bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Babbitt’s Gestural Dialectics
Authors: Bernstein Zachary 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
The array structures of Babbitt’s music, which present twelve-tone series fixed in narrow registers, seem abstract and impersonal. Nevertheless, numerous commentators on Babbitt’s music have celebrated the sense of motion the music inspires in its listeners. This chapter explores the tension between the music’s static contrapuntal structures and the dynamic experience that results, drawing from research on musical embodiment by Matthew Baileyshea and Seth Monahan, Candace Brower, Arnie Cox, Robert Hatten, Mariusz Kozak, Justin London, Patrick McCreless, and Andrew Mead. An exploration of these gestural dialectics sheds light on a variety of topics: virtuosity, text setting, the liminal periodicity of Babbitt’s later rhythmic practice, anomalous deviations from serial expectations, closing rhetoric, and partitioning. The chapter ends by discussing how scholars may navigate the distinction between Babbitt’s formalistic prose and the gestural experience of his music.
The Epistemic Pathologies of Elections and the Epistemic Promise of Lottocracy
Authors: Guerrero Alexander 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
There are many ways of evaluating legal and political institutions. This chapter introduces a new way to evaluate legal and political institutions: in terms of their sensibility. I define sensibility as the ability to appreciate and to respond to the world as it is, with two distinct components: (1) appreciating (or understanding or knowing) the world as it is, and (2) responding to the world in light of this appreciation. The first of these concerns the epistemic capacities of institutions. The second of these concerns the agential capacities of institutions. Having introduced the idea of sensibility, the chapter then focuses on a comparison of two different institutional arrangements—(1) electoral representative systems and (2) lottocratic systems of government, as introduced in this chapter—in terms of their epistemic quality or expected epistemic quality. I begin by drawing attention to several concerns about the sensibility of electoral representative institutions, focusing particularly on epistemic pathologies of those institutions. The second part of the chapter discusses an alternative kind of political institution, which I call a lottocratic political institution, and argues that we might well expect these institutions to be more sensible alternatives, at least under some conditions, on epistemic grounds. The negative contribution of the chapter, then, is to raise a series of challenges to the sensibility of electoral representative institutions. The positive contribution of the chapter is to suggest a direction for future institutional thinking, empirical study, and experimentation.
Introduction
Authors: Volpicelli Robert 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
The Introduction to this book provides a framework for analyzing both the “lecture” and the “tour.” The first half presents the lecture as a pervasive yet unexamined authorial practice. It draws on current theories of literary celebrity to demonstrate how lecturing is primarily concerned with the construction of an author’s “personality.” However, it also shows how an analysis of lecturing demands a close attention to live, embodied performance generally lacking among the scholarship in this area. The second half of the Introduction then looks at the social and historical contexts surrounding the US lecture tour. Focusing on the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it highlights two institutions—the lyceum and the Chautauqua—that were crucial in connecting the practice of lecturing to a larger traveling-show culture that hovered between public education and popular entertainment. Detailing this context underscores how the US lecture tour injected modernist authors into an environment of great social variety where they had to learn how to vary the presentation and performance of their own authorship.
Guru
Authors: Volpicelli Robert 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
Chapter 3 argues that Rabindranath Tagore followed W. B. Yeats in becoming a cultural representative while traveling on the circuit, but it also contends that Tagore’s reception as a popular guru ultimately hampered his ability to engage with political issues in the same way that Yeats had on his tour. More specifically, this chapter considers how this specific reception history evolved across Tagore’s first two US lecture tours, which took place in 1912–13 and 1916–17 respectively. While US audiences certainly played a large part in labeling Tagore as a guru, the poet was also a much cannier manipulator of his own reception than his critics have previously acknowledged. Through his public lecturing on his first tour, Tagore cultivated a spiritual image without playing to certain stereotypes that painted the East as a place of staid contemplation. Yet this effort became much more difficult during his next tour, when he began using his lectures on Hinduism as a platform for waging an explicit anti-colonial campaign. At this point, the poet was met with criticism, not only from Euro-Americans, but also from Bengali immigrants living in the US. This chapter therefore comes to the conclusion that Tagore’s success in altering his identity as a spiritual leader came at the expense of his popularity as an international literary figure.
Coda
Authors: Volpicelli Robert 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
The coda to this book uses modernist authors’ diverse engagements with academic institutions on the US lecture tour as an opportunity to reconsider long-standing scholarly narratives about modernist institutionalization. In particular, it argues that the academic institution is not the closed, autonomous space that critics frequently make it out to be and that modernism’s relocation into the university during the postwar period should not be seen as a retreat from the social world. After highlighting several scenes from this book that reflect an alternative perspective on modernism’s relationship with the university, the coda makes a final call for us to model our contemporary institutions on the US lecture tour’s diverse social engagements as a way of furthering recent efforts in the public humanities.
