bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The Epistemologies of the Humanities and the Sciences
Authors: Foley Richard 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
In this essay, the author provides an overview of some of the main themes of his book, The Geography of Insight: The Humanities, the Sciences, How They Differ, Why They Matter (2018). In particular, he argues that there are four core differences between the sciences and the humanities: (1) it is proper for the sciences but not the humanities to seek insights not limited to particular locations, times, or things; (2) the sciences but not the humanities value findings as independent as possible of the perspectives of the inquirers; (3) the sciences should be wholly descriptive, while the humanities can also be concerned with prescriptive claims, which give expression to values; and (4) the sciences are organized to increase collective knowledge, whereas in the humanities individual insight is highly valued independently of its ability to generate consensus. Associated with these differences are a set of secondary distinctions: different attitudes about the possibility of endpoint of inquiry; different notions of intellectual progress; different roles for expertise; and different working assumptions about simplicity and complexity.
Are Humans Intuitive Philosophers?
Authors: Sloman Steven , Zemla Jeffrey C. , Lagnado David , Bechlivanidis Christos , Hemmatian Babak 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
What are the criteria that people use to evaluate everyday explanations? This chapter focuses on simplicity, coherence, and unification. It considers various operationalizations of each construct within the context of explanations to measure how people respond to them. With regard to simplicity, some of the psychological literature suggests that people do have a preference for simple explanations that have few causes, but the authors find that a more complete assessment shows that this preference is moderated by a number of factors when evaluating everyday explanations. For one, people prefer explanations that elaborate on causal mechanisms and provide a greater sense of understanding, even if this increases complexity. Measures of coherence are highly predictive of explanation quality. Moreover, people prefer explanations that cohere with the evidence. But the meaning of coherence remains mysterious; it seems to be a placeholder for a complex system of evaluation. There is surprisingly little evidence that people value unification in the form of abstract explanation. Indeed, people often respond positively to extraneous detail. Detail may enhance our understanding of particular events and might help us better visualize mechanisms. The authors also find that people prefer explanations that use words entrenched in a community even if the explanation offers no real information. The authors conclude that people are not merely intuitive philosophers. How a person evaluates an explanation depends on what that person is trying to achieve.
Introduction
Authors: Stohr Karen 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
This short introductory chapter sets out the aims and scope of the book as a whole, with the goal of orienting the reader. It explains the motivation for the project and the philosophical inspirations for the approach, as well as the limitations. The chapter begins by explaining the gap referenced in the title in terms of a gap between moral ideals and the reality of human beings and human life. Moral improvement is the practical project of trying to narrow that gap as far as possible. Understood as a practical project, it is fundamentally first-personal. It is also, however, fundamentally social. Moral improvement is something we do together. The social aspect of moral improvement consists in constructing joint normative spaces in which we can make ourselves better. The chapter concludes with brief summaries of individual chapters.
Making the Woman Worker
Authors: Boris Eileen 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
Founded in 1919 along with the League of Nations, the International Labor Organization (ILO) establishes labor standards and produces knowledge about the world of work, serving as a forum for nations, unions, and employer associations. Making the Woman Worker illuminates the ILO’s transformation in the context of the long fight for social justice. Before 1945, it focused on enhancing conditions for male industrial workers in Western, often imperial, economies, while restricting the circumstances of women’s labors. After WWII, the ILO—then a UN agency—highlighted the global differences in women’s work, focused on bringing women into “development,” began to combat sexism in the workplace, and declared care work essential to women’s labor participation. Today, it enters its second century with a mission to protect the interests of all workers in the face of increasingly globalized supply chains, the digitization of homework, and cross-border labor trafficking. The ILO’s treatment of women provides a window into the modern history of labor. The historic relegation of feminized labor to the part-time, short-term, and low-waged prefigures the future organization of work. How we treat workers in the next century will inevitably build upon evolving ideas of the woman worker, shaped significantly through the ILO.
Equality
Authors: Boris Eileen 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
When the 1944 Philadelphia International Labour Conference set forth to imagine the woman worker’s place amid postwar demobilization, it unearthed old fissures. This chapter explores discourses of equality in the making of the woman worker, when equal remuneration and non-discrimination came to stand for universal progress for women workers, displacing deliberation on the home as a workplace, in terms of both industrial home work and domestic service. Women inside and outside of the ILO pushed for equality measures. The “double-difference” of colonized women, however, produced a notion of “equality” with multiple and unequal tiers of meaning. Ultimately, “equal rights” would enable women in “non-metropolitan territories” to produce goods or reproduce labor power for the benefit of the Global North. The developing Cold War and institutional rivalry between the ILO and the new United Nations Commission on the Status of Women influenced agenda setting. Labor feminists won a revised maternity protection convention, which did not challenge the ideal of the male breadwinner. A shift from interwar policy occurred, but reluctantly and incompletely as a strategic measure rather than as a step toward decolonization or as an affirmation of women’s rights.
