bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Conclusion
Authors: Lærke Mogens 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This concluding chapter offers some perspectives on Spinoza’s understanding of the freedom of philosophizing. It shows how Spinoza’s conception responded to the need for new normative theories of public debate and civic engagement in the seventeenth-century Dutch Republic. It also confronts Spinoza’s conception of collective free philosophizing with Jürgen Habermas’s classic account of the bourgeois public sphere. While pointing to essential similarities between their conceptions, it also shows how Spinoza’s model of libertas philosophandi, based on democratic realignment of the structures of political counsel and sovereign command, and on a model of public speech driven by intellectual joy, offers a theoretical alternative to Habermas’s dialectical understanding of the relations between the state and the public sphere, and to his consensus-oriented conception of public debate.
Introduction
Authors: Greig Matilda 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
The Peninsular War (1808–1814) was one of the most colourful and brutal campaigns of the Napoleonic period. It prompted hundreds of veterans from the armies of the participating countries (Spain, Portugal, Britain, and France) to write and publish autobiographies about their experiences. These war memoirs are well-known to historians as rich and compelling sources, but relying on them for direct eyewitness testimony about the experience of war poses significant methodological problems. Military memoirs, including those from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, tend to be written in hindsight and shaped to an unknown extent by selective or traumatised memory. They may be unrepresentative of the majority of experiences, written in very different styles and formats, published immediately after the war, or only made public decades after the author’s death. Taking these challenges as a starting point, this introductory chapter lays out a new methodological framework for ‘what to do with war memoirs’, including considering closely the identities and motives of the authors, tracing the material histories of the books themselves, and employing a comparative, transnational approach to the history of the military memoir genre. It also summarises the relevant historiography, emphasising the lack of attention so far given to Spanish and Portuguese wartime autobiography, and the long-term importance of Peninsular War memoirs as a precedent for the twentieth-century ‘soldier’s tale’.
Iberian War Writing
Authors: Greig Matilda 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This chapter explores the roots of the modern war memoir genre. It debunks the enduring idea that in the early nineteenth century the Iberian peninsula did not produce military autobiographies, or any autobiographical writing at all, comparable to the output in north-western Europe. Making the argument for a broader definition of ‘war memoir’, it highlights the numerous ephemeral, polemical pamphlets (also known as manifiestos) written by Spanish veterans during the Peninsular War. It presents these military authors as ambitious, high-ranking career officers and shrewd guerrilla leaders, who used memoir-writing as a political tool to defend their actions on the battlefield, assert their suitability for command, and win popular support. In doing so, it emphasises the juridical and bureaucratic origins of Spanish life writing, dating back to colonial relaciones de méritos y servicios and an elite eighteenth-century service culture, as well as the shifts caused during the Peninsular War by the forced abdication of the king and the temporary declaration of freedom of the press.
Circulation and Transnational Memory
Authors: Greig Matilda 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This final chapter examines the international scope of the Napoleonic war memoir genre. Widespread and often illegal practices of reprinting and translating veterans’ autobiographies ensured that narratives of the Peninsular War circulated extensively across borders throughout the nineteenth century, not only within Europe but also across the Atlantic, to both the United States and Latin America. Peninsular War memoirs became a transnational genre, crossing national and linguistic divides. This did not, however, result in a peaceful shared memory of the war. Instead, the reprinting and translation of memoirs was unequal, with Spanish accounts rarely reaching British and French audiences, and hostile, with foreign soldiers’ tales being severely edited and disputed by translators. This nationalistic reaction to the circulation of military memoirs laid the foundations for enduring grand narratives about what is in British history the Peninsular War, in French history the War in Spain, and in Spanish history the War of Independence.
Introduction
Authors: Linares-Cantillo Alejandro 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the twenty essays compiled for the XIII conference of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Colombia, which was held in Bogota in January of 2019. The collection is divided into three thematic parts which illustrate five subjects at the spotlight of comparative constitutional law, in light of the growing circulation and intensification of the idea of constitutionalism. The first part examines the evolving and leading role of constitutional courts in constitutional democracies. The second part allows constitutional experiences speak for themselves and discusses tensions and debates in three topics: (A) the growing trend to judicially enforce 'constitutional unamendability' under the doctrine of 'unconstitutional constitutional amendments'; (B) the idea of 'transformative constitutionalism' in the area of social rights enforcement; and (C) the models of transitional justice and their implementation in the Colombian case. Finally, the third part analyses vertical and horizontal movements of constitutional law doctrines and decisions.
Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and Democracy
Authors: Marmor Andrei 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This chapter describes the tension between democratic decision-making procedures and constitutional judicial review. It shows that the liberal values that justify a democratic self-government may also vindicate some limits on majoritarian decision-making procedures, but not necessarily in the form of the current constitutional regimes. The chapter argues that constitutional courts are not a necessary feature of a liberal regime. It also acknowledges that democratic decision-making has many defects. These defects concern the fate of persistent vulnerable minorities, the tendency towards short-sightedness, a similar tendency to downplay people's rights and liberties for the sake of greater economic gains or in the force of external threats, and finally the dangers of populism and anti-liberal politics gaining ground within a democratic system. The chapter then depicts courts as essentially conservative institutions which are not — and cannot be — as counter-majoritarian as depicted by legal scholars, mainly because their legitimacy and the acceptance of their decisions depends on the people. It contends that the acceptance and efficacy of judicial review is context dependent, but that some fights still need to be fought in the political, not the legal arena.
Dialogic Constitutionalism in Defective Democracies
Authors: Gargarella Roberto 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This chapter studies the theory and practice of constitutional dialogue, in the context of defective democracies. Within the framework of a deliberative democracy, it argues for a dialogic approach to constitutionalism where the different branches of government and the people at large engage in a conversation with the aim of interpreting the actual implications of the fundamental constitutional values. Such conversation about the Constitution includes basic considerations about who discusses, about what they discuss, how they do it, and why they do it. The chapter then presents some of the problems that seem to be affecting constitutional democracies. It also reflects on the tasks that a committed judiciary could assume, in order to confront the existing social and institutional difficulties. Finally, the chapter looks at different cases related to actions and omissions by the Colombian Constitutional Court.
From the Public Action of Unconstitutionality of 1910 to the Constitutional Court of 1991
Authors: Cajas-Sarria Mario Alberto 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This chapter traces the history of the transformations and the attempts to change the Colombian constitutional justice since the establishment of the Public Action of Unconstitutionality (PAU) in 1910 to the creation of the Constitutional Court of Colombia (CC) of 1991. The enactment of the PAU allowed any citizen to challenge the constitutionality of laws and decrees before the Supreme Court. Ultimately, this trajectory highlights how political actors and legal scholars, with different purposes and strategies, in certain political contexts and under particular legal doctrines, shaped the national judicial review. The narrative also shows how a local institutional development was transformed under the influences of foreign legal institutions that local jurist as well as politicians, invoked, adapted, and 'used' for different purposes and at different times. In this way, it will account for the legal and political struggles to establish a CC, which seemed in part to transplant the model expanded from Europe to the world in the second half of the twentieth century.
Courts as Guarantors of Democracy
Authors: Issacharoff Samuel 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This chapter discusses the judicial oversight of democracy. Three cases indicate how courts act as guarantors of constitutional democracy, suggesting ways they could react to current populist challenges. First, from India, the basic structures decisions set forth the principle that certain constitutional changes, even if procedurally proper, can go too far in undermining the fundamental character of a democratic order. This series of decisions also claims for the judiciary the power and duty to judge when an amendment oversteps this line. Next, the South African Constitutional Court's decision rejecting the draft constitution to replace the apartheid system establishes that protections against untrammelled majority rule are among these basic features of constitutional democracy. Last, a decision of the Constitutional Court of Colombia to disallow a president from running for a third term goes to how courts can protect competition in the political process. Rejecting a properly enacted constitutional amendment that would have permitted a president to run for a third term, the Court feared lack of rotation in office would chill political debate and contestation. Together, these decisions articulate a distinct challenge for apex courts confronting a challenge to the democratic process itself.
The Straw that Broke the Constitution’s Back?
