bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Epistemic Intuition and Disagreement
Authors: Bergmann Michael 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
This chapter examines skeptical objections to epistemic intuition that are based on disagreement. Section 1 distinguishes internal from external rationality in order to facilitate our understanding and analysis of the epistemology of disagreement. Section 2 lays out a variety of kinds of disagreement with respect to epistemic intuition. Section 3 explains why disagreement gives rise to a defeater in cases where it is not rational to view the one disagreeing with you as a person with worse evidence than you or as a person who is worse than you at responding well to evidence. Section 4 considers, in light of the previous sections, whether the intuitionist particularist anti-skeptic’s beliefs based on epistemic intuition can withstand disagreement-based skeptical objections in a way that is compatible with the requirements of intellectual humility. Section 5 works through the implications of disagreement about the proposed response (in Section 4) to disagreement about epistemic intuition.
Introduction
Authors: Posner Eric A. 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Antitrust law has very rarely been used by workers to challenge anticompetitive employment practices. Yet recent empirical research shows that labor markets are highly concentrated and that employers engage in practices that harm competition and suppress wages. These practices include no-poaching agreements, wage-fixing, mergers, covenants not to compete, and misclassification of gig workers as independent contractors. This failure of antitrust is due to a range of other failures—intellectual, political, moral, and economic. Until recently, economists assumed that labor markets are usually competitive when in fact recent studies reveal that they are usually not competitive. Commentators and politicians also seems to have assumed—falsely—that employment and labor law adequately addresses inequality of bargaining power and the resulting risk of wage suppression. The impact of this failure has been profound for wage levels, economic growth, and inequality.
Labor Monopsony in the United States
Authors: Posner Eric A. 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Most labor markets are monopsonistic, meaning that employers have market power and can suppress wages below the competitive rate. Among the various sources of market power is concentration: the usually small number of employers who compete to offer a type of job to workers. At one time, economists assumed that labor markets were competitive, and largely ignored the phenomenon of labor market concentration. Recent empirical work, relying on newly available databases, has established that labor market concentration is a serious problem in the United States and may account for a wide range of pathologies, including low wages, inequality, and stagnant economic growth.
Noncompetes
Authors: Posner Eric A. 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Employee covenants not to compete, which bar workers who leave their jobs from working for a competing employer for a period of time, should be subject to heightened antitrust enforcement. While noncompetes may serve legitimate purposes, they also create entry barriers and reduce labor market competition. The threat to competition has been highlighted by new research, which suggests that employers overuse noncompetes and that noncompetes reduce labor market competition. A likely explanation is the inadequacy of the existing legal regime. Antitrust law nominally applies to noncompetes, but courts have eviscerated it by imposing an excessive burden of proof on plaintiffs who challenge noncompetes. An appropriate doctrinal framework for evaluating noncompetes under antitrust law would shift the burden of proof to employers. Employers would be permitted to rebut challenges to their noncompetes only by showing that the noncompetes raise wages for their own workers and workers in the broader labor market.
The Gig Economy and Independent Contractors
Authors: Posner Eric A. 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
In recent years, a controversy has erupted over the distinction between employees and independent contractors. Commentators have argued that in the modern “gig economy,” many people traditionally classified as independent contractors are as vulnerable as employees and should be granted the legal protections that employees alone normally enjoy. However, the distinction between the two categories remains inescapable, and the theoretical basis for it has not been identified. A better approach derives the distinction from market structure. Employees are workers who, because they must make relationship-specific investments in a single firm, are subject to labor monopsony. Independent contractors do not make such relationship-specific investments, and hence normally operate in a competitive labor market. Employment and labor law may be explained as a method for protecting workers from labor monopsony; because independent contracts are not subject to labor monopsony, they do not require such protection.
Conclusion
Authors: Posner Eric A. 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Many people are worried about the fragmentation of labor markets, as firms replace employees with independent contractors. Another common worry is that low-skill work, and ultimately nearly all forms of work, will be replaced by robots as artificial intelligence advances. Labor market fragmentation is not a new phenomenon and can be addressed with stronger classification laws supplemented by antitrust enforcement. In fact, the gig economy has many attractive elements, and there is no reason to fear it as long as existing laws are enforced. Over the long run, artificial intelligence may replace much of the work currently performed by human beings. If it does, the appropriate response is not antitrust or employment regulation but policy that ensures the social surplus is fairly divided.
