bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Subjective Obligation
Authors: Mason Elinor 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
This chapter offers an account of subjective obligation. Different accounts of rightness and wrongness meet different versions of a ‘responsibility constraint’. Subjective rightness meets a very strong version of the responsibility constraint, and correlates closely with praise- and blameworthiness. It also seems that subjective obligation must be accessible and action guiding. This chapter argues for some modifications to these starting points. First, subjective obligation should be action guiding, but not in the rich sense that people often intend when they say that subjective obligation should be action guiding. Second, it should be anchored in the true Morality, and so is accessible only to those in our moral community. Finally, we cannot formulate subjective obligation in terms of the agent’s beliefs about what ought to be done. Rather, we need to formulate subjective obligation in terms of trying: an agent is fulfilling her subjective obligation when she is trying to do well by Morality.
Trying to Do Well by Morality
Authors: Mason Elinor 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
This chapter presents an account of trying. Trying involves knowledge of the aim and requires accepting the aim as an aim. In other words, there is a ‘reflexivity requirement’ on trying: roughly, the agent must know what she is doing to count as doing it, but her knowledge need not be full awareness in the moment. Additionally, we should understand trying in a strong sense, trying is not ‘merely’ trying. Trying means taking steps that the agent believes most likely to achieve her goal, which may be complex. The chapter closes with an account of failing to try. Failing to try, like trying, involves a conscious, though not necessarily conscious in the moment, grasp of the relevant aim as a required aim. Thus only those who have a grasp of Morality as an aim can count as failing to try to do well by Morality.
Ordinary Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness
Authors: Mason Elinor 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
This chapter defends the connection between subjective rightness and ordinary praiseworthiness. First, merely acting on conscience is not enough for praiseworthiness. On the other hand, merely being motivated towards what is actually good is not enough either. Praiseworthiness, like trying, is subject to a ‘reflexivity requirement’. Nomy Arpaly uses the example of Huck Finn to argue that an agent can be praiseworthy without having a good grasp of morality, and without acting as they believe they ought. On a competing view, the ‘Searchlight View’, full awareness of every relevant aspect of the act at the moment of action is necessary for praise- or blameworthiness. Both of these views fail: Arpaly’s view does not meet the reflexivity requirement, and the Searchlight View meets too strong a version. Some awareness, some background knowledge is required, but it need not be as bright as a searchlight.
Exemptions
Authors: Mason Elinor 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
This chapter explores the complexities of who is in and who is out of our moral community. First, it considers agents who are not impaired in any obvious way, but who are in the grip of a false moral view. Such agents are exempt from ordinary blame even if they could, in principle, be brought into our moral community. There are also agents who understand Morality, but have some sort of motivational incapacity. Proceeding through a discussion of Susan Wolf’s asymmetry thesis and Bernard Williams’s account of moral incapacity, the chapter argues that just as a psychological incapacity to do bad things does not undermine praiseworthiness, so a certain sort of incapacity to act well does not undermine blameworthiness. Last, the chapter argues that there is a way to understand psychopaths such that they do not have moral knowledge, and so are exempt from ordinary blame on that ground.
Taking Responsibility
Authors: Mason Elinor 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
This chapter introduces a third sort of blameworthiness, extended blameworthiness. The argument defends the idea that we can take responsibility. One kind of relevant case was discussed in Chapter 6: sometimes agents try hard, but because of their own bad motivations, do badly. This chapter returns to that case, and considers two other challenges: cases where an agent’s act or omission is bad but entirely inadvertent, and cases where an agent acts through implicit biases. In these cases, there is some pull to find the agent blameworthy. We can make sense of that by arguing that when certain sorts of relationship are at stake, agents should take responsibility for their failures and be willing to engage in the blame conversation. In taking responsibility they become properly blameworthy in the extended way.
What is The State?
