bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Extended Action and Instrumental Rationality
Authors: Tenenbaum Sergio 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
Chapter 1 presents the general structure of a theory of instrumental rationality, as well as laying down some of the main ideas and motivations for the extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR) developed in the book. It characterizes the content of a theory of instrumental rationality in terms of its given attitudes (the “inputs” for a theory of instrumental rationality), its principles of coherence, its principles of derivation, and what counts as the conclusion of practical reasoning or the exercise of our rational powers (the “outputs”) of instrumental rationality. On ETR, intentional actions are both the given attitudes and the exercises of our instrumental, rational powers.
Extended Theory of Rationality
Authors: Tenenbaum Sergio 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
Chapter 2 presents the main tenets of the extended theory of rationality (ETR). According to ETR, both the given attitudes (“inputs”) and the conclusion of practical reasoning (“outputs”) are actions (more particularly, the intentional pursuit of ends). The principle of instrumental reasoning, which tells us (roughly) to adopt means to our ends, is the only principle of derivation, and a principle (roughly) requiring agents not to pursue incompatible ends is the only principle of coherence. The chapter also presents one of the main theses of ETR; namely that the rationality of an agent through an interval t1-tn does not supervene on the rationality of the agent at each moment t1-tn (what I call the “non-supervenience thesis”). In other words, someone may be irrational over a period of time without there being any moment during that time at which they were irrational.
Pursuing Ends as the Fundamental Given Attitude
Authors: Tenenbaum Sergio 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
The extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR) takes the intentional pursuit of ends to be the only relevant attitude for the theory of instrumental rationality, and takes the principle of instrumental reasoning, a non-comparative principle, to be the only principle of derivation. However, it seems that if the agent has more than one end, we’ll need to introduce comparative or graded attitudes, such as the preference orderings in orthodox decision theory, in order to explain the rationality of choices among competing ends. In fact, ETR can provide a significantly better account of how a rational agent pursues multiple indeterminate ends through time than theories that make use of comparative and graded attitudes. ETR proposes that in the pursuit of such ends a rational agent must inevitably “satisfice” rather than maximize. At the same time, the chapter explains how some comparative attitudes, such as preferences, can be incorporated into ETR.
Indeterminate Ends and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer
Authors: Tenenbaum Sergio 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
Chapter 4 looks at Quinn’s puzzle of the rational self-torturer. The puzzle presents, in a clear way, a structure that pervades our pursuit of ends through time. The chapter argues that a proper solution for the puzzle, and thus a proper account of instrumental rationality that applies to extended action, must accept the non-supervenience thesis. We also need to understand how the agent’s extended perspective (the perspective of the pursuit of long-term ends) and the agent’s punctate perspective (the perspective of the pursuit of momentary actions) interact in realizing the agent’s indeterminate ends. This chapter presents ETR’s account of this interaction. Since extant theories of instrumental rationality cannot do justice to the non-supervenience thesis, and a fortiori, to the structure of agency illustrated in the puzzle of the rational self-torturer, this account represents an important argument in favour of ETR.
Practical Judgment and Its Corresponding Vices
Authors: Tenenbaum Sergio 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
Chapter 8 concludes the discussion of instrumental virtues started in the previous chapter. It argues that ETR gives us the tools to account for an overlooked instrumental virtue, which I call “practical judgment”. An agent exhibits the virtue of practical judgment insofar as she can pursue long-term ends without relying too much on restrictive implementation policies; this virtue turns out to be essential to our understanding of a rational agent who pursues indeterminate ends over time. The account also allows us to understand ordinary phenomena such as procrastination as manifestations of practical judgment’s corresponding vices, such as procrastination.
Debating the A Priori
Authors: Boghossian Paul , Williamson Timothy 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
The book records a series of philosophical exchanges between its authors, amounting to a debate extended over more than fifteen years. Its subject matter is the nature and scope of reason. A central case at issue is basic logical knowledge, and the justification for basic deductive inferences, but the arguments range far more widely, at stake the distinctions between analytic and synthetic, and between a priori and a posteriori. The discussion naturally involves problems about the conditions for linguistic understanding and competence, and what it might be to grasp a concept or to have an intuition. Since reason is central to philosophical method, there are associated implications for how philosophy itself works, or should work. In particular, the discussion raises fundamental concerns about how to approach epistemology.