Authors: Roznai Yaniv 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This chapter examines the doctrines of constitutional unamendability and how they can counteract revolutionary changes. It focuses mainly in developing the theory of quantity transforming into quality in the realm of constitutional amendments: under certain conditions, even small things can cause big changes. The chapter takes the Colombian presidential re-election amendment as an example, departing from the question of why a second consecutive term is a valid constitutional amendment, while a third consecutive term is an unconstitutional replacement, and thus, an unconstitutional constitutional amendment. It demonstrates how this 'new' re-election, seemingly a small change, subverted the democratic structure of the Colombian 1991 Constitution. The chapter then proposes that courts should consider the cumulative impact of a series of amendments affecting a certain constitutional rule or set of principles, since most of the times the dismemberment of a constitutional democracy occurs via a series of small changes, rather than by a single revolutionary change. By this approach, constitutional courts will not disproportionately curtail democratic decision-making, and might act as the guardians of constitutional democracies in face of populism and democratic decay.
The Transitional Justice Model in Colombia vis-à-vis the Inter-American Human Rights SystemAmidst the Conventionality Control and the National Margin of Appreciation
Authors: Acosta-López Juana I. , Murcia Cindy Vanessa Espitia 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This chapter assesses the international consequences of the transitional justice model in Colombia. It demonstrates that the Colombian transitional justice model, and particularly the integrated system for truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition, are likely to successfully withstand the 'conventionality control' by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (ICtHR). The chapter then presents a model to be used by the Inter-American organs when analysing the Colombian transitional justice model. In seeking to accommodate the needs of the transitional process with the demands for justice, the model proposes a harmonizing technique between the notions of 'conventionality control', developed by the Inter-American Court since 2006, and the 'national margin of appreciation' doctrine, developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). This harmonizing approach would allow States to implement the most adequate mechanisms for the consolidation of a lasting peace scenario.
Not so Moderate
Authors: Arévalo Carlos , Huertas Julián 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
This chapter demonstrates how the Colombian Constitutional Court shaped the relationship between municipal and international law by decisively defining the role of international law in Colombia. It resorts to the classical distinction between monism and dualism as analytical tools to study the Colombian Constitutional Court's decisions. The Court's position regarding the interaction between international and domestic law does not fit the 'moderate monism' model it has claimed to have followed since 1998. On the contrary, the answer to the question about the status of general international law in the Colombian constitutional order is at some point between constitutional monism and dualism. To that extent, with the exceptions of jus cogens, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and border delimitation, the Colombian Constitutional Court follows a “sovereigntist or statist” position, in which there is a general prevalence of domestic legislation over international law. However, the chapter does recognize that the Court has found a useful tool in international law to advance in significant social, political, and economic changes.
Just and Unjust Uses of Limited Force
Authors: Brunstetter Daniel R. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Limited force—no-fly zones, limited strikes, Special Forces raids, and drones strikes outside “hot” battlefields—has been at the nexus of the moral and strategic debates about just war since the fall of the Berlin Wall but has remained largely under-theorized. The main premise of the book is that limited force is different than war in scope, strategic purpose, and ethical permissions and restraints. By revisiting the major wars animating contemporary just war scholarship (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the drone “wars,” and Libya) and drawing insights from the just war tradition, this book teases out an ethical account of force-short-of-war. It covers the deliberation about whether to use limited force (jus ad vim), restraints that govern its use (jus in vi), when to stop (jus ex vi), and the after-use context (jus post vim). While these moral categories parallel to some extent their just war counterparts of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum, and jus ex bello, the book illustrates how they can be reimagined and recalibrated in a limited force context, while also introducing new specific to the dilemmas associated with escalation and risk. As the argument unfolds, the reader will be presented with a view of limited force as a moral alternative to war, exposed to a series of dilemmas that raise challenges regarding when and how limited force is used, and provided with a more precise and morally enriched vocabulary to talk about limited force and the responsibilities its use entails.
Blurring the Lines
Authors: Brunstetter Daniel R. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Law enforcement is often seen as the de facto, and relatively pure, alternative to contemporary just war. If we are not at war, then the more restrictive law enforcement is the viable paradigm. This chapter interrogates two assumptions underlying this view. It begins by demystifying the unwritten assumption that the liberal law enforcement paradigm associated with Western democracies is the idealized foil to just war. Using France, whose postcolonial legacy complicates the turn to the Western liberal paradigm as an illuminating case, the chapter explores how domestic warlike violence creates a state of fractured order—the violence and potential for abuses of power that permeate society as the government seeks to balance security and individual rights. The chapter then turns to the transnational context to challenge the view that there exists a clear line between the state of war and the state of peace. Mali serves as a paradigmatic case to illustrate how the effectiveness of law enforcement is curtailed in spaces of contested order where heavily armed terrorist groups challenge the authority of the state, thus prompting a turn to Special Forces and drones to restore order. In both contexts, the chapter identifies a shift away from the restrained norms that typically govern the use of force in law enforcement to more warlike uses of force that blur the lines between peace and war. The chapter concludes with a reflection on how this shift might inform the ethics of limited force, which lies between law enforcement and just war.
