bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Relational Egalitarianism
Authors: Lippert-Rasmussen Kasper 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
Derek Parfit famously introduced a now commonly adopted distinction between telic and deontic distributive egalitarianism. This chapter argues that we can draw a similar distinction between telic and deontic relational egalitarianism. Interestingly, telic relational egalitarianism might be less vulnerable to the levelling-down objection than telic distributive egalitarianism. However, while some relational egalitarian concerns are best captured by telic relational egalitarianism, other concerns are better captured by deontic relational egalitarianism and yet others relating to intergenerational justice are better captured by telic distributive egalitarianism. Accordingly, insofar as we are egalitarians, we should be pluralist egalitarians in a more thoroughgoing way than Parfit entertained.
Duties That Become Supererogatory or Forbidden?
Authors: Kamm F. M. 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This chapter first examines certain of Derek Parfit’s views in his On What Matters, volume iii on the relation between not harming, aiding, and making personal sacrifices to achieve each. It compares his views with those of the author on two different measures of the stringency of duties and the distinction between supererogation and obligation. The chapter goes on to consider implications of these views for cases in which an agent must choose whether to save many people by either (i) not saving or harming someone else or (ii) suffering some large personal loss himself. The chapter continues by arguing against one way in which Parfit thinks an agent-relative deontological conception of one’s duty incorrectly bars our having common aims by requiring each person to minimize the harm he does.
The Successful Communication Principle
Authors: Dougherty Tom 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This chapter introduces the case for the ‘Successful Communication Principle’ for the scope of consent, according to which an action falls within the scope of someone’s consent when the consent-giver successfully communicates an intention to permit this action. This principle pairs with a view of consent as consisting in successful communication between the consent-giver and the consent-receiver. This principle and view can be motivated by the Control Argument, which appeals to the idea that an agent wrongs a victim by acting in the victim’s personal domain in a way that the victim does not control. For a consent-giver to control a consent-receiver’s conduct in virtue of the consent-receiver being guided by their consent, there must be successful communication between the consent-giver and the consent-receiver.
Why We Should Reject the Uptake Condition
Authors: Dougherty Tom 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This chapter argues that we should reject the Uptake Condition, according to which an action falls within the scope of consent only if the consent-receiver successfully interprets the consent-giver’s behaviour as motivated by an intention to permit this action. We should reject this condition on the grounds that a public commitment can be sufficient for consent in the absence of uptake with the consent-receiver. Since the Uptake Condition is implied by the Successful Communication Principle for the scope of consent, we must also reject the Successful Communication Principle. However, since the Behavioural View is not committed to the Uptake Condition, it does not follow that we must reject the Behavioural View.
The Expression of Will View I
Authors: Dougherty Tom 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This chapter begins developing the Expression of Will View, according to which someone consents by expressing their will for how another person behaves. This view is motivated by the Interpersonal Justification Argument, which makes use of the idea that an agent can justify treating an individual in a certain way by appealing to that individual’s consent. By locating consent as a means of interpersonal justification, this approach situates consent alongside forfeiture and waivers as ways that we can give up complaints against other people causally contributing to harms that we suffer. What distinguishes consent from these other bases of interpersonal justification is that consent involves an individual deliberately expressing their will for how an agent behaves.
Pneumatological Emphasis in the Doctrine of Grace
Authors: Ruokanen Miikka 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
Luther’s Pneumatologically accentuated view of grace directs its criticism, first, at Nominalism with its teaching on the concept of free choice, and, second, at Scholasticism with its teaching on justification based on the idea of habitual grace in the human soul created by a process of cooperation between divine grace and its human receiver. Luther follows Augustine: Grace means participation in the personal reality of the Spirit of Jesus Christ and of his Father. The presence of Christ in the sinner—his personal righteousness, his divine life, and his gifts of salvation accomplished on his cross and in his resurrection—is the “alien justice” on the basis of which the sinner is imputed as righteous. The favor (forensic forgiveness) and the donum (the indwelling of the Spirit), the Christological and Pneumatological aspects of justification, are simultaneous and inseparable. For Luther, the Late Medieval teaching of grace, represented by Erasmus, is “cheap grace” contrasting salvation sola gratia. Permitting any human role in salvation promotes secret pride and leads to self-righteousness. In the beginning of creation, the Spirit was the provider of the union between the Creator and the human being. He/she was fully dependent on God’s Spirit, there was no freedom in relation the “things above him/herself.” Sin broke off the relationship, and the humans lost God’s Spirit; consequently, the “slavery of God” was replaced by the slavery of unfaith. The humans became mortal, flesh cannot exist eternally without God’s Spirit; the re-entrance of the Spirit changes the situation.