Blind Reasoning
Authors: Boghossian Paul , Williamson Timothy 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
The essay asks under what conditions deductive reasoning transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion. It argues that both standard externalist and standard internalist accounts of this phenomenon fail. The nature of this failure is taken to indicate the way forward: basic forms of deductive reasoning must justify by being instances of ‘blind but blameless’ reasoning. The essay then explores the suggestion that an inferentialist account of the logical constants, according to which an understanding of the constants constitutively involves a disposition to infer according to their characteristic inferential rules, can help explain how such reasoning is possible. Some salient objections are considered and rebutted.
Inferentialism and the Epistemology of Logic
Authors: Boghossian Paul , Williamson Timothy 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This essay attempts to clarify the project of explaining the possibility of ‘blind reasoning’—namely, of basic logical inferences to which we are entitled without our having an explicit justification for them. The role played by inferentialism in this project is examined and objections made to inferentialism by Paolo Casalegno and Timothy Williamson are answered. Casalegno proposes a recipe for formulating a counterexample to any proposed constitutive inferential role by imaging a subject who understands the logical constant in question but fails to have the capacity to make the inference in question; Williamson’s recipe turns on imagining an expert who continues to understand the constant in question while having developed sophisticated considerations for refusing to make it. It’s argued that neither recipe succeeds.
Boghossian and Casalegno on Understanding and Inference1
Authors: Boghossian Paul , Williamson Timothy 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
In response to Boghossian’s objections in Chapter 6, this chapter defends counterexamples offered by Paolo Casalegno and the author to an inferentialist account of what it is to understand a logical constant, on which Boghossian relied in his explanation of our entitlement to reason according to basic logical principles. The importance for understanding is stressed of non-inferential aspects of the use of logical constants, for example in the description of a perceived scene. Boghossian’s criteria for individuating concepts are also queried, as is the viability of hybrid accounts which mix inferential accounts of the use of some terms with non-inferential accounts of other terms.
How Deep is the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge?1
Authors: Boghossian Paul , Williamson Timothy 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This chapter argues that although a distinction can be drawn between a priori and a posteriori ways of knowing or forms of justification, by contrasting paradigm cases on each side, the result is epistemologically shallow: it does not cut at the joints, because some clear cases of the a priori differ from some clear cases of the a posteriori only in epistemologically superficial ways. By contrast, attempts to draw the distinction in more theoretical terms, for instance by distinguishing evidential from enabling roles for experience in knowledge, end up by classifying paradigm cases on unwanted sides of the line. Although the role of the imagination in the chapter’s key examples may seem abnormal, it is argued that it generalizes much more widely than one might expect to logical and mathematical knowledge.
Reply to Boghossian on the Distinction between the A Priori and the A Posteriori1
Authors: Boghossian Paul , Williamson Timothy 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This chapter replies to Boghossian’s defence of the epistemological depth of the a priori–a posteriori distinction in Chapter 9 against the author’s critique in Chapter 8. It shows that nothing essential to the argument depends on the distinction between inner and outer experience. It then explains how Boghossian provides no workable alternative to the account in Chapter 8 of the role of imagination in generating knowledge in the key examples, and why the absence of such an alternative leaves Boghossian in danger of drifting into very extensive scepticism about mathematical knowledge. It is also noted that epistemological externalism does not figure as a premise in the key arguments of Chapter 8, although they may offer support for such externalism.
Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori1
Authors: Boghossian Paul , Williamson Timothy 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This essay distinguishes between Constitutive and Basis versions of understanding-based accounts of a priori justification and argues, contra Williamson, that the phenomenon of expert competent dissent doesn’t undermine either one. The argument involves revisiting Williamson’s famous expert-based recipe for generating counterexamples to any constitutive understanding–assent link. Notwithstanding, it is further argued that the theory of the a priori cannot avoid appeal to a notion of intuition or rational insight primarily because there are propositions, such as normative principles, that are synthetic a priori. It answers Williamson’s stated skepticism about the existence of intuitions and makes a start at explaining how intuitions might be able to contribute to a priori justification.
Boghossian on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori Once Again1
Authors: Boghossian Paul , Williamson Timothy 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This chapter replies to Boghossian’s Chapter 15 and amplifies the arguments of the author’s Chapter 14. In particular, it illustrates the loss of underived dispositions with an example from learning mathematics, when the novice gradually ceases to be tempted by a certain kind of mistake. It is also explains why the argument of Chapter 14 does not assume that introspection and postulation are mutually incompatible; rather, it notes the author’s inability to introspect the non-doxastic intellectual seemings Boghossian postulates and suggests that it is not idiosyncratic. Finally, a challenge is raised for Boghossian’s view of a priori justification as coherence with intellectual seemings. What prevents bigoted beliefs being justified a priori in the way he describes by the bigoted intellectual seemings of a consistent Nazi, for example? If nothing does, what prevents the Nazi’s so-justified beliefs as to what one ought to do from justifying the corresponding actions?
