bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Street-Level Implementation in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire
Authors: Medie Peace A. 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This chapter draws on interviews with police officers in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire and gendarmes in Côte d’Ivoire to show how international and domestic factors changed how the rape and domestic violence laws were enforced. It demonstrates how the greater degree of institutionalization of the specialized unit led to a deeper salience of the international women’s justice norm in Liberia. However, in both countries, there were substantial deficiencies in how laws were enforced and how the norm was implemented. This chapter explains how a lack of resources for policing, combined with the social and economic pressures that survivors face, hindered law enforcement and norm implementation.
The Meaning of Property in Things
Authors: Wilson Bart J. 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
The central claim of the book is that property is a universal and uniquely human custom. Contra cultural relativists, every human society has property tools, utensils, and ornaments. Contra biologists, only Homo sapiens has property in things other than food, mates, and territories. Contra philosophers and legal scholars, the bedrock of property is custom, not rights. Contra social scientists and ordinary people, property is indeed a custom and not something that must be instituted by government. Property operates at the three levels. At the micro-level core of property is an organism that perceives the physical world through its body. The meso-level of property is the community within which the organism resides. At the macro-level of property are the institutions that unite strangers of different communities through the modern democratic concept of rights. Whereas the custom of property is ancient, moral, and universal to all people, property rights are modern, amoral, and majoritarian.
Primates Socially Transmit Tool Practices, but Humans Share Meaning-Laden Customs
Authors: Wilson Bart J. 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
The custom of property emerges out of the social practice of tool use in primates when symbolic thought is applied to it. Primates socially transmit tool practices, but humans share meaning-laden customs. The thingness of property as a custom comes from tools. Tool use is embodied knowledge, and property embodies the claim, “This is mine!” Humans socially transmit property with moral force. With symbolic thought, we can think about our actions, or others’, in the past and in the future, and we can evaluate them to be good or bad. We contemplate our conduct and our character in regards to the connections we make with things.
The Custom of Property Is Physically Contained
Authors: Wilson Bart J. 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
The class of words most likely to be overlooked in a title is the preposition. While this chapter briefly touches on of, as well as to and for, as examples of the mighty unsung and inversely proportional work that prepositions do in language, the focus in this chapter is on the cognitive contribution of the little word in. The chapter posits that an English language convention arose, and now has largely fallen out of use, for dealing with the formidable, yet beautiful, complexity of the meaning of property. The burden of the argument is to show that while this convention lasted for only 500 years, less than 1% of the time our modern species has roamed the planet, it provides an insight into how humans universally and uniquely cognize property. And the argument is this: Humans locate the meaning of property within a thing. Property is contained within the thing.
Disputes Explicate How We Cognize Property, Out of Which We Discover a Clear General Rule
Authors: Wilson Bart J. 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This chapter reconsiders several prominent court cases involving property to work through how the book’s theory can be used to think about property disputes. Such disputes explicate how people cognize property, out of which a clear rule emerges. The custom for created goods is first-in-hand, especially if the thing is someone’s creation, but also if the thing is in the common state placed by nature. The custom may evolve to first-to-work-upon if, as the property law scholar Robert Ellickson clearly explains, the costs are high. Firstness, however, doesn’t matter if location priorly matters. Out of this discussion emerges a testable implication of the theory. If someone has property in Y and X is in Y, that person has property in X in Y. The rule is that simple, and a difficult case indicates how to test the rule.
Water Security and Gender Inequality
Authors: Larson Rhett B. 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
The burden of water insecurity is often disproportionately borne by girls and young women. In many parts of the developing world, girls and young women spend hours every day in water-gathering work for their households, often under dangerous conditions and even more often in ways that effectively prevent them from pursuing an education or other employment. Additionally, cultural taboos surrounding menstruation and inadequate hygiene and sanitation facilities add to the burden of water insecurity borne by women. Advancing water security is one of the most important goals for improving gender equality. While water laws can aggravate gender inequality in the water, sanitation, and hygiene sector, human rights laws can also help address those challenges. Additionally, legal reforms to encourage greater stakeholder participation and broader access to landownership can further improve water security and the vital role women play in its advance.
