Cognition, vie et... temps
Authors: Rosenthal Victor 
Published: November 2018

Cognition, Living Process, and... Time
What sense are we to make of the proposition that cognition is a characteristic sui generis of living process and what implications does it hold for our understanding of both cognition and living process ? The examination of these questions leads us to the issue of a putative elementary form of knowing and to the problem of the impossible self-generation of intelligence in the absence of certain a priori elements.
Three theses are examined in this article. That of Piaget, for whom cognition is both the outcome of organic self-regulations and their most differentiated agent, appears unenlightening and turns out to be inconsistent with his proposal regarding the role of both social interaction and the individual's own action. Polanyi's position, for whom knowledge is imbedded in living process in the sense that it takes a knower (and proceeds from his personal experience) and that its structure is shaped by living process, seems more satisfactory but does not solve the problem of a priori elements. Yet, Polanyi's analyses of the structure of skills and of the reciprocal relationship holding between consciousness and body in all forms of action appear to be most useful. Finally, the thesis of Maturana and Varela, who posit that life entails cognition in the sense that any interaction of an organism with its environment involves knowledge of this environment, furthers our inquiry, but leaves unresolved the issue of a priori elements, and is problematic with respect to both the temporal dimension of living and ontogeny.
Neither cognition (as well as meaningfulness and consciousness) nor living process may be amenable to rational explanation without recourse to the notion of endogenous time which alone permits the thematization of the temporal structure of logical phenomena and allows us to deal with the problem of a priori elements. A new concept may thus be needed, the concept of autochrony. Life is self-generation of time, life is time. The scientific explanation of the relationship of the reciprocal dependence between knowing and living may critically require recourse to the concept of autochrony. of these questions leads us to the issue of a putative elementary form of knowing and to the problem of the impossible self-generation of intelligence in the absence of certain a priori elements.
Three theses are examined in this article. That of Piaget, for whom cognition is both the outcome of organic self-regulations and their most differentiated agent, appears unenlightening and turns out to be inconsistent with his proposal regarding the role of both social interaction and the individual's own action. Polanyi's position, for whom knowledge is imbedded in living process in the sense that it takes a knower (and proceeds from his personal experience) and that its structure is shaped by living process, seems more satisfactory but does not solve the problem of a priori elements. Yet, Polanyi's analyses of the structure of skills and of the reciprocal relationship holding between consciousness and body in all forms of action appear to be most useful. Finally, the thesis of Maturana and Varela, who posit that life entails cognition in the sense that any interaction of an organism with its environment involves knowledge of this environment, furthers our inquiry, but leaves unresolved the issue of a priori elements, and is problematic with respect to both the temporal dimension of living and ontogeny.
Neither cognition (as well as meaningfulness and consciousness) nor living process may be amenable to rational explanation without recourse to the notion of endogenous time which alone permits the thematization of the temporal structure of logical phenomena and allows us to deal with the problem of a priori elements. A new concept may thus be needed, the concept of autochrony. Life is self-generation of time, life is time. The scientific explanation of the relationship of the reciprocal dependence between knowing and living may critically require recourse to the concept of autochrony.