bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Forensic Face Matching
Authors: Roberts Andrew 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This chapter considers the use of forensic face matching as evidence in criminal trials. It provides an account of the evidential rules and principles that govern the admissibility of this form of evidence in common law jurisdictions—namely, the requirement of relevance, the prohibition on evidence of opinion, and the exception to that prohibition for those who possess expertise. It explains that notwithstanding differences in approach to the reception of expert evidence across jurisdictions, and despite persistent and unresolved concerns about its reliability, evidence of image-to-image comparison will be admitted. In contrast, because person-to-image comparison is a task that can usually be undertaken in the courtroom by the fact-finder, the evidence of witnesses who have engaged in this kind of comparison will usually be excluded on the grounds that it does not satisfy the fundamental requirement of relevance.
Introduction
Authors: Rostill Luke 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This chapter introduces the principle of relativity of title and the principle that possession is a source of title. It also introduces the four questions that the book is concerned with: (1) What, for the purposes of the rules concerning the acquisition of title, is possession? (2) What is the nature of the title acquired through possession? (3) What are the grounds of relativity of title? (4) What is the relationship between relativity of title and ownership? The chapter explains why these questions matter and identifies some common answers. It also summarises the book’s main arguments and provides an overview of the other six chapters.
Possession
Authors: Rostill Luke 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This chapter examines the nature of the possession that gives rise to title. It explains that ‘possession’ is ambiguous, particular senses of ‘possession’ are vague, and that the meaning of ‘possession’ shifts from context to context. It argues that, for the purposes of the rules concerning the acquisition of title, the general rule is that one will obtain possession of certain land or a particular chattel if and only if one has (a) exclusive physical control of the land or chattel; and (b) an intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world from it.
Ownership and Relativity of Title
Authors: Rostill Luke 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This chapter examines the relationship between relativity of title and ownership. It is argued that, despite the fact that English law is a multititular system that recognises relativity of title, land and chattels can be owned. But it is a mistake to think that an inferior fee simple or an inferior general property interest has all the incidents of ownership. There are important differences between the legal position of a person who has the best title to a thing and a person who has an inferior title. The former, it is suggested, may have ownership, but the latter does not.
Experience is Knowledge
Authors: Duncan Matt 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
It seems like experience plays a positive—even essential—role in generating some knowledge. The problem is, it’s not clear what that role is. To see this, suppose that when my visual system takes in information about the world it skips the experience step and just immediately generates beliefs in me about my surroundings. A lot of philosophers think that I would still know, via perception, about the world around me. But then that raises the question: How does experience contribute to my having knowledge of my surroundings? Philosophers have given many different answers to this question. In this chapter I offer and defend a different answer that avoids the pitfalls of other answers. I argue that experience is, all by itself, a kind of knowledge—what Bertrand Russell calls “knowledge of things.” So I argue that experience helps generate knowledge simply by being knowledge.
On Characterizing Metaphysical Naturalism
Authors: Chan Lok-Chi 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
The disciplinary characterization (DC) is the most popular approach to defining metaphysical naturalism and physicalism. It defines metaphysical naturalism with reference to scientific theories and defines physicalism with reference to physical theories, and suggests that every entity that exists is a posited entity of these theories. DC has been criticized for its inability to solve Hempel’s dilemma and a list of problems alike. In this chapter, I propose a novel version of DC that can be called a historical paths approach. The idea is (roughly) that metaphysical naturalism can be defined with reference to the historical ideas that current scientific ideas descend from. I argue that it is not rendered implausible by the above problems, and hence that DC is more defensible and attractive than it may first appear. I then argue that the approach also provides a useful framework for the naturalization of the philosophy of mind and phenomenology.
Consciousness and Same Consciousness
Authors: Boeker Ruth 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This chapter distinguishes consciousness that is built into individual mental states from a more complex notion of same consciousness, which additionally involves relations among several mental states. Regarding the former, the author agrees with other interpreters that Lockean consciousness is not a higher order mental state and cannot be identified with reflection, but she questions the view that Locke restricts consciousness to self-consciousness. Locke’s account of same consciousness has been interpreted in a variety of ways: For instance, it has been suggested that he understands same consciousness in terms of memory, appropriation, duration, or a metaphysical fact. Often these proposals are treated as exclusive rival views, which the author takes to be a mistake. Rather many existing interpretations offer important insights into Locke’s understanding of same consciousness, yet they are incomplete on their own. The chapter proposes that his account of same consciousness is richer than commonly acknowledged and involves multiple aspects.
