bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Infinity
Authors: Moore A.W. 
Published: September 2018

The infinite is standardly conceived as that which is endless, unlimited, immeasurable. It also has theological connotations of absoluteness and perfection. From the dawn of civilization, it has held a special fascination: people have been captivated by the boundlessness of space and time, by the mystery of numbers going on forever, by the paradoxes of endless divisibility and by the riddles of divine perfection.
The infinite is of profound importance to mathematics. Nevertheless, the relationship between the two has been a curiously ambivalent one. It is clear that mathematics in some sense presupposes the infinite, for instance in the fact that there is no largest integer. But the idea that the infinite should itself be an object of mathematical study has time and again been subjected to ridicule. In the nineteenth century this orthodoxy was challenged, with the advent of ‘transfinite arithmetic’. Many, however, have remained sceptical, believing that the infinite is inherently beyond our grasp.
Perhaps their scepticism should be trained on the infinite itself: perhaps the concept is ultimately incoherent. It is certainly riddled with paradoxes. Yet we cannot simply jettison it. This is why the paradoxes are so acute. The roots of these paradoxes lie in our own finitude: it is self-conscious awareness of that finitude which gives us our initial sense of a contrasting infinite, and, at the same time, makes us despair of knowing anything about it, or having any kind of grasp of it. This creates a tension. We feel pressure to acknowledge the infinite, and we feel pressure not to. In trying to come to terms with the infinite, we are trying to come to terms with a basic conflict in ourselves.
Process philosophy
Authors: Griffin David Ray 
Published: September 2018

In the broad sense, the term ‘process philosophy’ refers to all worldviews holding that process or becoming is more fundamental than unchanging being. For example, an anthology titled Philosophers of Process(1965) includes selections from Samuel Alexander, Henri Bergson, John Dewey, William James, Lloyd Morgan, Charles Peirce and Alfred North Whitehead, with an introduction by Charles HARTSHORNE. Some lists include Hegel and Heraclitus. The term has widely come to refer in particular, however, to the movement inaugurated by Whitehead and extended by Hartshorne. Here, process philosophy is treated in this narrower sense.
Philosophy’s central task, process philosophers hold, is to develop a metaphysical cosmology that is self-consistent and adequate to all experienced facts. To be adequate, it cannot be based solely on the natural sciences, but must give equal weight to aesthetic, ethical and religious intuitions. Philosophy’s chief importance, in fact, derives from its integration of science and religion into a rational scheme of thought. This integration is impossible, however, unless exaggerations on both sides are overcome. On the side of science, the main exaggerations involve ‘scientific materialism’ and the ‘sensationalist’ doctrine of perception. On the side of religion, the chief exaggeration has been the idea of divine omnipotence. Process philosophy replaces these ideas with a ‘panexperientialist’ ontology, a doctrine of perception in which nonsensory ‘prehension’ is fundamental, and a doctrine of divine power as persuasive rather than coercive.
Will, the
Authors: Pink Thomas 
Published: September 2018

As traditionally conceived, the will is the faculty of choice or decision, by which we determine which actions we shall perform. As a faculty of decision, the will is naturally seen as the point at which we exercise our freedom of action – our control of how we act. It is within our control or up to us which actions we perform only because we have a capacity to decide which actions we shall perform, and it is up to us which such decisions we take. We exercise our freedom of action through freely taken decisions about how we shall act.
From late antiquity onwards, many philosophers took this traditional conception of the will very seriously, and developed it as part of a general theory of specifically human action. Human action, on this theory, is importantly different from animal action. Not only do humans have a freedom of or control over their action which animals lack; but this freedom supposedly arises because humans can act on the basis of reason, while animal action is driven by appetite and instinct. Both this freedom and rationality involve humans possessing what animals are supposed to lack: a will or rational appetite – a genuine decision making capacity.
From the sixteenth century on, this conception of the will and its role in human action met with increasing scepticism. There was no longer a consensus that human action involved mental capacities radically unlike those found in animals. And the idea that free actions are explained by free decisions of the will came to be seen as viciously regressive: if our freedom of action has to come from a prior freedom of will, why shouldn’t that freedom of will have to come from some yet further, will-generating form of freedom – and so on ad infinitum?
Yet it is very natural to believe that we do have a decision making capacity, and that it is up to us how we exercise that capacity – that it is indeed up to us which actions we decide to perform. The will-scepticism of early modern Europe, which persists in much modern Anglophone philosophy of action, may then have involved abandoning a model of human action and human rationality that is deeply part of common sense. We need to understand this model far better before we can conclude that its abandonment by so many philosophers really was warranted.
Teleology
Authors: Woodfield Andrew 
Published: September 2018

