bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
The “Francophone” Fermata
Authors: Rice Alison 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
Chapter 6 focuses on the widespread reluctance among worldwide women writers to accept the word “Francophone” to describe their lives and work. For many, this disinclination is due to their understanding that this term is frequently employed in order to set their work apart as separate from and implicitly inferior to writing by French authors from France. Some admit that the classification is useful in certain settings, but most are quick to deny its pertinence to the French literary scene. An examination of bookstore displays and literary prizes reveals that narrow definitions of what constitutes “French literature” and a tendency to hastily classify authors as “Francophone” can lead to forms of exclusivity with deleterious effects. A consequential number of women signed a manifesto arguing for abolishing the ambiguous application of the descriptor “Francophone” in favor of the adoption of the much broader, more encompassing phrase “world-literature in French.” Two months after the publication of this document in the French newspaper Le Monde on March 16, 2007, an accompanying collective book volume came out, featuring chapters by a relatively high percentage of authors in my study. Their signatures and essays indicate a desire among worldwide women writers of French to be respected simply as authors, free from the oft-confining specifications that restrict the way they are received and read. Their involvement in this movement also exhibits a willingness to advocate avidly for different angles of interpreting written works that transcend the limits of a label.
Improvising Improperly
Authors: Rice Alison 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
Chapter 8 is attentive to the innovation that women writers from around the world are introducing into their work in French. It explores how certain books depict inappropriate behavior in inventive textual turns that are transgressive but also transformative, ultimately allowing for the complex formulation of truths that are so often elided in euphemistic writings. Many of the writers who have come to France have encountered prejudice in various forms that they address in their work. They portray racial discrimination and gender bias, and they contemplate the plight of migrants in Europe at a time of political change. Theatrical metaphors frequently emerge in the work of authors who describe encounters in performative terms, emphasizing how the script their characters are assigned appears to preclude all forms of improvisation. Despite the difficulties of this vocation, many women writers describe a compulsion to compose literary works, an irresistible pressure to take up the pen that propels them to write, even when their texts meet with criticism and misunderstandings. The role of generic categorizations often predetermines textual interpretations in ways that mirror the confining societal categorizations these authors represent in their writing. The fictional space of literary creations nonetheless allows for the creative staging of unacceptable actions in which characters from elsewhere who have experienced trauma effectively act out, demonstrating the pent-up frustration and releasing the tension that has accumulated in a setting where they are often not afforded the opportunity to express themselves verbally.
Accepting Hypertolerance
Authors: Dorr Cian , Hawthorne John , Yli-Vakkuri Juhani 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
This is the first of two chapters exploring the option of resolving various Tolerance Puzzles by accepting Hypertolerance, the conclusion that the objects in question could have been arbitrarily different in the respects relevant to the puzzle. This chapter discusses two influential objections to certain Hypertolerance claims, one based on the doctrine of ‘Anti-haecceitism’ (according to which an object’s qualitative profile suffices for its identity), and another based on the doctrine of ‘Overlap Essentialism’ (according to which a table originally made of certain matter could not have been originally made of entirely non-overlapping matter). We consider some arguments for Overlap Essentialism from certain ‘sufficiency of origin’ principles, and discuss some difficult cases which put pressure on Overlap Essentialism.
Alternatives and Challenges
Authors: Dorr Cian , Hawthorne John , Yli-Vakkuri Juhani 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
After an opening section surveying some possible alternative ways of employing semantic plasticity to handle the puzzles, this chapter discusses two challenges to the view developed in chapters 11 and 12. One involves the threat of rampant error in counterfactual speech reports. The second involves certain uncomfortable consequences of applying our favoured treatment of words like ‘that’ and ‘table’ to words like ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘person’, ‘thinker’, and ‘conscious’. We show how considerations of semantic plasticity militate in the direction of a kind of “metaphysical misanthropy”, and explore its ethical ramifications.
Autonomous Knowledge
Authors: Carter J. Adam 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
A central conclusion developed and defended throughout the book is that epistemic autonomy is necessary for knowledge (both knowledge-that and knowledge-how) and in ways that epistemologists have not yet fully appreciated. The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 motivates (using a series of twists on Lehrer’s TrueTemp case) the claim that propositional knowledge requires autonomous belief. Chapters 2 and 3 flesh out this proposal in two ways, by defending a specific form of history-sensitive externalism with respect to propositional knowledge-apt autonomous belief (Chapter 2) and by showing how the idea that knowledge requires autonomous belief—understood along the externalist lines proposed—corresponds with an entirely new class of knowledge defeaters (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 extends the proposal to (both intellectualist and anti-intellectualist) knowledge-how and performance enhancement, and in a way that combines insights from virtue epistemology with research on freedom, responsibility, and manipulation. Chapter 5 concludes with a new twist on the Value of Knowledge debate, by vindicating the value of epistemically autonomous knowledge over that which falls short, including (mere) heteronomous but otherwise epistemically impeccable justified true belief.
