bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Perpetual War or Perpetual Peace
Authors: Ripstein Arthur 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
This chapter introduces the Kantian conception of right in war, arguing that Kant regards peace as the principle through which everything about war must be judged. The Kantian position is contrasted with two other ways of thinking about war. The just war tradition conceives of war as an enforcement action against wrongdoer. The regular war tradition understands war as a mode of dispute resolution between sovereigns. Both go wrong in their conception of the moral nature of the state. The just war tradition conceives of the state as having universal jurisdiction to right wrongs of any kind anywhere on earth; the regular war tradition conceives it as the private domain of its sovereign. In place of these conceptions, Kant develops a distinctively public conception of the state, and an account of what is distinctively wrong with war. This account has fundamental implications for each of the right to go to war, right in war, and right after war.
Universal Health Coverage
Authors: Mukherjee Joia S. 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
As part of the Sustainable Development Goals the right to health is captured under the rubric of universal health coverage (UHC). That is that all people should have access to the high quality care they need without suffering financial hardship. This chapter explores this seminal topic reviewing the theory of universal coverage and definitions that shape the current conversation about UHC. This chapter also highlights some important steps taken by countries to expand access to quality health care but challenges the rhetoric that financing care through insurance schemes, a common approach to UHC) is sufficient when the inputs into the health systems do not match the disease burden. Finally, the chapter investigates the theory and practice behind a morbidity-based approach to strengthening health systems and achieving UHC.
Community Health Workers
Authors: Mukherjee Joia S. 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
Community health workers (CHWs) represent an important cadre of health workers, particularly in impoverished countries. The CHW program began with China’s barefoot doctor campaign. The barefoot doctors were laypeople who were educated to provide basic medical education and care in rural China in the 1950s to the 1970s. CHWs have evolved over the years and now perform a variety of functions in many countries, from education to prevention, case finding to treatments, and referral to follow-up. They are often used to fill the gap in human resources. There are a number of challenges in scaling up and sustaining CHW programs, including providing adequate training, compensation, and supervision for them within the health system. This chapter begins with a look back at the roots of CHW programs and goes on to explore the current status of CHWs and to address some of the challenges to using their full potential.
Governance and International Cooperation
Authors: Mukherjee Joia S. 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
Governance represents a key building block of a health system. A government is responsible for the health of its people. It sets the health strategy and oversees the implementation of health programs. External forces and actors influence the governance of the health sector. This chapter explores governance of health from the perspective of the nation-state (sometimes called governance for global health). The chapter also examines the importance of international cooperation, particularly in the setting of a pandemic. In the interconnected and globalized world, global governance for health is needed to coordinate the geopolitical forces that impact health and its social determinants.
Justice
Authors: Mukherjee Joia S. 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
A biosocial analysis (chapter 5) of the health of the world’s population reveals deep structural inequality. Impoverishment based on the historical and present-day impact of racist, nationalism, and neoliberalism assure will continue cause death and suffering unless the status quo changes. There is reason to hope because, as we saw with the movement for AIDS treatment access, activism works. This chapter introduces the concept of social movements. It highlights the strategies and tactics used by successful and ongoing movements that seek global health equity and justice. The chapter also presents concrete examples for action that can be used to help build and support the social movement needed to realize the universal right to health care. The chapter also includes the fight for COVID-19 vaccine equity.
Science Against Interests
Authors: Fèvre Raphaël 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
The second chapter shows that, in the eyes of ordoliberals, power is the source of an epistemological problem. Eucken tried to acquire a scientific understanding of the driving forces underlying the economic order, what he called the actual economic reality. His ambition rested on a method to escape the given and immediate aspects of the reality, which seemed contaminated by vested interests. Thus, Eucken updated the old German methodological quarrel (Methodenstreit). In order to resolve the great antinomy between theory and history, Eucken suggested articulating these two approaches by means of his theory of orders. Eucken aimed at applying theoretical analysis to the uses and abuses of power in the economy but without falling under the influence of the expression of vested interests.
Economy Through Orders
Authors: Fèvre Raphaël 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
Ordoliberals studied the manifestations of power through a “morphological” lens (opposing the centrally administered economy to the economy of exchange), leading Eucken to take a stand in relation to two of the great international discussions of the discipline in the interwar years: the feasibility of a socialist calculation and the debate over imperfect/monopolistic market structures. The theoretical substance of these two debates is closely related to a political quest for stability of the economic and social order. The centrally administered economy is characterized by the strong influence of what ordoliberals saw as illegitimate powers on the economic process. But ordoliberals considered that, within the exchange economy system itself, markets were not free from power relations. The contribution of Stackelberg to the analysis of unbalanced market structures is therefore indispensable for understanding the literary marginalism of the ordoliberals.
