bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Basic Perceptual Reasons
Authors: Schroeder Mark 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Chapter 3 takes up the first obstacle to the idea that reasons come first among normative concepts in epistemology: the problem of unjustified belief. It does so by introducing the issues that arise in the epistemology of perception when we ask what reason or evidence you acquire for ordinary conclusions about the external world in virtue of having perceptual experiences. The resulting space of possible answers is explored, including the natural ways in which it leads to skepticism, rationalism, coherentism, dogmatism, pure externalism, and disjunctivism. These views are contrasted with answers that allow reasons to be false, and by doing so avoid all of the distinctive commitments of each of these alternatives.
Subjective Reasons and Truth
Authors: Schroeder Mark 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Chapter 4 takes up the question of why epistemologists have been reluctant to endorse answers to what evidence supports basic perceptual beliefs that allow such evidence to be false, and argues that the best philosophical motivation for this commitment is closely related to the problem of unjustified belief. The idea that subjective reasons are just a special case of objective reasons is resisted, as are arguments drawing on felicity data about reports of subjective or motivating reasons. An alternative argument drawing on the idea that perceptual experiences can in themselves be instances of knowledge is addressed, and Williamson’s claim that knowledge is the most general factive stative attitude is refuted. Finally, a simple model for thinking about how subjective reasons could factor into the competition over what it is rational to believe without building in a prior truth or rationality constraint is introduced, drawing on work by John Horty.
The Apparent Factive Attitude View
Authors: Schroeder Mark 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Chapter 5 takes up the question of which way of developing a non-factive answer to what evidence perceptual experiences provide about the external world is most promising. Two forms of the apparent defeasibility of knowledge are introduced: objective defeat and subjective defeat. Each view’s resources for accounting for both objective and subjective defeat are compared, and it is argued that the non-factive content view fails to account for both objective and subjective defeat. In contrast, the apparent factive attitude view, because of its closer relationship to disjunctivist alternatives, is argued to offer clean treatments of both objective and subjective defeat—even better than the disjunctivist alternatives from which it borrows. The distinctive commitments of the apparent factive attitude view are defended, its distinctive treatment of the bootstrapping problem for dogmatism is introduced, and the resulting view is contrasted with Matthew McGrath’s objective looks theory.
Acting and Believing Well
Authors: Schroeder Mark 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Chapter 10 introduces and elaborates on the deliberative role for reasons, and lays out the Fundamental Argument for Reasons First. It is shown that the fact that reasons can be acted on played very little role in any of the main arguments in Chapters 3 through 9, and argued that this means that it is possible to apply yet more leverage in order to show that reasons have analytic and explanatory priority. It is argued that deontic properties such as being the right thing to do, permissible, rational, obligatory, advisable, and the like each come with the corresponding well property of not only doing the right thing, but doing it well. The fact that reasons can be acted on is especially important, it is argued, when it comes to understanding the relationship between right properties and their corresponding well properties. The Fundamental Argument for Reasons First seeks to show that we must appeal to reasons in our analysis and explanation of right properties in order for them to result in corresponding well properties in a way that is non-recursive.
The Kantian Account of Knowledge
Authors: Schroeder Mark 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Chapter 11 elaborates on and defends the account of knowledge—the Kantian Account—that follows from a right reasons account of the nature of well properties. Knowledge, it is argued, is a special case of a well property—one which requires believing well along both objective and subjective dimensions. This, it is argued, makes knowledge involve a kind of match between internal and external components that explains why it is prime and why it has distinctive explanatory power, as argued by Williamson. It explains why defeaters for knowledge come in objective and subjective pairs—even according to pragmatic encroachers. It explains where earlier generations of defeasibility accounts of knowledge went wrong, by adopting subjunctive rather than categorical accounts of the sufficiency of reasons, and by insufficiently appreciating the generality of the relationship between reasons and their weight. And it explains how to avoid Linda Zagzebski’s diagnosis of the inevitability of Gettier cases.
Safeguarding Individuals in the Data-driven Economy—EU Data Protection Framework in a Nutshell
Authors: Vrabec Helena U. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Chapter 2 shows that EU law protects individuals and their data through several provisions of primary and secondary law, which, in many aspects, complement each other. EU primary law refers to the body of treaties which represent the agreement of the EU Member States and form the foundation of the EU. EU secondary law is a specific manifestation of more general fundamental principles of EU law. It comprises unilateral acts such as regulations and directives that enable the EU to exercise its powers. Recognising that the body of law that adds to individual protection in the big-data age has been evolving, the chapter provides an analysis of the most relevant parts of the primary and secondary legislation.
