity across the border conceals violence against those who are considered obstacles to the illicit business.