Circularity and Insufficiency Worries
Authors: Boeker Ruth 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This chapter addresses circularity and insufficiency worries that have been raised against Locke’s same consciousness account of personal identity. The chapter distinguishes different versions of circularity problems and shows that Locke has resources to respond to Joseph Butler’s circularity objection. The more pressing worry concerns the question of whether sameness of consciousness is sufficient for personal identity, which is the so-called insufficiency worry. A response to this question calls for an examination of whether sameness of consciousness can ontologically ground personal identity. The chapter proposes that Locke has resources to accept, on the basis of probable reasoning, that same consciousness that has a metaphysical foundation that most likely has relational structure. The advantage of this reading is that it brings to light that he not merely criticizes substance accounts of identity, but also that he has the resources to develop a plausible—though probable—alternative that avoids circularity and insufficiency.
Locke’s Response to the Problems of his Predecessors
Authors: Boeker Ruth 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This chapter situates Locke’s account of personal identity in the context of metaphysical and religious debates of his day, especially the debates concerning the possibility of the afterlife and the resurrection. It adopts Locke’s classifications of the views of his predecessors and examines metaphysical problems for material, Cartesian and non-Cartesian immaterial views of the soul, and views that regard human beings as mind-body unions. It shows that Locke is well aware of these problems and argues that the strength of his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of consciousness is that it provides a response to the various problems that arise for the views of his predecessors. Furthermore, the advantage of his theory is that it does not require him to prove the views of his predecessors to be mistaken, and it is thereby consistent with their mutually exclusive views regarding the materiality and immateriality of thinking substances.
Personal Identity, Transitivity, and Divine Justice
Authors: Boeker Ruth 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This chapter offers a new look at the problem of transitivity. It argues that a genuine question of transitivity arises in the context of the afterlife and a last judgement and that Locke would take the transitivity problem seriously in this context. Recent non-transitive interpretations emphasize that Locke’s account of personal identity fundamentally concerns questions of moral accountability, but they do not give sufficient attention to the religious context of Locke’s view. The chapter develops a hybrid interpretation that combines insights of transitive and non-transitive interpretations. It shows how the hybrid interpretation is grounded in Locke’s account of sameness of consciousness, how it can better accommodate the religious context than competing interpretations without neglecting the insights of non-transitive interpretations. Moreover, it shows with reference to Locke’s writings on religion that his account of personal identity leaves room for repentance.
Locke’s Underlying Background Beliefs
Authors: Boeker Ruth 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This chapter brings together the results of the previous chapters and shows what role Locke’s moral, religious, metaphysical, and epistemic background beliefs play in his thinking about persons and personal identity. Locke breaks with traditional metaphysical debates, first, by adopting a metaphysically agnostic stance with regard to the materiality or immateriality of thinking substances and, second, by arguing for a kind-dependent approach to questions of identity over time. Locke’s moral and legal conception of a person, according to which persons are subjects of accountability, is informed by his moral and religious beliefs. His thinking about moral accountability can be challenged and has been challenged by his contemporaries. Although Locke has good reasons for distinguishing our idea of a person from that of a human being and of a substance, these reasons are based on his metaphysical agnostic views and his religious belief in an afterlife.
Hobbes’s Argument for the Practical Necessity of Colonization
Authors: James David 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
Hobbes attempts to show that practical necessity and human nature are related in such a way that colonization is unavoidable by virtue of its naturalness. Colonization is practically and historically necessary because unavoidable constraints generated by human nature combine with material and social factors to produce certain inevitable outcomes. Hobbes’s account of colonization can also be understood in terms of his negative idea of freedom. Hobbes fails, however, to provide a sufficient explanation of one aspect of modern colonialism, namely, the existence of national liberation movements, while the role of the sovereign implies a different idea of freedom to Hobbes’s purely negative one. This makes colonization appear less natural and necessary than he suggests. Finally, I explore the implications of Hobbes’s account of the causes of colonization in connection with the possibility of a ‘science’ of history and the idea of historical necessity.
Practical Necessity and History II
Authors: James David 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
Kant argues that constraints generated by social antagonism compel individuals to submit themselves to law and state authority, and that international conflict compels states to form a global legal order. The establishment of legal and political order in turn enables human beings to exercise collective control over their conditions of life. In this way, Kant employs the concept of practical necessity in order to explain the transition to a state of affairs in which freedom and necessity are reconciled while introducing minimal assumptions about what motivates agents. It is shown, however, that although practical necessity here tracks a type of normative necessity, Kant fails to explain how the latter can become the direct object of an agent’s willing. I argue that this implies the need for a different picture of history to the one provided by Kant’s idea of universal history.
