bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Metaphysics of composition
Authors: Brenner Andrew 
Published: September 2018

Composition occurs when one or more objects are parts of another object. The metaphysics of composition concerns the nature of composition – i.e. what it is, and how it works. Some of the more important questions philosophers have regarding the metaphysics of composition are the following:
(1) When does composition occur? This is van Inwagen’s ‘Special Composition Question’. Four prominent answers to this question include: (i) objects compose another object when those former objects are in contact; (ii) any two or more objects compose another object; (iii) objects never compose another object; (iv) objects compose another object when the activities of the former objects constitute a life.
(2) Are composite objects identical with their parts? Proponents of ‘composition as identity’ answer ‘yes’ to this question. There are two primary variants of composition as identity, ‘strong’ composition as identity and ‘weak’ composition as identity. The most prominent objection to strong composition as identity is an objection from Leibniz’s Law: composite objects cannot be identical with their parts, since they seem to have properties which their parts do not have.
(3) Is it possible for one object to constitute another object? Here ‘constitution’ is the relation which is alleged to obtain between, for example, a clay statue and the lump of clay from which it is formed. We can distinguish between the thesis that constitution is identity, and the thesis that constitution is not identity. The chief motivation which leads some philosophers to reject the thesis that constitution is not identity is the ‘grounding problem’ for that thesis.
(4) Are there, in addition to composite objects, the ‘forms’ of those objects, and if so, what is the relationship between composite objects and their forms? We can distinguish between (at least) two variants of hylomorphism (the thesis that objects have forms), with the main distinction between the two views being whether or not they regard forms as being among the parts of composite objects.
Epistemic basing relation
Authors: Bondy Patrick 
Published: September 2018

The epistemic basing relation is the relation that holds between beliefs and the reasons for which they are held. It is important to understand this relation if we want to have a full account of epistemic justification, because it sometimes happens that people possess good reasons for their beliefs, but fail to hold their beliefs on the basis of their good reasons. In cases like that, it seems, beliefs are not fully justified. In addition to possessing good reasons for our beliefs, we must also hold our beliefs on the basis of our good reasons.
It is tempting to think that the basing relation is some sort of causal relation, something along the following lines: a subject S’s belief that P is based on a reason R if and only if R is at least part of what causes or causally sustains S’s belief. However, this analysis is subject to important and well-known objections, such as the causal deviance problem: sometimes reasons cause beliefs in ways that are too strange or indirect (that is, they deviate from the normal ways that reasons cause beliefs), and in cases like that, a reason will cause a belief but the belief will not be based on the reason.
A main alternative to the causal account is the doxastic account, according to which whether S’s belief that P is based on a reason R depends on whether it seems to S that R is a good reason for believing P. Another alternative is the dispositional account, which roughly holds that S’s belief that P is based on a reason R just in case S is disposed to revise or give up the belief that P if S loses R. A fourth kind of account appeals to what subjects would say in defense of their beliefs if they were asked to give their reasons for holding them.
Intellectual virtue
Authors: Battaly Heather 
Published: September 2018

Intellectual virtues are qualities that make one an excellent thinker. The contemporary literature offers two different analyses of intellectual virtues: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilism argues that intellectual virtues are stable dispositions that reliably produce true beliefs. For reliabilists, any stable reliable disposition will do. Hard-wired faculties like reliable vision, acquired skills like the ability to identify bird species, and acquired character traits like open-mindedness all count as intellectual virtues. In contrast, responsibilists restrict intellectual virtues to acquired character traits, like open-mindedness, intellectual humility, and intellectual courage, over which the agent has some control and for which she is to some degree responsible.
What can these analyses of intellectual virtue do for us? Reliabilists and responsibilists have used their respective analyses of intellectual virtue to ground new accounts of knowledge. Though the details of their accounts differ, both camps define knowledge in terms of intellectual virtues. They take intellectual virtues, which are evaluations of agents, to be more theoretically fundamental than knowledge and justification, which are evaluations of beliefs. It is an open question as to whether their accounts of knowledge succeed. But even if they fail, their virtue theoretic approach to knowledge has already had a significant impact on analytic epistemology – it has put active knowledge back on the map. Responsibilists have also begun to apply their analysis of intellectual virtue to classroom education and curricula. They argue that virtues like intellectual humility, intellectual perseverance, and open-mindedness are developed over time, via practice and the imitation of role models. There are several educational projects underway that aim to facilitate the development of these virtues in students.
Epistemic infinitism
Authors: Aikin Scott 
Published: September 2018