Teleology is the study of purposes, goals, ends and functions. Intrinsic or immanent teleology is concerned with cases of aiming or striving towards goals; extrinsic teleology covers cases where an object, event or characteristic serves a function for something.
Teleological explanations attempt to explain X by saying that X exists or occurs for the sake of Y. Since the question ‘For what purpose… ?’ may be construed either intrinsically or extrinsically, such explanations split into two broad types: those that cite goals of an agent, and those that cite functions.
The history of Western philosophy and science has been characterized by major debates about the logic, legitimacy and proper domains of these types of explanation. They still raise problems in contemporary biology and psychology. The modern debates have progressed considerably from the earlier ones, although continuities do exist.
Postcolonialism
Authors: Quayson Ato 
Published: September 2018

The term ‘postcolonialism’ is sometimes spelled with a hyphen – post-colonial – and sometimes without. There is no strict general practice, but the hyphenated version is often used to refer to the condition of life after the end of colonialism while the non-hyphenated version denotes the theory that attempts to make sense of this condition. The term is regularly used to denote both colonialism and imperialism even though these refer to different historical realities.
Like postmodernism and poststructuralism, postcolonialism designates a critical practice that is highly eclectic and difficult to define. It involves a studied engagement with the experience of colonialism and its past and present effects at the levels of material culture and of representation. Postcolonialism often involves the discussion of experiences such as those of slavery, migration, suppression and resistance, difference, race, gender, place and analysis of the responses to the discourses of imperial Europe, such as history, philosophy, anthropology and linguistics. Since conditions under imperialism and colonialism proper are as much the subject of postcolonialism as those coming after the historical end of colonialism, postcolonialism allows for a wide range of applications and a constant interplay between the sense of a historical transition, a cultural location and an epochal condition. Postcolonialism is seen to pertain as much to conditions of existence in former colonies as to conditions in diaspora. Both are frequently linked to the continuing power and authority of the West in the global political, economic and symbolic spheres and the ways in which resistance to, appropriation of and negotiation with the West’s order are prosecuted. However the term is construed, there is as much focus on the discourse and ideology of colonialism as on the material effects of colonial subjugation. Because it has its source in past and continuing oppression, postcolonialism furthermore has affinities with multicultural, feminist, and gay and lesbian studies.
New Zealand, philosophy in
Authors: Nola Robert 
Published: September 2018

Philosophy as an academic discipline in New Zealand came into its own during the late 1930s under the influence of J.N. Findlay and Karl Popper. Arthur Prior was the first New Zealand philosopher to gain prominence and to inaugurate original research into logic and its application to philosophy. This tradition was continued by local philosophers such as Max Cresswell and Richard Sylvan (formerly Routley) and those from overseas who found the developing analytical ethos congenial, such as George Hughes, Krister Segerberg and Pavel Tichý. New Zealand philosophy found its footing within analytic philosophy, not so much on the side of philosophy of language, but in logic used both as an analytic tool and as a subject in its own right. Philosophers also explored what would have then been regarded by many elsewhere as ‘fringe’ logics, such as modal and tense logics; these however have now become mainstream within both logic and metaphysics.
The current philosophical scene is one that allows as much diversity as might be possible in a small country with a small number of academic philosophers. Their preoccupations are very much those that one would find in many universities elsewhere. But whereas earlier philosophical interests were based on philosophical connections with the UK, now these have become quite minor compared with the very strong connections with philosophy in Australia and the USA. Although philosophy has found a firm and energetic place in New Zealand, it remains to consider whether there is a distinctive New Zealand philosophy, and to ask what that might even be. Earlier philosophers were much more willing to take on unconventional and unfashionable points of view and turn them into viable philosophical positions; even though that is still the case, there is much more of a seamless connection with philosophy elsewhere. However, there are applications of philosophy to local matters that often have to do with relations with the indigenous Maori, the nature of the New Zealand state, which sees itself as both a bi-cultural and a multi-cultural society, the nature of New Zealand’s social and cultural identity, and local ethical issues that arise in respect to, for example, medicine, biotechnology and the environment. Most of these, of course, are concerns elsewhere also; but the local context calls for work by local philosophers in a way for which others cannot substitute.
Romania, philosophy in
Authors: Petreu Marta , Muntean Ioan , Flonta Mircea 
Published: September 2018