Authors: Lawford-Smith Holly 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
Chapter 2 focuses on alternative conceptions of the state. It presents several different models of the state drawn from different academic disciplines: political science, international relations, political philosophy, and international law. These include states as political leaders; states as unified national governments; states as defined in the Montevideo Convention; states as the citizenry taken together (at least in democratic states); states as competing organizations; and states as competing leaders of organizations. It is argued that particular attention should be paid to two of these models: the citizenry taken together (because this accords well with ordinary intuitions about what the state is), and a version of the unified national governments model that restricts membership in the state to those involved in the wider government administration. Both of these models are taken forward into Chapters 3 and 4 (respectively), in asking whether each group counts as a collective agent, capable of intentional action.
Governmental Culpability
Authors: Lawford-Smith Holly 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
This chapter returns to the issue of what the normative implications of collective culpability are for members of the collective (e.g. those in government, public services, defence forces and the police). After setting aside some preliminary worries with the idea of collective punishment, the chapter argues for a distribution of culpability under a particular transformation: proportional to hierarchy in the collective. This entails that all members get a share in the collective’s culpability, but some get a greater share than others. This conclusion is defended against several objections, including the problem that some employees may have done all they could to prevent a collective harm taking place.
Shelley, Lamb, Hazlitt, and the Revolutionary Imagination
Authors: O'Neill Michael 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
This chapter is concerned with the revolutionary imagination and Shelley’s relationship with Charles Lamb and William Hazlitt. It examines the personal and critical tensions between Shelley and his older contemporaries. Although Lamb and Hazlitt were outspoken in their objections to Shelley’s poetry and politics, the chapter traces their many affinities. It focuses mainly on Hazlitt’s response to Shelley and the conflicting feelings of contempt and admiration that Hazlitt has for Shelley and his poetry. The chapter identifies the ways in which the two writers converge and depart in their revolutionary, poetic, and philosophical ideals. Hazlitt, who places great value on disinterestedness, is identified as at first hopeful but ultimately aware of the difficulty of sustaining his revolutionary ideals. Thus, Hazlitt criticizes in Shelley an optimism that he believes to be naive. For Hazlitt, Shelley’s idealism isolates him and diminishes the potential achievement of his poetry. The chapter draws out the brilliance of Lamb’s and Hazlitt’s prose, and identifies ways in which the other Romantic poets’ antipathy toward Shelley is often accompanied with admiration. The chapter argues that Lamb’s and Hazlitt’s dislike of Shelley coexists with admiration, and that many of their condemnations of Shelley’s poetic, philosophical, and political ideals reveal an underlying acknowledgement of Shelley’s poetic genius.
Shelley and Southey Reconsidered
Authors: O'Neill Michael 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
‘Shelley and Southey Reconsidered’ provides a fresh approach to viewing Shelley’s relationship with Southey. It points out that in spite of the mythology created by Thomas Jefferson Hogg, in which Shelley is bored to sleep by Southey’s self-indulgent readings of his own works, Shelley’s initial response to Southey was genuine admiration mingled with criticism. The chapter argues that, for Shelley, his attitude of dissent towards Southey is ‘imaginatively productive’. Rather than discarding Southey and his work as of no value, Shelley alludes to Southey often in his own works and harnesses aspects of Southey’s style for its inherent revolutionary qualities as well as its originality. Although Shelley’s references to Southey in his letters often involve strong critiques of what Shelley sees as Southey’s growing orthodoxy, his ‘tergiversation’ and condoning of ‘Bigotry Tyranny and Law’, they reveal a continuing engagement with Southey’s verse. The chapter points out that, in alluding to Southey, Shelley seeks to rewrite elements of the older poet’s works rather than to discredit them entirely. This chapter identifies some of Southey’s most ambitious poetic passages and how the older poet’s skill lingered in Shelley’s imagination and continued to elicit response. The chapter points out that Shelley’s capacity for doubleness in his poetry, his ability to perceive contradiction in both human nature and in the natural world, are apparent in his intertextual relationship with Southey, a relationship exemplified by hope and admiration commingled with disillusionment and disappointment.