Practical Necessity, Ethical Freedom, and History
Authors: James David 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
It is explained how the conceptual order of Hegel’s system of right concerns the actualization of ‘ethical’ freedom, which consists in self-determination and self-constraint. Practical necessity plays a key role in explaining not only how agents come to exercise and thereby develop their capacity for ethical freedom, but also how they act in accordance with a normative necessity whose sources are the social and institutional conditions of this form of freedom. This is shown to explain how freedom and necessity are reconciled in Hegel’s theory of ethical life. I argue that ethical freedom is, however, prematurely displaced by a negative idea of freedom that has expansionary implications, despite how this ‘global’ freedom becomes explicit only later in Hegel’s account of world history. I explore the tension between ethical freedom and global freedom in connection with Hegel’s claims concerning the essentially progressive character of world history.
Wastepaper Modernism
Authors: Rosenberg Joseph Elkanah 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
At the same time that writers were becoming infatuated with new technologies like the cinema and the radio, they were also being haunted by their own pages. From Henry James’s fascination with burnt manuscripts to destroyed books in the fiction of the Blitz, from junk mail in the work of Elizabeth Bowen to bureaucratic paperwork in Vladimir Nabokov, modern fiction is littered with images of tattered and useless paper that reveal an increasingly uneasy relationship between literature and its own materials over the course of the twentieth century. Wastepaper Modernism argues that these images are vital to our understanding of modernism, disclosing an anxiety about textual matter that lurks behind the desire for radically different modes of communication. Having its roots in the late nineteenth century, but finding its fullest constellation in the wake of the high modernist experimentation with novelistic form, “wastepaper modernism” arises when fiction imagines its own processes of transmission and representation breaking down. When the descriptive capabilities of the novel exhaust themselves, the wastepaper modernists picture instead the physical decay of the book’s own primary matter. Bringing together book history and media theory with detailed close reading, Wastepaper Modernism reveals modernist literature’s dark sense of itself as a ruin in the making.
Henry James’s Literary Remains
Authors: Rosenberg Joseph Elkanah 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
In his critically neglected autobiographical writings, Henry James depicts himself as a young boy given to cooing over school notebooks, gazing dreamily at peeling bills, and luxuriating in the grease of theatrical posters. Such tattered wastepaper acts as a kind of material plug with which James fills his many confessed memorial gaps: James, that is, stuffs the blank spots of his memory with paper. But the persistence of a tangible past can be a dangerous thing, as James—a prodigious destroyer of his own literary remains—was well aware. Letter-burning, a recurring motif in his fiction from “The Aspern Papers” to The Wings of the Dove, is for James a surprisingly ethical act of destruction: it not only lays troubled ghosts to rest but, at the same time, re-enchants the past by eradicating its ability to speak through matter, transforming the palpable objects of memory into impalpable objects of desire.
Elizabeth Bowen’s Junk Mail
Authors: Rosenberg Joseph Elkanah 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
In Elizabeth Bowen’s The Death of the Heart (1938), the novel’s victimized, orphan-heroine Portia is said to cherish a “wretched little escritoire” stuffed full, as if it “were a bin,” with junk mail. Crammed into an overflowing desk, the advertisements and begging letters that Portia collects have been rendered void: they are circulars that have been taken out of circulation. Like Portia’s desk, Bowen’s fiction is stuffed full of letters: letters sent, lost, found, returned to sender, read, unread, buried, and burned. Such letters offer an image of intimate print reduced to wastepaper. In Bowen’s fiction, the degraded materiality of print corrupts the privacy of the epistolary form, mediating the depths of feeling into clutter. And when wrongly re-circulated—as happens to the letters intercepted by the orphan Leopold in The House in Paris (1935), or the mysterious packet left behind by Guy Danby in A World of Love (1955)—junk mail transforms into a menacing remainder that shatters the boundary between the interior world of memory and consciousness and the exterior world of objects and others.
Introduction
Authors: Begby Endre 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This introductory chapter seeks a preliminary clarification of what prejudice is and why it is a cause of persistent normative concern. It then distinguishes between two normative vocabularies in which that concern can be framed: the moral and the epistemic. When we consider prejudice from a moral point of view, we are concerned with the harms suffered by people who are targeted by prejudiced beliefs, and the moral responsibilities incurred by those who hold these beliefs. When we consider prejudice from an epistemological point of view we are concerned with the cognitive processes by which people come to hold these beliefs. This book is primarily focused on the epistemology of prejudice: the first order of the day is to explain why we should not hope to ground our account of the moral wrongs flowing from prejudice in an account of the epistemic wrongs committed by those who hold these beliefs.