The origins of Romanian philosophical thinking can be traced back to the late Middle Ages. The first attempts were made in monasteries and princely courts; the language used was Church Slavonic or Latin. The first original philosophical work in Romanian dates from 1698 and was written by Dimitrie Cantemir, Prince of Moldavia. The first Romanian philosophical school, the Transylvanian School, formed in Transylvania at the end of the eighteenth century, was an expression of Enlightenment ideas. Romanian philosophical thinking in the nineteenth century was imbued with the ideas of the Enlightenment and Kantianism.
Romanian modern culture and, implicitly, modern Romanian philosophy were born in the second half of the nineteenth century, under the influence of Titu Maiorescu, a major cultural personality. At the peak of its evolution between the two world wars, Romanian philosophy had the following characteristic features: it was closely related to literature, in the sense that most Romanian philosophers were also important writers; it showed excessive preoccupation with the issue of Romanian identity; it was involved in Romania’s historical, political and ideological debates, fuelling attitudes in favour of or against Westernization and modernization; it synchronized quickly with Western philosophical thinking; and it was (and still is) lacking in ethical thought.
During the first half of the twentieth century, Romanian philosophers focused mainly on discussing the status of metaphysics and its right to existence, followed by any individual efforts to set up an original philosophical system; secondly, they were interested in the issue of identity, the theme of Romanian-ness, which led to the development of the philosophy of culture and history, and to the involvement of philosophers in politics. The most important original philosophical constructions were those of Lucian Blaga and Constantin Noica.
During the communist regime, an initial period of complete stagnation of independent thinking was followed, at the beginning of the 1960s, by a relative liberalization that favoured research in logic, the philosophy of science, and the writing of literary-philosophical essays.
Romanian philosophy since 1989 has made efforts to restructure its institutional framework, reclaim the formerly forbidden fields, and synchronize - through translations and studies - with contemporary world philosophy.
Action at a distance
Authors: French Steven 
Published: September 2018

Action at a distance is typically characterized in terms of some cause producing a spatially separated effect in the absence of any medium by which the causal interaction is transmitted. Historically it has been viewed with suspicion; Leibniz famously accused Newton of introducing ‘occult’ forces because according to his theory, gravity appeared to act at a distance. However, the grounds for ruling it out are not always so clear. One might insist that all forces are ‘contact forces’, but why should this be so? Alternatively, it could be argued that if action at a distance is accepted, then certain ‘facts’ about physical interactions would be left unexplained: the nature of Newton’s law of gravitation might be explicable if some underlying medium is presupposed, but otherwise it simply has to be accepted as a brute feature. But this assumes that the ‘nature’ of physical laws requires this sort of explanation. Finally, if it is acknowledged that such action at a distance cannot be instantaneous, on pain of violating Special Relativity, then it turns out that there are problems satisfying conservation of energy. Again, even this consequence can be side-stepped if one were to adopt an anti-realist view of energy.
With the development of field theories and Einstein’s liberation of physics from the grip of the ether, it appeared that action at a distance had been pushed out of the picture by the beginning of the twentieth century. However, the non-local nature of quantum entanglement appears to have allowed it back in. Of course the form of this putative quantum action at a distance is very different from the classical kind: for one thing, it cannot be used instantaneously to send information and so there is still ‘peaceful co-existence’ with Special Relativity. Again, however, its acceptance depends on certain assumptions – on how one understands quantum entanglement, for example. Shifting the focus to violation of a form of ‘separability’ between systems, rather than locality, may allow us to accept quantum holism without having to swallow action at distance as well.
Dispositions
Authors: Mumford Stephen 
Published: September 2018

