Passiivne süntees kultuurifenomenoloogias / Passive Synthesis in Cultural Phenomenology
Authors: Mion Regina-Nino 
Published: December 2024

Teesid: Oma artiklis soovin arutleda kultuurifenomenoloogia kui meetodi üle. Sel teemal on Tõnu Viik avaldanud mitmeid nii inglis- kui ka eestikeelseid artikleid. Ma leian, et Viigi arendatud kultuurifenomenoloogia on liialt Husserli staatilise fenomenoloogia raamistikus – otsides invariantseid, eideetilisi struktuure (noeem–noees). Oma hilisemas filosoofias arendab Husserl aga geneetilist fenomenoloogiat. Kui uurida tähendusloome protsesse, siis peaks kindlasti vaatama Husserli geneetilist fenomenoloogiat ja tema aktiivse ja passiivse sünteesi ideed. Ma soovin näidata, et just kogemuse passiivne tasand aitab seletada mõningate kultuuriobjektide kogemist, samuti kultuurikriiside tekkeid ja nendest väljatulekuid.

The aim of the article is to contribute to the study of the methodology of cultural phenomenology based on Edmund Husserl’s philosophy. More specifically, it aims to develop further, but also criticise, Tõnu Viik’s understanding of the meaning-formation in Husserl’s phenomenology. I find that the cultural phenomenology developed by Viik is too constrained in the framework of Husserl’s static phenomenology, describing the invariant, eidetic structure of consciousness. Husserl later developed genetic phenomenology that, in my view, is better suited to examine the processes of meaning-formation. This is why the concepts of passive and active synthesis in genetic phenomenology become important.
According to Husserl’s distinction between passive and active synthesis (or genesis) presented in the Cartesian Meditations, passive synthesis is the lowest level of our experience. However, active synthesis, as a higher form, necessarily presupposes the passive synthesis in which the objects are already given. In active genesis, the Ego functions through specific Ego-acts that are productively constitutive. On the basis of already given objects (in passive synthesis), active synthesis can constitute new objects originally. As Anthony Steinbock emphasises, it is important to see that already passive synthesis functions to form intelligible, meaningful wholes out of diverse manifolds. Thus, passive synthesis is an important part of meaning-formation.
In Experience and Judgment, Husserl divides passive synthesis into primary or original passivity (ursprüngliche Passivität) and secondary passivity (sekundäre Passivität). The former is a mere act of receiving the sense originally preconstituted in passivity and involves the structures of association and affection. Secondary passivity involves, for instance, habituality and traditions or sedimentations. In my article, I would like to show that the concept of primary passivity can be used to explain our strong emotional responses to certain cultural objects and that the concept of secondary passivity can be useful in understanding the emergence of cultural crises and the ways to overcome them.
Simon Høffding and Tone Roald argue in their article ‘Passivity in Aesthetic Experience’ (2019) that Husserl’s concepts of passive synthesis and passivity are helpful in explaining intense aesthetic experience, that is, the experience of being moved or carried away, or the putative experiences of subject–object fusion. Harri Mäcklin follows Høffding and Roald’s approach in his article “Ingarden, Dufrenne, and the Passivity of Aesthetic Experience” (2021) and summarises ‘passive synthesis’ in the following way: it is a peculiar experience of which I have a sense of ownership (a sense of being the one who experiences the results of those acts), but no sense of agency (a sense of being the instigator of those acts). In my article, I take this description of passive synthesis to correspond to Husserl’s primary passivity and suggest that it is not limited to aesthetic experience. Some ordinary everyday life objects that we own, such as a cup of coffee, can evoke strong affective responses in us, so much so that we might even be reluctant to let someone else touch them. These experiences could be explained by the concept of primary passivity.
Many of Husserl’s texts suggest that cultural crises are instigated by the upsurge of passive tendencies (containment, impotence and servitude). To overcome crises, we need renewal (Erneuerung) which can only be achieved through activity. As Husserl argues in the so-called Kaizo-articles, passive tendencies obstruct reflection and self-evaluation, that is, truly authentic human life. Authenticity consists in the sovereignty of the rational, active self over the passive self. However, as many Husserl scholars have shown, passivity can also play an important role in overcoming cultural crises. Victor Biceaga shows that there is no clear-cut divide between passivity and activity in Husserl’s philosophy. Moreover, passive sedimentations (secondary passivity) are necessary for the conservation of actively thought. Thus, passivity not only causes cultural crises, but also contributes to the accomplishment of the renewals.
This article highlights the importance of distinguishing between passive and active synthesis to emphasise that passivity plays an important role in meaning-formation. A further step would be to examine whether primary and secondary passivity are culture-defined, culturally dependent. For example, is the strongly emotional experience of works of art specific to certain cultures? Or, do cultural crises manifest differently in cultures that do not consider rationality (Rationalität) and free will to be the ‘highest’ form of life?