bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Between Life and Violent Death
Authors: Dallmayr Fred 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
The chapter considers the origin and meaning of “natural law” and “natural rightness,” the core of right conduct, whose origin is sometimes placed in the cogito. This chapter emphasizes, instead, the role of contextual “relationality” in rules, whether “positive” social norms or “divine” rules, such as the Mosaic “laws” which were not imposed unilaterally by a divine potentate but reflected the people’s experience and “common sense” of right conduct. The chapter extends this argument to the work of Thomas Hobbes for whom transit from the “state of nature” to the “civil state” depended on reciprocal and relational “natural laws,” which he called “immutable and eternal” because they originate at the experiential boundary between life and death. Relationality prevails even when human norms are set aside in favor of “higher” rules—as revealed by Antigone of Thebes who appealed beyond state rules to the relationality between brother and sister.
The Politics of Virtue?
Authors: Dallmayr Fred 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
Interlude B reviews The Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the Human Future by John Milbank and Adrian Pabst, in which they charge “buffered” liberalism and authoritarian interventions with the “atomization” of society. For them, “post-liberalism” replaces “market, state, and technocracy” with the relational fabric of “society, culture, and interpersonal relations.” They also hold that “virtue ethics” is both “more demanding” than utilitarianism and “less moralist” than Kantian deontology. They go on to review politics, economics, culture, and international relations, providing significant insights for a viable post-liberal agenda. Although applauding the general tenor of the book, the Interlude takes exception to a number of accents, such as appeals to (unreflective) “naturalism,” “verticality,” and “neo-medievalism.”
Chaosmos
Authors: Dallmayr Fred 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
The chapter reflects a redemptive hope which is sometimes called a “grounded expectation” or chaosmos, which stresses the tension between order and disorder, concord and conflict. To explicate this conundrum, the chapter turns again to Heidegger as a thinker of “difference,” for whom chaos and cosmos both inhabit the “world,” triggering a transformative struggle. To exemplify the meaning of this struggle, the chapter invokes the task of “world-maintenance” upheld, in the Indian Bhagavad Gita, in the midst of an epic battle in the Mahabharata. In the Chinese tradition, world-maintenance involves the striving for a differentiated holism of “all under heaven,” in opposition to an imperially imposed “world order” from above, and urging the cultivation of mutual learning and understanding, fostering genuine mutual respect between cultures and peoples. Heidegger’s “being-in-the-world” from this angle means a wager in favor of a peaceful cosmopolis.
Aristotle and the Eleatic One
Authors: Clarke Timothy 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This book examines Aristotle’s response to Eleatic monism, the theory of Parmenides of Elea and his followers that reality is ‘one’. The book argues that Aristotle interprets the Eleatics as thoroughgoing monists, for whom the pluralistic, changing world of the senses is a mere illusion. Understood in this way, the Eleatic theory constitutes a radical challenge to the possibility of natural philosophy. Aristotle discusses the Eleatics in several works, including De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, and the Metaphysics. But his most extensive treatment of their monism comes at the beginning of the Physics, where he criticizes them for overlooking the fact that ‘being is said in many ways’—in other words, that there are many ways of being. Through a careful analysis of this and other criticisms, the book explains how Aristotle’s engagement with the Eleatics prepares the ground for his own theory of the principles of nature. Aristotle is commonly thought to be an unreliable interpreter of his Presocratic predecessors; in contrast, this book argues that his critique can shed valuable light on the motivation of the Eleatic theory and its influence on the later philosophical tradition.
Parmenides’ Argument for Monism
Authors: Clarke Timothy 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter reconstructs Aristotle’s interpretation of Parmenides’ argument for monism. After asking how Aristotle conceives of the Parmenidean One, the chapter focuses on his ‘solution’ to Parmenides’ argument (Phys. 1.3, 186a23–8). This solution makes excellent sense if we see it as targeting Parmenides’ argument at B 8.22–5 for the continuity and uniformity of what is. Accordingly, it is proposed that Aristotle reads these lines as containing Parmenides’ principal argument for monism. If this is right, Aristotle has a much more appealing interpretation of Parmenides’ argument than has previously been thought. The proposal receives additional support from the discussion of Eleatic arguments in De Generatione et Corruptione 1.8.
Did Aristotle Change His Mind about Parmenides?
