bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Break all the Borders
Authors: Ahram Ariel I. 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Since 2011, civil wars and state failure have beset the Arab world, underlying the perceived misalignment between national borders and identity in the region. This book is about the separatist movements that aim to remake those borders—the Southern Movement in Yemen, the federalists in eastern Libya, Kurdish nationalists in Syria and Iraq, and the Islamic State (IS). These movements took advantage of state breakdown to seize territory and set up states-within-states. They ran schools, hospitals, and court systems. Their militias provided security to those whom the state had failed. Separatists drew inspiration from the ideals of self-determination that emerged after World War I during the brief “Wilsonian moment.” They built off the historical legacies of prior state-building projects that had failed to gain recognition. New international norms, such as responsibility to protect, offered them hope to correct mistakes of the past. Separatists reached out to the international community for acknowledgement and support. Some served as crucial allies in the campaign against terrorism. Yet the United States and the rest of the international community refused to grant them the recognition they sought. This book shows how understanding the separatist movements’ efforts to break borders in their own terms can help illuminate avenues toward a more stable regional order in the Arab world.
Introduction
Authors: Kekes John 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
The book is concerned with what we personally can do to answer hard questions we face in our personal and social circumstances. Reasonable answers depend on a critical examination of anthropological, historical, and literary contexts in which others struggled to give reasonable answers to hard questions. Our understanding of our possibilities and limits are enriched by learning from the good and bad examples of others. Each of the following chapters compares and critically examines two conflicting answers given by two people to the same hard question they faced in different circumstances.
Must We Conform?
Authors: Kekes John 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter compares Melville’s Bartleby and the Venetian atheist savant, Sarpi. Bartleby lived a miserable life in nineteenth-century New York City. His inner resources were meager, and quiet desperation eventually led him to refuse to conform any longer. He died of self-inflicted inanition. The other lived in sixteenth-century Venice. His inner resources were considerable, and they enabled him to wear a lifelong mask hiding what he really believed. Both had reasons for the different answers they gave to the hard question. Comparison between their responses makes it possible for us from a distance to evaluate whether conformity was or was not reasonable for them and whether it would be reasonable for us as we face the question of whether we should conform to our conditions. I follow Montaigne in concluding that although circumstances may force us to make prudent compromises, there is a limit beyond which we should not go. But what that limit is varies with social and personal circumstances.
Must Justice Be Done at All Costs?
Authors: Kekes John 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
In the Tibetan Sherpa society, the dominant value was social harmony, and it was valued much more than justice. In ancient Greece, Sophocles’s Creon and Antigone thought that the dominant value was justice, but they radically disagreed about whether it was primarily political or religious. The comparison in the chapter is between a Sherpa who had reason for accepting the unjust treatment he received and Creon and Antigone who had reasons for defending what they took to be justice at great cost to themselves, others, and social harmony. This chapter is concerned with evaluating the reasons for and against regarding justice as necessary. The crucial point is that there are good reasons for both of the conflicting answers, but they vary with the contexts of those who face the question. And that rules out the possibility of relying on an absolute value that could determine when justice is and is not necessary. We can then ask ourselves whether we in our context would be reasonable in regarding justice as necessary even if it conflicts, for instance, with peace, compassion, or loyalty to those we love. And that must be an individual, not a social, decision.
Should We Forgive Wrong Actions?
Authors: Kekes John 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
The question is considered by comparing the reasons for and against forgiving two men whose actions were wrong. Captain Vere in Billy Budd did wrong in the course of discharging his duty to uphold military law. It required him in time of war to hang a morally innocent although legally guilty person. The other was Albert Speer, who was responsible for German war production in the latter part of World War II. His dedication and efficiency prolonged the already lost war for years, during which time millions were killed. Both had reasons for and against their actions. Whether it is right to forgive them depends on how wrong their actions were; whether their actions were isolated episodes in their lives or part of a pattern; whether the war in which they acted was just; whether they regretted their actions; and whether they had reasonable alternatives. This chapter shows that the reasons for and against forgiveness vary with persons, actions, and contexts. If by thinking about these cases we realize that forgiveness is neither always right, nor always wrong, then we see that reasonable answers to this hard question must vary from case to case. Given that, I claim that there are good reasons for forgiving Vere for the one episode of killing of a morally innocent person and against forgiving Speer for the pattern of his actions that led to the deaths of millions of innocent people.
