bluuebunny/crossref_metadata_2025_split huggingface dataset:
Your DNA Reveals Medical and Health Surprises
Authors: McHughen Alan 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Why are so many people getting their DNA tested? Apart from the science nerds who are always up for such activities, there are two main reasons: health and genealogy. And for each of these there are subgroups. Traditional genealogists hit the proverbial “brick wall” and seek some means to break through, while some adoptees, desperate to find biological family, seem willing to try almost anything. On the other hand, those seeking medical information may have a family history of some frightening health condition, or—due to missing family histories—are in the dark about potential medical issues and want to find out. This chapter first explores personal genomics: the medical and health information held in your DNA base sequence, how to interpret that information, and what may be next on the horizon. What does all this data mean? Can it answer questions such as “Am I carrying around a ticking cancer bomb in my DNA, waiting for me to smoke one more cigarette, or eat one more hot dog before it activates a malignant tumor?”
Genetic Genealogy
Authors: McHughen Alan 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
We discussed genealogy DNA tests in Chapter 8. Here we focus on some practical matters to aid your engagement with genetic genealogy. We’ll survey which company you might choose for conducting your DNA test(s), explain how to interpret your results, and answer some common questions posed by genetic genealogy beginners (and even by some more advanced practitioners, too). Before seeking a company, identify what you hope to achieve. Different companies offer different types of tests, which reveal different genetic features and answer different questions, so knowing what you want to get from a DNA test will then allow you to choose from a list of companies offering that feature. Once you have a short list of suitable companies, you can choose based on practical criteria—price, convenience, appeal of website and presentation of data, privacy policy, and other factors. When you receive the results, you may want some help in interpreting the data and in identifying “matches,” your close and distant DNA relatives. We’ll also discuss a recommended free site, Gedmatch, and offer help for adoptees and others lacking known biological connections. In the latter half of the chapter we’ll explain some of the arcane terminology and address some common misconceptions encountered in the genetic genealogy community.
The Stepping-Stone to Truth
Authors: Nicolaides Demetris 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
In his search for the primary substance of matter, Anaximenes returned to the tangible world and chose air. And he explained the manifold of natural phenomena quantitatively, in terms of condensation and rarefaction of air (of one material of unchangeable nature). With these opposite processes in mind, it was no longer necessary to ascribe all sorts of different properties to each object—such as rigidity, softness, hotness, coldness—just how dense it was. This idea in itself has a certain truth. But from a grander point of view as regards the evolution of science, his theory was the stepping-stone to one of the most consequential truths of nature, the atom! Atomism, however, required first the development of all other great ideas conceived thereafter, including mathematics. The significance of mathematics as a practical method to describe nature had been realized first by the great Pythagoras because of his passion for numbers.
It’s Fate—Maybe
Authors: Nicolaides Demetris 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Since everything is made of atoms, then the behavior of all living things must be dictated by the laws these atoms obey, the laws of nature, Democritus thought. In fact, no biological system hitherto has violated this general realization. Schrödinger’s book What Is Life? alludes to that by contemplating the physics of living cells and of life. Of course, nowadays the specialized fields of biochemistry and biophysics have been constantly verifying this idea. Does such a realization, however, mean that the laws of nature have an influence on human free will? That is, when one decides to eat pizza instead of Chinese food, has one really decided what to eat, or has “one’s decision” been predetermined by the laws of nature? Generally, do humans have free will or not? Regardless of how history gets written (deterministically, via chance, via free will, or some combination), it is time that “we” consider it.
Introduction
Authors: McDonough Jeffrey K. 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
The core idea of teleology is intuitive enough: some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things. Cats have claws for the sake of grasping their prey. Birds have wings for the sake of escaping predators. Cats stalk birds in order to catch them. Birds fly away in order to escape cats. This introduction first highlights various philosophical questions that arise as we dig deeper into the concept of teleology. Is teleology intrinsic or extrinsic? Does it involve intentionality? What is its scope? Is it explanatory? The chapter then provides brief overviews of how these and other questions are taken up by the volume’s authors as they trace the development of the concept of teleology through the ages in a wide variety of traditions and contexts.
Teleology in the Later Middle Ages
Authors: McDonough Jeffrey K. 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Teleological explanation is one of the legacies of antiquity that received a surprisingly muted response in the Middle Ages. Aristotle’s naturalized approach to teleology met with little enthusiasm, and grave doubts arose in the later Middle Ages over whether final causes are a legitimate kind of cause at all. This was a natural reaction to the distinctive feature of medieval teleology, which is that teleological causes are universal, intelligent, particular, forward-looking, intentional, and (in nonrational cases) extrinsic. When teleology is so understood, its explanatory role becomes limited to certain special cases. Indeed, the one place where reflection on ends plays a truly robust role in later medieval philosophy is in ethics. Even here, however, the consensus of antiquity—that human beings are and ought to be ultimately motivated by their own happiness—meets with growing resistance and eventually outright rejection.
