bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Response Options for an Offshore Deepwater Blow-Out, A Generic Evaluation of Individual and Combined Response Strategies
Authors: Brandvik Per Johan , Skancke Jørgen , Daae Ragnhild , Sørheim Kristin , Daling Per S. , Hofstad Karina Heitnes , Rantrud Øystein , McKeever Thomas 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
The low oil recovery rates reported during Macondo (3–5% of the released oil) have caused discussions regarding the efficiency of mechanical recovery compared to other oil spill response options. These low recovery rates have unfortunately been used as reference recovery rates in several later modelling studies and oil spill response analysis. Multiple factors could explain these low rates, such as operational priorities, where dispersants and/or in situ burning are given priority before mechanical recovery; extended safety zones; availability of adequate equipment and storage capacity of collected oil; the number of units available; the level of training and the available remote sensing support to guide operations.
This study uses the OSCAR oil spill model to simulate a deep-water oil release to evaluate the effect of different response options both separately and in combination. The evaluated response options are subsea dispersant injection, mechanical recovery, and a combination of these.
As expected, Subsea Dispersant Injection (SSDI) was highly effective and resulted in a significant reduction in residual surface oil (8% of released oil volume, versus 28% for the non-response option, NR). However, using large offshore oil recovery systems also reduced residual surface oil with a similar amount (9% of released oil volume).
These results deviate significantly from the efficiency numbers reported after the Macondo incident and from later modelling studies scaled after the Macondo recovery rates. The increased efficiency of mechanical reported in this study is mainly due to inclusion of updated descriptions of response capabilities, reduced exclusion zone, a more realistic representation of surface oil distribution and modelling of response units' interactions with oil, (efficient oil recovery only on thick parts of the oil slick).
The response capabilities and efficiency numbers for the different response options used in this study are based on equipment specifications from multiple response providers and authorities (Norwegian Clean Seas organisation (NOFO), Oil Spill Response (OSRL), Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA), US Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and others). These capabilities are justified by well-established contingency plans, offshore exercises and annual equipment performance testing with oil.
Large scale exercise in Norway – Exercise Frohavet 2019
Authors: Fiksdal Gry Eide , Fullwood Cathrine Floen 
Published: December 2021

ABSTRACT
« October 8th at 1630 hours: Equinor reports loss of well control on the exploration well «Staalull». Large amounts of crude oil flow continuously from the seabed at the depth of 1200 feet. An oil spill from the exploration well has a potential for landfall within five days. The oil characteristics are unknown. Equinor is unable to control the well and needs to start planning for a relief well. This may take several months. »
This is a potential scenario for a major oil spill and the exercise planned for the Norwegian coast, October 2019. Approximately 600 responders were involved.
The intention was to test Equinor and NOFO (The Norwegian Clean Seas Association for Operating Companies) and their ability to handle a long-lasting oil spill in a safe and secure manner – within all barriers.
The exercise involved Equinor CMT (Crisis Management Team), IMT (Incident Management Team), NOFO, offshore and nearshore vessels, aircraft, digital SCAT (Shoreline Cleanup and Assessment Technique) surveys and beach cleaning operations at different locations onshore.
The main goal of the exercise was interaction and communication within and between the different response organisations. The intermediate objectives were 1) establish a common situational awareness and 2) communicate accurate information at the right time to affected parties.
The exercise took place at seven different locations in Norway and establishment and maintenance of situational awareness throughout the response organisation was crucial to the effective handling of the incident. This required effective communication and information sharing throughout all levels. The incident management is based on the Incident Command System (ICS), but modified to align with Norwegian conditions.
During the exercise we performed an extensive evaluation of all the organisations; with feedback to and from the personnel involved. The result of the evaluation, lessons learned, and implementation of improvements within the organisations involved, will improve the Norwegian industry's ability to manage long-lasting oils spills in the future.
Recent Development on Herder Commercialization
Authors: Nedwed Tim , Pegau Scott , Stone Karen 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
Herders (also known as surface collecting agents) are made of surface active compounds (surfactants). They reduce the surface tension of water and thereby change the spreading behavior of immiscible liquids, such as an oil slick, floating on the surface. Oil slicks that have spread too thin to burn can be re-thickened if herders are sprayed on the water surface around a slick. Once the slick is thickened, it is amenable to in situ burning without the need for fire-resistant boom. Herders are listed as surface collecting agents on the National Contingency Product Schedule administered by the US Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA, 2019) for use in US waters. Herders are commercially available and oil spill response organizations have the capability to utilize herders.
A new joint industry / government agency project was recently initiated to develop a novel herder delivery and ignition system. The initial plan is to develop a remotely operated surface vehicle (RSV) that will deliver herder from an onboard reservoir and a system to ignite herded slicks. The RSV we are developing has 10–12 hours of operation time, a range of 500 miles and can travel at speeds of up to 65 miles/hour. The RSV can be deployed from a helicopter that has a cargo hook, a boat, and potentially a fixed-wing aircraft that has an appropriately sized hatch. The vision is rapid deployed to a remote spill location using a helicopter (or a fixed-wing aircraft) and operated from this platform until a response vessel arrives on the scene. The response vessel can then take over RSV control freeing the aircraft for other duties.
This paper will describe the planned development and testing of the RSV and other progress toward herder commercialization.
ESA Section 7: Pre-spill Planning Updates and Emergency Consultations
Authors: LaMorte LCDR John 
Published: December 2021

