bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Experimental Response of Steel Pipelines to Close Trench Blasting
Authors: Matta Lawrence M. 
Published: January 2019

When protecting pipelines from third party activities, it is beneficial for operators to apply very conservative criteria for safe blasting. Recently, however, demands for increased capacity have required adding pipelines to existing rights-of-way, often close to or between existing pipelines. In these cases, overly-conservative blasting criteria can result in significant expenses and delays. The reported tests supply blasting stress data on full-scale pipes configured to simulate trenching in close proximity and parallel to an existing pipeline. Two sets of tests have been performed at a location with rock anticipated to be similar to that known to exist along a planned pipeline route. The pipes were instrumented at a number of locations prior to burial. Ground vibrations were recorded using seismographs during each shot. A variety of test blasts were performed, including advancing staggered line shots with delays, grids of charges set off simultaneously to simulate sympathetic detonations , and grids of decked charges. Charge weight ranged from 7.4 to 17.2 lbs/hole at distances from 15 to 25 feet from the pipes.
Measured blasting stresses are compared with predicted values. Data from classic SwRI tests is included for comparison. Appropriate safety factors for close trench blasting based on the test data are considered. Measured stress values from simultaneously detonated lines of charges are compared to predicted values, which are typically of concern when the potential for sympathetic detonation is considered. Neglecting the potential for simultaneous detonations may result in significant error. Also, the measured PPV as a function of the scaled distance and a correlation of the blasting stresses with the measured PPVs are provided.
Towards an Acceptable Pipeline Integrity Target Reliability
Authors: Hassanien Sherif , Leblanc Len , Nemeth Alex 
Published: January 2019

Integrity reliability analysis is becoming an important component of effective pipeline integrity management systems. It aims at utilizing reliability engineering to address integrity uncertainties and check pipeline reliability measures against safety objectives/targets. In current practice, pipeline safety is typically verified using simplified deterministic procedures based on a safety factor approach that is tailored to the design of new pipes. A more realistic verification of actual safety performance of existing pipelines can be achieved by probabilistic methods where uncertainties of basic random variables are considered and the impact on the reliability of the system is analyzed. To enable such an approach, specification of integrity target reliability levels is required in order to benchmark the safety level of an existing pipeline system. The probability of failure (PoF) per pipeline segment or unit length is quantified and then checked against an integrity permissible probability of failure (PoFp) or integrity target reliability (1-PoFp). This check against a specified reliability target allows the operator to confidently determine whether a segment of pipe is safe at current operating conditions while considering identified uncertainties. However, the main challenge around reliability targets is choosing such targets to begin with.
This paper presents a semi-quantitative validation approach for estimating integrity reliability targets based on calibrating past failure incidents and evaluating PoF at the time of failure. Accounting for both aleatory and epistemic uncertainties in assigning the integrity targets, pipeline operators can gauge how to choose such targets and how to be flexible in terms of customizing integrity targets based on their asset performance and adopted integrity programs. A brief summary of published reliability targets in pipeline and non-pipeline industries is presented herein.
Power Law Analysis Implications of the San Bruno Pipeline Failure
Authors: Oliphant Ken , Bryce Wayne , Luff William 
Published: January 2019

When major pipeline incidents occur there is always a question as to how applicable the learnings from that incident are across the industry. To address this question for the San Bruno pipeline failure in 2010, an analysis of historical transmission pipeline industry events was conducted to determine if San Bruno was consistent with past industry performance or whether it was an outlier event. This paper draws on Power Law analysis to generate a characteristic curve of past transmission pipeline accidents in the US. Power Law, or Pareto, behavior has been observed for a wide variety of phenomenon, such as fire damage, earthquake damage and terrorist attacks. The size of these events is seen to follow not the typical normal distribution but the Power Law distribution, where low probability - high consequence (LPHC) events play a more significant role in the overall risk picture. Analysis shows that the consequences of pipeline incidents in a variety of pipeline industries (gas distribution, gas transmission, gas gathering and hazardous liquid pipelines) are seen to exhibit Power Law behavior. The Power Law model is seen to capture the distribution of the size of consequences from pipeline incidents and defines the relationship between the size of an incident and its frequency. Through characterization of these distributions, it is possible to project the likelihood or expected frequency of events of a given magnitude and to assess if a given incident fits within historical industry patterns; i.e. whether the incident is consistent with past observations or is an outlier.
The Power Law analysis shows that the San Bruno incident, which caused eight fatalities and an estimated $380 million in property damage in 2010, is not an outlier. Rather, this incident lies on the Power Law curve for historical transmission pipeline incidents, with an estimated frequency of once every 40 years. The event is consistent with the history of gas transmission pipeline consequences in the US. This paper argues that the San Bruno incident, therefore, provides lessons relevant to the industry as whole.
Root Cause Analysis of 8-Inch FRP Pipeline Failure That Resulted in a Spill and Fire
Authors: Gareau Frank , Tatarov Alex 
Published: January 2019