Turning to Dante
Authors: O'Neill Michael 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
Chapter 11 offers an additional perspective on the discussion of Adonais in the preceding chapter. Attending to the process by which Keats is immortalized as Adonais, this chapter considers the creative dialogue between Dante and Shelley. Using Dante, in part, as a vital alternative to contemporary British cultural and philosophical norms, Shelley almost seems to reverse the linearity of influence, as Richard Harter Fogle suggests when he refers to Paradiso 30 as ‘highly Shelleyan’. Dante’s presence in Adonais is both subtle and pervasive, even as Shelley’s individuality comes to the fore as he adapts and alters Dante’s medieval Catholic vision. Viewed in this light, Adonais emerges, newly, as a work that answers to Shelley’s affirmation that his poem is ‘a highly wrought piece of art’. Dante, like Shelley, recognizes that he is engaged in the process of figuring, shadowing forth, finding poetic equivalents for visionary apprehensions. Shelley’s own ‘sudden leap’ is in the direction of a ‘sacred strain’ (to borrow Dantean phrases) but one that is sung by a modem poet who is, who must be, priest of his own imaginative religion, rather as Keats imagines himself to be in the second half of ‘Ode to Psyche’. What happens is more than a Romantic raid on the medieval Catholic Thomist epic; it is also a matter of independent responsiveness, as Shelley both appropriates and honours Dante, and seeks resurgent consolation and existential encouragement through the act and fact of poetic creativity. Shelley is often most original at the very points where we most detect Dante’s influence.
Shelley, Beddoes, Death, and Reputation
Authors: O'Neill Michael 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
Chapter 13 explores the response of the poet and dramatist Thomas Lovell Beddoes to Shelley’s work. It suggests that Beddoes’s concern with imagery of death and resurrection derives from figurative patterns in Shelley and expresses a preoccupation with questions of poetic legacy and reputation. At times Beddoes brings to mind in his dealings with Shelley Harold Bloom’s theory of the anxiety of influence: Beddoes’s very readiness to suffer neglect may suggest an act of ‘kenosis’, that ‘ “undoing” and … “isolating” movement of the imagination’ which is the third of Bloom’s revisionary ratios. Elsewhere, Bloom writes that ‘Beddoes, in despair of his times and of himself, chose to waste his genius on a theme that baffled his own imagination’. But Beddoes, who helped with the publication of Shelley’s Posthumous Poems (1824), was engaged complexly and, the chapter argues, impressively in his writing with questions of reputation raised by Shelley’s legacy. More often than he yields to ‘despair’, Beddoes holds ghostly commune with the dead Shelley in ways that seek to pay tribute rather than express anxiety; he does so, as this chapter shows, by developing imaginative modes that are at once stylishly and grotesquely productive.
‘Beautiful but Ideal’
Authors: O'Neill Michael 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
Chapter 15 draws out the complexity of Landon’s relationship with Shelley. Landon goes far beyond irony alone in her range of responses to Shelley. Balancing her influences, from Wordsworth and Byron to Shelley, Landon creates a multi-tonal and elusive inflection in her most accomplished poetry. The chapter’s stress is on her intricate relationship with Shelley, a poet to whom she responds in a fluid and productive manner. If she sympathizes, she qualifies, yet if she withholds total assent from his vision, she does not disavow its hold over her imagination. The chapter contains a detailed reading of ‘Lines of Life’, a poem whose individual timbre re-orchestrates Shelleyan concerns with the role of the writer, reflexivity, posterity, and inspiration. Landon responds most vividly to Shelley, the chapter suggests, when she hears in his work the accents of transcendental seeker and anguishing elegist.