God and Christ in Irenaeus
Authors: Briggman Anthony 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
For too long certain scholars have been content to portray Irenaeus of Lyons as rather stupid, a well-meaning churchman but incompetent theologian. The Irenaeus that emerges from a careful reading of his polemical and constructive arguments, as this book demonstrates, is highly educated, trained in the rhetorical arts, aware of general philosophical positions, and able to use both rhetorical and philosophical theories and methods in his argumentation. Moreover, the theological account laid down by his pen was original and sophisticated, supremely so for one of the second century. In contrast to readings that minimize the metaphysical dimension of Irenaeus’ theology, this study shows that his conception of the divine being as infinite and simple, the reciprocal immanence of the Word-Son and God the Father, divine generation, the union of the divine Word-Son and human nature in the person of Christ, and the revelatory activity of the infinite and incomprehensible Word-Son, amongst other features of his theology detailed in these chapters, are pillars of his polemical argumentation and constructive theology. What emerges from these pages, then, is a fundamentally new understanding of Irenaeus and his thought.
Christ and his Work
Authors: Briggman Anthony 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Chapter 2 through 4 lead on to Chapter 5. Having established Irenaeus’ understanding of the nature of the divine being, the Word-Son, and the person of Christ, this chapter shows that central aspects of Irenaeus’ account of the economic activity of Christ are grounded upon his understanding of God. It constitutes the final movement in my argument that scholars have underappreciated—or failed to appreciate altogether—the significance of metaphysics to Irenaeus’ theology. This chapter consists of two sections. The first focuses on AH 3.18.7, wherein Irenaeus founds essential features of the economy of salvation upon the divinity of Christ—namely, the security of salvation, the reception of incorruptibility, and the adoption as children of God. The second section shows that Irenaeus’ understanding of the revelatory activity of the Word-Son in the Old Testament theophanies and incarnation is based upon his conception of the divine being as infinite and incomprehensible.
Conclusion
Authors: Briggman Anthony 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
The Conclusion summarizes previous findings and locates Irenaeus in the Christian tradition. Irenaeus was the first Christian to attribute infinitude to God and possibly the first to attribute simplicity to God. Irenaeus, and not Origen, is also the first to affirm the eternal generation of the Word-Son. This being the case his conception of divine generation is more advanced than Theophilus of Antioch and Tertullian. Irenaeus is the first theologian after the New Testament writings to affirm both the eternal unity and diversity of the divine being. He is also the first to attempt to explain, by utilizing Stoic mixture theory, how the two realities of the incarnate Word-Son function as one reality. The bishop of Lyons, therefore, emerges as a subtle and eclectic thinker able to use philosophical and rhetorical ideas in order to substantiate his understanding of the apostolic tradition and the hypothesis of Scripture.
Introduction
Authors: Briggman Anthony 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
When it comes to the history of Christian thought, Irenaeus is most famous as the greatest opponent of Gnosticism in the early Church. For that reason his polemic has received considerable attention and at times his polemical significance has overshadowed his importance as a theologian. But a focus on his polemical significance was not the only thing that discouraged nuanced analysis of his theological account. For his theological ability and even intelligence have been impugned for generations. As a result central aspects of Irenaeus’ thought have gone unexplored—especially the metaphysical dimension of his theology. This Introduction locates this study within the scholarly conversation about Irenaeus that has taken place over the past two centuries, and then summarizes the themes and chapters that constitute the study proper.
Humility, Pride, and Christian Virtue Theory
Authors: Dunnington Kent 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This book proposes an account of humility that relies on the most radical Christian sayings about humility, especially those found in Augustine and the early monastic tradition. It argues that this was the view of humility that put Christian moral thought into decisive conflict with the best Greco-Roman moral thought. This radical Christian account of humility has been forgotten amid contemporary efforts to clarify and retrieve the virtue of humility for secular life. The book shows how humility was repurposed during the early modern era—particularly in the thought of Hobbes, Hume, and Kant—better to serve the economic and social needs of the emerging modern state. This repurposed humility insisted on a role for proper pride alongside humility, as a necessary constituent of self-esteem and a necessary motive of consistent moral action over time. Contemporary philosophical accounts of humility continue this emphasis on proper pride as a counterbalance to humility. By contrast, radical Christian humility proscribes pride altogether. The book shows how such a radical view need not give rise to vices of humility such as servility and pusillanimity, nor need such a view fall prey to feminist critiques of humility. But the view of humility set forth makes little sense abstracted from a specific set of doctrinal commitments peculiar to Christianity. The book argues that this is a strength rather than a weakness of the account since it displays how Christianity matters for the shape of the moral life.