Fibreglass reinforced plastic pipe (FRP) is the second most common type of pipe in the Canadian oil and gas industry, based on installed length. Industry methods to define risks and prevent failures are difficult because industry is still learning how these types of materials fail. Current industry failure records indicate that the failure rates for some of these materials are higher than steel failure rates. Unique details related to a specific FRP failure will be discussed in this paper. This failure occurred on an 8-inch OD FRP pipeline at the bottom of a riser. The failure resulted in a spill and a fire. The reasons for failure and fire initiation were analysed separately.
The failure was a result of a combination of several types of stresses and material degradation. Both static and dynamic stresses contributed to the failure.
• Ground settling resulted in high static bending stress of the last section of the pipeline connected to the riser elbow supported by the anchor.
• The failure was in the last connection of the pipeline. Static tie-in stresses could have contributed to the failure.
• Static stresses were evaluated using Finite Element Analysis (FEA) approach and found to be insufficient for the failure.
• Dynamic stresses contributed to the failure. The failure happened soon after a power outage, when numerous wells were restarted, and several fluid surges may have occurred.
• Material degradation associated with a specific orientation of glass fibres at the connection pup contributed to the failure.
The failure sequence was established and different modes of fire initiation were analysed.
Implementing a Quantitative Geohazard Frequency Analysis Framework as a Component of Risk Assessment of New Pipelines
Authors: Baumgard Alex , Beaupre Michael , Leir Mark 
Published: January 2019

In the last 5 years in Canada, regulators have been requesting that new pipeline projects provide quantitative risk management of all credible geohazards involving the proposed pipeline corridor so it can be demonstrated that geohazards are being recognized prioritized and that adequate resources are being allocated and to minimize the impact of adverse consequences of pipeline construction and operation. Complete risk management includes risk analysis that identifies credible geohazards sites, estimates their annual frequency or probability of pipeline failure and, when combined with a consequence of pipeline failure, estimates the risk from each hazard.
This paper presents a framework and methodology that quantitatively estimates the Frequency of Loss of Containment (FLoC) for several types of geohazards that meet the requirements for geohazard identification and frequency analysis components of risk analysis. This framework builds on an international geohazard management framework advanced in the last decade by the Australian Geomechanics Society, British Columbia forestry industry, used in geohazard management programs for operating pipelines and proposed pipeline projects in Canada. The framework provides a repeatable and defensible methodology that is intended to be scalable to accept inputs from feasibility level desktop studies, through field-based observations, and incorporate proposed mitigations. This updated framework was most recently implemented on a proposed large diameter transmission pipeline route crossing the varied terrains of Western Canada, the results of which have been adjusted for Owner confidentiality, but are presented to demonstrate the application of the methodology and the effectiveness of communicating the overall hazard frequency reduction as a result of applying site specific mitigations.
A Practical Approach for Updating and Improving Integrity Management Process Documents
Authors: Lutz Andrew R. , Godfrey John , Maier Clifford , Moreno Pamela , McMahan Tara 
Published: January 2019

Pipeline operators of both hazardous liquid and gas pipelines occasionally need to update and improve the process documents within their integrity management programs (e.g. written integrity management plan, risk methodology, etc.). Typically these needs arise in the spirit of continuous improvement (e.g. internal audit findings), or following a large merger or acquisition that requires version consolidation for one or more integrity management process documents.
The authors have identified essential elements that provide a proven approach for successfully updating and improving integrity management process documents, including:
1. Gap Analysis
2. Gap Filling with Stakeholder Involvement
3. Implementation Plan
DNV GL has found these elements can be applied effectively to small scale (e.g. an update of an operator’s in-line inspection process) and large scale updates (e.g. concurrently updating the entire set of integrity management program process documents).
After identifying the process documents for updating, the first element is a gap analysis to identify gaps related to compliance and industry standard practices. The gap analysis may also identify inconsistencies between multiple legacy documents (which is often the case after a merger).
The next element is to fill each of the gaps and resolve each of the inconsistencies identified during the gap analysis. The primary stakeholders for the target process(es) should provide input to this step. Significant changes require increased stakeholder involvement and buy-in. Gap filling concludes with creating revised (or new) integrity management process document(s).
The last element is implementation of the revised (or new) integrity management process document(s). The revised (or new) integrity management process(es) may require the operator to add resources or new expertise to their organization. The implementation plan will identify potential additional resources and/or training requirements. The implementation plan will also identify benchmarks and goals to allow the operator to effectively monitor the implementation of the revised (or new) process and ensure it achieves the intended results.
The following paper explains in detail how to execute each element and provides examples of supporting work materials to efficiently create effective and compliant integrity management process documents.
Numerical Investigation of Vertical Penetration of Steel Catenary Riser Near the Touch Down Zone
Authors: Dutta Sujan , Hawlader Bipul , Phillips Ryan , Paulin Mike 
Published: January 2019