Radical Enhancement, Knowledge, and Autonomous Belief
Authors: Carter J. Adam 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
Epistemic autonomy is necessary for knowledge in ways that epistemologists have not yet fully appreciated. This chapter uses a series of thought experiments featuring (radical) forms of cognitive enhancement in order to show why; in particular, and with reference to a series of tweaks on Lehrer’s ‘TrueTemp’ case, I motivate an autonomous belief condition on propositional knowledge, a condition the satisfaction of which—it will be shown—is neither entailed by, nor entails, the satisfaction of either a belief condition or, importantly, an epistemic justification condition. This transition from a ‘JTB+X’ to a ‘JTAB+X’ template marks an important and needed update to the received thinking about what knowing involves. (Of course, the question of whether knowledge is analysable is contentious; an appendix for knowledge-firsters explains the relevance of the necessity of epistemic autonomy for knowledge for knowledge-first projects).
Epistemic Autonomy and Knowledge Defeat
Authors: Carter J. Adam 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
Chapter 3 highlights an important epistemological implication of the view developed so far—which is that the inclusion of an autonomous belief condition on propositional knowledge implies that knowledge can be defeated in ways other than via the standard modes of rebutting and undercutting defeat. An account of two types of what I call ‘heteronomous defeat’ for propositional knowledge is developed and defended: one on which propositional knowledge is defeated when the subject acquires a belief that either indicates the target belief is epistemically heteronymous (i.e. Type 1) or calls into doubt the reliability of the subject’s belief-forming process as one that would (reliably enough) result in an epistemically autonomous belief (i.e. Type 2). Recognizing heteronomous defeat as a genuine form of knowledge defeat fits snugly with the wider idea that knowledge defeaters, as such, are indicators of ignorance.
Know-How, Performance Enhancement, and Guidance Control
Authors: Carter J. Adam 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
If intellectualism about knowledge-how is true (and so, if knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that), then to the extent that we need an autonomy condition on know-how, it will be (simply) an autonomy condition on know-that: a condition on propositional knowledge-apt belief. However, the anti-intellectualist—according to whom know-how is fundamentally dispositional rather than propositional—would need an entirely different story here––one that places an autonomy-related restriction not on propositional-knowledge-apt belief but, instead, on know-how-apt dispositions. Chapter 4 develops exactly this kind of restriction, by cobbling together some ideas about know-how and virtue epistemology with recent thinking in the moral responsibility literature about freedom, responsibility, and manipulation. The proposal is that one is in a state of knowing how to do something, φ, only if one has the skill to φ successfully with guidance control, and one’s φ-ing exhibits guidance control (and furthermore, manifests know-how) only if one’s φ-ing is caused by a reasons-responsive mechanism that one owns. Unsurprisingly, the devil is in these details—and this chapter aims to spell them out in a way that rules out certain kinds of radical performance enhancing cases while not ruling out that, say, one knows how to do a maths problem when one’s performance is just mildly boosted by Adderall.
The Value of Autonomous Knowledge
Authors: Carter J. Adam 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
How does satisfying the epistemic autonomy condition on propositional knowledge add value to an otherwise unknown belief (including a justified, true, non-Gettiered but epistemically heteronomous belief)? This question isn’t some kind of afterthought. As work on the value of knowledge would suggest, lacking a good answer here actually counts as a mark against the adequacy of the JTAB+X template account. Several strategies are canvassed for attempting to vindicate the idea that epistemic autonomy adds value to an otherwise unknown justified, true non-Gettiered belief. Pragmatic and instrumentalist arguments are considered and shown to fail. A variation on a recent non-instrumentalist argument strategy is given special attention, but it also is shown to come up short. Finally, and by cobbling together some new twists on some ideas in value theory and action theory, I outline an answer that works. Key to the answer I defend is that knowledge makes us the knowers we are in a way that equally justified and anti-Gettiered true beliefs that lack epistemic autonomy do not and cannot.