If you believe something rationally, you believe it for a reason. And that reason can’t just be any old reason. You’ve got to rationally hold it as a good reason. In order to do so, you must have another reason. And that reason needs another. And so a regress of reasons ensues. This is a rough-and-ready picture of the epistemic regress problem. Epistemic infinitism is the view that justifying reasons are infinite, and so it is a particular solution to the regress problem. Consider, also, that justification comes in degrees – some beliefs are better justified than others. Moreover, it seems that people can know things better than others. Call this the gradability phenomenon. Epistemic infinitism is the view that for someone to be justified maximally is for that person to have an infinite series of supporting reasons.
Epistemic infinitisms admit of a wide variety. Differences between versions of infinitism arise according to two factors for the view: one dialectical, the other ecumenical. The dialectical factor for epistemic infinitisms is the matter of what philosophical problems or questions they answer. Infinitisms are designed to either provide models for how to solve the epistemic regress problem or address the phenomenon of the gradability of justification and knowledge. Infinitisms will differ depending on which issue they are designed to address, and an infinitism designed to address one issue may not be the same as one designed to address another. The ecumenical factor for epistemic infinitisms is the matter of how consistent the view is with other competing theories about how to address the regress problem and the gradability phenomenon. With the regress problem, infinitism’s main competitor theories are foundationalism, the view that there are basic beliefs for which there is no need for further reason, and coherentism, the view that justifying reasons come in large mutually supporting packages. For the most part, infinitism is taken to be a form of noncoherentist antifoundationalism about justification, because the infinitist holds that reasons must be infinitely long chains of nonrepeating reasons. However, there are versions of infinitism consistent with both foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism faces a variety of challenges, and two of particular importance are whether infinitism is actually a form of scepticism and whether infinitism is a complete theory of justification.
Climate change justice
Authors: Boran Idil , Katz Corey 
Published: September 2018

Climate change justice is a branch of philosophical inquiry concerned with fair terms of cooperation for addressing global climate change. Global climate change refers to the adverse effects of rising average global temperature on meteorological, environmental, and societal systems due to human activities. Independent observations show a rising trend in average global surface temperature since 1880, with most of the relevant global warming occurring since the 1980s. These climatic changes are the outcome of heightened concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) – e.g., carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide – in the atmosphere. These gases are produced by a wide range of human activities, from the burning of fossil fuels for energy at both the industrial and the consumer level to overall land use.
The fundamental relation between concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere and global warming is well understood. And yet, achieving effective and fair international coordination to respond to the problem of global climate change has been far more challenging than expected. One of the reasons for this is that any attempt to address global climate change raises complex problems of justice. First, those communities that are most vulnerable to the risks and harms of climate change have contributed the least to the problem. Second, economic capacity to address the problem is not distributed equally around the globe. Third, political communities and generations have clashing interest claims in relation to the burdens of addressing climate change. These circumstances raise pressing questions about how to coordinate global and intergenerational cooperation.
The debate over climate change justice has been primarily concerned with what counts as a just allocation of burdens and benefits in the global response to the problem of climate change. To a large extent, philosophical interest in these questions developed against the backdrop of the international effort to reach a global agreement. A prominent discussion within this debate is concerned with the allocation of duties and rights with regard to climate action. Broadly speaking, there are two distinct categories of climate change action. One is mitigation, which refers to efforts to reduce GHG emissions; the other is adaptation and refers to a wide range of actions to help adjust social systems to a changing climate. Much of the philosophical debate has revolved around the allocation of mitigation duties. More recently, questions of justice for adaptation along with alternative perspectives that challenge the allocative framework have been attracting interest.
Cosmopolitanism
Authors: Held David , Maffettone Pietro 
Published: September 2018