Steel catenary risers (SCR) are widely used in offshore to transport hydrocarbon from the seabed to floating or fixed platforms. The fatigue life of SCR near the touchdown zone (TDZ) is one of the main design concerns because the risers are often subjected to cyclic loading (vertical penetration/uplift, lateral and axial displacements) from various sources of environmental loadings, such as sea waves and currents. Numerical modeling of the penetration and uplift behaviour of an SCR is a challenging task. Most of the models available in the literature for uplift resistance are empirical, which have been developed mainly from the results of physical experiments.
In this study, numerical simulation of vertical resistance is presented. Analysis is performed using ANSYS CFX software. Strain-softening and strain-rate dependent undrained shear strength behavior of soft clay sediment has been reported by many researchers. Unfortunately, these models were not available in CFX. Numerical simulations presented in this paper are performed implementing this behavior in CFX. Numerical results are compared with available empirical models. The present CFX modeling explains some mechanisms involved in trench formation and suction development during uplift. Factors affecting uplift resistance such as the size and shape of the trench are also discussed from a parametric study.
Assurance Management Implementation Within a Large Organization
Authors: Sporns Ryan , Fader Shireen 
Published: January 2019

Assurance Management is an essential aspect of a company’s governance. Assurance management can be defined as the “check” and “act” elements in any management system’s continual improvement cycle and is designed to provide stakeholders with current and accurate information about the adequacy, compliance, and effectiveness of its policies, programs, processes, and activities. An assurance management program may have activities that span beyond a particular management system’s scope, and often incorporates processes completed by various internal and external stakeholder groups. As such, it is vital to have a structured and disciplined approach to assurance management.
Over the past few years, Enbridge Pipeline Inc. Liquid Pipeline Business Unit (Enbridge) has been actively working on the development, implementation, and continual improvement of its Assurance Management Program (AMP) and associated processes, as part of our Integrated Management System (IMS) framework. The alignment of existing processes within a single structured program within Enbridge will provide a more coordinated approach as well as clear accountabilities on assurance functions within the organization. Enbridge’s AMP consists of three layers of “Check” defenses and is linked to core “act” processes in an effort to drive overall continual improvement throughout the organization.
The minimum requirements and considerations in establishing an adequate and effective AMP will be detailed within this paper based on the insight Enbridge has gathered through its journey in the implementation of its program within the organization. The paper will discuss the principles behind our AMP model as well as some of the challenges and successes experienced in implementing the AMP within Enbridge.
Tensile and Compressive Strain Capacity of Pipelines With Corrosion Anomalies
Authors: Zhou Honggang , Liu Ming , Ayton Brent , Bergman Jason , Nanney Steve 
Published: January 2019

Strain-based design and assessment (SBDA) methods have been developed to address integrity issues for pipelines subjected to ground movement hazards. The current practice of strain capacity assessment focuses on the tensile rupture of girth welds and compressive buckling of pipes. The integrity management of in-service pipelines often involves assessing pipe segments with anomalies, such as mechanical damage and corrosion. The existing strain capacity models do not yet include the impact of those anomalies.
This paper covers a part of the outcome from a comprehensive research effort aimed at developing assessment procedures for pipelines containing corrosion anomalies and simultaneously subjected to large longitudinal strains. The resistance to tensile rupture and compressive buckling are the focus of the paper. Recommendations for the assessment of strain capacities were provided based on numerical analysis which identified key influencing parameters and controlling mechanisms. Full-scale experimental tests were also conducted to demonstrate the identified mechanisms and evaluate the assessment methods. Both numerical analysis and experimental test results demonstrate that: (1) corrosion anomalies can significantly reduce the tensile strain capacity (TSC) and compressive strain capacity (CSC) of pipes, (2) in addition to the depth and longitudinal length, the circumferential width of the corrosion anomalies has a significant impact on the TSC and CSC of pipes, (3) circumferential-groove corrosion anomalies reduce the tensile strain capacity more than general corrosion anomalies of the same depth and circumferential width, and (4) general corrosion anomalies reduce the compressive strain capacity more than the circumferential-groove anomalies of the same depth and circumferential width. The analysis and experimental test results shown in this paper can support development of SBDA procedures and guidelines of pipelines subjected to large longitudinal strains.
Transitioning a Relative Risk Model to Absolute
Authors: Murray Jake 
Published: January 2019