Prejudice from an Epistemological Point of View
Authors: Begby Endre 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
The book’s opening chapter begins by providing a working definition of prejudice in terms of negatively charged stereotypes targeting some group of people, and derivatively, the individuals who comprise this group. It then turns to situating this approach in the larger landscape of contemporary epistemological theory. The study of prejudiced belief falls within the ambit of social epistemology. It should also, it is argued, be considered as a form of situated, applied epistemology. As such, it is recognizably a contribution to “non-ideal epistemology” (a notion to be further elaborated in chapter 3): non-ideal epistemology aims to provide normative guidelines for decision-making under uncertainty. Currently popular “externalist” approaches to epistemology are of no help here. But at the same time, non-ideal epistemology is also not “internalist,” since it routinely holds what we are responsible to a broader subset of the total evidence than is currently in our possession.
The Psychology of Stereotypes
Authors: Begby Endre 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This book has defined prejudice as involving a certain class of negative stereotypes. In chapter 2, this definition is elaborated further in light of developments in social and cognitive psychology. The human mind is an information-processing mechanism operating in real-time. Its defining problem is that of developing effective algorithms to cope with a threat of information overload. These algorithms distinctively involve compression of information, resulting in a predictable loss of fidelity. But even cognitive processing strategies involving significant filtering and compression can be cognitively optimal, relative to our contingent, “non-ideal” cognitive starting points. The basic cognitive expression of this fact is what psychologists call ‘categorization.’ Stereotyping is essentially just categorization applied to the domain of social cognition. As such, no epistemological aspersions can be cast on prejudice simply in virtue of being grounded in stereotypes. The chapter ends by explaining how this research relates to the currently popular concept of ‘implicit bias.’
Evidential Preemption
Authors: Begby Endre 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
So far the book has worked on the assumption that the confrontation with contrary evidence always requires rational believers to reduce their credence in the relevant propositions. This chapter introduces the notion of “evidential preemption,” which occurs when a testifier, in addition to offering testimony that p, also warns the hearer that others will try to persuade them of contrary views. This chapter argues that whenever it is rational for someone to accept the “ground-level” testimony on offer, it is also rational for them to accept the warning about what others will tell them. When they are subsequently confronted with this testimony, its evidential force has effectively been neutralized, since it is, essentially, information the subject has already conditionalized on. In this way, evidential preemption can serve as a tool for “epistemic inoculation,” all but ensuring that subjects cannot make beneficial use of the contrary evidence to correct their beliefs.
Automated Risk Assessment in the Criminal Justice Process
Authors: Begby Endre 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
This chapter addresses recent concerns about “algorithmic bias,” specifically in the context of the criminal justice process. Starting from a recent controversy about the use of “automated risk assessment tools” in criminal sentencing and parole hearings, where evidence suggests that such tools effectively discriminate against minority defendants, this chapter argues that the problem here has nothing in particular to do with algorithm-assisted reasoning, nor is it in any clear sense a case of epistemic bias. Rather, given the data set that we are given to work with, there is reason to think that no improvement to our epistemic routines would deliver significantly better results. Instead, the bias is effectively encoded into the data set itself, via a long history of institutionalized racism. This suggests a different diagnosis of the problem: in deeply divided societies, there may just be no way to simultaneously satisfy our moral ideals and our epistemic ideals.
A Better Approach
Authors: Begby Endre 
Published: March 2021

Abstract
But maybe the relation between morality and epistemology runs in the opposite direction, and it is the range of our epistemic responsibility which constrains the range of our moral responsibility. Initially, this may seem like an unwelcome thought. To the contrary, this chapter argues that it can serve to empower victims of prejudice seeking redress. Moral responsibility is a multi-dimensional concept: while it is plausible that ascriptions of moral blame track ascriptions of epistemic responsibility, other forms of moral liability do not. Drawing on insights from tort law and discrimination law, this chapter argues that victims’ claims to have been wronged in no way depends on their ability to demonstrate that their victimizers were positioned to know that their actions were wrong. This frees victims of prejudice from the substantial burden of having to show that prejudiced believers are—universally, or in any specific case—epistemically irrational in believing as they do.