Cosmopolitanism, in the broadest sense, is a way of thinking about the human condition. It portrays humanity as a universal fellowship. The unity to which cosmopolitans refer can be intellectual (we all share a capacity for reason), moral (we are all part of a single moral community), or institutional (we are all vulnerable to the same political evils and thus require shared collective solutions). The cosmopolitan intuition with its drive to highlight commonality is undoubtedly important. It understands that human beings are capable of an enormous range of good and bad, and attempts to embed human activity in a framework of common rules and norms; hence, it seeks to tame the potential for violent conflict. It tries to give us reasons to care for each other and to broaden our moral and intellectual universe beyond the remit of our personal ties and immediate environment. It offers a model of political action that confronts some of the most pressing challenges we face in the twenty-first century and does so by suggesting inclusive institutional solutions.
Yet, cosmopolitanism would not be an attractive philosophical position if it did not consistently strive to address some of its underlying tensions. One of the most intensely shared elements of the human experience is particularity, not unity. We come to the world from families and social and cultural groups, and often develop our moral sensibilities within the framework of public discourses based on specific political traditions. Critics often contend that cosmopolitanism downplays such particularity and is thus unable to reflect one of the most important aspects of persons’ lives. A second encompassing objection leveled at cosmopolitanism is its high degree of utopianism. Cosmopolitanism, its critics contend, is a flight from political reality. Its plans for institutional reform are too abstract to be credible and neglect the importance of power in human political relationships. Cosmopolitans should accept these challenges. Their aim should be to make cosmopolitanism more attractive by explaining the place of special ties in their moral outlook, and to make it more credible by detailing the urgency of cosmopolitan political reform. The enduring success of a cosmopolitan ethos is thus partly reliant on cosmopolitans’ ability to provide convincing answers to these alleged weaknesses.
Animal minds
Authors: Andrews Kristin 
Published: September 2018

By examining the mind across species, we can make better progress on questions about the nature of the mind generally. While this has been acknowledged since ancient times, only recently has the philosophy of animal minds developed into a robust area of philosophical research. One wave of recent discussion focused on the nature and possibility of animal belief. Another wave of discussion focused on and the question of chimpanzee mindreading/theory of mind, or whether chimpanzees understand that other animals have mental states.
A more comprehensive investigation into the philosophy of animal minds came with the publication of the book Species of Mind (1997), written by philosopher Colin Allen and biologist Marc Bekoff. Given a commitment to the evolutionary continuity of mentality, just as we study other animals to better understand physical functions like disease or digestion, we can look at other animals to better understand consciousness, communication, memory, perception, and other aspects of mind. This approach raised methodological questions about how best to study animal minds. Anthropomorphism (the attribution of perhaps uniquely human traits to animals) and the use of anecdotes as data in animal cognition research were hotly debated. In the face of evidence suggesting that vervet monkeys have different alarm calls for different predators, philosophers investigated how best to interpret animal behaviour and communicative signals.
With advances in neurological and biological techniques, scientists started investigating animal consciousness, and philosophers often appealed to empirical research as part of their arguments about whether animals are conscious. Animals also started to gain more attention from ethicists, who often appealed to mental properties in their arguments for granting moral status to animals.
At the same time that the philosophical interest in animal minds has grown, many more findings in animal cognition have come from research in psychology, biology, and anthropology. In many cases, the philosophical and scientific discussions are tightly intertwined. This is apparent in the numerous philosophical articles that take empirical research into account as well as in the rich discussions about animal cognitive capacities that often arise from particular empirical findings.
Vision
Authors: Orlandi Nico 
Published: September 2018