In order to increase the effectiveness of risk-based asset management, pipeline companies require a solution for modeling integrity threats with potential safety and environmental consequences in measureable units. A quantitative model offers the ability to not only prioritize assets for spending on mitigation, but also to identify which are in need of mitigation. When a company is able to estimate its exposure to risk using real units of measure, such as incidents per year and dollars per incident, it is then possible to identify which assets are above the company’s tolerance for risk and make better decisions about spending than the competitors can.
It is recognized that purely quantitative models have a number of advantages over indexed, or relative, models. Managing a risk model becomes easier, as the model is easier to calibrate and discuss when the results are in real, tangible units. It is also easier to disseminate the risk data to business users across the enterprise. With a quantitative model, discussions can occur around actual failure rates and actual costs, as opposed to how severe things are on an abstract, relative scale. Quantitative models lend themselves to greater consistency of results across different field offices and types of assets. Most importantly, as mentioned above, it makes it possible to not only decide which assets are more important to mitigate than others, but also how many require mitigation at all.
Quantitative models can present challenges in development. Numeric equations for calculating rates of failure often rely on inputs which may not be available. Subject matter expert can cloud the transition and make the process overly complicated. Although it is possible to create empirical equations independent of established industry models for threat behavior, in many cases, there is not enough data available to infer relationships between available inputs and failure rates. As the risk model changes from reporting to scores to reporting in units (e.g. number of fatalities), this may cause some apprehension for legal and management; some education may be necessary to overcome this. It is also important to note that the added complexity and uniqueness of the model may stretch the capabilities of the current IT and software infrastructure supporting the legacy risk model.
The focus of this paper is to outline an approach to making the transition from an indexed or relative risk assessment method to an absolute, quantitative method. This includes strategies identified while attempting to convert various threat calculations, using inputs already being gathered for the existing model. The paper will conclude with some challenges, lessons learned, and ways to identify future recommended improvements.
Putting veterans with heart failure FIRST improves follow-up and reduces readmissions
Authors: Ogunwole Serena Michelle , Phillips Jason , Gossett Amber , Downs John Richard 
Published: January 2019

BackgroundDespite improvements in length of stay and mortality, congestive heart failure (CHF) remains the most common cause of 30-day readmissions to the hospital. Though multiple studies have found that early follow-up after discharge (eg, within 7 days) is critical to improving 30-day readmissions, implementation strategies are challenging in resource-limited settings. Here we present a quality improvement initiative aimed at improving early follow-up while maximising available resources.MethodsThis was a medical resident-driven initiative. A process map of the discharge and follow-up appointment process was created that identified multiple areas for improvement. Based on these findings, a two-part intervention was implemented. First, heart failure discharge education with focus on early follow-up was disseminated to providers throughout the internal medicine department. Subsequently, improved identification of high-risk patients (FailureInterventionRiskStratificationTool) and innovative use of the existing electronic medical record (EMR) were employed to sustain and improve on gains from the first set of interventions.ResultsWe increased our 7-day follow-up rate from 47% to 57% (p=0.429) and decreased the average time to follow-up from 17.6 days to 8.7 days (p=0.016) following the first intervention. The percentage of patients readmitted within 30 days after discharge at baseline (2012–2013) and following the first intervention (education and standardisation of follow-up scheduling) and second intervention (risk stratification, intensive follow-up and EMR change) was 25% and 21%, respectively. Thirty-day mortality rate decreased from 10% in 2011 to 7.16% in December 2015.ConclusionClose hospital discharge follow-up and identification of high-risk patients with CHF are useful approaches to reduce readmissions. Using the existing EMR tool for identifying high-risk patients and improving adherence to best practices is an effective intervention. In patients with CHF these strategies improved time to follow-up and 30-day readmissions while decreasing mortality.