The Threat of Skepticism
Authors: Kornblith Hilary 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
What is a theory of knowledge and why do we need one? Traditionally, the need for a theory of knowledge is motivated by way of skeptical argument. Arguments for skepticism start with seemingly obvious premises and move by way of apparently forced inferences to a conclusion—that knowledge is impossible—which is frankly unbelievable. A theory of knowledge is called upon to respond to these arguments and explain how knowledge is possible. This chapter presents an important argument for skepticism and discusses how we should understand it. The view presented here motivates an approach to epistemological questions which deemphasizes the importance of responding to skepticism.
The Phenomenon of Knowledge
Authors: Kornblith Hilary 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
There is a robust phenomenon of knowledge and the theory of knowledge should provide an understanding of it in much the same way that the physical, biological, and social sciences provide an understanding of various physical, biological, and social phenomena. This chapter offers a pretheoretical view of the phenomenon of knowledge in order to pave the way for such a theoretical understanding. The role of perception and inference in gaining knowledge is briefly surveyed, as is the role which social factors play here. The reasons for thinking that knowledge is not the exclusive property of adult human beings are briefly discussed as well.
From the Individual to the Social
Authors: Kornblith Hilary 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
This chapter focuses on social factors in cognition. There is a puzzle about the human capacity to reflect on our beliefs. As argued in Chapter 4, this capacity, when exercised privately, does not make our belief acquisition more reliable. If we assume, however, that this capacity was selected for by evolution, like other features of the human body and human mind, then the question arises as to what it was selected for. This chapter focuses on a hypothesis due to Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber: that our capacity to reflect was selected for its role in cooperative activity. The upshot of this hypothesis, if it should prove correct, is that reflection does indeed contribute to greater reliability in belief acquisition, but only when it is used in cooperative problem-solving rather than private reflection.
Of Sovereignty and Saints
Authors: Lechterman Theodore M. 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
The chapter considers what kinds of goods and services a democratic polity should furnish via donation. Donations are a well-known solution to the problem of “public goods,” goods with characteristics that prevent efficient market provision. But are all such goods equally appropriate objects of philanthropy? Common arguments fail to appreciate that part of democracy’s value lies in reserving certain decisions for collective control. Democracy, the chapter argues, makes citizens sovereign over the legislation and administration of matters of basic justice. Citizens’ interests in democratic sovereignty supply a strong reason to maintain public control over public goods that are intimately linked to fundamental rights, duties, and opportunities. The argument helps to justify and explain discomfort that many share about privately sponsored social assistance and private funding of public schools. It also indicates that philanthropy for goods more distant from basic justice—such as the arts, research, sport, and religion—may be easier to justify in democratic terms.
Donation and Deliberation
Authors: Lechterman Theodore M. 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
How should opportunities for donation be distributed? Laissez-faire treatment of the ability to convert wealth into voice allows wealthier citizens to augment their influence over public affairs, further marginalizing poorer citizens. The present chapter contends that this state of affairs is ultimately incompatible with the requirements of political equality. The reasons to regulate political spending, it argues, also apply to certain kinds of philanthropic donations. It explores various policy proposals for redressing this problem, including a progressive voucher scheme that would replace cash donations for expressive activities with vouchers whose price increases the more vouchers one purchases. Such a proposal seeks to balance interests in liberty and efficiency with the demands of political equality.
In Usufruct to the Living
Authors: Lechterman Theodore M. 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
An especially underappreciated problem regarding philanthropic power concerns the way in which charitable gifts exercise control over future generations. Charitable bequests and trusts, which are popular instruments of donation, bind future generations to respect the wills of past donors. This chapter draws on views of Thomas Jefferson—noted critic of institutions that favor the dead over the living—to illustrate the problem of “dead-hand control.” Jefferson’s perspective helps us to appreciate that donations meant to benefit future persons may also mistreat them by imposing conditions on their use of resources. The chapter argues that generations have an interest in sovereignty over their common affairs that qualifies how resources can be donated across time. Though it ultimately defends the practice of intergenerational philanthropy, the chapter also shows how taking the value of sovereignty seriously recommends restrictions on the duration that donors can expect to have their wills honored.