Chafing at the Bit
Authors: Jackson Christine 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
The early years of the seventeenth century saw the accession of a new ruling dynasty and the rise of elite urban sociability. Chapter 2 explores Herbert’s move to London with his mother, wife, and siblings and his struggle to assert his authority as the head of a cadet branch of the Herbert family in both public and domestic spheres. It examines his introduction to the Elizabethan court at the dangerous time of the Essex revolt, his initial success in securing advancement as Knight of the Bath at the Jacobean court with the help of Sir George More, and his fascination with chivalric notions of honour. It follows his attempts, encouraged by family and friends, and in the face of local rivalry, to establish himself as a leading county governor in Montgomeryshire and as a county MP in Wales, and his role in the pursuit of the Gunpowder Plot conspirators. It considers the friction caused by primogeniture and Herbert’s battle with his mother to reduce his financial responsibilities for his siblings. It explores his relationship with his wife; the management of their estates in Wales, England, and Ireland; and his attitude towards his infant children.
French Leave
Authors: Jackson Christine 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
Europe’s return to peace after 1604 re-established European travel as a rite of passage for the sons of the nobility and gentry. Encouraged by Henry, prince of Wales, Herbert joined other noblemen in leaving England to travel the continent; gain experience of other European courts and governments; improve their social, weapons handling, and equestrian skills; and acquire expertise in foreign languages. Chapter 3 explores Herbert’s visit to France and the educational and social activities he pursued while resident in Paris and the Île de France. It focuses on his experience of the French court, his introduction to the influential Montmorency family, his growing enthusiasm for duelling and riding the great horse, his attempts at writing satirical verse, his introduction to Isaac Casaubon and his scholarly circle, and the development of his views on monarchical rule and religious toleration. It counterpoises the courtly civility, honour, and confidence he gained in Paris to augment his performance and reputation as a courtier with the impact of his failure to persuade his wife to settle her estates on his heir or to avoid the socially and financially embarrassing remarriage of his mother to a well-connected but impecunious younger man.
My Lord, the Ambassador
Authors: Jackson Christine 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
Herbert’s embassy coincided with a particularly complex period of European diplomacy as Catholic and Protestant nations moved from negotiating to taking up arms in the Thirty Years War. Chapter 7 explores his diplomatic role, actions, and lifestyle. It considers the difficulties he encountered in serving an English monarch pursuing a pro-Spanish foreign policy unpopular with a majority of his subjects, while cultivating good relations with an inexperienced French monarch facing internal opposition from his politically ambitious mother, rebellious nobility, and a discontented Protestant minority. It looks at Herbert’s reinvigoration of his noble and princely contacts in France and other European states and his relations with princes, ministers, and fellow diplomats. It focuses upon his determination to maximize his status and dignity when representing James I in the renewal of the oath of alliance with France, his energetic but unofficial support for the elector and electress palatine when they accepted the Bohemian Crown and triggered European-wide war, and his robust defence of French Protestants. It emphasizes the quality of his diplomatic reports and the success of his diplomatic networking and intelligence gathering. It examines his controversial exchanges with Louis XIII, and the royal favourite, the duke of Luynes, when, on the direct instruction of James I, he criticized the French king’s use of military force to suppress French Protestantism in south-west France during 1620 to 1621.
The Fickleness of Princes
Authors: Jackson Christine 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
Herbert returned home from Paris in 1621 to recuperate following illness and near bankruptcy and found Parliament engaged in attacks upon Buckingham and James I resisting pressure to intervene militarily in Europe to support his dethroned daughter and son-in-law. Chapter 8 explores Herbert’s unexpectedly warm reception at the English court and his return to France as ambassador at the end of 1622. It examines his role in James I’s attempts to persuade Louis XIII to provide support and assistance to the elector palatine; his continuing, though more restrained, support for French Protestants; and his reports on the unorthodox diplomatic mission undertaken by Charles, prince of Wales, and Buckingham to complete negotiations for the Spanish match. Having accurately forecast that the Spanish infanta would marry a Catholic kinsman and personally promoted the advantages of a French bride for the prince, Herbert was devastated when he was recalled to allow ambassadors more acceptable to Louis XIII to negotiate a French match. The chapter ends with a review of his diplomatic career, set within the wider context of James I’s treatment of ambassadors. It emphasizes the accuracy of Herbert’s diplomatic predictions about Spanish and French priorities and intentions, and debunks the view that Herbert returned to England in disgrace in either 1621 or 1624.
Epilogue
Authors: Jackson Christine 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
The epilogue assesses Herbert’s legacy and reputation. It examines his testamentary dispositions, the descent and extinction of his direct family line, the transfer of his title and estates, and his failure to secure a funerary monument. It analyses his enduring chivalric reputation, his allegiance to the Stuart dynasty, and the posthumous reception of his philosophical, historical, and autobiographical writings. It argues that Herbert’s reputation has been adversely and unfairly shaped by his retrospective adoption as a deist and the unhistorical treatment of his autobiography and that his contributions to English diplomacy as ambassador to the court of Louis XIII during the early years of the Thirty Years War, the advances made in English philosophy during the early seventeenth century as author of De veritate, and the development of historical method as author of The Life and Raigne of King Henry the Eighth have been undervalued. It concludes that his unique life, multiple careers, and significant intellectual achievements merit greater celebration.