Closing Reflections1
Authors: Boghossian Paul , Williamson Timothy 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
In these brief comments, the author discusses the origins of his interest in the epistemology, why he has always found inferentialist accounts of it implausible, and why the similarities between the epistemology of logic and the epistemology of other domains have always been salient to him. There is also a brief account of the asymmetry between the role of internalism in Boghossian’s epistemology and the role of externalism in the author’s epistemology. Finally, there are some reflections on the ways in which we can hope to improve the shaky methodology of traditional epistemology, for example by making more use of formal methods and the findings of experimental psychology.
What is Land Law?
Authors: Cooke Elizabeth 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This chapter begins with some fundamental questions: what is property? what is real property? what is land? and what are property rights? The chapter looks at the definition of land as provided in section 205(1)(ix) of the Law of Property Act 192. It explores the impact of the European Convention on Human Rights, brought into our domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. The tensions and themes of land law are introduced, in particular the tension between static and dynamic security and the notion that land law is a struggle between competing categories of rights and competing values.
Land Law and Registration Today
Authors: Cooke Elizabeth 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This chapter explains how the reforms of 1925 addressed the problem of complexity by redefining legal and equitable estates and interests in land. It then discusses the management of enforceability under the 1925 legislation, particularly by the central role of the trust. The chapter explains how the law has managed the problem of hidden, undocumented ownership rights, and explores the concept of indefeasibility in registered land. Finally the chapter considers the Law Commission’s project commenced in 2014, which was designed to iron out problems that had appeared in the operation of the 2002 Act in the decade since it came into force. It discusses the report published at the conclusion of the project in 2018 and the recommendations therein.
Joint Ownership of Land
Authors: Cooke Elizabeth 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
The chapter examines the law that manages joint ownership using the structure known as the ‘trust of land’. It begins by introducing the different circumstances in which joint ownership can arise (family, business, or succession), and the distinction between joint tenancy and tenancy in common, and how to tell them apart. It then looks at the ways in which a joint tenancy can be severed. The chapter explains the provisions of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 (TLATA) which governs the operation of the trust of land. Dispute resolution and bankruptcy are considered. The chapter concludes with a look at the conflict of static versus dynamic security in land law, and discusses the use of restrictions to protect unregistered ownership interests in land.
Mortgages
Authors: Cooke Elizabeth 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This chapter explains what the function of a mortgage as a security interest, and details the different forms of mortgages that now exist. It discusses the rights, remedies, and protections available to the mortgagor and mortgagee, and the process by which the courts have intervened in the contractual relationship largely for the protection of the borrower. Protections available for the homeowner, and for third parties whose rights are affected by a mortgage, are discussed. Finally, the problems of pressure and the law of undue influence are introduced.
Appurtenant Rights
Authors: Cooke Elizabeth 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This chapter provides an exposition of the law relating to easements, profits à prendre, and restrictive covenants. It describes the nature of an easement and how easements are created, including implication and prescription. The chapter then explores the ways in which easements can be brought to an end. It discusses the creation and characteristics of positive and restrictive covenants and the complex rules relating to their enforceability. It explores how covenants can be brought to an end, and the possibility of discharge or modification provided by section 84 of the Law of Property Act 1925. Finally, the chapter looks at the Law Commission’s proposals for the reform of these areas of the law.
A Theory of Substantive Deliberation
Authors: Mak Vanessa 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This chapter examines the normative substance of rules of European private law. Lawmaking in this field stands apart from transnational law due to its commitment to the objectives and values of European contract and consumer law. That characteristic means that, in theory, legal pluralism in European private law could go beyond a procedural approach — in which mechanisms of recognition and toleration determine how norm conflicts are mediated between legal orders — to a normative approach that prescribes to which values outcomes should adhere. The chapter submits, therefore, that European private law contains elements that allow for a ‘substantive deliberation’ of rules, values, and objectives. This means that a recursive process between lawmaking actors in which the substance of rules — laid down in public and private regulation — is examined, and adjusted if it falls below the threshold that EU law prescribes. Whilst the reference to objectives and values seems to imply an ordering of some sort, it is argued that a strong legal pluralist framework can still be maintained. The coordination of lawmaking can occur through an instrumental-normative approach.