Forgetting Christian Humility
Authors: Dunnington Kent 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Recent scholarship on humility can be grouped into five major accounts of humility. This chapter canvasses those accounts before suggesting that two accounts—“low concern” and “limitations-owning”—have become the dominant contemporary views. A recurring feature of the current discussion is the need to distance contemporary accounts of humility from their Christian antecedents, since those antecedents are typically thought to be grounded by unacceptable metaphysical commitments. But the contemporary “memory” of the major contours of Christian humility is mistaken. The chapter isolates a recurring story told by contemporary theorists about what Christian humility once was, and then shows why that story is almost certainly false.
Mundane Humility
Authors: Dunnington Kent 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Christian humility was repurposed in the early modern period to suit the goals of the emerging liberal state. After sketching how Thomas Hobbes achieved this repurposing, this chapter shows how David Hume’s critique of Christian humility and Immanuel Kant’s attempt to rescue Christian humility from Hume’s critique created a new kind of “mundane” humility newly committed to the need for a counterbalancing proper pride alongside anything that could be called virtuous humility. After showing how this concern for proper pride was a modern development, the chapter then shows how it drives most contemporary theorizing about humility, including the dominant low concern account of humility. Given that early Christian sayings about humility show no regard for the proper prides, an account of Christian humility will need to confront the claim that the virtue of humility requires counterbalancing by pride.
Conclusion
Authors: Dunnington Kent 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
Because it is so clearly indexed to Christian theological convictions, the account of humility developed in this book may appear irrelevant to the field of virtue theory broadly conceived. The Conclusion argues that this way of thinking fails to recognize that the rediscovery of the virtue tradition was originally animated—especially in the thought of Alasdair MacIntyre—by the realization that the moral life is more deeply tradition-dependent than reigning normative theories allow. This book should then be thought of as an exercise in general virtue theory insofar as it attempts carefully to display how one particular virtue, humility, is tradition-dependent all the way down. The Conclusion argues that attempts to specify the virtues in less tradition-dependent ways actually conceal ideological commitments to a liberal political agenda.
Introduction
Authors: Dunnington Kent 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
The Introduction clarifies the aims of the book: to set forth an account of Christian humility as it was envisioned by the early and most radical proponents of Christian humility. The book does not aim to invalidate other views of humility, whether historic or contemporary. The methodological aim of the book is to display what other virtue theorists tend merely to assert—namely, that specific metaphysical and anthropological commitments matter for thorough specifications of the virtues. The Introduction also quotes several passages from the writings of the early desert monastic tradition to show the discrepancy between early Christian and contemporary visions of humility. The task of the book is conceptually to clarify the early Christian stream of wisdom about humility, and to defend it against contemporary detractors.
The Elizabethan Settlement, the Issue of the Royal Succession, and the Emergence of Religious Dissent, c.1558–1571
Authors: Questier Michael 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter rehearses the dis/continuities between the reigns of Mary Tudor and Elizabeth Tudor. It looks at the attempts to embed the new regime in England and Ireland in and after 1558/1559 and at the foreign policy issues which Elizabeth’s accession generated. First and foremost, this meant the relationship with Scotland, particularly after the return from the Continent of Mary Stuart. In the early and mid-1560s contemporaries witnessed the Scottish queen doing all the things that the English queen was conspicuously failing to do, that is, until the implosion of Mary’s government, her deposition, and the civil war in Scotland. Mary’s arrival in England produced a breakdown of consensus about how her relationship to Elizabeth should be negotiated; in the end there was a rebellion in the North of England which was phrased in part by reference to Catholic hostility to the Elizabethan settlement of religion.
Protestant Foreign Policy and the Coming of War, 1582–1593
Authors: Questier Michael 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
The Anjou marriage diplomacy triggered a series of reactions. The chapter deals with James VI’s attempts to free himself from the control of Anglophile elements within his court. The response of those around Elizabeth was to become increasingly hostile to Mary Stuart and, against Elizabeth’s wishes, to evolve republican schemes in response to the unsettled English succession and also to intervene militarily in the Netherlands. The narratives of the English and French succession crises began to move in step at this point, that is as, after Anjou’s death, it became an issue as to whether the Huguenot Henry of Navarre ought to be allowed to take the French crown after Henry III. The latter half of the chapter deals with the exclusion of the Scottish queen from the English line of succession, the war with Spain and the Armada of 1588, and the turn of a certain sort of Catholic to the Scotland of James VI as their best hope for the political future.
The Ethical Demand and Social Norms
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter covers Chapters 3 and 4 of The Ethical Demand. In these chapters, Løgstrup adds to his characterization of the demand by claiming that it is ‘radical’. He explains this radicality in terms of various further key features, including the way it may intrude on our lives and pick us out as individuals, while even the enemy is included in the requirement on us to care. At the same time, Løgstrup argues that we do not have the right to make the demand, while also denying that it is ‘limitless’. The features of the demand that make it radical distinguish it from the social norms, while the unconditional and absolute nature of the demand contrasts with the variable character of such norms, a contrast which he uses to respond to the challenge of relativism.