Water Security and Technological Innovation
Authors: Larson Rhett B. 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
For many, the promise of technological innovation is a source of optimism in the pursuit of water security. Improved technologies allow us to use water more efficiently and conserve our water resources. But some of these technologies face legal obstacles, or else, in the case of smart appliances and meters, cultural opposition. Water augmentation technologies could conceivably increase our water supply, through desalination or cloud seeding. But these technologies have environmental costs and raise complex questions regarding water allocation and equity as wealthy countries and communities augment their water supplies through costly means. Additionally, water represents both our hope and greatest challenge for a future among the stars. This chapter discusses the role of water law in advancing technologies for water conservation, managing technologies for water augmentation, and imagining the future legal regimes associated with water rights on other planets.
Perception and Perceptual Belief
Authors: Audi Robert 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This chapter shows how perception is experiential, relational, and representational: in broad terms, a phenomenally representational, discriminative, non-deviant causal relation to an object. In seeing, we have visual experience; in visual experience that is perceptual and not merely sensory, as in hallucinations, some object is visually represented as having certain properties; and genuinely seeing an object entails that it exists. This view of perception is a version of realism. It is realistic about both the objects of perception and the phenomenal properties we instantiate in perceptual experience. The view leaves open, however, the ultimate ontological status of those objects and properties. The properties, however, must be understood to have a character that enables us both to experience what, phenomenologically, it is like to see and what, externally, the things seen are like physically.
Reasons, Perceptual Grounds, and Normative Explanation
Authors: Audi Robert 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
Reasons come in many forms. There are reasons to believe, for believing, for which one believes, and why one believes; and some are internal reasons we have, others external reasons we lack. This chapter clarifies how we have normative reasons for beliefs in virtue of certain experiential states that ground those reasons: these states, including sense-experiences and hedonic experiences, are the kinds that ground the rationality of beliefs or the desirability of acts. Normative reasons, practical as well as theoretical, are themselves grounded in certain experiential elements, including perceptions as a central kind. Normative reasons for belief are unified by their explanatory scope: they can explain propositional justification—roughly, justification that at least permits our properly believing propositions adequately supported by our experience. These normative explanations parallel causal explanations that hold between the experiential elements, such as perceptions, that ground the reasons and the doxastically justified beliefs that reflect those experiences.
Knowing, Reasoning, and Doing
Authors: Audi Robert 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This chapter draws on earlier ones in developing a critique of intellectualism, especially as applied to the philosophy of action. For intellectualism, theoretical knowledge is more basic than practical knowledge, and action, at least if performed for a good reason, must be knowledge-guided and not just guided by otherwise appropriate beliefs. Intellectualism is shown too strong on at least three counts. Knowing how is not reducible to knowing that; knowledge is not required for premises of practical reasoning; and (normative) reasons for action need not be factive, much less constituted by known propositions. These conclusions by no means imply that knowledge is not important for understanding action and practical reasoning, especially rational action and good practical reasoning. It is also true that intentional actions correspond to (possibly hypothetical) practical reasoning; but this point is shown to be very different from the intellectualist view that they are based on actual practical reasoning.
The Revolution in Freedoms of Press and Speech
Authors: Bird Wendell 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This book discusses the revolutionary broadening of concepts of freedoms of press and speech in Great Britain and in America during the quarter century before the First Amendment and Fox’s Libel Act. The conventional view of the history of freedoms of press and speech is that the common law since antiquity defined those freedoms narrowly. In that view, Sir William Blackstone in 1769, and Lord Chief Justice Mansfield in 1770, faithfully summarized that common law in giving very narrow definitions of those freedoms as mere liberty from prior restraint and not as liberty from punishment after printing or speaking (the political crimes of seditious libel and seditious speech). Today, that view continues to be held by neo-Blackstonians, and remains dominant or at least very influential among historians. Neo-Blackstonians claim that the Framers used freedom of press “in a Blackstonian sense to mean a guarantee against previous restraints” with no protection against “subsequent restraints” (punishment) of seditious expression. Neo-Blackstonians further claim that “[n]o other definition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in America before 1798” existed. This book, by contrast, concludes that a broad definition and understanding of freedoms of press and speech was the dominant context of the First Amendment and of Fox’s Libel Act. Its basis is hundreds of examples of a broad understanding of freedoms of press and speech, in both Britain and America, in the late eighteenth century. For example, a book published in London in 1760 by a Scottish lawyer, George Wallace, stated that it is tyranny “to restrain the freedom of speculative disquisitions,” and because “men have a right to think for themselves, and to publish their thoughts,” it is “monstrous … under the pretext of the authority of laws, which ought never to have been enacted … attempting to restrain the liberty of the press” (seditious libel law). This book also challenges the conventional view of Blackstone and the neo-Blackstonians. Blackstone and Mansfield did not find any definition in the common law, but instead selected the narrowest definition in popular essays from the prior seventy years. Blackstone misdescribed it as an accepted common law definition, which in fact did not exist, and a year later Mansfield inserted a similar definition into the common law for the first time. Both misdescribed that narrow definition and the unique rules for prosecuting sedition as ancient. They were leading a counter-revolution, cloaked as a summary of a narrow and ancient common law doctrine that was neither.
