bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Hegel
Authors: McDonough Jeffrey K. 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Hegel defends the reality and the priority of immanent teleology. He does so by accepting Kant’s analysis of immanent teleology, but arguing against Kant’s subjectivist position. Key to Hegel’s argument is the idea that a general kind—in Hegel’s terms, a “concept” of a form of life—can be the substance or nature of the individual organism, or determine what it is to be that organism. In some ways Hegel here follows his own interpretation of Aristotle, while also trying to turn modern arguments against immanent teleology to his own opposing purposes. And we can approach in these terms the way in which Hegel tries to build his broader metaphysics around teleology.
The Value of Ideal Theory
Authors: Adams Matthew 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
This chapter delineates two types of ideal theory that are found in Rawls’s corpus of work. The first is ideal-method theory, which is theory constructed using idealizing assumptions that do not directly correspond with the actual world. The second is ideal-content theory, namely criteria for assessing whether something is a perfectly justice institution. The chapter provides an independent justification for both types of theory, arguing that ideal-method theory is valuable within certain parameters; for instance, the idealizing assumption of strict compliance helps to clarify the distinction between distributive and retributive justice. The chapter illuminates the value of ideal-content theory by clarifying and defending Rawls’s claim that nonideal theory depends on ideal-content theory. In particular, it argues that in order to gain a systematic grasp of the more pressing problems of nonideal theory it is plausible to argue that ideal-content theory is necessary.
Rawls’s Underestimation of the Importance of Economic Agency and Economic Rights
Authors: Platz Jeppe von 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
In Rawls’s justice as fairness, the moral powers of democratic citizenship are the capacity for a conception of the good and the sense of justice, and basic rights are those necessary for the development and exercise of these two powers. Since economic agency is not a power of democratic citizenship, economic rights are not basic. To libertarians, this relative devaluation of economic agency and economic rights is a mistake, since economic agency and economic rights are the main concerns of justice. This libertarian critique is correct: justice as fairness underestimates the importance of economic agency and economic rights. Yet libertarian critics mistake how we should care about economic agency and which economic rights are basic. The economic agency that matters for justice as fairness is the capacity to work together with others, and the basic economic rights are those that enable and protect this capacity.
Rawls on Economic Liberty and the Choice of Systems of Social Cooperation
Authors: Thomas Alan 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Classical liberals argue Rawls fails to give sufficient weight to economic liberty. This paper argues that these classical liberals are mistaken. We know that Rawls took seriously Marx’s critique that the merely formal equality guaranteed by the basic liberties principle was de facto undermined by the material inequality permitted by the difference principle. As a response to Marx, Rawls believed that his principles could be fully specified in only one of two forms: liberal market socialism or property-owning democracy. Each fully specified system disperses capital so as to bring it under democratic control. Furthermore, within each system, economic liberties are robustly protected in a stable way. The classical liberal critique misfires as it takes only a part of his view to be the whole and neglects the full specification of these principles in one or another of Rawls’s preferred social systems.
A Feminist Defense of Political Liberalism
Authors: Hartley Christie , Watson Lori 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Some feminists claim that liberal theories lack the resources necessary for fully diagnosing and remedying the social subordination of persons as members of social groups. Part of the problem is that liberals focus too narrowly on the state as the locus of political power. However, equal citizenship is also affected by systems of power that operate in the background culture and that construct social hierarchies in which persons are subordinated as members of social groups. This chapter argues that political liberalism, properly understood, entails a commitment to substantive equality such that it has the internal resources to address the kinds of inequality produced by unjust forms of social power. Although some will claim that if the basic structure is the subject of justice, political liberalism will still fall short of securing gender justice, we explain why this worry is misplaced.
Rawls and Animals
Authors: Smith Patrick Taylor 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
This chapter claims that Rawlsians ought to deny that we have direct duties of justice toward animals. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, the chapter shows that animal rights critics of Rawls fail to offer convincing examples where Rawlsians would permit obviously unjust examples of animal cruelty; rather, they argue that even if Rawls would justify the correct policy, he does so for the wrong reasons. I call these “animal-centrality” arguments: the interests of animals must, as a theoretical matter, be central to why we protect them. Second, the chapter demonstrates that the theoretical costs of including animals in our theories of justice is much higher than often thought. Third, the chapter suggests that Rawlsians have significant yet often ignored resources to defend substantial protections for animals on indirect grounds. It thus concludes that the theoretical benefits of including direct duties for animals are significantly outweighed by the theoretical costs and that Rawlsians are justified in rejecting animal-centrality arguments.