Social Science Biases and Collective Knowledge
Authors: Grossmann Matt 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Understanding, investigating, and adapting to the biases inherent in social science research is the best path toward accumulating and advancing social science knowledge. Social science faces many categories of bias, from those stemming from unrepresentative researcher demographics to those based on research practices and incentives. Each has implications for research practices, but none makes social science impossible. Scholars face inherent challenges larger than those of natural scientists, with more disagreement on the most important biases to address and the kinds of research necessary to do so. But there are important advances in scholars’ self-understanding that can serve as the basis for our future progress.
The Quiet Resolution of the Science Wars
Authors: Grossmann Matt 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
The “science wars” were resolved surprisingly quietly. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, critics of science from humanities disciplines fought with scientists over the extent to which science is a social and biased process or a path to truth. Today, there are few absolute relativists or adherents of scientific purity and far more acknowledgment that science involves biased truth-seeking. Continuing (but less vicious) wars over Bayesian and frequentist statistics likewise ignore some key agreements: tests of scientific claims require clarifying assumptions and some way to account for confirmation bias, either by building it into the model or by establishing more severe tests for the sufficiency of evidence. This sedation was accompanied by shifts within social science disciplines. Debates over both simplistic models of human nature (especially over rational choice theory) and over what constituted proper quantitative and qualitative methods died down as nearly everyone became theoretically and methodologically pluralist in practice. I herald this evolution, pointing to its benefits in the topics we cover, the ideas we consider, the evidence we generate, and how we evaluate and integrate our knowledge.
Me-Search All the Way Down
Authors: Grossmann Matt 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
The most commonly cited distinct difficulty of social science compared to science in general is that researchers are studying ourselves. But most thinkers have evolved toward a contemporary scientific realism on this point: there are biases, but they can be managed with close attention. Beyond perennial difficulties of self-knowledge, scholars tend to study their own time period, countries, and social groups, introducing additional biases while enabling research on how they affect our questions, methods, and interpretations. This often leads to accusations of “me-search,” especially by underrepresented minorities. But many of the same considerations that drive those critiques and their responses apply to scholars studying their own countries and time periods, and to all of us studying our own species. I argue that the successful history of racial and gender studies shows that progress requires acknowledgment of biases and diversification of viewpoints.
Multiple Levels of Analysis and Time Scales
Authors: Grossmann Matt 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Explanations for human behavior often involve factors operating at multiple levels of analysis (from individuals to organizations to nations) and across different time scales (immediate, developmental, and evolutionary). Continuing debates over methodological individualism within the social sciences ignore the growing consensus within philosophy of social science that influences on social life are present across individual and collective units, each with influential histories. Even if models of individual interaction offer useful templates, they do not imply that any social process started anew at any particular point in time or that individuals created social structures without being influenced by prior institutions. Using a comparison of traffic and weather, I find that these difficulties are no worse for social than natural science, once we welcome both simple patterns and complex multilevel processes. In both cases, much progress is made simply through observational generalization and many complaints involve our ability to change the world, not understand it.
Popularization and Consilience
Authors: Grossmann Matt 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Social science makes its way into public debate, raising concerns about publicity-seeking scholarship but also opening up potential benefits for engagement across disciplines and society. Social science debates are no longer, if they ever were, confined to universities and obscure journals; they are now central parts of popular media and political debate. Associated scholarly motivations for public influence drive research, then popular discussion of research findings feeds back into scholarship. The increasing role of media attention, popular nonfiction, and think tanks changes the incentives and the practices of social scientists. Popularized scholarship not only (mis)informs the public and policymakers, but also shapes interdisciplinary debates. This enables integration by concentrating diverse minds on public concerns. Sociobiology shows that scholars with very different views of human nature have put forward popular accounts, responded to one another, and created an ongoing space for advancing knowledge.