Introduction
Authors: Bird Wendell 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
The “father of the Bill of Rights,” James Madison, described the unqualified words protecting freedoms of speech and press as embodying a broad definition rather than a narrow definition of those liberties. Upon offering those provisions, he said that “freedom of the press and rights of conscience . . . are unguarded in the British constitution,” including the common law, and that “every government should be disarmed of powers which trench upon those particular rights.” In Madison’s draft and in the final First Amendment, each clause was worded to modify or to reject the English common law on point in order to provide for far greater protection of individual liberties; no clause was worded with the restrictions that the common law imposed. Was Madison right? Are freedoms of press and speech in the First Amendment broad or narrow protections?
A Court of Specialists
Authors: Hanretty Chris 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This book explains how judges on the UK Supreme Court behave. It looks at different stages in the court's decision-making process—from the initial selection of cases, to the choice of judges to sit on panels, to the final outcome. The main argument of the book is that judges' behavior is strongly affected by their specialism in different areas of law. Cases in tax law (or family law, or public law) are more likely to be heard by specialists in that area, and those specialists are more likely to write the court's decision—or disagree with the decision when there is dissent. Legal factors like specialization in areas of law explains more of the court's work than do political differences between judges.
Who Wins?
Authors: Hanretty Chris 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This chapter looks at whether appellants succeed before the Supreme Court. Around half of appellants succeed, and these rates of success vary by area of law and by the type of appellant. The strongest predictors of success, however, have to do with the route the case took to the court. Appellants are more likely to succeed if the Supreme Court itself granted permission to appeal (rather than having leave granted by the lower court), and if appellants were able to convince at least some judges in lower courts. Success is not wholly determined by what happens in lower courts, however: litigants who employ one additional senior lawyer are more likely to succeed.
To Recognize or Not?
Authors: King Elisabeth 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This introductory chapter presents the book’s driving questions, introduces the term “ethnic recognition,” explains the book’s focus on institutions in post-conflict contexts, and lays out the plan of the rest of the book. The book asks: Under what conditions do governments manage internal violent conflicts by formally recognizing different ethnic identities? Moreover, what are the implications for peace? This introduction reviews the book’s theoretical arguments in brief, motivating a focus on ethnic power configurations and especially leaders’ status as minority or non-minority group members as a key condition for both the adoption and effects of recognition. It introduces our mixed-methods approach, then reviews the key findings. Recognition is adopted about 40 percent of the time; it is much more likely when the leader is from the largest ethnic group, as opposed to an ethnic minority; and it generally promotes peace better than non-recognition under plurality leadership.
The Two-Degree Solution
Authors: Stein Michael D. , Galea Sandro 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This chapter highlights possible solutions to avoid global warming and its consequences for health. An energy policy firm, Energy Innovation, created a model on how current energy policies would impact future carbon emissions. Industry has the greatest potential for cutting back on global emissions through policies focused on more efficient energy production and stricter emissions standards. Power sector (electricity) emissions would decline with renewable energy incentives and improving the grid's capacity to accommodate multiple energy sources. Transportation sector emissions would drop with stricter fuel economy standards and more green urban transportation systems. The energy consumption of buildings could decrease with more efficient building codes and appliance standards. Meanwhile, carbon pricing is a cross-sector policy that would create carbon taxes and caps, while land use emissions could be reduced through policies aimed at reducing deforestation and forest degradation.