Rawls on Global Economic Justice
Authors: Nath Rekha 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
This chapter canvasses the debate between John Rawls and his cosmopolitan critics over the demands of economic justice that arise beyond state borders. In particular, it examines the merits of three defenses of the position Rawls advances in The Law of Peoples that justice does not call for a cross-society egalitarian distributive principle: first, that such a principle would fail to hold states responsible for their economic position; second, that satisfying such a principle would not be feasible; and, third, that appeal to Rawls’s constructivist methodology can explain why the egalitarian principles he takes to be suited for the state context are not suited for the international context. The chapter concludes that upon careful examination, none of these defenses succeeds in plausibly motivating Rawls’s rejection of global egalitarianism.
Rawls’s Reasoning about International Economic Justice
Authors: Brock Gillian 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
This chapter discusses Rawls’s reasoning concerning how to navigate issues of international economic justice. Rawls offers a sophisticated account that offers many significant insights. This chapter aims to highlight some of these. After outlining Rawls’s argument for his model aimed at offering substantial guidance in international affairs, the chapter covers frequently voiced key criticisms of Rawls’s views in this domain. It shows some of the ways in which Rawls, or rather those who would defend him, might address these challenges. In the process we come to appreciate the important insights that Rawls is able to offer. So this chapter argues that Rawls’s position on duties to address global poverty and his views concerning how to assist burdened societies to make the improvements they seek contain considerable wisdom that is not adequately acknowledged.
Right-Wing Populism and Noncoercive Injustice
Authors: Blake Michael 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples makes several assumptions that, in the years since that book’s writing, have been shown to be potentially flawed. The first is that democratic societies can be predicted to inculcate citizens with democratic values, such that democratic peoples have no realistic worry about backsliding into tyranny. The second is that there is a sharp conceptual distinction between coercive intervention, on the one hand, and mere conversation and speech on the other. The emergence of right-wing populism—and the related phenomenon of troll farms, intended to inflame disagreement and anger within democratic political communities abroad—have raised the issue of antidemocratic societies using speech to undermine support for democratic self-government abroad. Rawls’s Law of Peoples, I argue, is poorly suited for the task of responding to these circumstances. Rawls’s Law of Peoples might have been better situated for this task, the chapter concludes, had Rawls included robust respect for democratic governance within that law. This Democratic Law of Peoples might have been the basis of a global society in which democracies held each other to account for their deviations from democratic self-government—while still expressing tolerance and modesty about the extent to which we might coercively intervene in favor of democracy.
Tolerating Decent Societies
Authors: Mandle Jon 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Rawls argues that the public reason of a liberal democratic society should aim to include—and therefore tolerate—all reasonable persons. But the public reason that he defends for the Society of Peoples (globally) is considerably more inclusive. Rawls argues for the toleration of “decent” societies that are not liberal democracies. Critics have charged that such toleration, while perhaps pragmatic, is unprincipled. But a careful examination of Rawls’s criteria for “decency” reveals a defense of Rawls’s position that is grounded in the institutional requirements for a society to be able to make its own legitimate political decisions.
The Relevance of Wrongs
Authors: Gold Andrew S. 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter discusses the senses in which private law is responsive to wrongs. It begins by explaining that while private law is responsive to civil wrongs, it is responsive to other kinds of wrongs, too, including moral wrongs. The chapter explains that private law proves particularly responsive to moral wrongs within the conscience-based jurisdiction of equity. It also notes that private law’s responses to wrongs are varied. Furthermore, in certain circumstances, courts’ concern for moral wrongs in the enforcement of legal rights will mean that it overlooks a civil wrong or deviates from its customary responses (remedial or otherwise) to these wrongs. Finally, the variety evident in private law’s responses to wrongs suggests that wrongs raise different concerns of justice within private law, some of which may be in tension.
Losing the Right to Assert You’ve Been Wronged: A Study in Conceptual Chaos?
Authors: Ferzan Kimberly Kessler 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter addresses consent and estoppel, raising questions about their meaning, implications, and justification. It disentangles various bases on which one could lose the right to redress for a civil wrong. One such basis is that an individual actually or apparently consented to conduct an act that would, but for consent, be wrongful. But this chapter cautions that it is important to recognize that apparent consent is not a form of consent. Another basis upon which a right to redress can be lost is where an underlying primary right is deemed forfeited though the right-holder’s insincere act, as where duty-holders are duped into committing a wrong because the “victim” seeks a valued remedy. Finally, this chapter explains that the overbroad rubric of estoppel conceals at least three other distinct bases on which the exercise of a right to redress may be varied or suspended.