Reasons for Cautious Optimism
Authors: Grossmann Matt 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
The explosion of data collection and availability, the expansion of academia and the spread of ideas, and innovations in theory and method all suggest bright days ahead for social science. Addressing human collective challenges such as climate change, poverty, and public health depends on the advance of social science. I revisit the benefits of accounting for human bias in advancing these efforts and for the further understanding of ourselves. I embrace reforms, but as pieces of a pluralist landscape rather than strictures. Descriptive inferences of generalized patterns, causal inference, and qualitative explorations will all remain important to the advance of social knowledge.
Women and Politics Across Latin America
Authors: Hinojosa Magda , Kittilson Miki Caul 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Chapter 1 presents the puzzle of gender differences in political engagement and support for democracy. Traditional explanations come up short in fully explaining these gender gaps: gender differences in democratic engagement endure for some countries despite women’s increased participation in higher education and in the paid labor force. Much research has focused on gender gaps in voting, giving short shrift to the more puzzling differences in political interest (and related measures of political engagement) and support for democracy. Yet, the latter set of behaviors and motivations are essential to a strong democracy: at the individual level they are essential components of full democratic citizenship, and in the aggregate contribute to equality in the democratic process and to enlightened, inclusive debate. We explain why the Uruguayan case proves an unrivaled laboratory for investigating the effects of women’s gains in politics for changes in mass-level connections to the democratic process.
How Visibility Matters
Authors: Hinojosa Magda , Kittilson Miki Caul 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Chapter 2 presents our theoretical framework underpinning expectations about how increases in descriptive representation—the number of women in politics—act as symbols to elicit changes in orientations toward politics, especially among women. We argue that women’s inclusion fosters a sense of belonging among women in the electorate. Importantly, these cues about women’s inclusion must be visible to ordinary citizens. Widespread awareness of quotas and women’s numbers in elected office are key implicit assumptions in much prior research on descriptive and symbolic representation. We argue that gender quotas and women’s presence in office can only yield changes in mass-level attitudes under conditions of visibility. We develop a visible cue theory of representation, linking descriptive to symbolic representation. We contend that having more women in politically powerful positions signals that politics is not strictly an arena for men (but only if citizens are aware of women’s political presence).
Women’s Political Inclusion in Latin America: The Challenges of Gauging Visibility
Authors: Hinojosa Magda , Kittilson Miki Caul 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Chapter 3 focuses on a select set of Latin American countries (Honduras, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Panama) where women’s legislative representation doubled from one election to the next and rose above 20 percent. Detecting the effects of quotas and descriptive representation is complicated. Available survey evidence is inadequate to discern clear patterns on how sizable jumps in the numbers of women in political office influence political engagement and support. Cross-national survey timing makes it even more difficult to gauge the impact of these changes. Further, these gains may not have always been publicly visible, and a variety of salient campaign issues and events contend for the public’s attention and may overshadow the influence of women’s election to office. Assessing changes to political engagement and political support requires precise methods. In this way, this chapter sets up the analysis using our unique survey from Uruguay.
Invisible Laws, Visible Gains
Authors: Hinojosa Magda , Kittilson Miki Caul 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
In Chapter 4 we introduce our unique Uruguayan panel survey, and also present data gathered from elite interviews conducted in Montevideo and content analyses of three major Uruguayan newspapers. Drawing on these data, we carefully demonstrate how the quota policy itself failed to attract visibility among the general population, but then show how women’s gains in elected office were more visible. By establishing the visibility of women’s descriptive representation following the sizable increase in women’s numbers in parliament, this chapter sets the stage for our empirical analyses of the Uruguayan data.
Introduction
Authors: Doshi Rush 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
This introductory chapter summarizes the book’s argument. It explains that US-China competition is over regional and global order, outlines what Chinese-led order might look like, explores why grand strategy matters and how to study it, and discusses competing views of whether China has a grand strategy. It argues that China has sought to displace America from regional and global order through three sequential “strategies of displacement” pursued at the military, political, and economic levels. The first of these strategies sought to blunt American order regionally, the second sought to build Chinese order regionally, and the third—a strategy of expansion—now seeks to do both globally. The Introduction explains that shifts in China’s strategy are profoundly shaped by key events that change its perception of American power.