Christian Ethics and Life as a Gift
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter covers Chapters 5 and 6 of The Ethical Demand. Having distinguished the ethical demand from social norms, Løgstrup now turns to consider where this leaves him in relation to Christian ethics, and his claim to be operating from a ‘purely human’ standpoint. While he resists the suggestion that Christianity can break the ‘silence’ of the demand by providing it with a content that rests on religious doctrines, Løgstrup also claims that the ethical demand only makes sense if we consider life to be a gift, which raises the interpretative question whether for Løgstrup the giver of this gift is God, or whether this idea can be made sense of in more secular terms.
The Ethical Demand and the Failure of Love
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter covers Chapters 7 to 9 of The Ethical Demand. In these chapters, Løgstrup considers how it is that the demand enters our life as a demand, which happens when natural love fails, and we therefore come to feel under some obligation to do what we would have done, had we loved the other person properly. The demand is thus characterized as unfulfillable, as once it arises, we have already failed to love and so to respond to the other in the right way. Nonetheless, Løgstrup argues, we cannot use this unfulfillability to claim that the demand no longer applies to us, as the failure to love is our fault, while any goodness must be attributed to life and not ourselves. This failure is reflected in the many and various ways which we find to wriggle out of facing up to the demand and what it requires of us.
Dealing with Darwall
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter contrasts Løgstrup’s position with the account of moral obligation offered by Stephen Darwall, which bases obligation on second-personal authority. The chapter begins by setting out Darwall’s position (§10.1). It then focuses on three respects in which he could seem to claim an advantage over Løgstrup: namely, in the way he links obligations to rights; in the place he gives to respect for autonomy in his account; and in the greater explanatory resources he has available to make sense of the idea of moral obligation (§10.2). The chapter then considers responses that Løgstrup might give to these challenges (§10.3), arguing that Løgstrup’s objection to the command account of obligation is also telling against Darwall.
Learning from Luther
Authors: Stern Robert 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter considers Løgstrup’s relation to Martin Luther. It begins by outlining Luther’s account of human wickedness, and the crucial role this plays in his distinctive theology and ethics. It then shows how Løgstrup takes over this account, but also departs from Luther in certain fundamental respects (§11.1). It then considers how K. Olesen Larsen, building on Kierkegaard, exploits this departure to mount a critical challenge to Løgstrup (§11.2). It is then shown how Løgstrup might respond to Olesen Larsen, but in a way that reveals how his ethics is indeed a step beyond Luther, but arguably a defensible one (§11.3). Finally, the chapter considers how Løgstrup deals with an issue that is central to his Lutheran approach, namely the conception of moral agency that is possible on this model, making a critical comparison with Iris Murdoch (§11.4).
Frege’s and Russell’s New Logic
Authors: Kuusela Oskari 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter discusses the background of Wittgenstein’s work in the logical methodologies of Frege and Russell. It outlines the dialectical context and background for the problems in the work of Frege and Russell discussed in chapters 2 and 3, and to which Wittgenstein responds in the Tractatus by developing further their philosophies of logic and logical methodologies. Key issues to be addressed are the notion of a logical language or a concept-script, the sense in which logic is not a branch of psychology, and Frege’s and Russell’s accounts of logic as a science. The final section 1.4 contextualizes the interpretation of the Tractatus proposed in subsequent chapters by situating it in the context of current scholarly disputes regarding the Tractatus, between the so-called resolute reading and traditional metaphysical interpretations that attribute ineffable nonsensical theses to the Tractatus.
Ideality and Reality
Authors: Kuusela Oskari 
Published: February 2019

Abstract
This chapter discusses Wittgenstein’s later account of the status of logic and logical idealization. It explains how Wittgenstein solves the problem of logic seeming to lose its rigour, consequent to the acknowledgement that the uses of language targeted for logical clarification often do not meet the ideals of logic of simplicity and exactness, and that language use therefore apparently cannot be described in the simple and exact terms of logic without falsification. This solution then makes it possible for the discipline of logic to acknowledge that thinking and language use are natural historical phenomena, not abstract ideal objects, and at the same time to retain its non-empirical character. The novel account of the status of logic developed by Wittgenstein is distinguished from the extant aprioristic, conventionalist, and empiricist accounts of logic, and Wittgenstein’s account of idealization in logic is contrasted with idealization in science. The chapter also explains how this account solves a number of problems that arise for the logical methodologies of Frege, Russell, the Tractatus and Carnap, and how logic need not involve any metaphysical claims.