ABSTRACT
In 2001 the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (collectively referred to as Action Agencies) along with the Department of the Interior's (DOI) United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and the Department of Commerce (DOC) National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) (collectively referred to as the Services) signed the 2001 Inter-agency Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)1. The purpose of this 2001 MOA was to “identify and incorporate plans and procedures to protect listed species and designated critical habitat during spill planning and response activities” (USCG, EPA, USFWS, and NMFS, 2001). The procedures outlined in the 2001 MOA are based on the need to meet legal requirements set forth in the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP) (Title 40 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 300 [40 CFR § 300]), the Clean Water Act of 1972, and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973 [16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.]. The 2001 MOA established procedures to improve the conservation of listed species and the oil spill planning and response procedures delineated in the NCP. Streamlining this process is required by section 7(a)(1) of the ESA. (USCG, 2018).
The MOA also coordinates the consultation requirements specified in the ESA regulations, 50 C.F.R. § 402, with pollution response responsibilities outlined in the NCP. It addresses three areas of oil spill response: 1) pre-spill planning activities; 2) spill response event activities; and 3) post-spill activities. (USCG, 2018). Though this document outlined procedures for how the Action Agencies and the Services were to comply with ESA Section 7, there still existed ambiguities and lack of national level guidance on how agencies were to comply with ESA Section 7. More specifically, these concerns pertained to pre-spill, emergency, and post-response operations. To alleviate the demand in the field for further ESA Section 7 guidance the National Response Team (NRT)2 established the NEC Subcommittee which quickly began developing guidance for federal agencies in order to assist these agencies maintain environmental compliance for oil and hazardous substance incident response operations. This paper will provide an update from the 2017 IOSC ESA presentation, discuss what products the NEC is currently developing and how previous NEC products have since been implemented.
Marine Mammals and Respiration: Evidence of Poor Pulmonary Health in Bottlenose Dolphins Following the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
Authors: Smith Cynthia R. , Rowles Teresa K. , Gomez Forrest M. , Colegrove Kathleen M. , Takeshita Ryan , Zolman Eric S. , Balmer Brian C. , Wells Randall S. , Townsend Forrest I. , Schwacke Lori H. 
Published: December 2021

ABSTRACTThe Deepwater Horizon (DWH) disaster resulted in large-scale contamination of bays, sounds, and estuaries in the northern Gulf of Mexico (GoM), home to multiple stocks of bottlenose dolphins. Inhalation, direct aspiration, ingestion with subsequent aspiration, and dermal absorption of oil and its toxic components were all considered possible routes of exposure for dolphins living within the oil spill footprint. To determine if dolphins were adversely impacted, capture-release health assessments were performed in heavily-oiled Barataria Bay (BB), Louisiana, and in Sarasota Bay (SB), Florida, a comparison site with no DWH oil contamination. Initial studies were conducted as part of a Natural Resource Damage Assessment (2011–2014), with follow-on studies supported by the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative (2016–2018). To specifically evaluate pulmonary health, transthoracic ultrasound techniques previously developed for managed dolphins were applied to wild dolphins. Results showed that BB dolphins were ~5 times more likely to have moderate to severe lung disease than SB dolphins in 2011, the year following the spill. Concurrent pathology investigations of dead dolphins in the northern GoM reported similar pulmonary findings. In 2013 and 2014, moderate to severe lung disease persisted among BB dolphins, and remained elevated relative to the prevalence at the SB comparison site. More recent live animal health assessments (2016–2018) showed long-term persistence and potential worsening of moderate to severe lung disease in BB dolphins, specifically in animals alive during the oil spill (prevalence of 0.20, 0.35, and 0.55 in 2016, 2017, and 2018, respectively). Long-term monitoring of dolphin populations is critical to fully understand the potential for and timeline of individual and population recovery from the impacts of a large-scale oil spill event, as well as the cost-benefit trade-offs for restoration activities. In particular, BB dolphins provide valuable insight into the long-lasting effects of oil and oil-related contaminants on animal, human, and ecosystem health.
A Risk-Based Approach to the Sustainable Management of Spill Response Equipment
Authors: Tan Z.H. , Ong S.B. 
Published: December 2021