Control as a Central Notion in the Discussion on Data Subject Rights
Authors: Vrabec Helena U. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Chapter 3 establishes a bridge between (a) the general overview of the data-driven economy and the pertaining legal framework, and (b) the specific analysis of data subject control rights. Individual control represents a central notion in philosophical discussions related to people’s autonomy and freedom. In a similar manner, individual control over data plays an important role in the provisions of primary and secondary EU (data protection) law, and has two facets: the normative, meaning that control links back to the values that underpin the entire legal field; and the instrumental, which materialises through the provisions on data subject rights. Despite being a central notion in data protection law, individual control faces many challenges which are rooted in the specific characteristics of the data-driven economy.
Conclusions: Striving for Data Subject Control within and beyond Data Subject Rights
Authors: Vrabec Helena U. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Chapter 9 is a concluding section of the book. It takes a look at the rights from the perspective of effectiveness and analyses them in a more structured manner by utilising a framework of data protection principles from Article 5 of the GDPR. The analysis shows that data subjects’ control rights are sometimes ineffective. However, this part of data protection law must be, nonetheless, maintained, because it not only serves the objective of control but has other objectives too. To mitigate the ineffectiveness, some alterative measures are considered, for example technological solutions and legal mechanisms outside of data protection law. The chapter refers to these alternatives as ‘a holistic approach to control’.
Resultant Luck and the Fairness Intuition
Authors: Lang Gerald 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This chapter examines the ‘Fairness Intuition’, which is the other fundamental constituent in the Anti-Luck Account. The Fairness Intuition holds that it is unfair, not just irrelevant, to hold one agent to be more blameworthy than another if the differences in the outcome of their acts reflect only luck. The Fairness Intuition prescribes ‘Equal Worlds’ for the allocation of blameworthiness, rather than ‘Lucky Worlds’. That does not mean that an agent who would have been more blameworthy than another agent in a Lucky World will be less blameworthy in an Equal World. It all depends. Luck cannot be evaded even in Equal Worlds, which contain ‘fate-sharing luck’. So it is far from clear that, even in terms of fairness, Equal Worlds are preferable to Lucky Worlds. The ‘Moral Cost Argument’ locates an explanation for why one agent may be more blameworthy than another, though the differences between them may reflect only luck: this agent is consequentially liable to be blamed for the foreseeable results of what she does. That liability is present in ‘Bad Cases’, which call for blameworthiness, but it is missing in ‘Good Cases’, which call for praiseworthiness. Thus an asymmetrical attitude to Good Cases and Bad Cases is favoured.
Gauguin’s Lucky Escape
Authors: Lang Gerald 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This chapter tackles Bernard Williams’s argument in his ‘Moral Luck’. Despite some relatively superficial similarities between him and Nagel, Williams’s critical targets differ from Nagel and those who have continued to worry about resultant luck, because Williams is mainly concerned about an agent’s prospects for escaping a Kantian version of morality that he described as the ‘morality system’ by undertaking projects whose success depends on luck. It is suggested that it is difficult to find an interpretation of Williams’s position that does full justice to his various desiderata. Seven interpretations are considered, and the most promising of them makes an agent a beneficiary of moral luck if her acts succeed in transforming her perspective in such a way that she is immune to a certain form of regret for the consequences of what she has done. It is contended that this interpretation does not provide a convincing assault on the morality system, as Williams does not have enough to say about the differences between agents who have genuinely escaped the authority of ordinary morality and agents who have simply decided to ignore morality. Williams’s arguments can be interpreted as providing a model of responsibility which rivals the Restricted Account, but it is argued here that the Restricted Account provides the better way forward.
What is Arbitrary about Moral Arbitrariness?
Authors: Lang Gerald 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
John Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ is often cited as a central source of inspiration for luck egalitarianism, which is, correlatively, often characterized as a more refined version of justice as fairness. Rawls’s distributive hostility to morally arbitrary endowments is standardly interpreted as betraying hostility to distributions that are skewed by brute luck. This chapter argues otherwise. It has two main aims. First, it replaces the standard ‘Neutralization Interpretation’ of Rawls’s main arguments with the ‘Irrelevance Interpretation’. According to the Irrelevance Interpretation, morally arbitrary person endowments ought to play no role in the selection of principles of justice in the original position. According to the Neutralization Interpretation, by contrast, principles of justice ought to expunge the influence of any inequalities that are due to luck. The Irrelevance Interpretation is more permissive of inequalities, just as long as they serve some other purpose, such as improving the position of the worst-off. The Irrelevance Interpretation is also more congenial to Rawls’s investment in the contractarian machinery of the original position and the veil of ignorance.