Authors: Clarke Timothy 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter asks whether Aristotle’s interpretation of Parmenides stays the same throughout the corpus. Some commentators have denied this on the basis of Aristotle’s discussion of the Eleatics in Metaphysics A 5. This passage has been thought to show that he comes to read the cosmological section of Parmenides’ poem, the Doxa, as presenting Parmenides’ own views of the (really existing) natural world. If this is correct, then Aristotle comes to favour an interpretation of Parmenides that is very different from the interpretation he adopts in Physics 1.2–3. This chapter argues that there is no evidence that Aristotle’s interpretation of Parmenides changes in this way. He consistently reads the Doxa as a ‘way of falsity’ and consistently regards Parmenides as a radical monist.
The Book’s Composition
Authors: Juslin Patrik N. 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of the book's main themes. Based on insights from a 20-year quest to unravel the mysteries of music and emotion,it is argued that real progress can only be achieved if we accept a number of basic premises about music and emotion. These premises constitute several themes, which will reoccur throughout the book. These themes are as follows: emotions depend on evolved mechanisms; music engages multiple emotion mechanisms; there are definitive limits to human introspection; emotional responses to music are intrinsically social; musical emotions depend on music-listener-situation interactions.
What Comes Next?
Authors: Juslin Patrik N. 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter discusses the notion of musical expectancy. Musical expectancy is defined as a process whereby an emotion is aroused in a listener because a specific feature of the music violates, delays, or confirms the listener's expectations about the continuation of the music. Every time the listener hears a piece of music, he or she has such expectations, based on music he or she has heard before. For example, the sequential progression of E-F# may set up the expectation that the music will continue with G#. In other words, some notes seem to imply other notes; and if these musical implications are not realized — if the listener's expectations are thwarted — an affective response might be induced.
Coda
Authors: Juslin Patrik N. 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter considers what the future holds for the field of music and emotion. It suggests that when it comes to making true progress in the field, there is no substitute for systematic experimentation, to tease out those psychophysical relationships that exist between musical features, the social context, and listener reactions, as mediated by a range of mechanisms. More specifically, field studies are needed in ‘ecologically valid’ settings to demonstrate the plausibility of responses, followed by experimental studies in more controlled settings to establish that presumed causal relationships really do hold. It further argues that the relationship between music and emotions depends essentially on evolution.
‘History will judge us right’
Authors: Davey Jennifer 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
Chapter 1 provides a biographical sketch of the woman at the centre of this book. Starting with her childhood, it charts Mary’s domestic life. We are introduced to Mary as daughter, wife, mother, and widow. It pieces together the little we know about Mary’s childhood, considering the political and social experiences that shaped her early years. It explores Mary’s two marriages: the first to a man thirty-three years her senior, James Cecil, second Marquess of Salisbury, and the second to Edward Stanley, fifteenth Earl of Derby. It considers her experiences of motherhood and widowhood, and what her domestic family life was like. Finally, it explores contemporary impressions of Mary, which reveal much about her personality and interests.
‘That Miserable Party Spirit’
Authors: Davey Jennifer 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
Chapter 4 considers Mary’s relationship with the Conservative Party in the late 1860s and early 1870s. In order to examine the influential role Mary played at the heart of the Conservative Party, this chapter considers three connected case studies. The first considers the disquiet over Disraeli’s leadership of the Conservative Party during the years 1868–1874 and examines the attempts by Mary and her political allies to oust him as leader. The second case study examines the intersections between Mary and the 1874 Conservative cabinet. It pays particular attention to her pivotal role in the formation of that cabinet. The third case study develops this narrative and explores her involvement in the processes and tensions of cabinet government during the years 1874–1876. In doing so, it considers the challenges and constraints offered up by the post-1867 landscape. Significantly, this chapter also casts new light on the fragility of Disraeli’s leadership of the Conservative Party.
Conclusion: ‘Female Politicians’?
Authors: Davey Jennifer 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This conclusion explores what Mary’s life in politics might tell us about political life in Victorian Britain. It argues that Mary’s life illuminates particular aspects of Victorian political culture. In particular, it stresses the importance of incorporating informal political processes into the construction of high political narratives. It suggests that focusing on the activities of informal politics might offer new insights into familiar preoccupations of historians of high politics: of parliamentary dynamics, of party politics, of civil servants, and of public opinion.
Intersections of Value
Authors: Stecker Robert 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This book is about the universal human need to aesthetically experience the world around us. To this end, it examines three appreciative contexts where aesthetic value plays a central role: art, nature, and the everyday. The book concludes by asking: what is the place of the aesthetic in a good life? An equally important theme explores the way the aesthetic interacts with other values—broadly moral, cognitive, and functional ones. No important appreciative practice is completely centered on a single value and such practices can only be fully understood in terms of a plurality of intersecting values. Complementing the study of aesthetic appreciation are: (1) An analysis of the cognitive and ethical value of art; (2) an attempt to answer fundamental questions in environmental aesthetics, and an investigation of the interface between environmental ethics and aesthetics; and (3) an examination of the extent to which the aesthetic value of everyday artifacts derives from their basic practical functions. The book devotes special attention to art as an appreciative context because it is an especially rich arena where different values interact. Artistic value is complex and pluralistic, a value composed of other values. Aesthetic value is among these, but so are ethical, cognitive, and art-historical values.