Resistance and Treason, 1765–1775
Authors: Larson Carlton F.W. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
This chapter discusses two broad themes that emerged following the passage of the Stamp Act in 1765. First, there was a growing desire in Great Britain to punish acts of colonial resistance as treason and to bring resistance leaders to England for trial under the statute of 35 Henry VIII. Colonial Americans responded that resistance activities did not legally constitute treason and that trials of alleged American traitors in England, far from a local jury, were illegal. Second, and somewhat paradoxically, colonial Americans readily hurled accusations of treason at their political enemies, ranging from colonial governors to Parliament, its ministers, and even the king himself. “Traitors” (and “enemies to their country)” were now denounced for betraying America, their “country,” and even liberty itself. Once the War for Independence had begun, it was easy to conclude that these individuals were no longer traitors in a rhetorical sense, but real traitors who directly threatened the American cause.
Treason against America, 1775–1776
Authors: Larson Carlton F.W. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
This chapter discusses how Americans were at open war with British forces, while claiming to be formally loyal to the king. Persons who aided the British could not be tried for treason in a court of law, so Pennsylvania employed committees of safety to conduct trials of disloyal persons. At the county level, committees punished primarily verbal offenses, but the state committee in Philadelphia heard cases of actual disloyalty. The persons convicted were imprisoned on charges of “high treason.” These ad hoc and legally questionable detentions were an impetus for the Declaration of Independence, which put the punishment of traitors on a sounder footing. For their part, British efforts to punish disloyal Americans all faltered and the suspension of habeas corpus permitted American prisoners to be effectively treated as prisoners of war.
The Philadelphia Treason Trials, 1778–1779
Authors: Larson Carlton F.W. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
This chapter begins by introducing the defendants, who were predominantly Quaker and Anglican artisans of relatively modest means. Some had actively supported resistance activities and many had connections to the jurors and grand jurors. The chapter then turns to the role of defense counsel, the witnesses and testimony presented at trial, the court’s rulings on contested issues, and jury deliberations. It argues that the verdicts were shaped in significant part by aversion to the death penalty as a punishment for treason. Even the few juries that convicted defendants petitioned the state’s executive authority for clemency, as did hundreds of other Philadelphians. Although treason was nominally the highest crime, juries simply didn’t view it that way. Persons who had sided with the enemy were not incorrigible criminals, but friends and neighbors who had made an unfortunate political choice and were fully capable of redemption.
Riding the Wanderlust Express
Authors: DiGirolamo Vincent 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
Railroads reigned supreme in industrial America. They were the engines that drove the postbellum economy, stimulated western expansion, and imposed their corporate time zones on the nation. Local, state, and transcontinental railways employed thousands of men, carried millions of passengers, and brought a cornucopia of goods—including newspapers—to distant markets. Three types of newsboys emerged from this transportation network: salaried news agency hands who regularly met trains to ship and receive local and out-of-town papers, uniformed “news butchers” who plied passengers with reading material and sundry items, and footloose “tramp newsboys” who hitched rides on freight or passenger cars in search of work, adventure, or family. Each of these types occupied a separate niche in the distribution process and a different rung on the social ladder, but they shared a dependence on railroads and newspapers for their daily bread. Their experiences offer a crucial bottom-up perspective on the circulation of newspapers and the role of children and railroads in the development of print capitalism.
Bell Nonlocality
Authors: Scarani Valerio 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
Nonlocality was discovered by John Bell in 1964, in the context of the debates about quantum theory, but is a phenomenon that can be studied in its own right. Its observation proves that measurements are not revealing pre-determined values, falsifying the idea of “local hidden variables” suggested by Einstein and others. One is then forced to make some radical choice: either nature is intrinsically statistical and individual events are unspeakable, or our familiar space-time cannot be the setting for the whole of physics. As phenomena, nonlocality and its consequences will have to be predicted by any future theory, and may possibly play the role of foundational principles in these developments. But nonlocality has found a role in applied physics too: it can be used for “device-independent” certification of the correct functioning of random number generators and other devices. After a self-contained introduction to the topic, this monograph on nonlocality presents the main tools and results following a logical, rather than a chronological, order.