Why do things look to us as they do? This question, formulated by psychologist Kurt Koffka, identifies the main problematic of vision science. Consider looking at a black cat. We tend to see both the cat and its colour as the same at different times. Despite the ease with which this perception occurs, the process by which we perceive is fairly complex. The initial stimulation that gives rise to seeing, consists in a pattern of light that projects on the retina – a light-sensitive layer of the eye. The so-called ‘retinal image’ is a two-dimensional projection that does not correspond in any obvious manner to the way things look. It is not three-dimensional, coloured and shaped in a similar fashion to the objects of our experience. Indeed the light projected from objects is not just different from what we see, it is also both continuously changing and ambiguous. Because the cat moves around, the light it reflects changes from moment to moment. The cat’s projection on the retina correspondingly changes in size. We do not, however, see the cat as changing in size. We tend to see it as size-constant and uniformly coloured through time. How do we explain this constancy?
Along similar lines, the cat’s white paws cause on the retina a patch of light that differs in intensity from the rest. This patch could also be caused by a change in illumination. A black surface illuminated very brightly can look like a white surface illuminated very dimly. This means that the light hitting the retina from the paws is underdetermined – it does not uniquely specify what is present. But, again, we tend to see the paws as consistently white. We do not see them as shifting from being white to being black, but illuminated brightly. How do we explain this stability? A central aim of theories of vision is to answer these questions.
The science that attempts to address these queries is interdisciplinary. Traditionally, philosophical theories of vision have influenced psychological theories and vice versa. The collaboration between these disciplines eventually developed into what is now known as cognitive science. Cognitive science includes – in addition to philosophy and psychology – computer science, linguistics and neuroscience. Cognitive scientists aim primarily to understand the process by which we see. Philosophers are interested in this topic particularly as it connects to understanding the nature of our acquaintance with reality.
Theories of vision differ along many dimensions. Giving a full survey is not possible in this entry. One useful difference is whether a theory presumes that visual perception involves a psychological process. Psychological theories of vision hold that in achieving perception – which is itself a psychological state – the organism uses other psychological material. Opponents of psychological theories prefer to make reference to physiological, mechanical and neurophysiological explanations.
Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. AD 200)
Authors: Sharples R.W. 
Published: September 2018

The Peripatetic philosopher Alexander was known to posterity as the commentator on Aristotle, until Averroes took over this title. His commentaries eclipsed most of those of his predecessors, which now survive only in scattered quotations. Used by Plotinus, Alexander’s commentaries were the basis for subsequent work on Aristotle by Neoplatonist commentators, and even though some themselves survive only in quotations by these later writers, Alexander’s interpretations of particular passages are still helpful and are cited by commentators today.
In addition to Alexander’s commentaries we have a number of monographs, and also collections of short discussions which are connected with themes in his writings, though some are probably by pupils rather than by Alexander himself. Alexander’s most influential and controversial doctrine has been his interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of soul and intellect; regarding the soul as the product of the mixture of the bodily elements, he has been seen as subordinating form to matter and as thereby misinterpreting Aristotle. Certainly his view excludes any immortality for individuals, but even if Aristotle himself allowed this it is arguable that to do so was incompatible with his definition of soul as the form of potentially living body. Alexander himself interpreted Aristotle’s ‘active intellect’ not as an immortal element in each individual, but as god, the unmoved mover, apprehended by our own intellects. Both on the question of soul and on that of the status of universals, Alexander gives a non-Platonizing reading of Aristotle, which accounts for some of the criticism to which he has been subjected by successors both ancient and modern. His treatment of the problem of free will has also been influential, though his criticisms of determinism are more telling than his own positive solution.
Seeing his task as interpreting Aristotle’s writings with the aid of one another and explaining apparent inconsistencies, Alexander contributed to the growth of Aristotelianism as a system; he does not criticize nor challenge Aristotle, and regards his own innovations as Aristotelian doctrine, developed in the context of new questions which Aristotle himself had not confronted in the same form. He was better at seeing the details than at comprehending the global picture, and the potential of some of his doctrinal contributions is most apparent in what they suggested to others; but there is still much to interest philosophers in his detailed argumentation on particular points and passages.