The Trinitarian Nature of the Pneumatological Grace
Authors: Ruokanen Miikka 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
In his magnum opus Luther follows the Trinitarian logic of John and Paul in the New Testament and the Patristic teaching on the indivisibility of the works of the three persons of the Trinity. When the Holy Spirit of the Father and of the Son makes known Christ, he simultaneously makes known the Father who sent his Son. The mission of the Son depends entirely on his Father who sent him, and the mission of the Son becomes effective only in the power of the Holy Spirit. Only the Spirit makes Christ together with his gifts truly present in the human person, without the Spirit, Christological grace has no impact on the sinner—Christological grace and Pneumatological grace are inseparable and simultaneous. Luther expresses the same truth both in Pneumatological and in Christological terms, the chapter at hand displays extensive evidence on this coincidence. Moreover, Luther creates an explicit analogy between the creation of the universe and of the work of the Holy Spirit enabling the new birth or rebirth of the sinner. The universe was created “from nothing” by the monergistic power of the Triune God, so is the conversion and the faith of the sinner created ex nihilo by God’s Spirit. As human beings “did nothing to create themselves,” likewise they cannot do anything to “newly create” themselves from unbelief to faith; any notion of free choice collapses. The ability of creation and that of new creation are divine properties only: “Let God be God!”
A Theology of Paradoxes
Authors: Ruokanen Miikka 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
Why does God’s Spirit grant the gift of faith to some but not to others? Erasmus solved the dilemma by admitting minimal freedom to the human side, a wrong use of free choice is to be blamed. This is the way of maintaining credibility in the justice of God. Luther’s solution to the dilemma was a distinction between the concepts of “the revealed God,” Deus revelatus, and of “the hidden God,” Deus absconditus. On the notitia level, i.e. in regard to knowing who is elected, we are in total darkness; it is a secret of the hidden majesty. We are restricted to the usus level of election, i.e. to revelation which says that God wills everyone to be saved. God’s will does not follow any human logic of justice, God’s will itself is the norm for itself and cannot be subjected to any rule outside itself. Asking why God does what he does is a concern arising from religious pride; the sovereignty of the divine will utterly annihilates speculation about any grounds for bargaining with God. Luther follows the paradigm of “the theology of the cross”: Anyone who has become “desperate about him/herself” is, paradoxically, already in the state of grace. This paradox brings about certainty of salvation: God has taken the question of salvation completely “outside ourselves” into his hands, this results in peace in the scruples of salvation, the believer is liberated from “the pestilence of uncertainty.” Luther prefers the Biblical term “election” to the philosophical concept “predestination.”
The Uncomfortable Ordinary
Authors: Tanner Laura E. 
Published: June 2021

AbstractDespite extensive dialogue among Robinson scholars about the role of the ordinary in her fiction, critical attention limits itself almost exclusively to the transformation of the everyday. This chapter focuses instead on the way that, for Robinson’s protagonists, loss settles uneasily into the everyday; the aesthetic defamiliarization of a taken-for-granted world often translates into the intimate experience of estrangement. The power of representation that critics associate with Robinson’s rendering of ordinary things emerges from an intensity of perception that marks her characters’ expulsion from the taken for granted. Scarred by grief, illness, aging, and trauma, Robinson’s characters inhabit a world of transcendent beauty suffused with the terrifying threat of loss. This chapter introduces the concept of the “uncomfortable ordinary” within the frameworks of everyday life theory, Robinson criticism, contemporary novel studies, and recent dialogues on the lyrical novel to argue for the complexity, relevance, and contemporaneity of Robinson’s fiction.
Housekeepingand the Phantom Ordinary
Authors: Tanner Laura E. 
Published: June 2021

AbstractThis chapter shifts focus away from the luminous images of Housekeeping to the lived experiences of traumatic grief those images often veil. The lyrical beauty of Housekeeping offers stylistic reinforcement of a first-person narrative that seeks consolation in immaterial forms. Critical focus on the transfigured ordinary and its aesthetic compensations tends to substantiate rather than interrogate the project of Ruth, focusing on the vibrancy and vitality of the images that she conjures rather than her terrifying expulsion from the everyday. Haunted by memories of maternal presence and incapable of resurrecting her mother, Robinson’s protagonist attempts to write herself out of the everyday world and into the spectral landscape in which her mother continues to exist; rendering her own embodied existence in ghostly terms, Ruth situates herself in a phantom ordinary. Housekeeping, I argue, subtly interrogates Ruth’s substitution of aesthetic images for ordinary presence in a way that anticipates the dramatic collapse of aesthetic consolation in Robinson’s later fiction.