Formalizing Bell Nonlocality
Authors: Scarani Valerio 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
This chapter covers the essential mathematical tools for the study of nonlocality. It begins with the main object under study: a collection of several probability distributions usually called “behavior”. The crucial definition of locality is then given, followed by Fine’s theorem that relates local behaviors to pre-existing values and clarifies the role of local deterministic processes. In turn, one finds that local behaviors belong to a polytope, whose facets are Bell inequalities. The simplest scenario, called CHSH, is studied in detail.
Device-Independent Self-Testing
Authors: Scarani Valerio 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
This chapter is devoted to deviice-independent self-testing. This refers to the fact that some extremal behaviors in the quantum set can actually be realised only with specific measurements on a specific shared entangled state. The two main examples, namely the maximal value of CHSH and the Mayers-Yao test, are described in detail before the abstract definition of self-testing is given.
Hume’s Jurisprudence
Authors: Postema Gerald J. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
This chapter considers Hume's theory of justice. Situating Hume's discussion in the tradition of British legal theory will be beneficial not only because Hume's theory and the arguments for it are clarified, but they also illuminate the jurisprudential landscape stretching back to Coke and forward to Bentham, Burke, and the nineteenth century. Hume, in fact, is pivotal in the development of British legal theory. Furthermore, Hume's reflections on justice and law shaped Bentham's perception of the problems of jurisprudence and his struggle to solve them, although he rarely acknowledges his debt to Hume in this respect. Especially in Bentham's early formative years, his formulation of problems regarding the foundations, nature, and basic tasks of law, as well as strategies for solving them, are silently shaped by Hume.
Utilitarian Positivism
Authors: Postema Gerald J. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
Professor Hart claims that Bentham's utilitarianism at times gets in the way of his analytical vision. This chapter defends Bentham against this criticism which rests on two mistakes. First, it seriously misunderstands Bentham's theoretical motivations; second, it rests on a mistaken view of the jurisprudential enterprise generally. It is argued that Bentham's reliance on normative considerations in his criticism of Common Law theory, and his argument for his positivist theory of law, would not be regarded by him as a mistake, but rather as an essential part of the programme he set for himself at the outset of his career. This programme is not incoherent, but in fact rests on a more plausible understanding of the jurisprudential enterprise than that inherited from Austin and Analytical Jurisprudence.
Meaning, Analysis, and Exposition
Authors: Postema Gerald J. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
Bentham trained his intellectual energy primarily on law and political ordering, but he looked to every mode of inquiry available for analytic and normative tools with which to “rear the fabric of felicity.” Some he adopted and adapted from other thinkers (e.g., the Greatest Happiness Principle), but others he invented. The most important of his theoretical innovations, in his view, was his theory of meaning, the heart of which was his analysis of language in terms of “real” and “fictitious” entities (conventionally but misleadingly referred to as his “theory of fictions”). He sought to understand the way our language facilitates and misleads thought, reasoning, deliberation, and action. He devised a theory of meaning and the technology of thought in order to allow language the room it needs to do its essential work, while controlling its excesses. He devised a method of analysis—definition by “paraphrasis”—that enabled systematic ordering of thought. With this technology, Bentham sought to discipline potentially wayward language and thereby to deprive arbitrary power of one of its favorite weapons.
Human Psychology, Individual and Social
Authors: Postema Gerald J. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
The second main pillar of Bentham’s thought was his “practicable” psychology. On his view, human beings always act from what they take their most dominant interests at the time to be, but these may be disinterested concerns for the well-being of others, even those of humanity in general. It is trivial and misleading to insist that only their own interests motivate human beings, yet this claim, recast into something more meaningful, can be understood to call attention of moral advisors and designers of political institutions alike to the fact that voluntary human action issues from the subjectively recognized interests of human agents. While self-regarding interests are always powerful, Bentham thought it is possible to construct institutions that cultivate socially oriented motives, even extensive benevolence, to counter powerful self-regarding interests. Human affections are rooted in the constitution of human nature, but they are plastic, responding to education and enlightenment.
Interests, Universal and Particular
Authors: Postema Gerald J. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
The ultimate end of government, and the aim of all morality, Bentham insisted, is the advancement of the universal interest. The universal interest, according to Bentham, is that interest of a person common to himself and every other member of the community. It (1) excludes all particular interests; (2) includes interests common to all members of community; and (3) that in it each member has a share. Social institutions designed to serve the universal interest are likely to call for the sacrifice of personal interests, but they also make pursuit of such personal interests possible, and always include each member in the benefits resulting from the realization of the universal interest. While the (personal or private) interests of individual members may be sacrificed, individuals are not. Each member is accorded a substantial share in the interest of all.