Coda
Authors: O'Neill Michael 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
This Coda considers Shelley’s reception at the hands of A. C. Bradley, a critic distinguished by his tough-minded though sympathetically mobile readings of Shelley’s poetry. Bradley’s ‘adoration’ shifted into a more sobered, even self-divided admiration, yet he remains among the best critics of Shelley because he is always testing his response to the Romantic poet. He does so in, among other places, the essay mentioned above; in the earlier piece, ‘Shelley’s View of Poetry’, included in the Oxford Lectures on Poetry, which contains other material on Shelley, principally in the essay ‘The Long Poem in the Age of Wordsworth’; in his short pieces (collected in A Miscellany) on ‘Coleridge-Echoes in Shelley’s Poems’ and ‘Odours and Flowers in the Poetry of Shelley’, which contains a cogent footnote doubting the validity of reading Alastor as showing that ‘the failure of the hero comes from his “self-centred seclusion’”; and in his notes on passages in the poetry and prose, and on The Triumph of Life. He may have been aware of an element in Oxford disdainful of literary criticism as ‘mere chatter about Shelley’, but he was not fearful of analysing the Romantic poet’s work or of laying bare complexities in the poetry and conflict in his responses. How this fine critic shaped his own dialogue with Shelley offers a suggestive model to the reader who wishes still, in ways the book is concerned to foster, to generate ‘new relations’ with the work of a major Romantic poet.
The Archbishop’s Chapel
Authors: Linehan Peter 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
This chapter opens with events in 1334, including the establishment of a new chapel for Braga cathedral to be under the overall charge of the dean, with the proviso that he should not be a foreigner. Details are given of the exhaustive rules (confirmed by the pope) for its staffing; the duties of its chaplains; provision for lodging and feeding; offices; and for burial space to be reserved for archbishops, but not for kings. The chapter then moves on to 1340, the battle of the Salado, followed in 1341 by Afonso IV’s attack on the archbishop of Braga’s possession of that city, since the donation of Braga to the church in 1120 was ‘invalid inasmuch as the city pertained to the corona regis and had not been the property of the donor’. The archbishop’s allegationes in response, as submitted to the judgment of judges at Avignon, are described and analysed.
After Salado
Authors: Linehan Peter 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
Chapter 6 commences in 1342, with a new front opening against the bishop of Porto in the battle for jurisdiction over that city, and with Alfonso XI facing an ultimatum from the pope. We read of Pedro de Casis, the king of Castile’s man at Avignon, and his machinations, papal provision, and the royal civil service. The chapter moves on to the pope’s investiture of Luis de la Cerda with the Canary Islands, questions concerning the identity of Alfonsus de Hispania, and the 1344 siege and capture of Algeciras. A future French pope’s sermons are shown to be doctored by a Spanish amanuensis intent on proving the supremacy of the king of France, ‘except for the king of Spain’. The revised statutes for the archbishop of Braga’s chapel are considered. Finally, Guillelmus de Rivoforcato’s heirs energetic but failed attempts to salvage some of their putative inheritance are described.
Alfonso XI: ‘A King Entire’
Authors: Linehan Peter 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
The author reflects that it is impossible to evaluate the potential of Alfonso XI’s reign had it not been for the Cortes of Alcalá in 1348 and the Black Death. He also points out the significance, of the Glosa castellana of Egidius Colonna’s De regimine principum. Afonso IV’s complaints against the church of Coimbra are seen to show the smack of firm government, with more in the offing. The peninsular clergy and their ‘connubial bliss’ pass before our eyes. The chapter concludes with a general view of Castile in the late 1340s, and a ‘glimpse’ of the Galician Church and its need for firm government, a need which Avignon’s attempts to implement end in failure. Finally, we are reminded of Álvaro Pais and his world.
Convenience or Conversation?
Authors: Driediger-Murphy Lindsay G. 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
This chapter addresses what has long been seen as the best evidence for the modern view that augural theory permitted Romans to fabricate signs that aligned with their own desires, the technique of ‘watching the sky’ (servare de caelo). Modern reconstructions of this technique suppose that practitioners always received the sign they wanted, because if no real sign was forthcoming, one could simply be created by a report (obnuntiatio). On this view, Romans considered such fabrication acceptable, and publicly chose to treat as true signs which they privately knew had been faked. The chapter provides an alternative explanation for the prohibitive effect of sky-watching on assemblies, reinterpreting the ancient evidence (mostly from Cicero) and arguing that sky-watching can be understood as genuine open-ended consultation of Jupiter.