What Is the Opposite of Well-Being?
Authors: Kagan Shelly 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
Typically, discussions of the nature of well-being focus only on the positive elements—those things that directly constitute someone’s being well off or better off. But an adequate theory of well-being also needs to give an account of ill-being, the negative elements that directly constitute being badly off, or worse off. This chapter asks how to extend a particular nonstandard theory of well-being—according to which well-being consists in the enjoyment of objective goods—so as to cover ill-being as well. In effect, then, it tries to discover the opposite of well-being, according to this nonstandard theory. This chapter tries to answer the question: what is ill-being when well-being is enjoying the good? Graphs are used throughout to illustrate the alternative possibilities, and to help display the surprising complexity of the most plausible answers.
Doing Right by Wrong
Authors: Darwall Stephen 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
A striking contrast between Reasons and Persons and On What Matters is the vastly different attitude Parfit takes towards Act Consequentialism. Parfit’s defense of Act Consequentialism against a battery of criticisms in Reasons and Persons was legendary. In On What Matters, however, Parfit remarks that Sidgwick’s act-consequentialist principle of rational benevolence is best regarded, like egoism, as an ‘external rival to morality’. What lies behind this remarkable change in attitude, if not in view, is Parfit’s focus in On What Matters on deontic moral concepts, like wrongness, and their relation to accountability and reactive attitudes like moral blame. This essay explores the details of Parfit’s later views, arguing that he did not go far enough in pursuing this line of thought and that doing so is necessary to bring out the distinctive normativity of deontic moral concepts. Parfit’s claim that the ‘ordinary’ concept of wrongness is indefinable threatens to rob the concept of normativity in the ‘reason-involving sense’. If, however, we understand wrongness in terms of there being reason to blame, lacking excuse, we can account for its distinctive normative contours.
Defence Against Parfit’s Torturers
Authors: McMahan Jeff 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
In the literature on ‘moral mathematics’ prompted by the section with that title in Derek Parfit’s Reasons and Persons, one issue is whether, and if so to what extent, it is wrong to cause a negligible harm to each of a large number of people, and in particular whether doing so could ever be as seriously wrong as causing a substantial harm to one person. The topic in this chapter is the closely related issue of proportionality in defence against those who would inflict only such tiny harms, though on a large number of victims. For example, might a person who would otherwise inflict a tiny harm on each of a large number of people be liable to be killed in defence of those people? The chapter suggests that such a person seems liable to be killed in some cases but not in others, depending on what other people might be doing or on other facts about the context in which the harms would occur. It reviews a range of examples involving the infliction of tiny harms, including Parfit’s example of the Harmless Torturers, that reveal some surprising facts about the conditions and limits of liability to defensive harm.
What Is Harming?
Authors: Gardner Molly 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
A complete theory of harming must have both a substantive component and a formal component. The substantive component, which Victor Tadros calls the ‘currency’ of harm, tells us what I interfere with when I harm you. The formal component, which Tadros calls the ‘measure’ of harm, tells us how the harm to you is related to my action. This chapter surveys the literature on both the currency and the measure of harm. It argues that the currency of harm is well-being and that the measure of harming is best captured by a causal account on which harming is causing a harm. A harm for you is the presence of something intrinsically bad for you or the absence of something intrinsically good for you. Thus, although a counterfactual account of the measure of harm need not distinguish between a harm and a harmful event, the causal account reserves the term ‘harm’, not for a harmful event, but only for its effect. Finally, the chapter shows how a complete theory of harming can help us to answer questions about whether we can harm people with speech, whether we can harm the dead, and how it is possible to harm future generations.
Erasmus and Luther
Authors: Ruokanen Miikka 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
For Erasmus, the relationship between God and the human being is rationally and morally acceptable fair play in which both parties have their responsibilities. He follows the teaching of Nominalism: God has promised to grant his grace to anyone who does the minimum that he/she naturally can for receiving grace. “Free choice” means that the human being has the capability of applying him/herself to the things which lead to eternal salvation or turning away from them.Impenitence is a sin that can never be forgiven; moral deeds “attract” grace. For Luther, freedom in moral decisions plays a crucial role in the human community “in front of the world and people,” in relation to the “things below oneself.” But the human being is not free in his/her relation to the “things above oneself,” “in front of God,” or facing the power of unfaith, sin, and demonic evil. Should there be any change in the human’s relation to the realities “above oneself,” it is always a work of God’s prevenient grace effected by the Holy Spirit. Faith is a “new creation” infused into human hearts by God’s Spirit; sola fide is fully a Pneumatological reality for Luther—a fact overlooked in Luther research. The Spirit establishes an intimate union between the Triune God and the human being. Luther creates a massive defense of God’s sovereign grace, sola gratia. The doctrine of two “kingdoms” is the backbone of Luther’s thinking. Erasmus did not make such a distinction; consequently, law and gospel get mixed.