The Effective Altruist’s Political Problem
Authors: Lechterman Theodore M. 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
What does it mean to give well? This chapter argues that political considerations are essential—though often neglected—ingredients in the practical ethics of giving. It develops through an examination of effective altruism, an increasingly popular and sophisticated perspective on the ethics of philanthropy. A core component of effective altruism is the relief of poverty through targeted interventions in the developing world. The chapter rearticulates and expands on the moral challenges of relieving the symptoms of poverty through philanthropic interventions. It counters that redirecting philanthropists to institutional reform—as effective altruism’s critics often advocate—falls unwittingly into some of the same traps. Unqualified recommendations for diverting more money into politics stumble right into to the challenges of political injustice observed in Chapter 4. The chapter suggests that donors can mitigate these challenges by (e.g.) making assistance projects self-consciously transitional and investing in community organizing rather than direct policy change.
The State
Authors: Lee Daniel 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
The principal focus of Bodin’s major work of political theory wasn’t sovereignty. It was the state [république; respublica], which he conceptualized as a compound pluralistic and ‘harmonious’ association of families and corporate bodies united under the authority of one common sovereign. Applying a typically ‘Ramist’ method of analysis, Bodin sought to separate genuine statehood from those state-like entities that were common in medieval politics, such as feudalities, leagues and alliances, and captive populations subdued under the unlawful force of brigands and pirates [latrones]. Bodin’s respublica marked a theoretical concept of statehood in the most generic sense possible, a category inclusive of all possible forms of state, encompassing the smallest city-republics as well as vast empires. The chapter investigates the principal constituent elements of Bodinian statehood. What binds these elements together to form a sovereign state is more than the bond of friendship. For Bodin, it must be a bond of obligation.
Introduction
Authors: Textor Mark 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
The book is a problem-oriented presentation of (the anti-metaphysical phase of) Austrian philosophy. The introduction motivates the problems that drive the inquiry and gives a characterization of Austrian philosophy. I will outline how the science of psychology was initially conceived by Herbart and other so-called ‘Metaphysical Psychologists’ as the science of the soul and it activities and states. Austro-German Philosophers aim to develop a conception of psychology that is independent of the soul. This serves as a model for the emancipation of empirical science from metaphysics. The introduction relates part I to IV of the book to this narrative and provides a motivation for the final fourth part of the book that assesses epistemological arguments for anti-metaphysics.
‘Psychology without a Soul’
Authors: Textor Mark 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
Empirical psychologists aimed to liberate psychology from the metaphysics of the soul. Psychology is an empirical science independent of metaphysics. This line of argument is inspired by Hume and Lichtenberg’s famous claim that our immediate consciousness is consciousness of subjectless processes and events. The leading empirical psychologists—Brentano, Mach, Wundt—are encouraged by Lange to dare to develop ‘a psychology without a soul’. The chapter assesses the empiricists’s arguments for this conclusion and the suggested replacements for the soul. The chapter closes by considering Lotze’s response to the empirical psychologists that dispensing with a subject of experience is not in line with the spirit of the empirical approach to psychology.
From Substance and Accident to Complex and Element
Authors: Textor Mark 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
The anti-metaphysical orientation of empirical psychology inspired and provided a model for the criticism of the metaphysics of substance and accident. Lotze and Stumpf, Avenarius and Mach argue for different reasons that the notion of substance is an instrument to simplify our view of the world that seems initially advantages but then gives rise to pseudo-questions about the nature of substance and the distinction between reality and appearance. Just as the soul needs to go, substance needs to go ! But common sense and, following it, philosophy had conceived of reality in terms of substances and properties of them. Hence, properties also need to go. The new ontology that sits better with science and avoids pseudo-questions replaces substances with complexes that have elements. The chapter looks at the development of the new metaphysics and its problems.
Brentano’s One-Term View of Judgement
Authors: Textor Mark 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
The view that (atomic) judgements have at least ‘two terms’—predicate something of an object or objects—is a widely held one in philosophy. The chapter introduces the two-term dogma about judgement as the background for Brentano’s view of judgement. Brentano challenged the dogma and argued that an acknowledgement of an object is a judgement but has only one term. The chapter considers Brentano’s argument in favour of the one-term view and connects them to our understanding of non-epistemic perception. Brentano’s one-term view of judgement will be the philosophical contrary to the two-term views of judgement of the positivists that will figure in chapter 11.