Conclusion
Authors: Driediger-Murphy Lindsay G. 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
The Conclusion proposes avenues for future research in augury and considers the implications of the book’s findings for the nature of Roman religion and cognition. It explores the possibility that Roman willingness to abide by the results of augury was driven by fear of Jupiter. If so, the god would not have been conceived of purely as an equanimous fellow citizen, but as an uncontrollable and potentially hostile person with his own interests and desires, which did not always overlap with those of his human enquirers. This conception of the divine–human relationship suggests that fear may have played an important part in Roman religion. Ultimately, when human and divine will clashed, it was the will of Jupiter, not of the man consulting him, which was supposed to prevail. In theory as in practice, it was the Romans, not their supreme god, who were ‘bound’ by the auguries and auspices.
Informing Realities
Authors: Allen William , Blinder Scott , McNeil Robert 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
This chapter addresses how research and public debate about migration interact with and inform each other, focusing on public perceptions and media coverage as important aspects. Factors including generalized public innumeracy about migration levels, effects of emotions on perceptions, and variation in the perceived credibility of different messengers make communicating information—of which research evidence is an important type—a complex process with multiple points of potential resistance. Meanwhile, the demands and expectations of public users and policy-makers can influence how research happens and the types of questions that are seen to be more meaningful. These interrelationships exist within wider social, political, and economic contexts that, in certain circumstances, are likely to favour some outcomes over others. In total, the chapter argues that the pathway from generating research evidence to impacting public debates is not only uncertain, it is also more complex than is often presumed.
Migration Research and Policy in the United States
Authors: Martin Philip 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
US researchers have reached more consensus on the number and characteristics of migrants than on their socio-economic impacts, especially with regard to unauthorized migrants. When there is consensus among social scientists on some aspect of migration, such as the additional economic output due to the presence of migrants, this consensus result suggests very different policies for advocates. For example, the finding that the US economy may have been up to $10 billion larger in the 1990s due to migrants was touted by advocates of more migrants as proof of their benefits, and criticized by those favouring less migration as the equivalent of two weeks economic growth. President Trump is an example of a policy-maker selectively using migration research to justify restrictionist policies.
A Knowledge-base for the EU External Migration Policy
Authors: Weinar Agnieszka 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
Since the early 2000s, the European Union (EU) has been gradually developing its external migration policy, the Global Approach to Migration. In support of the policy, the EU has been funding research that contributes to a knowledge-base on migration issues outside of its borders. This chapter discusses the experiences of the Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration (CARIM) Observatories at the European University Institute (EUI), one of the central knowledge-brokers funded by the European Commission between 2004 and 2013. The research produced by the Observatories was primarily to serve the European policy-makers but, in the spirit of the EU partnership, they were also intended to benefit the partner countries. The success of the Observatories was possible thanks to a complex net of arrangements and multilateral adjustments. The chapter explores the pathways to that success and provides the insights and lessons for consideration regarding the relationship between research and policy-making in an international context.
Aristotle’s Metaethics
Authors: Berryman Sylvia 
Published: April 2019

Abstract
Aristotle’s critique of attempts to ground ethics in metaphysical abstractions would be the logical place for him to have articulated the case for a naturalistic ethics, but he does not do so. Rather, we find, in Eudemian Ethics, a contrary case for a distinction between the natural good and the practical good. Given Aristotle’s well-known emphasis on the nature of action, and his practice of beginning normative treatises from the nature of action, we can see implicit in this focus an argument that, for rational agents, the fact that we aim at some good commits us to seeking the genuine or true good. This chapter argues that an apparent fallacy in the first sentence of Nicomachean Ethics yields—if properly understood—an insistence that rational agency requires consideration of the truly best goal.