The Enslavement of the Human Being
Authors: Ruokanen Miikka 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
Luther underscores sin as unbelief which cuts off the relationship between the human being and his/her Creator resulting in the imprisonment of the human by sin, death, and transcendental evil. He/she exists in the state of infirmity, incapable of changing his/her basic orientation of life. Sin is weakness, inability to be free. Paradoxically, the enslavement of sin entered humanity when the human being was deceived by an illusion of absolute freedom, independence from the Creator: “man himself wants to be God, and does not want God to be God.” Erasmus criticized Luther for using the deterministic concept of “absolute necessity.” In fact, Luther is not a determinist, but he uses a hamartiological idea of “the necessity of immutability”: the sinner necessarily must continue to be a captive of unfaith until efficient Pneumatological grace liberates him/her. Luther’s thought does not include any notion of “the necessity of coaction.” The sinner freely enjoys sinning unless changed by God. The necessity of immutability concerns the human being’s relation to the “things above oneself,” not to those “below oneself” where natural freedom of will prevails. Luther represents no theodicy, he leaves open the question about where the ultimate origin of evil will lies. God is not the cause of evil will, but he may sometimes use it as an “instrumental cause” for his good purposes. In Luther’s treatise there is no trace of a doctrine of predestination applied to individual human beings. Any notion of double predestination is impossible in Luther’s doctrine of grace.
Is there Any Possibility of Reconciliation between Erasmus and Luther?
Authors: Ruokanen Miikka 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
After five centuries, would it be possible to see any chance of reconciliation between Erasmus and Luther? Looking at this question from the point of view of the three dimensions of the doctrine of grace, we might say some hopeful words. As to the first (1) dimension of grace, at many points even Erasmus admits that human choice must be empowered by God’s grace in order to move in the direction willed by God. But here the real difference is that, for Erasmus, free choice is enabled by the grace given in the creation and it is still naturally efficient in the sinners, whereas Luther sees that there is no freedom because of the human being’s enslavement by unfaith —there is a need for the efficient prevenient movement of the Holy Spirit which alone can create faith. As to the second (2) dimension of grace, following the Catholic tradition, Erasmus knows the conception of (2a) the forensic-juridical forgiveness of sins based on the atonement by the cross of Christ—in this respect there is no real point of controversy between the two. But Erasmus knows nothing about (2b) the union of the sinner with Christ in the Holy Spirit, the Trinitarian participatory conception of justification, central for Luther. In respect to the third (3) dimension of grace, both see possible the cooperation of the believer with God, the difference being Erasmus’ more anthropocentric concept of sanctification if compared with Luther’s emphasis of growth in love enabled by the Holy Spirit.
The Philosophy of Work
Authors: Appiah Kwame Anthony 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This chapter identifies three domains of philosophical questions about work. First, an ontological issue: What is work? This question is both historical and conceptual, as questions in social ontology usually are. Second, an ethical issue: How does work fit into the good life? The hard problem here is to substitute, in new economic conditions, for the four main things a good job currently does: first, produce the goods and services we need, while also providing people with income, sociability, and significance. These are issues on which many popular writers on the “Fourth Industrial Revolution” and on globalization have, of course, written for some time. But what’s lacking, the chapter claims, is serious organized reflection on the normative issues raised by these challenges. And that leads to the third cluster of concerns: How should law and other sources of normative authority be configured to allow work to contribute to the flourishing of workers, and how should the opportunities and rewards of work be shared?
Politics, Truth, and Respect
Authors: Turner Jonathan 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
Some claim that comprehensive liberalism is exclusionary on the ground that it ignores false but reasonable views. They claim that, insofar as the political liberal state bases its policy on views for which it claims reasonableness but not truth, it respects citizens in a way that comprehensive liberalism does not. The chapter argues that this is false. It distinguishes between ignoring a false view and ignoring the fact that someone holds a view (that happens to be false). Comprehensive liberalism does the former, but this is far from committing it to the latter also. Due respect is paid to citizens by taking appropriate account of the fact that they hold views other than those endorsed by the state. The chapter suggests a variety of ways in which this might be done. It argues that the comprehensive liberal state may reject views as untrue while respecting those who hold them because its attitude towards citizens is premised on the understanding that we are all interested in what really is just, and we are all concerned in trying to find out what that is. None of us wants a false view to be accepted—because it is false. The state respects a person’s capacity for reason by occupying the same epistemic ground as she does on the question of her belief, taking her to be a sincere but fallible inquirer after the truth, rather than patronizing her by remaining neutral in a way that she does not.