Normativity, Rationality and Reasoning
Authors: Broome John 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
This book is a selection of my recent papers on normativity, rationality and reasoning. It covers a variety of topics that fall under these three subjects: the meanings of ‘ought’, ‘reason’ and ‘reasons’; the fundamental structure of normativity and the metaphysical priority of ought over reasons; the ownership—or agent-relativity—of oughts and reasons; the distinction between rationality and normativity; the notion of rational motivation; what characterizes the human activity of reasoning, and what is the role of normativity within it; the nature of preferences and of reasoning with preferences; and others. In recent decades, many philosophers have given a high priority to reasons in their accounts of normativity, rationality and reasoning. One purpose of this book is to counter this ‘reasons first’ movement in philosophy.
Reason fundamentalism and what is wrong with it
Authors: Broome John 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
Is there a fundamental feature of normativity, to which other features can be reduced? One defensible view is ‘reason fundamentalism’: that the fundamental feature is the relation that holds between a person and F-ing when the person has reason to F. (‘F’ stands for any verb phrase, such as ‘run for the bus’ or ‘hope for relief’ or ‘believe Kampala is in Ghana’.) Another defensible view is ‘ought fundamentalism’: that the fundamental feature is the relation that holds between a person and F-ing when the person ought to F. The popular view that the fundamental feature of normativity is the property of being a reason is not defensible, since that property can be reduced to either of the two relations I have just described. I argue that ought fundamentalism is more credible that reason fundamentalism because it is more faithful to our ordinary normative concepts.
Giving reasons and given reasons
Authors: Broome John 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
Derek Parfit, as a leader of the ‘reasons-first’ movement, says that the concept of a reason is fundamental and indefinable. But his concept of a reason differs from most philosophers’. Most philosophers take a reason to be a fact, whereas Parfit says that reasons are given by facts, not that they are facts. This paper distinguishes Parfit’s concept of a reason, which I call a ‘given reason’, from the more common one, which I call a ‘giving reason’. It argues that, whereas the concept of a giving reason is easily defined, the concept of a given reason is not. Parfit is therefore better placed than most philosophers to defend the claim that the concept of a reason is fundamental and indefinable.
A linguistic turn in the philosophy of normativity?
Authors: Broome John 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
The theory of deontic modality within linguistics, led particularly by Angelika Kratzer, offers an account of the meaning of normative terms including ‘ought’. It is largely based on the standard semantics of deontic logic as it was extended. How should the philosophy of normativity be affected by this theory? I argue that it should not be affected much. For one thing, the philosophy of normativity needs to go beyond the grammatical constraints that ‘ought’, as an auxiliary verb, is subject to. Moreover ‘ought’ in the sense that is central in normativity does not conform to the standard semantics of deontic logic. For this reason, the theory of deontic modality would be improved by adopting a neighbourhood semantics rather than the standard semantics.
Rationality versus normativity
Authors: Broome John 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
Philosophers often do not make as sharp a distinction as they should between rationality and normativity. Partly this is because the word ‘reason’ can be used to refer to either, and partly it is because of substantive arguments that purport to show there is no real distinction. Many philosophers give a reductive account of rationality in terms of reasons. In particular, many claim that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. Since responding correctly to reasons is the concern of normativity, this in effect identifies rationality with normativity. After clarifying the meanings of ‘normativity’ and ‘rationality’, this paper refutes the claim that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons, by means of a ‘quick objection’. The quick objection is that rationality supervenes on the mind whereas complying with normativity does not.
Normativity in reasoning
Authors: Broome John 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
Reasoning is a process through which premise-attitudes give rise to a conclusion-attitude. When you reason actively you operate on the propositions that are the contents of your premise-attitudes, following a rule, to derive a new proposition that is the content of your conclusion-attitude. It may seem that, when you follow a rule, you must, at least implicitly, have the normative belief that you ought to comply with the rule, which guides you to comply. But I argue that to follow a rule is to manifest a particular sort of disposition, which can be interpreted as an intention. An intention is itself a guiding disposition. It can guide you to comply with a rule, and no normative belief is required.
A linking belief is not essential for reasoning
Authors: Broome John 
Published: October 2021

Abstract
In reasoning, you acquire a new conclusion-attitude on the basis of premise-attitudes. It is commonly thought that an essential feature of reasoning is that you have a linking belief, which is a belief that the premises imply the conclusion. This paper shows that a linking belief is not essential for reasoning. A genuinely essential feature of reasoning is that you acquire the conclusion-attitude by following a rule. A linking belief may be a necessary feature of theoretical reasoning, because it may be a consequence of having the disposition to follow a rule. But it is not essential for reasoning, which is to say that it does not contribute to making the process reasoning. For other sorts of reasoning including practical reasoning, a linking belief is not even necessary.