“A Coherent Body of Thought and Action”
Authors: Doshi Rush 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Chapter 1 defines grand strategy and international order. It then explores how rising powers displace hegemonic order through strategies of blunting, building, and expansion. First, the chapter argues that grand strategy is a theory of how a state can achieve security integrated across military, political, and economic means; and that finding it requires evidence of grand strategic concepts, capabilities, and conduct. Second, the chapter argues that international order emerges from a web of hierarchical relationships sustained by “forms of control” including coercion, inducement, and legitimacy—and that US-China competition is primarily over regional and global order. Finally, the chapter argues that rising powers can blunt a rival order by weakening its “forms of control” and build order by strengthening their own. Rising power perceptions of the hegemon’s power and threat shape the selection of rising power grand strategies.
“The Party Leads Everything”
Authors: Doshi Rush 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Chapter 2 explores the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) role in China’s grand strategy. First, it focuses on the CCP as a nationalist party, one that emerged from the patriotic ferment of the late Qing period and has sought to restore the country to its rightful place. Second, it focuses on the CCP as a Leninist party, one that has built centralized institutions—blended with a ruthless amorality—to govern the country and achieve its nationalist mission. Together, it argues, the Party’s nationalist orientation helps set the ends of Chinese grand strategy, while Leninism provides an instrument for realizing them. Finally, the book focuses on the CCP as a producer of paper and a subject of research, noting how a careful study of the Party’s own voluminous publications can provide insight into its grand strategic concepts. It then outlines much of the textual research strategy employed in the rest of this book.
“New Cold Wars Have Begun”
Authors: Doshi Rush 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Chapter 3 uses Party texts to explore China’s changing view of the United States at the end of the Cold War and the ends, ways, and means of its subsequent grand strategy to blunt American power. It demonstrates how China went from seeing the United States as a quasi-ally against the Soviet Union to seeing it as China’s greatest threat and “main adversary” in the wake of three events: the traumatic trifecta of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, the Gulf War, and the Soviet collapse. It traces how Beijing launched its blunting strategy under the Party guideline of “hiding capabilities and biding time,” which it tied to perceptions of US power captured in phrases like the “international balance of forces” and “multipolarity.” The chapter also introduces China’s effort to asymmetrically weaken American power in Asia across military, economic, and political instruments, which are discussed in greater detail in subsequent chapters.
“Demonstrate Benign Intentions”
Authors: Doshi Rush 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Chapter 5 considers the political and multilateral components of China’s grand strategy to blunt American power in Asia. It demonstrates that the “traumatic trifecta” at the end of the Cold War led China to reverse its previous opposition to joining regional institutions. Beijing feared Asian regional forums might be used by Washington to build liberal regional order or even an Asian NATO, so China joined them to blunt American power. It stalled institutionalization in regional organizations that included the United States; wielded institutional rules to constrain US freedom of maneuver; and hoped its own participation would reassure wary neighbors otherwise tempted to join a US-led balancing coalition. China also worked with Russia to erect regional institutions in Central Asia to guard against US influence within the region.
“A Change in the Balance of Power”
Authors: Doshi Rush 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Chapter 7 explores the dawn of China’s grand strategy to build regional order as well as the ends, ways, and means of this strategy. Using Party texts, it explores how the shock of the Global Financial Crisis led China to see the United States as weakening and emboldened it to take a more assertive course. It begins with a thorough review of China’s discourse on “multipolarity” and the “international balance of forces,” concepts China uses as euphemisms for US power and which it ties to its strategic guidelines. It then shows that the Party sought to lay the foundations for order—coercion, inducements, and legitimacy—under the auspices of the revised guidance “actively accomplish something” issued by Chinese leader Hu Jintao in 2009. This strategy, like blunting before it, was implemented across multiple instruments of statecraft—military, political, and economic.
“Aboard Our Development Train”
Authors: Doshi Rush 
Published: August 2021

Abstract
Chapter 10 focuses on the economic and financial components of China’s grand strategy to build regional order. It argues that the Global Financial Crisis helped Beijing depart from a defensive blunting strategy that targeted American economic leverage to an offensive building strategy designed to build China’s own coercive and consensual economic capacities. At the core of this effort was China’s Belt and Road Initiative, its robust use of economic statecraft against its neighbors, and its attempts to gain greater financial influence through building or promoting alternatives to SWIFT messaging system, new credit-rating agencies, and the US dollar.