Facts, Fictions, and Law
Authors: Postema Gerald J. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
Bentham’s analysis of the probative force of evidence appears to be skeptical and relativist. Bentham was convinced that in all aspects of the judicial assessment of evidence, there was no place for formal, rule-bound reasoning, and it is tempting to trace this rule-skepticism to a deeper epistemological skepticism. Yet his monumental Rationale of Judicial Evidence shows few signs of this epistemologically skeptical foundation. Rather, seen in light of his theory of language and fictitious entities, the empiricist, quasi-pragmatist elements of his theory become clear. Bentham was no skeptic or radical subjectivist regarding the evaluation of evidence. Statements of probability, or of the persuasive force of some piece of evidence, on Bentham’s view, are subject to rational assessment. Judgments of the probative value of evidence, like moral judgments, are expressions of the speaker’s state of mind; they express degrees of conviction of the speaker, which are subject to the discipline of rational method.
In Defense of “French Nonsense”
Authors: Postema Gerald J. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
Buried beneath the intemperate rhetoric of Bentham’s attack on natural rights lies a serious challenge to the jurisprudence of rights in constitutional adjudication. The political rhetoric of rights, Bentham charged, is not the rhetoric of rational deliberation, but rather the rhetoric of mere assertion and counter-assertion. The language of rights supplies no determinate basis for deciding particular cases. However, Bentham saw clearly that indeterminacy threatens not objectivity—in the sense of a decision’s being ideally correct, or rationally preferred when seen “from nowhere”—but rather publicity. He argued that the indeterminacy of rights language weakens the rule of law, because it undermines conditions of genuine public justification. The language of rights provides no public standards for evaluating rights assertions. Bentham was correct to insist upon the importance of publicity in a democratic constitutional order. However, he mistakenly assumed that public justification is possible only if the demonstrability condition is met. In defense of constitutional rights jurisprudence, this chapter sketches an alternative conception of public justification and argues that public justification understood in this way is not threatened by indeterminacy.
Perestroika and Post-Soviet Afterlives
Authors: Jones Polly 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
This chapter focusses on the dramatic changes that the ‘Fiery Revolutionaries’ series underwent over the last decade of Soviet power. It first analyses the difficult conditions for the series in the early 1980s, as official suspicion of the series and its ‘niche’ mounted, and as censorship became more oppressive. However, these conditions of the late Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko periods ultimately proved easier and more productive than the Gorbachev era: glasnost and perestroika marked the peak of popular interest in Soviet history nationwide, but also a full-blown crisis for the series. It came under threat in the mid- to late 1980s, as both public and internal criticism singled out ‘Fiery Revolutionaries’ for its historical falsifications and declining literary quality; sales and popular interest went into free fall, and the series closed in 1990. The conclusion traces Politizdat’s transformation into a post-Soviet philosophical publishing house, and shows that the series itself has been selectively reimagined, from the late 1990s to the present, as a dissident and liberal project, rather than fully revived in all its diversity.
The Bounds of Nonsense
Authors: Moore A.W. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
This essay is about the distinction between sense and nonsense, or more strictly the distinction between truth-valued propositions and nonsensical pseudo-propositions, in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Two questions that are raised are: whether ‘truth-valued’ in ‘truth-valued propositions’ is pleonastic; and whether ‘nonsensical’ in ‘nonsensical pseudo-propositions’ is pleonastic. Neither question, it is conceded, has much exegetical or philosophical significance. But there is an associated question that does: namely, whether we have any understanding of what it is for something to be a pseudo-proposition without a truth-value independently of what it is for something to be a proposition with one. It is urged that, for Wittgenstein, we do not: a pseudo-proposition without a truth-value is an item that appears, falsely, to be a proposition with one. In an appendix the question is raised whether Kant would have done well to say something similar about empty thoughts.
The Bounds of Sense
Authors: Moore A.W. 
Published: September 2019

Abstract
This essay was written for a special issue of Philosophical Topics on the links between Kant and analytic philosophy. It explores these links through consideration of: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus; the logical positivism endorsed by Ayer; and the (very different) variation on that theme endorsed by Quine. It is argued that in all three cases we see analytic philosophers trying to attain and express a general philosophical understanding of why the bounds of sense should be drawn where they should—but thereby confronting the aporia, which Kant too confronted, that it is impossible to do this without transgressing those very bounds. It is suggested in conclusion that the problem is in trying to attain and express such an understanding; in other words, that such an understanding is attainable, but not expressible.