Social Cognitive Studies, Sociological Theory, and International Law
Authors: Hirsch Moshe 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
The image of international legal decision-makers emerging from socio-cognitive studies is significantly different from the prevalent view among diverse actors operating in this field. The socio-cognitive perspective of international law underlines that sensory objects are not ‘objectives’ or self-evident, and that their internalization in legal decision-makers’ minds always involves intermediating mental processes. The increasing awareness of the constraining influence of default socio-cognitive systems on individuals tends to diminish the significance of human agency in real-life social situations. On the theoretical level, the latter tendency in socio-cognitive literature supports a shift towards the structural pole of the agency–structure continuum. Equipped with insights drawn from socio-cognitive and sociological theoretical literatures, the last section of this chapter focuses on international criminal law, emphasizing its intensified multi-cognitive character and the significant effects of socio-mental patterns on defendants and additional actors (such as adjudicators and prosecutorial staff).
Cognitive Biases and International Law: What’s the Point of Critique?
Authors: Venzke Ingo 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
One of the main aims of critique is to work towards progressive change. What are critical scholarship’s assumptions about how that change should happen? And do they hold? In the present chapter, I focus on three characteristic traits of critique: seeing law as part of the problem; emphasizing law’s relative indeterminacy; and carving out contingencies in the law’s past. Critique has exposed and countered several dynamics that render the present state of affairs more natural, necessary, and just. Social psychological research has notably drawn attention to people’s longing to live in a world that they consider just—which is a world in which things appear to happen for a reason. Research has further drawn attention to the bias of hindsight and dynamics of ex post rationalization. In short, there are many concerns, tropes, and even vocabularies that are shared between critical legal scholarship and social psychological research. Yet, divides between the two still remain deep.
Institutionally Embodied Law: Cognitive Linguistics and the Making of International Law
Authors: Slosser Jacob Livingston , Madsen Mikael Rask 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
This chapter examines language’s role in the formation of legal categories. It holds that they are not just subject to whims of negotiated power dynamics but also to the dynamics of how human beings involved in the legal process operationalize underlying cognitive processes. We focus on the process of law-making by cognitive category-making. We promote a methodological intervention to examine the processes of meaning-making in legal principles to explore the politics of legal practice in action as, in part, an embodied cognitive process. Although public hearings, consultation, and deliberation are all part of the legal process, we focus on how law is performed as a written exercise with the goal of understanding the law through its use of linguistic choices. The result is an exploration of how language displays the cognitive underpinnings of legal category making and the development of legal institutions, legal rules and, the law itself.
A Worldly Law in a Legal World
Authors: d’Aspremont Jean 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
Most of international legal thought and practice rests on a distinction between international law and the world to which international law applies. It is informed, in this sense, by what is called here a form of ontological dualism whereby the actuality, historicity, and materiality of international law is distinct from the actuality, historicity, and materiality of the world to which international law applies. This chapter questions the ontological dualism that dominates international law and shows that, notwithstanding this common ontological dualism, international law and the world to which it applies are better construed as having no distinct actuality, historicity, and materiality. It argues that international law exists nowhere else than in the world to which it applies and the world to which international law applies exists nowhere else than in international law.
The Invisible Frames Affecting Wartime Investigations
Authors: Krebs Shiri 
Published: December 2021

Abstract
What are the invisible frames affecting fact-finding processes during armed conflicts? In this chapter I examine normative, cognitive, and legal frames shaping the outcomes of wartime investigations. First, I examine the reliance on the fog of war metaphor to justify practices of unknowing. Secondly, I analyse the role of legal ontology and epistemology in shaping the narrative of military actions. Thirdly, I survey cognitive and motivational biases influencing the collection and construction of facts during armed conflicts. Based on this interdisciplinary framework, I analyse data from the Israeli investigation of the targeted killing of Hamas Leader Salah Shehadeh. The analysis suggests that the combination of future-focused legal epistemology, cognitive and motivational biases, and the fog of war metaphor, generates law-fulfilling prophecies: a decision-making dynamic producing normative evaluations that are consistent with the legal requirements. The outcome is legitimization of otherwise unlawful actions, and perpetuation of faulty processes and human insecurity.