The Case for Wellbeing as the Goal of Government and Constraints on Policy-making
Authors: Frijters Paul , Krekel Christian 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
The first chapter is targeted at readers who are interested in the general push to include subjective wellbeing in governments’ policy-making institutions. It discusses the origin of the idea that governments should care about wellbeing; how wellbeing is already incorporated in many policy evaluations and appraisals; how a wellbeing-oriented bureaucracy fits in with the democratic process; and how the realities of policy-making often limit the use of formal wellbeing analyses and give rise to the importance of general knowledge about wellbeing amongst all decision-makers. To begin with, the chapter gives a quick synopsis of the basic vision at the heart of this book: what ‘more wellbeing’ would mean for policy-making and what steps would need to be taken to realize it. It is this basic vision which will unfold in the different chapters that follow and which forms the book’s basic motivation. The chapter ends with a quick overview of the institutional trajectory yet to be undertaken to have wellbeing policy embedded in the government machinery.
The Limited Use View of the Duty to Save
Authors: Frowe Helen 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This chapter defends the Limited Use View of our duties to save. The Limited Use View holds that the duty to save is a duty to treat oneself, and perhaps one’s resources, as a means for preventing harm to others. But the duty to treat oneself as a means for the sake of others is limited. One need not treat oneself as a means when doing so is either very costly or conflicts with one’s more stringent duties to others. This provides an agent-neutral account of the duty to save. When the cost of saving passes a certain threshold, one is permitted to fail to save, and it is impermissible for others to force one to save, if doing so will force one to incur an equal or greater cost. The chapter argues that the Limited Use View is to be preferred to agent-relative accounts of the duty to save, which hold that the limit on our duty to save is grounded in an agent-relative prerogative to weight our own interests (and those of special others) more heavily than other people’s interests.
When Public Reason Falls Silent
Authors: Kogelmann Brian , Stich Stephen G. W. 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
Public reason theorists argue that coercive state action must be justified to those subject to such action. Doing so requires citizens to give only those reasons that all can accept. These reasons, the chapter argues, include scientific and social scientific considerations. One ineliminable and arguably salutary property of the modern administrative state is that the coercive policies it produces can be justified only on the basis of extremely complex scientific and social scientific considerations. Many of these considerations are neither understood by most ordinary citizens nor agreed upon by experts. This means that the overwhelming majority of citizens do not accept the reasons justifying coercive administrative policies. As a result, public reason is inconsistent with the administrative state. There are deep implications to this result: if public reason is inconsistent with the administrative state, then it is also inconsistent with forms of social organization that presuppose it. This, the chapter argues, includes egalitarianism, which many proponents of public reason also endorse. Public reason theorists thus must choose: justification through public reason, or distributive equality?
Why Strict Compliance?
Authors: May Simon Căbulea 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
John Rawls defines ideal theory in terms of a strict compliance assumption. The standard interpretation of ideal theory is telic: the function of the strict compliance assumption is to help specify a realistic utopia as a telos for political decision making. The chapter defends an alternative, deontic interpretation of ideal theory, one based on the fundamental Rawlsian idea of society as a fair scheme of cooperation. It claims that the participants of a genuinely cooperative scheme are mutually accountable in that they have the standing to make demands of one another. It argues that the logic of these moral demands implies that the rules of any cooperative scheme must be justified on the basis of a strict compliance assumption. Since society as a whole constitutes a cooperative scheme in justice as fairness, the same conclusion holds of its principles of justice. The chapter also defends the possibility of a non-utopian ideal theory.
Legality in EU Common Foreign and Security Policy
Authors: Wessel Ramses A. 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU finds itself between exceptionalism and normalization. Because of its special position and because the legislative procedure is not applicable to this policy area, questions of legality are not usually raised in the context of CFSP. At the same time, CFSP has become a policy area to which most EU rules and principles simply apply. This chapter assesses questions of (the review of) legality in the context of CFSP. As questions of legality make sense only in the context of legal acts, this chapter will first revisit the nature of CFSP acts as well as their consequences in the light of the ‘normalization’ of CFSP. Second, questions of legality will be assessed in relation to the legal basis of CFSP acts, and in particular, the choice of legal basis and the possibility of combining CFSP and other legal bases to enhance options for legality review.
The Enlightenment’s Paradigm Shift and the Three Impostors
Authors: Stroumsa Guy G. 
Published: June 2021

AbstractThe preceding chapter dealt with the legend of the three rings, which highlighted the close family relationship between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. This relationship, which had been an obvious one up through the Middle Ages, began to be seen as less evident in the eighteenth century. The Enlightenment (or perhaps, rather, the Enlightenments) took many different shapes across Europe. The present chapter is devoted to a paradigm shift, one which reflects a new historicization of European cultural life, at least in the approach to religious phenomena. In France, on which this chapter focuses, the historical transformation started earlier than elsewhere, at the very beginning of the eighteenth century.