What is Aesthetic Value?
Authors: Stecker Robert 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter offers an answer to the question: what is aesthetic value? It defends aesthetic empiricism: the view that the primary bearer of aesthetic value are experiences and that other things have aesthetic value in virtue of their capacity to provide aesthetically valuable experiences. By way of answering criticisms of this conception of aesthetic value, it argues that it is coherent, that it is grounded in the history of thought about the aesthetic, and that it does not succumb to counterexamples. The chapter concludes by looking at the idea that aesthetic value should be defined instead in terms of aesthetic properties and argues that defensible versions of such an approach are consistent with a definition in terms of aesthetic experience.
Why Artistic Value is not Aesthetic Value
Authors: Stecker Robert 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter argues that artistic value is a distinct kind of value from aesthetic value. Artistic value is a function of, and derived from, a plurality of more basic values, including, but not confined to, aesthetic value. Artworks are also valued as artworks for their cognitive value, ethical value, art-historical value, interpretation-centered value, and in other ways as well. To understand the artistic value of particular works requires understanding what the artist who makes the work is intending to do in it—what functions it is intended to fulfill or what it is intended to achieve. In order to defend this view, the chapter will show that artistic value is not reducible to aesthetic value.
Contractualist Common Ownership and the Basic Needs Principle
Authors: Blomfield Megan 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter draws on Charles Beitz’s account of natural resource justice to defend a method of justification that can be used to develop the Common Ownership view. This method employs an original position device, familiar from contemporary social contract theory, and the resulting view is therefore termed ‘Contractualist Common Ownership’. This understanding of Common Ownership is motivated by arguing that it is an apt interpretation of Equal Original Claims. Two key objections to this approach are anticipated and addressed. Contractualist Common Ownership is then used to reconsider and reject the principle of equal division. It is argued that instead, the parties would first secure agreement on a basic needs principle. However, it is also argued that this sufficientarian principle would not be accepted in isolation; parties would seek agreement on further principles of justice for the assignment of rights to natural resources, beyond what is required for basic needs.
The Modes Combined
Authors: Sienkiewicz Stefan 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter examines how all of the Agrippan modes (bar relativity for the reasons given in Chapter 5) work in combination with one another. Sextus provides us with two such sceptical ‘nets’ in the Outlines each of which is analysed. A third net of Jonathan Barnes’s invention is also analysed, as well a fourth, modified version of Barnes’s net. The conclusion drawn is that all four combinations are underscored by a variety of theoretical assumptions which the sceptic is not in a position to make.
The Crisis of the Dogma of Sovereignty in the History of Ideas
Authors: Heller Hermann 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter considers Bodin’s theory of sovereignty. Bodin’s concept of sovereignty was the result of a war fought by the French state under the leadership of the king and the University of Paris against the king’s subjection to the Catholic Church and the empire, as well as against the subordination of state power to the feudal barons. Even before Bodin, the “initially relative, comparative concept of royal sovereignty” had changed to “an absolute one.” The state, represented in the king, which had heretofore only been superior in its relationship to the Church, empire, and barons, now became “supreme.” Bodin was the first to claim sovereignty as a defining criterion of the state.
The Sovereign Person
Authors: Heller Hermann 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter attempts to secure a sovereign person to positivize the supreme legal principles, one who is capable of making consciously evaluative decisions. This person must, on the one hand, eventually become a real bearer of the will, while, on the other, must be an independent, law-creating authority. A person equipped with these characteristics is unknown to the present theory of the state. In Germany, the dominant theory since Hegel maintains that the sovereign person is the state; sovereignty is a characteristic of state power or, in a relationship that is not entirely clear, the state’s will or state personality. The state can only be considered the sovereign person, however, if it is seen, with objective necessity, as a unified reality of will or decision-making unit.
The Juristic Limits of and the Absolute Character of Sovereignty
Authors: Heller Hermann 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter discusses how sovereignty retains its absolute character despite highly developed international law. It argues that states’ social interdependence does not itself negate their juristic independence. Even the peace treaty forced upon the conquered state by the victor does not negate the sovereignty of the conquered, but only confirms it. Nor does the concept of sovereignty lose its absolute character as a result of international law obligations. “International law does not and cannot exist apart from distinct nations, separate, and living their own lives. So it must write on the pediment of its edifice that nations have the right to preserve themselves and to freely take the measures that serve this objective.” This absolute right of self-preservation demanded by international law is the basis for the absolute character of sovereignty.