The Significance of a Civil Wrong
Authors: Smith Stephen A. 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter claims that the commission of a civil wrong generally holds no significance for the substantive rights and duties of the parties to the wrong, and that it holds but minor significance in the law of remedies. This chapter’s claims are based on an analysis of the relationship between the nature of particular civil wrongs and the content of associated remedies. It is true that wrongs are causally significant to remedies, in that proof of a wrong is frequently a condition requisite to the award of a remedy. But this does not imply that remedies are responsive to wrongs in the more robust and important sense of being addressed to the wrong as such. This chapter explains that many remedies do little more than insist on respect for an underlying right, in which case the wrong is just an occasion for an order for performance of a substantive duty. Remedies are robustly responsive to wrongs only where the wrong itself supplies reasons for “creative” court-ordered remedies, these reasons being reflected in the content of the remedies ordered.
Secondary Duties
Authors: Tadros Victor 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter argues that civil wrongs are central to remedies. It shows that private law remedies are primarily responsive to wrongs. Furthermore, the stringency of secondary or remedial duties reflects the special moral significance of wrongs as such. This chapter attributes the tendency to discount the normative relationship between wrongs and remedies to lack of clarity on that between primary and secondary moral and legal duties. Here, the justification for secondary legal duties becomes an extension of that for secondary moral duties. This implies that the way forward lies in the clarification of the normative significance of the deontic structure of private law and, in turn, the associated moral aims of private law.
Joint-Carving in Deontic Tort
Authors: Azmat Ahson 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter argues that non-instrumental, deontic approaches to tort law—like Corrective Justice or Civil Recourse Theory—presuppose an unspecified and undefended non-naturalist account of the normativity of civil wrongs. Linking this puzzle to current debate within metaphysics, the chapter argues that a deontic theory of tort must be a theory of legal grounding—that is, an account of the relationship between torts and the facts that underwrite them. It specifies a model of the logical form of this grounding relationship and then examines whether it is a metaphysical or, instead, a sui generis legal relationship. The chapter then turns squarely to Corrective Justice and Civil Recourse Theory to determine whether they can make good on their metaphysical presuppositions.
Vosburg v. Baxendale
Authors: Goldberg John C.P. , Zipursky Benjamin C. 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter addresses a basic difference between the rules governing tort and contract damages. It also explains why this already puzzling divergence is all the more puzzling in virtue of a seemingly intuitive “foreseeable-at-breach” rule that tort law rejects in favor of one that is less restrictive, while contract law rejects in favor of one that is more so. The chapter sets out to explain this phenomenon, in the process defending and illuminating prevailing doctrine. Two cases provide the focal point for this discussion. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) stands for the rejection, in contract law, of the foreseeable-at-breach rule in favor of foreseeability of loss at the time of contract formation. Vosburg v. Putney (1891), meanwhile, holds that damages may be recovered in a tort action even if not reasonably foreseeable at the time of breach.
Broken Records
Authors: Lageson Sarah Esther 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Uneven modes of data production have led thousands of jurisdictions to organize and share data in myriad of complicated ways. Using two case studies in New York City and Pennsylvania, this chapter explains how technological innovation within criminal justice systems can lead to incorrect, incomplete, or misused data. Within the offices of local criminal justice agencies, it is the employees who are charged with modernizing record-keeping, streamlining systems, and controlling information for their respective branch of criminal justice. But these branches have divergent functions and somewhat conflicting goals, leading to a lack of data harmonization and little consensus on what should be shared.
The Digilantes
Authors: Lageson Sarah Esther 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Interviews with people who operate criminal record websites, crime watch networks, and social media feeds illustrate how today’s users of criminal records extend well beyond criminal justice officials, data brokers, statisticians, and employers. Instead, civilians use criminal justice data to create online communities that promise to do better report on, respond to, and prevent crime compared to existing structures. These “digilantes” use criminal records, arrest logs, and booking photos in their quest to create better forms of citizen journalism, victim support networks, and neighborhood watch networks. There is a tension centered around whether digilantes’ access to criminal records benefits broader society or whether publishing already public information harms subjects even more. What seems like a privacy violation to a website subject is simultaneously viewed as a social benefit by those who circulate criminal records.