Not Dead Yet
Authors: McDonough Jeffrey K. 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
It is often maintained that teleology was undermined in the early modern era by the scientific revolution. Hoping to correct this misperception, this essay looks at three areas in which teleology was upheld and developed by three pioneers of early modern science. The first main section argues that teleological reasoning is woven into the very fabric of William Harvey’s revolutionary work in biology. The second main section takes up Robert Boyle’s explicit and systematic defense of teleology and especially his effort to reconcile the methods and views of the new science with a deep-seated commitment to divine teleology. Finally, the last main section explores Pierre Maupertuis’s bold attempt to find a place for teleology in the heart of modern, mathematical physics.
“The Revised Method of Physico-Theology”
Authors: McDonough Jeffrey K. 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
For Immanuel Kant, teleology was a philosophical method as well as a central topic for philosophy. As a philosophical method, teleology meant that no way of thinking that is natural for us can be in vain, as long as we understand it properly: this was the basis for Kant’s critique of traditional theoretical metaphysics but reconstruction of the central ideas of metaphysics on practical grounds. As a philosophical topic, Kant thought about teleology from his early book The Only Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763) until his late Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790), eventually arriving at the position that a teleological outlook is a subjectively necessary regulative principle for our scientific inquiry into organic nature but also an indispensable part of our self-understanding as moral agents in the natural world.
The Parental Brain
Authors: Numan Michael 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
The Parental Brain: Mechanisms, Development, and Evolution takes a three-pronged approach to the parental brain. The first part of the book deals with neural mechanisms. Subcortical circuits are crucially involved in parental behavior, and, for most mammals, the physiological events of pregnancy and parturition prime these circuits so that they become responsive to infant stimuli, allowing for the onset of maternal behavior at parturition. However, since paternal behavior and alloparental behavior occur in some mammalian species, alternate mechanisms are shown to exist that regulate the access of infant stimuli to these circuits. In humans, cortical circuits interact with subcortical circuits so that parental feeling states (emotions) and cognitions can be translated into parental behavior. The section on development emphasizes the experiential basis of the intergenerational continuity of normal and abnormal maternal behavior in animals and humans: The way a mother treats her infant affects the development of the infant’s brain and subsequent maternal behavior. Genetic factors, including epigenetic processes and gene by environment (G × E) interactions, are also involved. The chapter on evolution presents evidence that the parental brain most likely provided the foundation or template for other strong prosocial bonds. In particular, cortical and subcortical parental brain circuits have probably been utilized by natural selection to promote the evolution of the hyper-cooperation and hyper-prosociality that exist in human social groups. A unique aspect of this book is its integration of animal and human research to create a complete understanding of the parental brain.
Just Wide Enough
Authors: Boettcher James 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
This chapter proposes to widen Rawls’s idea of public reason in order to respond to a dilemma originally developed by David Reidy in his article “Rawls’s Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough” (2000). The dilemma is that public reason is either indeterminate or inconsistent with the animating values of political liberalism, including the value of political autonomy. Reidy’s article identifies two different ways in which public reason might turn out to be indeterminate, one arising when there are too few public reasons in support of some law or policy and the other when there are too many. The latter problem is not as serious as Reidy supposes, at least with respect to several conceptions of justice that might provide the content of public reason. The problem of there being too few reasons suggests that the idea of public reason should include a more expansive set of politically relevant justifying reasons than is otherwise suggested by Rawls’s theory. The chapter proposes a principle for widening public reason and maintains that such a principle is consistent with political autonomy.
The “Focusing Illusion” of Rawlsian Ideal Theory
Authors: Farrelly Colin 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
In A Theory of Justice John Rawls constructed and defended an abstract account of distributive justice founded upon hypothetical theoretical devices like the original position and veil of ignorance, the principle of maximin, and conceptual analyses of equality of opportunities. Such a methodology places a premium on abstract hypotheticals (vs. the actual history of injustice), and idealizations that involve making claims that are actually false, in order to simplify an argument. This chapter critically examines the idealizations employed by Rawls’s original theory of justice. It argues that Rawlsian ideal theory is inherently flawed because Rawls’s idealizations make our normative theorizing prone to the valuation distortions that arise in what psychologists call a “focusing illusion.”