Justice and Arbitrary Boundaries
Authors: Lang Gerald 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This chapter deals with three problems of discrimination, arising from our membership of certain communities. The first of these concerns the debate between cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitans about international justice. It is just a lucky accident that we were born where we were, but these arbitrary facts can make a huge difference to life chances. Rawlsian non-cosmopolitans thus risk a charge of incoherence if they combine an acceptance of these sources of arbitrariness with a commitment to anti-arbitrariness principles of justice. The Irrelevance Interpretation of Rawls’s justice as fairness advanced in Chapter 7 is used to defuse this charge of incoherence. The second problem concerns the ‘basic equality’ project of establishing robust foundations for human moral equality by locating a morally significant property that every human possesses, and possesses equally. It is contended that the basic equality project is wrongheaded, and that we need not worry about descriptive inequalities among human beings. The third problem concerns interspecies relations and the charge of ‘speciesism’. It is maintained that much anti-speciesist literature rests upon the doctrine of ‘moral individualism’, and that this doctrine is severely flawed. To come to a satisfactory view of what we owe to each other, we need to pay attention to both the properties individuals possess, and also the properties they lack. To do that, in turn, requires that these individuals be situated in certain communities, including species-specific communities.
Continuities through Change, 1641–85
Authors: Ó hAnnracháin Tadhg 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Chapter 2 analyzes the reorganization of Irish Catholicism after the massive disruption of the Cromwellian conquest and settlement. It argues that the leadership chosen to spearhead this movement continued to reflect an emphasis on continental formation and commitment to a post-Tridentine understanding of religious reform. While the Cromwellian period clearly represented a significant caesura in the effective functioning of the Catholic church in Ireland, it did not alter the basis outline of Catholic organization.
Mendelian Executive
Authors: Levinthal Daniel A. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
A “Mendelian” executive is proposed as an image of strategy-making that lies intermediate between the grand strategist suggested by rational choice approaches and a Darwinian process of random variation and market-based differential selection. The Mendelian executive is capable of intentional design efforts in order to explore possible adjacent strategic spaces. Furthermore, the argument developed here highlights the role of intentionality with respect to selection processes within the organization, and the culling and amplification of strategic initiatives. The firm is viewed as operating an “artificial selection” environment in contrast to selection as the direct consequence of the outcome of competitive processes. Examining the nature of the processes generating these experimental variants and the bases of internal selection, and how these selection criteria may themselves change, is argued to be central to the formation of strategy in dynamic environments.
Choice, Selection, and Learning
Authors: Levinthal Daniel A. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
The chapter examines the relationship among processes of choice, selection, and learning. The notions of choice and selection differ with respect to the degree of intentionality that they suggest. However, if “choice” is viewed as the identification of preferential action over some set of latent alternatives, then processes of choice and selection can be seen as differing primarily by their level of analysis. Another critical distinction among these processes is their temporal orientation. In the case of rational choice, selection is driven by a projection of the future consequences of alternative actions. In contrast, evolutionary selection processes are driven by the contemporaneous relative fitness of alternatives. A third perspective is that of learning. Here, the preferential attraction to different alternatives is backward looking, with actions that are perceived to have been associated with more successful outcomes more likely to be enacted than those associated with less successful outcomes.
Exploration and Exploitation
Authors: Levinthal Daniel A. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
While traditionally processes of exploration and exploitation have been understood with respect to the novelty of the associated behavior and the a priori beliefs of the promise of these behaviors, the perspective developed here highlights the possible contestation regarding the merit and promise of a given action or initiative. An action may be viewed as exploratory from an observer’s perspective, while that same action may be considered exploitive from the perspective of the focal actor. The argument highlights the alternative beliefs and cognitive schemas by which promising behaviors and initiatives are evaluated. Validating actions to others, either ex ante or ex post, requires either the validation of particular dimensions of performance or the casting of “shadows” on the dimension of performance valued by others.
Punctuated Change
Authors: Levinthal Daniel A. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
The pace of change is a central question regarding evolutionary dynamics. Some management theorists have pointed to processes of punctuated change; however, it is argued here that such accounts have generally under-attended to the multi-level nature of these processes and in particular to the critical role of speciation. By recognizing the multi-level nature of these dynamics, we can reconcile our often conflicting sense of organizations and technologies as undergoing periods of rapid change, while still conforming to a gradualist perspective with regard to the underlying elements of organizational capabilities and technologies. This argument is developed to consider change processes in three different contexts: the pace of technological change, shifts in organizational strategy and capabilities, and changes in the scope of firms.