Geek Identities in the Digital Family
Authors: Rocca Della 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
This chapter addresses families that have most actively embraced the idea of a digital future—self-declared “geeky” children and parents. Although these families are in some ways exceptional, their lives reveal the considerable emotional, financial, and time investment required by the premise—avidly promoted by both the public and private sectors—that the future is digital. But the outcomes remain unknown and are, arguably, riskier than more traditional routes. Families accept these terms, it is suggested, insofar as they see the adoption of a “geeky” identity as offering them a plausible pathway to overcome some unique biographical challenges. However, the authors avoid celebrating them as “positive deviants” even though they may yet benefit from being in the vanguard.
(Dis)abilities
Authors: Rocca Della 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Parents of children with special education needs and disabilities (SEN) often experience an intensified struggle to balance the risks of digital technologies while also embracing the opportunities. This chapter argues that, rather than being the exception, these families illustrate the dilemmas of the digital age felt in varying degrees by many families. For families with children with special education needs and disabilities, these dilemmas, we argue, are heightened given parents’ efforts to chart individualized pathways under conditions of significant uncertainty and reduced structural support. Digital technologies, in short, seem to suggest a potential path toward a socially sanctioned and innovative future, along with some creative workarounds to resolve a lack of domestic resources or capacity. However, the hopes raised by digital technologies for some of the families discussed in this chapter may be unrealized, and do not substitute for provision of better state services.
Parents and Digital Learning
Authors: Rocca Della 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
This chapter explores parents’ practical efforts to realize the promise that the believe digital technologies hold for learning –at home, at school and in extracurricular activities-- in the present and for the future. Our fieldwork contrasts the values and imaginaries of three extracurricular digital learning sites, bringing together the voices of educators and parents to understand how each conceives of the learning potential associated with digital technologies. Somewhat unexpectedly, although the chosen learning sites vary considerably in resources, each tends to underplay the importance of parents in scaffolding children’s digital interests and, through a series of minor but significant barriers, to disconnect parents from their children’s learning.
What’s Going On?
Authors: Caputi Jane 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Mother Nature-Earth is probably humanity’s oldest religious, philosophical, and scientific idea, recognizing a non-binary mothering power, the encompassing womb that both gives and takes life through a process of continuing rebirth and renewal. Western culture reduces Mother Nature-Earth to a folkloric figure, but cognitive justice challenges the assumed supremacy and centrality of Eurocentric and male-dominated theory mostly associated with father figures. The Anthropocene is not only a geological event but also a political, philosophical, and theological one. Key to its undoing is decolonization, including of lands, waters, minds, and spirit, by drawing upon unjustly discredited knowledges, including Indigenous ontological conceptions of spiritual meanings that recognize the awareness and being of all terrestrial life, the inherent value of matter and the agency of Nature-Earth.
The Gods We Worship
Authors: Caputi Jane 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Anthropocene Man worships himself via a creed of human exceptionalism and idolization of “tower of power” gods—speed, profit, domination, and accumulation. Anthropocene Man proclaims that he is becoming god—able to engineer a new genesis to replace nature, yielding a fully controlled manmade world. The divine role model for this project is the heaven-based and reportedly immortal, omnipotent, and purely male father god. Man’s self-deification is contingent upon deicide—simultaneously ecocide and matricide—of the original earth deity Mother Nature-Earth. Western ways of thinking reduce Mother Nature-Earth to mere metaphor, but this is wrong. Environmental justice theorists and activists worldwide speak to the reality of Mother Nature-Earth and call for the defense of the planetary Mother, including through the legal establishment of Mother Earth Rights.
The Anthropocene Is a Motherfucker
Authors: Caputi Jane 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Critical Anthropocene analyses, including those naming the era the Capitalocene and the Plantationocene, neglect to analyze the gendered-sexual domination, or rapism, that founds the era. The origins of the Anthropocene extend back some seven thousand years to the establishment of patriarchal systems, based in ruling men establishing control over women’s sexual and reproductive powers. That model of domination then extended into the enslavement of others, ownership of land, and establishment of social hierarchies. These patterns mark the founding of the United States through the European rapist genocide of Indigenous peoples and theft of land, as well as the rapism at the core of chattel slavery. These enactments of motherfucking enabled a world-wide cotton industry, which in turn made possible the global and rapacious capitalist system that is most responsible for the Anthropocene. Gendered sex and violence infuse ecocidal activities, past and present, including plowing, drilling, nuking, and fracking—which all double as slang terms for fucking.