The Use and Abuse of Principles
Authors: Neves Marcelo 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This chapter reviews the use and abuse of principles in the Brazilian constitutional doctrine and practice. First, the problem of doctrinal fascination will be addressed, pointing out theoretical and jurisprudential mistakes. The misguiding and acritical reception of the theory of principles in Brazil is questioned considering leading Brazilian constitutional scholars who transplant foreign theoretical models without taking seriously the Brazilian legal order and its social context. Second, the book makes some critical comments on confused constitutional practices related to principles, considering some cases judged by the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court. A historical constitutional case and some recent constitutional cases are analysed considering the disparate application of balancing and proportionality.
Deconversion Narratives
Authors: Scheidt Hannah K. 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This chapter analyzes over 200 deconversion narratives (accounts of the loss of faith and the adoption of an atheist position) from an online atheist forum community. This chapter shows how notions of atheist identity develop in direct relation to notions of religious identity. Appeals to what is “natural” or “authentic” and descriptions of a progressive process of maturation or enlightenment appear in these narratives as ways to imagine atheist identity as starkly different from religious identity. The analyses in this chapter reveal a more complicated story, however, as the narratives also nod to the importance of authority, media, and new community in the formation of atheist subjects. This suggests that becoming an atheist entails not only divesting a religious identity but also adopting a new identity: one that is personal as well as communal.
Conclusion
Authors: Scheidt Hannah K. 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
The conclusion to Practicing Atheism outlines areas for further analysis. Specifically, it observes how questions of identity politics and “atheist intersectionality” lurk throughout the book. The conclusion provides an explanation for the fraught state of identity politics in atheism based on “Enlightenment zeal,” or a contemporary interest in recovering Enlightenment values. The conclusion also introduces the questions of whether an atheist “tradition” exists and how scholars might locate and narrativize such a tradition if it exists. Though many of the materials of contemporary atheist culture analyzed in this work are forgetful or dismissive of the past, there are ways that they harken to much older practices and materials. This chapter concludes with a statement on the theoretical takeaways of the ritual model developed throughout the book.
Introduction
Authors: Loxton James 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This introductory chapter presents the central puzzle of the book and sets the stage for the chapters to come. The first section defines the terms “conservative party” and “party-building.” The second section discusses the rise of the “new right” in Latin America during the 1980s. The third section presents data on new conservative parties formed in the region between 1978 and 2010. It highlights the puzzling fact that all of the successful cases (e.g., UDI in Chile, ARENA in El Salvador) were authoritarian successor parties, while those with more democratic origins (e.g., UCEDE in Argentina, PAN in Guatemala) failed. The fourth section briefly lays out the book’s argument about authoritarian inheritance and counterrevolutionary struggle. The fifth section considers potential alternative explanations. The final two sections discuss research design and provide a road map for the rest of the book.
A Theory of Conservative Party-Building
Authors: Loxton James 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This chapter lays out the book’s theory of conservative party-building, emphasizing two independent variables: (1) authoritarian inheritance and (2) counterrevolutionary struggle. The first section examines the challenges of conservative party-building in contemporary Latin America. The second section discusses the concept of authoritarian inheritance, arguing that authoritarian regimes can endow their partisan successors with a range of valuable resources. The third section discusses the role of counterrevolutionary struggle, arguing that intense struggles to preserve the existing order from a government perceived as an existential threat can serve as a powerful source of cohesion. The final section asks why conservative authoritarian successor parties emerged in some Latin America countries but not others, showing that this can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy by looking at three simple antecedent conditions.
UCEDE
Authors: Loxton James 
Published: June 2021

Abstract
This chapter examines the failure of the UCEDE in Argentina, and compares it to the success of the UDI in Chile. The first section discusses the long history of conservative party weakness in Argentina. The second section asks why no “Argentine UDI” emerged from the 1976–1983 military regime, arguing that its poor governing performance—including, notably, its defeat in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War—made the formation of such a party unviable. The third section examines the emergence of the UCEDE, emphasizing its much weaker starting position relative to the UDI. The fourth section discusses the fall of the UCEDE, which suffered a series of schisms and a sharp drop in electoral support after newly elected President Carlos Menem (1989–1999), a Peronist, began to implement much of its economic program. While the proximate cause of the UCEDE’s collapse was the Menem government, the chapter argues that the deeper cause was the party’s various built-in weaknesses.