Limited Force and the Triumph, Crisis, and Schism of Just War Thinking
Authors: Brunstetter Daniel R. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Just war, oft-lauded as the authoritative moral framework to address the decision to go war and the ethical permissions this might grant, has seen the meaning of its principles mired in controversy and debate in the post-9/11 era. From calls to reclaim the historic tradition to the need to re-negotiate the terms of the orthodox stance or embrace revisionist insights drawn from analytical philosophy, critical reflections on the major wars showcased competing claims about what just war thinking should be. Where does limited force fit into the story? In answering this question, the chapter exposes a major lacuna in just war thinking by highlighting the moral and strategic dilemmas of limited force—limited strikes, Special Forces, no-fly zones, and drones—in the build-up to the major conflicts that animated just war debates of the post-Cold War era. Viewing the wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the broader fight against Al Qaeda through the lens of limited force provides a new angle from which to analyse perennial debates about when to go to war and what victory looks like. Doing so exposes important limitations of existing just war moral frameworks related to concerns about escalation from limited force to war and punishment as a moral justification. Harvesting cues from the historical tradition, the chapter concludes by introducing five types of punishment that contain insights relevant to discerning the just and unjust uses of limited force.
Imagining jus post vim
Authors: Brunstetter Daniel R. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Standard accounts of just war follow a chronological path: deliberating whether to go to war (jus ad bellum), considering what can be done in war (jus in bello), and determining the responsibilities after war’s end (jus post bellum). This chapter challenges the chronological timeline by arguing that understanding jus post vim, or the justice after limited force, is paramount to discerning the just and unjust uses of limited force. Placing the emphasis on the post-force environment first shifts the focus onto the achievable ends, which then recalibrates the goals, and, by consequence, the means employed to achieve them. The chapter thus begins by distinguishing between jus post bellum and jus post vim, with one of the main differences being that the latter is necessarily a form of truncated victory. This circumscribed nature of victory has ethical implications insofar as many of the lofty goals sometimes associated with jus post bellum (rehabilitation, regime change, war crimes trials, etc.) are not feasible objectives of using limited force. Drawing on the classical just war doctrine’s emphasis on the pursuit of order and justice, the chapter identifies the re-establishment and containment principles as markers of moral truncated victory and the committed pursuit of long-term peace. These jus post vim principles reflect the heavy moral lifting that diplomatic measures play in the pursuit of peace once truncated victory is achieved. The chapter concludes by linking jus post vim to conciliation, inviting deeper engagement with non-Western peace practices and traditions.
Jus in vi
Authors: Brunstetter Daniel R. 
Published: July 2021

Abstract
Jus in vi is the set of moral principles governing how limited force is used. Taking the traditionalist jus in bello principles as a starting point, this chapter interrogates what necessity, proportionality, and distinction look like in a limited force context and makes the case for the novel psychological risk principle by evaluating how concepts such as “excessive,” “military advantage,” and “harms” and “goods” fit into our thinking about vim. The keystone of jus in vi is the predisposition toward maximal restraint maxim. The chapter thus begins by making the case for why jus in vi principles should be more restrictive than their jus in bello counterparts. It continues by exploring how a circumscribed view of necessity sets the groundwork for constraining proportionality calculations and shaping the way we think about distinction in more restricted ways. The notion of jus in vi proportionality is then explored, with concerns about escalation and psychological risk driving the analysis. Drawing insights from revisionist just war theory to consider jus in vi distinction, the chapter concludes by making the case for affording greater protections to both combatants and non-combatants compared to standard just war accounts. Unlike war, in which almost any soldier can be targeted, in a context of limited force only those who are an active threat can be justly targeted. Both innocent non-combatants and non-threatening combatants should be preserved from the more predictable harms of limited force, though this differs depending on whether the use of limited force is protective, preventive, or punitive.