Pseudoscience and Abortion Policy
Authors: Stein Michael D. , Galea Sandro 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This chapter demonstrates how arguments against abortion are often based on pseudoscience. Twenty-nine states, home to 88 million women, have implemented at least two state-wide abortion restrictions not backed by scientific evidence. For example, Texas’s “A Woman’s Right to Know” booklet, offered to patients before having an abortion, uses deceptive language to lead readers to believe that abortion increases the risk of breast cancer. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists released a statement in 2009 concluding that there is “no association between induced abortion and breast cancer.” Meanwhile, Kentucky’s Senate Bill 5, passed in 2017, made it illegal to have an abortion after the twentieth week of pregnancy. The sponsor of the bill cited fetal pain as justification for the law, calling abortion after 20 weeks an “awful painful experience” for the fetus. However, a review of fetal pain evidence found that fetuses are unlikely to feel pain before the third trimester (around 29 weeks). Overall, Kansas, Texas, and South Dakota have the highest number of these types of pseudoscientific information policies in place.
Income Inequality and Our Health
Authors: Stein Michael D. , Galea Sandro 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This chapter discusses the effects of income inequality on the health of the public. Countries or regions where there are wide gaps in income tend to be characterized by weaker social ties and less investment in the social and physical resources that create health. Thus, countries with more income inequality are less likely to have healthy air, water, and food; safe places to work and play; and affordable quality housing—all of which are necessary for health. For these reasons, income inequality should be a core focus of public health. By discussing income inequality, people will start to see the truth of what the data are telling them: money—who has it and who does not—is at the heart of health in the society. Until people address this, they will continue to see health gaps between those at the top of the economic ladder and those at the bottom.
Maybe the End of HIV
Authors: Stein Michael D. , Galea Sandro 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This chapter focuses on HIV, which has been our most politically charged illness and a defining health challenge of our time. The world of HIV care over the last two decades has seen a great, almost miraculous, revolution. Today, a 35-year-old who was HIV-infected in 2018 and takes her daily medication adherently has the life expectancy of a 35-year-old without HIV infection. Monthly injections of long-acting HIV drugs look to be as good as daily pills at suppressing the virus, creating easier treatment. Despite these stunning advances, disparities in detection and care characterize the disease. The epidemic has shifted to groups that are hard to test, hard to get started on preventive care, and hard to keep on daily medication—persons who inject stimulants, men on the down-low, the mentally ill, the homeless, and the rural poor with no health insurance. Lack of information, lack of trust of providers, unfamiliarity with services, and refusals of testing and treatment due to social rejection and privacy concerns make the delivery of care more challenging for these groups. Even among persons enrolled in AIDS clinical trials who have found their way to cutting-edge medical treatment, blacks and Hispanics have poorer outcomes. As such, reaching an end to HIV will require new attention to health systems and social stigma, to geography, to housing and outreach, to the long work of public health.
Should Black Boxes Be Welcome in Medicine?
Authors: Stein Michael D. , Galea Sandro 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This chapter explores the use of “black boxes” in surgeries. When an airplane goes down, there is an urgent search for the plane’s black box. The black box contains both the audio recording of all cockpit discussion, as well as a recording of flight instrument readings. These two flight recorders are required by international regulation and together offer the best possibility of learning what happened in the minutes preceding any aviation accident or incident. A version of this kind of recording technology—which captures medical conversation and physiological parameters, allowing for postsurgery analysis—is starting to make its way into the world of medicine. However, this new technology raises important questions: Will surgeons and other health professionals be put in malpractice jeopardy by such new information? Will patients and their families become more likely to sue? Will more information undermine patient trust? Ultimately, medicine aspires to create a culture of continual improvement. As such, one can imagine black box technology entering medicine widely over the next years.
In Social Media We Trust
Authors: Stein Michael D. , Galea Sandro 
Published: April 2020

Abstract
This chapter discusses the possible impact of micro-targeting in social media for health. For example, a hypothetical social media platform called InstaTwitBook had an algorithm that could accurately judge that a user was suicidal from changes in the language she communicated online. Then that site’s administrators could send this at-risk person a gentle message suggesting that she is showing warning signs of depression, or maybe even nudge her toward help by sending advertisements about local mental health counseling. What if 3,500 persons could be reliably identified and sent such messages this year, and that one in 100 messages would lead to care-seeking, averting 35 suicides? Would this not be worthwhile? And it is not just InstaTwitBook that has the power of detection. Phone companies may be able to tell from someone’s voice if he or she is depressed and use that information to identify who may benefit from mental health help. However, there are challenges that arise from this approach—challenges like inevitable inaccuracy, false-positive results, and the sending of notifications to persons who are not suicidal. As such, more research on this approach is needed, which would require social media companies to be more open to third-party investigators using their data.