Sen’s Capability Critique
Authors: Lowry Christopher 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
Amartya Sen’s capability critique identified a problem with Rawls’s use of primary goods as his metric of advantage (that is, his way to measure inequality). Sen offered the notion of capability as a solution that would improve the ability of justice as fairness to acknowledge unfair inequalities related to disability, among other things. This chapter aims, first, to provide a more precise and conciliatory understanding of the disagreement between Rawls and Sen (by attending to Rawls’s remarks about the value of liberties); second, to spell out the deeper theoretical implications of Sen’s critique by tracing the connections between the elements Sen modifies and other more fundamental elements in justice as fairness (such as liberal neutrality); third, to identify problems raised by those implications; and fourth, to provide a solution by developing a further modification to Rawlsian theory (namely, public value perfectionism).
The Dependency Critique of Rawlsian Equality
Authors: Kittay Eva Feder 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
In this chapter, the author revisits her dependency critique of John Rawls’s political theory. She argues that, in conceiving justice in terms of voluntary associations between equals, Rawls neglects the reality of human dependence and interdependence. She argues that there are five areas where Rawls’ conception of equality is inadequate for addressing dependency. First, Rawls mistakenly accepts Hume’s circumstances of justice. Second, Rawls mistakenly accepts the assumption that citizens are all “fully cooperating” members of society. Third, the theory of justice mistakenly presumes that people are free in the sense that they are a “self-originating” source of valid claims. Fourth, the chapter argues that Rawls’s list of primary goods is not adequate for meeting the needs of those giving and receiving care. Fifth, Rawls begins with a concept of social cooperation that presumes equality between those who cooperate. The chapter argues that with each of these assumptions, important concerns about dependency are omitted.
Purely Formal Wrongs
Authors: Murphy Liam 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter cautions against the moral grounding of private rights and duties and, in turn, private law's response to wrongs. The argument is framed as a rebuke to those who suppose that private law must be interpreted from an internal, rather than instrumental, point of view. According to this chapter, interpretive theorists assume that the deontic structure of private law implies deontological moral grounding. But it argues that there is no good reason to think this, and, indeed, there are plenty of reasons to think otherwise. Private law may be formally deontic but nevertheless have instrumental moral justification. The interesting and difficult question is what to make, normatively, of the deontic structure of private law. Against the view that civil wrongs are moral wrongs, this chapter asserts that they are purely formal.
What Do We Remedy?
Authors: Cornell Nicolas 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter examines the nature of civil wrongs from the perspective of the law of remedies, querying the supposition that remedies are exclusively responsive to primary rights violations and, in turn, the related supposition that a civil wrong is nothing more the violation of a primary right and correlative duty. Here, remedies correct for wrongs, but it is essential to recognize that the nature of a wrong—and, in turn, the selection of an apt or responsive remedy—is not driven exclusively by the nature of the right that was violated by the wrongdoer. This chapter’s analysis is framed as a critique of corrective justice theorists’ assertion of tight conceptual and normative connections between primary rights and duties on the one hand and remedies on the other. It argues that remedies are partly responsive to rights violations, and thus the ex ante positioning of the parties as a matter of right. But an expectation of responsiveness underdetermines choices between different kinds of remedies and those bearing on the quantum of relief to be afforded to a successful plaintiff.
Torts Against the State
Authors: Miller Paul B. , Pojanowski Jeffrey A. 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter argues that the dominant “interpersonal accountability model of tort law” must be significantly amended to accommodate tort law’s protection of the interests of artificial persons. The chapter focuses on protection of state interests, in particular. It begins with a critical exposition of the interpersonal accountability model, highlighting the extent to which leading tort theorists share the assumption that torts are wrongs that are suffered by natural persons alone. Next, the chapter shows that and how the interpersonal accountability model neglects torts against the state, and offers a schema for categorizing these torts. The chapter concludes by tracing the implications of arguments developed in it. Among other things, it notes that understanding that tort law includes torts against the state calls into question the tendency to gloss torts as “private wrongs” and supports the practice of treating them as “civil wrongs.”
Is Tort Law “Private”?
Authors: Keating Gregory C. 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter contends that modern tort law is not “private law” in the distinctive way in which that term is now used. Theorists of tort as “private law” tend to regard its domain as one-off collisions among individual persons as they pursue their particular purposes, each in his or her individual, idiosyncratic, and voluntary way. Modern tort law, however, emerged in response to the rise of accidental harm as a pressing social problem. This chapter argues that refocusing on accidental harm as a basic feature of an industrial civilization prompted tort law to undergo a significant but underappreciated transformation in which harm is as salient as wrong and conceptions of collective responsibility compete with individual responsibility for control of the field. Trenchantly challenging the most basic commitments of the Kantian conception of tort law championed by Ernest Weinrib and Arthur Ripstein, this chapter maintains that there is nothing fundamentally private about tort law.