Disposition is a term used in metaphysics usually to indicate a type of property, state or condition. Such a property is one that provides for the possibility of some further specific state or behaviour, usually in circumstances of some specific kind. Terms such as causal power, capacity, ability, propensity, and others, can be used to convey the same idea.
The general criterion for something to be a disposition is that the appropriate kind of behaviour, the so-called manifestation, need not be actual. Hence, something can be disposed to break though it is not broken now. The disposition is thought to be a persisting state or condition that makes possible the manifestation.
Because dispositions make other events or properties possible, they are often understood in relation to conditional sentences. Something being fragile is somehow related to the conditional that if it is dropped, it will break. The antecedent of the conditional identifies the stimulus for the disposition. The consequent identifies the manifestation of the disposition.
Philosophers are increasingly interested in dispositions because many properties seem to be essentially dispositional in nature. To say that something is soft means that it is disposed to deform when pressed. It is difficult to identify a property that does not have some dispositional aspect. Even the fundamental properties of physics, such as spin, charge and mass, appear to be dispositional. This has led some to the conclusion that all properties are dispositions or at least bestow dispositions. In the philosophy of mind, many mental ascriptions carry dispositional implications. For example, to have a belief is to be disposed to behave in an appropriate way in certain circumstances. There are a number of philosophical problems that arise from dispositions, however. Are they real properties in their own right or are they in some way derived from other elements? How are dispositions distinguished from other things? What is the precise relation a disposition bears to its manifestation?
Dispositions
Authors: Mumford Stephen 
Published: September 2018

‘Disposition’ is a term used in metaphysics usually to indicate a type of property, state or condition. Such a property is one that provides for the possibility of some further specific state or behaviour, usually in circumstances of some specific kind. Terms such as ‘causal power’, ‘capacity’, ‘ability’, ‘propensity’, and others, can be used to convey the same idea.
The general criterion for something to be a disposition is that the appropriate kind of behaviour, the so-called manifestation, need not be actual. Thus, something can be disposed to break though it is not broken now. The disposition is thought to be a persisting state or condition that makes possible the manifestation.
Because dispositions make other events or properties possible, they are often understood in relation to counterfactual conditional sentences. Something being fragile is somehow related to the conditional that if it is dropped, it will break. The antecedent of the conditional identifies the stimulus for the disposition. The consequent identifies the manifestation of the disposition.
Philosophers are increasingly interested in dispositions because many properties seem to be essentially dispositional in nature. Thus, to say that something is soft means that it is disposed to deform when put under pressure. It is difficult to identify a property that does not have some dispositional aspect. Even the fundamental properties of physics, such as spin, charge and mass, appear to be dispositional. This has led some to the conclusion that all properties are dispositions, or at least that they bestow dispositions. In the philosophy of mind, many mental ascriptions carry dispositional implications. For example, to have a belief is to be disposed to behave in an appropriate way in certain circumstances. There are a number of philosophical problems that arise about dispositions, however. Are they real properties in their own right or are they in some way derived from other elements? How are dispositions distinguished from other things? What is the precise relation a disposition bears to its manifestation?
Motion
Authors: Huggett Nick 
Published: September 2018

Motion is a kind of change, so it is worth beginning with change generally. Change is puzzling because it requires something both to remain the same (so one thing changes) and to become different (so change has occurred), a contradiction according to some pre-Socratic philosophers. Aristotle’s analysis of change dissolved the paradox: an underlying subject must remain the same thing, but which properties inhere in it change. But then what causes change? According to Aristotle things possess forms, or ideal states, and change in order to achieve them: the form of an acorn is an oak so the acorn grows to become an oak. In the seventeenth century, Aristotle’s account was superseded by a mechanistic understanding of change. According to Descartes the only fundamental properties of bodies are geometrical – shape, size and motion – and all other properties are to be explained in terms of them: all physical change is merely change in the geometrical arrangements of bodies caused by their collisions with one another. The success of Newton’s theory of planetary motion showed that Descartes’ picture was incomplete, and that a limited number of forces, such as gravity, are also needed to account for change.
Turning to motion specifically, we first ask what causes it. Is it, as the Aristotelians came to believe, ‘impetus’: moving bodies possess an internal force that overcomes their natural resistance to motion? Following Galileo, modern science takes constant, straight-line motion to be natural, requiring no cause, and inertia (or momentum) as a measure of how much external force is required to bring a body to rest. Second, there is the question of whether motion is always relative; or do the laws of physics support a sense of motion in which ‘x moves’ – without mention of a reference body – is determinately true or false? In fact almost all interpretations of motion in almost all systems of mechanics (Aristotle’s, Descartes’, Newton’s, relativity) imply that there is such a sense.