ABSTRACT&gt;
Spill response equipment is often kept for prolonged periods until required; such equipment would be operated continuously when deployed, often under harsh conditions detrimental to any equipment. Uncertainty in the reliability of response equipment bears significant risks to operational safety and incident management, especially in critical operations that have a widespread impact during an incident.
A qualitative risk assessment was conducted on OSRL's equipment stockpile, considering their known history of breakdown (probability) and foreseeable impact (severity) during an incident. The resultant matrix categorises them into five different risk levels from low to very high.
Response equipment is categorised in accordance with OSRL's prescribed service life, a set of guidance documents based on the organisation's operational experience and consultation with various manufacturers and other users, forming baseline data of the stockpile. Coupled with the results from the risk assessment conducted, it provides a wider understanding of response equipment from a risk-based perspective. The existing equipment risk profile is mapped out using the above method to provide a high-level overview to decision-makers. Upon discussion with stakeholders, the desired position on the risk profile can be achieved by replacing identified critical equipment or extending the service life of non-critical equipment. A risk-based approach allows a logical prioritisation of actions to be undertaken, in line with the organisation's strategy and enables decision-makers to make plans for a sustainable equipment reinvigoration program over a projected budget and period.
With continual monitoring and assessment in place during planned maintenance, timely feedback can be provided to decision-makers on any changes to risk profile in the equipment stockpile; this not only helps in accurately updating the equipment condition, but also enables the early detection of equipment failure and prompts timely actions for resolution.
Response equipment constitutes a valuable resource in response readiness; an evolved approach to the management of response equipment is discussed here and can be applied for Tier 1 and 2 response equipment to assure equipment reliability.
Ten Years of Advances in Oil Spill Preparedness and Response: A Summary of Key International Industry Programs
Authors: Santner R. , Cramer M. 
Published: December 2021

ABSTRACT
In light of the Deepwater Horizon accident, the oil and gas industry has undertaken various national and global initiatives to advance our knowledge, understanding and approach to oil spill preparedness and response. Notable amongst these, are the IPIECAIOGP (International Association of Oil and Gas Producers) Oil Spill Response Joint Industry Project (OSR-JIP) and the American Petroleum Institute's Joint Industry Task Force (APIJITF). These alone represent million dollars of investment and the collective contribution of hundreds of subject matter experts from around the world.
The above two initiatives have produced numerous technical reports, good practice guides and recommended practices that have offered significant advances in industry's oil spill preparedness and response capabilities. Additionally, the various research projects conducted primarily by API have greatly enhanced the understanding of the efficacy and fate and effects of selected response options with a focus on subsea dispersant injection.
This paper provides an overview and assessment of the key outcomes of these programs as well as highlighting some of the key breakthrough projects including spill impact mitigation assessment (SIMA), incident management, tiered provision of response capability, wildlife response and dispersants. The authors also describe briefly how the industry has continued this legacy through ongoing API and IPIECA/IOGP programs, together with a brief exploration of the full extent of value which may be derived from these kinds of initiatives.
The Evolution and Implementation of Tiered Preparedness & Response
Authors: Foley Paul , Caetano Claudia , Bly Lucy , Nicoll Andrew , Jenkins Rhys , Ming Lee Nai , Heng Thomas , Keane Andrew 
Published: December 2021

ABSTRACT
Simply put, responders and planners define response capability in terms of “what it is”, “how much” and “by when”. The types of capability define the “what”, for example the ability to apply dispersant to a surface slick at sea or the ability to mount an aerial surveillance operation to track and monitor the oil (and the response effort) makes up the Toolbox that responders have at their disposal to mitigate impacts of an oil spill. The IPIECA Good Practice Guide on Tiered Preparedness and Response (TPR) recognises 15 such response capabilities that could be required for any given spill scenario and is a direct output from the Joint Industry Project on Oil Spill Response following the Macondo incident in 2010.
The “how-much” introduces a quantification of the capability and it is important to recognise that capability is not just a physical measure of the hardware itself (i.e. “six skimmers”) but should include assumptions about the trained manpower to deploy, and the logistical support needed to fully enable the resource to be effective.
“By-when” implies a time element that is critical in cascading remote resource effectively. It follows that some capability is required to be immediately available to enable a local response to be initiated quickly and effectively whilst other capabilities, usually only required for larger or more complex spills, can be introduced on a longer lead-time.
To help visualise the dynamics of “what”, “how-much and “by-when”, the IPIECA Guide provides a simple model to illustrate the provision of response capability for any given oil spill risk in the form of a wheel with 15 segments representing each element of capability. Each segment is further divided to illustrate the three tiers of cascading capability (Tier 1, near the centre representing capability immediately available, Tier 2 showing intermediate capability, and Tier 3 around the periphery to indicate additional, possibly internationally-sourced capability that necessitates a longer lead time required for the largest or most complex spills.)
Planners typically use the tool when matching resources to the identified risk, as it can usefully highlight any gaps that may exist in the provision of capability.
This paper draws upon the experience of Oil Spill Response Limited (OSRL) in applying and using the Guide and the TPR wheel, both in planning and in response. Case history evidence will be used to illustrate the benefits and limitations of this industry-adopted planning and response approach.
Advances in Global Industry Response Capability for Source Control
Authors: Guinn Mitch , Castille Craig 
Published: December 2021