Should Tort Law Demand the Impossible?
Authors: Slavny Adam 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter critically examines the moral justification of two settled features of tort law—the objective standard of care and strict liability—insofar as they appear to violate the putative moral stricture “ought-implies-can.” The proposition that duties must be possible of fulfillment (and likewise, compliance with applicable normative reasons) has a pedigree stretching back to Immanuel Kant and is still widely assumed. Thus, this chapter begins by defending this foundational proposition on the grounds that normative reasons must be able to guide conduct. It notes that reasons that fail to comply with ought-implies-can are incapable of guiding conduct. This chapter then confronts arguments on behalf of the objective standard of care in negligence and strict liability, respectively, that purport to show that both doctrines sometimes justifiably violate ought-implies-can.
Owning Bad
Authors: Fennell Lee Anne 
Published: July 2020

AbstractThis chapter examines whether and how malign motives can convert the otherwise innocent exercise of a property right into a civil wrong. As a doctrinal matter, courts have been willing to grant that motives do indeed matter in certain cases. Tracking a distinction drawn within the theory of rights proper between specificationism and generalism, this chapter imagines two ways of making sense of this phenomenon: one might liken property rights to a lattice wherein they are defined permanently at the outset to exclude badly motivated conduct, or one might instead analogize them to a blanket in which holes can be cut around badly motivated acts piecemeal. The chapter opts for the second conceptualization because it meshes better with property’s in rem aspect—they “cover” all cases, one might say—and the organic way property rights evolve. Motives rarely alter property rights, but by factoring in the owner’s incivility as well as victims’ interests and broader social interests, exceptional cases come into focus that illuminate the structure of property rights.
Imagining the Future
Authors: Rocca Della 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
In this chapter the authors develop conclusions by revisiting families from earlier chapters to demonstrate what differences their conceptions of the future made to their parenting in the here and now. It is observed that the genres of practice—embrace, balance, resist—illuminate the generational stories that parents tell, looking back to their childhoods and forward to particular visions of an often-digital future. Whether parents embrace, balance, or resist technology, it is through these practices, and the values that parents invest in them, that parents shape their family’s present and their children’s future. Given that families’ lives are, further, characterized by risk and inequality, the results vary considerably as future uncertainties compound parental anxieties. Not only may parents’ fascination with or resistance to the digital turn out to be misplaced, but digital technologies add further complexities and compound parents’ uncertainties. Having listened to parents and sought to recognize their concerns, the authors end with recommendations for action for the organizations tasked with addressing and improving families’ lives and their futures, digital or otherwise.
Model Thinking and Formal Modeling to Improve Our Mental Models in Population Health Research
Authors: Lemke Michael K. 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
When encountering complex systems, the human mind applies various heuristics, and from these heuristics, mental models—how people understand phenomena in the real world—emerge, which shape their decisions. Unfortunately, the same limitations that confound heuristics similarly cloud people’s mental models and result in fundamental misunderstandings and lead to flawed decisions. The development of models, through the act of modeling, provide means to mitigate inherent shortcomings in people’s cognitive abilities and mental models and can stimulate new ways of understanding and acting in population health, grounded in model thinking. For the study of complex systems in particular, computational simulation modeling approaches enable novel scientific inquiry and facilitate decision-making. Engagement in modeling can also overcome the difficulties in learning imposed by complex systems, leading to transformed mental models and the proliferation of model thinking in population health research and action.
Mathematical Modeling in Population Health Research
Authors: Hicklin Karen , Hassmiller Lich Kristen 
Published: July 2020

Abstract
There is a long history of using mathematical modeling to study and improve aspects of population health. This chapter provides a brief overview of the diversity of such applications to complex health-related outcomes, including biological modeling (highlighting applications in infectious disease and human physiology), statistical modeling, cost-effectiveness analysis, and operations research (highlighting applications in queueing systems, Bayesian decision-making, and constrained optimization). Motivating objectives, typical model structure, and analyses are briefly described for each. As computational power has increased, computer simulation is often used to model complex phenomena. This chapter reminds readers of the many examples in which mathematical equations are used to parsimoniously represent complex systems and to understand their behavior. When mathematical models are tractable, analysts can obtain closed-form equations characterizing steady-state system behavior and tipping conditions—which provide a powerful and often easy to use tool for decision makers.