Aryans, Semites, and Jewish Scholars
Authors: Stroumsa Guy G. 
Published: June 2021

AbstractThe awareness of the proximity of Judaism and Islam to Christianity was nearly lost in the secularization process. Christian affinities with Judaism and Islam ceased to be a matter of evidence, immediately recognizable. More and more, literati started perceiving Christianity as a (or rather the) European religion, while its Near Eastern roots were trimmed far back, or even, in some cases, pulled up entirely. In German-speaking lands, in particular, the Romantic movement and the “discovery” of Sanskrit brought to the perception of “Indo-Europeans,” or Aryans and Semite peoples, throughout history, in contradistinction and opposition to one another. Within a climate of growing racist anti-Semitism, Jewish scholars started to develop modern scholarship on Judaism.
Constitutionalism and the Paradox of Principles and Rules
Authors: Neves Marcelo 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
The present book offers a critical counterpoint to Ronald Dworkin’s principle-based theory, and in particular to Robert Alexy’s idea of optimizing balancing. Instead of ceding to the compulsion of an optimizing balancing, it suggests the possibility of a comparative or at least ‘satisficing’ balancing, considering the precariousness of legal rationality. The book also reverses Dworkin’s metaphor, associating rules with Hercules and principles with the Hydra. It takes constitutional principles seriously, criticizing the abuse of principles by the legal and constitutional doctrine and practice, but pointing out their relationship of complementarity and tension with rules. Finally, the author offers an alternative model to the recent legal and constitutional theory on the basis of certain assumptions of the systems theory. It deals especially with the paradox of the circular and reflexive relationship between constitutional principles and rules: the former are referred primarily to the openness and adequacy of legal system to society and thus to substantive argumentation; the second are referred primarily to the closure and consistency of legal system and thus to formal argumentation.
Introduction
Authors: Neves Marcelo 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This Introduction deals foremost with the inversion of Ronald Dworkin’s metaphor of the ‘Judge Hercules’. According to him, this ideal judge is related primarily to principles and has the main task of closing the legal reasoning in the ‘hard cases’. In my view principles are primarily associated with the Judge Hydra, who has the key function of opening the argumentation chain to the overcomplex societal environment of law. In turn, the Judge Hercules is linked mainly to rules and has the mission of closing the legal reasoning with a ruling of the case. My assumption is that the paradox of modern constitutional law lies in the relation of tension and complementarity between Herculean rules and Hydra-like principles. In this Introduction, I also point out the ambiguity and vagueness of the word ‘principle’ in the different social and cultural fields as well as within the legal and constitutional realm. Then, I depart in advance from different uses of this word, clarifying that the focus of my book is the relation between constitutional principles and rules in the legal and constitutional theory of the turn from the twentieth century to the twenty-first century. Finally, I present briefly the book chapters.
Through the Still Dominant Models of Division Between Constitutional Principles and Rules
Authors: Neves Marcelo 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This chapter initially examines the philosophical background of the dominant model for understanding constitutional principles and rules. Thereafter, it analyses this model, paying special attention to two of its trends that build on the works of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy. Dworkin’s idea of ‘a single right answer’ for legal or constitutional questions and the Alexy’s conception of optimizing balancing are questioned. The connection between principles and the ideal judge Hercules proposed by Dworkin is objected to, and the idea that principles are related to the Hydra and the rules to Hercules is outlined. The model of proportionality developed by Alexy is also questioned. This chapter is divided into three sections: moral-philosophical background of the turn in the theory of legal principles; all-or-nothing versus dimension of weight (Ronald Dworkin); and definitive reasons versus optimization requirements (Robert Alexy).
Introduction
Authors: Young Phoebe S.K. 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
The introduction explains the complexities involved in the definition and history of camping, and the ways its recreational, political, and functional versions have intertwined and coevolved. It relates camping to the concept of the social contract that anchored the founding era of the United States, particularly as an agrarian ideal promoted by Thomas Jefferson. Moreover, it introduces the term “public nature”—both outdoor spaces and ideas about those spaces as settings where people work out relationships to nature, nation, and each other—as a useful way to approach the key questions of the book: What does it mean to camp, and why does it matter? The introduction offers a brief overview of the social contract and its relationship to public nature through the early twentieth centuries, touching on John Locke’s philosophy, back-to-the-land movements, the growth of urban industrial systems, consumer culture, and preservation movements.