ABSTRACT
Within a two-year period from 2009 through 2010, two major loss of containment incidents were experienced by the industry - Montara and Deepwater Horizon/Macondo. The reputation of the industry and its ability to self-regulate were questioned. Proposing a relief well as the primary recovery option was challenged, and after the failures of initial recovery efforts at Macondo, the US Dept. of Interior imposed a drilling moratorium to allow for the development of more effective response technologies. Several operator-led initiatives were commissioned: ExxonMobil initiated the establishment of the Marine Well Containment Company (MWCC) with Shell, Chevron and ConocoPhillips as founding members. MWCC was initially configured for large companies with multi-disciplined resources to support a full-scale response.Noble Energy and other operators, together with Helix Energy Solution Group (HESG), established an alternate option to MWCC that was built around the mutual aid model. Helix Well Containment Group (HWCG, and later just HWCG, LLC) was better adapted to the needs of small to mid-sized companies.The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP) established the Global Industry Response Group (GIRG), consisting of its worldwide membership of oil and gas producers, and tasked it with developing a plan to address the response deficiencies discovered during the Macondo incident. The initial GIRG report (May 2011) launched the Subsea Well Response Project (SWRP), which was charged with developing a design basis for subsea capping and containment systems.The GIRG report also founded the Wells Experts Committee and its Subsea Well Source Control Response Sub-committee which now acts as an industry center for knowledge and sharing.The SWRP was founded and led by nine of the world's largest oil & gas operators and upon project completion, Oil Spill Response, Ltd. (OSRL), was selected to manage the capping and containment equipment.In addition, some operators and multiple well control organizations developed a variety of additional capping stacks and debris removal equipment packages.
During development, response equipment and systems were risk-assessed and tested via tabletop exercises. Knowledge was shared across the industry, and as the new equipment packages became physically available, a range of full-scale exercises were conducted which included physically loading aircraft and vessels and deploying equipment on abandoned wells.
This paper steps back through the careful forethought in the development of these systems and shares some insights and strategic thinking behind the rationale of different response options and how they are strategically located to provide a global response.
Resources at risk: making the most of the ICS 232 form
Authors: Dubach Helen , Buschang Steve 
Published: December 2021

ABSTRACT&gt;
The ICS 232 Resources at Risk summary form is a key tool for the communication of resources at risk from an oil or chemical spill. Completion of the form requires consideration of environmental, archeocultural, and socio-economic resources that may be affected by a spill. This process of research, identification, prioritization, documentation, and communication of potential resources in the pathway of a spill is typically conducted within the Environmental Unit (EU) by the Resources at Risk (RAR) Technical Specialist or Environmental Unit Leader (EUL), with input from relevant stakeholders and trustees. The purpose of the form is twofold: to provide environmental information to aid assessment and decision making, for example: identifying where to conduct wildlife reconnaissance surveys, identifying resources of concern for Spill Impact Mitigation Assessment (SIMA)/ Net Environmental Benefit Analysis (NEBA), and recommending cleanup techniques and endpoints; andTo provide direct priorities for protection for response operations, such as from pre-established Geographic Response Plans (GRPs) or Geographic Response Strategies (GRSs), and other static or Geographic Informational Systems (GIS) data sources.
In recent years, GRP/GRSs have become more commonplace in contingency plans, and have become more practical for response operations, to a degree that some plans include executing the GRP/GRSs as ready-made ICS 204 (work order) forms to provide direct instruction to response operations on site location, access, operational strategies, and equipment required to protect specific resources. This pre-spill information can be valuable to ensure that priority resources are protected within the short window of opportunity that is typically available at the beginning of a response; and allows quick decision-making without the need for in-depth consideration of sensitivity and resource maps. A potential downside to this convenient data, which will be explored in this paper, is that we risk relying entirely on using the GRP data to provide operational protection priorities and losing the specific data on the resources we are aiming to protect. This reduces the purpose of the form to a purely operational instruction, without the documentation of environmental data that is essential for assessment and decision making within the Environmental Unit. This paper considers the use of the ICS 232 (Resources at Risk) form, how its use has developed over the years, and how the availability of GRPs has, in some areas, shifted the use of the form to a more directly operational purpose. Recommendations are provided for ensuring that the environmental information component is not forgotten.