A fundamental plane in X-ray binary activity of external galaxies
Authors: Inoue Yoshiyuki , Yabe Kiyoto , Ueda Yoshihiro 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
We construct a new catalog of extragalactic X-ray binaries (XRBs) by matching the latest Chandra source catalog with local galaxy catalogs. Our XRB catalog contains 4430 XRBs hosted by 237 galaxies within ∼130 Mpc. As XRBs dominate the X-ray activity in galaxies, the catalog enables us to study the correlations between the total X-ray luminosity of a galaxy LX,tot, star formation rate $\dot{\rho }_\star$, and stellar mass M⋆. As previously reported, LX,tot is correlated with $\dot{\rho }_\star$ and M⋆. In particular, we find that there is a fundamental plane in those three parameters; $\log L_{\rm X,tot}={38.80^{+0.09}_{-0.12}}+\log (\dot{\rho }_\star + \alpha M_\star )$, where α = (3.36 ± 1.40) × 10−11 yr−1. In order to investigate this relation, we construct a phenomenological binary population synthesis model. We find that the high-mass XRB and low-mass XRB fraction in formed compact object binary systems is $\sim\! 9\%$ and ${0.04}\%$, respectively. Utilizing the latest XMM-Newton and Swift X-ray source catalog data sets, additional XRB candidates are also found, resulting in a total of 5757 XRBs hosted by 311 galaxies.
The co-chaperone HOP3 participates in jasmonic acid signaling by regulating CORONATINE-INSENSITIVE 1 activity
Authors: Muñoz Alfonso , Santamaria M Estrella , Fernández-Bautista Nuria , Mangano Silvina , Toribio René , Martínez Manuel , Berrocal-Lobo Marta , Diaz Isabel , Castellano M Mar 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
HOPs (HSP70–HSP90 organizing proteins) are a highly conserved family of HSP70 and HSP90 co-chaperones whose role in assisting the folding of various hormonal receptors has been extensively studied in mammals. In plants, HOPs are mainly associated with stress response, but their potential involvement in hormonal networks remains completely unexplored. In this article we describe that a member of the HOP family, HOP3, is involved in the jasmonic acid (JA) pathway and is linked to plant defense responses not only to pathogens, but also to a generalist herbivore. The JA pathway regulates responses to Botrytis cinerea infection and to Tetranychus urticae feeding; our data demonstrate that the Arabidopsis (Arabidopsis thaliana) hop3-1 mutant shows an increased susceptibility to both. The hop3-1 mutant exhibits reduced sensitivity to JA derivatives in root growth assays and downregulation of different JA-responsive genes in response to methyl jasmonate, further revealing the relevance of HOP3 in the JA pathway. Interestingly, yeast two-hybrid assays and in planta co-immunoprecipitation assays found that HOP3 interacts with COI1, suggesting that COI1 is a target of HOP3. Consistent with this observation, COI1 activity is reduced in the hop3-1 mutant. All these data strongly suggest that, specifically among HOPs, HOP3 plays a relevant role in the JA pathway by regulating COI1 activity in response to JA and, consequently, participating in defense signaling to biotic stresses.
Weighting gates in circuit complexity and holography
Authors: Akal I 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Motivated by recent studies of quantum computational complexity in quantum field theory and holography, we discuss how weighting certain classes of gates building up a quantum circuit more heavily than others affects the complexity. Utilizing Nielsen’s geometric approach to circuit complexity, we investigate the effects for a regulated field theory for which the optimal circuit is a representation of $GL(N,\mathbb{R})$. More precisely, we work out how a uniformly chosen weighting factor acting on the entangling gates affects the complexity and, particularly, its divergent behavior. We show that assigning a higher cost to the entangling gates increases the complexity. Employing penalized and unpenalized complexities for the $\mathcal{F}_{\kappa=2}$ cost, we further find an interesting relation between the latter and that based on the unpenalized $\mathcal{F}_{\kappa=1}$ cost. In addition, we exhibit how imposing such penalties modifies the leading-order UV divergence in the complexity. We show that appropriately tuning the gate weighting eliminates the additional logarithmic factor, thus resulting in a simple power-law scaling. We also compare the circuit complexity with holographic predictions, specifically based on the complexity=action conjecture, and relate the weighting factor to certain bulk quantities. Finally, we comment on certain expectations concerning the role of gate penalties in defining complexity in field theory and also speculate on possible implications for holography.