International Criminal Justice History Writing as Anachronism
Authors: Mégret Frédéric 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter focuses on the extent to which the contemporary project of international criminal justice cannot easily lay claim to what it imagines to be its past, because that past, despite superficial similarities, often exhibited fundamentally different concerns. It highlights three areas in which international criminal justice today is arguably dramatically different from how it was understood up to the 1990s. First, international criminal justice was for a long time much less obsessed with the criminalization of international law prohibitions specifically, and much more interested in the transnational dimensions of the criminal law. Second, it was much less committed to a strict model of individual accountability under international law and much more willing to see the state as the central pivot of international criminal responsibility. Third, it was intimately linked to peace projects whereas it has become intimately associated to the fight against atrocities and mass human rights violations.
Kant's Revolutionary Theory of Modality
Authors: Abacı Uygar 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This book offers a comprehensive study of Kant’s views on modal notions of possibility, actuality or existence, and necessity. It aims to locate Kant’s views on these notions in their broader historical context, establish their continuity and transformation across Kant’s precritical and critical texts, and determine their role in the substance as well as the development of Kant’s philosophical project. It makes two overarching claims. First, Kant’s precritical views on modality, which appear in the context of his attempts to revise the ontological argument and are critical of the tradition only from within its prevailing paradigm of modality, develop into a revolutionary theory of modality in his critical period, radicalizing his critique of the ontotheological and rationalist metaphysical tradition. While the traditional paradigm construes modal notions as fundamental ontological predicates, expressing different modes or ways of being of things, Kant’s theory consists in redefining them as subjective and relational features of our discursivity, expressing different modes in which our conceptual representations of objects are related to our cognitive faculty. Second, this revolutionary theory of modality does not only become a crucial component of Kant’s critical epistemology and his radical critique of rationalist metaphysics, but it is in fact directly constitutive of the critical turn itself, as Kant originally formulates the latter in terms of a shift from an ontological to an epistemological approach to the question of possibility. Thus, tracing the development of Kant’s understanding of modality comes to fruition in an alternative reading of Kant’s overall philosophical development.
Ontotheology and Modality I
Authors: Abacı Uygar 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter offers a general framework for reading ontotheology, according to which any version of the ontological argument consists of two logical steps. First, it introduces existence into the concept of God in one way or another; second, it infers the existence of God from the concept of God and asserts identity between two distinct notions of God, viz. as the most real being and as the necessary being. With this framework in place, the chapter then examines the classical version of the ontological argument, introduced by St Anselm and popularized by Descartes. It demonstrates that while Kant’s primary objection, i.e. existence is not a real predicate, applies equally to both Anselm’s and Descartes’ arguments, Descartes importantly anticipates the actualist principle, i.e. facts about possibility must be grounded on facts about actuality, which will come to be a major insight in Kant’s theory of modality.
The Revolutionary Shift in Kantian Modality Prior to the Critique
Authors: Abacı Uygar 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter examines the development of Kant’s conception of modality in the period between The Only Possible Argument (1763) and the Critique of Pure Reason (1781). From the mid-1760s on, Kant interprets his discovery that existence involves a relation to the cognitive faculty as more broadly applying to modality in general, and adopts the epistemological interpretation of the actualist principle. This shift plays an essential role in Kant’s realization of the need for a ‘critical turn’ in philosophy, which Kant first formulates in his 1772 letter to Herz in terms of the question of how to cognize that our pure concepts do indeed represent really possible objects. What problematizes this question is the actualist principle, epistemologically interpreted as stating that the cognition of actuality is a prerequisite of cognition of real possibility. Kant’s emerging revolution in modality is thus constitutive of his critical turn rather than a consequence of it.
The Modality of Judgments
Authors: Abacı Uygar 
Published: May 2019

Abstract
This chapter focuses on Kant’s account of the modal functions of judgments in the Critique of Pure Reason. There are two current strands of interpreting this account. The first understands the modality of a given judgment in terms of the judger’s attitude toward its content, based on their epistemic or psychological states. The second understands it solely in terms of its location in a syllogistic context. On the alternative interpretation defended in this chapter, Kant construes the modalities of judgments as instantiating relative logical modalities and expressing logical coherence relations between a judgment and a set of background judgments. This interpretation not only fits well with Kant’s revolutionary program of redefining modality as a feature of the relation between the conceptual representations of things and the cognitive faculty of the judger, but also captures the formal-logical infrastructure of his account of real modality in the rest of the Critique.