Objectives and Values
Authors: Mak Vanessa 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This chapter delves into the substantive values that underlie contract and consumer law in the EU. It shows that lawmaking in European contract and consumer law is embedded within the ordoliberal ideology on which the EU internal market was founded, yet is shaped not only by economic rights but also by social rights. Those rights have a basis in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which ground European cooperation in the common pursuit of a ‘highly competitive social market economy’ — social justice, equality, amongst other values and objectives. While the balance between economic and social rights in this area is in flux, the EU Treaties in combination with secondary legislation, case law, and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights circumscribe a framework of shared values and objectives within which a substantive deliberation between lawmaking actors can take place. The chapter argues, therefore, that the EU legal order has a normative basis that enables legal pluralist perspectives on lawmaking to go beyond procedural approaches.
Integrity, Personal, and Political
Authors: Nili Shmuel 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
Conventional philosophical wisdom holds that no agent can invoke its own moral integrity—no agent can invoke fidelity to its deepest ethical commitments—as an independent moral consideration. This is because moral integrity simply consists in doing what is, all-things-considered, the right thing. Shmuel Nili argues that this conventional wisdom is mistaken with regard to individual agents, but is especially misguided with regard to liberal democracies as collective agents. Even more than individual persons, liberal democracies as collective agents often face integrity considerations of independent moral force, affecting the moral status of actual political decisions. After defending this philosophical thesis, Nili illustrates its practical value in thinking through a wide range of practical policy problems. These problems range from “dirty” national security policies, through the moral status of political honors celebrating political figures of questionable integrity, to the “clean hands” dilemmas of political operatives who enable media demagogues to scapegoat vulnerable ethnic and racial minorities. Accessibly written, and combining detailed philosophical analysis with numerous vivid real-world examples, Integrity: Personal and Political will appeal to moral, legal, and political philosophers, to political scientists, and to scholars of political communication.
Outrageously Real
Authors: James Alison 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This chapter dismantles the common distinction between modernist aestheticism and documentary reference by studying André Gide’s factual writings. In his recollections of his experiences as a juror (Souvenirs de la cour d’assises, 1914) and his reports on court cases in the Nouvelle Revue Française series “Ne jugez pas” (“Judge Not,” 1930), Gide’s ostensibly impersonal organization of testimonial evidence produces a complex polyphonic construction that claims to let documents speak for themselves, while in fact articulating them within a larger discourse. In Voyage au Congo (1927) and Le Retour du Tchad (1928) Gide’s politically engaged writing on French Equatorial Africa enters into dialogue with the largely apolitical documentary film-making practices of his travelling companion Marc Allégret. Commenting on Allégret’s cinematic practices, Gide both reflects on the limitations of documentary and attempts to rival film’s visual capture of living gesture.
Paper Witnesses
Authors: James Alison 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
This chapter traces the emergence of a literature of testimony in the years following World War II. However, this new tendency does not immediately reshape the literary field, which was dominated in the 1950s and 1960s by the (mostly) anti-documentary approach of the nouveau roman. Later, however, the document becomes central to explorations of the national past. In Marguerite Duras’s La Douleur (1985) and Patrick Modiano’s Dora Bruder (1997/1999), the “found text” is a figure of the personal and cultural repressed, before becoming a site of simultaneous identification and separation. Written traces set in motion a quest for the past, while narrative reconstruction aims to restore immediacy to the personal archive (as in Duras’s war notebooks), or to point to intimate truths beyond the impersonality and violence of the bureaucratic record (as in the documents collected by Modiano). In the wake of these experiments and at the turn of the twenty-first century, French and Francophone works alike experiment with documentary or hybrid approaches to historical trauma—especially in cases where fictionalization is perceived to be ethically risky, such as the Rwandan genocide.
The Commonwealth of Custom in Thomas More’s Utopia
Authors: Elsky Stephanie 
Published: October 2020

Abstract
Thomas More sets the stage for fiction as a sphere in which to explore the constitutional promise of custom. This chapter argues that Utopia (1516) shares the same constitutional dispensation as England, since it is predominantly governed by custom rather than law. The chapter uncovers a remarkable similarity between the concept of legal custom in common law and of linguistic and cultural custom in the Renaissance humanist use of proverbs and commonplaces, which are ubiquitous in Utopia. I interpret this intersection of political and literary-linguistic custom as a means by which More ensures the commensurability of his native political institution with the classical tradition he sought to revive. The chapter reveals More’s awareness of the unstable boundaries of the concept of “common” in English law and continental humanism, a conundrum to which early modern writers would return over and again.